prospects of the normalization process in the southern philippines:
TRANSCRIPT
Prospects of the normalization process in the Southern Philippines:
An architecture of uncertainty?
Australian National UniversityBy Georgi S. Engelbrecht
September 3rd, 2016
Last week in the Philippines:
• In Marawi City, Lanao del Sur:„ISIS-inspired“ armed group (Maute Brothers) breaks out of jail
• In Manila: Department of Justice filed criminal charges of assault and murder against MILF BIAF commanders (Mamasapano incident)
• Sulu/Basilan: Continuous law-enforcement operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group
• In Davao: Meeting of the GPH-MILF implementation teams/panels
Appraisal of the ground level• Vertical armed violence in the Bangsamoro areas on thedecline, yet situation not devoid of violent incidents (3ceasefire incidents 2016 between GPH and MILF andregular GPH‐BIFF/ASG clashes in the context of lawenforcement ops)
• Protracted horizontal conflict with varying intensity, scopeand situational trends (relative decline of high‐intensityclan feuds, emergence/transformation of new violentactors)
Localized pockets of violence embedded in atransitional system with sectors of human insecurity
The promise of Normalization
“The aim of normalization is to ensure human security in the Bangsamoro. Normalization helps build a society that is committed to basic human rights, whereby individuals are free from fear of violence or crime and where long‐held traditions and values continue to be honoured (FAB, 2012).”
Bringing the peace dividend to the existing flash point areas where conflict still occurs on regular basis
President Duterte: “No BangsamoroArmy/Police.”
Adviser on Peace Process Dureza: “Massive development packages.”
Security Aspects of the GPH‐MILF Normalization Process
• Normalization vs. Standard DDR• Interdependency of measures: MILF decommissioning relative to government actions
• Complicated umbrella architecture (JNC, JPSC, JPST) ‐ currently on hold
• Practical aspect of thousands of armed men (AFP, BIAF and others) on the ground “Insecurity Trap” through continuous supply of means and actors of violence
Uncertainties of the process
1.Normalization without BBL and decommissioning?
‐Ongoing socio‐economic interventions without a reduction in the number armed forces (cosmetic/symbolic measures)‐Synergies between the Enabling Law (Federalism?) and the sequencing of decommissioning?‐Hanging post‐conflict security framework in Bangsamoro areas perpetuating the “insecurity trap”
2. Changes in the landscape of armed groups in Bangsamoro areas
‐Implications of MILF‐MNLF convergence to the ground levelInternational Crisis Group recommendation: Amnesty and Demobilisation package to MNLF?
‐No recipe to tackle the security challenges from BIFF, Maute Group and ASG except for law enforcement
Impact on vertical conflict? The hidden challenge of thenormalization process
DecommissioningLess high‐powered
firearms and formal combatants of the BIAF‐MILF(supply‐side)
Only the beginning of human security efforts
Other Normalization measuresReducing incentives for
return to violence through confidence‐building and socio‐economic aspects of MILF and potentially other groups (demand‐side)
Need for consistent and genuine implementation
Impact on local political economies?
Critical Factors and Recommendations1) Management of a political issue2) Policy Coherence3) Avoiding security dilemmas and power vacuums 4) Issue of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)5) Community‐centered approach and “local” normalization• Decommissioning, what for? Primacy of status quo in the short‐to‐medium‐term? Renegotiating the terms?
Thank you very much/Salamat po. Questions?
Contact Information
Georgi S. Engelbrecht:+639178179395
Skype: georgij.engelbrecht