pronounced on : 07in the high court of judicature at ... · prayer in crl.o.p.no.13276 of 2017:...

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

Reserved on : 07.08.2017

Pronounced on : 07IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

Reserved on : 07.08.2017

Pronounced on : 07.09.2017

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.S.RAMESH

Crl.O.P.Nos.13276, 13670, 13769,

14077, 14485 & 14595 of 2017

Ramalingam .. Petitioner in Crl.O.P.No.13276/2017

Vs.

1. S.Subramanian

2. The Inspector of Police,

Ambillikkai Police Station,

Oddanchatram Taluk,

Dindigul District. .. Respondents in Crl.O.P.No.13276/2017

Bar & Bench (www.barandbench.com)

Prayer in Crl.O.P.No.13276 of 2017: Criminal Original Petition filed

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. praying to direct the 5th Metropolitan

Magistrate, Egmore to consider the Recall-Warrant petition filed by the

petitioner on the same day in the event of surrender by the petitioner and

seeks to Recall the Non-Bailable Warrant issued in C.C.No.21841 of 2005

pending on the file 5th Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore.

For Petitioners : Mr.N.R.Elango, Senior Counsel(Amicus Curiae)

for Mr.K.Raghupathy in Crl.O.P.No.13276/2017

Mr.S.Kalyanaraman in Crl.O.P.13670/2017

Mr.S.Parthasarathy in Crl.O.P.13769/ 2017

Mr.B.Vasudevan in Crl.O.P.No.14077/2017

Mr.A.G.Rajan in Crl.O.P.No.14485/2017

Mr.J.Franklin in Crl.O.P.No.14595/2017

For Respondent : No Appearance

(R1 in Crl.O.P.No.13276 of 2017

Respondent in Crl.O.P.14595/2017)

For Respondent : Mr.Rajarathinam,

State Public Prosecutor Assisted by

Mr.P.Govindarajan, APP (R2 in in Crl.O.P.No.13276 of 2017,

Respondent in

Crl.O.P.Nos.13670,13769,14077/2017)

C O M M O N O R D E R


One among the common questions that arises for consideration in the

present petitions is as to whether the High Court, exercising its powers

under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is empowered to

quash or recall a Non-bailable Warrant when an alternate remedy under

Section 70 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers cancellation

of the warrant by the court that had issued the warrant.

2.An analogous proposition came to be dealt by me in a recent decision in

K. Raghupathy Vs. Commissioner of Police reported in 2017 (2) Lw

(Crl.) 177. The order was made on the basis of the law laid down by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the cases of Ramesh Kumari Vs.

State (N.C.T. Of Delhi) and others reported in 2006 (1) CTC 666 and

Prabhu Chawla Vs. State of Rajasthan and another reported in CDJ

2016 SC 810. The relevant portion of the K. Raghupathy’s case reads as

follows:

“….5.For the sake of brevity, Section 482 of the Criminal

Code of Procedure, 1973 is extracted:

“Section 482: Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to

limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to

make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to

any order this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process

of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

6.The Section begins with a non obstante clause and in

view of the inherent powers conferred therein, there

cannot be a total ban on the High Courts’ interminable

jurisdiction. In other words, the availability of an


alternate remedy under the Code of Criminal Procedure

cannot be an embargo for the High Court to exercise its

inherent powers to secure the ends of justice in view of

the non obstante clause. This Court is conscious of the

fact that the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., must

be exercised very sparingly and in the rarest of rare

cases and the limitation to exercise this power is self

restrained.

7.At the outset, I would like to reiterate the views

expressed by my learned Brother Judge in the judgment

reported in 2016(5) CTC 577 that there can be no

circumvention of the time table prescribed by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari's case (supra)

and I am in agreement with the proposition. But, in my

considered view, the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the case of Ramesh Kumari Vs. State (N.C.T. Of

Delhi) and others reported in 2006 (1) CTC 666 and

Prabhu Chawla Vs. State of Rajasthan and another

reported in CDJ 2016 SC 810 are binding on me. In

Ramesh Kumari's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has

held as follows:

“3.……. We are not convinced by this submission because

the sole grievance of the Appellant is that no case has

been registered in terms of the mandatory provisions of

Section 154 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Genuineness or otherwise of the information can only be

considered after registration of the case. Genuineness or

credibility of the information is not a condition precedent

for registration of a case. We are also clearly of the view


that the High Court erred in law in dismissing the

petition solely on the ground that the contempt petition

was pending and the Appellant had an alternative

remedy. The ground of alternative remedy nor pending

of the contempt petition would be no substitute in law

not to register a case when a citizen makes a complaint

of a cognizance offence against the Police Officer.”

8.From the aforesaid judgment, it is comprehensible that

the amount of alternate remedy cannot be a bar for

issuance of a direction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to

register a case when cognizable offence is made out

before the police officer. The aforesaid judgment came

to be considered by my learned Brother Judge and was

distinguished holding that the dictum laid down therein

arose from the peculiar facts of that case and hence, the

proposition laid down therein cannot be made applicable

to the facts of the subject cases…..”

3.The aforesaid excerpt is self explanatory and came to passed in the

light of the following propositions by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India

holding that the existence of an alternate remedy shall neither limit nor

affect the inherent powers of the High court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.,

to pass any order, if such an order is essential (i) to give effect to any

order; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court; or (iii) if such an

order is necessary to secure the ends of justice.


4.In the case of Prabhu Chalwa Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in

2016 (16) SCC 30, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:

“6.In our considered view any attempt to explain the law

further as regards the issue relating to inherent power of

the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is unwarranted.

We would simply reiterate that Section 482 begins with

a non obstante clause to state:

“482. Saving of inherent powers of High

Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed

to limit or affect the inherent powers of the

High Court to make such orders as may be

necessary to give effect to any order under this

Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of

justice.”

A fortiori, there can be no total ban on the exercise of

such wholesome jurisdiction where, in the words of

Krishna Iyer, J.

“abuse of the process of the court or other

extraordinary situation excites the Court’s

jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint,

nothing more”. (Raj Kapoor case 1980 (1) SCC

43, p. 48, para 10)

We venture to add a further reason in support. Since

Section 397 CrPC is attracted against all orders other


than interlocutory, a contrary view would limit the

availability of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC

only to petty interlocutory orders! A situation wholly

unwarranted and undesirable.”

5.Likewise, in the case of Raj Kapoor v. State reported in (1980) 1

SCC 43, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has examined the power of

High Courts under Section 482 vis-a-vis availability of alternative

remedies under the Code and held as follows:-

“10.The first question is as to whether the inherent

power of the High Court under Section 482 stands

repelled when the revisional power under Section 397

overlaps. The opening words of Section 482 contradict

this contention because nothing of the Code, not even

Section 397, can affect the amplitude of the inherent

power preserved in so many terms by the language of

Section 482. Even so, a general principle pervades this

branch of law when a specific provision is made: easy

resort to inherent power is not right except under

compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of

jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade

areas set apart for specific power under the same Code.

In Madhu Limaye case [1977 (4) SCC 551] this Court

has exhaustively and, if I may say so with great respect,

correctly discussed and delineated the law beyond

mistake. While it is true that Section 482 is pervasive it

should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same

Code, such, for instance, in Section 397(2). Apparent

conflict may arise in some situations between the two

provisions and a happy solution “would be to say that


the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397

operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the

High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will

have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory

order. Then in accordance with one or the other

principles enunciated above, the inherent power will

come into play, there being no other provision in the

Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved

party. But then, if the order assailed is purely of an

interlocutory character which could be corrected in

exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under

the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its

inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly

brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process

of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of

justice interference by the High Court is absolutely

necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can

limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the

High Court. But such cases would be few and far

between. The High Court must exercise the inherent

power very sparingly. One such case would be the

desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding

initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without

jurisdiction”(para 10).

In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of

inherent power where abuse of the process of the court

or other extraordinary situation excites the court’s

jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing

more. The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory

orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the


High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay.

At the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of

being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring

injustice stares the court in the face. In between is a

tertium quid, as Untwalia, J. has pointed out as for

example, where it is more than a purely interlocutory

order and less than a final disposal. The present case

falls under that category where the accused complain of

harassment through the court’s process. Can we state

that in this third category the inherent power can be

exercised? In the words of Untwalia, J.: (SCC p. 556,

para 10)

“The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to

prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to

secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed

by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can

examine the matter in an appropriate case under its

inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for

exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance

with Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming,

although not accepting, that invoking the revisional

power of the High Court is impermissible.”

I am, therefore clear in my mind that the inherent

power is not rebuffed in the case situation before us.

Counsel on both sides, sensitively responding to our

allergy for legalistics, rightly agreed that the fanatical

insistence on the formal filing of a copy of the order

under cessation need not take up this court’s time. Our

conclusion concurs with the concession of counsel on


both sides that merely because a copy of the order has

not been produced, despite its presence in the records

in the court, it is not possible for me to hold that the

entire revisory power stands frustrated and the inherent

power stultified.”

6.Thus, in view of the above pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court of India, it is a settled proposition that there cannot be a total ban

on the exercise of inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of

the Code of Criminal procedure where abuse of the process of Court or

other extraordinary situation to excites the Court's jurisdiction.

7.It is now brought to my notice that petitions under Section 482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure are not being entertained by the High Court

for the purpose of cancellation or recalling of a Non Bailable Warrant in

view of a judgment of this Court in P.A. Saleem Vs. State [1994 (2)

LW Crl. 402] wherein it was held that the High Court exercising its

power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot recall a

Non Bailable Warrant. The relevant portion of the said order is as under:

“20.Simplicitor, recall of warrant, in exercise of power

under Section 482 of the Code, in anyone of the actions,

is not legally permissible and this will be patent, on a

cursory perusal thereof. The said section prescribes that

nothing in this Code, shall be deemed to limit or affect


the inherent powers of the High Court to make such

orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order

under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of

any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It

is thus patently clear that the inherent power is capable

of being exercising either to give effect to any order

under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of

any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

21. ‘Re-call’ of a warrant can, by no stretch of

imagination, be stated to come under the former clause,

to give effect to any order under this Code, which would

mean that this Court has the power to see whether the

warrant that has been issued by a Magistrate under

Section 70 had been executed by the issuance of the

proper direction to the police officer or any other person

to whom the same had been issued, if such an officer is

keeping the warrant, without executing it, thereby

hampering the progress of speedy trial. In view of the

specific provisions engrafted under Sub-clause 2 of

Section 70 of the Code for the redress of the grievance

of an aggrieved accused and further remedy by way of

revision either under Section 397 or 401 of the Code,

simpliciter re-call warrant cannot be stated to attract the

latter clause also, namely, to prevent the abuse of

process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of

justice.


The Court had also referred to the prevailing ills in the

criminal justice system to justify denying relief under

Section 482:

“18. … This sort of a practice had its origin, by

assumption of power under Section 482 of the Code,

without making an investigation therefor. The impelling

occasion or moment has come to decide the tenability or

otherwise of such a practice, when especially it tilted the

very foundation of the smooth functioning of the

administration of the criminal justice system, in the

sense of creating or causing agonizing situation by

prolongation of trials, especially in heinous crimes of

murder and what not, by reason of indiscriminate and

wanton absence of one or other of the accused, where

there are more than one, by turns and by getting

warrants issued to secure their appearance or

production before Court, re-called by this Court, under

Section 482 of the Code, with an ulterior motive of

hampering the progress of trial, that what little bit of

evidence available in a case is irretrievably getting lost

either by death or creation of a situation, making it

almost impossible for the investigating agency to trace

the witness or by tampering, getting their memories

failed etc., in process of passage of sands of time and

thereby getting innumerable acquittals, as revealed by

recent statistics, as earlier adverted to, rudely shocking,

not only the conscience of this Court, but also eroding

the faith of the society in the very system of

administration of criminal justice in Courts, to which

Judges themselves should not be responsible, either


knowingly or unknowingly, sometimes by abuse or

misuse of their power”.

8.However, in a subsequent judgment in Francis Xavier V.

Nelamangalam reported in 1995 (2) MWN (Cri.) 114, where another

learned Judge, after considering the previous decisions of this Court

including P.A. Saleem (supra), has held that the High Court can recall a

NBW while exercising its power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., and noted

thus:

“12.From the above Supreme Court rulings, it

is clear that the inherent powers of this Court

are wide and the various conditions imposed by

the rulings of the Supreme Court are only

illustrative and not exhaustive. In the words of

Justice Krishna Iyer, it is self-imposed

restrictions. Therefore, I am of the considered

view that the inherent powers of this Court

under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are wide and in

order to prevent abuse of process of Court and

to secure the ends of justice, this court may

exercise its inherent powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C., notwithstanding any specific provisions

in Section 70 (2) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure. However, this Court will exercise its

self-imposed restraint and direct the concerned

party to approach the Court below to redress

their respective grievance according to specific


provisions given under the Code of Criminal

Procedure.”

9.The learned Judge of this Court after considering the previous decisions

of this Court including the judgment in P.A. Saleem (supra), held that the

High Court is well within its power to recall Non Bailable Warrant under

Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Justification in that case was

on the basis of reliance of various Supreme Court judgments.

10.Among the conflicting decisions in P.A. Saleem and Francis Xavier by

co-ordinate Benches, the latter decision in the case of Francis Xavier had

taken into account, the decision of Saleem's case and hence, is binding on

this Court.

11.The view in Francis Xavier's case has been upheld by the decision of

the Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Prabhu

Chawla's case. Hence, the judgments referred to, by the learned Public

Prosecutor in Valampuri John v Peter [1997 (2) LW(Crl) 673];

Sennasi v State [CDJ 1997 MHC 728]; Sarathkumar v Inspector of

Police [CDJ 2004 MHC 728]; Durgakumari v Jhansilakshmi [CDJ

2007 MHC 5561]; Prapbakaran v State [CDJ 2010 MHC 140];

Kannan v State [CDJ 2011 MHC 3064]; State v SubashKapoor [CDJ


2012 MHC 2553]; Sundar v State [CDJ 2016 MHC 656] need not be

cited to, in view of the fact that none of these cases had reconsidered the

proposition laid down in Francis Xavier's case or had gone into the scope

of the power exercised by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Nevertheless, the view in Francis Xavier's case having been upheld by a

Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Prabhu

Chawla's case, would be binding on this Court.

12.It would not be out of place to mention here that P.A. Saleem's case

was pronounced in the year 1994, despite deprecation of interference by

the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., it can only be seen that the

situation has only worsen in the intervening 23 years. According to the

data collected by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) for the year

2015, there are 61,999 Non Bailable Warrants were issued in Tamil Nadu

alone.

13.It is worthwhile to recall and recollect the decision of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC

494, wherein it has held that the task of statutory interpretation is a

delicate one and judges must be attentive to the changes in social

conditions as they seek to interpret the intentions of lawmakers. The

relevant portion of the decision is as follows:


34. … But the Court does not 'rush in to demolish

provisions where judicial endeavour, amelioratively

interpretational, may achieved both constitutionality and

compassionate resurrection. The salutary strategy of

sustaining the validity of the law and softening its

application was, with lovely dexterity adopted by Sri Soli

Sorabjee appearing for the State. The semantic

technique of updating the living sense of dated

legislation is, in our view, perfectly legitimated,

especially when, in a developing country like ours, the

corpus juirs is, in some measure a raj hand-over.

14.Similarly, in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of

Uttaranchal [(2007) 12 SCC 1], the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has

cautioned against the alacrity with which trial courts have issued NBWs

and issued detailed guidelines to be followed by trial courts when issuing

NBWs which is as follows:

When non-bailable warrants should be issued

53.Non-bailable warrant should be issued to bring a

person to court when summons or bailable warrants

would be unlikely to have the desired result. This could

be when:

*it is reasonable to believe that the person will not

voluntarily appear in court; or

*the police authorities are unable to find the person to

serve him with a summon; or


*it is considered that the person could harm someone if

not placed into custody immediately.

54.As far as possible, if the court is of the opinion that a

summon will suffice in getting the appearance of the

accused in the court, the summon or the bailable

warrants should be preferred. The warrants either

bailable or non-bailable should never be issued without

proper scrutiny of facts and complete application of

mind, due to the extremely serious consequences and

ramifications which ensue on issuance of warrants. The

court must very carefully examine whether the criminal

complaint or FIR has not been filed with an oblique

motive.

55.In complaint cases, at the first instance, the court

should direct serving of the summons along with the

copy of the complaint. If the accused seem to be

avoiding the summons, the court, in the second instance

should issue bailable warrant. In the third instance,

when the court is fully satisfied that the accused is

avoiding the court's proceeding intentionally, the process

of issuance of the non-bailable warrant should be

resorted to. Personal liberty is paramount, therefore, we

caution courts at the first and second instance to refrain

from issuing non-bailable warrants.

56.The power being discretionary must be exercised

judiciously with extreme care and caution. The court

should properly balance both personal liberty and

societal interest before issuing warrants. There cannot

be any straitjacket formula for issuance of warrants but

as a general rule, unless an accused is charged with the


commission of an offence of a heinous crime and it is

feared that he is likely to tamper or destroy the evidence

or is likely to evade the process of law, issuance of non-

bailable warrants should be avoided.

57.The court should try to maintain proper balance

between individual liberty and the interest of the public

and the State while issuing non-bailable warrant.

15.It is seen from the Inder Mohan Goswami's case, that the guidelines

stated therein, have been observed mostly in the breach by trial courts in

Tamil Nadu. It is essential for the High Court, as the highest criminal

Court and as a Court of supervision over all trial courts in the State, to

reiterate these principles regarding issuance of Non Bailable Warrants and

ensure compliance.

16.It is further seen that the cases in which trial courts issue Non Bailable

Warrants may be broadly classified in four categories namely, (i) the trial

court issues Non Bailable Warrants without issuing summons first, (ii) the

trial court issues a Non Bailable Warrant when the accused is absent for

one or two hearings without inquiring into the cause of absence, (iii)

where the accused is absent for one or two hearings and files a petition

under Section 317 of the Code, the Court rejects the petition and issues a

Non Bailable Warrant and (iv) where the accused has intentionally


absented himself from the trial and does not attend any hearings and

then, the trial court issues a Non Bailable Warrant.

17.Among the aforesaid four categories, the first three categories of cases

can be leniently considered by the High Court for the purpose of recalling

a Non Bailable Warrant. Of course, such leniency could be to the

subjective satisfaction of the reasonings of the petitioners as to the bona-

fide inability to approach the lower Court seeking for recalling/cancellation

of Non Bailable Warrant. Insofar as the fourth category is concerned, it

would not be desirable to recall the warrant but to direct the petitioner to

approach the Court which had issued warrant, seeking for a prior relief.

18.It is also brought to my notice that apart from various other reasons

for the long pendency of cases before the trial Courts, the non execution

of Non Bailable Warrant is one among the reasons. This fact is reiterated

through the last data collected by the NCRB. In most of these pending

cases, it is seen that whenever a Non Bailable warrant is kept pending

execution, the usual practice among many of the Court is to adjourn the

case on the ground that “Non Bailable Warrant is pending”.


19.In heinous crimes, where there is deliberate and continuous non

appearance of the accused, the trial Court may proclaim him as person

absconding under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section

82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

82.Proclamation for person absconding:

(1)If Any Court has reason to believe (whether

after taking evidence or not) that any person

against whom a warrant has been issued by it

has absconded or is concealing himself so that

such warrant cannot be executed, such Court

may publish a written proclamation requiring

him to appear at a specified place and at a

specified time not less than thirty days from

the date of publishing such proclamation

(2)The proclamation shall be published as

follows—

(i) (a) it shall be publicly read in some

conspicuous place of the town or village in

which such person ordinarily resides;

(b) it shall be affixed to some conspicuous part

of the house or home-stead in which such

person ordinarily resides or or to some

conspicuous place of such town or village;

(c) a copy thereof shall be affixed to some

conspicuous part of the Court-house;

(ii)the Court may also, if it thinks fit, direct a

copy of the proclamation to be published in a


daily newspaper circulating in the place in

which such person ordinarily resides

(3)A statement in writing by the Court issuing

the proclamation to the effect that the

proclamation was duly published on a specified

day, in the manner specified in clause (i) of

subsection (2), shall be conclusive evidence

that the requirements of this section have been

complied with, and that the proclamation was

published on such day.

[(4)Where a proclamation was duly published

under sub-section(1) is in respect of a person

accused of an offence punishable under Section

302, 304, 364, 367, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395,

396, 397, 398,399, 400, 402, 436, 449, 459 or

460 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), and

such person fails to appear at the specified

place and time required by the proclamation,

the Court may, after making such inquiry as it

thinks fit, pronounce him a proclaimed offender

and make a declaration to that effect.

(5)The provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3)

shall apply to a declaration made by the Court

under sub-section (4) as they apply to the

proclamation published under sub-section(1).]

sub clause 4 & 5 inserted by Act 25 of 2005,

S.12 (w.e.f.23.06.2006).“


20.Thus, under Section 82 of Cr.P.C., there can be no impediment on the

part of the trial Court to pronounce him as a proclaimed offender, instead

of keeping the matter pending indefinitely for the purpose of having the

warrant executed. Hence, the existence of the fourth category of cases

cannot be a ground to preclude the High Court to do justice in the first

three categories particularly, when they constitute a major portion of the

pending cases in the State of Tamil Nadu, in which, Non Bailable Warrants

are pending execution.

21.To sum up the findings rendered by me, it is reiterated that the

issuance of Bailable Warrant or Non Bailable Warrant should be exercised

with extreme caution and in the rarest of cases, bearing in mind that the

pendency of Non Bailable Warrant is one of the major factors for the long

pendency of cases before the trial Court. The trial Court shall also

scrupulously follow the guidelines imposed in Inder Mohan Gowsami's

case (supra) as well as the observations made in the present case while

issuing Non Bailable Warrants or recalling the Non Bailable Warrants.

22.Before parting with the case, I would like to place on record the

contributions of the learned Senior counsel Mr.N.R.Elango, who had acted

as an Amicus Curiae and for his able assistance. Equally, I would also like

to place on record the assistance of Mr.Rajarathinam, learned State Public

Prosecutor and Mr.P.Govindarajan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor

who had not only represented the State but had fairly presented the


various legal propositions, for and against State, held by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court of India as well as this Court.

23.In the present cases in hand, Non Bailable Warrants came to be issued

on 15.06.2017, 21.01.2016, 27.08.2015, 06.10.2016, 18.07.2017 and

07.04.2017 in C.C.No.21841/2005, C.C.No.3837/2005, C.C.No.90/2008,

Spl. C.C.No.10/2016, C.C.No.309 of 2005 and STC.No.670 of 2016

pending on the file of the learned V Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, XI

Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, learned Judicial Magistrate,

Sathyamangalam, learned Sessions Judge, (Fast Track), Mahila Court,

Namakkal, learned Judicial Magistrate-I, Kallakurichi and learned Judicial

Magistrate, Kodumudi, Erode respectively. In view of my above findings,

the Crl.O.P.Nos.13276, 13670, 13769, 14077, 14485, 14595 of 2017

stand allowed. Consequently, the Non Bailable Warrants issued against

the petitioners are recalled.

24.It is made clear that the petitioners shall henceforth co-operate by

regularly attending the proceedings before the concerned Court.

07.09.2017

DP


Index:Yes

Internet:Yes

Note to Registry: Henceforth, the petitions filed

under Section 482 Cr.P.c. Seeking for recall of NBWs issued by the trial Court shall be numbered

and taken on file, if it is otherwise in order.

To

1.The Inspector of Police,

Ambillikkai Police Station,

Oddanchatram Taluk,

Dindigul District.

2.The Public Prosecutor,

High Court, Madras.


M.S.RAMESH.J,

DP

order made in

Crl.O.P.Nos.13276, 13670, 13769,

14077, 14485 & 14595 of 2017

07.09.2017


pronounced on : 07in the high court of judicature at ... · prayer in crl.o.p.no.13276 of 2017:...

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