promises to keep: technology, law, and the future of entertainment william fisher march 25, 2003
TRANSCRIPT
OutlineI. Potential Benefits of New TechnologiesII. Background: Copyright Law circa 1990III. Cycles of Innovation and Resistance
DAT Recorders / AHRA Encryption circumvention / DMCA §1201 Music Lockers / MP3.com litigation Webcasting / DPRA-DMCA §114; CARP ruling Centralized File Sharing / Napster-Scour litigation P2P / P2P litigation; limited authorized services CD Burning / CD copy protection
IV. Defects of the Resultant SystemV. Where Do We Go from Here?
A. Private PropertyB. Regulated IndustryC. An Alternative Compensation System
TechnologiesDownloading: Transmission over the Internet of a
digital copy of a recorded musical performance, followed by storage of that file on the recipient’s computer, enabling the music to be replayed repeatedly on demand
Interactive Streaming: At the request of the recipient, transmission over the Internet of a digital copy of a recorded musical performance, which is then “played” but not stored
Noninteractive Streaming: Same process not at the request of the recipient
Distribution of the SRLP of a Typical CD
Retailer: 38%
Distributor: 8%Marketing: 8%
Manufacturer: 8%
Recording Artist: 12%
Overhead: 14%
Music Publisher: 4%
A&R: 5%
RC Profit: 1%
Functions of Record Companies
A&R (Artists and Repertoire)
ProductionPromotionDistributionRisk Spreading
Rapidly dropping studio costs
Less dependence on (expensive) radio promotion
Inexpensive distribution through the Internet
Fewer “losers”; less need for insurance
Internet Distribution
Retailer: 38%
Distributor: 8%Marketing: 8%
Manufacturer: 8%
Recording Artist: 12%
Overhead: 14%
Music Publisher: 4%
A&R: 5%
RC Profit: 1%
Results: increased revenues for writers and artists, decreased prices for consumers, or both
Internet Distribution of Unsecured Digital Files
Benefits(1) Cost Savings(2) Eliminate
Overproduction and underproduction
(3) Convenience & precision
(4) Increase number & variety of musicians
(5) Semiotic Democracy
Dangers:
(1) Threaten Revenues of Creators
--fairness
--incentives
(2) Threaten Moral Rights
(3) Threaten Audience Interests in stable culture
Copyright Law circa 1990
Objects of ProtectionMusical compositionsSound recordingsMotion pictures
RightsReproductionDerivative worksDistributionPublic Performance
Exceptions and LimitationsFirst-sale doctrineCompulsory licenses
jukeboxes; PBS license; cable and satellite retransmissions; “covers”
Fair Use
Composer
Publisher
Sheet MusicPrinter
MovieStudio
RecordCompany
BMI; ASCAP; SESAC
RestaurantRadio or TVStation
Blanket licenses
Assignment of musical-works copyright
Mechanicallicense
Synchronizationlicense
Reproductionlicense
RecordingArtist
Assignmentof sound-recordingcopyright
Performancelicense
Figure 2.1: Legal Rights in the Music Industry
RecordImporter
Importlicense
Harry Fox Agency
payola
Novelist
Actors
Screenwriters
Director
RecordCompany
Producer
“Work for Hire” agreementsDerivative-work license Synchronization and
performance licenses
Theatres
Video Stores
TV Networks
HBO, Airlines
Recordcompany
Merchandisemanufacturer
Rentals plus
performance licenses
Cablecompany
Com
pulsory licensemechanical
license
derivative-work
licenses
Studio
Distribution agreement
Movies
Sales
Advertiser
MusicPublisher
Master u
se license
“Location”owners
relea
ses
Composer
Studio
TV Networks
Figure 2.5: Compensation System for Network Broadcasts of Films
Advertisers
Viewers
Sony
licenses
license fees
cost of VCRs
advertising fees
productpurchases
VCRs
free programming(with embedded ads) $
Holdings of Sony
Manufacturer of a device that can be used to violate the copyright laws is liable for contributory copyright infringement if and only if the device is not capable of significant noninfringing uses
Timeshifting copyrighted programs is a fair use
Audio Home Recording Act (1992)
Serial Copyright Management SystemTax and Royalty SystemSafe Harbor for Noncommercial Coping
AHRA 1008
“No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording device, a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog recording medium, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings.”
Copyright Law circa 1990
Objects of ProtectionMusical compositionsSound recordingsMotion pictures
RightsReproductionDerivative worksDistributionPublic Performance
Exceptions and LimitationsFirst-sale doctrineCompulsory licenses
jukeboxes; PBS license; cable and satellite retransmissions; “covers”
Fair Use
AHRA
Encryption Initiatives
DVDs: CSS SDMIRealMedia
copy-protection switch
Ebook reader
CircumventionDeCSS;
SmartripperFeltenStreamripperSklyarov
Anti-Circumvention: §1201Prohibitions:
Circumventing access-control technology – §1201(a) Manufacturing or “trafficking” in technology that circumvents
access controls – §1201(a) Manufacturing or “trafficking” in technology that circumvents
technological protections for rights of copyright owners – §1201(b)
Exceptions include: Reverse engineering in order to achieve interoperability §1201(f) Encryption research Ambiguous reference to the survival of fair use – §1201(c) Biennial rulemaking establishes limits to ban on acts of
circumvention – §1201(a)(1)(C)
Anti-Circumvention: §1201Civil Remedies:
Injunctions Impoundment and/or destruction of devices Damages (treble for repeat offenders) Attorneys’ fees, costs
Criminal penalties (for willful violations for commercial advantage or personal gain) -- §1204 First offense: up to $500,000 and 5 years in prison Second offense: up to $1M and 10 years in prison
Streambox (WD Wa 2000)
Streambox “VCR” mimics authentication procedure of RealMedia files and disables copy-protection switch
Held: violation of §§1201(a) & (b)Sony doctrine not applicable
Links to Illegal Material
Site #1
advertising
Webpage
Webpage
DecryptionProgram
2600 Magazine
advertising
Visitor
Webpage
Webpage
Plaintiff
?
Reimerdes (SDNY, August 2000)Providing a link to a website that, in turn,
enables visitors to download copies of encryption-breaking software = “trafficking” in violation of §1201(a)(2)
Claim that purpose was to create Linux DVD player not credible
§1201 trumps fair useReverse-engineering exemption does not
justify public sharing of the information
Reimerdes (CA2, 11/28/2001)Uphold issuance of the injunction§1201, as applied, does not violate 1st amend:
Content neutral Advances a “substantial governmental purpose”:
assisting copyright owners in preventing access to their “property”
Does not burden more speech than necessary for that purpose
Other constitutional challenges were not properly raised at trial:
§1201 exceeds Congress’ power under Commerce Clause and Art. 1, Sec. 8, Clause 8
§1201 unconstitutionally curtails “fair uses”
FeltenSept. 2000: SDMI issues challenge to break watermark prototypesFelten breaks codes, proposes to publish resultsRIAA sends Felten a letter, suggesting that publication “could
subject you and your research team to actions under the DMCA” June 2000: Felten brings declaratory judgment action against
RIAA, SDMI, and U.S. in NJDCtDefendants insist they have no intention to sueAugust 2001: Felten presents results at a conferenceNovember 2001: Suit dismissed because of absence of “case or
controversy”
SklyarovAdobe’s eBook Reader prevents copying of electronic
booksSklyarov developed for ElcomSoft a program that
enables the copying of eBook filesSklyarov (temporarily in U.S. for Def Con conference)
arrested and indicted in NDCal for violating §1201(b) – and “aiding and abetting” a violation; Elcomsoft charged with conspiracy
Dec. 2001: Charges against Sklyarov are droppedFeb. 2002: Prosecution argues DMCA applies globally
UMG Recordings v. MP3.com Nonpermissive copying violates §106 No fair-use defense:
1) Copying was for a commercial purpose; not transformative
2) Copied material is highly creative
3) Songs copied in their entirety
4) Undermines legitimate “potential market”
Settlements with 4 of the plaintiffs Finding of “willful infringement” of Universal 5/2001: Universal buys MP3.com for $372m
“Live 365”Electro Jungle Spoken Word
Alternative Experimental Latin Swing
Ambient Folk Metal Talk
Asian Funk Music To ... To Techno
Blues Goth New Age Trance
Breakbeat Government Oldies UK Garage/2-Step
Christian Hard House Pop Valentine
Classical Hip-Hop Punk Various
Classic Rock Holiday R&B Western
Comedy House Rap World
Country Indie Rock Reality 50s
Dance Industrial Reggae 60s
Downtempo International Religious 70s
Drum 'n' Bass Irish Rock 80s
Dub Jazz Soundtracks 90s
Examples of “Folk” Webcasters
Makossa Jukebox (offering “100% Cameroonian ethnic music: makossa, bikutsi, manganbeu, assiko and other freestyles”)
Pagan Paradise Samhian (offering “a magical mix of neo-Pagan, XTC, Tull, McKennitt, Yes, Mediaeval Baebes, Genesis, Heart, Rush [and] traditional folk”)
Radio Free Boonie (offering a “one-hour show for the 0 to 4 crowd and their respective grownups”)
Copyright Law circa 1990
Objects of ProtectionMusical compositionsSound recordingsMotion pictures
RightsReproductionDerivative worksDistributionPublic Performance
Exceptions and LimitationsFirst-sale doctrineCompulsory licenses
jukeboxes; PBS license; cable and satellite retransmissions; “covers”
Fair Use
AHRADPRA Limitations (114)
digital audio transmission
Types of Digital Audio Transmissions of Sound Recordings
Level 3: Copyright Owners may refuse to issue licenses – or may demand freely negotiated fees
Level 2: Copyright Owners must accept “compulsory licenses” set by an Arbitration Panel
Level 1: Exempt transmissions
Librarian of Congress, 2/24/2002Per Performance Fee
Ephemeral License
Webcasters: retransmission of radio 0.07¢ 8.8% of performance fee
Webcasters: all other webcasts 0.07¢ 8.8% of performance fee
Commercial Broadcasters: simulcasts
0.07¢ 8.8% of performance fee
Commercial Broadcasters: all other webcasts
0.07¢ 8.8% of performance fee
Noncommercial Broadcasters: simulcasts
0.02¢ 8.8% of performance fee
Noncommercial Broadcasters: all other webcasts
0.02¢ 8.8% of performance fee
Suppose HipHop.com distributes ad-free popular music to (on average) 10,000 listeners, 24 hours a day Aprx. 15 songs per hour 360 songs per day 131,400 songs per year 1,314,000,000 performances per year
Performance fee: $919,800 per yearEphemeral fee: $80,942 per yearTotal: $1,000,742 per year
CARP Ruling, 2/20/2002
Napster Website
UserUser1Library
Directory
UserUser2Library
Inde
x
UserUser6Library
UserUser7Library
UserUser8Library
UserUser4Library
UserUser3Library
UserUser5Library
UserUser9Library
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. Claim: contributory copyright infringement;
vicarious copyright infringement Napster’s defenses:
1) DMCA §§512(a), 512(d)
2) AHRA §1008
3) Sony defense
4) Copyright misuse
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. 7/26/00: Judge Patel rejects all of the defenses, grants
preliminary injunction against “facilitating … copying, uploading … plaintiffs’ … compositions and recordings”
7/27/00: CA9 stays the injunction 2/12/2001: CA9 modifies and remands 3/5/2001: Patel issues modified injunction 6/28/2001: New Napster software with file ID technology; old
software is disabled 7/2002: Napster goes offline 1/2002: Patel permits discovery on copyright-misuse issue;
settlement discussions intensify 2/2002: Settlement fails; case resumes 5/2002: Bertelsmann buys residue of Napster
User 1
User 3
User 2
CentralServer
SuperNode
SuperNode
SuperNodeUser 7
User 8
User 9
User 6User 5
User 4
Adapted from Webnoize
Fasttrack
Peer-to-Peer Copying SystemsParent technology:
GnutellaAimster/Madster Kazaa/Morpheus-
Music City/ Grokster/Altnet
80,000,000 downloads 3.6 billion downloads in
January 2002
Audiogalaxy 30,000,000 downloads
Japan MMO
MPAA/RIAA suit MPAA/RIAA suit
(Cal) Dutch court enjoins
software downloads; sale to Sharman Networks (Australia); investigation by APRA
RIAJ & JASRAC suit; April 2002 injunction
RIAA suit in NY; settlement
Authorized ServicesMusicNet
EMI, AOL Time Warner, BMG, RealNetworks
Pressplay Sony, EMI, Vivendi
Universal (MP3.com), Yahoo
Listen.com Subscription streaming,
$10 per month [Ongoing civil
investigation by USDOJ]
Secure (nontransferrable) short-term digital downloads and streaming
Subscription fees, $10-$25 per month
Limits on permanent downloads and CD burning slowly lifting
Copy-Protected CDs
Rapidly spreading experiment in US 10,000,000 CDs produced by Midbar so far
Similar initiative in JapanConsumer backlashPhilips, owner of patents on much of CD
technology, protests deviations from Red Book standards
Likely shift toward DVD-Audio
Defects of the Current RegimeHigh transaction costsPrice to consumers of access to recorded
music remain highNo “celestial jukebox”Encryption and ephemeral downloads
reduce flexibility, curtail “fair use” and impede semiotic democracy
Continued concentration of music industry reduces consumers’ choices
Limited effectiveness: P2P threatens artists’ revenues
OutlineI. Potential Benefits of Internet DistributionII. Background: Copyright Law circa 1990III. Cycles of Innovation and Resistance
DAT Recorders / AHRA Encryption circumvention / DMCA §1201 Music Lockers / MP3.com litigation Webcasting / DPRA-DMCA §114; CARP ruling Centralized File Sharing / Napster-Scour litigation P2P / P2P litigation; limited authorized services CD Burning / CD copy protection
IV. Defects of the Resultant SystemV. Where Do We Go from Here?
A. Private PropertyB. Regulated IndustryC. An Alternative Compensation System
“No black flags with skull and crossbones, no cutlasses, cannons, or daggers identify today’s pirates. You can’t see them coming; there’s no warning shot across your bow. Yet rest assured the pirates are out there because today there is plenty of gold (and platinum and diamonds) to be had. Today’s pirates operate not on the high seas but on the Internet, in illegal CD factories, distribution centers, and on the street. The pirate’s credo is still the same--why pay for it when it’s so easy to steal? The credo is as wrong as it ever was. Stealing is still illegal, unethical, and all too frequent in today’s digital age. That is why RIAA continues to fight music piracy.” Website of the Recording Industry Association of America
Theory: Clarify and enforce the property rights of the
creators of music; Rely upon Coasean bargains and the emergence
of private collective rights societies to overcome transaction costs (Merges)
Private Property
Features of Private Property
In Real Property Right to exclude
Injunctive Relief
Criminal Trespass
Prohibition of burglary tools
Privilege of self-help tracks right to exclude
Copyrights Add full public-performance
right for sound recordings Eliminate compulsory licenses Lower “willful requirement and
increase enforcement of criminal copyright infringement
CBDTPA Curtail DMCA and add Ploof-
style liability
SSSCA; CBDTPASecurity Systems Standards and Certification Act;
ConsumerBroadband and Digital Television Promotion Act
Would make it “unlawful to manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide or otherwise traffic in any interactive digital device that does not include and utilize certified security technologies that adhere to the security system standards”
Private sector has 12 months to agree on a standard If fail, standard selected by National Institute of
Standards and Technology
SSSCA; CBDTPA“The term ‘interactive digital device’ means any
machine, device, product, software, or technology, whether or not included with or as part of some other machine, device, product, software, or technology, that is designed, marketed or used for the primary purpose of, and that is capable of, storing, retrieving, processing, performing, transmitting, receiving, or copying information in digital form.”
Would apply to PCs, hard drives, CD-Rom drives, TVs, set-top boxes, CD players, MP3 players, video game consoles, other digital appliances
Benefits:Media companies, confident in their ability to
make money in the new environment, would accelerate Internet distribution
Associated socioeconomic advantages and cost savingsEmergence of refined and flexible private
licensing societies (cf. ASCAP) would overcome transaction-cost barriers to licensing (Merges)
The price system would provide creators precise signals concerning the tastes of consumers (Goldstein)
Enable musicians to break free of record companies
Disadvantages
Critical and transformative uses of recordings would be curtailed, threatening semiotic democracy
Erosion of “end-to-end” principleFacilitate price discrimination – on balance,
pernicious in this context
Effects of Increased Price Discrimination
Benefits Increased profits stimulate
inventive activity Reduced deadweight
losses Egalitarianism
(progressive redistribution of wealth; broader access to creative works)
Reduction of costs associated with cruder 2nd-degree PD
Harms Increased “granularity” of
social life Invasions of privacy Threats to transformative
uses Radically increased profits
cause increased rent-seeking within music and film industries
Threats to “End-to-end”
Proprietary control over the pipes E.g., AT&T’s exercise of control over its cable
modem systemStandardization and “dumbing down” of the
computers located on the endsResults:
Greater proprietary control over digital content Curtailment of both competition and innovation
OutlineI. Potential Benefits of Internet DistributionII. Background: Copyright in Music circa 1990III. Cycles of Innovation and Resistance
DAT Recorders / AHRA Encryption circumvention / DMCA §1201 Music Lockers / MP3.com litigation Webcasting / DPRA-DMCA §114; CARP ruling Centralized File Sharing / Napster-Scour litigation P2P / P2P litigation; limited authorized services CD Burning / CD copy protection
IV. Defects of the Resultant SystemV. Where Do We Go from Here?
A. Private PropertyB. Regulated IndustryC. An Alternative Compensation System
Regulated IndustryTheory: Increased
governmental involvement necessary to:
Respond to oligopolistic structure of the industry
Calibrate more finely the balance between incentives and public access
Equalize bargaining power between artists and record companies
Reject the “propertization”of copyright; Reinstatethe utilitarian balance
Theory ofcompulsoryterms
Regulated Industry
Preserve and extend prohibitions on file-sharing and encryption circumvention
Enforcement at ISP level NET prosecutions of operators of SuperNodes
Compulsory Royalty Systems for all forms of Internet distribution of recorded music(extend current §114(f)(2)(B) and AHRA)
Mandatory (inalienable) distribution of revenues between performers and producers(extend current §114(g); cf. EC Directive)
Compulsory RoyaltiesCopyright Office at two-year intervals establish:Types of Internet distribution of recorded music
Nonsubscription noninteractive webcasting Subscription noninteractive webcasting Interactive webcasting Ephemeral downloads Permanent downloads
Terms and conditions for eachRoyalty rates for each
For owners of copyrights in musical works For owners of copyrights in sound recordings
boundarieswill shift asconsumptiontechnologieschange
ReplaceASCAP,BMI,SESAC
Likely ResultsBenefits:
Internet distribution of recorded music grows rapidly Reverse vertical integration of the music industry Diversity of services available to consumers increases Net revenues of record industry stable Composers and performers get larger shares of revenues
Drawbacks: Transaction costs remain high Copy-protections limit semiotic democracy Surveillance and invasions of privacy
OutlineI. Potential Benefits of Internet DistributionII. Background: Copyright Law circa 1990III. Cycles of Innovation and Resistance
DAT Recorders / AHRA Encryption circumvention / DMCA §1201 Music Lockers / MP3.com litigation Webcasting / DPRA-DMCA §114; CARP ruling Centralized File Sharing / Napster-Scour litigation P2P / P2P litigation; limited authorized services CD Burning / CD copy protection
IV. Defects of the Resultant SystemV. Where Do We Go from Here?
A. Private PropertyB. Regulated IndustryC. An Alternative Compensation System
Intellectual Products are “Public Goods”
Can be used and enjoyed by an infinite number of persons without being “used up” (nonrivalrous)
It is difficult to prevent people from gaining access to the good (nonexcludable)
Creates a danger that an inefficiently low number of such goods will be produced
Possible Responses to Public-Goods Problem
Government provides the good e.g., lighthouses; armed forces
Government subsidizes production of the activity e.g., basic scientific research; NEA
Government issues prizes cf. reward system for atomic-energy inventions
Government confers monopoly power on producers e.g., 19th c. toll roads; intellectual-property rights
Government assists private parties in increasing “excludability”
Trade-secret law; anti-circumvention laws
Registration Copyright owners register recordings with Copyright
Office Only unencrypted recordings may be registered
Unique ID numbers inserted into file name of publicly available recordings
E.g., #4m8sp60wxi# Application designates:
any other registered digital recordings incorporated into the work duration of the incorporated work In the case of audio recordings, the owner of the copyright in the
composition Small registration fee to make the system self-financing Opposition Procedure
Taxation
Possible principles:
1) Provide creators the full social surplus of their efforts
2) Fairness
3) Make creators, as a group, whole
4) Preserve a flourishing entertainment culture
Composer
Publisher
Sheet MusicPrinter
MovieStudio
RecordCompany
BMI; ASCAP; SESAC
RestaurantRadio or TVStation
Blanket licenses
Assignment of musical-works copyright
Mechanicallicense
Synchronizationlicense
Reproductionlicense
RecordingArtist
Assignmentof sound-recordingcopyright
Performancelicense
RecordImporter
Importlicense
Harry Fox Agency
WebcasterPerformancelicense Sound
Exchangepayola
Figure 6.1: Revenues Streams Threatened by Free Internet Distribution
Novelist
Actors
Screenwriters
Director
RecordCompany
Producer
“Work for Hire” agreementsDerivative-work license Synchronization and
performance licenses
Theatres
Video Stores
TV Networks
HBO, PPV, Airlines
Recordcompany
Merchandisemanufacturer
Rentals plus
performance licenses
Cablecompany
Com
pulsory licensemechanical
license
derivative-work
licenses
Studio
Distribution agreement
Movies
Sales
Advertiser
MusicPublisher
Master u
se license
“Location”owners
relea
ses
Composer
TaxationBaseline year: 2000Estimated revenues needed (year 1):Music Industry
Injury to record companies from diminished sales: $1.05 billion
Injuries to music publishers from diminished record sales: $132 million
Injuries to music publishers from reduced radio public-performance fees: $58 million
No compensation for diminished webcasting license fees Music Industry total: $1.24 billion
Taxation
Film Industry: Impairment of studios’ income from domestic
home-video sales and rentals: $435 million Impairment of cable and satellite licensing
revenues: $60 million Impairment of pay-per-view revenues: $37
million Film industry total: $532 million
Total: $1.774 billion
Taxation
Assuming that the agency devotes 20% of its revenues to administrative costs, it would need to collect in taxes during the first year: $2.217 billion
Adjusted (using Consumer Price Index plus projected inflation rate to 2004): $2.418 billion
Count consumption
Webcasters report playlists and number of listeners
Websites count number of downloadsP2P systems report frequency of sharing
registration numbersSurveys estimate frequency of replaying stored
recordingsSales of prerecorded, non-copyprotected CDsSampling and penalties to deter “ballot stuffing”
PaymentMonies allocated among categories of copyright
owners, initially, in accordance with magnitude of estimated injuries
Sound recordings: $1.05 billion Musical compositions: $190 million Motion pictures: $418 million
Within each category, money distributed in accordance with frequency of consumption
Over time, the shares allocated to each genre would shift in response to changing injuries and costs
Lift Copyright System and DMCA
No liability for reproduction, distribution, modification, adaptation, or performance of audio or video recordings over the Internet
No liability for circumventing encryption protections
Merits
For consumers:Large cost savings Elimination of deadweight loss (music
priced at marginal cost of replication); increased consumer surplus
ConvenienceNo price discriminationCultural diversity and semiotic democracy
Cheaper EntertainmentAverage American household currently spends
$100 on CDs and $350 on video recordings. Total: $450
Broadband subscribers: for $42 per year in taxes, get unlimited “free” music and movies
Dial-up modem users: for $180 in increased subscription fees plus taxes, get unlimited “free” music and movies
Households without Internet Access: no material change in position
Merits
For artists:Incomes protected from corrosion Opportunity to offer products directly to
consumers economic and cultural gains
Merits
For manufacturers of electronic equipment and suppliers of electronic services:
Increased taxes offset by increased value of the products and services
Merits
For society at large:Decreased litigationDecreased costs of law enforcementDecreased encryption costs
Demerits
Distortions and Cross-subsidies E.g., data CD sales Underconsumption of ISP access
Giving a government agency considerable discretionary power Risks of rent-seeking
Life Cycle of the SystemLaunch:
Reform Berne Convention, Articles 9, 11, 12 No 5th amendment problem
Growth Increased usage results in increased taxes Offset by:
• Growing tax base• Increasing savings
Expansion and technological change may eventually lead to replacement with federal income tax
Variations on the Theme
Global versionComprehensive Domestic VersionNUL Domestic VersionVoluntary Version – entertainment co-op
Scale
geographic
Var
ieti
es o
f M
ater
ials
Varieties of Uses
national
multilateral treatymusic & film
All uses
P2P
everything
music
global
all forms of Internet distribution
Entertainment Co-opArtists register with private co-op
Grant transferable non-exclusive license to download or stream material
Co-op licenses webcasters and download sites Each accessible with a single subscription fee and
associated password Licensees provides data concerning usage
Revenues from subscription fees distributed in accordance with revenue-sharing plan
Consumer willingness to subscribe reinforced by tightened penalties on P2P systems