prof.richard werner:a solution to the european crisis – how to avoid banking and debt crises for...
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Centre for Banking, Finance & Sustainable Development Management School
Richard A. Werner 2013
Solutions for Greece– other than default, euro-exit or giving up
national sovereignty
Richard A. WernerCentre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development
University of Southampton Management School
Athens University of Economics and Business
Athens
24 January 2013
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Richard A. Werner 2013 1
How did Greece get into trouble?
• We all know, it started by Greece giving up control over its money and joining the euro
• Since then, the ECB has been making monetary policy in Greece.
• What sort of monetary policy did it pursue?
• What is the best way to measure monetary policy?
• What is money?
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Richard A. Werner 2013
Textbooks and central banks do not tell us clearly:
“It is much harder to measure than one would have first thought.” (p. 119) Chamberlin and Yueh (2006)
“Although there is widespread agreement among economists that money is important, they have never agreed on how to define and how to measure money” (Miller and Van Hoose, 2004:42)
Today, even the Federal Reserve cannot tell us just what money is:“there is still no definitive answer in terms of all its final uses to the question: What is money?”
What is Money?
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Saving
(Lenders,Depositors)
Banks& other financial
intermediaries= “indirect finance”
Investment
(Borrowers)
Purchase of Newly Issued Debt/Equity = “direct finance”/disintermediation
3
RR = 1%
Textbook View of Banks as Financial Intermediaries
What is the Role of Banks?
Thus when the financial crisis hit, the leading economics models and theories did not include banks as they were not considered important or special.
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What Makes Banks Special?
But empirically, it had been found that banks are special!
Their function cannot be easily replaced by other financial players or markets.
- Fama (1985) shows that banks must have monopoly power compared to other financial institutions.
- Ashcraft (2005) shows that the closure of small regional banks significantly hurts the local economy.
But economic theory could not explain why.
Here is why.
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Over 80% of the population thinks that it comes from the central bankor the government.
No money comes from the government.
Only about 3% of the money supply comes from the central bank.
Who creates the remaining 97% of our money supply and who allocatesthis money?
5
Where Does Money Come From?
Answer: The banks They are not financial intermediaries but the main creators of money.
They have a license to create money out of nothing.
The ‘leading’ economic journals and textbooks are silent on this.
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Balance Sheet of Bank A
Step 1 Deposit of $100 by customer at Bank A
Assets Liabilities
$100
Step 2 $100 used to increase the reserve of Bank A
Assets Liabilities
$100 $100
Banks Do Not Lend Money
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Step 3 Loan of $9,900 granted, by crediting borrower’s bank account. Where do the £9,900 come from? From nowhere. The borrower is treated as ifshe/he or the bank had actually deposited the money, but no moneywas deposited or transferred from anywhere else.
Assets Liabilities
$100 +$9,900
$100+$9,900
Banks Do Not Lend Money, They Create it!
NB: No money is transferred from
elsewhere
There is no such thing as a ‘bank loan‘.
Banks create money through ‘credit creation‘.
This is how 97% of the money supply is created.
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“The actual process of money creation takes place primarily in banks.” (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1961, p. 3);
“By far the largest role in creating broad money is played by the banking sector ... When banks make loans they create additional deposits for those that have borrowed.” (Bank of England, 2007)
“Over time… Banknotes and commercial bank money became fully interchangeable payment media that customers could use according to their needs” (ECB, 2000).
“The commercial banks can also create money themselves… in the eurosystem, money is primarily created by the extension of credit… ….” (Bundesbank, 2009)
Bank Credit Creation: Not in Economics Textbooks, but Admitted by Central Banks:
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Banks are Not Financial Intermediaries
They are the Creators of the Money Supply.
And they decide who gets the money and for which purpose it is used.
This decision shapes the economic landscape.
Banks thus decide over the economic destiny of a country.
Credit creation is the most important macroeconomic variable.
Saving(Lenders,Depositors)
$100
Banks(‘FinancialIntermediaries’)=“indirect finance”
Investment(Borrowers)
$99
/
“direct finance”
9
RR = 1%
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Money is best measured by its credit counterpart (C) which created it.
Financial transactions are not part of GDP.
If we want a link to GDP, we must divide money/credit into two streams:
Credit used for GDP transactions, used for the ‘real economy’ (‘real circulation credit’ = CR)
Credit used for non-GDP transactions (‘financial circulation credit’ = CF)
The Quantity Theory of Credit (Werner, 1992, 1997):
C
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-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Latest: Q4 2000
YoY %
CR (L)
nGDP (R)
YoY %
The Quantity Theory of Credit (Werner, 1992, 1997)
∆(PRY) = VR ∆CR ∆(PFQF) = VF∆CFnominal GDP real economy credit creation asset markets financial credit creation
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01
YoY %
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Latest: H1 2001
YoY %
Nationwide ResidentialLand Price (R)Real Estate
Credit (L)
Real circulation credit determines nominal GDP growth
Financial circulation credit determines asset prices – leads to asset cycles and banking crises
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Investment credit (= credit for the creation of new goods and services or productivity gains)
Result: Growth without inflation, even at full employment
Case 1: Consumption credit
Result: Inflation without growth
Bank credit creation determines economic growth. The effect of bank credit allocation depends on
the use money is put to
Case 2: Financial credit(= credit for transactions that do not contribute to and are not part of GDP):
Result: Asset inflation, bubblesand banking crises
= unproductive creditcreation
= productive credit creation
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A significant rise in credit creation for non-GDP transactions (financial credit CF) must lead to:- asset bubbles and busts- banking and economic crises
USA in 1920s: margin loans rosefrom 23.8% of all loans in 1919to over 35%
Case Study Japan in the 1980s:CF/C rose from about 15% at the beginning of the 1980s to almost twice this share
Credit for financial transactions explains boom/bust cycles and banking crises
CF/C = Share of loans to the real estate industry, construction companies and non-bank financial institutions
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
22%
24%
26%
28%
30%
79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93
Source: Bank of Japan
CF/C
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Warning Sign: Broad Bank Credit Growth > nGDP Growth
This Created Japan's Bubble.
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11
YoY %
Latest: Q3 2011
Excess Credit Creation
Nominal GDP
Broad Bank Credit
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Out-of-control CF is the problem, creating the Bubbles and Crises in Ireland, Spain
Broad Bank Credit and GDP (Ireland)
-20-10
0102030405060708090
100
1998/Q11998/Q31999/Q11999/Q32000/Q12000/Q32001/Q12001/Q32002/Q12002/Q32003/Q12003/Q32004/Q12004/Q32005/Q12005/Q32006/Q12006/Q32007/Q12007/Q32008/Q12008/Q32009/Q12009/Q3
Broad Bank Credit and GDP (Spain)
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1987/Q1
1988/Q1
1989/Q1
1990/Q1
1991/Q1
1992/Q1
1993/Q1
1994/Q1
1995/Q1
1996/Q1
1997/Q1
1998/Q1
1999/Q1
2000/Q1
2001/Q1
2002/Q1
2003/Q1
2004/Q1
2005/Q1
2006/Q1
2007/Q1
2008/Q1
2009/Q1
nGDPnGDP
Broad Bank Credit Growth > nGDP Growth
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Greece: 1993-2009: over 10% credit growth1995-97: over 20% credit growth2001-2: over 30% credit growth
nGDP
Broad Bank Credit Growth > nGDP Growth
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What happened in 1993/4? And in 2000/1?
• The Bank of Greece was established by League of Nations (Annexto the Geneva Protocol of 1927) in 1928, as a Société Anonyme
• In 1994, the Bank of Greece was made more independent fromthe government, and monetisation of government policy stopped.
“As of 1994 the Bank of Greece no longer provides finance in any form to the public sector. …prohibition of monetary financing.” (Bank of Greece)
• In 2000, the Bank of Greece was made fully independent fromthe government, without democratic accountability.
• In 2001, the Bank of Greece became an integral part of the ECB.
• Note: the ECB is independent of and unaccountable to any government or democratically elected assembly in Europe
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The Great Greek Asset Bubble of 1994-2009
• was created by the policy of excessive credit creation by theGreek central bank and the ECB.
• increased tax revenues and economic growth projections.
• encouraged the government to overspend and undersave significantly
• the bubble was unsustainable – as they always are – and thus would,without fail, result in a banking crisis and a fiscal crisis
• what happened since 2009 has been predictable and was causedby the monetary policy of the central bank and the ECB.
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Greece: 1995-97: over 20% credit growth2001-2: over 30% credit growth
Independence from govt
ECB control
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The Solution, as told by the ECB:
• Greece must increase its debts by borrowing more from theIMF/EU/ECB.
• An exit from the euro or full default must not happen.
• Greece must implement deep fiscal and welfare cuts.
• All must tighten their belts.
• The ESM must be established and fiscal policy controlledcentrally by the EU/ECB (loss of national sovereignty).
BUT: No policies to stimulate growth and employment!
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What must happen with shrinking credit creation?
A deepening slump and higher unemployment
Bank credit creation:
-7.2% YoY
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The same is happening in Ireland, Portugal, Spain & Italy
Bank credit: -17% YoY Bank credit: -6.6% YoY
Bank credit: -1% YoY Bank credit: -0.3% YoY
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But there is a solution – without costs and fiscal pain, producing a recovery and lower unemployment
• the policy proposal would have reduced government debt and deficits
• it would solve the funding problem in the bond markets
• it would help the banks and increase credit creation without extracosts
• no need for centralisation of fiscal policy or issuance of European gov’t bonds
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How to Create A Recovery After a Banking Crisis: Werner-Proposal of 1994:
A new policy called “Quantitative Easing” = Expansion in Credit Creation = Total Effective Purchasing Power
Richard A. Werner, Create a Recovery Through Quantitative Easing, 2 September 1995, Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei)
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Applying this Framework to Solving the European Sovereign Debt Crisis
Werner-Proposal of 2011
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy need to stimulate economic growth. This means stimulation of credit creation.
Their governments need to save money and reduce borrowing costs.
Bank credit growth needs to expand and banks need a safe way to expand their business and their returns
Here is how all of this can be achieved:
Governments need to stop the issuance of government bonds
Instead of borrowing from the bond markets – who do not create money – governments should fund their borrowing requirements entirely by borrowing from all the banks in their country.
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Werner-Proposal: The solution that maintains the euro and avoids default
Governments should enter into 3-year loan contracts at the much lower prime borrowing rate.
Eurozone governments remain zero risk borrowers according to the Basel capital adequacy framework (banks are thus happy to lend).
The prime rate is close to the banks’ refinancing costs of 1% - say 3.5%.
Instead of governments injecting money into banks, banks create new money and give it to the governments.
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Ministry of Finance
(no credit creation)
Funding viabond issuance
Fiscal stimulus
Net Effect = Zero
Non-bank private sector (no credit creation)
Fiscal stimulation funded by bond issuance(e.g. : ¥20trn government spending package)
-¥20trn +¥20trn
Why fiscal spending programmes alone are ineffective
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Non-bank private sector
(no credit creation)
+¥ 20 trn
Bank sector(credit creation power)
Assets Liabilities ¥20 trn ¥20 trn
MoF(No credit creation)
Funding via bank Loans
Fiscal stimulus
deposit
Net Effect = ¥ 20 trn
Fiscal stimulation funded by bank borrowing
(e.g. : ¥20trn government spending package)
How to Make Fiscal Policy Effective
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Advantages of this Proposal
The proposal will not increase aggregate debt.
Each country remains in charge of and liable for its debts.
No further ECB intervention required or purchases by the EFSF/ESM
The immediate savings will be substantial, as this method of enhanced debt management reduces the new borrowing costs, even below post-ECB-purchase yields (E 10bn in the coming year for Italy alone).
This helps the banking sector, as its core business, to extend credit, is expanded, thus increasing retained earnings.
These can then be used by banks to shore up their capital. Thus there are substantial savings to the taxpayer as new bank rescues become
unnecessary.
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Advantages (II)
This proposal addresses the core underlying problem: slowing growth and the need to stimulate it. The proposal will boost nominal GDP growth – and avoid crowding out from the bond markets.
This is a problem as tight fiscal policy and tight credit conditions slow growth, with bank credit shrinking: Germany (-0.1%), Greece (-3.5%), Spain (-0.5%), Ireland (-14%).
Bank credit extension adds to the money supply. From the credit model we know that the proposal will boost nominal GDP growth – and avoid crowding out from the bond markets.
This increases employment and tax revenues.
It can push countries back from the brink of a deflationary and contractionary downward spiral into a positive cycle of growth, greater tax revenues and falling debt/GDP.
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Prime Rate vs. Market Yield of Benchmark Bonds: Portugal
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
16.00%
18.00%
2003
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012 Latest July 2012
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, ECB
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
16.00%
18.00%
Portugal Prime Rates on Existing Loans to Non-Fin. Crops., Over 5 Year Maturity (%)Portugal 10y Government Benchmark Bid Yield - Redemption Yield (%)Portugal 5y Government Benchmark Bid Yield - Redemption Yield (%)
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Prime Rate vs. Market Yield of Benchmark Bonds: Spain
1.70%
2.70%
3.70%
4.70%
5.70%
6.70%
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Latest July 2012
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, ECB
1.70%
2.70%
3.70%
4.70%
5.70%
6.70%
Spain Prime Rates on Existing Loans to Non-Fin. Corps., Over 1 Year Maturity (%)Spain 5y Government Benchmark Bid Yield - Redemption Yield (%)Spain 10y Government Benchmark Bid Yield - Redemption Yield (%)
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Prime Rate vs. Market Yield of Benchmark Bonds: Greece
2.00%
12.00%
22.00%
32.00%
42.00%
52.00%
62.00%
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012 Latest: July 2012
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, ECB
2.00%
12.00%
22.00%
32.00%
42.00%
52.00%
62.00%
Greece Prime Rates on Existing Loans to Non-Fin. Corps., Over 5 Year Maturity (%)
Greece 10y Government Benchmark Bid Yield - Redemption Yield (%)
Greece 5y Government Benchmark Bid Yield - Redemption Yield (%)
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Other solutions exist
Bad debts in the banking system: can be extinguished at zero cost by central bank purchases at face value (and not marking to market). As done by the Bank of England 1914 and Bank of Japan 1945
Central banks should be made accountable to parliaments– This was the lesson from the Bundesbank. Normally it is said that the ECB is a
good central bank, because it is modelled on the successful Bundesbank.– This is not true. The lesson from the Bundesbank was to make the central bank
accountable to parliament – its predecessor was not, and it was one of the most disastrous central banks (Reichsbank).
– The ECB is the revived Reichsbank, unaccountable to parliaments
Bank credit should be monitored to prevent harmful speculative credit creation and encourage productivity (credit guidance – the secret of the success of Japan, Taiwan, Korea and China).
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Solutions exist
Redesign the banking sector so that it consists of not-for-profit, local banks (like in Germany, public savings and cooperative banks)
The monetary system should be changed: do banks need to be the creators of the money supply?
Local gov’t-owned Savings Banks42.9%
Large, nationwide Banks 12.5%
Regional, foreign, other banks
17.8%Local cooperative banks (credit unions)
26.6%
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China: Government-issued paper money (Kublai Khan)Zero Government Debt, Zero Interest Payments
State Money: Less Debt, Lower Taxes, More Growth, More Equality and Fairness
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Japan: Government-issued paper money: 1868
太政官
札
Dajōkan satsu
State-Issued Money
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Colonial Scrip in North American British Colonies“In the Colonies we issue our own money. It is called Colonial Scrip. …we control its purchasing power, and we have no interest to pay to no one.” (Banjamin Franklin, quoted by Senate Robert Owen, National Economy and the Banking System, Senate document 23, Washington DC: US Gov’t Printing Office, 1939, p. 98)
State-Issued Money
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Was the War of Independence fought over taxes on tea? (‘Boston Tea Party’)Or over new English legislation forcing colonies to abandon their paper money and use gold and silver?“The Colonies would gladly have borne the little tax on tea and other matters had it not been that England took away from the Colonies money, which created unemployment and dissatisfaction” Benjamin Franklin (as quoted by R. Owen, 1939, op. cit).
Colonial Scrip Banned by Britain (Currency Act 1751 and 1764, forbidding scrip to be designated legal tender and to settle private debt.)
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1862, President Lincoln signed the First Legal Tender Act“The underlying idea in the greenback philosophy… is that the issue of currency is a function of the government, a sovereign right which ought not to be delegated to corporations.” Davis Rich Dewey (MIT, 1902)
State-Issued MoneyPresident Lincoln issued United States Notes
1863 United States Notes, aka ‘Greenbacks’
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41Deutsches Reich: German government-issued paper money
State-Issued Money
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UK: Government-issued paper money: 1914-1928
Britain
1917
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The standard ‘Federal Reserve Note’
JFK’s 1963 ‘United States Note’:No Fed seal
State-Issued Money
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Further Reading:
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005 New Economics Foundation, 2011
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Weitere Details:
München: Vahlen Verlag, 2007 M. E. Sharpe, 2003