prospects for nuclear power in the middle east: russia’s interests

7/25/2019 Prospects for Nuclear Power in the Middle East: Russias Interests

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PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR

POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

RUSSIAS INTERESTS

Valdai Discussion Club

Grantees Report


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RG:

Sameh Aboul-Enein, Adjunct Professor,

American University in Cairo, Egypt.

Tayseer Al-Khunaizi, Chairman, Al-Andalus

Group for Economic and Management Con-sultancy, Dammam, Saudi Arabia.

Valeriya Chekina, Research Associate, Center

for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS),

Moscow, Russia.

Serdar Erdurmaz, Director, WMD and Disar-

mament Institute, Turkish Centre for Inter-

national Relations and Strategic Analysis

(TURKSAM), Ankara, Turkey.

Ayman Khalil, Director, Arab Institute for

Security Studies (ACSIS), Amman, Jordan.

Anton Khlopkov, Director, Center for Ener-

gy and Security Studies (CENESS), Moscow,

Russia.

Dmitry Konukhov, Research Associate, Cen-

ter for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS),

Moscow, Russia.

Editor-in-Chief of the report;

Chair of the Research Group:

Anton Khlopkov, Director, Center for Ener-

gy and Security Studies (CENESS), Moscow,

Russia.

This report has been prepared as part of the

Research Grants Program of the Foundation

for Development and Support of the Valdai

Discussion Club.

The opinions, assessments and conclusions

presented in this report do not represent a

consensus. They primarily reflect the view

of the editor-in-chief and do not necessarily

reflect the positions of all members of the

research group, the organizations they rep-

resent, or the Foundation for Development and

Support of the Valdai Discussion Club.

This report includes imagery by the TASS news

agency.

ISBN 978-5-906757-15-9


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Moscow, 2016

PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER

IN THE MIDDLE EAST: RUSSIAS INTERESTS

Valdai Discussion Club

Grantees Report


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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABWR Advanced Boiling Water Reactor

ACSIS Arab Institute for Security Studies (Jordan)

AEOI Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

AKP Justice and Development Party (Turkey)

APR Advanced Power Reactor

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

BOO Build-Own-Operate

BP British Petroleum

CENESS Center for Energy and Security Studies

(Russia)

CNS Convention on Nuclear Safety

Comecon Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

EAEA Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority

ENEC Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation

EPR Evolutionary Power Reactor

ETRR Experimental Training Research Reactor

EU European Union

FANR Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation

(UAE)

GCC Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the

Gulf

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IAF Islamic Action Front (Jordan)

JAEC Jordan Atomic Energy Commission

JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

JNRC Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission

K.A.CARE King Abdullah City for Atomic and

Renewable Energy

KEPCO Korea Electric Power Corporation

KNF KEPCO Nuclear Fuels

KNNEC Kuwait National Nuclear Energy

Committee

KOICA Korea International Cooperation Agency

MEPhI Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute

MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology

NPPA Egyptian Nuclear Power Plants Authority

NPP nuclear power plant

NPPD Nuclear Power Production & Development

Company of Iran

NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

of Nuclear Weapons

NRRA Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory

Authority (Egypt)

PBO Plan and Budget Organization of Iran

PDA Project Development Agreement

SESAME Synchrotron-Light for Experimental

Science and Applications in the Middle East

TASAM Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies

TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Company

TURKSAM Turkish Centre for International

Relations and Strategic Analysis

UAE United Arab Emirates

UN United Nations

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific

and Cultural Organization

UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament

Research

VVER Russian version of Pressurized Water

Reactor (PWR)

WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction


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CONTENTS

Foreword

1. Prospects for nuclear energy development in the Middle East

1.1. Growing interest to nuclear energy in the Middle East: 20052010

Facts and figures

Reasons and incentives to pursue nuclear energy

1.2. Major factors of influence: 20102015

Accident at the Fukushima NPP

The Arab Spring

1.3. Prospects for nuclear energy development in the Middle East

in the 2030 horizon

2. Distinctive features and potential for nuclear energy

development in Middle Eastern countries

2.1. Egypt

2.2. Jordan

2.3. Iran

2.4. Saudi Arabia

2.5. United Arab Emirates

2.6. Turkey

3. Russias role on the world market for nuclear technologies

and potential for cooperation with Middle Eastern countries

3.1. Russian plans for building NPPs abroad

3.2. Place of the Middle East in the Russian nuclear

industrys export plans

3.3. Legal framework for peaceful nuclear energy cooperation

between Russia and Middle Eastern countries

3.4. Outlook for Russian nuclear exports to the Middle East in the 2030

timeframe

Conclusion

Notes


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Wadi Rum Desert, Jordan


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Of all the nuclear energy newcomers, i.e.countries that have only just started to de-

velop nuclear energy, Middle Eastern statesare making the most dynamic progress.In September 2011 Iran became the firstcountry in the world in past 15 years to haveconnected its first nuclear power reactorto the national grid.1 In July 2012 the UAEbecame the first country in past 27 yearsto start building its first-ever NPP. Extensivepreparations have already been made to start

building Turkeys first nuclear power plantas part of the Akkuyu project. The proce-dure of choosing the technology supplier forthe first NPP in Jordan has been completed.A project development agreement to imple-ment the first part of the project to builda two-unit NPP in Jordans central Zarqa

Province was signed in September 2014. InSaudi Arabia, work has begun to developa national nuclear infrastructure requiredfor effective and safe peaceful use of nu-clear energy. Despite several recent changesof government and ongoing security prob-lems in the country, Egypt remains commit-ted to nuclear energy development.

Of all the nuclear newcomer countries, Mid-dle Eastern states also tend to be the mostambitious (although whether some of theannounced plans and deadlines are realisticis another matter). Iran, Saudi Arabia andTurkey have announced they will build from16 to 23 nuclear power reactors apiece inless than 20 years.

The goal of this study was to analyze theimpact of the developments and transfor-

mations in the Middle East that began inlate 2010 early 2011 (i.e. the events thatare often referred to as the Arab Spring) and ofthe Fukushima nuclear accident on plans andprospects for nuclear energy developmentin the region, as well as Russias potentialrole in implementing those plans.2

United Nations documents and UN GeneralAssembly resolutions do not contain an

official definition of the Middle East. IAEAreports define the Middle East as the terri-tory that stretches from Libya in the West toIran in the East, and from Syria in the Northto Yemen in the South; it does not includeTurkey.3

There is no common definitionof the Middle East in the ex-pert community, either. Aca-

demician Evgeny Primakov,a renowned Russian experton the Middle East, opines in

his book Confidential: Middle East on theStage and Behind the Curtains that the re-gion comprises all the Arab states (includingthose in North Africa) plus Israel and Iran.4

Some experts in the region believe that inview of the latest trend for the blurring of

national boundaries, the appearance of newstates, and the growing influence of non-state actors, the term Middle East in itstraditional sense is becoming irrelevant.

For the purposes of this study, we havedefined the Middle East as all the PersianGulf states (Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman,Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), plus Egypt,Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian NationalAuthority, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen.

FOREWORD

Among all the nuclear newcomer countries, the Middle

Eastern nations have some of the most ambitious

nuclear energy plans


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The study was conducted by a team ofresearchers from Russia and the Middle Eastcountries. A significant contribution was alsomade by reviewers and consultants fromRussia and other countries who verified the

accuracy of the data used in this paper andreviewed the drafts. A series of interviewsconducted by the members of the researchgroup with experts and officials from Bahrain,

Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, SaudiArabia, the UAE, and other Middle Easternstates played an important role in thegathering of primary data.

Interim results of this study were unveiledfor a broad discussion at several internati-onal conferences, workshops, and round

tables held in November 2012 December2015, including the workshop hosted by theUnited Nations Institute for DisarmamentResearch (UNIDIR) and the Moscow Non-proliferation Conference.5

The members of the research group wouldlike to thank the Foundation for Develop-ment and Support of the Valdai DiscussionClub, whose support was instrumental.

The opinions, assessmentsand conclusions presented inthis paper do not representa consensus. They primarilyreflect the view of the editor-

in-chief and do not necessarilyreflect the positions of all the members ofthe research group, the organizations theyrepresent, or the Foundation for Develop-ment and Support of the Valdai DiscussionClub.

This study was largely completed inSeptember 2015, with the latest edits andminor updates added in January 2016.

In 20052010, 13 Middle Eastern states announced

plans to build about 90 nuclear power reactors

at 26 different sites by 2030


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1.1. GROWING INTEREST TO NUCLEAR

ENERGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: 20052010.

Facts and figures

According to the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA), as of September 2010 therewere 441 nuclear power reactors in operati-on in 29 countries. The share of nuclearenergy in the overall electricity generation

was the highest in Western Europe (27%)and the lowest in Southeast Asia and theMiddle East, where it stood at zero.6 IAEAdocuments also mentioned, however, that65 new countries had expressed interest indeveloping nuclear energy. About a fifth ofthose countries are Middle Eastern states.

By late 2010, amid a strong resurgenceof interest in nuclear energy around the

world, almost every single country in theMiddle East had announced plans of using

nuclear technologies to meet its nationalenergy needs. The only two exceptionswere Lebanon and the Palestinian NationalAuthority. Some of the states that unveilednuclear energy plans, such as Egypt andTurkey, had already had decades of relevantexperience and formidable expertise in thatarea. Others, such as Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait,

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Yemen, had notpreviously demonstrated any great interestin peaceful nuclear energy.

In December 2007 members of the GulfCooperation Council (GCC) held a meetingto discuss plans for joint implementationof nuclear energy programs. In practice,however, each of these countries has begunto implement its own national program,

without any meaningful coordination withthe other GCC states. In fact, there is moreof competition than cooperation in thesecountries relations as far as nuclear energyprograms are concerned.

According to all the statementsmade by Middle Easternleaders and senior officialsin the first decade of the 21stcentury (mainly in the late2000s), there were plansto build approximately 90nuclear power reactors at 26sites (NPPs) in 13 states inthe region over the following20 years (i.e. by 2030). Sixcountries Bahrain, Egypt,Iran, Jordan, the UAE, andYemen were planning

PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR

ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST1.

The Masjid al-Haram during hajj,

Mecca, Saudi Arabia


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to launch their first nuclear power reactorsby 2017. An average of six new powerreactors were to be launched in the MiddleEast every year between 2018 and 2030.For more details, see Fig.1 Nuclear EnergyDevelopment Plans in the Middle East before

Fukushima and the Arab Spring.7

When the global nuclear energy sector wasat its peak in the late 1970s and early 1980s,there was an average of 22 nuclear reactorsbeing launched in countries around the

world every year. As many as 34 reactorswere launched in 1984. As of late 2010 i.e. before the Arab Spring and the Fukushi-ma accident the Middle Eastern countrieshad very ambitious nuclear energy plans.

They accounted for about 20% of the globalplans for building new nuclear energy reac-tors. These programs jointly were probablyas ambitious as the ones pursued by thedeveloped countries during the golden ageof nuclear energy in the 1970s and 1980s.8


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Diversification of energy sources

In the Middle East, reliable access to elec-tricity is crucial not only to keep homeslit and electric appliances working. It alsomeans access air conditioning and to fresh

water since many countries rely on energy-hungry desalination plants for their watersupply. In Saudi Arabia, half of all electricitygenerated in the country is used to runair conditioners; in the scorching summermonths, when temperatures reach 50 C,that proportion is even higher.13The regionis home to about 4% of the planets populati-on, but it has only 1% of the global supply of

fresh water.14

As a result, about 50% of theglobal water desalination capacity is situa-ted in the Middle East.15Electricity blackoutscan there fore wreak havoc not only to theregions industry but to its life supportsystems as well. This has obvious implicati-ons for the public perceptions of the energysecurity problem and its possible solutions inthe Middle East.

The regions largest oil and gas producers arealmost entirely dependent on hydrocarbonsfor their electricity production. In SaudiArabia, natural gas-burning power plantsaccount for 43% of electricity production;the rest of the countrys power plants burnoil and petrochemicals.16 In the UAE, 97%

of electricity is generated byburning gas; oil accounts forthe remaining 3%. In Egypt,

70% of power plants burngas, 20% oil, and 10% usehydroelectric energy and otherrenewables17. In Iran, which

has the largest installed electricity generati-on capacity in the region, gas accounts for67% of electricity production, oil 27%, andother sources (including hydro and nuclearenergy) 6%.18

Reasons and incentives

to pursue nuclear energy

The most universal reasons for MiddleEastern countries to launch nuclear energyprograms in 20052010 included their

growing demand for electricity, their desireto diversify their energy sources, and thegrowing public acceptance of nuclear energy.

Growing demand for electricity

Economic and population growth in theMiddle Eastern countries has led to a fivefoldincrease in their demand for electricity sincethe 1980s. In 20002010, their electricitydemand was growing by an average of 2%

every year, which is more than in most otherparts of the world.9 The figures were evenhigher in the largest oil and gas producingcountries in the region: 4% in Iran, 5% inKuwait and Egypt, 8% in Saudi Arabia, and9% in the UAE.10

According to various estimates, these trendswill continue over the coming decades. TheWorld Energy Council believes that the global

electricity demand will rise by 2761% in20102050. In the Middle East, the figurewill be in the 81114% range, depending onthe scenario.11According to projections by BP,energy demand in the Middle East will rise by77% by 2035.12

As a result, the Middle Eastern governmentsare looking for ways to meet the growingenergy demand of their economies and popu-lations. Building nuclear power plants is seenas one of the available options.

According to a forecast by the World Energy Council,

global demand for electricity will increase

by 27-61 per cent in 2010-2050, but the projectedgrowth figures for the Middle East are as high

as 81-114 per cent


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These countries aim to diver-sify their energy sources inorder to increase the reliabilityand resilience of their nationalenergy systems and reduce

CO2 emissions. Most of the re-gions countries are develo-ping alternative energy sour-ces, but these sources cannotreplace nuclear energy due tosuch considerations as scale,reliability, and uninterruptedenergy production. At thesame time, according to some

estimates for the largest oil-producingcountries in the region, the cost of nuclearenergy will be twice as high as the cost ofenergy produced by burning fossil fuel.19

According to UAE energy plans, the propor-tion of natural gas in electricity generationis to fall to 71% by 2030; the proportion ofnuclear energy and coal-burning plants isto increase to 12% apiece, and solar energyto 5%.20 Countries such as Egypt, Iran, andseveral others also say that another reasonto diversity their national energy systemsis to limit the domestic use of oil and gasfor electricity generation in order to releasemore of these valuable resources for exports.For most countries in the region, these exportsare the main source of budget revenue. Oiland gas account for 85% of export earningsin Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and about 60%

in Iran.Meanwhile, the net importers of energy,such as Jordan and Turkey, aim to diversitytheir energy sources in order to reduce theirdependence on imports of oil or gas. For exam-ple, Turkey is severely dependent on gasimports. Until recently, the same was trueof Jordan. Turkey generates almost half ofits electricity by burning natural gas impor-

ted from Russia or Iran. A few years ago

it faced a major disruption of gas suppliesfrom Iran, which accounts for a third of Tur-keys gas imports. In Jordan, up to 90% ofelectricity was generated by burning naturalgas imported via a pipeline from Egypt. Afterthe fall of the Hosni Mubarak government,imports from Egypt were completely inter-rupted on several occasions because of ar-med attacks on pipeline infrastructure inEgyptian territory. Jordan is more than 95%dependent on imports of primary energysources.

Growing public acceptance of nuclear energy

Public opinion and its policy implicationsare more important for the nuclear energy

industry than for almost any other industry.The nuclear accidents at the Three Mile Is-land and Chernobyl nuclear power plantshave amply demonstrated the power of pub-lic opinion to reverse nuclear industrydevelopment trends.

Negative public perceptions of nuclear powerreached their peak in the late 1980s and1990s. In the first decade of the 21stcentury,

however, attitudes began to change because

Burj Khalifa skyscraper,

Dubai, UAE


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of the growing problems of global warmingand energy security. In most countries inWestern Europe, the level of public supportfor the nuclear industry increased by 15%or even more over the indicated period, reac-

hing 50% in Sweden and 75% in Hungary.21In the United States the figure increasedby 20 percentage points to 62% in 2007.

The nuclear industry received an importantpositive signal from the United States thathave the largest fleet of NPPs in the world.In April 2005 President George W. Bushcalled for a review of Americas long-termenergy strategy, with a greater role to be gi-ven to nuclear energy generation.22Up untilthat statement, there were no new nuclearreactor construction starts in the UnitedStates since 1977.

The aforementioned trends had forced manycountries, including those that had previous-ly abandoned peaceful nuclear energy plans(such as Italy), to consider a change of policy.The practical effects of the growing publicacceptance of nuclear energy became quiteobvious on a global scale in 20062010, whenthe number of nuclear power reactors startseach year rose from 4 to as many as 16 (the

average annual number increased from 2.6in 20012005 to 10 in 20062010). The lasttime more than 15 nuclear power reactorshad been started in a space of a single yearwas in 1985, i.e. shortly before the Chernobylaccident.23

Middle East was no exception in terms ofgrowing public acceptance of nuclear ener-gy. According to a survey, public support

for nuclear energy in Saudi Arabia increas-ed by almost 10% thanks to explaining topublic that nuclear power plants do not con-tribute to global warming.24The high level ofpublic support (85%) for the industry in the

UAE remained unchanged for several weekseven after the Fukushima accident.25 Of allthe potential nuclear newcomer countries

that are close to launch theirfirst NPP project, public sup-port for nuclear energy wasthe highest in Egypt.26 Threedecades previously, stronglynegative public opinion was

one of the reasons for the Egyptian go-vernments decision to shelve its plans forbuilding NPPs in the wake of the Chernobyldisaster.

Some of the Middle Eastern countries alsohad their own individual reasons to pursuenuclear energy (i.e. reasons that did notnecessarily apply across the region). Theseincluded regional competition and thefactor of prestige associated with having

nuclear power plants; the availability ofcapital looking for investment opportunities;and finally, the desire to build scientific,technological, and industrial capability in thenuclear sphere, which could later be used tobuild nuclear weapons.

Capital looking for investment opportunities

In 19731974, Irans oil export revenuesrose by a staggering 400%.27As a result, by

the mid-1970s the country was faced withthe question of how to invest that windfallto the best possible effect. It began to lookfor promising investment projects, bothdomestically and abroad. The Irans Planand Budget Organization (PBO) intended toinvest 21 bn dollars in foreign projects overa five-year period. The priorities includedinvestment in high-tech industries, suchas the acquisition of stakes in the car giant

According to various surveys, campaigns emphasizing

that nuclear power plants to not contribute to global

climate change have increased Saudi public support for

nuclear energy plans by almost 10 percentage points


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Mercedes, the household appliances makerKrupp, and uranium enrichment companiesin Europe and the United States.28 Some ofthese investment projects were implementedbefore the 1979 Islamic Revolution; for

example, Tehran bought a stake in Eurodif,an international uranium enrichment con-sortium.

At the same time, the country was looking

for domestic investment opportunities. Inparticular, the government decided to usethe historically opportune moment to diver-sify the Iranian energy sector and launchan ambitious nuclear energy program. Toa certain extent, the Shah and his govern-ment were swayed in favor of such a decisionby their foreign advisors and by Iransown industrialists, who wanted the oil-richcountry to become a nuclear industrypowerhouse.

A very similar situation had arisen in SaudiArabia by the late 2000s as a result of thehigh oil prices. The Kingdom announcedplans to invest about 100 bndollars in the constructionof 16 nuclear power reactors.It also launched other majorinvestment projects, such as

building a metro in the capi-tal Riyadh. The first stage ofthe project will cost an esti-mated 20 bn dollars; theSaudis hope it will stimulateeconomic growth, stabilizethe employment situation, al-leviate the transport problem,and help the environment.29

It cannot be ruled out that at some point inthe future, Qatar will also come to regard anuclear energy program as a good invest-ment opportunity. It has already announceda plan to build a nuclear power plant by

2036. In the first half of 2014, Qatar invested10 bn dollars in foreign assets. It currentlyholds more than 120 bn dollars of various

investments in Britain, France,Germany, and the United Sta-tes.30 It must be taken intoaccount, however, that Qataris a small country, which could

be a natural limiting factor for the deve-

lopment of its nuclear energy industry.The prestige factor

Prestige is another factor that drives nuclearenergy programs in the Middle East. In themid-1970s the Iranian Shah had an ambi-tious aspiration for his country to acquirethe most advanced technologies in theworld, including Concorde supersonic airli-ners, AWACS aircrafts31, nuclear reactors,

enrichment technologies, and nuclear sub-marines. By investing its oil export revenues

Panoramic view

of Tehran in daylight,

Iran

It cannot be ruled out that at some point

in the future, Qatar will also come to regard a nuclear

energy program as a good investment opportunity


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in high-techindustries, Iran hoped to beco-me West Asias Japan and the worlds fifth-largest industrial power.32 It regarded nucle-ar energy as one of the ways of achievingsuperiority over its Arab neighbors. The then

Iranian deputy foreign minister Jafar Nadimwas quoted as saying that nuclear energy

help us to get the respect we feel we deserve.You should understand, we Persians have avery ancient, very advanced culture, yet wehave been a victim of so many insults andinvasions, and now we have to stand up.33

In view of the fierce regional competitionand rivalry, the connection to the nationalgrid of the first reactor of the Bushehr NPPin September 2011 has stimulated otherlarge Middle Eastern powers to explore theirown nuclear energy plans. The regions firstNPP in Iran has probably been a tangiblefactor behind the ongoing NPP constructionprojects in the UAE and Turkey. The sameconsideration probably applies to Egyptand Saudi Arabia, even though their nuclearenergy plans have not yet ente-red the practical phase.

For several Middle Easterncountries, possession of NPPsor concrete nuclear energy

plans has served as a ticket toa series of Nuclear SecuritySummits held in 20102016 inthe United States, South Korea,the Netherlands, and the Uni-ted States again. Membershipof such an elite club is certainlya factor of prestige. It alsoserves as an incentive for other

states in the Middle East and beyond to buildnational nuclear infrastructure.

Desire to build scientific, technological,

and industrial capability

Yet another incentive for nuclear energydevelopment that may well feature promi-nently in Middle Eastern countries domesticdebate is the desire to acquire a scientific,technological, and then industrial nuclearcapability that could later be used for wea-pons purposes, if a political decision is madeto that effect.34

It is entirely possible thatIrans real strategy ever sincethe mid-1970s has alwaysbeen to develop peaceful nuc-lear energy in parallel with the

acquisition of nuclear weapons capability, i.e.the science, technology and resources thatwould enable it to build nuclear weapons.According to former Iranian foreign ministerArdeshir Zahedi, before the Islamic Revolu-tion the Iranian government thought it ne-

cessary to have the kind of nuclear capability

NPP Fukushima Daiichi

accident consequences

The connection of the Bushehr NPP

to the Iranian national grid in 2011has stimulated other Middle Eastern powers

to explore their own nuclear energy plans


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that would enable it to build nuclear weaponswithin 18 months of the political decisionbeing made.

Recent examples of foreign interference in

sovereign states affairs under various pre-texts, and diverging interpretations of fun-damental principles of international lawwhen launching military campaigns againstYugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya have forced seve-ral countries (especially those who havefraught relations with the United States)to think hard about their own deterrencecapability.

Meanwhile, Israel, which possesses nuclearweapons, remains outside the NPT. All theseconsiderations could well serve as a ca-talyst for some Middle Eastern states to givethe go-ahead to their nuclear technologydevelopment programs. The conclusionsdrawn by some Middle Eastern researchershave dire implications for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. These researchersargue that third-world countries must

acquire nuclear weapons if they want to re-main sovereign states, because only nuclearweapons can guarantee non-interferenceby foreign powers.35Many experts in the Mid-dle East, including Iran, regard the deposalof Col. Gaddafi shortly after he relinquishedhis WMD programs as some-thing much more than a merecoincidence.

1.2. MAJOR FACTORS OFINFLUENCE: 20102015

Most of the Middle Easternstates plans, however, appearedoverly ambitious in view of thelimited technological capabilityof the majority of the countriesinvolved, including their lack ofspecialists. As of late 2010, onlyfour states, Egypt, Iran, Israel,

and Turkey were operating research reactors.Syria had a miniature neutron source usedfor experimental work. For details, see Fig.2

Nuclear Research Reactors and Critical/

Subcritical Assemblies in the Middle Eastern

States.

Iraq had also operated research reactors inthe past. The Al Tuwaitha Nuclear ResearchCentre located near Baghdad had two re-search reactors: IRT-5000 supplied by theSoviet Union, and a Tammuz-2 suppliedby France. As a result of the Desert Stormoperation in 1991 Iraq was found to be pur-suing undeclared nuclear activities. In accor-

dance with UN Security Council Resolution687 (1991) of April 3, 1991, all Iraqi nuclearmaterials, equipment, and facilities were tobe removed and destroyed.36

Most of Middle Eastern scientists untilrecently educated in nuclear physics andrelated areas of science in foreign countrieswere forced to pursue a career elsewhereupon their return home because of lack of

demand for their expertise.

Yemeni army soldiers join protesters

during mass demonstrations against

the incumbent president,

Yemen, June 2, 2011


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Some of the statements made by Middle Eas-tern leaders on nuclear energy plans wereclearly dominated by political considerations,and were not sufficiently thought through.For example, under some of those plans,

the first nuclear power reactors were to belaunched at a completely new site within

seven or eight years (i.e. much sooner thanthe 1015 years time frame projected bythe IAEA), even though the host countrieslacked the necessary legal framework, a nuc-lear regulatory system, a pool of qualified

specialists, or secure sources of financing.37


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Several statements also ignored the securitysituation in the host country and the widerregion. For example, some Iraqi officialsspoke in the early 2010s about the possibility

of building an NPP despite the lack of anytangible progress in stabilizing the situationin the country, the ongoing power vacuum,

and a deep domestic political crisis.

Also,some of the statements appeared to be con-fused on the distinction between the terms

nuclear power reactor and nuclear powerplant.

Nuclear energy development plans havebeen affected by the accident at the Fuku-shima NPP in March 2011, as well as thetransformations in the region variously des-cribed as the Arab Spring, the Arab Awake-ning, and the Islamic Awakening (we willstick to the Arab Spring for simplicitys sakein this report) that began inlate 2010, gradually spreadto engulf almost the entire Mid-dle East, and continue to thisday.

Accident at the Fukushima NPP

On March 11, 2011 the east coast of JapansHonshu Island was struck by a magnitude9 earthquake, the strongest in decades. The

disaster was later dubbed the

Great East Japan Earthquake.There were 11 reactors in ope-ration at five nuclear powerplants in the affected area.38Soon after tremors began, reac-tors were shut down auto-

matically. All of them switched to auxiliarycooling systems for the removal of residualheat.39Less than an hour after the earthqua-

ke, the coastline was struck by a powerfultsunami wave. At eight of the 11 reactors, po-wer supply of the cooling systems remainedintact thanks to high-voltage grid connec-tions and reserve generators working ondiesel. The Fukushima Daiichi NPP, however,was struck by a 14 meter tsunami wave; itsflood defenses were designed to withstand

Plans for nuclear energy development in the MiddleEast have been affected by the nuclear accident at the

Fukushima NPP and the transformations in the region

that are frequently referred to as the Arab Spring,

which began in 2010, spreading to almost the entire

region and continuing to this day

Protest held on the 3rd anniversaryof the Fukushima NPP accident,

Manila, Philippines


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waves of only 5.7 meters.40As a result, reservediesel generators at the No 1, 2 and 3 reactorsshut down, leaving the emergency coolingsystem without power.41The plants No 4, 5and 6 reactors were undergoing scheduled

maintenance at the time.42

Failure of the cooling system due to the powercut led to a major meltdown of the reactorcore at the No 1, 2 and 3 reactors. The spentfuel storage facility of the No 4 reactor wasalso affected. As a result, large amounts of ra-

diation were released into the environment.According to IAEA estimates, the release ofradiation at Fukushima reached up to 10% ofthe Chernobyl level.43

More than 185,000 people who lived with-in a 20 km radius from the NPP wereevacuated.44 According to Japanese experts

by the Fall 2013, the Fukushima accidentmay have caused up to 80 bn dollars worthof damage.45The World Bank has estimatedthe damage caused by the earthquake andthe ensuing tsunami at up to 235 bn dollars.46

The Fukushima accident itself did not direct-ly cause any fatalities. Two members of staffat the Fukushima Daiichi NPP (operators ofthe turbine hall) were killed by the tsunamiwave. According to conclusions by IAEA ex-

perts, no serious cases of radiation sicknesscaused by the accident have been found.47Japans police service has reported that16,000 people were killed by the earthquakeand the tsunami (including 1,599 inFukushima Prefecture), and another 8,000went missing.48

On May 20, 2011, TEPCO, the operator ofthe Fukushima Daiichi NPP, announced

that the No 1, 2, 3 and 4 reactors would bedecommissioned, and plans to build the No 7and 8 reactors cancelled.49In December 2013it has also made a decision to decommissionslightly damaged units 5 and 6. As of January

1, 2016, only 2 of 54 nuclear power reactorsoperated in Japan before the Great East JapanEarthquake were restarted.50

As a result of the Fukushima accident inJapan, 12 nuclear power reactors were shutdown in several other countries in 2011. The

worlds total installed nucleargeneration capacity fell from375 GW to 368 GW, and the

number of nuclear powerreactors in operation fell to

435 as of September 2012.51 According toIAEA projections, however, the Fukushimaaccident will merely slow down rather thanreverse nuclear energy development.52 Inhis September 2012 report IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano said that eighteenmonths after the accident, it was clear thatnuclear energy would remain an importantoption for many countries. Later IAEAprojections show a steady rise in the numberof nuclear power plants in the world in thenext 20 years.53According to the IAEA, mostof the nuclear newcomers, i.e. countries thatare considering projects to build their firstnuclear power reactor, still intend to pressahead with these programs.

The effects of the Fukushima accident on the

Middle Eastern states nuclear energy plansare threefold.

1. The smallest countries in the region,Bahrain and Oman, as well as Kuwait, haveabandoned these plans (or postponed themindefinitely, in the case of Bahrain). Kuwaithas abolished the National Nuclear EnergyCommittee (KNNEC), the national agency incharge of implementing the countrys nuclear

According to IAEA, however, the Fukushima accident

merely slowed down than reversed nuclear energy

development in nuclear newcomers countries


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energy strategy. The main reason for thesedecisions boils down to concerns related tothe small size of these countries territoryand their inability to ensure adequate publicsafety measures if the nuclear power plants

were to be built after all. Bahrains territoryis only 765 sq km, whereas Japan had toevacuate population from an area of morethan 1,200 sq km after the Fukushimaaccident.

2. Several countries in the region haveadjusted their nuclear energy plans to makethem more realistic. For example, Jordan,which has no nuclear energy expertise or

trained specialists, initially wanted its futureNPPs to double as desalination plants andhydrogen production facilities for futurehydrogen cars. In theory, such a combinationis possible, but it has yet to be implementedanywhere in the world. Jordan has since aban-doned these ambitions, and plans to use itsfuture NPPs only for electricity generation.

3. The Fukushima accident has led to the

introduction of more stringent nuclear safe-ty requirements, raising the technologicalbar and making third-generation reactorsthe minimum acceptable level of technology.China, which has the technology to buildsecond-generation reactors, was regardedas a potential nuclear exporter to the MiddleEast and a competitor to the traditionalnuclear suppliers as recently as 2010. Now,however, China has dropped out of the list

of potential technology suppliers for thenext five or 10 years. The suppliers whoare wooing the regions governments mostenergetically such as Russia, France, Japan,and South Korea are offering GenerationIII or III+ reactors.

In order to improve nuclear safety on aglobal level, Russia has been using variousinternational platforms, including the IAEA,

to advocate the introduction of minimumstandards requiring the use of GenerationIII+ or above for new NPP projects.

The Arab Spring

The effects of political upheavals in the Mid-dle East on nuclear energy plans have alsobeen threefold.

1. Political transformations in the regionhave forced Middle Eastern states to post-pone decisions on various mega-projects,including the construction of NPPs. Therehave been obvious reasons for such delays,including a change of government in several

countries, etc. For example, in August 2010Egypt completed preparations for a tenderto choose the technology supplier for thecountrys first nuclear power plant. That ten-der, however, was postponed because ofa wave of protests and the ensuing changeof government. All work on the NPP projectitself was frozen because of unrest in thecountry. Officials and experts in Jordan alsosay that growing instability on the countrys

borders, including the influx of refugees fromother Middle Eastern states, could force thegovernment to postpone the NPP project.

2. Turbulence in the Middle East, whichis a large exporter of hydrocarbons, hasexacerbated concerns about the reliabilityof energy supplies including concernsfelt by countries in the region itself. Thishas strengthened the argument in favor

of nuclear energy. A case in point is Jordan.Since the change of government in Egyptthe pipeline used for Egyptian gas exportsto Jordan (as well as Israel) has sufferedmore than 20 separate bombing attacks.As a result, according to various reports,Jordan received only 1025% of the naturalgas it was supposed to receive under thecontract. Gas-burning power plants accountfor up to 90% of electricity generation in


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the country. In addition, the new Egyptiangovernment revised the financial side ofthe contract, making Egyptian gas suppliesmuch more expensive. According to theJordanian government, the country suffered

losses of more than 5 bn dollars as a result.54These developments served to strengthenthe argument of nuclear energy advocates,especially since Jordan, which currently im-ports 95% of its primary energy, has its ownuranium reserves.

Another example is Turkey. Events in Syriahave led to a deterioration in Turkish-Iranianand Turkish-Russian relations. Natural gasimports currently account for about a halfof Turkeys energy needs, and about a thirdof those imports are sourced from Iran. Thishas increased concerns about the reliabilityof gas supplies and the nations energy securi-ty. Turkey already has first-hand experienceof the dire consequences of dependence ongas imports. In January 2008 gas suppliesfrom Iran first fell well below the figuresagreed in the contract, and then stoppedaltogether for a certain period because theIranian government had imposed a tempora-ry ban on gas exports. Turkey therefore hasgood reasons to diversify its energy basket

and speed up nuclear energy development.3. Public opinion on nuclear energy is be-coming a more influential factor for the re-gions governments. In some cases legitimatepublic concerns are becoming more promi-nent. In others, politicians merely exploitthe issue to score political points. For exam-ple, some forces in Jordan are prone to cri-ticizing plans to build a nuclear power plant

merely because those plans have the kingssupport.

After the change of government in Egypt,locals in the region of El-Dabaa occupied the

site that was chosen back in the 1980s forthe construction of the countrys first NPP.It was previously believed that the issue hadbeen settled, and an agreement on variousforms of compensation had been reachedwith the local residents who had propertiesand land in the future NPPs exclusion zone.

Egyptian specialists believethat if the government were tobe forced to choose a new site,

plans for the construction ofa nuclear power plant could be

delayed by another four or five years.

1.3. PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY

DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

IN THE 2030 HORIZON

To summarize, the Fukushima nuclear acci-dent has had a salutary effect on the MiddleEastern states nuclear energy plans, without

removing the fundamental causes of theirinterest in nuclear energy. These causesinclude rising energy demand, environmentaland climate challenges, and energy securityconcerns. At the same time, long-term plansfor the numbers of new reactors and the timeframe for their launch will have to be adjustedto reflect the technological and financialcapabilities of the regions economies, as wellas their actual demand for nuclear energy.This is especially true of countries such asIran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

The effects of the Arab Spring on the MiddleEastern states nuclear energy plans havebeen more ambiguous. For energy-dependentcountries in the region, the ongoing turbu-lence strengthens the argument in favorof bolstering their energy security and pur-suing nuclear energy. In other countries

Recent events in the region have forced Middle

Eastern states to postpone decisions on various

mega-projects, including the construction of NPPs


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especially those that have already under-gone a change of government the ongo-ing centrifugal trends could force delays inthe implementation of nuclear energy plansdue to domestic instability, security challen-

ges, and economic problems.

Another development that will have an im-pact on the prospects for nuclear energydevelopment in the Middle East is the sharpfall in the world prices for hydrocarbonsthat began in mid-2014 and shows no signsof reversal throughout 2015. This has redu-ced budget revenues in most of the regionscountries and made it more difficult for nu-

clear energy to compete with fossil fuel-burning power plants.

The state of nuclear energy programs inthe Middle East as of January 1, 2016 is

summarized in Fig.

3 Current State of Nuc-lear Energy Programs in the Middle East.

Detailed information about NPP projectsbeing implemented in the Middle East iscontained in Fig.4 NPP Projects Under Wayin the Middle East.

The next chapter will focus on the history,distinctive features, and potential for nuclearenergy development in individual Middle

Eastern countries that are the most likelyregional candidates to build NPPs in theforeseeable future and fall within the first sixcategories specified on the Fig. 3 (Egypt, Iran,Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE).

It is very likely that over the next 10 years,the UAE and Turkey will launch their firstnuclear power plants (each consisting of four

reactors). However, the deepening crisis inRussian-Turkish relations may become a fac-tor that affects the outlook for Turkeys nu-clear energy development program. The cri-sis was triggered when the Turkish Air Force

shot down a Russian Su-24 bomber near theSyrian-Turkish border in November 2015. It isalso likely that by the early 2020s, Abu Dhabiwill have become the regional leader in termsof installed nuclear generation capacity.

Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, which arealso showing great interest in nuclear ener-gy, are unlikely to launch their first NPPsbefore 2025. Over the same period, Iran may

build another two reactors at the existingBushehr NPP.

Under the optimistic scenariofor the nuclear energy industryin the Middle East, Iran, Turkey,the UAE may launch their secondNPPs (each consisting of four

reactors) by 2030.

To summarize, six Middle Eastern coun-

tries will have built nine NPPs with a totalof 33 reactors by 2030 under the optimisticscenario.

Under the pessimistic scenario, only Iran, theUAE, and Turkey will have built one NPP eachwith a total of 11 reactors by 2030. A moreconservative scenario is possible if relationsbetween Russia and Turkey fail to improvereasonably quickly.

While in 20052010, 13 Middle Eastern coun-tries announced plans to set in operationabout 26 NPPs with about 90 reactorsby 2030, in fact, only about a third of thereactors announced in 20052010 will belaunched during the indicated period un-der the optimistic scenario, and 10% underthe pessimistic scenario.

Under the optimistic scenario

for the nuclear energy industry in the Middle

East six countries will have built 9 NPPs

with a total of 33 reactors by 2030


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2.1. EGYPT

Egypts demand for electricity is rising ata rapid pace, but the countrys own energyresources are limited. There is very littleroom left for increasing the countrys outputof hydroelectric energy. Egypts energy sec-tor is heavily dependent on oil and gas. Egyp-tian specialists believe that even though thecountry is rich in renewable energy resour-

ces such as wind and solar, these resourceswill not be enough to meet growing energydemand. Faced with the need to ensure sus-tainable and long-term development in theinterests of future generations, Egypt is in-creasingly looking to nuclear energy as asolution.

Background of the Egyptian

nuclear energy program

Egypt has been pursuingpeaceful nuclear energy re-search for almost 60 years. Itwas one of the first developing

countries to launch a programof using nuclear energy forelectricity production and wa-ter desalination. The Egyptiangovernment started to showinterest in nuclear energy soonafter U. S. President DwightEisenhower announced theAtoms for Peace program atthe UN General Assembly on

December 8, 1953. In 1955 Egyptian pre-sident Gamal Abdel Nasser ordered the crea-tion of the Egyptian Commission for AtomicEnergy, the forerunner of the Egyptian Ato-mic Energy Authority (EAEA). The maintask set before that agency is to facilitatepeaceful use of nuclear technologies, espe-cially for electricity production.55

Thanks to close relations with the SovietUnion under President Nasser, Egypt built anuclear research center in Inshas, Al SharqiaGovernorate. The center operates an ETRR-1research reactor, a 2 MW light-water unit. In1964 Egypt released technical requirementsfor a proposed nuclear power plant that

was to double as a desalinationplant. The facility was to be

built in Borg El Arab, a city onthe Mediterranean coast 30 kmwest of Alexandria. It was to

DISTINCTIVE FEATURES AND POTENTIAL

FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN

MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES2.

Cairo, Egypt

Egypt was one of the first developing countries

to launch a research program of using nuclear energy

for electricity production and water desalination


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have 150 MW of generation ca-pacity, and produce 20,000 cu. m.of fresh water every day. Theproject was frozen after the Six-Day War in June 1967. After Pre-

sident Nassers death in 1970he was succeeded by Anwar Sa-dat, who had little enthusiasmfor nuclear energy. That, as wellas the freezing of the NPP pro-ject, triggered the exodus of manynuclear scientists from Egypt.56

In 1974 Egypt tried to sign a pea-ceful nuclear energy cooperation

agreement (the so-called 123 Agreement)with the United States. Such an agreementwas expected to put in place the legal fra-mework for a project to build up to eightAmerican-designed nuclear power reactorsin the country. Washington, however, wasinsisting on very stringent terms for suchan agreement; the talks were taking placeshortly after India conducted its first nuc-lear weapons test using heavy water of U.S.origin to produce weapons-grade plutonium,so the United States was determined totighten its export controls. Cairo believedthat the terms proposed by the Americanswere unfair, and the negotiations took se-ven years to complete.57

Egypts nuclear program received a freshimpetus following the arrival of PresidentHosni Mubarak in 1981.58 The country resu-med talks with several nuclear suppliers, butthe Chernobyl accident in 1986 dampenedits interest in nuclear energy. Many nuclear

projects were frozen, with a notable excep-tion of the 1992 agreement with Argentinato build a 22 MW light-water research reactorat the nuclear research center in Inshas.59

Modern days:

renewed interest in nuclear energy

In September 2006 Egypt announced its

intention to relaunch the nuclear energyprogram. The government made the decisionin view of the growing oil and gas prices, im-proving public perceptions of nuclear ener-gy, and the depletion of national reservesof natural gas. To ensure the energy rightsof future generations, it decided to press

ahead with a two-pronged stra-tegy that focused on nuclearand renewable energy.

In 2007 Egypt unveiled an am-bitious program of building nu-clear power plants. It intended

to build up to 10 nuclear power reactors,the first of which was to be launched in2017. In 2009 the Egyptian Nuclear PowerPlants Authority (NPPA) and AustraliasWorley Parsons Ltd. signed a consulting ag-reement under which Egypt was to receive

The Nile river, Cairo

In 2007 Egypt unveiled an ambitious program

of building nuclear power plants. It intendedto build up to 10 nuclear power reactors


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All the Egyptian nuclear facilities are current-ly operated by the EAEA. These facilities in-clude:

ETRR-1, a 2 MW research reactor built

with Soviet assistance; ETRR-2, a 22 MW research reactor builtwith Argentine assistance;

A pilot nuclear fuel production facility; A nuclear fuel research laboratory; A hydrometallurgical R&D unit; A nuclear chemistry research laboratory; Two gamma-irradiators (one of them is

still being built).60

Egypt is a member of SESAME, a UNESCO-sponsored initiative to create a regionalresearch center in Jordan. At the heart ofthat center is a synchrotron that is scheduledfor launch in 2016. One of the goals of theproject, which was founded in 2003, is tobuild trust between the Middle Easternstates by pursuing joint nuclear research.The list of SESAME participants includes

expert advice in choosing the nucleartechnology supplier.

In March 2010 Egypt adopted a comprehen-sive law on nuclear and radiation regulation

(Law No 7 of 2010). In 2012 the country setup an independent nuclear regulation autho-rity Nuclear and Radiological RegulatoryAuthority (NRRA). The new regulator wastasked with creating a national system of nu-clear material control and accounting. It wasalso to serve as a coordinator between thecentral government, the local authorities,and international organizations.

Egypt is making energetic efforts to developits human resources in cooperation with theIAEA and nuclear technology suppliers. Aspart of preparations for building a NPP atthe El Dabaa site, in 2010 the country turnedto the Korea International Cooperation Agen-cy (KOICA) with a request for assistance intraining nuclear personnel. It also launchedconsultations with foreign specialists aboutpossible modernization of the nuclear re-

search center in Inshas, including the 2 MWlight-water reactor.

Protesters throwing stonesat the police,

Cairo, Egypt, January 25, 2011


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Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan,Pakistan, the Palestinian National Authority,and Turkey. Britain, France, Germany, Greece,Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Portugal, Russia, Sweden,Switzerland, and the United States have been

given observer status.All of these national projects and plans,however, have felt the impact of the radicalchanges in the countrys politics, economy,and security situation in 20102015. TheEgyptian project to build the countrys firstnuclear power plant has slowed down.

Impact of the Fukushima

accident and the Arab Spring

A revitalization of Egypts nuclear energyprogram in the late 2000s led to an upsurgein anti-nuclear sentiment over safety con-cerns. That sentiment first appeared afterthe Chernobyl disaster, leading to the govern-ments decision to postpone the NPP project.By the late 1990s, however, the issue was nolonger a subject of much controversy, thankspartly to a national campaign to increaseawareness of the benefits of nuclear energy.61

The Fukushima accident inMarch 2011 coincided witha period of major politicaltransformations in Egypt, andreignited public concerns over

nuclear energys safety re-cord.62 The debate about thepros and cons of buildingnuclear power plants in thecountry came to the fore onceagain. Some of the opponentsof nuclear energy are propos-ing solar and other types ofrenewable energy as an alter-

native.Political and security situation in Egypt,limited financial resources of the state bud-get and anti-nuclear protests by local resi-dents in El Dabaa, the site of the future NPP,are the main obstacles to a speedy implemen-tation of that project.

The tender for the contract to build Egyptsfirst NPP has been postponed on several

occasions. As of January 1, 2016, that tenderhad yet to be announced. If and when thathappens, the first reactor is expected tobe built within 10 years, with subsequentreactor being launched every in two years.The Egyptian government will try to stick tothe following timeline:

69 months: time given to would-begeneral contractors to prepare their bids;

1214 months: technical and financialassessment of the bids; 36 months: negotiations and the signing

of the contract with the winner; 57 years: building the NPP, loading fuel,

commissioning and start of commercialoperation reactor.

After the Fukushima accident the EgyptianNuclear Power Plants Authority revisedthe specifications of the proposed NPPs on

Meeting between Russian President

Vladimir Putin and Egyptian President

Abdel Fattah el-Sisi,

Novo-Ogaryovo, Russia, February 13, 2014


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the basis of IAEA recommendations in orderto improve their safety. Cairo is showinggreat interest in technical cooperation pro-jects with the IAEA, with an emphasis onbuilding nuclear power plants, strengthen-

ing the countrys nuclear regulatory system,facilitating the development of nuclear me-dicine, improving Egypts emergency res-ponse capability, and developing its humanresources.

In 2011 Egyptian officials expected the firstnuclear power reactor to be launched by2021. It is now safe to say that this timelinehas been pushed back by at least five years.Under current plans, the Egyptian nuclearenergy program will rely on pressurizedwater reactor technology offered by a wholerange of suppliers from Russia, France, Japan,South Korea, and the United States. Thesecountries had already expressed interestin working in Egypt before the governmentpostponed the launch of the bidding processin 2011.

The election of the new Egyptian President,Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, in May 2014 has notaffected Egypts resolve to continue its prog-

ram of building nuclear power plants. Thecountrys political leadership views NPPsas an important and indispensible sourceof energy that will underpin a sustainabledevelopment of the Egyptian economy. OnFebruary 10, 2015, during Russian PresidentVladimir Putins visit to Cairo, Rusatom Over-seas and Egyptian Nuclear Power PlantsAuthority signed a Project Development

Agreement (PDA). Under the terms of that

document, Russia and Egypt have agreedto cooperate in building an NPP in Egypt,consisting initially of two 1,200 MW reac-tors, with a possibility of adding anothertwo reactors at some point in the future.

As part of the NPP project, the parties alsoagreed to build a water desalination plant.

On November 19, 2015, the Russian andEgyptian delegations met in Cairo to signa bilateral agreement on cooperation in buil-

ding and operation of a nu-clear power plant based of1,200 MW reactors in Egypt.The two governments are

now expected to sign an ag-reement on credit financingfor the project. However, as

of January 1, 2016, Egypt has yet to make anofficial announcement of the tender for theNPP project. Neither has Cairo announced thechoice of Rosatom as the general contractorfor the project to build the countrys first NPPbypassing the tender procedures (as Turkeyhas done, for example).

Public opinion in the Arab countries isbecoming an increasingly important factor;it will have a great impact on the MiddleEastern nations nuclear energy policies. InEgypt, the national legislature, includingthe parliamentary committees for foreignaffairs, Arab affairs, and national securitywill play a more important role in the coun-trys policy than they used to in the past.

There is no doubt that a lot of attention willbe paid to nuclear issues, including thoserelated to peaceful nuclear energy.

Outlook

Egypt has one of the most sophisticated nu-clear regulatory systems in the Middle East.By the regions standards, it also has a largepool of qualified specialists. It is thereforeone of the most likely regional candidates to

build NPPs.

Success in the implementation of Egypts program

to build nuclear power plants will depend

on its governments ability to improve security

conditions, attract investmentand win the support of the general public


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Success in the implementation of the coun-trys program to build nuclear power plantswill depend on its governments abilityto improve security conditions, attract in-vestment and win the support of the general

public. Instability in Egypt itself and in thewider region could yet force further delaysin building the countrys first nuclear powerplant. The act of terror that brought downthe Russian A321 airliner flying fromSharm el-Sheikh on October 31, 2015 hasraised serious questions about the Egyptiangovernments ability to provide adequate le-vels of security at its critical infrastructure

facilities amid the growing terror threat.Even under the best-case scenario, the firstnuclear power reactor is unlikely to belaunched before 2026.

2.2. JORDAN

One of the main challenges faced by Jordan isan acute shortage of natural resources. Thatshortage has far-reaching implications forthe countrys domestic and foreign policy.Jordan aspires to be an influential regionalactor, but it is severely dependent on oiland gas imports. Meanwhile, the countrys

economy has been growing at an averageannual rate of 5% between 1993 and 2014,putting an ever greater strain on its energybalance.

Jordan also happens to be the worlds fourthmost arid country. A reliable and sustainableenergy source could do much to improve thecountrys water supply.

As part of its efforts to solve the energyproblem, Jordan has conducted a risks andbenefits analysis for traditional, renewable,and alternative energy. It has studied suchoptions as solar, wind, and geothermal ener-gy, as well as shale oil production. In 2009senior Jordanian officials concluded that themost realistic option for ending the energycrisis is nuclear energy.

One of the reasons for such achoice was the countrys pain-ful experience of dependenceon oil and gas imports fromother Middle Eastern states.

When Saddam Hussein was in power in Iraq,

Jordan served as the gateway for Iraqi oilexports. As a result, the country was able to

Amman, Jordan

One of the main challenges faced by Jordan

is an acute shortage of natural resources


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buy Iraqi crude at a heavy discount. Afterthe fall of Saddam, Jordan switched to naturalgas imports from Egypt, only to face majorproblems with the reliability of supply dueto regular bombing attacks on the Egyptian

export pipeline during the Arab Spring.The share of Egyptian gas in Jordanianelectricity generation collapsed from 90%to 16%, and then to zero as supplies werehalted completely. Jordan was forced to startbuying oil on the open market without anydiscounts, mainly from Kuwait. This led to arapid rise in electricity tariffs; the Jordanianbudget deficit also rose sharply because

the government subsidizes electricity for60% of the countrys population. After thegovernment announced a reduction in oiland gas subsidies in September 2012, massprotests broke out in the capital Amman andother cities. Two days later the governmentwas forced to reverse the decision. It wasgetting increasingly difficult to preservefragile political and social stability amidrising unemployment and a growing influx

of refugees from armed conflict zones inthe Middle East.

The Jordanian government has alreadyapproved the decision to build the countrysfirst nuclear power plant. In October 2013it chose the Al Amra site 70 km east of Am-man. Russias nuclear industry has beenawarded the contract to build the NPP.63Theplant will consist of two 1,000 MW reactors;the first of the two is to be launched in 2023,and the second in 2025. Under the govern-ments ambitious plans, construction works

at the Al Amra site are to begin as earlyas 2017.64

Previously, the Korean Institute of NuclearEnergy Research and Daewoo corporation

started to build a research reactor at the Jor-dan University of Science and Technologyfacility in Ar Ramtha in the northwest ofthe country.65 The launch of that reactor isscheduled for 2016. In 2013 Areva signeda contract to supply nuclear fuel for the ArRamtha facility.66

One of the reasons why Jordan has chosenthe nuclear energy option is that there areuranium deposits on the countrys territory.According to the Jordanian Atomic EnergyCommission, these reserves are commercial-ly viable. Geological exploration results sug-gest that Jordan can produce up to 35,000tonnes of uranium concentrate from fieldsdiscovered in the central part of the country,which would be enough for the entire lifetimeof two 1,000 MW reactors.67 Jordan alsotakes part in the already mentioned SESAME

project, a UNESCO-sponsored regional re-search center with a synchrotron facility atits heart. The synchrotron itself is scheduled

for launch in 2016.

First steps

Jordan has already taken se-veral practical steps as part ofits nuclear energy program.In accordance with the 2001

Law on Nuclear Energy and Radiation Safety,which was amended in 2007, the country hasset up the Jordan Atomic Energy Commis-sion (JAEC) and the Jordan Nuclear Regula-tory Commission (JNRC).

The amendments approved in 2007 havetransferred the regulatory remit from JAECto JNRC. Under Law No 43/2007 on Radia-tion Protection, Nuclear Safety and Security,JNRCs regulatory and supervision remit

One of the reasons why Jordan

has chosen the nuclear energy option

is that there are uranium deposits

on the countrys territory


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includes nuclear energy, environmental pro-tection, and compliance with nuclear safetyand security requirements.68

Work has begun to explore the countrys

natural uranium reserves, which are seenas an important element of reducing depen-dence on oil and gas imports and turningJordan into a net electricity exporter after2025 (the country has grid interconnectionswith Egypt, Iraq, and Syria).69

Tender for the NPP contract

In 2011 the Jordanian government recei-ved applications for a tender to build a7501,100 MW reactor from three companies:

Atomstroyexport (Russia); SNC-Lavalin International Inc. (Canada);

A consortium of Areva (France) andMitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (Japan).70

South Korea also showed great interest inthe Jordanian NPP project, and was in con-tact with Jordanian officials in various bila-teral formats. KEPCO was regarded in Jor-dan as a serious contender but then the

Korean company won a UAE contract to build

four reactors at the Barakah NPP, and lost

interest in the Jordanian venture. In the end,it did not even take part in the tender.

Jordan has signed various bilateral agree-ments and memorandums of understandingon peaceful nuclear energy cooperation withseveral countries, including Argentina, Bri-tain, Canada, China, France, Italy, Japan, Ro-mania, Spain, and Turkey.71 It was also intalks with the United States about the signingof a so-called 123 Agreement. Washington

insisted, however, that Jordan relinquishits right to enrich uranium in return for U.S.nuclear assistance.72 In 2009 the two count-ries signed a memorandum of understan-ding on nuclear energy cooperation, but as

of January 1, 2016, Jordan has not acceptedthe proposed language for the 123 Agreement.

By April 2013 only two contenders, Atom-stroyexport and the Areva-Mitsubishi con-sortium, were still in the running. Thegovernment announced the winner in Octo-ber 2013,73 designating Atomstroyexportas the strategic partner of the countrysfirst NPP. According to Jordanian specialists,

the Russian company won because it hadsubmitted a comprehensive proposal thatincluded fresh fuel supply and spent fuelremoval for the entire life of the NPP, andpossible co-financing of the project.74

Because the tender process took longer thanplanned, the original 2020 deadline for thelaunch of Jordans first nuclear power reactorhas been pushed back to 2023.

Obstacles faced by the Jordanian

nuclear energy program

Like many other countries,Jordan is facing major econo-mic problems as a result ofinstability in the Middle Eastand the global economic crisis.In 2011 the amount of foreign

direct investment into the Jordanian econo-

my fell by 60%.

75

Financial considerationswere therefore a major factor in the choiceof the general contractor for the NPP project.

Meanwhile, there is a growing debate inJordan about the pros and cons of nucleartechnologies. In May 2012 the Jordanianparliaments select committee for energyand natural resources recommended thatthe nuclear energy program be abandoned.It argued that the program would drive

One of the reasons why Jordan has chosen Russia

as the NPP technology supplier is the integrated

nature of the Rosatom offer, which includes

the removal of spent nuclear fuel, and Russias

openness to the idea of co-financing the project


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the country into a dark tunnel and haveirreversible environmental consequences.Later on, the lower chamber of parliamentbacked the committees recommendation

and urged the government to put the NPPand uranium mining projects on hold pen-

ding the outcome of economic feasibilityand environmental studies.76 Shortly after-wards King Abdullah II of Jordan dissolvedthe assembly.

In his response to the parliamentary re-solution, JAEC chairman Khaled Toukansaid that it would not have any consequen-ces for the Jordanian nuclear energy prog-ram. He criticized the resolution, arguingthat it was premature to call for a halt

of the NPP project becauseJAEC was still choosing thetechnology supplier and thesite of the future NPP at thetime.77 Dr. Toukan recognized,however, that the decision onwhether to build a uranium

mine would be largely informed by the fin-dings of the ongoing economic feasibilitystudy.

Choosing the most suitable site for the fu-ture NPP is another complex challenge fa-cing the Jordanian government. Initiallythe government chose a site near the townof Aqaba, on the Red Sea coast. Accordingto some reports, however, that decision hasbeen reconsidered under Israeli pressure.

Meeting between Russian

President Vladimir Putin

and King Abdullah II of Jordan,

Novo-Ogaryovo, Russia, Moscow,

April 9, 2014

For Jordan the NPP is seen as an important element

of reducing dependence of oil and gas imports

and even turning the country into a net electriciy

exporter


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Meanwhile, public discontent over the go-vernments nuclear energy plans reacheda breaking point in July 2012, when localsin Ar Ramtha attacked the site chosen forthe research reactor, smashing doors and

windows, and burning technical documents.Local residents were vehemently opposedto having a reactor built close to their homes.Several scientists and environmentalists laun-ched a campaign against building any nu-clear facilities in the country, and urged theSouth Korean contractor to pull out of theresearch reactor project.78Greenpeace playsa prominent role in the public debate over

Jordans nuclear energy plans. Accordingto some media reports, the environmentalmovements activists have already collectednumerous signatures under an anti-nuclearpetition submitted to the prime minister.79

Jordans largest opposition political party,the Islamic Action Front (IAF), was also ini-tially opposed to JAEC plans for buildingnuclear power plants. In April 2012 it saidthat the goals of the program and the sources

of its financing, as explained by the Commis-sion, were vague and misleading.80 Aftera meeting between IAF and JAEC represen-tatives in February 2013, the Islamic ActionFront said it would review its position on

the national nuclear energy program.

The IAF secretary-general, Hamza Mansour,said that the party was in favor of projectsaimed at strengthening the national energysector, and recognized the need to study theproposed nuclear energy program in greaterdetail. Later on the IAF released a statementoutlining 12 conditions JAEC must meet toensure the effectiveness of the nuclear pro-

gram. They included environmental protec-tion measures, safe and secure nuclear wastemanagement, a responsible approach to ma-naging the countrys water resources, andtransparency in the choice of the technologysupplier.

Excavation works in a desert

in southern Jordan


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Jordanian officials take into account instability

on the countrys borders as one of the potential

obstacles to the nuclear energy program

After Fukushima and the Arab Spring

The Fukushima accident in Japan highligh-ted the vulnerability of nuclear power plantsto natural disasters, thereby strengtheningthe argument of the opponents of Jordans

nuclear energy program.

Jordanian officials continue to insist, howe-ver, that the program is indispensable. Deputychairman of JAEC Abdul Haleem Wreikat hassaid that despite the potential risks posed bynatural disasters, the government had nointention of reversing its decision to buildNPPs because of the Fukushima accident.He argued that the pressurized water reac-

tor to be built in Jordan represented third-generation technology, which is much saferthan the old boiling water reactors at the Fu-kushima Daiichi NPP. He went on to say that

building nuclear power plants is currentlya more preferable option for Jordan thanrenewable energy, including solar and wind,because renewables still remain a more ex-pensive option. Nevertheless, in responseto the Fukushima accident the Jordaniangovernment drew up a new set of safetyrequirements for the future NPP and orde-red additional geological and environmentalassessments of the project.81

Jordanian officials also take into account

instability on the countrys borders as one

of the potential obstacles to the nuclear ener-

gy program. As the conflict in Syria took

a turn for the worse, Dr. Khaled Toukan

said that the project to build the Jordanian

nuclear power plant could be postponed,

especially in view of the growing number

of refugees fleeing to Jordan from Syria.82

Outlook

Jordan is one of the few countries in theMiddle East to have opted for nuclear energymainly because of the lack of its own oil, gas,or hydroelectric power resources, with the

resulting need to bolster national energysecurity. Jordans choice of the nuclear energyoption therefore appears entirely reasonableand justified.

The main obstacles to practical implementa-tion of the national nuclear energy programinclude high seismic activity in large partsof the country; lack of reliable geological da-ta about the Al Amra site chosen for the futu-

re NPP; the complexity of attracting invest-ment to finance the project; a shortageof trained specialists; mounting securityproblems on the countrys borders (which

could have dangerous reper-cussions for domestic politicalstability in Jordan itself); andlingering anti-nuclear senti-ment among Jordanians follow-

ing the Fukushima accident. On September22, 2014, Rusatom Overseas, a Rosatomsubsidiary, and the Jordan Atomic EnergyCommission signed an agreement to pursuethe Amra NPP project. Under the terms of thedocument, which was signed on the sidelinesof the IAEA General Conference in Vienna,the two sides have undertaken commitmentswith regard to the first phase of the projectto build a nuclear power plant consisting

of two 1,000 MW reactors. An actual contractis expected to follow at some point in thefuture. The Russian contractor will designa water cooling system for the NPP, conducta technical and economic feasibility study,supervise the assessment of the proposedsite, and assess the environmental impactof the project with the next 2430 months.Russian companies may also participatein the Amra NPP project as coinvestors.83


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On March 24, 2015 Rosatom Direc-tor-General Sergey Kiriyenko andJAEC Chairman Khaled Toukansigned an intergovernmental ag-reement on cooperation in buil-

ding and operating Jordans firstnuclear power plant.

2.3. IRAN

Iran has long shown steady inte-rest in nuclear energy. Practicalefforts in that area began in thelate 1950s. Over the past almost60 years the countrys nuclear pro-gram has been moving forward in

fits and starts. Depending on thestate of the Iranian economy, domestic policy,and foreign relations, there have been pe-riods of rapid progress (in the late 1970sand in the 1990s) and stagnation (for exam-ple, during the Iran-Iraq war in 19801988).In addition to pursuing peaceful nuclearenergy, Iran is also known to have donenuclear-related research that can have mili-

tary applications. These efforts, however, arebeyond the scope of this paper.84

The key period in the development of nucleartechnologies in Iran was the 1970s. Thatis when the country laid the foundations ofnuclear expertise and technological capabilitythat are still very relevant to this day, andwhich largely underpin Irans leadershipin terms of nuclear energy development inthe Middle East.

In the early 1970s Iran adopted a program ofenergy sector diversification that focused onnuclear energy development. In March 1974the Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi,

unveiled a plan of building 23 nuclear po-wer reactors with a total capacity of appro-ximately 20 GW. The first two of these reac-tors were to be launched in 1980 and 1981in the southwest of the country, at a site on

the Persian Gulf coast 18 km from Bushehr.The entire program was expected to take20 years (i.e. until 1994) to complete. It wassupposed to bring the share of nuclear ener-gy in the countrys energy balance to 25%.The Iranian government largely continuesto stick to the peaceful nuclear energydevelopment targets unveiled as part of theShahs program.

In 1974 the government in Tehran set up theAtomic Energy Organizationof Iran (AEOI). That same yearit started to build the NuclearResearch Center in Isfahan totrain Iranian scientists and

engineers and develop nuclear fuel cycletechnologies; the project involved Frenchspecialists. Previously, in 1967, the UnitedStates supplied a 5 MW light-water research

The Iranian government largely continues to stick

to the peaceful nuclear energy development targets

unveiled as part of the Shahs program

First unit of the Bushehr NPP,

Iran


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reactor to the Tehran Nuclear ResearchCenter. The reactor was supplied with IAEAassistance as part of the U.S. - led Atomsfor Peace program.

In the late 1970s hundreds of Iranian stu-dents and young specialists received nuclearphysics training in the United States and Wes-tern European countries, including Belgium,Britain, France, Italy, Switzerland, and WestGermany. The Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology (MIT), one of Americas leadingtechnology schools, launched a special pro-gram of training Iranian nuclear energyspecialists. In December 1977 the AEOI and

the U.S. Department of Energy signed an ag-reement to train Iranian specialists at theOak Ridge National Laboratory.

Meanwhile, Iran was also developing its own

capability to train specialists for the nuclearenergy sector and other high-tech industries.That capability, which was created with theassistance of leading Western schools suchas the MIT, is still being used to train high-ly qualified indigenous specialists. Despitethe numerous sanctions imposed on Iranand the absence of diplomatic relations bet-ween Tehran and Washington, up until re-cently Iranian students had sufficient trai-

ning to enroll on technology courses atthe leading U.S. schools, including Harvard,Stanford, the Caltech, the MIT, etc. In 2003alone, 15 Iranian citizens began post-graduate training at Stanfords ElectricalEngineering Department. Most of them weregraduates of the Sharif University of Tech-

Mohammad Ahmadian, Director-General

of the Nuclear Power Production and Development

Company of Iran (NPPD) and Deputy Head

of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI),

and Aleksandr Glukhov, President

of Atomstroyexport, at the Bushehr NPP launch

ceremony,

Bushehr, Iran, September 12, 2011


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nology, which rolled out nu-clear physics training pro-grams in cooperation withthe MIT back in the 1970s.85The current head of the AEOI

is Ali Akbar Salehi, who recei-ved PhD in nuclear enginee-ring from the MIT in 1977.

The first nuclear power reactor

in the Middle East

The Iranian nuclear energyprogram was frozen afterthe 1979 Islamic Revolution.The new Iranian leadership did not show

any interest in nuclear energy up untilthe mid-1980s.

By the time German specialists suspendedthe project to build the Bushehr NPP inJuly 1979, the first reactor of that plant hadreached 8085% completion, and the second5070%. During the Iran-Iraq war in 19801988, the unfinished Bushehr nuclear powerplant sustained major damage during seve-

ral air raids.86

In the early 1990s Russian specialists startedto work on a project to complete the firstreactor of the Bushehr NPP. On August 25,1992 the Russian and Iranian governmentssigned an agreement on cooperation in the

construction of a nuclear power plant in theterritory of Iran. On January 8, 1995, autho-rized Iranian and Russian organizations sig-ned a contract on the completion of thefirst reactor of the Bushehr NPP using theVVER-1000 reactor design. In August 1995Russia and Iran signed a contract under

which a Russian company undertook to sup-ply nuclear fuel for the Bushehr NPP forthe first 10 years of its operation. At Iransrequest, Russian engineers integrated thetechnologies and equipment supplied in the

1970s by Germanys Siemens into the Rus-sian reactor design after a careful inspectionand testing.

The Russian specialists who worked on theproject to complete the first reactor of the Bu-shehr NPP faced a whole range of technolo-

gical, technical, political, andfinancial difficulties. They we-re compounded by the fact

that the contract to finish theBushehr NPP was Russiasfirst contract of its kind since

the break-up of the Soviet Union and theComecon trading bloc. Iran had no previousexperience in such projects, either. On topof that, the Russian general contractor yiel-ded to the customers pressure and agreedto overly optimistic project deadlines.

Iran was the first country that launched

nuclear power reactor in the Middle East

Another round of nucleartalks between Tehran

and international mediators,

Baghdad, Iraq, May 23, 2012


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The No 1 reactor of the Bu-shehr NPP was connected tothe Iranian national grid onSeptember 3, 2011. It was thefirst nuclear power reactor

to be launched in the MiddleEast. Iran was also the firstcountry in the world in15 years, and only the fourthsince the Chernobyl disasterto have launched its first nu-clear power reactor. The Bu-shehr plant reached its maxi-mum output in 2012, bringing the share

of nuclear energy in Irans energy balanceto its peak of 2.5%. On September 23, 2013the Iranian customer signed a preliminaryacceptance certificate for the Bushehr NPP;this commenced the two-year warranty pe-riod. The No 1 reactor therefore went fullyoperational 37 years after German specia-lists began to work at the Bushehr NPP site.

Prospects for increasing

Irans nuclear energy output

AEOI representatives say that work is underway to choose sites for new Iranian nuclearpower plants. The potential candidatesinclude sites on the coast of the Caspian Sea,the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Oman; in

the Khuzestan Province; and in the north-west of the country. According to the in-formation at our disposal, the preliminarylist of potentially suitable NPP sites includes16 candidates, including the Bushehr andDarkhovin sites.

The first large-scale program to identify suit-

able NPP sites in Iran began in the mid-1970s.

These efforts involved leading Western com-panies. In the end, however, only two siteshad been identified by 1979. One was nearthe town of Bushehr, where the BushehrNPP has since been built. The other is nearthe town of Ahvaz, where Iran plans to buildthe Darkhovin NPP using medium-sized

power reactors of its own design, accordingto the AEOI. There is also a potential sitenear Isfahan, where Iran wanted to buildtwo German-designed air-cooled reactorssince the site lacks access to a large body

of water. Because of the technolo-gical complexity, however, the refe-rence unit of such a reactor has yetto be built anywhere in the world.

In view of the modern safety requi-rements, the project is unlikely to beimplemented ever.

In the 1970 Iran also considered candidate

sites near Arak (Shazand Country), Urmia

(West Azerbaijan Province), and Saveh

(Markazi Province).87 The future NPP in

Saveh was to be built by German companies

in the event of a successful completion of

the air-cooled NPP project in Isfahan (Saveh

The contract to finish the Bushehr NPP

prospects for nuclear power in the middle east: russia’s interests

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