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SIMPROSA VDA. DE ESPINA, RECAREDO ESPINA, TIMOTEO ESPINA, CELIA ESPINA, GAUDIOSA ESPINA and NECIFORA ESPINA, petitioners, vs.THE HON. OTILIO ABAYA and SOFIA ESPINA and JOSE ESPINA, respondents.Cipriano C. Alvizo, Sr. for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction seeking the nullification of the orders issued by the respondent Judge Otilio Abaya, in his capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Sur, Branch II, Lianga, Surigao del Sur in Civil Case No. L-108, entitled "Simprosa Vda. de Espina, et. al. v. Sofia Espina, et. al." dated May 9, 1975 dismissing the complaint for partition; July 25, 1975 denying the motion for reconsideration; August 13, 1975 denying the second motion for reconsideration and March 15, 1976 denying plaintiffs' notice of appeal.The antecedent facts are as follows:Marcos Espina died on February 14, 1953 and was survived by his spouses, Simprosa Vda. de Espina and their children namely, Recaredo, Timoteo, Celia, Gaudiosa, Necifora, Sora and Jose, all surnamed Espina. Decedent's estate comprises of four (4) parcels of land located at the Municipality of Barobo Province of Surigao del Sur.On August 23, 1973 an action for partition of the aforementioned parcels of land was filed by petitioners Simprosa and her children Recaredo, Timoteo, Celia, Gaudencia and Necifora.The complaint alleges that parcel No. 1 is the exclusive property of the deceased, hence the same is owned in common by petitioners and private respondents in eight (8) equal parts, while the other three (3) parcels of land being conjugal properties, are also owned in common, one-half (1/2) belongs to the widow Simprosa and the other half is owned by her and her children in eight (8) equal parts.It also alleges that parcel No. 1 has been subdivided into two lots. Lot No. 994 PL8-44 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5570 in the name of one of the heirs, Sofia Espina, who acquired the title as a trustee for the beneficiaries or heirs of Marcos Espina, while lot No. 1329 PCS-44 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3732 issued in the name of one of the heirs, Jose Espina as trustee for the heirs of Marcos Espina. Said parcel of land is in the possession of petitioners and private respondents who have their respective houses thereon.
Simprosa presently occupies parcel No. 2 while parcel No. 3 is occupied by Timoteo, although the same is actually titled in the name of Sofia. Parcel No. 4 is occupied by Recaredo.Petitioners have several times demanded the partition of the aforementioned properties, but notwithstanding such demands private respondents refused to accede.Private respondents alleged in their answer that in or about April, 1951, the late Marcos Espina and his widow, Simprosa, together with their children made a temporary verbal division and assignment of shares among their children. After the death of Marcos, the temporary division was finalized by the heirs. Thereafter the heirs took immediate possession of their respective shares on April 20, 1952. Private respondents took actual physical possession of their respective shares including the portions ceded to them by Simprosa upon their payment of P50.00 each per quarter starting April, 1952 until the latter's death pursuant to their contract of procession The assignment of shares was as follows:
(a) To the surviving spouses, (sic) Simprosa Vda. de Espina, herein plaintiffs, one-half (1/2) of the parcel of land adjudicated to each of said plaintiffs-heirs and defendants;(b) To each of the following compulsory heirs, to wit:1. To Recaredo (sic) Espina, one-half (1/2) portion which contains an area of one and three-fourths (1 3/4) hectares and which forms part of Parcel 4 whose description is given in paragraph III of the complaint, the said Parcel IV has been in the possession of both Recaredo Espina and plaintiff Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April 20, 1952 until the present time;2. To Timoteo Espina, one half (1/2) portion which contains an area of not less than one-half (1/2) hectare and which forms part of Parcel 3 whose description is given in paragraph III of the complaint, the said Parcel III was originally assigned by Marcos Espina who thereupon obtained an Original Certificate of Title in her (sic) name but was finally adjudicated to said Timoteo Espina in April, 1952, the other half (1/2) portion of which parcel III was the share of the surviving spouses (sic), Simprosa Vda. de Espina, and said Parcel III has been in the possession of said Timoteo Espina and Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April, 1952 until the present time as their share;3. To Cecilia (sic) Espina, Gaudiosa Espina and Necifora Espina, one-half (1/2) portion, share and share alike which contains two (2) hectares and which forms part of Parcel II whose description is given in paragraph III of the complaint, the other half (1/2) of said Parcel III (sic) is the share of the
surviving spouses (sic) Simprosa Vda. de Espina, and said Parcel III (sic) has been in the possession of said Cecilia. (sic) Espina, Gaudiosa Espina and Necifora Espina and Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April, 1952 until the present time;4. To Sofia Espina, one-half (1/2) portion of the parcel of land included in the deception of Parcel 1 in paragraph III of the complaint, the other half (1/2) of said parcel being the share of the surviving spouses (sic) Simprosa Vda. de Espina and having been ceded by said Simprosa Vda. de Espina to said Sofia Espina for a valuable consideration payable quarterly at the rate of P50.00 beginning April, 1952 until her death, and said Sofia Espina has been regularly paying to said Simprosa Vda. de Espina quarterly from April, 1952 the said amount of P50.00 until the present time, and by virtue of said agreement, Sofia Espina obtained Original Certificate of Title in her name of said parcel of land which is included in the description of said parcel 1, as her exclusive property;5. To Jose Espina, one-half (1/2) portion of the other parcel of land included in the description of Parcel 1 in paragraph 1 of the complaint, the other half (1/2) of said parcel being the share of the surviving spouses (sic) Simprosa Vda. de Espina and having been coded (sic) by said Simprosa Vda. de Espina to said Jose Espina for a valuable consideration payable quarterly at the rate of P50.00 beginning April, 1952 until her death, and said Jose Espina has been regularly quarterly paying to said Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April, 1952 until the present time, the said amount of P50.00, and by virtue of said agreement, Jose Espina obtained Original Certificate of Title in his name of said parcel of land which is included in the description of said Parcel 1 as his exclusive property. (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
On February 13, 1974 private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging the following grounds, to wit:
ITHAT THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT FAIL TO CONFER UPON THE COURT COMPLETE AND LAWFUL JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITION SINE QUA NON CONCERNING SUIT BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY.x x x x x x x x xIITHAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED BY . . . . STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
x x x x x x x x xIIITHAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAS NO LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE, (Motion to Dismiss Complaint, pp. 1-5; Rollo, pp. 34-38)x x x x x x x x x
On May 9, 1975 the trial court granted the motion and thereafter dismissed the complaint. On May 23, 1975 petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the following grounds, to wit:
1. THAT THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL HAS NO LEGAL BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.2. THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR. (Rollo, p. 50)
However, petitioners' motion was denied in an order dated July 23, 1975. On August 11, 1975 petitioners filed another motion for reconsideration stressing that they were denied due process when their motion was not heard. Again said motion was denied on August 13, 1975.Thereafter, petitioners filed their notice of appeal on September 11, 1975 and a motion for extension of time to file their Record on Appeal on September 18, 1975.On March 15, 1976, the respondent judge disapproved petitioners' Record on Appeal and appeal bond on the ground that the notice of appeal was filed out of time. Hence, this petition. The petitioners raised four (,41) assignment of errors:
1. Whether or not an action for partition among co-heirs prescribes.2. Whether or not an oral partition among co-heirs is valid.3. Whether or not a hearing on a motion for reconsideration is indispensable the lack of which is a deal of due process.4. Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration is pro forma Rollo, p. 10)
Petitioners maintain that the present action is not for reconveyance but one for partition. Hence, the rule insisted by the private respondents on prescriptibility of an action for reconcile conveyance of real property based on an implied trust is not applicable in the case at bar. In addition, petitioners, argue that private respondents cannot set up the defense of prescription or laches because their possession of the property no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership. (Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 7)However, the private respondents stress that 'any supposed right of the petitioners to demand a new division or partition of said estate of Marcos Espina
has long been barred by the Statute of Limitations and has long prescribed." (Memorandum for Private Respondents, p. 5)The petitioners claim that the alleged oral partition is invalid and strictly under the coverage of the statute of Frauds on two grounds, to wit:Firstly, parcel No. 1 being an exclusive property of the deceased should have been divided into eight (8) equal parts. Therefore, Simprosa . could only cede her share of the land which is 1/8 portion thereof and cannot validly cede the shares of her then minor children without being duly appointed as guardian.Secondly, under Article 1358 of the New Civil Code, Simprosa could not have ceded her right and that of her other children except by a public document. (Memorandum of Petitioners, pp. 8-9)On the other hand, private respondents insist that the oral partition is valid and binding and does not fall under the coverage of the Statute of Frauds.Petitioners claim that they were denied due process when the motion for reconsideration was denied without any hearing.However, private respondents maintain that the hearing of a motion for reconsideration in oral argument is a matter which rest upon the sound discretion of the Court.Finally, petitioners stress that the second motion for reconsideration is not pro forma, thus, it suspends the running of the period of appeal. Hence, the notice of appeal was timely filed.On this point, private respondent maintain that the order of respondent judge dated March 1 5, 1976 disapproving petitioners' Record on Appeal and appeal bond may not properly be a subject of a petition for certiorari. (Memorandum of Private Respondents, p. 13)We find the petition devoid of merit.We already ruled in Lebrilla, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 72623, December 18, 1989, 180 SCRA 188; 192) that an action for partition is imprescriptible. However, an action for partition among co-heirs ceases to be such, and becomes one for title where the defendants allege exclusive ownership.In the case at bar, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition cannot be invoked because two of the co-heirs, namely private respondents Sora and Jose Espina possessed the property as exclusive owners and their possession for a period of twenty one (21) years is sufficient to acquire it by prescription. Hence, from the moment these co-heirs claim that they are the absolute and exclusive owners of the properties and deny the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership.
Anent the issue of oral partition, We sustain the validity of said partition.1âwphi1 "An agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the partition of the property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The Statute of Frauds has no operation in this kind of agreements, for partition is not a conveyance of property but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the property which belong to the co-owners." (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Edition, 182-183 citing Hernandez v. Andal, et. al., G.R. No. L275, March 29, 1957)Time and again, the Court stresses that the hearing of a motion for reconsideration in oral argument is a matter which rests upon the sound discretion of the Court. Its refusal does not constitute a denial of due process in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. (see Philippine Manufacturing Co. v. Ang Bisig ng PMC et. al., 118 Phil. 431, 434)The absence of a formal hearing on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration is thoroughly explained in the order of the respondent judge dated August 13, 1975, which is hereunder quoted as follows:
When the court issued its order of June 5, 1975 requiring counsel for defendants to answer plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the court opted to resolve plaintiffs' motion based on the pleadings of the parties, without further oral arguments. The court considered the arguments of the parties stated in their pleadings as already sufficient to apprise the court of the issues involved in said motion.Plaintiffs' allegation that the Clerk of Court failed to calendar their motion for reconsideration for oral argument has not deprived the plaintiffs of any substantial right or his right to due process.SO ORDERED. (Memorandum of Private Respondents, pp. 1213)
A cursory reading of the aforequoted order will show that there was indeed no formal hearing on the motion for reconsideration. There is no question however, that the motion is grounded on the lack of basis in fact and in law of the order of dismissal and the existence or lack of it is determined by a reference to the facts alleged in the challenged pleading. The issue raised in the motion was fully discussed therein and in the opposition thereto. Under such circumstances, oral argument on the motion is reduced to an unnecessary ceremony and should be overlooked (see Ethel Case, et al. v. Jugo, 77 Phil. 517, 522).We adhere to the findings of the trial court that the second motion for reconsideration dated August 11, 1975 ispro forma, to it
The grounds stated in said motion being in reiteration of the same grounds alleged in his first motion, the same is pro-forma. (Order dated March 15, 1976, p. 2, Rollo, p. 74)x x x x x x x x xFurthermore, the second motion for reconsideration has not stated new grounds considering that the alleged failure of the Clerk of Court to set plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, although seemingly a different ground than those alleged in their first motion for reconsideration, is only incidental to the issues raised in their first motion for reconsideration, as it only refers to the right of plaintiffs' counsel to argue his motion in court just to amplify the same grounds already deed by the court. (Ibid, p. 3, Rollo, p. 75)
Therefore, it is very evident that the second motion for reconsideration being pro-forma did not suspend the running of the period of appeal. Thus, the lower court committed no error when it held that the notice of appeal was filed after the lapse of thirty five (35) days, which is clearly beyond the period of thirty (30) days allowed by the rules.Finally, it has been a basic rule that certiorari is not a substitute for appeal which had been lost. (see Edra v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75041, November 13, 1989, 179 SCRA 344) A special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a substitute or cure for failure to file a timely petition for review oncertiorari (appeal) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Escudero v. Dulay, G.R. No. 60578, February 23, 1988, 158 SCRA 69, 77)The application of the abovecited rule should be relaxed where it is shown that it will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice. (Ibid, p. 77) However, as emphasized earlier, the case at bar is totally devoid of merit, thus, the strict application of the said file will not in any way override sub-substantial justice.Therefore, the delay of five (5) days in filing a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file a record on appeal cannot be excused on the basis of equity.All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the acts of respondent judge, in dismissing the action for partition and in subsequently denying the motions for reconsideration of the petitioners, does not amount to grave abuse of discretion.ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.
PEDRO OLIVERAS, TEODORA GASPAR, MELECIO OLIVERAS and ANICETA MINOR, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.CANDIDO LOPEZ, SEVERO LOPEZ, HIPOLITO LOPEZ, EUGENIA LOPEZ, PRIMITIVO GASPAR, CORAZON LOPEZ, ALEJANDRO CACAYURIN, FAUSTINA BOTUYAN, MODESTO SALAZAR, ADORACION BOTUYAN, CLAUDIO GANOTICE and ENONG BOTUYAN, defendants-appellants.Venancio B. Fernando for defendants-appellants. FERNAN, C.J.:This case exemplifies the Filipino custom of keeping inherited property in a prolonged juridical condition of co-owner ship.Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot 4685 of the Cadastral survey of Villasis, Pangasinan with an area of 69,687 square meters as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 15262. 1 In December, 1931, Lorenzo Lopez died, 2 leaving said property to his wife, Tomasa Ramos and six (6) children. From that time on, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez did not initiate any moves to legally partition the property.More than twenty-one years later, or on February 11, 1953, Tomasa Ramos and her eldest son, Candido Lopez, executed a deed of absolute sale of the "eastern undivided four thousand two hundred and fifty seven-square meters (4,257) more or less, of the undivided portion of (their) interests, rights and participation" over Lot 4685, in favor of the spouses Melecio Oliveras and Aniceta Minor, in consideration of the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000). 3
On the same day, Tomasa and Candido executed another deed of absolute sale of the "undivided" four thousand two hundred and fifty-seven (4,257) square meters of the "eastern part" of Lot 4685 in favor of the spouses Pedro Oliveras and Teodora Gaspar, also in consideration of P1,000. 4 Each of the said documents bear the thumbmark of Tomasa and the signature of Candido.In his affidavit also executed on February 11, 1953, Candido stated that a month prior to the execution of the deed of sale in favor of Melecio Oliveras, he offered his: "undivided portion" of Lot 4685 to his "adjacent owners" but none of them was "in a position to purchase" said property. 5
Since the execution of the two deeds of absolute sale, the vendees, brothers Melecio and Pedro, had been paying the real property taxes for their respectively purchased properties. 6 They also had been in possession of their purchased properties which, being planted to palay and peanuts, were segregated from the rest of Lot 4685 by dikes. 7
More than thirteen years later or on November 21, 1966, the counsel of the Oliveras brothers wrote the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez reminding them of the Oliverases' demands to partition the property so that they could acquire their respective titles thereto without resorting to court action, and that, should they fail to respond, he would be forced to file a case in court. 8 Apparently, the Lopezes did not answer said letter since on December 15, 1966, the Oliveras brothers and their wives filed a complaint for partition and damages 9 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.10
The Oliverases stated in their complaint that possession of the disputed properties was delivered to them with the knowledge and consent of the defendants; that they had been paying the real estate taxes thereon; that prior to the sale, said properties were offered to the other co-owners for sale but they refused to buy them; that on February 18, 1953, the transactions were duly annotated and entered in the Memorandum of encumbrances of OCT No. 15262 as adverse claims; and that their desire to segregate the portions of Lot 4685 sold to them was frustrated by defendants' adamant refusal to lend them the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 15262 and to execute a deed of partition of the whole lot.In claiming moral damages in the amount of P2,000.00 plaintiffs alleged that defendants also refused to allow them to survey and segregate the portions bought by them. Plaintiffs prayed that the court order the defendants to partition Lot 4685 and to allow them to survey and segregate the portions they had purchased. They also demanded payment of P800.00 as attorney's fees and cost of the suit.In their answer, the defendants alleged that no sale ever transpired as the alleged vendors could not have sold specific portions of the property; that plaintiffs' possession and occupation of specific portions of the properties being illegal, they could not ripen into ownership; and that they were not under any obligation to lend their copy of the certificate of title or to accede to plaintiffs' request for the partition or settlement of the property. As special and affirmative defenses, the defendants contended that the deeds of sale were null and void and hence, unenforceable against them; that the complaint did not state a cause of action and that the cause or causes of action if any, had prescribed.Defendants averred in their counterclaim that despite repeated demands, plaintiffs refused and failed to vacate the premises; that the properties occupied by the plaintiffs yielded an average net produce in palay and peanuts in the amount of P1,600.00 annually, and that the complaint was filed to harass them. They prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and the payment of P1,600.00 per
year from 1953 until plaintiffs shall have vacated the premises and P1,000.00 for attorney's fees.Plaintiffs filed an answer to defendants' counterclaim, denying all the allegations therein and stating that defendants never demanded that plaintiffs vacate the portions of Lot 4685 they had bought.The lower court explored the possibility of an amicable settlement between the parties without success. Hence, it set the case for trial and thereafter, it rendered adecision 11 declaring valid the deeds of absolute sale 12 and ordering the defendants to allow the segregation of the sold portions of Lot 4685 by a licensed surveyor in order that the plaintiffs could obtain their respective certificates of title over their portions of said lot.In resolving the case, the lower court passed upon the issue of whether the two deeds of absolute sale were what they purported to be or merely mortgage documents. It considered as indicia of plaintiffs' absolute dominion over the portions sold to them their actual possession thereof without any opposition from the defendants until the filing of the complaint, their payment of taxes thereon and their having benefited from the produce of the land. The court ruled that the defendants' testimonial evidence that the deeds in question were merely mortgage documents cannot overcome the evidentiary value of the public instruments presented by the plaintiffs.On the issue of whether the two deeds of absolute sale were null and void considering that the land subject thereof had not yet been partitioned, the court observed that the total area of 8,514 square meters sold to plaintiffs by Candido was less than his share should Lot 4685 with an area of 69,687 square meters be divided among the six children of Lorenzo Lopez and their mother. In this connection, the lower court also found that during his lifetime, and before Candido got married, Lorenzo Lopez had divided Lot 4685 among his children who then took possession of their respective shares. *The defendants appealed said decision to this Court contending that the lower court erred in declaring the two deeds of absolute sale as valid, in ordering the segregation of the sold portions of Lot 4685 to enable the plaintiffs to obtain their respective certificates of title, and in not considering their defense of prescription.The extrinsic validity of the two deeds of absolute sale is not in issue in this case in view of the finding of the trial court that the defendants admittedly do not question their due execution. 13 What should pre-occupy the Court is the intrinsic
validity of said deeds insofar as they pertain to sales of designated portions of an undivided, co-owned property.In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing. 14
However, the duration of the juridical condition of co-ownership is not limitless. Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership of an estate should not exceed the period of twenty (20) years. And, under the former article, any agreement to keep a thing or property undivided should be for a ten-year period only. Where the parties stipulate a definite period of in division which exceeds the maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void only as to the period beyond such maximum. 15
Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the in division of a property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period set by the law. Otherwise, the 20-year limitation expressly mandated by the Civil Code would be rendered meaningless.In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez maintained the co-ownership for more than twenty years. We hold that when Candido and his mother (who died before the filing of the complaint for partition) sold definite portions of Lot 4685, they validly exercised dominion over them because, by operation of law, the co-ownership had ceased. The filing of the complaint for partition by the Oliverases who, as vendees, are legally considered as subrogated to the rights of Candido over portions of Lot 4685 in their possession, 16 merely served to put a stamp of formality on Candido's otherwise accomplished act of terminating the co-ownership.The action for partition has not prescribed. Although the complaint was filed thirteen years from the execution of the deeds of sale and hence, as contended by the defendants-appellants, prescription might have barred its filing under the general provision of Article 1144 (a) of the Civil Code, Article 494 specifically mandates that eachco-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Hence, considering the validity of the conveyances of portions of Lot 4685 in their favor and as subrogees of Candido Lopez, the Oliverases' action for partition was timely and properly filed. 17
We cannot write finis to this decision without commenting on the compliance with the resolution of September 1, 1986 of counsel for defendants-appellants. In said resolution, the court required the parties to move in the premises
"considering the length of time that this case has remained pending in this Court and to determine whether or not there might be supervening events which may render the case moot and academic. 18 In his manifestation and motion dated August 12, 1987, said counsel informed the Court that he had contacted the defendants-appellants whom he advised "to move in the premises which is the land in question and to maintain the status quo with respect to their actual possession thereon" and that he had left a copy of said resolution with the defendants-appellants" for their guidance in the compliance of their obligations (sic) as specified in saidresolution." 19
Obviously, said counsel interpreted literally the Court's directive "to move in the premises." For the enlightenment of said counsel and all others of similar perception, a "move in the premises" resolution is not a license to occupy or enter the premises subject of litigation especially in cases involving real property. A "move in the premises" resolution simply means what is stated therein: the parties are obliged to inform the Court of developments pertinent to the case which may be of help to the Court in its immediate disposition.WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court insofar as it declares the validity of the two deeds of sale and directs the partition of Lot 4685, is AFFIRMED. The lower court is hereby ordered to facilitate with dispatch the preparation of a project of partition which it should thereafter approve. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.SO ORDERED.
IRENE TAC-AN-DANO, FELIPE G. TAC-AN, DIOSDADO G. TAC-AN and SOCORRO TAC-AN GENOBATEN,petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALFONSO G. TAC-AN, respondents.Felipe G. Tac-an for petitioners.Adelino B. Sitoy for private respondent. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:Petitioners herein seek to reverse the Decision of the then Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 63057-R, as well as its Resolution which denied their Motion for Reconsideration, and to reinstate in toto the Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, Oroquieta City, in Civil Case No. 3092, for Recovery of Ownership of Coconut Trees and Damages filed by private respondent against them.Petitioners Irene Tac-an Dano, Felipe G. Tac-an, Diosdado G. Tac-an and Socorro Tac-an Genobaten, and private respondent ALFONSO G. Tac-an, are brothers and sisters, children of the deceased spouses Pio Tac-an and Luisa Guzman. Upon the demise of Pio Tac-an on March 12, 1948, his wife, Luisa, managed the entire estate, including an agricultural land of approximately 89 hectares at San Isidro, Misamis Occidental, until her death on April 18, 1971.On September 28, 1971, intestate proceedings for the settlement of Luisa's estate were instituted by petitioner Diosdado Tac-an before the Court of First instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 615. ALFONSO opposed the petition contending that one-half of the new 6,159 coconut trees at the San Isidro property belonged to him in accordance with his agreement with his late mother. Ultimately, on January 29, 1973, partition was ordered by the intestate Court pursuant to a Compromise Agreement arrived at among the heirs. ALFONSO claimed, however, that the partition was without prejudice to the prosecution of his claim in a separate suit.On January 31, 1975, ALFONSO filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership of Coconut Trees and Damages against petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, Oroquieta City, docketed as Civil Case No. 3092, which he amended on April 3, 1975. He alleged that sometime in 1944, upon the request of his late mother, and with the consent of petitioners, he planted coconut trees on an agricultural land of their late father at San Isidro Señor Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental, with an area of 89.7033 hectares: that part of the land was planted with sugar cane which he gradually replaced with coconut trees, completing the work in 1957; that he and his mother, during her lifetime,
agreed, without objection from petitioners, that the coconut trees including the fruits and produce thereof, would be equally divided between them; that their equal sharing continued for fifteen (15) years; that upon the death of their mother, petitioner Diosdado Tac-an filed in September 1971, Special Proceeding No. 615 with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, for the partition of the real and personal properties left by their parents, which he opposed.Petitioners, in their Answer, stated that ALFONSO's claim for improvements is barred by prior judgment in Special Proceedings No. 615 rendered by the intestate Court on the basis of the amicable compromise agreement entered into by the parties after concessions were given to respondent for the settlement of said claim; that by virtue of said Decision, the land in San Isidro was subdivided and adjudicated in equal shares among them; that the claim of respondent for one-half (½) of the produce of the coconut trees was denied by the intestate Court in its Order of April 18, 1972, which had already became final; that the complaint states no cause of action; that the claim is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and is barred by the Statute of Limitations and/or prescription.On September 12, 1977, the trial Court, through Judge Mariano M. Florido, dismissed ALFONSO's Complaint and rendered judgment, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the plaintiff's complaint for lack of merit; and ordering the plaintiff, under the Counterclaim, to pay and deliver to the defendants:1. The amount of P21,000.00, representing the share of the defendants which the plaintiff failed to give and deliver to the defendants from May, 1971 to September, 1971, with interest thereon at six (6) per cent per annum from the filing of defendants' Counterclaim on July 3, 1975, until the amount is fully paid;2. The forty (40) heads of cows representing the shares of the defendants in the amicable settlement dated January 29, 1973 in Special Proc. No. 615, and the additional forty (40) heads of cows representing the offsprings, which the cows of the defendants would ordinarily have produced but which they failed to do so, to the prejudice of the defendants, on account of the default of the plaintiff, or for a total of eighty (80) heads of cows; or in case of failure of plaintiff to deliver the eighty (80) heads of cows to the defendants, to pay to the defendants the amount of P80,000.00, representing the value of the eighty (80) heads of cows at
P1,000.00 per head. plus interest thereon at six (6%) per cent per annum from the filing of defendants' counterclaim on July 3, 1975, until fully paid;3. The amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages;4. The amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and in the further amount of P5,000.00, as expenses of litigation; and5. With costs against the plaintiff.
On appeal, the then Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the trial Court by allowing ALFONSO to receive one-half of the produce of the coconut trees, reducing the number of cows, and eliminating the award of damages and attorney's fees, as follows:
WHEREFORE, with the modifications that the plaintiff is entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the produce of coconuts in the land at San Isidro, Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental to resume upon finality of this decision; that plaintiff should only return to defendants 40 cows and if not possible the equivalent in value at the rate of P500.00 per head or a total of P20,000.00 with legal rate of interest at 6% from the filing of defendants' counterclaim on July 3, 1975 until fully paid; the elimination of moral damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects, without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
Before us now, petitioners, as defendants below, impugn the Decision of the Appellate Court assigning to it the following errors:
IThe Court of Appeals committed serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not holding that the claim for improvements of Alfonso Tac-an is barred by a prior final order in Special Proceeding No. 615 — Res Judicata.IIThe Court of Appeals committed serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction in not holding that the claim for improvements of Alfonso Tac-an was likewise settled and adjudicated by the final decision embodying the amicable compromise agreement of the parties for the partition of the estate in Special Proceeding No. 615 — Res Judicata.
IIIThe Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it sanctioned the filing of this present independent civil action relying mainly on the clarificatory orders (erroneously referred to by the Court of Appeals as "decision") of Judge Melecio Genato which are contrary to the amicable compromise agreement embodied and approved in the decision of Judge Mariano Florido.IVThe Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in modifying the lower court decision by declaring that Alfonso Tac-an is entitled to receive one-half (½) of the produce despite the fact that it emphatically declared and held that no agreement existed between plaintiff and his mother.VAssuming arguendo that there was such agreement the Court of Appeals gravely erred in enforcing it against petitioners.VIThe Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in resolving the claim of Alfonso Tac-an by entitling him to one-half (½) of the produce based on equity, justice and human considerations instead of applying clear and specific provisions of law (positive laws).VIIThe Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in applying laches and estoppel against defendants.VIIIThe Court of Appeals gravely erred in not resolving the issue that this action is barred by prescription relying on the illegal clarificatory orders of Judge Melecio Genato.IXThe Court of Appeals likewise gravely erred in resolving the issue that this action is barred by the Statute of Frauds also relying on the clarificatory orders of Judge Genato.X
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in modifying the decision of the lower Court by ordering plaintiff to return to defendants only 40 heads of cows or if not possible the equivalent in value at the rate of P500.00 per head or a total sum of P20,000.00 instead of the valuation of the trial Court.XIThe Court of Appeals gravely erred in eliminating the award of P21,000.00 representing the share of petitioners which plaintiff failed to give or deliver for the period from May 1971 to September 1971.XIIThe Court of Appeals gravely erred in deleting the award of moral damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
On July 27, 1983, we denied the petition for lack of merit, and likewise denied on January 11, 1984, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution. However, upon petitioners' Second Motion for Reconsideration, we resolved to reconsider our Resolutions of July 27, 1983 and January 11, 1984 and gave due course to the Petition.On res judicata and prescriptionPetitioners contend that ALFONSO's suit for recovery of ownership of coconut trees is barred by prior judgment in Special Proceedings No. 615. While it may be that the said intestate proceedings did attain finality, it was subject to the clarificatory Order, dated April 24, 1973, issued by Judge Melecio Genato reading:
The decision dated January 29, 1973, rendered by this Court based on the amicable settlement of the heirs in this case is amended to be without prejudice to whatever claim oppositor Alfonso Tac-an has over the improvements he had personally introduced or caused to be introduced into the estate situated at Señor Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental.
In his Order, dated June 19, 1973, resolving petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the same Judge held that there was "no amendment" to the Decision dated January 29, 1973. 2
Those Orders were elevated on certiorari to this Court in G.R. No. L-37298 entitled Irene Tac-an Dano, etc. vs. Hon. Melecio Genato, et al., which petition this Court dismissed for lack of merit on February 12, 1974. 3
Premised on the foregoing, the defense of res judicata must fail and it has to be held that the right was reserved to ALFONSO to pursue his claim for recovery of ownership of coconut trees.
Prescription can neither be invoked as against ALFONSO by reason of that reservation in his favor. He filed suit two years after the Decision in the intestate proceedings had been rendered. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, he had ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrued within which to file suit upon a judgment.On the Alleged AgreementALFONSO's complaint, filed in the trial Court, was completely based on an alleged oral agreement between himself, as co- owner, and his mother as another co-owner, whereby he would be receiving benefits from the mentioned coconut land more than he would be entitled to as co-owner. Both the trial Court and the Appellate Court made the factual finding that the arrangement if at all, could have referred only to the produce, with the difference that the former Court held that its effectivity ceased after the mother's death and could not bind the other heirs; whereas the latter Court ruled that since petitioners acquiesced in the arrangement during their mother's lifetime, they are now estopped from asserting the contrary.It is not disputed that the San Isidro property was the capital property of the father of the opposing parties, and that Luisa, their mother, was not authorized by petitioners upon the death of their father, to enter into contract with ALFONSO concerning the produce of their respective shares of said property. It has been established, too, that the expenses incurred in planting coconut trees in said land came from the common fund 4 and that concessions were given ALFONSO in the partition for his work in converting the property into coconut land. So, whatever agreement the mother had with ALFONSO regarding the produce of the coconut trees, could legally bind her share only, and chased upon her death. Petitioners merely tolerated such sharing arrangement in deference to their mother's commitment. This is shown by the fact that five months after her death, petitioners instituted the proceedings for the partition of the estate of their deceased parents including the San Isidro property. Accordingly, the doctrine of laches and estoppel as against petitioners cannot be successfully invoked. Absent was any element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence by which another is misled to his injury. 5
Moreover, the agreement between mother and son must be deemed superseded, for, on September 29, 1953, even during the lifetime of the mother, Original Certificate of Title No. 28 (Lot No. 1) in the name of the deceased father, was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. RT-121 issued in the names of "Felipe Tac-An Irene Tac-an, Alfonso Tac-an, Catalina Tac-an, Diosdado Tac-an, Socorro Tac-an and Luisa Guzman, in pro indiviso share of one- seventh (1/7) each", the last
named being the surviving spouse (Exhibit "12"). It will be seen, therefore, that, after 1953, it was expressly made of record that ALFONSO, his mother, and five (5) siblings (Catalina has since passed away) were co-owners in equal shares. If, in fact, ALFONSO, had an agreement as to ownership of the trees and produce with his mother, that was the time for him to have insisted on a lien to be specifically included in the title. His mother, too, would have been in a position to confirm or deny the existence of the agreement.Additionally, as petitioners contend, to give ALFONSO the right to receive one-half (½) of the produce of coconuts, as respondent Court did, would be to perpetuate a state of co-ownership, contrary to Article 494 of the Civil Code, which limits co-ownership to a period of ten (10) years or at most twenty (20) years.On the PartitionIt follows that ALFONSO's claim for recovery of ownership of the coconut trees and of the produce thereof must fail. He should only be entitled to the share alloted to him in the "share raffle" embodied in their compromise agreement and approved by the Court in Special Proceeding No. 615, dated January 29, 1973, as follows:
5. The share raffle was conducted with respect to the "Coconut Lands" mentioned on page 3 of the said partition proposal and the following result was registered:1. Lot 1 was drawn in favor of Mrs. Socorro Tac-an Genobatan; Lot 2 was drawn in favor of Mrs. Irene Tac-an Dano; Lot 3 was drawn in favor of oppositor Alfonso Tac-an; Lot 4 was drawn in favor of Atty. Felipe Tac-an, and Lot 5 was drawn in favor of Diosdado Tac-an.xxx xxx xxx7. ... The administrator of the estate is hereby ordered to make a tentative partition of the coconut land located at Señor Sinacaban into five (5) shares based not only on the area, but also on the value of the improvements thereon within a period of ten (10) days from today, and that the heirs hereby agree to draw another raffle in order to determine the share that would correspond to them in the drawing of lots, except the share of Alfonso Tac-an, the oppositor, which is agreed by the heirs to be that area where his house is standing and that the farm house be adjudicated to him. 6 (Emphasis ours)
The sharing in the Compromise Agreement submitted before the intestate Court with respect to the partition of the cows should also be maintained. The Courts, as a rule may not impose upon the parties a judgment different from their Compromise Agreement. 7 The pertinent sharing agreement reads:
7. With respect to the number of cows, as of today, there are seventy-one (71) heads of cows. It has been agreed by the parties and their counsel that Alfonso Tac-an will get 3/7 of this number or of whatever number of cows there are belonging to the estate, and the remainder 4/7 of the cows shall be divided equally by the four (4) remaining heirs which would give them the equivalent of 1/7 share of the said cows. If actually the number of cows as counted by the administrator is only 71, let it be divided in accordance with the agreement of the parties and the remaining one head of cow be turned over to the administrator for evaluation and the administrator may sell it and distribute the actual proceeds among the heirs. ... 8
Consonant, therefore, with our finding that ALFONSO is not entitled to one-half (½) of the produce of the San Isidro property, he should give to petitioners, as ruled by the trial court, their share which he failed to deliver from May 1971 to September 1971, or the amount of P21,000.00 plus interest thereon at six (6) per cent per annum from the filing of petitioners' counterclaim on July 3, 1975, until the amount is fully paid.As to the award of damages, there being no evidence of fraud and bad faith committed by ALFONSO, the elimination by respondent Appellate Court of the award of moral damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation to petitioners should be affirmed.WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment under review, this court RESOLVES:1] The elimination of the award of moral damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation to petitioners is hereby AFFIRMED.2] The award in favor of private respondent, Alfonso G. Tac-an, of one-half of the produce of the coconut trees from the coconut lands situated at San Isidro Señor Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental, is hereby SET ASIDE;3] Private respondent, Alfonso G. Tac-an, is hereby ordered to pay to petitioners the amount of P21,000.00 representing the latter's share in the produce of the coconuts from May 1971 to September 1971 with six (6) per cent interest thereon per annum from the filing of the counterclaim on July 3, 1975 until the amount is fully paid; and4] The parties are enjoined to abide by the terms of their Compromise Agreement in the partition of the heads of cattle.No costs.SO ORDERED.
AURORA DEL BANCO, EVELYN DEL BANCO, FEDERICO TAINO, SOLEDAD TAINO, JOVENCIO TAINO, SAMSON TAINO, NOE TAINO, SOCORRO TAINO and CLEOFAS TAINO, petitioners, vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Second Civil Cases Division), ALEJANDRA PANSACOLA, LEONILA ENCALLADO, VEDASTO ENCALLADO, JOSE YEPES, et al., respondents. PARAS, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari by way of appeal from: (a) the decision of respondent Court of Appeals (Intermediate Appellate Court) * promulgated on May 17, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 70460, entitled "Alejandra Pansacola, et al. vs. Domen Villabona del Banco, et al." which reversed and set aside the judgment ** of the trial court; and (b) its resolution ** of October 15, 1985 in the same case, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision and their supplement to motion for reconsideration.The dispositive portion of the questioned decision (Rollo, p. 97) reads, as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as it dismisses the complaint, and another one entered —(1) Declaring plaintiffs-appellants and defendants-appellees, in their respective capacities as described in par. V of the complaint, as co-owners of the property in dispute, but subject to the four-part pro-indiviso division already made by said property;(2) Ordering the cancellation of all certificates of title that may have been issued to any of the parties hereto; and(3) Ordering the complete and final partition of the subject property in conformity with law.For this purpose, this case is hereby remanded to the Court of origin so that a final partition shall be made in accordance with Sections 2, 3, et. seq., Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Register of Deeds for the Province of Quezon.
The facts of the case are taken from the decision of the Appellate Court (Rollo, p. 39) as follows:In a document executed in the Municipality of San Rafael, Bulacan, on February 11, 1859, three brothers, Benedicto Pansacola, Jose Pansacola and Manuel Pansacola (known as Fr. Manuel Pena) entered into an agreement which provided, among others:
(1) That they will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands comprising the Island of Cagbalite which is located within the boundaries of the Municipality of Mauban, Province of Tayabas (now Quezon) and has an approximate area of 1,600 hectares;(2) That the lands shall be considered after the purchase as their common property;(3) That the co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, minors at that time represented by their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) who will contribute for them in the proposed purchase of the Cagbalite Island;(4) That whatever benefits may be derived from the Island shall be shared equally by the co-owners in the following proportion: Benedicto Pansacola-1/4 share; Jose Pansacola-1/4 share; and, Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo-2/4 shares which shall be placed under the care of their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena).On August 14, 1866, co-owners entered into the actual possession and enjoyment of the Island purchased by them from the Spanish Government. On April 11, 1868 they agreed to modify the terms and conditions of the agreement entered into by them on February 11, 1859. The new agreement provided for a new sharing and distribution of the lands, comprising the Island of Cagbalite and whatever benefits may be derived therefrom, as follows:
(a) The first one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Benedicto Pansacola;(b) The second one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Jose Pansacola;(c) The third one-fourth(1/4) portion shall henceforth belong to the children of their deceased brother, Don Eustaquio Pansacola, namely: Don Mariano Pansacola,- Maria Pansacola and Don Hipolito Pansacola;(d) The fourth and last one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to their nephews and nieces (1) Domingo Arce, (2) Baldomera Angulo, (3) Marcelina Flores, (4) Francisca Flores, (5) Candelaria dela Cruz, and (6) Gervasio Pansacola who, being all minors, are still under the care of their brother, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena). The latter is the real father of said minors.
About one hundred years later, on November 18, 1968, private respondents brought a special action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, under the provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, including as parties the heirs and successors-in-interest of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the
second contract of co-ownership dated April 11, 1968. In their answer some of the defendants, petitioners herein, interposed such defenses as prescription, res judicata, exclusive ownership, estoppel and laches.After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision *** dated November 6, 1981 dismissing the complaint, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in the fight of all the foregoing this Court finds and so holds that the Cagbalite Island has already been partitioned into four (4) parts among the original co-owners or their successors-in-interest.Judgment is therefore rendered for the defendants against the plaintiffs dismissing the complaint in the above entitled case.Considering that the cross claims filed in the above entitled civil case are not compulsory cross claims and in order that they may be litigated individually the same are hereby dismissed without prejudice.IT IS SO ORDERED.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs, private respondents herein, was denied by the trial court in an order dated February 25, 1982 (Record on Appeal, p. 241).On appeal, respondent Court reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court (Rollo, p. 117). It also denied the motion for reconsideration and the supplement to motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents, in its resolution dated October 15, 1983 (Rollo, p. 86).Instant petition was filed with the Court on December 5, 1985 (Rollo, p. 12). Petitioners Josefina Pansacola, et al. having filed a separate petition (G.R. No. 72620) on the same subject matter and issues raised in the instant 'petition, the counsel for private respondents filed a consolidated comment on the separate petitions for review on February 24, 1986 with the First Division of the Court (Rollo, p. 119). It appears that counsel for petitioners also filed a consolidated reply to the consolidated comment of private respondents as required by the Second Division of the Court (Rollo, p. 151). However, petitioners filed a separate reply in the instant case on February 18,1987 (Rollo, p. 168)as required by the Court in a Resolution of the Second Division dated November 24, 1986 (Rollo, p. 160).On May 19, 1987, private respondents in the instant petition filed a manifestation praying for the denial of the instant petition in the same manner that G.R. No. 72620 was denied by the Court in its Resolution dated July 23, 1986 (Rollo, p.
151). Their rejoinder to the reply of petitioners was filed on May 25,1987 (Rollo, p. 179).On June 8, 1987, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 192). The memorandum of private respondents was mailed on July 18, 1987 and received in the Court on July 29, 1987 (Rollo, p. 112); the memorandum for petitioners was mailed on August 18, 1987 and received in the Court on September 7, 1987 (Rollo, p. 177).The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is the question of whether or not Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in common by the heirs and successors-in-interest of the brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel Pansacola.The Pansacola brothers purchased the Island in 1859 as common property and agreed on how they would share in the benefits to be derived from the Island. On April 11, 1868, they modified the terms and conditions of the agreement so as to include in the co-ownership of the island the children of their deceased brothers Eustaquio and the other children of Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) who were committed in the agreement of February 11, 1859. The new agreement provided for a new sharing proportion and distribution of the Island among the co-owners.On January 20, 1907, the representative of the heirs of all the original owners of Cagbalite Island entered into an agreement to partition the Island, supplemented by another agreement dated April 18, 1908. The contract dated January 20, 1907 provides as follows:
Sa Mauban, Tayabas, ika 20 ng Enero ng 1907 caming mga quinatawan ng mga ibang co-herederos na hindi caharap, sa pulong na ito, sa nasa naming lahat na magcaroon na ng catahimikan ang aming-aming cabahagui sa Pulong Kagbalete sumacatuid upang mapagtoos ang hangahan ng apat na sapul na pagcacabahagui nitong manang ito, pagcacausap na naming lahat at maihanay at mapagtalonan ang saysay ng isa't isa, ay cusa naming pinagcasunduan at pinasiya ang nangasosonod:—Una: Ang malaquing calupaan, alis ang lahat na pacatan ay babahaguin alinsunod sa pagcabaki na guinawa sa croquis na niyari ng practico agrimensor Don Jose Garcia.Icalawa: Ang Lomingoy, doon ang tuid na guhit sa ilong ng Pait ay pagaapatin ding sinlaqui ayon sa dating pagkakabaki.Icatlo: Cung magawa na ang tunay na piano at icapit na sa lupa, paglalagay ng nadarapat na mojon, ang masacupan ng guhit, sumacatuid ang caingin at pananim ng isa na nasacupan ng pucto
na noocol sa iba, ay mapapasulit sa dapat mag-ari, na pagbabayaran nito ang nagtanim sa halagang:- bawat caponong niog na nabunga, P 1.00 'un peso); cung ang bias ay abot sa isang vara, P 0.50; cung bagong tanim o locloc P 0. 50 ang capono.Icapat: Ang lahat na pacatan ay bacod na pagaapatin at bawat bahagui ay noocol sa isat-isa sa apat na sanga ng paganacang nagmana.Icalima: Upang ang naipatanim ng bawat isa ay matama sa canya ng mailagan ang hirap ng loob ng nagatikha; ay pagtotolong-tolongan ng lahat naiba na mahusay ang dalawang partes na magcalapit na mapa ayong tumama, hangang may pagluluaran, sa nagsikap at maoyanam, maidaco sa lugar na walang cailangang pagusapan.Icanim: Ang casulatang ito, cung mapermahan na na magcacaharap sampong ng mga ibang co-herederos na notipicahan nitong lahat na pinagcasundoan ay mahahabilin sa camay ng agrimensor, Amadeo Pansacola, upang canyang mapanusugan ang maipaganap ang dito'y naootos.Na sa catunayan at catibayan ng lahat na nalalagda dito, sa pag galang at pag ganap dito sa paingacaisahan ay pumirma sampo ng mga sacsing caharap at catanto ngayong fecha ayon sa itaas.
The contract dated April 18, 1908 provides as follows:Sa Mauban, ika 18 ng Abril ng 1908, sa pagcacatipon ng lahat na firmantes nito ay pinagcaisahan itong nangasosonod:—Una — Pinagtitibay ang mga pinagcasundoan sa itaas noong 20 ng Enero ng 1907, liban na lamang sa mga pangcat na una at icapat at tongcol doon pinasiya naming bahaguinin ng halohalo at paparejo ang calupaan at pacatan.Ycalawa — Sa pagsucat ng agrimensor na si Amadeo at paggawa ng piano at descripcion ay pagbabayaran siya ng sa bawat isa naoocol sa halagang isang piso sa bawat hectares.Icatlo — Ang counting pucto sa 'Mayanibulong' na may caingin ni G. Isidro Altamarino, asawa ni Restitute ay tutumbasan naman cay G. Norberto Pansacola sa lugar ng Dapo calapit ng Pinangalo ng gasing sucat.Icapat — Sa inilahad na piano ay pinasiya nang itoloy at upang maca pagparehistro ang isa't isa ay pinagcaisahang
magcacagastos na parepareho para sa tablang pangmohon at ibat iba pang cagastusan.Sa catunayan at catibayan ay cami, pumirma. (Record on Appeal, p. 224)
There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition of the Island had really been made by either the original owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest. The agreement entered into in 1859 simply provides for the sharing of whatever benefits can be derived from the island. The agreement, in fact, states that the Island to be purchased shall be considered as their common property. In the second agreement entered in 1868 the co-owners agreed not only on the sharing proportion of the benefits derived from the Island but also on the distribution of the Island each of the brothers was allocated a 1/4 portion of the Island with the children of the deceased brother, Eustaquio Pansacola allocated a 1/4 portion and the children of Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) also allocated a 1/4 portion of the Island. With the distribution agreed upon each of the co-owner is a co-owner of the whole, and in this sense, over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the sole owner of a portion, in the instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each group of co-owners) of the Island which is truly abstract, because until physical division is effected such portion is merely an Ideal share, not concretely determined (3 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 3rd Ed., page 486, cited in Lopez vs. Cuaycong, 74 Phil. 601; De la Cruz vs. Cruz, 32 SCRA 307 [1970]; Felices vs. Colegado, 35 SCRA 173 [1970],; Dultra vs. CFl 70 SCRA 465 [1976]; Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977].)In the agreement of January 20, 1907, the heirs that were represented agreed on how the Island was to be partitioned. The agreement of April 18, 1908 which supplements that of January 20, 1907 reveals that as of the signing of the 1908 agreement no actual partition of the Island had as yet been done. The second and fourth paragraphs of the agreement speaks of a survey yet to be conducted by a certain Amadeo and a plan and description yet to be made. Virgilio Pansacola, a son of the surveyor named Amadeo who is referred to in the contract dated April 18, 1908 as the surveyor to whom the task of surveying Cagbalite Island pursuant to said agreement was entrusted, however, testified that said contracts were never implemented because nobody defrayed the expenses for surveying the same (Record on Appeal, p. 225).Petitioners invoke res judicata to bar this action for partition in view of the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 21033,"Domingo Arce vs. Maria Villabona, et al.," 21034, "Domingo Arce vs. Francisco Pansacola, et al.," and 21035,"Domingo
Arce vs. Emiliano Pansacola, et al." promulgated on February 20, 1958 (Rollo, p. 141) and Brief for Defendants-Appellees, p. 87 Appendix 1), wherein the Court said:
Considering the facts that he waited for a period of nearly 23 years after the return from his deportation before taking any positive action to recover his pretended right in the property in question, gives great credit, in our opinion, to the declaration of the witnesses for the defense (a) that the original parcel of land was partitioned as they claim, and (b) that the plaintiff had disposed of all the right and interest which he had in the portion which had been given to him.
The issue in the aforementioned case which were tried together is not whether there has already been a partition of the Cagbalite Island. The actions were brought by the plaintiff to recover possession of three distinct parcels of land, together with damages. In fact the word partition was used in the metaphysical or Ideal sense (not in its physical sense).Commenting on the above ruling of the Court in connection with the instant case, the respondent Court said:
Concededly, the Supreme Court decision in G.R. Nos. 21033-35 (Exh. X) did use or employ the word "partition." A careful reading of the said decision will, however, reveal, and we so hold, that the employment or use of the word "partition" therein was made not in its technical and legal meaning or sense adverted to above, but, rather in its Ideal, abstract and spiritual sense, this is (at) once evident from the bare statement in said decision to the effect that the property was divided into four parts, without any reference to the specific parts of the property that may have been adjudicated to each owner. There being no such reference in the decision and in the judgment affirmed therein to the adjudication of specific and definite portions of the property to each co-owner, there is a clear and logical inference that there was indeed no adjudication of specific and definite portions of the property made to each co-owner.
It must be admitted that the word "partition" is not infrequently used both in popular and technical parlance (Fule vs. Fule, 52 Phil. 750 [1929]). For purposes of the aforementioned case, evidently the Court used the word "partition" to refer to the distribution of the Cagbalite Island agreed upon by the original owners and in the later agreements, by the heirs and their subsequent successors-in-interest.
There need not be a physical partition; a distribution of the Island even in a state of indiviso or was sufficient in order that a co-owner may validly sell his portion of the co-owned property. The sale of part of a particular lot thus co-owned by one co-owner was within his right pro-indiviso is valid in its entirety (Pamplona vs. Moreto, 96 SCRA 775 [1980]) but he may not convey a physical portion with boundaries of the land owned in common (Mercado vs. Liwanag, 5 SCRA 472 [1962]). Definitely, there was no physical partition of the Island in 1859. Neither could there have been one in 1894 because the manner of subdividing the Island was only provided for in the later agreements entered into by the heirs in 1907 and 1908. There was a distribution of the Island in 1868 as agreed upon by the original co-owners in their agreement of April 11, 1868. Any agreement entered into by the parties in 1894 could be no more than another agreement as to the distribution of the Island among the heirs of the original co-owners and the preparation of a tentative plan by a practical surveyor, a Mr. Jose Garcia, mentioned in the first paragraph of the 1907 agreement, preparatory to the preparation of the real plan to be prepared by the surveyor Amadeo, mentioned in the agreement of April 18, 1908.What is important in the Court's ruling in the three aforementioned cases is that, the fact that there was a distribution of the Island among the co-owners made the sale of Domingo Arce of the portion allocated to him though pro-indiviso, valid. He thus disposed of all his rights and interests in the portion given to him.It is not disputed that some of the private respondents and some of the petitioners at the time the action for partition was filed in the trial court have been in actual possession and enjoyment of several portions of the property in question (Rollo, p. 148). This does not provide any proof that the Island in question has already been actually partitioned and co-ownership terminated. A co-owner cannot, without the conformity of the other co-owners or a judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to the provision of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court (Rule 71 of the Old Rules), adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of the lot owned in common, as his share therein, to the exclusion of other co-owners (Santos, Jr. vs. Buenconsejo, 14 SCRA 407 [1965]; Carvajal vs. Court of Appeals, 112 SCRA 237 [1982]). It is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership both under the present Civil Code as in the Code of 1889 that no individual co- owner can claim any definite portion thereof (Diversified Credit Corporation vs. Rosada 26 SCRA 470 [1968]). lt is therefore of no moment that some of the co-owners have succeeded in securing cadastral titles in their names to some portions of the Island occupied by them (Rollo, p. 10).
It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of them accordingly (Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982]). The mechanics of actual partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Maganon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282 [1986]).Neither can such actual possession and enjoyment of some portions of the Island by some of the petitioners herein be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership. It is undisputed that the Cagbalite Island was purchased by the original co-owners as a common property and it has not been proven that the Island had been partitioned among them or among their heirs. While there is co-ownership, a co-owner's possession of his share is co-possession which is linked to the possession of the other co-owners (Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977]).Furthermore, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Valdez vs. Olonga, 51 SCRA 71 [1973], Tero vs. Tero, 131 SCRA 100 [1984]). Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership clearly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]).An action for partition does not prescribe. Article 403 of the Old Civil Code, now Article 497, provides that the assignees of the co-owners may take part in the partition of the common property, and Article 400 of the Old Code, now Article 494 provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property, a provision which implies that the action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches (Budlong vs. Pondoc, 79 SCRA 24 [1977]). An action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co- owner (Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).On July 23, 1986, the Court through its Second Division denied the petition for the review of G.R. No. 72620, the petition for review on certiorari separately filed by Josefina Pansacola (Rollo, p. 151).PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is likewise DENIED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.
JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST, petitioner, vs.PR BUILDERS, INC., respondent.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated October 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60981.The facts:Jacobus Bernhard Hulst (petitioner) and his spouse Ida Johanna Hulst-Van Ijzeren (Ida), Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR Builders, Inc. (respondent), for the purchase of a 210-sq m residential unit in respondent's townhouse project in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas.When respondent failed to comply with its verbal promise to complete the project by June 1995, the spouses Hulst filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for rescission of contract with interest, damages and attorney's fees, docketed as HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618.On April 22, 1997, HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino (HLURB Arbiter) rendered a Decision2 in favor of spouses Hulst, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant, rescinding the Contract to Sell and ordering respondent to:1) Reimburse complainant the sum of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid by the complainants to P.R. Builders, plus interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time complaint was filed;2) Pay complainant the sum of P297,000.00 as actual damages;3) Pay complainant the sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral damages;4) Pay complainant the sum of P150,000.00 as exemplary damages;5) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and for other litigation expenses; and6) Cost of suit.SO ORDERED.3
Meanwhile, spouses Hulst divorced. Ida assigned her rights over the purchased property to petitioner.4 From then on, petitioner alone pursued the case.On August 21, 1997, the HLURB Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas directing the latter to execute its judgment.5
On April 13, 1998, the Ex-Officio Sheriff proceeded to implement the Writ of Execution. However, upon complaint of respondent with the CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the levy made by the Sheriff was set aside, requiring the Sheriff to levy first on respondent's personal properties.6 Sheriff Jaime B. Ozaeta (Sheriff) tried to implement the writ as directed but the writ was returned unsatisfied.7
On January 26, 1999, upon petitioner's motion, the HLURB Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution.8
On March 23, 1999, the Sheriff levied on respondent's 15 parcels of land covered by 13 Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)9 in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas.10
In a Notice of Sale dated March 27, 2000, the Sheriff set the public auction of the levied properties on April 28, 2000 at 10:00 a.m..11
Two days before the scheduled public auction or on April 26, 2000, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy with the HLURB on the ground that the Sheriff made an overlevy since the aggregate appraised value of the levied properties at P6,500.00 per sq m is P83,616,000.00, based on the Appraisal Report12 of Henry Hunter Bayne Co., Inc. dated December 11, 1996, which is over and above the judgment award.13
At 10:15 a.m. of the scheduled auction date of April 28, 2000, respondent's counsel objected to the conduct of the public auction on the ground that respondent's Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy was pending resolution. Absent any restraining order from the HLURB, the Sheriff proceeded to sell the 15 parcels of land. Holly Properties Realty Corporation was the winning bidder for all 15 parcels of land for the total amount of P5,450,653.33. The sum of P5,313,040.00 was turned over to the petitioner in satisfaction of the judgment award after deducting the legal fees.14
At 4:15 p.m. of the same day, while the Sheriff was at the HLURB office to remit the legal fees relative to the auction sale and to submit the Certificates of Sale15 for the signature of HLURB Director Belen G. Ceniza (HLURB Director), he received the Order dated April 28, 2000 issued by the HLURB Arbiter to suspend the proceedings on the matter.16
Four months later, or on August 28, 2000, the HLURB Arbiter and HLURB Director issued an Order setting aside the sheriff's levy on respondent's real properties,17 reasoning as follows:
While we are not making a ruling that the fair market value of the levied properties is PhP6,500.00 per square meter (or an aggregate value of PhP83,616,000.00) as indicated in the Hunter Baynes Appraisal Report, we definitely cannot agree with the position of the Complainants and the
Sheriff that the aggregate value of the 12,864.00-square meter levied properties is only around PhP6,000,000.00. The disparity between the two valuations are [sic] so egregious that the Sheriff should have looked into the matter first before proceeding with the execution sale of the said properties, especially when the auction sale proceedings was seasonably objected by Respondent's counsel, Atty. Noel Mingoa. However, instead of resolving first the objection timely posed by Atty. Mingoa, Sheriff Ozaete totally disregarded the objection raised and, posthaste, issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale even prior to the payment of the legal fees (pars. 7 & 8, Sheriff's Return).While we agree with the Complainants that what is material in an execution sale proceeding is the amount for which the properties were bidded and sold during the public auction and that, mere inadequacy of the price is not a sufficient ground to annul the sale, the court is justified to intervene where the inadequacy of the price shocks the conscience (Barrozo vs. Macaraeg, 83 Phil. 378). The difference between PhP83,616,000.00 and Php6,000,000.00 is PhP77,616,000.00 and it definitely invites our attention to look into the proceedings had especially so when there was only one bidder, the HOLLY PROPERTIES REALTY CORPORATION represented by Ma, Chandra Cacho (par. 7, Sheriff's Return) and the auction sale proceedings was timely objected by Respondent's counsel (par. 6, Sheriff's Return) due to the pendency of the Urgent Motion to Quash the Writ of Levy which was filed prior to the execution sale.Besides, what is at issue is not the value of the subject properties as determined during the auction sale, but the determination of the value of the properties levied upon by the Sheriff taking into consideration Section 9(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure x x x.x x x xIt is very clear from the foregoing that, even during levy, the Sheriff has to consider the fair market value of the properties levied upon to determine whether they are sufficient to satisfy the judgment, and any levy in excess of the judgment award is void (Buan v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 424).x x x x18 (Emphasis supplied).
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:WHEREFORE, the levy on the subject properties made by the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Tanauan, Batangas, is hereby SET ASIDE and the said Sheriff is hereby directed to levy instead Respondent's real properties
that are reasonably sufficient to enforce its final and executory judgment, this time, taking into consideration not only the value of the properties as indicated in their respective tax declarations, but also all the other determinants at arriving at a fair market value, namely: the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape or location, and the tax declarations thereon.SO ORDERED.19
A motion for reconsideration being a prohibited pleading under Section 1(h), Rule IV of the 1996 HLURB Rules and Procedure, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA on September 27, 2000.On October 30, 2002, the CA rendered herein assailed Decision20 dismissing the petition. The CA held that petitioner's insistence that Barrozo v. Macaraeg21 does not apply since said case stated that "when there is a right to redeem inadequacy of price should not be material" holds no water as what is obtaining in this case is not "mere inadequacy," but an inadequacy that shocks the senses; that Buan v. Court of Appeals22 properly applies since the questioned levy covered 15 parcels of land posited to have an aggregate value of P83,616,000.00 which shockingly exceeded the judgment debt of only around P6,000,000.00.Without filing a motion for reconsideration,23 petitioner took the present recourse on the sole ground that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ARBITER'S ORDER SETTING ASIDE THE LEVY MADE BY THE SHERIFF ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.24
Before resolving the question whether the CA erred in affirming the Order of the HLURB setting aside the levy made by the sheriff, it behooves this Court to address a matter of public and national importance which completely escaped the attention of the HLURB Arbiter and the CA: petitioner and his wife are foreign nationals who are disqualified under the Constitution from owning real property in their names.Section 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. (Emphasis supplied).
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public
domain." The 1987 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of lands of the public domain for Filipino citizens25 or corporations at least 60 percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.26 Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.27
Since petitioner and his wife, being Dutch nationals, are proscribed under the Constitution from acquiring and owning real property, it is unequivocal that the Contract to Sell entered into by petitioner together with his wife and respondent is void. Under Article 1409 (1) and (7) of the Civil Code, all contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law or public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are inexistent and void from the beginning. Article 1410 of the same Code provides that the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect.28 It does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation.29
Generally, parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of the law; the courts leave them as they are, because they are deemed in pari delicto or "in equal fault."30 In pari delicto is "a universal doctrine which holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation; and where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other."31
This rule, however, is subject to exceptions32 that permit the return of that which may have been given under a void contract to: (a) the innocent party (Arts. 1411-1412, Civil Code);33 (b) the debtor who pays usurious interest (Art. 1413, Civil Code);34 (c) the party repudiating the void contract before the illegal purpose is accomplished or before damage is caused to a third person and if public interest is subserved by allowing recovery (Art. 1414, Civil Code);35 (d) the incapacitated party if the interest of justice so demands (Art. 1415, Civil Code);36 (e) the party for whose protection the prohibition by law is intended if the agreement is not illegal per se but merely prohibited and if public policy would be enhanced by permitting recovery (Art. 1416, Civil Code);37 and (f) the party for whose benefit the law has been intended such as in price ceiling laws (Art. 1417, Civil Code)38 and labor laws (Arts. 1418-1419, Civil Code).39
It is significant to note that the agreement executed by the parties in this case is a Contract to Sell and not a contract of sale. A distinction between the two is
material in the determination of when ownership is deemed to have been transferred to the buyer or vendee and, ultimately, the resolution of the question on whether the constitutional proscription has been breached.In a contract of sale, the title passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. The vendor has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the property until and unless the contract of sale is itself resolved and set aside.40 On the other hand, a contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.41 In other words, in a contract to sell, the prospective seller agrees to transfer ownership of the property to the buyer upon the happening of an event, which normally is the full payment of the purchase price. But even upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, ownership does not automatically transfer to the buyer. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by executing a contract of absolute sale.42
Since the contract involved here is a Contract to Sell, ownership has not yet transferred to the petitioner when he filed the suit for rescission. While the intent to circumvent the constitutional proscription on aliens owning real property was evident by virtue of the execution of the Contract to Sell, such violation of the law did not materialize because petitioner caused the rescission of the contract before the execution of the final deed transferring ownership.Thus, exception (c) finds application in this case. Under Article 1414, one who repudiates the agreement and demands his money before the illegal act has taken place is entitled to recover. Petitioner is therefore entitled to recover what he has paid, although the basis of his claim for rescission, which was granted by the HLURB, was not the fact that he is not allowed to acquire private land under the Philippine Constitution. But petitioner is entitled to the recovery only of the amount of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid to respondent. No damages may be recovered on the basis of a void contract; being nonexistent, the agreement produces no juridical tie between the parties involved.43 Further, petitioner is not entitled to actual as well as interests thereon,44 moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.The Court takes into consideration the fact that the HLURB Decision dated April 22, 1997 has long been final and executory. Nothing is more settled in the law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.45 The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.46 None of the exceptions is present in this case. The HLURB decision cannot be considered a void judgment, as it was rendered by a tribunal with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.47
Ineluctably, the HLURB Decision resulted in the unjust enrichment of petitioner at the expense of respondent. Petitioner received more than what he is entitled to recover under the circumstances.Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim, nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another's injury), states:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The above-quoted article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience; guides for human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice.48 There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.49
A sense of justice and fairness demands that petitioner should not be allowed to benefit from his act of entering into a contract to sell that violates the constitutional proscription.This is not a case of equity overruling or supplanting a positive provision of law or judicial rule. Rather, equity is exercised in this case "as the complement of legal jurisdiction [that] seeks to reach and to complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so."50
The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete
justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal jurisdiction.51
The sheriff delivered to petitioner the amount of P5,313,040.00 representing the net proceeds (bidded amount isP5,450,653.33) of the auction sale after deducting the legal fees in the amount of P137,613.33.52 Petitioner is only entitled to P3,187,500.00, the amount of the purchase price of the real property paid by petitioner to respondent under the Contract to Sell. Thus, the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order petitioner to return the excess amount of P2,125,540.00.The Court shall now proceed to resolve the single issue raised in the present petition: whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the HLURB Order setting aside the levy made by the Sheriff on the subject properties.Petitioner avers that the HLURB Arbiter and Director had no factual basis for pegging the fair market value of the levied properties at P6,500.00 per sq m or P83,616,000.00; that reliance on the appraisal report was misplaced since the appraisal was based on the value of land in neighboring developed subdivisions and on the assumption that the residential unit appraised had already been built; that the Sheriff need not determine the fair market value of the subject properties before levying on the same since what is material is the amount for which the properties were bidded and sold during the public auction; that the pendency of any motion is not a valid ground for the Sheriff to suspend the execution proceedings and, by itself, does not have the effect of restraining the Sheriff from proceeding with the execution.Respondent, on the other hand, contends that while it is true that the HLURB Arbiter and Director did not categorically state the exact value of the levied properties, said properties cannot just amount to P6,000,000.00; that the HLURB Arbiter and Director correctly held that the value indicated in the tax declaration is not the sole determinant of the value of the property.The petition is impressed with merit.If the judgment is for money, the sheriff or other authorized officer must execute the same pursuant to the provisions of Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. –(a) Immediate payment on demand. - The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. x x x
(b) Satisfaction by levy. - If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution, giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon.When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment (Emphasis supplied).53
Thus, under Rule 39, in executing a money judgment against the property of the judgment debtor, the sheriff shall levy on all property belonging to the judgment debtor as is amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs, and sell the same paying to the judgment creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the amount of the judgment debt and costs. Any excess in the proceeds shall be delivered to the judgment debtor unless otherwise directed by the judgment or order of the court.54
Clearly, there are two stages in the execution of money judgments. First, the levy and then the execution sale.Levy has been defined as the act or acts by which an officer sets apart or appropriates a part or the whole of a judgment debtor's property for the purpose of satisfying the command of the writ of execution.55 The object of a levy is to take property into the custody of the law, and thereby render it liable to the lien of the execution, and put it out of the power of the judgment debtor to divert it to any other use or purpose.56
On the other hand, an execution sale is a sale by a sheriff or other ministerial officer under the authority of a writ of execution of the levied property of the debtor.57
In the present case, the HLURB Arbiter and Director gravely abused their discretion in setting aside the levy conducted by the Sheriff for the reason that the auction sale conducted by the sheriff rendered moot and academic the motion to quash the levy. The HLURB Arbiter lost jurisdiction to act on the motion to quash the levy by virtue of the consummation of the auction sale. Absent any order from the HLURB suspending the auction sale, the sheriff rightfully proceeded with the auction sale. The winning bidder had already paid the winning bid. The legal fees had already been remitted to the HLURB. The judgment award had already been turned over to the judgment creditor. What was left to be done was only the issuance of the corresponding certificates of sale to the winning bidder. In fact, only the signature of the HLURB Director for that purpose was needed58 – a purely ministerial act.A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard for or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.59In the present case, all the requirements of auction sale under the Rules have been fully complied with to warrant the issuance of the corresponding certificates of sale.And even if the Court should go into the merits of the assailed Order, the petition is meritorious on the following grounds:Firstly, the reliance of the HLURB Arbiter and Director, as well as the CA, on Barrozo v. Macaraeg60 and Buan v. Court of Appeals61 is misplaced.The HLURB and the CA misconstrued the Court's pronouncements in Barrozo. Barrozo involved a judgment debtor who wanted to repurchase properties sold at execution beyond the one-year redemption period. The statement of the Court in Barrozo, that "only where such inadequacy shocks the conscience the courts will intervene," is at best a mere obiter dictum. This declaration should be taken in the context of the other declarations of the Court in Barrozo, to wit:
Another point raised by appellant is that the price paid at the auction sale was so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court. Supposing
that this issue is open even after the one-year period has expired and after the properties have passed into the hands of third persons who may have paid a price higher than the auction sale money, the first thing to consider is that the stipulation contains no statement of the reasonable value of the properties; and although defendant' answer avers that the assessed value wasP3,960 it also avers that their real market value was P2,000 only. Anyway, mere inadequacy of price – which was the complaint' allegation – is not sufficient ground to annul the sale. It is only where such inadequacy shocks the conscience that the courts will intervene. x x x Another consideration is that the assessed value being P3,960 and the purchase price being in effect P1,864 (P464 sale price plus P1,400 mortgage lien which had to be discharged) the conscience is not shocked upon examining the prices paid in the sales in National Bank v. Gonzales, 45 Phil., 693 and Guerrero v. Guerrero, 57 Phil., 445, sales which were left undisturbed by this Court.Furthermore, where there is the right to redeem – as in this case – inadequacy of price should not be material because the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution sale.x x x x (Emphasis supplied).62
In other words, gross inadequacy of price does not nullify an execution sale. In an ordinary sale, for reason of equity, a transaction may be invalidated on the ground of inadequacy of price, or when such inadequacy shocks one's conscience as to justify the courts to interfere; such does not follow when the law gives the owner the right to redeem as when a sale is made at public auction,63 upon the theory that the lesser the price, the easier it is for the owner to effect redemption.64 When there is a right to redeem, inadequacy of price should not be material because the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution sale.65 Thus, respondent stood to gain rather than be harmed by the low sale value of the auctioned properties because it possesses the right of redemption. More importantly, the subject matter in Barrozo is the auction sale, not the levy made by the Sheriff.The Court does not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of a decision. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety.66
As regards Buan, it is cast under an entirely different factual milieu. It involved the levy on two parcels of land owned by the judgment debtor; and the sale at public auction of one was sufficient to fully satisfy the judgment, such that the levy and attempted execution of the second parcel of land was declared void for being in excess of and beyond the original judgment award granted in favor of the judgment creditor.In the present case, the Sheriff complied with the mandate of Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, to "sell only a sufficient portion" of the levied properties "as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and the lawful fees." Each of the 15 levied properties was successively bidded upon and sold, one after the other until the judgment debt and the lawful fees were fully satisfied. Holly Properties Realty Corporation successively bidded upon and bought each of the levied properties for the total amount of P5,450,653.33 in full satisfaction of the judgment award and legal fees.67
Secondly, the Rules of Court do not require that the value of the property levied be exactly the same as the judgment debt; it can be less or more than the amount of debt. This is the contingency addressed by Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In the levy of property, the Sheriff does not determine the exact valuation of the levied property. Under Section 9, Rule 39, in conjunction with Section 7, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is required to do only two specific things to effect a levy upon a realty: (a) file with the register of deeds a copy of the order of execution, together with the description of the levied property and notice of execution; and (b) leave with the occupant of the property copy of the same order, description and notice.68 Records do not show that respondent alleged non-compliance by the Sheriff of said requisites.Thirdly, in determining what amount of property is sufficient out of which to secure satisfaction of the execution, the Sheriff is left to his own judgment. He may exercise a reasonable discretion, and must exercise the care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise under like conditions and circumstances, endeavoring on the one hand to obtain sufficient property to satisfy the purposes of the writ, and on the other hand not to make an unreasonable and unnecessary levy.69 Because it is impossible to know the precise quantity of land or other property necessary to satisfy an execution, the Sheriff should be allowed a reasonable margin between the value of the property levied upon and the amount of the execution; the fact that the Sheriff levies upon a little more than is necessary to satisfy the execution does not render his actions improper.70 Section 9, Rule 39, provides adequate safeguards against excessive
levying. The Sheriff is mandated to sell so much only of such real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.In the absence of a restraining order, no error, much less abuse of discretion, can be imputed to the Sheriff in proceeding with the auction sale despite the pending motion to quash the levy filed by the respondents with the HLURB. It is elementary that sheriffs, as officers charged with the delicate task of the enforcement and/or implementation of judgments, must, in the absence of a restraining order, act with considerable dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration of justice; otherwise, the decisions, orders, or other processes of the courts of justice and the like would be futile.71 It is not within the jurisdiction of the Sheriff to consider, much less resolve, respondent's objection to the continuation of the conduct of the auction sale. The Sheriff has no authority, on his own, to suspend the auction sale. His duty being ministerial, he has no discretion to postpone the conduct of the auction sale.Finally, one who attacks a levy on the ground of excessiveness carries the burden of sustaining that contention.72In the determination of whether a levy of execution is excessive, it is proper to take into consideration encumbrances upon the property, as well as the fact that a forced sale usually results in a sacrifice; that is, the price demanded for the property upon a private sale is not the standard for determining the excessiveness of the levy.73
Here, the HLURB Arbiter and Director had no sufficient factual basis to determine the value of the levied property. Respondent only submitted an Appraisal Report, based merely on surmises. The Report was based on the projected value of the townhouse project after it shall have been fully developed, that is, on the assumption that the residential units appraised had already been built. The Appraiser in fact made this qualification in its Appraisal Report: "[t]he property subject of this appraisal has not been constructed. The basis of the appraiser is on the existing model units."74 Since it is undisputed that the townhouse project did not push through, the projected value did not become a reality. Thus, the appraisal value cannot be equated with the fair market value. The Appraisal Report is not the best proof to accurately show the value of the levied properties as it is clearly self-serving.Therefore, the Order dated August 28, 2000 of HLURB Arbiter Aquino and Director Ceniza in HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618 which set aside the sheriff's levy on respondent's real properties, was clearly issued with grave abuse of discretion. The CA erred in affirming said Order.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60981 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Order dated August 28, 2000 of HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino and Director Belen G. Ceniza in HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618 is declared NULL andVOID. HLURB Arbiter Aquino and Director Ceniza are directed to issue the corresponding certificates of sale in favor of the winning bidder, Holly Properties Realty Corporation. Petitioner is ordered to return to respondent the amount of P2,125,540.00, without interest, in excess of the proceeds of the auction sale delivered to petitioner. After the finality of herein judgment, the amount of P2,125,540.00 shall earn 6% interest until fully paid.SO ORDERED.