On the contention that he is not bound by the contract of easement because the same was not annotated in the title and that a notice of lis pendens: As already explained, it is in the nature of legal easement that the servient estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the dominant estate ingress from and egress to the public highway. (VILLANUEVA vs VELASCO) The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. The true standard for the grant of the legal right is "adequacy." When there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the said outlet is inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. For to justify the imposition of an easement or right of way, "there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it." (RAMOS vs GATCHALIAN REALTY) An easement of right of way is a discontinuous one which, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may only be acquired by virtue of a title and not by prescription. (COSTABELLA vs KATIPUNAN LUMBER) A document stipulating a voluntary easement must be recorded in the Registry of Property in order not to prejudice third parties (VALDEZ vs TABISULA) Art 708, 708 NCC RIGHT TO COMPENSATION Where the easement to be established in favor of petitioner is of a continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil Code. (ENCARNACION vs CA) When government entities acquire an easement within the purview of the power of eminent domain, the owner of such property is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. (NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs SUAREZ) WIDTH OF AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY The width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time. (651) This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the passage. And these needs may vary from time to time. (ENCARNACION vs CA) NATURE OF PARTY WALL Article 660 of the Civil Code also declares that it shall be understood that there are exterior signs which conflict with the easement of party wall, when, among other circumstances, the entire wall is built on one of the lots and not on the line dividing the two adjoining parcels; when the dividing wall, being constructed of stone and cement, has stones projecting at intervals from the surface on one side only and not on the other; and when it supports joists, beams, floors, and the roof timbers of one of the houses but not of the adjoining building. (LAO vs HEIRS OF ALBURO) EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW Art 621 (running of prescription) does not apply when the two estates were formerly owned by just one person who introduced improvements on both such that the wall of the house constructed on the first estate extends to the wall of the camarin on the second estate. This then is precisely the case covered by Article 624 which provides that the existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed. (GARGANTOS vs TAN YANON) Easement of lights in the case of windows opened in one's own wall is of a negative character, and, as such, cannot be acquired by prescription under article 621 of the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may, by a formal act, have prohibited the owner of the servient estate from doing something which it would be lawful for him to do were it not for the easement. The owner of the servient estate subject to such an easement is under no obligation whatsoever to allow anything to be done on his tenement, nor to do anything there himself, but is simply restrained from doing anything thereon which may tend to cut off the light from the dominant estate, which he would undoubtedly be entitled to do were it not for the existence of the easement. (CORTES vs YU-TIBO)

VOLUNTARY EASEMENT A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. As such, it is generally effective between the parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. (UNISOURCE vs CHUNG) ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. (HIDALGO vs BALANDAN) REMEDIES FOR ABATEMENT Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity . The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. (ESTATE OF GREGORIA vs CA) The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. Thus, a nuisance per accidens cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance. And the local government unit concerned does not have the power to summarily abate a nuisance per accidens in the guise of exercising its police power through an ordinance. If it does, such ordinance is null and void because it violates the guarantee of due process under the Constitution. (PARAYNO vs JOVELLANOS) The bus and jeepney terminals are not nuisances per se. Hence, they may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings. (LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL vs JAC LINER) TRADITION OR DELIVERY The execution of a public instrument gives rise, therefore, only to a prima facie presumption of delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the instrument itself expresses or implies that delivery was not intended; or when by other means it is shown that such delivery was not effected, because a third person was actually in possession of the thing. In the latter case, the sale cannot be considered consummated. (EQUATORIAL) In the Law on Sales, delivery may be either actual or constructive, but both forms of delivery contemplate the absolute giving up of the control and custody of the property on the part of the vendor, and the assumption of the same by the vendee. "Delivery" as used in the Law on Sales refers to the concurrent transfer of two things: (1) possession and (2) ownership. This is the rationale behind the jurisprudential doctrine that presumptive delivery via execution of a public instrument is negated by the reality that the vendee actually failed to obtain material possession of the land subject of the sale. In the same vein, if the vendee is placed in actual possession of the property, but by agreement of the parties ownership of the same is retained by the vendor until the vendee has fully paid the price, the mere transfer of the possession of the property subject of the sale is not the "delivery" contemplated in the Law on Sales or as used in Article 1543 of the Civil Code. (CEBU WINLAND) DONATION When contents of a contract provide for automatic reversion of property donated in case of violation of conditions set forth therein, judicial action for rescission, not necessary. (ROMAN CATHOLIC) In contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper. INTER VIVOS AND MORTIS CAUSA The dispositions in a deed of donation — whether inter vivos or mortis causa do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation but on the provisions stated in such deed. In other words, the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is “to take effect at the death of the donor” are not controlling criteria; such statements are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor.

That the donation is to have effect during the lifetime of the donor or at his death does not mean the delivery of the property must be made during his life or after his death. From the moment that the donor disposes freely of his property and such disposal is accepted by the donee, the donation exists, perfectly and irrevocably (articles 618 and 623). (LAURETA) Even when the donor calls the donation mortis causa instead of inter vivos, even if he says it is to take effect after his death, when from the body of the instrument or donation it is to be gathered that the main consideration of the donation is not the death of the donor but rather services rendered to him by the donee or his affection for the latter, then the donation should be considered as inter vivos, and when duly accepted, it transfers title immediately to the donee, and the condition that the donation is to take effect only after the death of donor should be interpreted as meaning that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the property donated should take place only after donor's death. Until the day arrives or until the condition is fulfilled, the donation, although valid when made, cannot be realized. Thus, he who makes the donation effective upon a certain date, even though to take place at his death, disposes of that which he donated and he cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another. (CONCEPCION) The prohibition to alienate does not go against the irrevocable character of the donation. Such provision is only necessary assurance that during the donor’s lifetime, the latter would still enjoy the right of possession over the property; but, his naked title of ownership has been passed on to the donees. (AUSTRIA-MAGAT) In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive." In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account:

1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and

3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. (MAGLASANG) VALIDITY OF CONDITIONS IN AN ONEROUS DONATION The prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of the property for an entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. (ROMAN CATHOLIC) Article 727 Illegal or impossible conditions in simple and remuneratory donations shall be considered as not imposed. PERFECTION OF DONATION The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to the donor. (PAJARILLO) Art 633 PERSONS WHO MAY GIVE OR RECEIVE A DONATION Donation made in favor of a common-law spouse is void under the family code (ARCABA) MAKING AND ACCEPTANCE OF DONATION The lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument. (QUILALA) The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form and this step shall be noted in both instruments. (HEIRS OF SALUD) The Court cannot in conscience declare the donation ineffective because there is no notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the donee's acceptance. That would be placing too much stress on mere form over substance. (PAJARILLO)

In the case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and requested that the donated land be not registered during her lifetime by Salud. VOID DONATION AS BASIS FOR TITLE BY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION Notwithstanding the invalidity of a donation, a donee may become the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription as long as the possession is in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years without need of title or of good faith. (CALICDAN) REVOCATION AND REDUCTION OF DONATION When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Under the Civil Code, an action to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. (ROMAN CATHOLIC) Onerous donation governed by rules on contract and general rules on prescription of action. Thus, an action to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. (DE LUNA)