Project Bullrun Case Neg

***T: Surveillance***

Surveillance = CollectionSurveillance is data collectionUS Legal No DateUS Legal, “Electronic Surveillance Law & Legal Definition,” http://definitions.uslegal.com/e/electronic-surveillance/ SJE

According to 50 USCS § 1801 [Title 50. War and National Defense; Chapter 36. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Electronic

Surveillance], electronic surveillance means (1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes;

Surveillance is collection or monitoringUNODC 09UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Current practices in electronic surveillance in the investigation of serious and organized crime,” 2009 https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Electronic_surveillance.pdf SJE

Surveillance (or “electronic surveillance”) is rarely itself defined in the legislation delineating its use. Instead, relevant provisions will often provide a definition of “intercept”, “communication” and other more device-specific definitions, which range from succinct to complex. For the

purposes of this document, and in the context of law enforcement, surveillance is the collection or monitoring of information about a person or persons through the use of technology. This document will focus on surveillance for the stated purpose of preventing crime or prosecuting offences.

Surveillance =/= DecryptionSurveillance is data acquisition, not NSA decryption – prefer the FISA definitionMayer 14Jonathan, J.D., fellow at the Center for Internet and Society and the Center for International Security and Cooperation, “Executive Order 12333 on American Soil, and Other Tales from the FISA Frontier,” 12/3/14, http://webpolicy.org/2014/12/03/eo-12333-on-american-soil/ SJE

The term “electronic surveillance” has a precise (and counterintuitive) meaning in FISA. There are multiple parts to

the definition; the component that directly addresses wireline intercepts is 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(2). It encompasses: the acquisition . . . of the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States . . . if such acquisition occurs in the United States. A two-end foreign communication is, of course, not “to or from a person in the United States.” When the NSA intercepts a two-end foreign wireline communication, then, it hasn’t engaged in “electronic

surveillance.”3 Much of FISA is scoped to the term “electronic surveillance,” including some key exclusivity provisions. Just by navigating

that definition, the NSA can largely escape FISA’s restrictions .

Surveillance is the act of collecting data – decryption is secondaryStray 13Jonathan, leads the Overview Project for the Associated Press and teaches computational journalism at Columbia University, “What You Need to Know About the NSA’s Surveillance Programs,” ProPublica, 6/27/13, http://www.propublica.org/article/nsa-data-collection-faq SJE

The collected information covers “nearly everything a user does on the Internet,” according to a presentation on the XKEYSCORE system. The slides specifically mention emails, Facebook chats, websites visited, Google Maps searches, transmitted files,

photographs, and documents of different kinds. It’s also possible to search for people based on where they are connecting from, the

language they use, or their use of privacy technologies such as VPNs and encryption, according to the slides. This is a massive amount of data. The full contents of intercepted Internet traffic can only be stored for up to a few days, depending on the collection site, while the associated “metadata” (who communicated with whom online) is stored up to 30 days. Telephone metadata is smaller and is stored for five years. NSA analysts can move specific data to more permanent databases when they become relevant to an investigation. The NSA also collects narrower and more detailed information on specific people, such as the actual audio of phone calls and the entire content of email accounts. NSA analysts can submit a request to obtain these types of more detailed information about specific people. Watching a specific person like this is called “targeting” by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the law which authorizes this type of individual surveillance. The NSA is allowed to record the conversations of non-Americans without a specific warrant for each person monitored, if at least one end of the conversation is outside of the U.S. It is also allowed to record the communications of Americans if they are outside the U.S. and the NSA first gets a warrant for each case. It’s not known exactly how many people the NSA is currently targeting, but according to a leaked report the NSA intercepted content from 37,664 telephone numbers and email addresses from October 2001 to January 2007. Of these, 8% were domestic: 2,612 U.S. phone numbers and 406 U.S. email addresses. How the NSA actually gets the data depends on the type of information requested. If the analyst wants someone's private emails or social media posts, the NSA must request that specific data from companies such as Google and Facebook. Some technology companies (we don't know which ones) have FBI monitoring equipment installed "on the premises" and the NSA gets the information via the FBI's Data Intercept Technology Unit. The NSA also has the capability to monitor calls made over the Internet (such as Skype calls) and instant messaging chats as they happen. For information that is already flowing through Internet cables that the NSA is monitoring, or the audio of phone calls, a targeting request instructs automatic systems to watch for the communications of a specific person and save them. It’s important to note that the NSA probably has information about you even if you aren’t on this target list. If you have previously communicated with someone who has been targeted, then the NSA already has the content of any emails, instant messages, phone calls, etc. you exchanged with

the targeted person. Also, your data is likely in bulk records such as phone metadata and Internet traffic recordings. This is what makes these programs “mass surveillance ,” as opposed to traditional wiretaps, which are authorized by individual, specific court orders.

***Advantage CP – China BIT***

1NCCP: The United States federal government should enter into binding consultation with the People’s Republic of China over a bilateral investment treaty.Solves foreign investment and resolves US/China tensionsLee 15Thomas, business columnist for the San Francisco chronicle, “US and China need to complete foreign investment treaty,” 3/31/15, http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/U-S-and-China-need-to-complete-foreign-6171955.php SJE

American companies ranging from Silicon Valley giants like Google and Facebook to older firms like IBM and Ford have long lobbied Chinese leaders to further open its economy. So far, none of these efforts have substantially moved the needle. What really needs to happen is for the United States and China to complete negotiations on the long-delayed bilateral investment treaty , a legally binding agreement that will open most Chinese markets to American firms. Since China opened its doors to American investment in

the early 1980s, economics has been the driving force behind the complicated relationship between the two countries. The Asian giant needed Western talent, money and technology to help lift millions of people out of

poverty. And U.S. businesses longed to expand beyond their core market. “The gap is still huge but the two economies are clearly interdependent,” Cui Tiankai, China’s ambassador to the United States, told me earlier this week. “What is good for the U.S. economy will also be good for the Chinese economy. It’s also true the other way. We hope very much

that the U.S. economy will have an even stronger recovery and growth and that there will be increased bilateral trade and investment.” But as China’s military and economic growth has substantially increased over the past decade, so has the country’s confidence and antipathy toward

foreigners. During a trip to Shanghai last November, business leaders told me that China is casting an increasingly cold shoulder toward American companies. For example, government leaders have “encouraged” American companies to form strategic alliances with Chinese firms and to disclose intellectual property secrets. And certain industries — the Internet, health care, education, banking — remain all but closed to outside investors. Despite over 20 years of economic exchanges, America’s business footprint China remains relatively small. In 2012, U.S. foreign direct investment in China totaled only $54 billion, or about 1.2 percent of the $2.2 trillion in total outside investment dollars in China, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Meanwhile, Chinese foreign direct investment in the United States doubled compared with 2012, to $14 billion, according to research firm Rhodium Group. Chinese search engine Baidu recently invested an undisclosed sum in the popular ride-hailing app Uber. And Alibaba, China’s e-commerce giant, raised a record $25 billion on the New York

Stock Exchange even as Chinese officials continue to ban Facebook, Twitter, and Google. China’s recent effort to require the country’s banks to use only Chinese technology has further irritated the United States. “During my meetings in Beijing, I underscored that policies designed to block foreign technology by imposing unfair disclosure terms or outright bans would damage

our bilateral economic relationship,” Lew said. Experts say only a legally binding bilateral trade investment treaty can preempt these problems. “Removing discriminatory investment restrictions via treaty could yield a significant payoff, not simply as a means of encouraging two-way investment but also as a means of helping resolve investment-related disputes,” according to report last month by Goldman Sachs. One important feature of the pending treaty requires each country to create a “negative list” of industries off limits to outsiders, a much quicker process than

haggling over a list of markets open to foreign investment. Even Chinese officials think such a treaty will go a long way in easing the tension between the world’s largest economies.

The impact is nuclear warUCS 15

Union of Concerned Scientists, for eight consecutive years we have received a four-star rating from Charity Navigator—a distinction achieved by fewer than 2 percent of nonprofits, it’s legit here’s a link to a list of their accomplishments http://www.ucsusa.org/about/history-of-accomplishments.html#.VY26ivlViko “Nuclear Weapons and U.S./China Relations,” 2015, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/us-china-relations#.VY2wUPlViko SJE

Tensions between the United States and China, made worse by mistrust and misunderstandings, work to undermine cooperation on everything from nuclear weapons to space policies. The United States sees China’s growing economic and military power as a potential threat, both regionally and globally. China sees new U.S. military technologies (such as missile defense),

and U.S. steps to strengthen ties with Asian allies, as both a military threat and an attempt at containment. Left unchecked, growing tensions could spur the buildup of weapons and make conflict more likely, especially in times of crisis. Combating misunderstandings with accurate information on China's nuclear capabilities

and intentions is essential for U.S. security. This includes careful, rigorous scholarship; better translations of Chinese

military texts; increased understanding of policy motives and contexts; and a clear technical understanding of

China’s military capabilities. The Cold War and the "space race" went hand in hand. China’s development of space technology has led to U.S. reactions—some based on misperceptions and misunderstanding—that could lead to a space arms race. Such a response would threaten legitimate uses of space and could spark conflicts on the ground, raising the risk of armed nuclear conflict . The United States should instead promote cooperation on space science and exploration. This would build trust between the United States and China, and sustain norms against the development, testing, and deployment of space weapons.

Solves InvestmentBIT solves foreign investment Lehr 15Deborah, senior fellow at the Paulson Institute, “Why the Bilateral Investment Treaty Matters,” 2/13/15, http://english.caixin.com/2015-02-13/100784042.html SJE

A BIT would benefit the economies of both the United States and China, by creating new streams of two-way trade and investment. The growing and interdependent economic relationship between the two countries is the underlying fabric that binds our countries together. It provides a foundation that allows us to disagree on specific issues without threatening the overall relationship. As China becomes a more active player on the world

stage, it is important for the United States to work with China and to support its entry and full participation in global, rules-based institutions. To delve into the importance of a BIT to both countries, the Paulson Institute – with its partners, Goldman Sachs, the U.S.-China Business Council and the China Development Reform Foundation – convened a U.S.-China CEO Investment Dialogue to explore the implications of a possible agreement for both countries. The discussions included the U.S. secretary of commerce, the U.S. trade representative, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, the Chinese ambassador, and leading U.S. and Chinese CEOs, mayors and high-level opinion leaders. A lively discussion ensured about potential opportunities for increasing jobs, investment and exports. All agreed that it was important that China continue to be part of the rules-based systems on trade. As a former U.S. trade negotiator with China during the WTO and other negotiations, I witnessed firsthand how bringing China into the rules-based trading systems pays off. In the early 1990s one of the most transformational commitments we obtained came down to one important line. It simply required China to publish its own trade laws. Previously, its trade laws and regulations had been confidential; while companies were expected to abide by them, they could be arrested if they actually read or owned a copy. This requirement of transparency fundamentally changed the trading regime to the benefit of both Chinese and U.S. companies. Two decades later, laws are published and commented on, making the playing field more balanced. China's WTO accession provided a 10-year road map for opening and reform of its economy. It outlined how sectors would open to foreign competition, and both countries benefited from this transparency. Low-cost Chinese exports to the United States have increased over 330 percent since the signing of the agreement, and U.S. exports to China rose by 533 percent since then. Yet that 10-year road map ran out four years ago. A high standard BIT can fill the resulting gap. It

would bring greater transparency and consistency to the investment environment for both countries. A BIT would be good for China because the required opening of the market would bring in investments, encouraging more competition in the consumer and services sectors. That in turn would help China achieve its ambitious plan to transform its economic model away from export-led

growth to a more consumption-based model. Such a treaty would also help clarify regulations for Chinese companies investing in the United States. And why would a BIT be good for the United States? For one, it would create a more transparent and level playing field for its companies in China, leading to greater opportunities for investors . It would also encourage more Chinese companies to invest in the United States as part of their government's "going out" initiative to encourage overseas investment. This would create jobs and opportunities for American workers.

Solves China HackingBIT solves tensions over China hacking – repairs distrustRoach 14Stephen, senior fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute of Global Affairs and a senior lecturer at Yale’s School of Management, “Why China and the US need to trust each other,” World Economic Forum, 8/4/14, https://agenda.weforum.org/2014/08/china-us-trust-hacking-cyber-trade/ SJE

The failure of both US and Chinese leaders to recognize the mutual benefits of an investment treaty is disturbing. Going slow on such an obvious “win-win” reform suggests either that each country attaches little importance to its growth imperative or that they are unwilling to address that urgency by coming to grips with the increasingly insidious trust deficit that

divides them. I suspect it is the latter. Leaders on both sides understand their countries’ growth challenges. But neither seems willing to address the intensification of distrust that has arisen during the past year from the cyber issue. Here is where the blame game belies the obvious: both countries hack, and both have lost control over their hackers. Moreover, cyber-

hacking itself is growing at an exponential rate in today’s interconnected world. In other words, the cyber blame game is pointless. Acceptance of shared responsibilities in coming to grips with cyber tensions is essential if the US and China are to re-engage on the other geostrategic and economic challenges that they both face. The failure of July’s

S&ED was a red flag, yet another indication that the bilateral relationship is headed in the wrong direction. Staying the course is not an option.

Net Benefit – Chinese DemocracyBIT solves Chinese rule of law adherenceLehr 15 (Yo this is the same Lehr card w/different highlights, don’t read it twice goobers)Deborah, senior fellow at the Paulson Institute, “Why the Bilateral Investment Treaty Matters,” 2/13/15, http://english.caixin.com/2015-02-13/100784042.html SJE

A BIT would benefit the economies of both the United States and China, by creating new streams of two-way trade and investment. The growing and interdependent economic relationship between the two countries is the underlying fabric that binds our countries together. It provides a foundation that allows us to disagree on specific issues without threatening the overall relationship. As China becomes a more active player on the world

stage, it is important for the United States to work with China and to support its entry and full participation in global, rules-based institutions. To delve into the importance of a BIT to both countries, the Paulson Institute – with its partners, Goldman Sachs, the U.S.-China Business Council and the China Development Reform Foundation – convened a U.S.-China CEO Investment Dialogue to explore the implications of a possible agreement for both countries. The

discussions included the U.S. secretary of commerce, the U.S. trade representative, former secretary of state Henry

Kissinger, the Chinese ambassador, and leading U.S. and Chinese CEOs, mayors and high-level opinion

leaders. A lively discussion ensured about potential opportunities for increasing jobs, investment and exports. All agreed that it was important that China continue to be part of the rules-based systems on trade. As a former U.S. trade

negotiator with China during the WTO and other negotiations, I witnessed firsthand how bringing China into the rules-based trading systems pays off. In the early 1990s one of the most transformational commitments we obtained came down to one important line. It simply required China to publish its own trade laws. Previously, its trade laws and regulations had been confidential; while

companies were expected to abide by them, they could be arrested if they actually read or owned a copy. This requirement of transparency fundamentally changed the trading regime to the benefit of both Chinese and U.S. companies. Two decades later, laws are published and commented on, making the playing field more balanced.

That solves peaceful Chinese democracy rise Hedrick-Wong 14Yuwa Hedrick-Wong, Chief Economist at the Center for Inclusive Growth Forbes, 7/10/14, http://www.forbes.com/sites/yuwahedrickwong/2014/07/10/history-lessons-for-china-rule-of-law-before-democracy/SJE

While both camps captured some elements of China’s multi-faceted reality; the pessimists are, well, too pessimistic, whereas the optimists are

being unrealistic. We believe that there is a middle ground in mapping China’s way forward. Political development is not a linear progression of democratization leading to the rule of law leading to economic growth. In fact, these are three separate and largely independent processes, each of which could develop following its own dynamics, in spite of being closely intertwined. In

this context, we argue that the rule of law in China can evolve in the absence of democracy. In fact, evolving

the rule of law from the ground up may well prove to be a more successful pathway to democracy than one that is imposed from top down. In this regard, history offers some valuable lessons learned. For example, in contrast with the top down imposition of democracy in many post-colonial societies, the experience of the emergence of democratic institutions in Europe in

previous centuries suggests that democracy evolved gradually and organically, sometimes over several centuries. Indeed, the best exemplar of a gradual and by and large peaceful evolution from absolutist feudal monarchy to democracy is

Britain (and England before that). And it began there with the rule of law being slowly but firmly established, and

strengthened over time, with the consequence that the absolutist power of the monarch was rolled back gradually long before

democracy was established. This is an important process that created conditions conducive to the emergence of a market economy, which made possible more equitable distribution of wealth, which in turn emboldened demand for a more equitable distribution of political power, setting into motion the virtuous circle of a mutually reinforcing evolution of inclusive economic and political institutions. And one of the most important lessons learned is that the rule of law was established in England prior to the appearance of anything that could be recognized today as

democracy. In this historical context, the rule of law is not only a critical prerequisite for democracy to emerge, but it is capable of exerting powerful influences in the absence of any formal democratic institutions to foster a market economy and to set into motion the virtuous circle of inclusive economic and political growth. We argue that this historical insight is of great relevance for understanding and mapping how the trajectories of China’s political evolution may unfold in the coming years and decades.

Solves nuclear warSchurman 15Peter, founding executive director of MoveOn.org, “A Better Approach to China – and the World,” 6/3/15, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-schurman/a-better-approach-to-chin_b_7506036.html SJE

We must remember that the US-China relationship is complex. China continues to invest billions here. The two countries reached a breakthrough agreement on climate change last winter, and since then China has already dramatically reduced its carbon emissions. Still,

there’s every reason to take a perceived threat from China seriously. It’s the world’s most populous

country, and as its economy has surged to global prominence over the past decade, its industrial capacity,

implicitly including war-making capability, have grown as well. In some respects, this is the first time the US has faced such a situation since the end of World War II. To be sure, we faced off against the Soviet Union throughout the cold war, and our relations with

post-Soviet Russia under Putin have been frosty. Yet, while the nuclear threat has darkened this picture for decades , neither the Soviet Union nor Russia has been a top economic or industrial power, despite the recent oil-and-gas wealth of its oligarchs. So now is an opportune time to ask whether we want to continue the usual geopolitical power game, in

which separate countries vie against each other for resources and dominance, threatening everyone’s survival, safety, and rights, or whether a

new, globally inclusive, democratic governance structure would serve us better. We in the US may rightly

condemn China’s recent actions. Yet we should also bear in mind that China’s recent muscle-flexing follows inevitably from its economic rise, given the perverse incentives of our fragmented global political structure. With the world divided into separate nation-states, national governments can often keep order within their borders, but they face a constant power struggle beyond, with no legitimate entity truly in charge at the global level. (The UN is simply too weak.) Leaders whose only accountability comes from within their borders can build their power at home by elbowing their neighbors, so they do. This is especially true in countries with ascendant economies,

such as China today, or the US at many points over the past 100-plus years. The structural inevitability of confrontations like the one now developing with China should compel us to consider an alternative that has never been possible until now: a single, global democracy, including everyone (holding dictators, terrorists, and other

criminals accountable to the rule of law). With blockchain technology (the secure, distributed ledger underlying bitcoin) it’s now

becoming feasible to securely record the votes of potentially limitless numbers of people, online. Although related challenges remain (the secret ballot, unique voting accounts, the digital divide) all of these appear solvable over the next decade or two, and possibly sooner.

Net Benefit – RelationsBIT solves relations and demonstrates our ability to negotiateMiner 14Sean, China Program Manager and research associate at the Peterson Institute, “China-U.S. Investment Treaty Would Strengthen Economic Relations,” 11/21/14, http://english.caixin.com/2014-11-21/100754012.html SJE

It seems like the United States and China disagree on many issues, and there is little reason for the two economic heavyweights to become truly closer in the next few years. This pessimistic take overlooks the prospect of significantly increased bilateral investment. With the recent breakthrough between China and the United States in the negotiations on the global Information Technology

Agreement, the prospects for a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between the two have improved. In fact, the countries' negotiators should promptly head back to the table to continue BIT talks. An agreement will provide significant momentum toward the long-stated Bogor Goals of "free and open trade and investment in the

Asia Pacific region" announced by Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation members in 1994 in Bogor, Indonesia. A BIT would increase

foreign direct investment (FDI) between China and the United States. The economic benefits from increased

FDI flow both ways and would encourage needed structural reforms in both countries. Increased FDI in China's services sector would facilitate the shift from a manufacturing economy to a more efficient and sustainable growth model, and would drive

productivity increases throughout the economy. The United States needs more investment throughout its economy, especially in infrastructure. Investment between China and the United States is much smaller than it should be considering the economic and even geographic fundamentals. Total U.S. FDI abroad in 2013 was more than US$ 4 trillion, but U.S. investment in China was less than 2 percent of that amount. Likewise, China's outward FDI in 2013 was US$ 600 billion, but just around 5 percent of that was invested in the United States. Yet, China and the United States are among each other's largest trading partners. In addition, China and the United States are the world's largest recipients of FDI due to their large markets and opportunities for management and

technological learning, so there should be much more investment going on between these two countries. Bilateral investment treaties are intended to create fair, open and transparent investment environments, but in order to do so the agreements must be comprehensive. Getting a comprehensive, high-quality deal on investment between the United States and China is not as far-fetched as some believe. Canada and China signed a BIT in 2012 that was ratified by Canada in September. The treaty contains some commitments equivalent to those that the United States would seek in a BIT with China. Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is an important aspect of the Canada-China BIT, along with protection for the respective countries' public policy objectives. China also signed a trilateral investment treaty with Japan and South Korea in 2012. While this "CJK" agreement also provided for some meaningful investment protections, it is short of what the United States government is looking to achieve – and requires in such a treaty in order to get Congressional support. China is also negotiating a BIT with the European Union, where areas like market access and dispute resolution will engender tough negotiations. ISDS is a controversial topic, even between the EU and United States, but that is part of setting a global standard for such protections for China to live up to. Most multinational companies and investors see comprehensive treatment of investor rights as essential to putting some teeth in investment protections. Talks on a potential BIT between China and the United States picked up in 2013 with China's agreement to national treatment of U.S. investors in the pre-establishment phase of investment, leveling the playing field for American and Chinese firms. Pre-establishment was one of the requirements listed on the updated U.S. Model BIT in 2012 – and the negotiators achieved it. In contrast, pre-establishment had been left out of the CJK treaty and the Canada-China BIT. Not all the requirements for a BIT would be easily met. The United States would like to see a push toward a "one-stop" shop for regulatory agencies, rather than having foreign firms obtain permits and licenses from several Chinese agencies for a single investment. In addition, the increasing application of China's anti-monopoly law in a strict fashion, since the ascension of President Xi Jinping, has become a major issue for large foreign firms in China, even if enforcement would be to China's benefit and aid global investors. The prohibition of performance requirements, including for indigenous innovation and technology transfer, is certainly another area of U.S. government concern. The United States would also like to see China adopt and issue a short negative list as opposed to the foreign investment catalogue that it issues every several years. Such negative lists, which spell out the encouraged, restricted and prohibited industries for foreign investment, are currently being revised. The vice minister of finance, Zhu Guangyao, stated in a speech at the Peterson Institute in October that China "faces a real challenge domestically" to trim the negative list. However, this is one of the most important issues for the United States. In order to significantly increase market access, the negative list, which lists only the industries that are off limits to foreign investment, must be relatively short. China, on the other hand, would also like to have some enhanced investor protections when its businesses go

into the United States. Chinese negotiators have also been clamoring for a clarification of the process some foreign investors must go through in the United States. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) investigates any investments than may run up against U.S. national security concerns, and is admittedly a somewhat arbitrary and opaque process – and not just for proposed Chinese investments, but perhaps especially so. Chinese investors would like to see more

transparency in this process. The apparent randomness of rejections of proposed deals by Chinese firms is arguably deterring the growth of FDI to the United States , as well as souring economic relations more widely. All of these challenges to the U.S. and Chinese negotiators of a BIT between the two countries are, however, surmountable. In fact, there are clear precedents in both countries' economic relations with other parties for the kind of compromises and reforms needed to close the deal. There is also clearly pent-up demand for investment in both directions that would emerge rapidly, were a deal to be

struck. This seemingly technocratic and narrow measure of a bilateral investment treaty is not only attainable – such an agreement

between Chinese and American negotiators would demonstrate the ability of the two economic powers to work together and the availability of common ground on economics.

AT: China Says NoChina is seeking cooperation on the BIT Cheek et al 14Marney, a former Associate General Counsel in the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Alan Larson, a former Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, Timothy Stratford, Assistant USTR for China Affairs when the BIT negotiations were first launched , and Gina Vetere, Senior Policy Advisor at USTR when the U.S.-China BIT negotiations were first launched, “THE U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY’S POTENTIAL TO UNLOCK SIGNIFICANT BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES,” 2014 SJE

The United States and China continue to make progress in their negotiations toward a bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”)—a government-to-

government agreement that establishes binding rules on the treatment of foreign investors and their investments. In 2013, a major breakthrough occurred when China signaled its willingness to provide market access to foreign investors on a national treatment basis in all sectors and industries, except where explicitly

excluded on a “negative list.” At this year’s U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing, the U.S. and China announced their intent to reach agreement on key elements of the BIT text by year-end and launch negotiations on

the “negative list” in early 2015. This timetable solidifies the commitment on both sides to intensify negotiations and reflects the mutual priority of concluding the BIT in the near-term. It also provides immediate opportunities for

companies and associations to engage with policymakers on both sides to ensure their interests are advanced in the BIT. All of this takes place against the backdrop of Chinese plans for economic liberalization unveiled last fall, and points to strong prospects for a BIT that promotes greater two-way investment.

***AT: Privacy Advantage***

No LinkNSA Surveillance programs are not a breach of privacy – they only target real suspects and are centered on protecting citizens from terrorismBowden 13’ Mr Caspar Bowden (Independent Privacy Researcher) September 2013. “The US surveillance programmes and their impact on EU citizens' fundamental rights” http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.pdf

Today, in democratic ¶ regimes, when these technologies are used, they are limited on purpose and are mainly centred on antiterrorism collaboration, in order to prevent attempts of attacks. According to Intelligence Services worldwide, these technologies are not endangering civil liberties; they ¶ are the best way to protect the citizen from global terrorism . Intelligence services

screen¶ suspicious behaviors and exchange of information occurs at the international level. Only “real suspects” are, in principle, under surveillance. From this perspective, far from being a “shame”, the revelations of programmes like PRISM could be seen as a proof of a good¶ level of collaboration, which has eventually to be enhanced in the future against numerous forms of violence.

No Internal Link - BackdoorsBackdoors aren’t key to privacyMcCarthy 15(Tom McCarthy is national affairs correspondent for Guardian. “NSA director defends plan to maintain 'backdoors' into technology companies” February 23, 2015, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/feb/23/nsa-director-defends-backdoors-into-technology-companies)

The National Security Agency director, Mike Rogers, on Monday sought to calm a chorus of doubts about the government’s plans to maintain

built-in access to data held by US technology companies, saying such “backdoors” would not be harmful to privacy, would not fatally compromise encryption and would not ruin international markets for US technology products. Rogers mounted an elaborate defense of Barack Obama’s evolving cybersecurity strategy in an appearance before an audience of cryptographers, tech company security officers and national security reporters at the New America Foundation in Washington. In an hour-long question-and-answer session, Rogers said a cyber-attack against Sony pictures by North Korea last year showed the urgency and difficulty of defending against potential cyber threats. “If you look at the topology of that attack from North Korea against Sony PicturesEntertainment, it literally bounced all over the world before it got to California,” Rogers said. “Infrastructure located on multiple continents, in multiple different

geographic regions.” For most of the appearance, however, Rogers was on the defensive, at pains to explain how legal or technological protections could be put in place to ensure that government access to the data of US technology companies would not result in abuse by intelligence agencies. The White House is trying to broker a deal with companies such as Apple, Yahoo and Google, to ensure holes in encryption for the government to access mobile data, cloud computing and other data. “‘Backdoor’ is not the context I would use, because when I hear the phrase ‘backdoor’ I think: ‘Well this is kind of shady, why wouldn’t you want to go in the front door, be very public?’” Rogers said. “We can create a legal framework for how we do this.” Rogers, who is also commander of US Cyber Command, said the government was playing catch-up not only in establishing defenses against cyber attacks but in laying out its own rules of cyber warfare, including when retaliation was appropriate. “We’re not mature and we’re clearly not where we need to be,” Rogers said. “Take the nuclear example. If you go back in the first 10, 20 years, we were still debating about, ‘Well, what are the fundamental concepts of deterrence?’ This whole idea of mutually assured destruction – that didn’t develop in five years, for example. All of

that has taken time. Cyber is no different.” Rogers admitted that concerns about US government infiltration of US companies’ data represented a business risk for US companies, but he suggested that the greater threat was from cyber-attacks. “I think it’s a very valid concern to say ‘Look, are we losing US market segment here?’” Rogers said. “What’s the economic impact of this? I just think, between a combination of technology, legality and policy, we can get to a better place than we are now.” US technology companies have bridled at government pressure to introduce weaknesses in encryption systems in order to ensure government access to data streams, and technical experts have warned that there is no way to create a “backdoor” in an encryption system without summarily compromising it. An appearance by Obama at a cybersecurity conference at Stanford University last week to tout cooperation between the government and US tech companies was upstaged by an impassioned speech by Apple;s chief executive, Tim Cook, whowarned of the “dire consequences” of sacrificing the right to online privacy. The basic discomfort of the new partnership the government would like to see with technology companies once again burst into full view on Monday when Alex Stamos, the chief information security officer at Yahoo, challenged Rogers on his recommendation for built-in “defects-slash-backdoors, or golden master keys” to serve government purposes. Stamos asked Rogers how companies such as Yahoo, with 1.3 billion users worldwide, would be expected to reply to parallel requests for backdoors from foreign governments, and told Rogers such backdoors would be like “drilling a hole through a

windshield”. “I’ve got a lot of world-class cryptographers at the National Security Agency,” replied Rogers, skipping over the question of foreign government requests. “I think that this is technically feasible. Now it needs to done within a framework.”

***AT: Cyberwar Advantage***

Link Turn – Surveillance k2 CyberwarSurveillance and intelligence gathering are key to win a cyber-warCushing 14 — B.A., Simon Fraser University

(Seychelle Cushing, November 28, 2014, “Leveraging Information as Power: America’s Pursuit of Cyber Security”, Date Access: 6-29-2015) //NM

Information seeking in cyberspace is competitive – it matters which state acquires and exploits information first to advance its security interests. Unlike the domains of land, sea, or air,

cyberspace cannot be conquered using overwhelming power. A competitive cyber advantage requires the United States (US) to consistently seek out information about its adversaries to gauge intent, action, and capabilities. Cyber actions thus help prepare America for future conflicts by “identify[ing] potential

threats and the best ways to defeat them” in cyberspace. The Internet was not designed for security but, rather, for accessibility. States, including America, are largely dependent on cyber to support their national security and economic activities. While the Internet enhances a state’s efficiency in accessing and transmitting information, it also comes with a corresponding increase in vulnerabilities. Networks built around the architecture of the Internet are inherently exploitable.

America thus takes advantage of cyber’s lax security architecture to seek out and extract information from its adversaries’ networks in innovative operations. The once benign nature of the Internet has now given way to “a battleground, [and] a ground zero” for political and military contests and conflicts. Yet, in cyber, there is no

such thing as a clear-cut win – any actions undertaken can make the American security posture relatively better or worse. Security in cyberspace thus seesaws between advantage and vulnerability, as depicted below.

No Impact – CyberwarCyber war won’t happen – their evidence is alarmistLeach 11 — content coordinator for the Guardian Global Development Professionals Network

(Anna Leach, 20 Oct 2011 At 07, 10-20-2011, "War Boffin: Killer cyber-attacks won't happen," http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/10/20/cyber_war_wont_be_real/, Date Accessed: 6-29-2015) //NM

People worried about a cyber-war should calm down and stop worrying because it will never happen, a war studies academic has said. In the paper Cyber War Will Not Take Place Dr Thomas Rid

confidently argues that hacking and computer viruses never actually kill people. An act of war must have the potential to be lethal, says Dr Rid, of King's College London, writing in The Journal of Strategic Studies, but hacking and cyber-attacks have much more in common with spying than, say, nuclear bombs. He believes

that although a "cyber war" conforms to the traditional definition of a two-sided conflict, a lethal one will never take place.

"The threat intuitively makes sense," Dr Rid says. "Almost everybody has an iPhone, an email address and a Facebook

account. We feel vulnerable to cyber-attack every day. Cyber-war seems the logical next step." But worriers are misguided: Dr Rid

states that to constitute cyber-warfare an action must be a "potentially lethal, instrumental and political act of force, conducted through the use of software". Yet, he says, no single cyber attack has ever been classed as such and no single digital onslaught has ever constituted an act of war. He concludes: "Politically motivated cyber-attacks are simply a more sophisticated version of activities that have always occurred within warfare: sabotage, espionage and subversion."

Zero impact to cyberwar --- too hard to execute and defenses solveColin S. Gray 13, Prof. of International Politics and Strategic Studies @ the University of Reading and External Researcher @ the Strategic Studies Institute @ the U.S. Army War College, April, “Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not Falling,” U.S. Army War College Press, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1147.pdf

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE SKY IS NOT FALLING¶ This analysis has sought to explore, identify, and explain the strategic meaning of cyber power. The organizing and thematic question that has shaped and driven the inquiry has been “So what?” Today we all do cyber, but this behavior usually has not been much informed by an understanding that reaches beyond the tactical and technical. I have endeavored to analyze in strategic terms what is on offer from the largely technical and tactical literature on cyber. What can or might be done and how to go about doing it are vitally important bodies of knowledge. But at least as important is understanding what cyber, as a fifth domain of warfare, brings to national security when it is considered strategically. Military history is stocked abundantly with examples of tactical behavior un - guided by any credible semblance of strategy. This inquiry has not been a campaign to reveal what cy ber can and might do; a large literature already exists that claims fairly convincingly to explain “how to . . .” But what does cyber power mean, and how does it fit strategically, if it does? These Conclusions and Rec ommendations offer some understanding of this fifth geography of war in terms that make sense to this strategist, at least. ¶ 1.

Cyber can only be an enabler of physical effort. Stand-alone (popularly misnamed as “strategic”) cyber action is inherently grossly limited by its immateriality. The physicality of conflict with cyber’s human participants and mechanical artifacts has not been a passing phase in our

species’ strategic history. Cyber action, quite independent of action on land, at sea, in the air, and in orbital space, certainly is possible. But the strategic logic of such behavior, keyed to anticipated success in tactical achievement, is not promising. To date, “What if . . .” speculation about strategic cyber attack usually is either contextually too light, or, more often, contextually unpersuasive. 49 However, this is not a great strategic truth, though it is a judgment advanced with considerable confidence. Although societies could, of course, be hurt by cyber

action, it is important not to lose touch with the fact, in Libicki’s apposite words, that “[i]n the absence of physical combat, cyber war cannot lead to the occupation of territory. It is almost inconceivable that a sufficiently vigorous cyber war can overthrow the adversary’s government and replace it with a more pliable one.” 50 In the same way that the concepts of sea war, air war, and space war are fundamentally unsound, so also the idea of cyber war is unpersuasive. ¶ It is not impossible, but then, neither is war conducted only at sea, or in the air, or in space. On the one hand, cyber war may seem more probable

than like environmentally independent action at sea or in the air. After all, cyber warfare would be very unlikely to harm human beings directly , let alone damage physically the machines on which they depend. These near-facts (cyber

attack might cause socially critical machines to behave in a rogue manner with damaging physical consequences) might seem to ren - der cyber a safer zone of

belligerent engagement than would physically violent action in other domains. But most likely there would be serious uncertainties pertaining to the consequences of cyber action, which must include the possibility of escalation into other domains of conflict. Despite popular assertions to the contrary, cyber is not likely to prove a precision weapon anytime soon. 51 In addition, assuming that the political and strategic contexts for cyber war were as serious as surely

they would need to be to trigger events warranting plausible labeling as cyber war, the distinctly limited harm likely to follow from cyber assault would hardly appeal as prospectively effective coercive moves. On balance, it is most probable that cyber’s strategic future in war will be as a contribut - ing enabler of effectiveness of physical efforts in the other four geographies of conflict.

Speculation about cyber war, defined strictly as hostile action by net - worked computers against networked computers, is hugely unconvincing.¶ 2. Cyber defense is difficult, but should be sufficiently effective. The structural advantages of the offense in cyber conflict are as obvious as they are easy to overstate. Penetration and exploitation , or even attack, would need to be by surprise. It can be swift almost beyond the imagination of those encultured by the traditional demands of physical combat. Cyber attack may be so stealthy that it escapes notice for a long while, or it might wreak digital havoc by com - plete surprise. And need one emphasize, that at least for a while, hostile cyber action is likely to be hard (though not quite impossible) to attribute with a cy - berized equivalent to a “smoking gun.” Once one is in the realm of the catastrophic “What if . . . ,” the world is indeed a frightening place. On a personal note, this defense analyst was for some years exposed to highly speculative briefings that hypothesized how unques - tionably cunning plans for nuclear attack could so promptly disable the United States as a functioning state that our nuclear retaliation would likely be still - born. I should hardly need to add that the briefers of these Scary Scenarios were obliged to make a series of Heroic

Assumptions. ¶ The literature of cyber scare is more than mildly reminiscent of the nuclear attack stories with which I was assailed in the 1970s and 1980s. As one may observe regarding what Winston Churchill wrote of the disaster that was the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, “[t]he terrible ‘Ifs’ accumulate.” 52 Of course, there are dangers in the cyber domain. Not only are there cyber-competent competitors and enemies abroad; there are also Americans who make mistakes in cyber operation. Furthermore, there are the manufacturers and

constructors of the physical artifacts behind (or in, depending upon the preferred definition) cyber - space who assuredly err in this and that detail. The more sophisticated—usually meaning complex—the code for cyber, the more certain must it be that mistakes both lurk in the program and will be made in digital communication.¶ What I have just outlined minimally is not a reluc - tant admission of the fallibility of cyber, but rather a statement of what is obvious and should be anticipat - ed about people and material in a domain of war. All human activities are more or less harassed by friction and carry with them some risk of failure, great or small. A strategist who has read Clausewitz, especially Book One of On War , 53 will know this. Alternatively, anyone who skims my summary version of the general theory of strategy will note that Dictum 14 states explicitly that “Strategy is more difficult to devise and execute than are policy, operations, and tactics: friction of all kinds comprise phenomena inseparable from the mak - ing and execution of strategies.” 54 Because of its often widely distributed character, the physical infrastruc - ture of an enemy’s cyber power is typically, though not invariably, an impracticable target set for physical assault. Happily, this probable fact should have only annoying consequences. The discretionary nature and therefore the variable possible characters feasible for friendly cyberspace(s), mean that the more danger - ous potential vulnerabilities that in theory could be the condition of our cyber-dependency ought to be avoidable at best, or bearable and survivable at worst. Libicki offers forthright advice on this aspect of the subject that deserves to be taken at face value: ¶ [T]here is no inherent reason that improving informa - tion technologies should lead to a rise in the amount of critical information in existence (for example, the names of every secret agent). Really critical information should never see a computer; if it sees a

computer, it should not be one that is networked; and if the computer is networked, it should be air-gapped.¶ Cyber defense admittedly is difficult to do, but so is cyber offense. To quote Libicki yet again, “[i]n this medium [cyberspace] the best defense is not necessarily a good

offense; it is usually a good defense.” 56 Unlike the geostrategic context for nuclear-framed competition in U.S.–Soviet/Russian rivalry, the geographical domain of cyberspace definitely is defensible. Even when the enemy is both clever and lucky, it will be our own design and operating fault if he is able to do more than disrupt and irritate us temporarily.¶ When cyber is contextually regarded properly— which means first, in particular, when it is viewed as but the latest military domain for defense planning—it should be plain to see that cyber performance needs to be good enough rather than

perfect. 57 Our Landpower, sea power, air power, and prospectively our space systems also will have to be capable of accepting combat damage and loss, then recovering and carrying on. There is no fundamental reason that less should be demanded of our cyber power. Second, given that cyber is not of a nature or potential character at all likely to parallel nuclear dangers in the menace it could con - tain, we should anticipate international cyber rivalry to follow the competitive dynamic path already fol - lowed in the other domains in the past. Because the digital age is so young, the pace of technical change and tactical invention can be startling. However, the mechanization RMA of the 1920s and 1930s recorded reaction to the new science and technology of the time that is

reminiscent of the cyber alarmism that has flour - ished of recent years. 58 We can be confident that cyber defense should be able to function well enough , given the strength of political, military, and commercial motivation for it to do so. The technical context here is a medium that is a constructed one, which provides air-gapping options for choice regarding the extent of networking. Naturally, a price is paid in convenience for some closing off of possible cyberspace(s), but all important defense decisions involve choice, so what is novel about that? There is nothing new about accepting some limitations on utility as a price worth paying for security.¶ 3. Intelligence is critically important, but informa - tion should not be overvalued. The strategic history of cyber over the past decade confirms what we could know already from the

science and technology of this new domain for conflict. Specifically, cyber power is not technically forgiving of user error. Cyber warriors seeking criminal or military benefit require precise information if their intended exploits are to succeed. Lucky guesses should not stumble upon passwords, while efforts to disrupt electronic

Supervisory Con - trol and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems ought to be unable to achieve widespread harmful effects. But obviously there are practical limits to the air-gap op - tion, given that control (and command) systems need to be networks for communication.

However, Internet connection needs to be treated as a potential source of serious danger.¶ It is one thing to be able to be an electronic nuisance, to annoy, disrupt, and perhaps delay. But it is quite another to be capable of inflicting real persisting harm on the fighting power of an enemy. Critically important military computer networks are, of course, accessible neither to the inspired amateur outsider, nor to the malignant political enemy. Easy passing reference to a hypothetical “cyber Pearl Harbor” reflects both poor history and ignorance of contemporary military common sense. Critical potential military (and other) targets for cyber attack are extremely hard to access and influence (I

believe and certainly hope), and the technical knowledge, skills, and effort required to do serious harm to national security is forbiddingly high. This is not to claim, foolishly, that cyber means absolutely could not secure near-catastrophic results. However, it is to say that such a scenario is extremely improbable . Cyber defense is advancing all the time, as is cyber offense, of course. But so discretionary in vital detail can one be in the making of cyberspace, that confidence—real confidence—in cyber attack could not plausibly be high. It should be noted that I am confining this particular discussion to what rather idly tends to be called cyber war. In political and strategic practice, it is unlikely that war would or, more importantly, ever could be restricted to the EMS. Somewhat rhetorically, one should pose the question: Is it likely (almost anything, strictly, is possible) that cyber war with the potential to inflict catastrophic damage would be allowed to stand unsupported in and by action in the other four geographical domains of war? I believe not.¶ Because we have told ourselves that ours uniquely is the Information Age, we have become unduly respectful of the potency of this rather slippery catch-all term. As usual, it is helpful to contextualize the al - legedly magical ingredient, information, by locating it properly in strategic history as just one important element contributing to net strategic effectiveness. This mild caveat is supported usefully by recognizing the general contemporary rule that information per se harms nothing and nobody. The electrons in cyber - ized conflict have to be interpreted and acted upon by physical forces (including agency by physical human beings). As one might say, intelligence (alone) sinks no ship; only men and machines can sink ships! That said, there is no doubt that if friendly cyber action can infiltrate and misinform the electronic informa - tion on which advisory weaponry and other machines depend, considerable warfighting advantage could be gained. I do not intend to join Clausewitz in his dis - dain for intelligence, but I will argue that in strategic affairs, intelligence usually is somewhat uncertain. 59 Detailed up-to-date intelligence literally is essential for successful cyber offense, but it can be healthily sobering to appreciate that the strategic rewards of intelligence often are considerably exaggerated. The basic reason is not hard to recognize. Strategic success is a complex endeavor that requires adequate perfor - mances by many necessary contributors at every level of conflict (from the political to the tactical). ¶ When thoroughly reliable intelligence on the en - emy is in short supply, which usually is the case, the strategist finds ways to compensate as best he or she can. The IT-led RMA of the past 2 decades was fueled in part by the prospect of a quality of military effec - tiveness that was believed to flow from “dominant battle space knowledge,” to deploy a familiar con - cept. 60 While there is much to be said in praise of this idea, it is not unreasonable to ask why it has been that our ever-improving battle space knowledge has been compatible with so troubled a course of events in the 2000s in Iraq and Afghanistan. What we might have misunderstood is not the value of knowledge, or of the information from which knowledge is quarried, or even the merit in the IT that passed information and knowledge around. Instead, we may well have failed to grasp and grip understanding of the whole context of war and strategy for which battle space knowledge unquestionably is vital. One must say “vital” rather than strictly essential, because relatively ignorant armies can and have fought and won despite their ig - norance. History requires only that one’s net strategic performance is superior to that of the enemy. One is not required to be deeply well informed about the en - emy. It is historically quite commonplace for armies to fight in a condition of more-than-marginal reciprocal and strategic cultural ignorance. Intelligence is king in electronic warfare, but such warfare is unlikely to be solely, or even close to solely, sovereign in war and its warfare, considered overall as they should be.¶ 4. Why the sky will not fall. More accurately, one should

say that the sky will not fall because of hostile action against us in cyberspace unless we are improb - ably careless and foolish. David J. Betz and Tim Ste vens strike the right note when they conclude that “[i]f cyberspace is not quite the hoped-for Garden of Eden, it is also not quite the pestilential swamp of the imagination of the cyber-alarmists.” 61 Our understanding of cyber is high at the technical and tactical level, but re -

mains distinctly rudimentary as one ascends through operations to the more rarified altitudes of strategy and policy. Nonetheless, our scientific, technological, and tactical knowledge and understanding clearly indicates that the sky is not falling and is unlikely to fall in the future as a result of hostile cyber action. This analysis has weighed the more technical and tactical literature on cyber and concludes, not simply on balance , that cyber alarmism has little basis save in the imagination of the alarmists. There is military and civil peril in the hostile use of cyber, which is why we must take cyber security seriously, even to the point of buying redundant capabilities for a range of command and control systems. 62 So seriously should we regard cyber danger that it is only prudent to as - sume that we will be the target for hostile cyber action in future conflicts, and that some of that action will promote disruption and uncertainty in the damage it will cause.¶ That granted, this analysis recommends strongly that the U.S. Army, and indeed the whole of the U.S. Government, should strive to comprehend cyber in context. Approached in isolation as a new technol - ogy, it is not unduly hard to be over impressed with its potential both for good and harm. But if we see networked computing as just the latest RMA in an episodic succession of revolutionary changes in the way information is packaged and communicated, the computer-led IT revolution is set where it belongs, in historical context. In modern strategic history, there has been only one truly game-changing basket of tech - nologies, those pertaining to the creation and deliv - ery of nuclear weapons. Everything else has altered the tools with which conflict has been supported and waged, but has not changed the game. The nuclear revolution alone raised still-unanswered questions about the

viability of interstate armed conflict. How - ever, it would be accurate to claim that since 1945, methods have been found to pursue fairly traditional political ends in ways that accommodate nonuse of nuclear means, notwithstanding the permanent pres - ence of those means.¶ The light cast by general strategic theory reveals what requires revealing strategically about networked computers. Once one sheds some of the sheer wonder at the seeming miracle of cyber’s ubiquity, instanta - neity, and (near) anonymity, one realizes that cyber is just another operational domain, though certainly one very different from the others in its nonphysi - cality in direct agency. Having placed cyber where it belongs, as a domain of war, next it is essential to recognize that its nonphysicality compels that cyber should be treated

as an enabler of joint action, rather than as an agent of military action capable of behav - ing independently for useful coercive strategic effect. There are stand-alone possibilities for cyber action, but they are not convincing as attractive options either for or in opposition to a great power, let alone a superpower. No matter how intriguing the scenario design for cyber war strictly or for cyber warfare, the logic of grand and military strategy and a common sense fueled by understanding of the course of strategic history, require one so to contextualize cyber war that its independence is seen as too close to absurd to merit much concern.

No Impact – China CyberwarChina is decades behind the US in Cyber capabilities – their evidence is speculationGady 15Franz-Stefan, Senior Fellow with the EastWest Institute, “Does China Really Know How to Wage Cyber War?,” The Diplomat, 2/20/15, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/does-china-really-know-how-to-wage-cyber-war/ SJE

Third, the report fails to mention the all-important human factor in developing cyberwar capabilities. As a 2014 U.S. Army War College

publication on the PLA and information warfare points out: “The PLA also lacks a deep reservoir of personnel who can manage or operate such systems.” The paper adds that “Chinese military leaders, however, recognize this weakness and intend to develop a talent pool of troops who can conduct or plan joint military operations, manage information systems and cyber technology,

and use or maintain advanced weapon systems.” In addition, the USCC assessment does not discuss the crucial role that the private sector plays in developing cyberwar capabilities. Here the PLA is fundamentally at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the United States. Last, the crucial connection between nuclear deterrence and the cyber domain is also not elaborated upon. Already back in 1996, in an article in Foreign Affairs, Professor Joseph Nye and Admiral William Owens observed that “the information technologies driving America’s emerging military capabilities may change classic deterrence theory.” Since the paper deals with the weaknesses of the PLA, it would be have been noteworthy to point out that the PLA sense of vulnerability to cyberattacks impacts and amplifies their sense of insecurity in the nuclear deterrence realm. The PLA’s Push for Cyber Capability Back in 2007, at the 17th Party Congress, then Chinese President Hu Jintao called for the development of stronger cyber capabilities: “To attain the strategic objective of building computerized armed forces and winning IT-based warfare, we will accelerate composite development of mechanization and computerization, carry out military training under IT-based conditions, modernize every aspect of logistics, intensify our efforts to train a new type of high-caliber military personnel in large numbers and change the mode of generating combat capabilities.” China’s most recent defense white paper from 2013 points out the rationale for the rapid development of cyberwarfare capabilities: “Aiming to win local wars under the conditions of informationization and expanding and intensifying military preparedness. China’s armed forces firmly base their military preparedness on winning local wars under the conditions of informationization, make overall and coordinated plans to

promote military preparedness in all strategic directions, intensify the joint employment of different services and arms, and enhance warfighting capabilities based on information systems.”

However, so far the PLA has had a poor track record when it comes to interoperability. As of 2014, the

Army War College paper underlines that few ground formations are networked below the regimental level, although the majority of

PLA Navy, PLA Air Force units and some missile-firing battalions have “communications and data-sharing capabilities to be networked.” The simple truth is that much of the debate surrounding the PLA’s cyber war capabilities is mere speculation based on evidence of its undoubted success in cyber espionage. Some people doubt that the PLA’s capabilities amount to much. In a 2011 paper Desmond Ball, professor at the Australian National University, concludes: “China’s cyber-warfare authorities must despair at the breadth and depth of modern digital information and communications systems and technical expertise

available to their adversaries. China is condemned to inferiority in IW [information war] capabilities for

probably several decades.” Although this statement is in all likelihood too strongly worded, the assessment points to the difficulty of

publicly assessing the cyber war capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army. After studying the USCC report one thing is clear: There is an ever-present danger that we fall into a “cyber weapons gap” exaggerating the capabilities of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army when it comes to waging cyber war.

AT: Bioterror Bioterror risk exaggerated Leitenberg ‘5 – Senior Research Scholar at the University of MarylandMilton Leitenberg is a senior research scholar at the Univ. of Maryland and is the author of "Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat." LA Times – Feb 17th – lexis)

A pandemic flu outbreak of the kind the world witnessed in 1918-19 could kill hundreds of millions of people. The only lethal biological attack in the United States -- the anthrax mailings -- killed five. But the annual budget for combating bioterror is more than $7 billion , while Congress just passed a $3.8-

billion emergency package to prepare for a flu outbreak. The exaggeration of the bioterror threat began more than a decade ago after the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group released sarin gas in the Tokyo subways in 1995.

The scaremongering has grown more acute since 9/11 and the mailing of anthrax-laced letters to

Congress and media outlets in the fall of 2001. Now an edifice of institutes, programs and publicists with a vested interest in hyping the bioterror threat has grown, funded by the government and by foundations. Last year, for example, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist described bioterrorism as "the greatest existential threat we have in the world today." But how could he justify such a claim? Is bioterrorism a greater existential threat than global climate change, global poverty levels, wars and conflicts, nuclear proliferation, ocean-quality deterioration, deforestation, desertification, depletion of freshwater aquifers or the balancing of population growth and food production? Is it likely to kill more people than the more mundane scourges of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, measles and cholera, which kill more than 11 million people each year? So what substantiates the alarm and the massive federal spending on bioterrorism? There are two main sources of bioterrorism threats: first, from countries developing bioweapons, and second, from terrorist groups that might buy, steal

or manufacture them. The first threat is declining. U.S. intelligence estimates say the number of countries that conduct offensive bioweapons programs has fallen in the last 15 years from 13 to nine, as South Africa, Libya, Iraq and Cuba were dropped. There is no publicly available evidence that even the most hostile

of the nine remaining countries -- Syria and Iran -- are ramping up their programs. And, despite the fear that a hostile nation could help terrorists get biological weapons, no country has ever done so -- even nations known to have trained terrorists.

Low risk- difficult to use, no appeal and vaccines checkClark ‘8 – Emeritus Professor in Immunology at UCLAWilliam R. Clark, Bracing for Armageddon?: The Science and Politics of Bioterrorism in America, 2008, pg. 185

So who would do it? To the extent that bioterrorism would ever be used against the United States, all best are that it would come from

organized terrorist groups such as, yes, Al-Qaeda. But it very clear there is a huge, multifaceted barrier between us and a successful bioterrorist attack by any group. That bar-rier consists of the extreme difficulty of any such group build-ing an effective bioweapon on their own and the improbability of any organized state providing them with such a weapon . It is conceivable that eventually, as some of the technologies involved are simplified, these difficulties could be overcome to some extent. But there is still the problem our own and other

militaries had with state-of-the-art bioweapons provided to them ready-made by their own governments: they are diffi-cult to use and control, and have less impact than chemical or nuclear weapons. So why bother ? We are also buffered by the impressive improvements we have made in order to absorb the impact of such an attack, should one happen. Although our public health system still has a way to go, it is in much better

shape now than it was after 2001. And again, we now have stocks of vaccines and medicines that would greatly blunt the consequences of a bioterrorist attack . We would be bet-ter off with a few more vaccines,

but we are close to having them. The certainty that even a large-scale bioterrorist attack would have the desired effect is much less now than it was ten years ago .

Small impactCordesman ‘5 Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for International Studies and national security analyst for ABC news, The Challenge of Biological Terrorism, 2005, pg. 56-7

The probability of some variation of a worst-case biological attack may well be limited in the near term . It is far from clear that real-world biological terrorism will go beyond the limited spread of toxin or agents with casualties in double or triple digits. So far, the chronol-ogy of bioterrorism is largely a chronology of small incidents, failed plans, and ineffective strikes . The Aum Shinrikyo anthrax attacks are the clearest example of attempted acts of biological terrorism that in-volved adequate financial resources mixed with some credible scien-tific talent . The result of the Aum Shinrikyo attempt was a nonevent , detected only after the group succeeded in using chemical weapons. 5

AT: China HackNo China hack - vulnerable operating systems and weak offensive capabilityBall 11Desmond, Ph.D, Emeritus Professor at Australian National University, former Head of the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, “China’s Cyberwarfare Capabilities,” Security Challenges, Vol. 7:2, p. 81-103, Winter 2011 SJE

Chinese strategists are quite aware of their own deficiencies and vulnerabilities with respect to cyber-warfare. In June 2000, “a series of high technology combat exercises” being conducted by the PLA “had to be suspended” when

they were attacked by “a computer hacker”. China’s telecommunications technicians were impotent against

the intermittent hijacking of the Sinosat-1 national communications satellite by Falun Gong „practitioners‟ in the early 2000s. China’s demonstrated offensive cyberwarfare capabilities are fairly rudimentary. Chinese hackers have been able to easily orchestrate sufficient simultaneous „pings‟ to crash selected Web servers (i.e., Denial-of-Service attacks). They have been able to penetrate Web-sites and deface them, erase data from them, and post different information on them (such as propaganda slogans). And they have developed various fairly simple viruses for spreading by e-mails to disable targeted computer systems, as well as Trojan Horse programs insertible by e-mails to steal information from them. However, they have evinced little proficiency with more sophisticated hacking techniques. The viruses and Trojan Horses they have used have been fairly easy to detect and remove before any damage has been done or data stolen.

There is no evidence that China’s cyber-warriors can penetrate highly secure networks or covertly steal or falsify critical data. They would be unable to systematically [stymie] cripple

selected command and control, air defence and intelligence networks and databases of advanced adversaries, or to conduct deception operations by secretly manipulating the data in these networks. The gap between the sophistication of the anti-virus and network security programs available to China‟s cyber-warriors as compared to those of their counterparts in the

more open, advanced IT societies, is immense. China’s cyber-warfare authorities must despair at the breadth and depth of modern digital information and communications systems and technical expertise available to their adversaries. China is condemned to inferiority in IW capabilities for probably several decades. At best, it can employ asymmetric strategies designed to exploit the (perhaps relatively greater) dependence on IT by their potential adversaries—both the C3 ISREW elements of adversary military forces and the vital telecommunications and computer systems in the adversary's homelands. In particular, attacks on US information systems relating to military command and control, transportation and logistics could “possibly degrade or delay U.S. force mobilisation in a time-dependent scenario”, such as US intervention in a

military conflict in the Taiwan Straits.93 China’s cyber-warfare capabilities are very destructive, but could not compete in extended scenarios of sophisticated IW operations. In other words, they function best when used pre-emptively, as the PLA now practices in its exercises.94 In sum, the extensive Chinese IW capabilities, and the possibilities for asymmetric strategies, are only potent if employed first.

AT: ISIS HackNo impact – ISIS doesn’t have the capability and prioritizes ground controlFrizell 14Sam, writer for TIME, “Experts Doubt ISIS Could Launch Major Cyberattack Against the U.S.,” 10/19/14, http://time.com/3403769/isis-cyberattack/ SJE

But do we really need to fear a cyber attack from ISIS? As it turns out, probably not: ISIS’s social media savvy doesn’t necessarily translate into a real cybersecurity threat against the United States, and much of the talk about the group’s growing cyber-prowess overstates the point, experts told TIME. “I don’t think anyone has any proof that there’s an imminent attack or that ISIS has acquired the manpower or the resources to launch an attack on the infrastructure of the United States,” said Craig Guiliano, senior threat specialist at security firm TSC Advantage and a former counterterrorism officer with the Department of Defense. “It could be a potential threat in the future, but we’re not there yet.” ISIS, a

group with little technological infrastructure, doesn’t have many resources to wage a cyberwar against the United States. Compared to larger, state-sponsored hacking operations, ISIS is miles behind. Chinese hackers, for instance, who have been accused of attacking U.S. businesses and government contractors, are reported to have wide-ranging support from Chinese authorities, with many of the hackers hailing directly from the Chinese army. A few ISIS-related figures have been connected with cyberattacks or cybercrime. Abu Hussain Al Britani, a British hacker who has since moved to Syria and begun recruiting for ISIS, was jailed in 2012 for hacking into former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Gmail account. One of the more prominent tech-savvy ISIS supporters, Al Britani maintains a Twitter account that calls for new ISIS recruits. And a group called “Lizard Squad” that has claimed responsibility for high-profile cyberattacks that have

brought down the websites of the Vatican, Sony and others has tenuously been linked to ISIS on the basis of tweets like this one: But ISIS doesn’t appear to have the manpower to launch sophisticated attacks against the United States. “You need some resources. You need access to certain kinds of technology. You need to have hardcore programmers,” Jim Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said. “ISIS doesn’t have those capabilities.” Unlike China’s state-sponsored hackers, who have a strong interest in attacking U.S. businesses to hawk trade secrets and

intellectual property, ISIS is more concerned with taking real-world territory and controlling it. ISIS’ first priority is establishing control over the disparate desert regions from the outskirts of Aleppo in Syria to

Falluja in Iraq and creating an Islamic caliphate—not an expensive and often intangible cyberwar against American websites. “ISIS wants to conquer the Middle East, not hack websites in Omaha,” said Lewis. That’s not to say that ISIS is incapable of launching an attack in the future. ISIS is believed to be well-funded, likely

capable of purchasing simple malware on the black market and using it against the West. But the kinds of attacks ISIS would be able to carry out would likely be more of an annoyance than a debilitating strike on the United States’ infrastructure, the kind of attack that national security experts really worry about.

AT: NoKo HackNorth Korea has no capability for a major hackCBS 14“Former Anonymous Hacker: North Korea Doesn’t Have Technical Capabilities To Be Behind Sony Attack,” 12/18/14, http://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/12/18/former-anonymous-hacker-north-korea-doesnt-have-technical-capabilities-to-be-behind-sony-attack/ SJE

A former hacker for Anonymous doesn’t believe North Korea has the infrastructure to be behind the Sony hack attack. Hector Monsegur told “CBS This Morning” that the communist regime doesn’t have the technical capabilities to pull off the hack. “In my personal opinion, it’s not. Look at the bandwidth going into North Korea. I mean, the pipelines, the pipes going in, handling data, they only have one major ISP across their entire nation. That kind of information flowing at one time would have shut down North Korean Internet completely,” Monsegur explained. He continued, “They don’t have the technical capabilities. They do have state-sponsored hackers very similar to China, very similar to Russia and very similar to our good, old USA.” Sony Pictures Entertainment took the unprecedented step of canceling the Dec. 25 release of the Seth Rogen comedy “The Interview.” The cancellation announced Wednesday was a startling blow to the Hollywood studio that has been shaken by hacker leaks and intimidations over the last several weeks by an anonymous group calling itself Guardians of Peace. A U.S. official said Wednesday that federal investigators have now connected the Sony hacking to North Korea and may make an announcement in the near future. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because the official

was not authorized to openly discuss an ongoing criminal case. Monsegur stated that Sony’s hacking had to have happened over a long period of time. “For something like this to happen, it had to happen over a long period of time. You cannot just exfiltrate one terabyte or 100 terabytes of data in a matter of weeks,” he told “CBS This Morning.” “It’s not possible.

It would have taken months, maybe even years, to exfiltrate something like 100 terabytes of data without anyone noticing.”

AT: Grid CollapseNo impact to grid collapseLeger ’12 (Donna Leinwand Leger, USA Today, “Energy experts say blackout like India's is unlikely in U.S.,” http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-07-31/usa-india-power-outage/56622978/1, July 31, 2012]

A massive, countrywide power failure like the one in India on Tuesday is "extremely unlikely" in the United States, energy experts say. In India, three of the country's government-operated power grids failed Tuesday, leaving 620 million people without electricity for several hours. The outage, the second in two days in the country of 1.21 billion people, is

the world's biggest blackout on record. The U.S. electricity system is segmented into three parts with safeguards that prevent an outage in one system from tripping a blackout in another system , "making blackouts across the country extremely unlikely," Energy Department spokeswoman Keri Fulton said. Early reports from government officials in India say excessive demand knocked the country's power generators offline. Experts say India's industry and economy are growing faster than its electrical systems. Last year, the economy grew 7.8% and pushed energy needs

higher, but electricity generation did not keep pace, government records show. "We are much, much less at risk for something like that happening here, especially from the perspective of demand exceeding supply," said Gregory Reed, a professor of electric power engineering at University of Pittsburgh. "We're much more sophisticated in our operations. Most of our issues have been from natural disasters." The U.S. generates more than enough electricity to meet demand and always have power in reserve , Reed said. "Fundamentally, it's a different world here," said Arshad Mansoor, senior vice president of the Electric Power Research Institute in Washington and an expert on power grids. "It's an order of magnitude more reliable here than in a developing country." Grid operators across the country analyze power usage and generation, factoring outside factors such as weather, in real time and can forecast power supply and demand hour by hour, Mansoor said. "In any large, complex interactive network, the chance of that interconnection breaking up is always there," Mansoor said. "You cannot take your eye off the ball

for a minute." Widespread outages in the U.S. caused by weather are common. But the U.S. has also had system failures, said Ellen Vancko, senior energy adviser for the Union of Concerned Scientists, based in Washington. On Aug. 14, 2003, more than 50 million people in the Northeast and Canada lost power after a major U.S. grid collapsed. The problem began in Ohio when a transmission wire overheated and sagged into a tree that had grown too

close to the line, Vancko said. That caused other power lines to overheat until so many lines failed that the system shut itself down, she said. "That was less a failure of technology and more a failure of people, a failure of people to follow the rules," Vancko said. "There were a whole bunch of lessons learned." In 2005, in response to an investigation of the blackout, Congress passed a law establishing the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to enforce reliability standards for bulk electricity generation.

Grid is resilient and sustainableClark 12,MA candidate – Intelligence Studies @ American Military University, senior analyst – Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/’12

(Paul, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” American Military University)

In 2003, a simple physical breakdown occurred – trees shorted a power line and caused a fault – that had a cascading effect and caused a power blackout across the Northeast (Lewis 2010). This singular occurrence has been used as evidence that the electrical grid is fragile and subject to severe disruption through cyber-attack,

a disruption that could cost billions of dollars, brings business to a halt, and could even endanger lives – if compounded by other

catastrophic events (Brennan 2012). A power disruption the size of the 2003 blackout, the worst in American¶ history at that time (Minkel 2008), is a worst case scenario and used as an example of the¶ fragility of the U.S. energy

grid. This perceived fragility is not real when viewed in the context ¶ of the robustness of the electrical grid.¶ When asked about cyber-attacks against the electrical grid in April of 2012, the¶ intelligence chief of U.S. Cyber Command Rear Admiral Samuel Cox stated that an attack was¶ unlikely to succeed because of the “huge amounts of resiliency built into the [electrical] system¶ that makes that kind of catastrophic thing very difficult” (Capaccio 2012). This optimistic view¶ is supported by an electrical grid that has proven to be robust in the face of large natural¶ catastrophes. Complex systems like the electrical grid in the U.S. are prone to failures and the ¶ U.S. grid fails frequently . Despite efforts to reduce the risk out power outages, the risk is always¶ present. Power outages that affect more than 50,000 people have occurred steadily over the last¶ 20 years at a rate of 12% annually and the frequency of large catastrophes remains relatively¶ high and outages the size of the 2003 blackout are predicted to occur

every 25 years (Minkel¶ 2008). In a complex system that is always at risk of disruption, the effect is mitigated by policies¶

and procedures that are meant to restore services as quickly as possible. The most visible of these policies is the interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a legally binding¶

agreement allowing combined resources to be quickly deployed in response to a catastrophic¶

disaster such as power outages following a severe hurricane (Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev¶ 2009).¶ The electrical grid suffers service interruptions regularly, it is a large and complex system¶ supporting the largest economy in the world,

and yet commerce does not collapse (Lewis 2010).¶ Despite blizzards, earthquakes, fires, and hurricanes that

cause blackouts, the economy is¶ affected but does not collapse and even after massive damage like

that caused by Hurricane¶ Katrina, national security is not affected because U.S. military capability is not degraded (Lewis¶

2010).¶ Cyber-security is an ever-increasing concern in an increasingly electronic and¶ interconnected world.

Cyber-security is a high priority “economic and national security¶ challenge ” (National Security

Council n.d.) because cyber-attacks are expected to become the¶ top national security threat (Robert S. Mueller 2012). In response to the threat Congress is¶ crafting legislation to enhance cyber-security (Brito and Watkins 2012) and

the Department of¶ Homeland Security budget for cyber-security has been significantly increased (U.S. Senate¶ Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2012).

Systems are safe and constantly improvingFritz ‘9 Jason Fritz, Hacking Nuclear Command and Control, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf

SCADA systems may be more robust than some reports have indicated . These systems are designed to be distributed, diverse, redundant, and self-healing, in part because weather systems and natural disasters pose a continual threat of disruption. A cyber attack against SCADA

systems may require a sustained assault against multiple targets to have a significant effect. Additionally, humans remain in the loop. For example, reports that a terrorist could change the levels of iron in children’s breakfast cereal to toxic levels, neglects to account for the manual checks of assembly line workers, or the accounting procedures for the amount of iron in stock (Denning 1999). Al Qaeda computers recovered in Afghanistan revealed information on water systems and nuclear power plants. However this was more relevant to reconnaissance in support of a traditional physical attack. The degree to which these systems could cause massive disruption or death is

debatable, as traditional explosives remain a more potent tool for that task. It may take years to prepare an attack

against advanced networks, including the identification of exploits, development of tools, and the implementation of a plan, yet

technology is rapidly advancing and networks continually updating, possibly disrupting those plans . Terrorist organisations may not be able to keep up with the massive financial backing of nation states . Statesponsored hackers have this problem themselves (Wilson 2003).

***AT: Heg Advantage***

Heg UnsustainableUS heg is unsustainable and declining now – fiscal instability, China/India riseLayne 12 Christopher Layne, PhD is Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/2/)

Leaving aside the fate of the dollar, however, it is clear the United States must address its financial challenge and

restore the nation's fiscal health in order to reassure foreign lenders that their investments remain sound. This will require some combination of

budget cuts, entitlement reductions, tax increases and interest-rate hikes. That, in turn, will

surely curtail the amount of spending available for defense and national security--further eroding America's ability to play its traditional, post-World War II global role. Beyond the U.S. financial challenge, the world is percolating with emerging nations bent on exploiting the power shift away from the West and toward states that long have been confined to subordinate status in the global power game. (Parag Khanna explores this

phenomenon at length further in this issue.) By far the biggest test for the United States will be its relationship with China, which views itself as effecting a restoration of its former glory, before the First Opium War of 1839-1842 and its subsequent "century of humiliation." After all, China and India were the world's two largest economies in 1700, and as late as 1820 China's economy was larger than the combined economies of all of Europe. The question of why the West emerged as the world's most powerful civilization beginning in the sixteenth century, and thus was able to impose its will on China and India, has been widely debated. Essentially, the answer is firepower. As the late Samuel P. Huntington put it, "The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion . . . but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do."

Heg is unsustainable – empirics proveHamraie 9 (Hamraie, James, [Former student at Emory University], “U.S. Hegemony is Unsustainable”, http://www.students.emory.edu/EPR/UsHegUnsust.html)//HRC

The election of President Barack Obama, the withdrawal of troops from forward deployment in Iraq, and the mending of ties with foreign nations that were alienated during the War on Terror, have helped to create an atmosphere of optimism for the continued primacy of the

United States as the leading nation in the international arena. This optimism, however, is premature. Despite the perceptual stability of U.S. dominance over the past two decades, the continuation of its primacy will inevitably decline. This claim is neither extreme nor unprecedented. History is ripe with examples that show that all great empires collapse. The fall of Rome, Britain, the Mongols, the Han Dynasty, and the Byzantine Empire show that changes in the balance of power are quite frequent. An analysis of

the structure of unipolarity combined with a focus on recent events shows that a number of issues in all sectors of power, including economic, military, and diplomatic sectors, limit the ability of the United States to prevent counter-balancing and the weakening of power projection, eventually causing a shift to a world where the United States shares the stage with rising powers. Economic woes have affected the ability of the United States to maintain its supremacy. The recent financial crises, the erosion of U.S. competitiveness in business and education, and the declining purchasing power of the dollar have created domestic turmoil and

dented the leading view of U.S. dominance among international allies. These factors, coupled with dependence on foreign oil and energy resources, are weakening U.S. flexibility and allowing foreign nations with exploding economies, such as China and India, to close the gap. For example, if China’s booming growth continues, then China’s total GDP would be 2.5 times that of the United States. A weaker economy has high domestic dissatisfaction contributing to a greater urgency to focus on national issues instead of international affairs. It is essential for the United States to maintain its flexibility in international involvement and conflict resolution because it lends the impression that the U.S. does not have its hands tied and that the U.S. military is still extremely powerful. A strong economy also lessens the amount of domestic spending on social services and

foundation-level economic stimulus and allows for greater allocation of resources into research and development of new military technologies and upkeep of military supplies. Both of these factors are essential for conventional combat readiness and warfare, and allow the U.S. armed forces to sustain their lead over other nations. Diplomatic woes arise from the United States’ diminished image. Although the War on Terror initially forged alliances and international sympathy, the unilateral policy decisions, human rights abuses, and exceptionalism that followed transformed the perception of the United States from a benevolent world power to an international bully willing to neglect multilateral

solutions in favor of ad-hoc cowboy diplomacy. The abuses of Abu Ghraib, arguments over the Kyoto Protocol and global warming, and the invasion of Iraq are only a few examples of policies that have spurred heavy disdain and lasting animosity with both allies and hostile nations. Although Obama’s election has caused many foreign countries to begin changing their attitude towards the United States and public polls have illustrated a

stronger approval rating of the United States, there are still major issues that need to be settled. The U.S. has failed to take concrete action on a majority of issues that the international community has been asking the United States to follow through on for over a decade. These include the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Law of the Sea Treaty, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Being a world leader requires more than raw power. Sustaining alliances and goodwill with other nations is essential. Additionally, if the United States can convince other nations to comply with its wishes, it can lower the costs of shaping the global stage to reflect its interests. This arrangement, coupled with the evolving balance of power, can cause other nations to support the U.S. and oppose its potential challengers. For instance, the changing security dynamics in East Asia show that self-interest is spurring countries to be less willing to oppose neighbors on important issues or strategic circumstances. This is due to a fear of losing economic

and trading ties, despite a long history of cooperation and positive relations with the United States. Imperial overstretch, domestic costs of forward deployment, fighting capability, and overburdening security and humanitarian commitments has caused a decline in military power, the lifeline of U.S. global dominance . The growing strength of foreign militaries exacerbates the effect of these problems. The post-Cold War apex of American power has begun to erode while other nations with larger populations are training substantial military forces with increasingly sophisticated technology. Recent events illustrate the implication of these factors on the decline of U.S. power and the growing strength of potential global rivals. India and China are economic powerhouses, whose growth has allowed for greater modernization. Despite the military edge currently held by the U.S., domestic sentiment has drifted away from an overwhelming focus on defense spending since the invasion of and subsequent public backlash from Operation Iraqi Freedom. Additionally, China’s expanding naval forces, such as the nuclear-armed submarines, are lessening the effect of U.S. nuclear supremacy and first-strike leverage. Furthermore, in other important global regions, Brazil is vying for regional hegemony, China is building security and economic ties with African nations, and Russia is legitimizing interventionist policies with the invasion of Georgia and fiery rhetoric over national expansion and national missile defense.

Heg Unsustainable - ChinaHeg unsustainable – China rise White 2013

Hugh White is a Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Australian National University (Hugh, “Containing or counterbalancing China”, Asia Sentinel, August 5, 2013 http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/containing-or-counterbalancing-china/)

What if China doesn’t want to be contained or counter-balanced? I have said that containment was a strategy

that has been mistaken for a policy . This phrase means that to define a policy is to define an end, whereas to define a strategy is to define a

means. This debate about names - whether 'containment' or 'counterbalancing' - soon gets tangled in arguments about what the names themselves mean, and seriously misses the point . By debating the strategy before we get clear on the policy,

we put the means before the ends. What we need to do first is clarify the policy that lies behind these strategies. So let's put the word 'containment' to one side and instead explore the key questions about the policy itself. The key questions are pretty simple: what is the aim of the current US policy towards China? What are its

likely costs? Will it succeed? What if it fails? And what are the alternatives? America's primary aim in relation to China today is to preserve its position as the primary strategic power in Asia. This aim is seldom scrutinized or even

acknowledged. It is taken for granted because it assumes that primacy is the only conceivable strategic

role for America in Asia, that perpetuating US primacy is thus the only alternative to strategic withdrawal, and that US primacy therefore provides the only

possible basis for a stable and secure future for Asia, as it has done for so many years past. And it assumes that everyone else wants

Asia to remain peaceful, and that they all agree that continued US primacy is the only way to ensure

that. That used to be true. Since 1972 US primacy in Asia has been uncontested, and the costs of sustaining it have

consequently been relatively low. Whether America can preserve its primacy in Asia in the future, and how much it would cost to do

so, depends critically on whether this remains true. Most people - Americans and America's friends and allies - believe it is. In particular,

they think that China will ultimately accept US primacy as the foundation of the Asian order in the future, as they have since 1972. But this might be wrong. All the evidence suggests that China no

longer accepts US primacy . It wants to reshape the Asian order to give itself a much bigger role. This is surely what President Xi means when he

talks of 'a new model of great power relations'. If that's right, then America can only achieve its own objectives by persuading or compelling China to back down. Those who think China is not serious about challenging American primacy assume this will be easy, but they may underestimate China's power and resolve. China may be just as committed to challenging American primacy as America is to preserving it. They too might be willing to use 'every element' of their power to achieve their goals in Asia, as President Obama said America is. And China today is far wealthier, and hence ultimately more powerful, relative to the United States than any previous rival has been - even the Soviet Union. So if the Chinese are serious, it will cost America a great deal to force them to abandon their ambitions, and there is no guarantee it will succeed. And what if it fails? The biggest risk is not that China will throw America out and establish its own hegemony over Asia but that the two countries will be drawn into prolonged and inconclusive strategic rivalry carrying immense economic costs and strategic risks - including the risk of major, even nuclear, war. This is not a merely theoretical possibility, as the standoff between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands shows. Any serious debates about American policy in Asia must weigh this risk very carefully, just as Chinese debates must. So what are the alternatives? What other objectives might America adopt in Asia, other than perpetuating its primacy? The key here is to recognize that there are more than two options. America does not face a simple choice between abandoning Asia to China or competing for primacy against China.

Peaceful Transition NowSquo leads to peaceful shift from US heg to multilateralismSmith 5/31/15 (Smith, Jack, [Author at the Foreign Policy Journal], “The Hegemony Games: the United States of America (USA) vs. The People’s Republic of China (PRC)”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/tthe-hegemony-games-the-united-states-of-america-usa-vs-the-peoples-republic-of-china-prc/5452656)//HRC

Many millions of Americans have opposed Washington’s frequent and usually disastrous imperialist wars. But far fewer challenge the concept of U.S. global “leadership” — the euphemism for ruling the world that allows Washington carte blanche to engage in wars or bullying whenever its perceived interests appear to be challenged. It may seem like a century, considering the carnage, but it is important to remember that

Washington only obtained solo world power when the Soviet Union imploded less than a quarter century ago. The next quarter century, as a new world order is beginning to take shape in the very shadow of the old, will be rough indeed as the U.S. government resists inevitable change. The days of American hegemony over the nations of the world are numbered. This is perhaps the main and certainly the most dangerous contradiction deriving from America’s determination to lead the world as carried forward by President Obama and undoubtedly to be continued by the next and the next administrations. There are many secondary contradictions strewn throughout the world, but almost all

are related to first. The U.S. government is recklessly flailing its arms and interfering in all the global regions to impose its will in order to indefinitely continue enjoying unilateral domination and the sensation of luxuriating in the extraordinary advantages derived from being the world’s top cop, top judge, only jury, mass jailer and

executioner extraordinaire. If you doubt it, just look about at the human, structural and environmental anguish created in the last 15 years by the action or inaction of Bush-Obama world leadership. Think about the trillions of U.S. dollars for destruction and death, and the paucity of expenditures for construction and life. A better world can only emerge from a better and more people-friendly political and economic global order. Obama’s policy of enhanced American “leadership” has created havoc these last six years as a result of the collusion between the Democratic White House and the Republican Congress — partners in the projection of American armed power around the world. The main target — despite all the elbowing and ranting about Russia, Putin, Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran, Yemen, Islamic State, ad infinitum — is and will remain China. The U.S. does not want a war with China, though one is certainly possible in time. It would prefer warm, friendly and mutually beneficial

relations, under one condition: The U.S. is boss, and leads, while China — rich and powerful if it wishes

— is subordinate, and follows, even in its own natural sphere of influence. Beijing does not seek hegemony, but it will not kowtow to the United States. In the midst of all this rumbling and grumbling from the White House, it may be interesting to become acquainted with the enormous but modest main national strategic goal of the Communist Party of China. It is “to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2021; and the building of a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious by 2049. It is a Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” So goes the Chinese “menace.” China is not a newcomer to world politics and economic power, as the U.S. government has at times suggested of one of the world’s oldest and most creative civilizations. As James Petras has written: “The study of world power has been blighted by Eurocentric historians who have distorted and ignored the dominant role China played in the world economy between 1100 and 1800.” This period ended because of Western imperialist intervention and plunder, including the Opium War, which brought about the humiliation and decline of Imperial China’s final dynasty, which fell in 1911. A form of semi-democracy/semi-feudalism prevailed until the Communist revolution of 1949, when, in the words of Mao Zedong announcing victory, “The Chinese People have stood up.” In these last 66 years China removed about 700 million citizens from poverty, and has become the world’s manufacturing center and a major economic power. The Chinese Communist government is calibrating its rise very carefully, intent upon avoiding offense to the crouching, tail twitching American imperial dragon. On May 21, Peoples Daily quoted a recent talk by President Xi Jinping: “China aims to become stronger but not seek hegemony; the strategic choice of cooperation and win-win [for all sides] is the path that China chooses. China has always been a peace-loving nation that cherishes harmonious relations. Its adherence to the five principles of peaceful coexistence and anti-hegemonism has shown China’s determination to stick to peaceful development.” The five principles have governed New China since the revolution. They are: “Mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence.” There have been a few minor lapses, but these principles have remained stable and effective all these years. China’s concept of harmonious relations is of ancient philosophical extraction. Frankly, in this writer’s view, there are times when China’s criticism of an extremely inhumane aspect of one or another state’s internal affairs would do some good — but non-interference, much less non-aggression, is vastly superior to Washington’s endless interference and aggression. Xi’s statement is an accurate representation of China’s foreign relations. This is the PRC’s long-term global strategy of

development. It needs and wants peace. Washington knows all this, but that’s not the point. Xi declared that Beijing opposed the very concept of global hegemony by any nation, including itself, and, of course, the U.S.. President Obama’s primary foreign policy objective, and assuredly that of succeeding administrations, is the retention of global rule. This contradiction will eventually have to be resolved through negotiation or hostilities. China will certainly not confront the U.S. on this matter within the foreseeable future. Beijing’s

reading of the tea leaves suggests that world trends will encourage the incoming tide of multipolar world order and displace the outgoing tide of unipolar dominion. Such thinking emerges from America’s evident decline, the imminent rise of the developing nations, and the mounting dissatisfaction with the results of Washington’s global rule among countries not dependent upon Fortress Americana. Writing in Time June 1, Ian Bremmer noted: “Emerging countries are not strong

enough to overthrow U.S. dominance, but they have more than enough strength and self-confidence to refuse to follow Washington’s lead.” This is a recent development that will continue to unfold in the next decade or two.

Alt CausesMultiple alt causes to heg decline – China, Russia, Middle East, manufacturingBuchanan 6/9/15 (Buchanan, Patrick, [Former Assistant to the president for communications, Columnist for multiple sources, writer for “The Great Betrayal”, “Where the right went wrong”, and more], “Imperial Overstretch”, http://humanevents.com/2015/06/09/imperial-overstretch/)

Toward the end of the presidency of George H.W. Bush, America stood alone at the top of the world — the sole superpower. After five weeks of “shock and awe” and 100 hours of combat, Saddam’s army had fled Kuwait back up the road to Basra and Bagdad. Our Cold War adversary was breaking apart into 15 countries. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Germany was reunited. The captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe were breaking free. Bush I had mended fences with Beijing after the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square. Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin

were friends. The president declared the coming of a “new world order.” And neocons were chattering about a new “unipolar world” and the “benevolent global hegemony” of the United States. Consider now the world our next president will inherit. North Korea, now a nuclear power ruled by a 30-something

megalomaniac, is fitting ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. China has emerged as the great power in Asia, entered claims to all seas

around her, and is building naval and air forces to bring an end to a U.S. dominance of the western Pacific

dating to 1945. Vladimir Putin is modernizing Russian missiles, sending ships and planes into NATO waters and air space, and supporting secessionists in Eastern Ukraine. The great work of Nixon and Reagan — to split China from

Russia in the “Heartland” of Halford Mackinder’s “World Island,” then to make partners of both — has been undone. China and Russia are closer to each other and more antagonistic toward us than at any time since the Cold War. Terrorists from al-Qaida and its offspring and the Islamic Front run wild in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria and Somalia. Egypt is ruled by a dictatorship that came to power in a military coup. Japan is moving to rearm to meet the menace of North Korea and China, while NAT0 is but a shadow of its former self. Only four of 28 member nations now invest 2 percent of their GDP in defense. With the exception of the Soviet Union, some

geostrategists contend, no nation, not defeated in war, has ever suffered so rapid a decline in relative power as the United States. What are the causes of American decline? Hubris, ideology, bellicosity and stupidity all played parts. Toward Russia, which had lost an empire and seen its territory cut by a third and its population cut in half, we exhibited imperial contempt, shoving NATO right up into Moscow’s face and engineering “color-coded” revolutions in nations that had been part of the Soviet Union and its near-abroad. Blowback came in the form of an ex-KGB chief who rose to power promising to restore the national greatness of Mother Russia, protect Russians wherever they were, and stand up to the arrogant Americans. Our folly with China was in deluding ourselves into believing

that by throwing open U.S. markets to goods made in China, we would create a partner in prosperity. What we got, after $4 billion in trade deficits with Beijing, was a gutted U.S. manufacturing base and a nationalistic rival eager to pay back the West for past humiliations. China wants this to be the Chinese Century, not the Second American Century. Is that too difficult to understand?

But it was in the Middle East that the most costly blunders were committed. Believing liberal democracy to be the wave of the future, that all peoples, given the chance, would embrace it, we invaded Iraq, occupied Afghanistan and overthrew the dictator of Libya. So doing, we unleashed the demons of Islamic fanaticism, tribalism, and a Sunni-Shiite sectarian war now raging from North Africa to the Near

East. Yet though America’s relative economic and military power today is not what it was in 1992, our commitments are greater. We are now obligated to defend Eastern Europe and the Baltic republics against a resurgent Russia, South Korea against the North, Japan and the Philippines against a surging China. We bomb jihadists daily in Iraq and Syria, support a Saudi air war in Yemen, and sustain Kabul with 10,000 U.S. troops in its war with the Taliban. Our special forces are all over the Middle East and Africa. And if the neocons get back into power in 2017, U.S. arms will start flowing to Kiev, that war will explode, and the Tomahawks and B-2s will be on the way to Iran. Since 1992, the U.S. has been swamped with Third World immigrants, here legally and illegally, many of whom have moved onto welfare rolls. Our national debt has grown larger than our GDP. And we have run $11 trillion in trade deficits since Bush I went home to Kennebunkport. Thousands of U.S. soldiers have died, tens of thousands have been wounded, trillions of dollars have been expended

in these interventions and wars. Our present commitments are unsustainable. Retrenchment is an imperative.

Link Turn – Surveillance k2 HegSurveillance Uniquely key to US Heg - Allows for strategic decision making - that maintains power and securityGosztola 6/29/15 (Gosztola, Kevin, [Journalist for FDL], “WikiLeaks Publishes NSA Documents Detailing Economic Espionage by ‘Five Eyes’ Alliance Against France”, http://firedoglake.com/author/kgosztola/)//HRC

As The Washington Post’s David Ignatius declared on CNN, “Everybody does do this kind of thing. The US, through the NSA, does it more aggressively because it’s just better at it. It’s got more capabilities.” The above has been the typical reaction in the US. It aims to suppress

debate or conversation about the operations, which US intelligence is engaged in around the world. It seeks to paint outraged officials as simply jealous. If they could spy on all the world’s people at all levels of society, wouldn’t they be doing it, too? The nature of this response from officials and commentators, from within a country that has built a massive surveillance state for spying on the entire world of which no other country has matched, is truly imperial. Marc Ambinder, co-author of Deep State: Inside the Government Secrecy Industry and TheWeek.com’s editor-at-large, wrote what has been considered one of the more cogent defenses of the eavesdropping Snowden exposed. Citing former NSA chief Michael Hayden, he suggested NSA’s job, “to collect foreign intelligence,” included the objective “to steal stuff, or purloin letters, real and digital, in order to provide policymakers with a decision advantage.” They are to provide “accurate information about what people” who interact with the United States say “in private about their intentions; that gap between saying and doing.” He added

that “ability to predict action from it allows the president of the United States to stay a step ahead.”

Ambinder acknowledged “legit targets,” which he listed as “global terrorist networks, criminal conspiracies, nations like China that are strategic competitors,” and “nations like Iran and North Korea that actively seek to damage U.S. interests and threaten the body of its people, spies, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.” And noted there is another target—sources of “strategic intelligence,” which comes from America’s friends or allies. “It must” collect this “strategic intelligence” because the “United States does not have the freedom to act without

consequences, and without, in many cases, the aid and acquiescence of allies.” He continued, “In order to map out out the geopolitical space within which the president will act, he needs to have solid intelligence, a good guesstimate, on what other countries are going to do and how they will respond to whatever he decides to do. The president wages war, conducts diplomacy negotiates economic treaties, imposes sanctions, and works to promote US interests abroad. Strategic intelligence should inform all of these decisions, not simply those that involve the military.” To preserve American hegemony over the world, the US must collect all the data or “strategic intelligence ,” from world leaders, foreign governments and the United Nations and its associated foreign missions (which is a violation of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).

Heg Bad – WarHegemony empirically increases conflictMontiero 12--Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University

Nuno, Unrest Assured, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Unrest_Assured.pdf

How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990,

unipolarity. 46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In

multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher. 47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful.48

Hegemony causes WarMuzaffar ’07 [Malaysian intellectual and human rights activist. Founder of Malaysian human rights NGO Aliran and president 1977 – 91 ; president of International Movement for a Just World beginning in 1991 ; deputy president of the National Justice Party (KeADILan) beginning in 1999 . Author of Universalism of Islam ( 1979 ),Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia ( 1987 ), Human Rights and the New World Order ( 1993 ), andAlternative Politics for Asia: A Buddhist-Muslim Dialogue ( 1999 ). Awarded the Rockefeller Social Science Fellowship in Development Studies for Southeast Asia ( 1984 – 85 ) and the Harry J. Benda Prize for distinguished scholarship on Southeast Asia ( 1989 ).]

There is no doubt at all that hegemony uses war to extend and expand its power . Recent examples provide the evidence. The U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 enabled the superpower to plant its flag in that country, and, at the same time, to extend its influence over Central Asia—a region of the world where Russia still carries some weight and which China eyes with some interest. Apart from American bases in a couple of Central Asian republics, its geopolitical presence in the oil rich region also means that it is capable of exercising some control over the export of that commodity. This has enhanced its hegemonic power both regionally and globally. Similarly, the U.S.’s conquest of Iraq in 2003 was designed to strengthen its dominant position in the world’s largest oil exporting region. Iraq itself has the second largest oil reserves in the Middle East. It is also blessed with an abundance of water—a fact of some significance since the Middle East, according to some analysts, may be one of those areas that could well witness conflicts over water in the future. Besides, Iraq is strategically located, with Syria, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia as its immediate neighbors. Going to war in Iraq had another motive. It was to oust President Saddam Hussein and to destroy the Baathist government because Saddam was a staunch opponent of Israel. Weakening and eliminating governments and people’s movements in the Middle East that regard Israel as a morally and politically illegitimate entity has been central to U.S. foreign policy for almost four decades now. Given Iraq’s oil wealth and its scientific military

infrastructure, it was potentially a formidable foe of the U.S.’s closest ally and partner in the Middle East. This is why Saddam had to be crushed—for Israel’s sake Deploying the U.S.’s massive military might serve to secure its hegemonic power and to assist its allies to enhance their strength which is at the core of the agenda of the Bush Administration as defined by the “neo-cons.” Even before George W. Bush assumed the presidency in early 2001, the neo-cons like Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, John Bolton, and Lewis “Scooter” Libby among others, in association with Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, were already planning and plotting to use U.S. fire power to re-shape the politics of the Middle East in order to reinforce its grip over the region’s oil and to fortify Israel’s position. Crippling the democratically elected Hamas in Palestine and trying to replace it with a leadership that is subservient to Israel’s interest, attempting to eliminate an autonomous movement like Hizbullah in Lebanon with the aim of bolstering a weak pro-U.S. regime in Beirut, targeting the independent-minded government in Damascus, and most of all, manipulating the nuclear issue to prepare the ground for some sort of military action against an Iran that refuses to bow to the U.S. and Israel—apart from the Iraq war— are all part-and-parcel of the neo-cons’ elaborate agenda for establishing total hegemony over the Middle East as a prerequisite for global hegemony. After five years, some commentators are convinced that the agenda is in tatters. The people’s resistance to the U.S. led occupation of Iraq compounded by the unrelenting Sunni Shiite violence, the continuing popularity of Hamas in spite of the immense suffering that the masses have had to endure, Israel’s failure to defeat Hizbullah in the thirty-four day Lebanon war and the latter’s success in forging a multi-confessional coalition against the Beirut government,8 and Iran’s expanding geopolitical significance in the region due to an extent to the emergence of a Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad brought about ironically by the U.S. occupation, have separately and collectively helped to thwart the neo-cons’ grand design. The neo-cons have also been checkmated by the situation in the U.S. itself. A majority of Americans are now opposed to their country’s involvement in Iraq and want their soldiers to come home quickly. The failure of the neo-con agenda in the Middle East shows that war and violence are not necessarily the most effective instruments for establishing hegemony. Indeed, their defeat testifies to the limits of hard power in reshaping political realities. The American leadership has forgotten that war, as the ultimate expression of hard power, has not helped the U.S. to acquire hegemony in the post-second world war decades. The U.S. debacle in Vietnam in the late sixties and early seventies offers irrefutable proof of the folly of the hard power approach. This brings us to the question that we posed at the end of our discussion on hegemony and terrorism . If the U.S. government realizes that seeking and perpetuating hegemony does not serve the nation’s interests or if the U.S. ceases to be a hegemonic power, will wars also come to an end? Since the end of the Cold War, there have been three major wars led by the U.S.—the Kuwait war in 1991, the Afghan war in 2001, and the Iraq war in 2003—which were all in pursuit of its drive for global hegemony. To this list, one should add the July-August 2006 Lebanon war and Israel’s long drawn war against the Palestinians and other Arabs. It is indisputably true that the quest for hegemony is a cause of much of the violence and war we are witnessing today. There are other causes of war however, which have very little to do with global hegemony. Scores of

wars rooted in economic or political conditions sometimes with cultural, religious, or even tribal overtones have occurred in the last two or three decades. The wars in the now-demised Yugoslavia in the early nineties and the war in Rwanda in the mid-nineties would be among the outstanding examples. This is why even without the drive for global hegemony, there are bound to be wars, big and small. Nonetheless, hegemony should be acknowledged as a significant contributor.

Heg Bad – TerrorismHeg incites blowback terrorismIvan Eland 08 (May 5, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, "Reverand Wright Is Not Totally Wrong", http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2182)

But what about Wright’s implication that U.S. foreign policy causes blowback terrorism against the United States? Again, the facts are on his side. Poll after poll in the Arab/Islamic world indicates that U.S. political and economic freedoms,

technology, and even culture are popular in these countries, but U.S. interventionist foreign policy toward the Middle East is not. Bin Laden has repeatedly said that he attacks the United States because of its occupation of Muslim lands and its support for corrupt Middle Eastern governments. Finally, empirical studies have linked U.S. foreign occupation and military interventions with blowback terrorism against the U.S. targets. The upshot of Rev. Wright’s remarks is that if the United States militarily intervened less overseas, the chickens would not be roosting as much in the U.S. henhouse. It is too bad that Rev. Wright’s largely correct analysis of U.S. foreign policy is being thrown out with his other wacky and bigoted ravings.

Hegemonic policies empirically bolster terrorist recruitmentSmith 10

[Jack A. Smith was editor of the Guardian. Smith now edits the Hudson Valley Activist Newsletter.]

Washington implemented five major decisions during the last 65 years that turned public opinion in the Middle East against the United States and largely generated the conditions that led to the creation of al-Qaeda, jihadist warriors, and suicide bombers. We will describe these

causes which ultimately led to the effects called terrorism, then, in part 3, conclude with brief “modest” proposals to rectify the situation. (1) The first of these decisions took place immediately following the end of World War II in 1945, when the U.S. chose to extend its hegemony throughout the Middle East, and thus prevent its essential wartime ally, the Soviet Union, from gaining a foothold. Washington’s goal ever since that time — including the last two decades after the implosion of the socialist camp and the 16 months since Obama took office — has been directed toward establishing dominion over this petroleum-rich region to insure America’s global preeminence. In the process of gaining dominance over most Mideast regimes — the majority of which have remained undemocratic as a consequence — the United States has alienated the masses of people throughout the region.

Heg Bad – First StrikesHegemony leads to pre-emptive strikes – causes extinctionBBC 06

(“North Korean paper decries US pursuit of ‘preemptive nuclear strike” ;Minju Choson; February 15, 2006; Lexis Nexus)

In the "Review Report," the US Department of Defence decided to target "terrorist groups and rouge countries" as its basic goal of defence

strategies and military operations. It is a well-known fact to the world that those called "rogue countries" by the United States is actually the anti-imperialist independent countries, which stand in the way of the US realization of world domination. The United States has unreasonably stigmatized the anti-imperialist independent countries as "rogue countries" and manifested its attempt for preemptive strike. From this perspective, it is very clear what the

purposes of the military operation against "rouge countries" are, which have been raved by the United States. In one word, the cunning purpose is that the United States desires to achieve international hegemony by putting in place its attempt for preemptive strike against the anti-imperialist independent countries. Without minding global peace and stability at all, the United States is crazy about a nuclear war with blood-shot eyes, and this is bringing a new nuclear threat to the earth minute by minute. If this is left untreated, the peace and stability of the world as well as the existence of humanity itself will be put at risk.

Hegemons use pre-emptive strikes to sustain their dominanceRobinson 13 [7/10/13, Dr. Paul Robinson is Acting Director for the Institute of Applied Ethics at University of Hull, England “Pre-emptive War as a Manifestation of Hegemonic Power: Rome, Britain, and the United States” http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE05/Robinson05.html ]

Just as the United States of America dominates the world today as a ‘hegemonic power’, so once did Britain and Rome. It is the purpose of this paper to compare the use by contemporary America, nineteenth century Britain and Ancient Rome of the strategy of pre-emptive war. In so

doing it will suggest that the doctrine of pre-emptive war is one promoted by those with great power to justify the aggressive use of force in pursuit of their own hegemonic interests. I will

show that both Rome and Britain regularly fought what they claimed were ‘pre-emptive wars of self-defence’, justified by exaggerated fear of largely non-existent threats. Romans and Britons were willing to fight over these flimsy pretexts

because their power was sufficiently strong to enable them to do so at relatively little cost to themselves. In short, they made war because they could. Other weaker powers did not have the luxury of engaging in ‘pre-emption’ in the same way, and from the perspective of those attacked in these wars they could not be described as anything other than ‘aggression’. One can now observe a similar pattern in the wars of the United States of America, most especially the 2003 invasion of Iraq. I will conclude that the

purpose of the doctrine of pre-emption, today as in the past, appears to be to provide a means by which hegemonic powers can re-define aggression as self-defence. As such it is not a doctrine which one can expect anybody other than those with hegemonic power to accept. It should be stressed that the form of ‘pre-emptive war’ in question does not refer to military action taken against actually existing threats which pose an imminent danger to national security. Rather, the subject of the paper is military action undertaken against threats which are more remote, and may not even have yet manifested themselves. As we shall see,

Romans, Britons and Americans have all fought wars of this second kind. Ancient Rome Hegemonic powers do not feel secure in their hegemony. According to one recent history: The Romans seem to have perceived foreign relations as a

competition for honor and status between Rome and barbarian peoples; by proving its superior force through war and conquest, Rome extracts deference and reverence from other nations, who then remain submissive, refraining from revolt or attack. It is in this way that the empire is supposed to

maintain security. Conversely, signs of weakness on Rome’s part, such as a show of deference to a foreign people, or failure to avenge a defeat in war or to punish a revolt with sufficient ferocity, are considered invitations to disasters. For these reasons the Romans sometimes seem to react very aggressively to apparently minor breaches of treaty, to exaggerate the threat posed by rivals, and to respond to crises with conquest or even attempted genocide while insisting that their concerns are for their own security.[1] We observe in this quotation a pattern

which will reappear in both the British Empire and twenty-first century America. Great powers often have to secure vast areas with very small military forces (a mere 300,000 at the peak of the Roman Empire, even fewer at the peak of the British

Empire). Security comes to depend on portraying an impression of strength. This entails forceful responses to any perceived defiance. The watchful hegemons soon display a tendency to see threats and insults where

none exist, and then to lash out at those who are perceived as challengers. In short, they manifest a form of defensive aggressiveness. It is noticeable that histories of the expansion of both the Roman and British empires often promote the theory that these empires were built for purely defensive purposes. In the case of Rome, this theory claims that ‘Roman conquest did not flow from a master plan of world domination. It was foisted upon Rome by circumstances’.[2] There was, says E. Badian, a ‘traditional policy of avoiding major aggressive wars and administrative commitments’.[3] When Rome did annex land, it did so solely because the persistently aggressive

behaviour of the owners had left Rome with little choice for its own safety. The problem with this theory is that there are too many examples of outright aggression to make it plausible. One such was Julius Caesar’s attack on the German tribes led by the chieftain Ariovistus. These had settled in Gaul, and Caesar justified his attack on them by claiming that: If the Germans formed a habit of crossing the Rhine and entering Gaul in large numbers, he saw how dangerous it would be for the Romans. If those fierce barbarians occupied the whole of Gaul, the temptation would be too strong: they would cross the frontier into the Province ... and march on Italy ... This danger, he considered, must be provided against immediately. Moreover, Ariovistus personally had behaved with quite intolerable arrogance and pride’.

[4] We see in Caesar’s quote a clear exposition of the theory of pre-emptive war. An act of unprovoked aggression (for such it was) was justified by a succession of ‘ifs’, designed to conjure up a terrible threat which had to be dealt with ‘immediately’, but which never in fact existed. Similar pre-emptive logic was used by Cato the Elder to justify the Third Punic War, which destroyed Carthage, by then a shadow of its former might (Cato said that the war was necessary to forestall growing Carthaginian power – some other Romans, though, felt that Rome’s actions were unjust, as Carthage no longer posed any threat). What is interesting in these cases is that Caesar and Cato felt it necessary to produce a pretext for aggression. It was not acceptable to wage war for any reason. Under the Republic at least, it was necessary to persuade Senate and people to agree to war. If the people felt that there was not a just cause, and that the war was not compatible with the honour of Rome, then war would not happen. The only just causes in Roman eyes were defence of oneself or one’s allies, and response to provocation. The emphasis on self-defence was especially strong in the late Republic, when ‘at least a handful of senators probably felt a serious philosophical aversion to wars that were not genuinely defensive’,[5] Cato the Younger being the most notable example. As Susan Mattern says, the idea was ‘well atttested’ that ‘wars of conquest ought not to be simply plundering missions, or occasions for self-aggrandizement’, though plunder and self-aggrandizement were permitted as an incidental by-product of ‘just’ wars.[6] The origins of this attitude lie in what was known as the ‘fetial law’, which laid down certain criteria for a just war.[7] By the late Republic the fetial law had fallen into disuse. Nonetheless, despite some argument to the contrary,[8] it was not irrelevant. For even if it did not act to stop Rome fighting ‘unjust’ wars, it did influence the way they framed the justice of their actions. ‘Its effect was that Roman senators were conditioned from their earliest history to the notion of justifying a war in terms of the other

party’s wrong-doing’.[9] This had important practical consequences. An unjust war brought dishonour upon Rome, and so senators felt justified in punishing those who waged one. For instance, when Lucius Hortensius stormed and sacked the Greek city of Abdera, the Senate determined that Hortensius had waged an unjust war. It then freed all those whom he had enslaved, and restored to Abdera its freedom and independence.[10] It is true that in this and other cases, factors other than justice also motivated the Senate. Romans were extremely envious of successful colleagues.[11] The restoration of freedom to the people of Abdera may have been done from a desire to humiliate Lucius more than from a sense of justice. These facts created an interesting dynamic. Roman generals sought glory by fighting wars. But they had to find a way to make their aggression appear just, in other words defensive, in order to avoid giving their domestic political enemies an opportunity to attack them. To do so, they played on Romans’ paranoia about external threats. Rome had at one time been occupied by the Gauls, and the army of Hannibal had appeared before its walls. Romans were in consequence susceptible to scaremongering. By conjuring up images of Ariovistus’s Germans marching on Rome, Caesar could easily persuade most that his ‘pre-emptive war’ was in truth an act of self-defence. From the point of view of the Germans, though, as of every target of Roman aggression, there was nothing defensive about Caesar’s actions. Caesar used the overwhelming power of his state to assault a much weaker opponent on the pretext that the latter posed a potential future threat. In truth, it was precisely the Germans’ weakness that made them such an attractive target. Caesar attacked them not because they were dangerous, but because he knew he could defeat them and he wanted the glory which victory would bring. This fits in with a general pattern. As one commentator says, the Romans attacked numerous enemies, not because they feared them, but ‘because they had nothing to fear. ... Most Roman wars, if not all, were undertaken from a position of strength when Rome was secure in its military superiority’.[12] Roman behaviour, writes William Harris, ‘can be explained convincingly without much recourse to defensive thinking. Often the hostile or disobedient actions of other states seem to have had the effect of attracting Roman attention. The Romans, for their part, would have found someone to march against in any case’.[13] Imperial Britain One can observe a similar pattern in the expansion of the British Empire almost two thousand years later – a paranoid view of potential threats, a sensitivity to insults to national honour, and a corresponding tendency to engage in ‘pre-emptive’ wars of aggression against much weaker opponents, defeat of whom brought glory to the Empire. One of the oddities of the phenomenon was that the leaders of British governments in the late nineteenth century, most notably William Gladstone and Lord Salisbury, were men who had no desire to add territory to the empire. Historians of British imperialism therefore tend to explain the great expansion of the Empire in that era in terms of pre-emptive defence. Britain conquered much of the world in order to prevent others conquering it or to prevent others becoming so strong that one day they might be in a position to threaten British hegemony. From the subjective position of the British, one could possibly describe this logic as ‘defensive’. From the point of view of the natives of the conquered lands, it is hard to see how such a label applies. Furthermore, the defensive logic also happened to play very usefully into the hands of more aggressively inclined Empire builders, who wished to expand commerce and conquer land, or of ideologically-inclined dreamers who wished to spread Christianity and the benefits of Western civilization. Two examples

illustrate the British use of the doctrine of pre-emptive war – the South African War (Boer War), 1899-1902, and the 1903 invasion of Tibet. At the time of these wars, Britain was at the peak of its power, but countries such as Germany, France and the United States were developing advanced industrial economies and Britain’s status as number one nation was increasingly insecure. It became ever more important, therefore, to maintain an image of power, and not to lose face in any circumstances.[14] Sensitivity to insults to national honour increased as a result. Where one is afraid of not appearing strong in the face of threats, one tends to assume the worst. If one does not know whether a threat exists or one has been insulted, one must assume that it does or one has and respond accordingly. As a result, the British, like the Romans, developed paranoid views about the nature of the threat to their Empire. To counter the threat, some then demanded pre-emptive action. One such ‘threat’ was to British possessions in South Africa from the Boer republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State, which in the last two decades of the nineteenth century became extremely rich due to discoveries of gold and diamonds. Fearing that if the Boers were left unchecked they would eventually gain sufficient power to dominate South Africa at the expense of the British, the British High Commissioner in Cape Town, Sir Alfred Milner, demanded a pre-emptive war against them. This he achieved by deliberately provoking a dispute with the Boers concerning the status of British residents of the Boer Republics. Eventually, the Boers, aware that the British intended to attack them, pre-empted their pre-emption by attacking first. The Boer pre-emption, though, was of the sort that is generally recognised as legal – a strike to defend oneself against imminent attack. The British pre-emption, though, was more distant. There was no evidence that the Boers would have attacked the British if left to themselves. As Prime Minister Lord Salisbury said, ‘the real point to be made good to South Africa is that we not the Dutch are Boss’.[15] The misfortune of the Dutch (ie the Boers) was to be weak enough to be considered beatable by the British. Major powers such as Germany and Russia could not be pre-empted in this way, although the British did pre-empt them indirectly by occupying large parts of the world which they feared these other powers might occupy if they did not do so first. The British were particularly concerned about the Russian threat to the prize possession of the Empire - India. As Russia expanded through Central Asia, the British began to worry that the Russians would move through Afghanistan and Tibet and into India. This was a bizarre fear given the logistical impossibilities of supporting a Russian army through such terrain so far from home, but many nevertheless believed that the threat was real. British officials in India persuaded themselves that the Russians were planning to seize control of Tibet, from where they could directly threaten India. In a parallel with the American experience of Iraqi exiles providing false intelligence about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, a Chinese political exile named Kang-yu Wai gave the British a copy of a supposed secret treaty between China and Russia in which the Chinese government gave the Russians exclusive rights to the economic development of Tibet.[16] Shortly afterwards, the British invaded Tibet. Although the British viewed themselves as acting defensively, it is very hard for an outside observer to support this opinion. The Tibetans had not attacked, nor did they intend to attack, nor did they even have the means to attack, the British. They had, though, refused to permit the British to trade freely in their country and had refused to accept a British envoy. This was their real sin, and the British wished to teach them a lesson. As Major General George Younghusband said: ‘It is never wise to stand studied impertinence, or even the semblance of it, from any Oriental. … the moment there is a sign of revolt, mutiny or treachery, of which the symptoms are a swollen head and a tendency to incivility, it is wise to hit the Oriental straight between the eyes, and to keep on hitting him thus, till he appreciate exactly what he is, and who he is’.[17] The British, like the

Romans, were at the same time both militaristic and moralistic. Proponents of philosophies such as Muscular Christianity[18] believed in the aggressive use of force, while at the same time Britons viewed themselves as proponents of fair play who denounced the ‘bully’.[19] It is quite obvious that the British bullied both the Boers and the Tibetans, but they did not wish to think of themselves in that way. They therefore convinced themselves that they were acting in self-defence. Since there was no obvious threat in the immediate future, they had to invent more distant ones. One sees here that the role of the doctrine of pre-emption is not simply, or even primarily, to provide external justification for aggression. Rather it is part of a process of self-deception, convincing the aggressors themselves that they are in reality acting justly. The United States of America

The 2003 invasion of Iraq falls into the same pattern we have observed in Rome and Britain above. In the first place, a hegemonic power attacked a much weaker state. In the second place, it did so on the basis of exaggerated tales of future threats. Just as Caesar justified the attack on the Germans by a series of extremely improbable ‘ifs’ (‘If the Germans formed a habit of crossing the Rhine … If those fierce barbarians occupied the whole of Gaul’), in 2003 the

United States justified its attack on Iraq by a series of equally unjustified and improbable conditionals: if the Iraqis have weapons of mass destruction, and if they have the means to deliver them, and if they have links with terrorists, and if their leaders are irrational, and if they decide to give the weapons to the terrorists, and if they decide to use them – then they will be a terrible threat, and that is a risk we cannot take. We can now say with certainty that what flimsy evidence was provided to justify this logic was false. But the idea that Iraq posed a serious threat to the United States of America was always difficult to justify.[20] Given this, it is hard to see perceptions of future threat as being the real cause of the decision to wage war. This does not mean that decision makers did not believe in the threat – many clearly did, just some British leaders really believed

that a Russian army might come marching through Tibet – but it seems likely that they were only able to hold this belief because they were pre-conditioned to do so by other considerations. In other words, they believed in the threat because it provided an emotional crutch which would support the decision they had already made to start the war. Modern leaders need such a crutch as much as the Romans and British did, for the contemporary world still considers wars of aggression to be unjust. The general perception, as in Rome and Britain, is that war must be fought in self-defence. The doctrine of pre-emption appeals because it can provide the necessary justification where it would

otherwise not exist. In 2003, just as the Romans and British felt insecure in their hegemony, Americans felt insecure after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. And just as the Romans and British decided that the route to security was hypersensitivity to real and imagined insults and threats, so too do some American decision-makers in the present era. America, according to their logic, was attacked because it appeared weak and decadent, after it fled from Somalia and failed to deal with Saddam Hussein’s defiance

over a ten-year period. The purpose of attacking Iraq was to demonstrate strength and resolve . As the belligerent journalist Mark Steyn wrote: ‘that’s the real reason Saddam had to go: Having cocked a snook at Washington for over a decade, he

symbolised the limits of American power. And it was necessary … to make those limits look a lot less limited’.[21] Iraq was also chosen because it was weak. The Romans and British knew that their power

would enable them to prevail over their opponents. So too, the Americans in 2003 knew that they could conquer

Iraq quickly and at relatively little cost. Such a cost-free outcome was not assured with other potential opponents, such as North Korea or Iran. In the circumstances, it is very hard to view the invasion of Iraq as in any way ‘defensive’, and from the perspective of Iraqis, who know they posed no threat to the United States, it must be impossible. Conclusion

Comparing the three case studies, one can see a recurring pattern. Hegemonic states commit acts of aggression in order to display their power, prove their strength, and win honour for themselves. They justify this aggression by reference to imaginary future threats, based on intelligence which is faulty at best or entirely fabricated at worst. The targets of the aggression are invariably considerably weaker than the aggressors; the ease with which they can be beaten is one of their attractions as targets. This in turn reveals one of the characteristics of pre-emptive war. It is a form of war fought by the strong against the weak. This is necessarily

so. If the weak attempted to pre-empt those stronger than themselves, they would invite their own destruction (as the Boers found out). Because of this, one can conclude that the doctrine of pre-emption lacks universality. It is not a rule for behaviour which can apply to all. It is a manifestation of power, designed to support the power of those who already have the most, giving the powerful additional rights while depriving the weak of theirs. It masks aggression, and provides a justification for it. If you are the powerful, and consider your own interests paramount, then perhaps this doctrine may satisfy you. If you are not, it is one which must surely disturb you greatly.

***AT: Econ Advantage***

Econ High U.S. econ better than ever Michael Ivanovitch 14, 2-16-2014, "Stop whining! The US economy is in good shape ," CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/id/101420721

While operating more than an entire percentage point below its potential growth rate, the U.S. economy still raised its business sector employment by nearly 2 million people over the last twelve months. That is a remarkable achievement because companies usually don't step up hiring until a sustained increase in capacity pressures them to start adding to their labor force. (Read more: Wicked winter puts big chill on job creation) And no other economy contributed last year 4.1 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to the rest of the world. Those in the emerging markets, who are now complaining about declining dollar liquidity, may also wish to note that the U.S. last year bought from them $515 billion more than it sold to them. Based on current growth dynamics, this year promises an even better outlook for employment creation and America's contribution to the world economy.

Tech Sector HighTech sector is boomingDominic Rushe 12, 12-6-2012, "Technology sector found to be growing faster than rest of US economy," Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/dec/06/technology-sector-growing-faster-economy

Jobs growth in the technology sector is beating the rest of the economy by three to one,

according to a study of the industry released on Thursday. Since 2004, the bottom of the dot-com bust, employment growth in the hi-tech sector had grown at a pace three times faster than the private sector as a whole and has proved more resilient through the recession-and-recovery period, according to the report commissioned by Engine Advocacy, a tech start-up lobbyist and conducted by the Bay Area Council Economic

Institute. The report found growth not just in the more famous hi-tech hubs like Silicon Valley and Seattle but in nearly all communities across the US. It found 98% of US counties had at least one hi-tech business establishment in 2011. Delaware topped the list of states for growth in hi-tech employment in 2011 at 12.8%. Greensboro-High Point in North Carolina was the county with the fastest growth, a startling 36.3%.The report calculates that each hi-tech job creates 4.3 jobs in the wider community, thanks in part to wages that are 17%-27% higher than peers in other fields. By comparison, the average manufacturing job creates 1.4 jobs in the wider community.

No Internal LinkUS not key to the global economyGiles 10/5/14 – Financial Times, citing Eswar Prasad, an economist and senior fellow @ Brookings

Chris, Global recovery is stalling, index signals, 10/5/14, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6792cc34-4b10-11e4-b1be-00144feab7de.html#axzz3H1BVXEOE

Eswar Prasad, an economist and senior fellow at Brookings, said: “The world economy is now being powered mostly by the US growth engine, a situation that is untenable for a sustained and durable global economic recovery”. “To support more balanced growth, other economies will have to start pulling their weight, ideally by generating more domestic demand rather than replying on exports.” The Tiger index – Tracking Indices for the Global Economic Recovery – shows how measures of real

activity, financial markets and confidence compare with their historical averages. Annual growth in real activity in emerging markets has shown particular weakness. Growth in China appears to be losing momentum, Brazil and Russia remain “in a torpor”, according to Mr Prasad, and the only bright spot in large emerging economies is India, which is recovering “after a rough period of declining growth”. The findings chime with the downbeat mood of delegates who will gather in Washington for the World Bank and IMF annual meetings. Christine Lagarde, IMF managing director, has called for global action to improve the outlook. Last week she urged “bolder policies to inject a ‘new momentum’ that can overcome this ‘new mediocre’ that clouds the future”. Some other indicators of economic activity are more upbeat. A composite measure of the purchasing managers’ indices for the global economy, compiled by JPMorgan, showed a reasonably high level of growth momentum in September. Rob Dobson, of JPMorgan said if the figures translated into real output, the implied third quarter rise in global gross domestic product was “the best growth outcome since the second

quarter of 2010”. Expert and financial market sentiment, however, is much weaker as it has been depressed by rising geopolitical tensions, difficulties in securing economic reforms and the eurozone’s slow slide towards deflation. The most worrying aspect of the global economy, according to Mr Prasad, is that while low interest rates have bought time for reform, those months have been used badly. “The temporary policy space provided by aggressive monetary policy actions has not been used well by most major economies, which have squandered the opportunity to push

forward with reforms,” he said. With the dollar rising rapidly, the world cannot rely on the US as the global engine of growth, he added, and the current situation was likely to result in renewed global tensions over currency valuations.

No ImpactInterdependence prevents their war scenariosJohn Aziz 14, 3-6-2014, "Don't worry: World War III will almost certainly never happen," No Publication, http://theweek.com/articles/449783/dont-worry-world-war-iii-almost-certainly-never-happen

I believe the threat of World War III has almost faded into nothingness. That is, the probability of a world war is the lowest it has been in decades, and perhaps the lowest it has ever been since the dawn of modernity. This is certainly a view that current data supports. Steven Pinker's studies into the decline of violence revealthat deaths from war have fallen and fallen since World War II. But we should not just assume that the past is an accurate guide to the future. Instead, we must look at the factors which have led to the reduction in war and try to conclude whether the

decrease in war is sustainable. So what's changed? Well, the first big change after the last world war was the arrival of mutually assured destruction. It's no coincidence that the end of the last global war coincided with the invention of atomic weapons. The possibility of complete annihilation provided a huge disincentive to launching and expanding total wars. Instead, the great powers now fight proxy wars like Vietnam and Afghanistan (the 1980 version, that is), rather than letting their rivalries expand into full-on, globe-spanning struggles against each other. Sure, accidents could happen, but the possibility is incredibly remote. More importantly, nobody in power wants to be the cause of Armageddon. But what about a non-nuclear global war? Other changes — economic and social in nature — have made that highly unlikely too The world has become much more economically interconnected since the last global war. Economic cooperation treaties and free trade agreements have intertwined the economies of countries around the world. This has meant there has been a huge rise in the volume of global trade since World War II, and especially since the 1980s. America has totally fallen for the Afghan army's long con. The moral divide at the heart of the Greek debt crisis Today consumer goods like smartphones, laptops, cars, jewelery, food, cosmetics, and medicine are produced on a global level, with supply-chains criss-crossing the planet

No collapse – the economy is resilientMichael Snyder, 12, June 11 2012, "The Economic Collapse Is Not A Single Event," Economic Collapse, http://theeconomiccollapseblog.com/archives/the-economic-collapse-is-not-a-single-even

Many people hype “the coming economic collapse” as if it is some kind of big summer Hollywood blockbuster. Many people out there write about it as if it is something that will happen in a single day or over a few weeks and that it will suddenly change how the entire world functions. But that is not how the financial world works. The financial world is like a game of chess – very slow and methodical. Yes, there are times when things happen very quickly (like back in 2008), but even that crisis played out over a number of months. Sadly, most Americans are not used to thinking in terms of months or years. These days, most Americans have the attention span of a goldfish and most Americans have been trained to expect instant gratification. They are simply not accustomed to being

patient and to wait for things. Well, despite what you may have read, the economic collapse is not going to be a single event. It is going to play out over quite a few years. In some ways we are experiencing an economic collapse right now. When the next major financial crisis occurs, many will be calling that “an economic collapse”. But if you really want to grasp what is happening to us, you need to think long-term. We are heading for a complete and total nightmare, but it is going to take some time to get to the end of the story. Yes, there will certainly be times of great chaos. The

financial crisis of 2008 was one of those moments. But the financial crisis of 2008 did not completely destroy us. Neither will the next crisis.

Even massive economic decline has zero chance of war Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status

would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally

interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how

without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that

problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

***AT: Investment Advantage***

Foreign Investment HighThe US is the world’s largest recipient of FDI – manufacturing outweighs their internal linksDOC 15US Department of Commerce, “U.S. Manufacturing Attracts Foreign Investment,” 1/29/15, http://2010-2014.commerce.gov/blog/2015/01/29/us-manufacturing-attracts-foreign-investment SJE

The United States is an attractive destination for foreign investment dollars for a variety of reasons, including a large economy with diverse consumer markets, a skilled labor force (thanks

to community colleges with skill-development missions as well as research universities) and a predictable and stable regulatory system. These reasons and more explain why the U.S. has been the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) since 2006 according to an October 2013 White House report, Foreign Direct Investment in the

U.S. Working for NIST’s Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP), I wasn’t surprised to learn that the manufacturing industry is the largest beneficiary of FDI in the United States, accounting for more than one-third of that investment, according to data from the Commerce Department’s

Bureau of Economic Analysis. “Made in America” is, after all, a de facto stamp of approval the world over. We are a manufacturer’s dream! And investments in manufacturing have powerful multiplier effects on the U.S. economy. Every $1 spent in manufacturing generates $1.35 in additional economic activity. Since 1988, MEP has been committed to strengthening U.S. manufacturing and individual manufacturers, contributing to the growth of well-paying jobs, the development of dynamic manufacturing communities, and the enhancement of American innovation and global competitiveness. MEP delivers its own high return on investment to taxpayers. For every dollar of federal investment, MEP clients generate nearly $19 in new sales, which translates into $2.5 billion annually. Last year, MEP centers served more than 30,000 manufacturing clients—a subset of which are foreign-owned. For example, since 2012, MEP centers worked on 900 projects with 322 manufacturers in the U.S. that have ownership ties to other countries. These projects helped those companies create and retain more than $700 million dollars in sales, save about $77 million and create or retain more than 6,000 U.S. jobs. Looking beyond the statistics, we find many interesting success stories that illustrate how MEP centers across the country help make the most of foreign investment in U.S. manufacturing. Pasta Montana is a contract manufacturer that uses durum semolina to craft specialty pasta. About 40 percent of the 100-employee, 24-7 operation’s business goes to the Japanese market, and it sells to other countries as well. When a key customer asked the company to certify its products to the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), Pasta Montana called Montana MEP affiliate MMEC to help prepare for the GFSI audit—which they did in less than four months. The successful effort helped the company retain millions of dollars in sales (about 15 percent of its business), and achieve 3 to 5 percent growth through new business opportunities. Eagle Bend Manufacturing, Inc., manufactures automotive parts for cars and light weight trucks worldwide. A division of Magna International, Inc., of Canada, Eagle Bend has been in Clinton, Tenn., for more than 25 years and employs more than 450 workers. When the increasing number and volume of parts the company made started to create inefficiencies, Eagle Bend turned to Tennessee MEP for help optimizing both its product flow and use of space. This resulted in projected benefits that will top $2 million annually and a $64 million dollar facility expansion that will create 188 jobs over the next five years and add 100,000 square feet of floor space. With more than a century of design and manufacturing experience, RECARO Aircraft Seating Americas Inc. is a global supplier of premium aircraft seats for leading airlines around the world. Based in Schwäbisch Hall, Germany, the company employs more than 1,600 worldwide including 350 at its facility in Fort Worth, Tex. To meet growing demand, the company partnered with TMAC, the Texas MEP affiliate, on a series of operational excellence initiatives. As a result of that investment, RECARE has seen a 15 percent increase in production, 38 percent increase in on-time delivery, and an 86 percent improvement in the time needed to retrieve parts. Igus Bearings, Inc., is a global company with headquarters in Germany and a new, 162,000- square-foot factory and office facility in East Providence, R.I. Igus has served the North American market for almost 30 years, making polymer bearings and chains that are sold across many industries, including agriculture, construction and automotive. The economic downturn of 2008 changed business operations for Igus, as smaller orders replaced the large orders it was efficiently fulfilling. The ability to handle any order of any size was key to survival against larger (but slower) competitors. Providence-based Polaris MEP helped Igus implement lean practices, leading to 50 percent fewer customer complaints and faster shipping times—96 percent of

orders now ship within 24 hours. We should see even more of these success stories thanks to high investor confidence in the strength of the U.S. economic recovery. For the second year in a row, the U.S. topped A.T.

Kearney’s 2014 Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index, a survey of 300 companies worldwide. The U.S. is not only the most likely destination for FDI, but never in the 16-year history of this index has a country had such a positive net position. Foreign investment is clearly good for foreign investors, U.S. manufacturers and the communities they support.

Tech Investment HighForeign investment in tech is high – China outward investmentStratfor 15Stratfor Global Intelligence, geopolitical intelligence firm that provides strategic analysis and forecasting, “China's Outward Push in High-Tech Investment and Innovation,” 6/12/15, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chinas-outward-push-high-tech-investment-and-innovation SJE

A decade ago, Chinese electronics company Lenovo bought out IBM's personal computer arm for $1.75 billion in what was China's first major overseas acquisition in the technology sector. The deal cemented Lenovo's status as one of the world's biggest PC manufacturers (it now ranks as the largest), and it launched China's journey to becoming one of the world's largest foreign investors in the technology sector. That process

has accelerated exponentially; in 2014, for example, Chinese direct investment in the U.S. information and

communications technology industry accounted for about half of all Chinese investment into the United

States. In some areas, such as semiconductors, biotechnology and green energy, investment came almost entirely from private Chinese investors. This expansion abroad differs from traditional Chinese outward investment patterns. Chinese state-owned companies dominate overseas acquisitions in most sectors, but high-tech areas are the domain of companies with weak or no ties to the government. Despite the relative lack of Chinese state involvement, the growth of investment will still raise concerns among Western companies and governments, particularly in the United States, over Beijing's investment strategy and the impact Chinese companies could have on those markets. Meanwhile, China is becoming more innovative itself and evolving into a world

leader in some high-tech areas. China's aptitude in a number of tech-related sectors will only increase, and given

China's size, incremental changes in its capabilities can have a significant impact on world markets.

Alt Cause – Brain DrainSilicon Valley is weak in the squo – brain drainWadhwa 13Vivek, fellow at the Rock Center for Corporate Governance; President of Innovation and Research at Singularity University, “Silicon Valley Can’t Be Copied,” MIT Technology Review, 7/3/13, http://www.technologyreview.com/news/516506/silicon-valley-cant-be-copied/ SJE

The Valley is a meritocracy that’s far from perfect, however. And some of its flaws tear at the very fabric that makes it unique. Women and certain minorities like blacks and Hispanics are largely absent from the ranks of company founders and boards.

Venture capitalists have a herd mentality and largely fund startups that produce short-term results—leading to a preponderance of social-media and photo-sharing apps. Real-estate prices are so high that most Americans can’t afford to relocate there. All these things slow the Valley down, but they won’t stop it. The only serious

challenge I see to Silicon Valley is, ironically, from the same government that once catalyzed its development. Silicon Valley is starved for talent. Restrictions on work visas prevent foreigners from filling its openings. The

latest data indicate more than one million foreign workers on temporary work permits now waiting to become permanent residents. The visa shortage means some will have to leave, and others are getting frustrated and returning home. This brain drain could bleed the life out of Silicon Valley’s companies. Then indeed we will have real competitors emerging in places like New Delhi and Shanghai. But it won’t be because they discovered some recipe for innovation clusters that finally works. It will be because we exported the magic ingredient: smart people.

***Solvency***

No Solvency – GCHQ Fill-InGCHQ will fill in – congress can’t regulatePac 13June 25, 2013. Larouche Pac. NSA-GCHQ Spying: "The Core of the Special Relationship" http://archive.larouchepac.com/node/27097 S.H

On June 11, about ten days before the London Guardian started publishing documents obtained from Edward Snowden showing in detail the vast scope of Britain's GCHQ's telecommunications snooping and sharing with the NSA, the Guardian "Defence and Security Blog" published a blockbuster piece by Richard Norton-Taylor and Nick Hopkins, called "Intelligence-gathering by British state out of control." It begins: ¶ "Among all the uncertainties and denials over the interception of communications by GCHQ and American's National Security Agency some things

should be crystal clear. ¶ "The bilateral relationship between GCHQ and the NSA is uniquely special. It is the core of the 'special relationship.' The two agencies are truly intertwined." ¶ (That statement in itself should ring a bell with anyone who read LaRouchePAC's Chonology of the development of the Bush-Cheney-Obama surveillance dragnet.) ¶ Norton-Taylor and Hopkins point out that "There are NSA liason officers assigned to GCHQ in Cheltenman, and GHQC officers at the NSA's headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland." They note that the "RAF base" known as Menwith Hill, in North Yorkshire, is the NSA's largest listening post outside the U.S., consisting of a satellite listening station for monitoring foreign military traffic, but also plugged into Britain's telecommunications network. ¶ They cite a 1994 GCHQ staff manual which discusses the importance of GCHQ's contribution to the alliance with its partners, and stated that "This may entail on occasion the applying of UK resources to the meeting of U.S. requirements." This of course has

been going on for a long time: Norton-Taylor and Hopkins recall that in the late 1960s, GCHQ had cooperated in the illegal eavesdropping on U.S. civil rights and anti-war activists. "With the help of a US-funded GCHQ listening station at Bude on North Cornwall, the two agencies did each other's dirty work, getting around their domestic laws by spying on each other's citizens." ¶ As the new Snowden documents indicate (see slug "Britain's GCHQ: Worse than the NSA" in the June 23 briefing), GCHQ and the NSA are now sharing unprecedented amounts of telephone and Internet data, much of which is obtained and processed in the U.K., safe from the prying eyes of U.S. Congressional overseers.

No Solvency – Corporate ComplianceCompanies comply with the NSA to build in backdoors – the plan doesn’t prevent thatThe Guardian 13 July 12, 2013. The Guardian. “Microsoft handed NSA access to Encrypted Messages” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data

Microsoft has collaborated closely with US intelligence services to allow users' communications to be intercepted, including helping the National Security Agency to circumvent the company's own encryption, according to top-secret documents obtained by the Guardian.¶ The files provided by Edward Snowden illustrate the scale of co-operation between Silicon Valley and the intelligence agencies over the last three years. They also shed new light on the workings of the top-secret Prism program, which was disclosed by the Guardian and the

Washington Post last month.¶ The documents show that:¶ • Microsoft helped the NSA to circumvent its encryption to address concerns that the agency would be unable to intercept web chats on the

new Outlook.com portal;¶ • The agency already had pre-encryption stage access to email on Outlook.com,

including Hotmail;¶ • The company worked with the FBI this year to allow the NSA easier access via Prism to its cloud storage service SkyDrive, which now has more than 250 million users worldwide;¶ • Microsoft also worked with the FBI's Data Intercept Unit to "understand" potential issues with a feature in Outlook.com that allows users to create email aliases;¶ • In July last year, nine months after Microsoft bought Skype, the NSA boasted that a new capability

had tripled the amount of Skype video calls being collected through Prism;¶ • Material collected through Prism is routinely shared with the FBI and CIA, with one NSA document describing the program as a "team sport".¶ The latest NSA revelations further expose the tensions between Silicon Valley and the Obama administration. All the major tech firms are lobbying the government to allow them to disclose more fully the extent and nature of their co-operation with the NSA to meet their customers' privacy concerns. Privately, tech executives are at pains to distance themselves from claims of collaboration and teamwork given by the NSA documents, and insist the process is driven by legal compulsion.¶ In a statement, Microsoft said: "When we upgrade or update products we aren't absolved from the need to comply with existing or future lawful demands." The company reiterated its argument that it provides customer data "only in response to government demands and we only ever comply with orders for requests about

specific accounts or identifiers".¶ In June, the Guardian revealed that the NSA claimed to have "direct access" through the Prism program to the systems of many major internet companies, including Microsoft, Skype, Apple, Google, Facebook and Yahoo.¶ Blanket orders from the secret surveillance court allow these communications to be collected without an individual warrant if the NSA operative has a 51% belief that the target is not a US citizen and is not on US soil at the time. Targeting US citizens does require an individual warrant, but the NSA is able to collect Americans' communications without a warrant if the target is a foreign national located overseas.¶ Since Prism's existence became public, Microsoft and the other companies listed on the NSA documents as providers have

denied all knowledge of the program and insisted that the intelligence agencies do not have back doors into their systems.¶ Microsoft's latest marketing campaign, launched in April, emphasizes its commitment to privacy with the slogan: "Your privacy is our priority."¶ Similarly, Skype's privacy policy states: "Skype is committed to respecting your privacy and the confidentiality of your

personal data, traffic data and communications content."¶ But internal NSA newsletters, marked top secret, suggest the co-operation between the intelligence community and the companies is deep and ongoing.¶ The latest documents come from the NSA's Special Source Operations (SSO) division, described by Snowden as the "crown jewel" of the agency. It is responsible for all programs aimed at US communications systems through corporate partnerships such as Prism.¶ The files show that the NSA became concerned about the interception of encrypted chats on Microsoft's Outlook.com portal from the moment the

company began testing the service in July last year.¶ Within five months, the documents explain, Microsoft and the FBI had come up with a solution that allowed the NSA to circumvent encryption on Outlook.com chats.

Even companies in the security industry take bribes from the NSAMenn 13Joseph, “Secret contract tied NSA and security industry pioneer,” Reuters, 12/20/13, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/21/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131221 SJE

As a key part of a campaign to embed encryption software that it could crack into widely used computer products, the U.S. National Security Agency arranged a secret $10 million contract with RSA, one of the most influential firms in the computer security industry , Reuters has learned. Documents leaked by

former NSA contractor Edward Snowden show that the NSA created and promulgated a flawed formula for generating random

numbers to create a "back door" in encryption products, the New York Times reported in September. Reuters later reported that RSA became the most important distributor of that formula by rolling it into a software tool called Bsafe that is used to enhance security in personal computers and many other products. Undisclosed until now was that RSA received $10 million in a deal that set the NSA formula as the preferred, or default, method for number generation in the BSafe software, according to two sources familiar with the contract. Although that sum might seem paltry, it represented more than a third of the revenue that the relevant division at RSA had taken in during the entire

previous year, securities filings show. The earlier disclosures of RSA's entanglement with the NSA already had shocked

some in the close-knit world of computer security experts. The company had a long history of championing privacy and security, and it played a leading role in blocking a 1990s effort by the NSA to require a special chip to enable spying on a wide range of computer and communications products.

No Solvency – Mac BackdoorsCan’t solve - Macs have permanent backdoors Goodlin 15(“World’s first (known) bootkit for OS X can permanently backdoor Macs” http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/01/worlds-first-known-bootkit-for-os-x-can-permanently-backdoor-macs/)--BB

Securing Macs against stealthy malware infections could get more complicated thanks to a new proof-of-concept exploit that allows attackers with brief physical access to covertly replace the firmware of most machines built since 2011. Once installed, the bootkit—that is, malware that replaces the firmware that is normally used to boot Macs—can control the system from the very first instruction. That allows the malware to bypass firmware passwords, passwords users enter to decrypt hard drives and to preinstall backdoors in the operating system before it starts running. Because it's independent of the operating system and hard drive, it will survive both reformatting and OS reinstallation. And since it replaces the digital signature Apple uses to ensure only authorized firmware runs on Macs, there are few viable ways to disinfect infected boot systems. The proof-of-concept is the first of its kind on the OS X platform. While there are no known instances of bootkits for OS X in the wild, there is currently no way to detect them, either. The malware has been dubbed Thunderstrike, because it spreads through maliciously modified peripheral devices that connect to a Mac's Thunderbolt interface. When plugged into a Mac that's in the process of booting up, the device injects what's known as an Option ROM into the extensible firmware interface (EFI), the firmware responsible for starting a Mac's system management mode and enabling other low-level functions before loading the OS. The Option ROM replaces the RSA encryption key Macs use to ensure only authorized firmware is installed. From there, the Thunderbolt device can install malicious firmware that can't easily be removed by anyone who doesn't have the new key. Enter evil maid

While the hack requires an attacker to have brief physical access to a targeted machine, that prerequisite isn't prohibitively steep in many situations. For example, so-called "evil maid" scenarios—in which a rogue hotel housekeeper tampers with a computer—or an agent at an international border crossing both routinely have access to computers, often while unsupervised. Documents leaked by former National Security Agency subcontractor Edward Snowden also exposed how agents intercept hardware being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance and covertly install modified firmware onto them before they’re delivered. All any of these attackers would need to do to carry out a Thunderstrike-style attack is to reboot a Mac with a previously weaponized Thunderbolt device attached. If the machine is turned on but locked, the attacker need only press the power button for a few seconds to hard-reboot the machine. Firmware passwords, disk encryption passwords, and user passwords won't thwart the attack since the Option ROMs are loaded before any of those protections are checked. Thunderstrike made its debut in late December, at the Chaos Communication Congress. The vulnerability was discovered by Trammell Hudson, an employee of a high-tech hedge fund in New York City called Two Sigma Investments, while trying to secure the firm's MacBooks. A self-described reverse engineering hobbyist, Hudson was previously known for creating Magic Lantern, an open source programming environment for Canon digital SLR cameras. Thunderstrike builds on a similar attack as demonstrated at the 2012 Blackhat conference that bypasses OS X FileVault protections to install a rootkit. Like Thunderstrike, the 2012 exploit used Thunderbolt ports to inject the malicious payload into the boot process, but the earlier attack wasn't able to modify the boot ROM itself. To work around that limitation, the researcher—who works under the hacking moniker snare—wrote the bootkit to the EFI system partition. Eureka One of the breakthroughs of Thunderstrike is its ability to get the boot ROM firmware volumes validated. Hudson figured out how to do this after discovering an undocumented CRC32 cyclic redundancy check routine carried out during the normal validation process. A second breakthrough involved the discovery that Option ROMs are loaded during a recovery mode boot. That allowed Hudson to figure out how to replace Apple's existing EFI code. Thunderstrike was just one of at least two EFI-based attacks that were demonstrated at December's Chaos Communication Congress. A separate talk delved into the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface, a similar mechanism that's used to boot some Windows and Linux machines. Hudson said an attack technique known as Dark Jedi that was outlined during the talk could possibly be adapted

to make his exploit work remotely, so the attacker wouldn't require physical access. Earlier this week, the US CERT issued three advisories warning of vulnerabilities in widely used UEFI chips. A researcher from security firm Bromium also has this brief writeup on the UEFI talk. Hudson said Apple is in the process of partially patching the vulnerabilities that make Thunderstrike possible. The remedy involves not allowing Option ROMs to load during firmware updates, a measure that Hudson said is effective against his current proof of concept. Apple already has begun rolling out the upgrade to Mac Mini's and iMac Retina 5ks and plans to make it more widely available soon. "However... it is not a complete fix," he warned in a blog post detailing Thunderstrike. "Option ROMs are still loaded on normal boots, allowing snare's 2012 attack to continue working. Older Macs are subject to downgrade attacks by 'updating' to a vulnerable firmware version." Until there's a complete fix from Apple, there aren't a lot of viable options for preventing Thunderstrike-type attacks. Pouring a liberal amount of epoxy glue in a Thunderbolt port will certainly make the exploit harder, since it would force an attacker to take apart the casing to access the underlying flash ROM chip, but it would come at the cost of disabling key functionality. The other obvious solution is for people to keep their machines on their person at all times, but that isn't always practical, either. Hotel safes and locked and sealed storage boxes are also only partially effective, since both measures are vulnerable to cracking and picking.