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visibility | detection | control Protecting Smart Buildings The next frontier of critical infrastructure security Suzanne Rijnbergen - MBA

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Page 1: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

visibility | detection | control

Protecting Smart Buildings

The next frontier of critical infrastructure security

Suzanne Rijnbergen - MBA

Page 2: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

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Who am I?

Global Director Professional Services @SecurityMatters (ForeScout)

> 13y experience in cybersecurity

* Fox-IT

* Netherlands Forensics Institute

* TNO

* KPN

Passion for technology

* Privacy

* Intelligence

* MBA

Page 3: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

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Building Automation Systems - how (in)secure are we?

* Introduction to (Building Automation) Security

* Threat landscape: Risks to Building Automation Systems

* First hand experience

* What to do now? How to reduce security risks?

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About cybersecurity

Cybersecurity is to be prevented from the danger or damage caused by disruption of ICT or misuse of ICT. The risk of damage due to misuse, disruption or interruptions may consist of the limitation of the availability and reliability of ICT, the violation of the integrity of ICT information and the damage to the integrity of that information.

It is about• Availability• Reliability• Integrity

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Page 7: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

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Buildings yesterday

This project has been partially funded by the EU under the third SBIR Cyber Security Tender

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Buildings now

Page 9: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

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Buildings tomorrow

Page 11: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

visibility | detection | control

Threat Landscape

Page 12: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

12

What’s on the news today?

November 8, 2016 14:20

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Why should we worry?

60% of buildings have systems that are 20

years old

More connection = more vulnerabilities Airports

No encryption Default open ports Data centers

No authentication Default passwords Hospital & Public spaces

Legacy Systems Connectivity Critical Buildings

Page 14: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

14

Why should we worry?

60% of buildings have systems that are 20

years old

More connection = more vulnerabilities Airports

No encryption Default open ports Data centers

No authentication Default passwords Hospital & Public spaces

Legacy Systems Connectivity Critical Buildings

Page 15: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

15

Why the fuss?

60% of buildings have systems that are 20

years old

More connection = more vulnerabilities Airports

No encryption Default open ports Data centers

No authentication Default passwords Hospital & Public spaces

Legacy Systems Connectivity Critical Buildings

Page 16: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

16

Why the fuss?

Vulnerabilities are on the rise

2012

2013

2015

2016

2017

2018

0 8 15 23 30

and counting ….

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Real-life examples

2012: Target Hack2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria2017: >70% of all CCTV in Washington DC hacked2018: Cameras in gymschool Brabant hacked2018: AIVD hacked ‘CozyBear’ through CCTV systems

Page 18: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

visibility | detection | control

First-hand experience: a cyber security exercise

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Take a small team of security students.

Let them play for a few days

How many 0-days will they find??

Give them a few controllers and software used in Smart Buildings

BMS PLCs

1

2

4

5

Select devices from top vendors and with realistic distribution of firmware versions3

Exercise setup

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10

XSS Path traversal

Arbitrary file

deletion

Buffer overflow

Hardcoded keys

Authentication

bypass

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How many devices with those 0-days are publicly reachable?

22902

9103

Total devices publicly reachable (same models as those in our experiment)

Infographic obtained by: aggregating data from Shodan and Censys

22902

39,3 %

Devices publicly reachable vulnerable to the 0-days

9103

Page 22: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

visibility | detection | control

WHAT IS THE DANGER BEHIND EXPOSED DEVICES?

Page 23: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

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Building Automation Networks

Surveillance System

Management

Access Control / HVAC

Internet

Physical Building

IP Camera Building Management System

Access Control PLC

HVAC PLC

Thermometer

Fan

Door lock

Badge reader

IP Camera

IP Camera Windows Workstation

Storage Servers

contractors

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Gain Access

Surveillance System

Management

Access Control / HVAC

Internet

Physical Building

IP Camera Building Management System

Access Control PLC

HVAC PLC

Thermometer

Fan

Door lock

Badge reader

IP Camera

IP Camera Windows Workstation

Storage Servers

contractors

vpn

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Lateral Movements

Surveillance System

Management

Access Control / HVAC

Internet

Physical Building

IP Camera Building Management System

Access Control PLC

HVAC PLC

Thermometer

Fan

Door lock

Badge reader

IP Camera

IP Camera Windows Workstation

Storage Servers

contractors

vpn

Page 26: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

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Lateral Movements

Surveillance System

Management

Access Control / HVAC

Internet

Physical Building

IP Camera Building Management System

Access Control PLC

HVAC PLC

Thermometer

Fan

Door lock

Badge reader

IP Camera

IP Camera Windows Workstation

Storage Servers

contractors

vpn

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Attack consequences: Surveillance Systems

Turning off cameras to cover malicious physical actions

Delete recordings that could serve as evidence

Using cameras as botnet (Mirai)

THAT’S NOT IMPOSSIBLE

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Attack consequences: Access Control

Add/remove user credentials

Allow access to restricted areas to unauthorized users

Deny access to critical areas to authorized users

WHO LEFT THE DOOR OPENED?

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Attack consequences: HVAC

Change the settings for the temperature

Increase temperature to damage medical labs ..

.. or cause data centers to go offline

POWER BELONGS TO THOSE WHO TAKE IT (OFF).

Page 30: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

visibility | detection | control

How to reduce security risks?

Page 31: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

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A security strategy for Smart Buildings

Threat Intelligence Consumption

Threat and Environment Manipulation Incident Response

Asset Identification & Network Monitoring

Active Cyber Defense Cycle

Page 32: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

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A security strategy for Smart Buildings

Asset Identification & Network Monitoring

Active Cyber Defense Cycle

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A security strategy for Smart Buildings

Asset Identification & Network Monitoring

Active Cyber Defense Cycle ASSET

INVENTORY

NETWORK

MONITORING

ANOMALY

DETECTION

THREAT

DETECTION

raw network traffic actionable information

gain visibility know your devices

new hosts and links

indicator of compromise

Page 34: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

visibility | detection | control

Real-world examples

Page 35: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

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Setup

Headquarter of a financial institute

About 500 devices in the Building Automation Network

Monitored systems include HVAC, Surveillance and Access Control

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Lessons learned: network monitoring

Unwanted SMB traffic in the network

Identification of maintenance operations not adhering to policies (e.g. supplier connecting own laptop to network)

Unwanted communication links between IT and OT networks (firewall misconfiguration)

ASSET

INVENTORY

NETWORK

MONITORING

ANOMALY

DETECTION

THREAT

HUNTING

gain visibilityknow your

devices

new hosts and

links

indicator of

compromise

Page 37: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

37

Lessons learned: asset inventory

Automatic inventory of network assets and their status

Identified hundreds of BACnet devices with only outbound communication flows

Identified multiple vulnerable hosts and controllers with outdated firmware

ASSET

INVENTORY

NETWORK

MONITORING

ANOMALY

DETECTION

THREAT

HUNTING

gain visibility know your devices

new hosts and

links

indicator of

compromise

Page 38: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

38

Lessons learned: anomaly detection

Detect unusual traffic direction (inbound traffic to IP Cameras)

Detect IP-cameras using HD recording (high bandwidth consumption)

Identify out-of-range values for critical variables

ASSET

INVENTORY

NETWORK

MONITORING

Anomaly

Detection

THREAT

HUNTING

gain visibilityknow your

devices

new hosts and links

indicator of

compromise

Page 39: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

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Lessons learned: threat hunting

Detect changes to the logic of controllers

Detected usage of UpnP

Detected weak passwords to access IP-cameras

ASSET

INVENTORY

NETWORK

MONITORING

Anomaly

Detection

THREAT

HUNTING

gain visibilityknow your

devices

new hosts and

links

indicator of compromise

Page 40: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

visibility | detection | control

Wrapping up

Page 41: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

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Key takeaways

Smart building rely on legacy systems See what your network devices are doing Catch known and unknown threats

Cyber risks for smart buildings are on the rise

Assess risks, threats and vulnerabilities Pinpoint weak spots and current

inefficiencies

Building automation networks are

vulnerable

Understand the current resilience state of

your network

Gather all evidence required for incident

response

Landscape Visibility Detection

Page 42: Protecting Smart Buildings - Fhi2012: Target Hack 2013: Google Wharf Australia hacked 2016: Lappeenranta DDOS attack 2016-2017: 4x hack on Seehotel Austria 2017: >70% of all CCTV in

Q & A

Stay in touch with our team!

visibility | detection | control

[email protected]

@sec_matters

company/securitymatters