PROPERTY 7th WEEK

Si v Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA 653 FACTS:

Escolastica conveyed a parcel of land to her three sons. This is evidenced by three deeds of sale. One of the sons then sold a part of the land to spouses Si. Jose and his wife then sought to annul the sale alleging the co-ownership over the land.

HELD: After the physical division of the lot among the co-owners, the community ownership is terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each other was no longer available. There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by the different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.

Sering v Plazo, 166 SCRA 84

Anyone of the co-owners of an immovable may bring an action in ejectment.

FACTS: Sering won an ejectment suit against Spouses Plazo and Suan. On appeal with the CFI, respondents learned that Sering is not the sole owner of the property and they moved to implead the other co-owners because they think that they are indispensable parties to the case. Court granted and ordered Sering to amend complaint. Due to the failure of the petitioner to amend the complaint, the case was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether the other co-owners are indispensable to the ejecment case

HELD: No, according to Art 478 Anyone of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment (whether the action is forcible entry or unlawful detainer). The matter to be determined is the prior physical possession of the plaintiff which was correctly alleged.

Adlawan v Adlawan, G.R. No. 161916, January 20, 2006

A co-owner by virtue of Art. 487 is allowed to bring an action without necessity of including all the co-owners as plaintiffs for it is presumed to be for the benefit of all BUT if the action of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.

FACTS: A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador Adlawan, the father of (petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who is claiming that he is the sole heir. He then adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to himself and out of generosity allowed the siblings of his father to occupy the property provided that they vacate when asked. Time came when he demanded that they vacate and when they refused he filed an ejectment suit against them.

His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59) denied his allegations claiming that the said lot was registered in their parents name and they had been living in the said house and lot since birth. The only reason why the said house and lot was transferred in Dominador’s name was when their parents were in need of money for renovating their house, their parents were not qualified to obtain a loan and since Dominador was the only one who had a college education, they executed a simulated deed of sale in favor of Dominador.

The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelito’s filiation and the settlement of the estate are conditions precedent for the accrual of the suit. And since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, her legal heirs are entitled to their share in the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to turn over the possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted the motion of execution which was opposed by the nephew and nieces of Graciana who claim that they have a share in the lot.

The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana are co-heirs thus he cannot eject them from the property via unlawful detainer. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit

HELD: NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is not the sole heir of Dominador. Since he was survived was his wife, upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became co-owners of the lot. Upon her death, her share passed on to her relatives by consanguinity thus making them co-owners as well.

Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true that a co-owner may bring such an action w/o necessity of joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs because it is presumed to be instituted for the benefit of all BUT if the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed. Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and his repudiation of the ownership of the other heirs, the instant petition should be dismissed.

Plasabas v CA, G.R. No. 166519, March 31, 2009

Paulmitan v Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 866

When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent from the other co-owners, only his pro indiviso share on the property is transferred to the buyer.

FACTS: The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, which were owned by Agatona Paulmitan. She had 2 children, Pascual and Donato. Pascual’s (7) children (Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking, Anito) are the respondents and Donato and his daughter and son-in-law are petitioners.

Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, adjudicating to himself Lot 757 claiming that he is the sole surviving heir thus the OCT of Agatona was cancelled and a TCT was issued in his name. He executed a deed of sale of Lot 1091 in favor of his daughter, Juliana. For non-payment of taxes, the lot was forfeited and sole at a public to the Provincial Gov’t of Negros Occidental, however, Juliana was able to redeem the property. Upon learning these, the children of Pascual filed w/ the CFI a complaint against petitioners to partition the land plus damages. Petitioners’ defense was that the action has already prescribed for it was filed more than 11 years after the issuance of the TCT and that Juliana has acquired exclusive ownership thru the Deed of Sale and by redeeming the said property.

The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and executory. With respect to Lot 1091, the court decided in favor of respondents. They are entitled to ½ of Lot 1091, pro indiviso. The redemption did not in anyway prejudice their rights. The land was ordered to be partitioned and the petitioners were ordered to pay the respondents their share of the fruits and the respondents to pay their share in the redemption of the land. The CA affirmed the decision thus the case at bar.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Pascual’s children and Donato and Juliana were co-owners of their mother’s lot (2) Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by redeeming the property

HELD: (1) YES: When Agatona died, her estate was still unpartitioned. Art. 1078 states that “Where there are 2 or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased”. Since Pascual and Donato were still alive when she died, they are co-owners of the estate. When Pascual died, his children succeeded him in the co-ownership of the property.

When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-owner of the same thus he can only sell his undivided portion of the property. Art. 493 states that “each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.” Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making the buyer (Juliana) a co-owner.

(2) NO: When she redeemed the property, it did not end the co-ownership. The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner w/ respect to his/her share alone as stated in Art. 1612. But she may compel them to reimburse her for half of the repurchase price for a co-owner has the right to compel other co-owners to contribute to the expenses for the preservation of the thing and to taxes.

Cruz v Leis, 327 SCRA 570

Redemption by a co-owner doesn't terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the whole property subject of the co-ownership FACTS: Leis and Isidro married each other in 1923. Isidro subsequently acquired from the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources a parcel of land, which was titled in her name, with the description that she was a “widow”. Leis only passed away in 1973 without executing a will.

Isidro then secured a loan from Cruz (PhP 15,000, with 5% interest) secured by a mortgage on the land from DANR, but failed to pay on due date. Isidro executed 2 contracts in favor of Cruz: an Deed of Absolute Sale and a Contract indicating a pacto de retro sale. Isidro still failed to repurchase the property within 1 year, so she consolidated the ownership of the land in favor of Cruz.

When Isidro died, Cruz demanded her heirs to vacate the premises. The heirs then filed a complaint with the RTC averring that the land was conjugal property having been purchased during their marriage. The RTC found in favor of the heirs. The case was appealed to the CA, but the CA merely affirmed the ruling because Cruz failed to get a judicial order to have the land consolidated in his name after failure of Isidro to comply with the requirements of the right to repurchase (Art. 1607).

ISSUE: Whether or not the land in question is conjugal property, and therefore subject to the rules on co-ownership?

HELD: Although the land was purchased during the marriage, upon Leis’ death, the conjugal property regime ceased, and gave Isidro an equal portion of Leis’ half of the property to be divided among his legitimes. Co-ownership of the land then began.

However, upon failure of Isidro the heirs to exercise the right to repurchase, the ownership of the land transferred to Cruz. Despite the TCT being void for non-compliance with 1607, the ownership did not transfer back to the heirs, for compliance with 1607 is merely for purposes of registering the title in the Torrens System.

Villanueva v Florendo, 139 SCRA 329 (read dissent)

The “third party” contemplated in Art. 1620 refers to those who are not heirs in succession, either contemplated by will or by law to succeed the deceased.

FACTS: Spouses Villanueva and Garcia, parents of the petitioners, were owners of a land in Cagayan. Garcia died intestate, leaving her husband and children as sole and only legitimate heirs. The spouse, without having the land partitioned, sold the western portion of the lot to the wife of one of his children. Upon learning of the sale, the petitioners signified their intention to redeem the lot, but respondent refused, stating that as wife of one of the legal heirs, redemption will not lie against her. RTC found in favor of respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is a “third party” against whom redemption can be exercised against, pursuant to Art. 1620?

HELD: Within the meaning of Art. 1620, the term "third person" or "stranger" refers to all persons who are not heirs in succession, and by heirs are meant only those who are called either by will or the law to succeed the deceased and who actually succeeds. In short, a third person is any one who is not a co-owner. Respondent seller Villanueva, as co-owner and before partition, has the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest or his Ideal share but not a divided part and one with boundaries as what was done in the case at bar.

DISSENT (Aquino): The “third person” term contemplated in Art. 1620, basing on the Spanish origin of the Code, means “stranger”, and not merely one who is not an heir by succession.

In fact, the redemption should not run against the respondent for the reason that the land that respondent bought formed part of the conjugal property, of which her husband, who is a legitimate heir, also owns. Therefore, the land never transferred to the ownership or possession of “third parties”.

Mariano v Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 736

Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner within the redemption period does not terminate the co-ownership and does not vest in him sole ownership.

FACTS: Francisco Gosiengfaio is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao. In his lifetime, he mortgaged the land to Rural Bank of Tuguegarao to secure payment of a loan. Francisco died in without paying the debt. His intestate heirs were: his wife Antonia and children Amparo, Carlos, Severo, Grace, Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina, and Jacinto.

The bank foreclosed on the mortgage but before the redemption period expired, Antonia, Emma, Lina, Norma, Lina, Carlos and Severo executed a deed of assignment of the right of redemption in favor of Amparo. Amparo later on sold the land to Spouses Mariano.

Grace Gosengfiao, and the other heirs excuded in the deed of assignment filed a complaint for recovery and legal redemption with damages against spouses Mariano.

RTC decided in favor of spouses Mariano. CA for Grace Gosiengfia, et. al.

ISSUE: Whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with her own personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property and terminates the existing state of co-ownership?

HELD: No. Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the decedent, a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but will inure to the benefit of all co-owners. In other words, it will not end to the existing state of co-ownership. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.

Respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run.

Tan v Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 660

Consolidation of ownership by mortgagee after expiration of redemption period terminates co-ownership. A co-owner who redeems a property with her own funds after such consolidation becomes the sole owner thereof.

FACTS: Tan Tiong Tick, married to Tan Ong Hun was the registered owner of a parcel of land and its improvements in Binondo Manila. They had six children George Laurel, Teodora, Rosa, Rosita, Mauro Umali, and D. Annie Tan.

The land was mortgaged to China Bank to secure payment for several obligations. Tan Tiong Tick and Tan Ong Hun died without paying their obligations.

China Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Two weeks before the redemption period expired, China Bank and the Heirs of Tan Tiong Tick entered into a settlement. It provided that the heirs were given right to repurchase even after the redemption period but before August 3, 1973.

The heirs failed to redeem before the legal redemption period so China Bank consolidated its ownership and was issued a new TCT. However, D. Annie Tan exercised the right to repurchase pursuant to the settlement using her personal funds. But the title to the land was registered in the name of all the heirs.

D. Annie Tan filed an action to reconvey the property to her and damages. RTC ruled that the property was co-owned by the heirs. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not co-ownership among the heirs was dissolved by the foreclosure and consolidation of title by the bank after the redemption period has expired?

HELD: Yes. Since the lot and its improvement were mortgaged by the deceased parents, there can be no question that a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption by one during this period would have inured to the benefit of all. The records show, however, that when the petitioner purchased the disputed property on August 30, 1974, any co-ownership among the brothers and sisters no longer existed. The period to redeem had expired more than one year earlier, on July 6, 1973. The respondent China Bank consolidated its ownership and a new title was issued in the bank's name. When the heirs allowed the one year redemption period to expire without redeeming their parents' former property and permitted the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title, the co-ownership was extinguished. Since D. Annie Tan used her personal fund to repurchase the property, she is the lawful sole owner. The respondent China Banking Corporation is ordered to execute the deed of sale over the disputed property in favor of the petitioner alone.

Delima v Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 641

Cancellation of old title and issuance of new one constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership which would start the running of prescription.

FACTS: This case is another story of sibling war over a Friar Land Estate inherited from their parent who had acquired said land from the Government. When the parents died, Respondent Galileo allegedly paid the remaining balance of the purchase price, and the estate tax. Later on, he executed an affidavit declaring himself as sole owner and acquired TCT over it. 10 years after the TCT was issued, the other heirs instituted this action for reconveyance claiming their part as co-owners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the other heirs are still entitled to the land or are they barred by prescription.

RULING: The other heirs are barred by prescription. How did this happen? Galileo was able to prove the 4 requirements: (1) clear and convincing evidence of repudiation (2) made known to the other owners (3) adverse possession and open repudiation (4) for over 10 years.

What is important in this case is that the Court ruled that registration of the land would be sufficient compliance with the notice requirement above.

Adille v Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 455

Registration is not equivalent to notice of repudiation when it is done to defraud the others. Torrens title cannot be used as shield for fraud.

FACTS: There was a woman who had two husband. With the first husband, she produced the Petitioner. The second husband, the Respondents. Meanwhile, this woman owned a land and sold the same to a third person with right of repurchase. However, when the woman died, it was Petitioner who by himself repurchased the land and later on he executed an affidavit of sole ownership and registered the land unto himself alone. Eventually, the other heirs (Respondent) learned of the registration so they filed an action to cancel the title.

Now Petitioner claims prescription almost on similar grounds with the previous case, i.e. the registration constituted constructive notice to the other heirs, if not to the world.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is correct.

RULING: NO! First of all, the redemption by Petitioner benefited all so that the ownership did not transfer to him alone. The other heirs only need to reimburse him.

As to the notice, the registration by Petitioner cannot be considered as notice of the repudiation because they were done in bad faith to deprive the other co-heirs. In fact, they were done clandestinely. One of the co-heir in fact was in possession of the land and yet he was not informed of the pending registration nor ousted by Petitioner. Hence, should there have been any notice, it would be during litigation when the heirs finally learned of the registration. In that case, there is no prescription yet. Registration is not equivalent to notice of repudiation when it is done to defraud the others. Torrens title cannot be used as shield for fraud.

FACTS: There was a woman who had two husband. With the first husband, she produced the Petitioner. The second husband, the Respondents. Meanwhile, this woman owned a land and sold the same to a third person with right of repurchase. However, when the woman died, it was Petitioner who by himself repurchased the land and later on he executed an affidavit of sole ownership and registered the land unto himself alone. Eventually, the other heirs (Respondent) learned of the registration so they filed an action to cancel the title.

Now Petitioner claims prescription almost on similar grounds with the previous case, i.e. the registration constituted constructive notice to the other heirs, if not to the world.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is correct.

RULING: NO! First of all, the redemption by Petitioner benefited all so that the ownership did not transfer to him alone. The other heirs only need to reimburse him.

As to the notice, the registration by Petitioner cannot be considered as notice of the repudiation because they were done in bad faith to deprive the other co-heirs. In fact, they were done clandestinely. One of the co-heir in fact was in possession of the land and yet he was not informed of the pending registration nor ousted by Petitioner. Hence, should there have been any notice, it would be during litigation when the heirs finally learned of the registration. In that case, there is no prescription yet.

Mariategui v Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 337

Prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner. Petitioner’s registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation of co-ownership, especially since there was fraud involved.

FACTS:

Lupo Mariateguie died without a will on June 15, 1953. During his lifetime, Lupo contracted 3 marriages. He had 8 children all in all: 4 with his first wife, Eusebia; 1 daughter with his second wife, Flaviana; and 3 with his third wife, Felipe.

Lupo left four properties which he acquired while he was still unmarried. On December 2, 1967, Lupo’s descendants by his 1st and 2nd marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated one of the lots unto themselves. An OCT was issued in the names of these heirs. Subsequently, this lot was subdivided into two, for which separate TCTs were issued to the respective parties.

Lupo’s children with the third wife, who were claiming continuous enjoyment and possession of the land, protested. They went to court saying that when the court adjudicated one of the four lots to their co-heirs, they were deprived of their respective shares in the lot. They prayed for the partition of the entire estate (all 4 lots) and the annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition. The defendants (other heirs) filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and prescription. The trial court dismissed the case while the CA declared that all the heirs were entitled to equal shares in the estate. CA directed the heirs who had acquired TCTs to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor of the heirs with the third wife.

ISSUE:

Whether or not prescription barred private respondents’ right to demand partition of the estate [The court established that the heirs had successional rights as their father had, during his lifetime, repeatedly acknowledged them as his children; that they enjoyed that status since birth legitimate children & heirs indeed]

RULING: No. Prescription does not run against private respondents wrt the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs/co-owners for whose benefit the prescription is invoked have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership.

The registration was not a valid act of repudiation because it was not clearly made known to the other heirs. For prescription to run, the act of repudiation is subject to certain conditions:

1. a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership 2. such act is clearly made known to the other co-owners 3. the evidence is clear and conclusive 4. OCEN possession of the property

Assuming that it was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when the respondents filed the action for partition. The reason is because there was fraud involved in obtaining registration. Earlier the respondent heirs were assured by the petitioner-heirs no to worry about their share in their inheritance; their existence as co-owners was recognized and in fact, they constructed a house on the registered lot without objection from the petitioner-heirs. In as much as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs, prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time respondents discovered the fraud. In this case, respondents immediately commenced an action two months after they learned of the fraud.

Heirs of Segunda Maningding v Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601

While prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners.

FACTS:

This case involved 2 parcels of land: a riceland and sugarland in Pangasinan. The heirs of Segunda claim that they own the disputed lands together with the Buazons.

The Buazons aver that: 1. Their father, Roque Buazon, acquired the land by virtue of a deed of donation propter nuptias. 2. Segunda Maningding, Maria Maningding, Juan Maningding and Roque Bauzon co-owned the lands as heirs of Ramon Roque. Roque Buazon allegedly repudiated the co-ownership of the sugarland in 1965 and repudiated it to himself… and later on, Juan and Maria Maningding renounced and quitclaimed their shares in the Riceland in favor of R. Buazon. 3. Subsequently, Roque Bauzon transferred the riceland to his son Luis Bauzon and the sugarland to his daughter Eriberta Bauzon (the respondents in this case), both transactions being evidenced by deeds of sale.

On 31 July 1979 Segunda Maningding died. Her heirs allegedly discovered the transfers made by Roque Bauzon in favor of his children only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition of the properties as well as the accounting of the produce but were unsuccessful.

The trial court awarded both parcels to Segunda Maningding and Roque Bauzon as co-owners in equal shares after finding that Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding had already executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation. It rejected the deed of donation for failure to prove its due execution and authenticity and nullified the deed of sale by Roque Buazon to his children. It concluded that Roque Bauzon could not have validly conveyed both parcels as one-half (1/2) of each parcel rightfully belonged to Segunda Maningding and her heirs.

The CA reversed the ruling, declaring the donation and sales valid. Later on, the court reversed itself by declaring the donation void for failure to comply with the necessary requirements. However, it ruled that the properties belonged to Roque Bauzon by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

ISSUE: Whether or not Roque Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription

RULING: Yes. While prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners.

In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in the concept of owner by virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The possession was public as it was Roque Bauzon who personally tilled and cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were manifest and visible to all. These acts were made more pronounced and public considering that the parcels of land are located in a municipality wherein ownership and possession are particularly and normally known to the community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he was never ousted therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His possession was uninterrupted and in good faith because of his well-founded belief that the donation propter nuptias was properly executed and the grantors were legally allowed to convey their respective shares in his favor. He likewise appropriated to himself the whole produce of the parcels of land to the exclusion of all others.

As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the property from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who were never given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which reason they demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their shares. Unfortunately they slept on their rights and allowed almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse before attempting to assert their right. Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their inaction.

Note: The donation propter nuptias was effected as early as 21 April 1926. It was only in 1986 when the heirs of Segunda Maningding demanded partition of the properties and conveyance of the produce. Sixty (60) years have already elapsed. Even granting that Roque Bauzon possessed the properties only upon the death of his father in 1948, more than thirty (30) years have already passed. In either case, acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of Roque Bauzon.

Aguilar v Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 472

Any of the Co-owners may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.

FACTS:

Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a house and lot in Paraňaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. They initially agreed that Vergilio will get 2/3 and Senen will get 1/3; but later they agreed on equal shares. Senen was left in the said lot to take care of their father since Vergilio’s family was in Cebu. After their father’s death petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them but the latter refused. Petitioner then filed to compel the sale of the property. The chunk of the issue tackled by the courts was regarding the pre-trial. Respondent filed a motion to cancel Pre-trial since the counsel had to accompany his wife in Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding. CFI denied the motion; and the pre-trial proceeded on the scheduled date. The respondents did not appear thus they were declared in default. The trial went on ex parte without the respondent and held that the property should be sold to a third party and that the proceeds be distributed to the parties; in addition respondent was made to pay rent from the time the action was filed. Respondents appealed this and the decision was reversed by the CA saying that the TC erred in declaring respondents in default; the case was then remanded to the trial court. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

A) W/N CA erred (1) in holding that the motion of respondent through counsel to cancel the pre-trial was dilatory in character and

(2) in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial? ISSUE RELEVANT TO PROPERTY: B) W/N trial court was correct with regards to the sale and rent?

RULING: A) YES, CA erred in granting the respondents motion and remanding the case. The law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pretrial is mandatory. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default. It is the discretion of the court to grant the motion if it sees that the reason for the cancelation of the same would be reasonable. SC found that the reason for the cancelation of the pre-trial was insufficient and that the trial court was not in grave abuse of discretion when they denied it.

B) YES, with a few modification. Petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests. BASIS: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed.

SC held that ½ of the proceeds should go to the petitioner and the remainder to the respondent (1,200 each.) Also rent was awarded 1,200 pesos per month with legal interest from the time the trial court ordered the respondent to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property. BASIS:

When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.

Benjamin Coronel v Florentino Constantino, 397 SCRA 128

Sale of an undivided interest of a property only binds the co-owner only up to the portion of his/her interest; consequently he/she can only transfer ownership over the same to other parties.

FACTS:

The disputed property was originally owned by Honoria Aguinaldo. One half was inherited by Emilia Coronel together with her sons Benjamin, Catalino and Cerefino, all surnamed Coronel. The other half was inherited by Florentino Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso. Emilia sold her share of the lot to Jess C Santos and Priscilla Bernardo as evidenced by the “KASULATAN NG BILIHANG PATULUYAN.” Santos and Bernardo then sold it to the respondents. Petitioners built several constructions and improvements on the disputed lot. Respondents then filed a complaint for declaration of ownership, quieting of title and damages with prayer for writ of mandatory and/or prohibitory injunction with the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale was valid? If yes, up to what extent?

RULING: YES, only up to ¼ share of the land inherited by Emilia and her sons. Emilia signed only in her behalf and not in representation of her three children thus the sale is only binding to her share. The subject property was co-owned, pro-indiviso by petitioner Emilia together with her petitioner sons. No proof was presented to show that the co-ownership that existed among the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino and herein petitioners as never been terminated. No evidence was presented to show that the three brothers were aware of the sale made by their mother. Since there was no partition made, Emilia is deemed to have sold only her share of the lot which is ¼ thereof. Consequently SC declared respondents as owner of ½ undivided portion of the original lot which they inherited plus ¼ share (of their ½) of petitioner Emilia Coronel.