prof. randall nichols source: cyb 610 – z3fall 2012

AfghanistanNational Estimate

Prof. Randall NicholsSource: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_af.html

CYB 610 – Z3 Fall 2012

Team

TL – Chris Lewis

XO – Lester Thompson – Military Estimate

XO – Skip Corbin – Political Estimate

XO – Robert Howe – Economic Estimate

2Fall 2012

Team

Michael Amao

Heather Tarallo

Mo Ismail

Michael Surdey

Shane Liszewski

William Quick

3Fall 2012

Agenda

Executive SummaryAfghanistan National Estimate

Military Estimate - Facts - Evidence - Judgments - Summary

Political/Diplomatic Estimate - Facts - Evidence - Judgments - Summary

Economic Estimate - Facts - Evidence - Judgments - Summary

References

4Fall 2012

Executive SummaryMilitary Estimate

ANA will ethnically fracture after 2014

ANSF members join Insurgents and MilitiasStart in mid 2015

Peace cannot be negotiated

Civil warBy EOY 2015Biggest and most important judgment

5Fall 2012

Executive SummaryPolitical/Diplomatic Estimate

Increased infectious disease outbreaksHigh risk – mid year 2014

Rapid expansion of drug tradeGrowing poppies

Infiltration of ANSFVery high risk – 2014

Civil warBy EOY 2015

6Fall 2012

Executive SummaryEconomic Estimate

Afghanistan will not be able to self sustain its economy when foreign aid is reduced

Agriculture cannot be relied upon for economic growth

Mining won’t amount to economic prosperity

New Silk Road won’t amount to economic prosperity

Donor fatigue, corruption will lead to reduction in aid

Foreign military reduction will negatively impact Afghan economy

Reduction in provincial reconstruction teams (PRT)

Jobs and revenue loss

Reduced foreign spending

Fall 2012 7

Military Estimate

8Fall 2012

MILITARY – Facts

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)Afghan National Army (ANA)

- includes Afghan Air Force (AAF) - Security Operation Command (SOC)

Afghan National Police (ANP)Afghan Local Police (ALP)Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)

ANSF growth target – 352,000 by end of 2012Already achieved

9Fall 2012

MILITARY – Facts

Manpower available for military service males age 16-49: 7,056,339 females age 16-49: 6,653,419 (2010 est.)

Manpower fit for military service males age 16-49: 4,050,222 females age 16-49: 3,797,087 (2010 est.)

10Fall 2012

MILITARY - Facts

Manpower reaching military age each yearMale – 392,116Female – 370, 295

ServiceMust be 22 years old4 year term

11Fall 2012

MILITARY - FactsANSF

Take security responsibility in 2014Two bodies responsible for civic order and protection

Afghan National Army (ANA)Reports to Ministry of Defence (MoD)

- oversees entire Afghan military Afghan National Police (ANP)

Reports to Ministry of Interior (MoI) - responsible for law enforcement in Afghanistan

12Fall 2012

MILITARY - Facts

13Fall 2012

Source: Checchia, M. (2012, January). Corruption in the afghan national security forces. Civil Military Fusion Centre. Retrieved from https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC AFG Security Archive/CFC_Afghanistan_Corruption-in-ANSF_Jan12.pdf DLA: December 1, 2012

Growth of ANSF 2003 – 2011

MILITARY – FactsANA

MissionPreserve peace and securityProvide for the defense of Afghanistan

Overall force strength178, 504 assigned to ANA

- 74-81% present for duty6,172 assigned to AAF – Target of 8,000 and 140 aircraft by 2016 94% present for duty

14Fall 2012

MILITARY - FactsSubunits of ANA

National HQ – Kabul National Commando Brigade – Kabul 111th Division – Kabul 201st Corps – Kabul203rd Corps – Gardez205th Corps – Kandahar207th Corps – Herat209th Corps – Mazar-e-Sharif215th Corps – Lashkar Gah

15Fall 2012

MILITARY - Facts Afghan National Air Force Units

AAF Headquarters – KabulKabul Air WingKandahar Air WingShindand Air Wing (planned)Jalalabad DetachmentMazir e Sharif DetachmentGardez DetachmentHerat Detachment

16Fall 2012

MILITARY – FactsANA Area of Operations

17Fall 2012

Source: Radin, C. (2011, May). Afghan national army update, may 2011. Long War Journal. Retrieved from http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/05/afghan_national_army_4.php DLA: December 3, 2012

MILITARY – FactsCurrent ANA Subunit Strength

18Fall 2012

Source: Sopko, John F. (2012, October). Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/2012-10-30audit-13-1.pdf

MILITARY - Facts Afghan National Police (ANP) Units

Several Units including:Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP)Afghan Border Police (ABP) Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)Criminal Investigation DivisionCounter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)

19Fall 2012

MILITARY - FactsOverall Police Force Strength

ANP (as of May 2012)106,538 assigned to AUP22,243 assigned to ABP14,585 assigned to ANCOPPlus other ANP forces

Target growth157,000 by end of October 2012Projected to be ahead of schedule in May 2012

20Fall 2012

149,208

MILITARY - Facts Police Force Strength

Afghan Local Police Est. July 201013, 412 (as of May 2012)Target growth of 30,000 by end of 2014

Complements counterinsurgency efforts by targeting rural areas with limited to no ANSF presence

21Fall 2012

MILITARY - Facts Police Force Strength

Afghan Public Protection Force10,000 guards (as of May 2012)Target growth of 30,000 by March 2013

Units trained to protectPeopleCritical infrastructureConstruction projectsConvoys

Fall 2012 22

MILITARY – FactsWomen in the Armed Forces

1,370 women in the ANP

350 women in ANAIncluding 2 female pilot candidates

Currently represent 3% of the ANA recruitsNumbers are increasing steadily

Fall 2012 23

MILITARY - FactsAfghan Local Police (ALP)

Established by President KarzaiAfghan MOIAugust 2010Complementary component of Village Stability Operations (VSO)

To enhance security and governance

Link local villages to the government

24Fall 2012


Always deployed with VSO

To be expanded to 99 sites

Up to 30,000 ALP personnel

No future beyond two to five yearsTo be disarmed and absorbed into security forces

25Fall 2012


Ineffective communications regarding implementation

Created confusion and disruptionLogistics and payHampered visibility of MoI payment recordsCandidates not being processed

Graduating and being assigned with incomplete administration requirements

Lack of equipment, fuel and ammunitionIssues with roles and responsibility

26Fall 2012

MILITARY – FactsIran

SharesSeveral religious, linguistic and ethnic groupsCommon languages

During Soviet invasion of AfghanistanMaintained relations

Soviet UnionAfghanistan

Supported Persian speaking Shia groupsHazaraFunded, trained, supplied and gave sanctuary in Iran

27Fall 2012

Military - FactsIran

Viewed Taliban rise as threatSecurityIdeologicalEconomic

Supported the Northern Alliance

Taliban backed Sunni Islamist militantsLaunched attacks against Iran

1988 Taliban massacredHazari civiliansIranians with diplomatic credentials

28Fall 2012

MILITARY - FactsIran

Ethnic and faction mindsetOpposed to Saudi Arabia

Involved in peace talks with Taliban

Guardian of Afghan Farsi speakers and ShiasTajiksHazaras

Against Pashtuns

29Fall 2012

MILITARY - FactsPakistan - History

British ruleWhat is now India, Pakistan and BangladeshSeparation between Hindus and Muslims

Pakistan and India granted IndependenceEthnic tribal clashes in Pakistan

Bangladesh broke away from PakistanBecame independent country

Helped by Indian soldiersCreated friction between India and Pakistan

30Fall 2012


Strategic goalPrevent Afghanistan and India alliance

In case of war with India

Soviet invasion of AfghanistanTrained and resourced mujihadeenWith aid of CIA

31Fall 2012


Later supported the TalibanPashtun organization

14 million Pashtun in PakistanViewed as Pakistan friendlyMilitary and ISI provided resources and training

Still supports TalibanProvides sanctuary in western provinces

32Fall 2012

MILITARY - FactsPashtun Regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan

33Fall 2012

Source: Militancy in the pashtun belt; perspective of a peace jirga participant. (n.d.). Regional Institute of Policy Research & Training. Retrieved from http://www.khalidaziz.com/MILITANCY_IN_THE_PASHTUN_BELT_FINAL.pdf DLA: December 3, 2012

MILITARY - FactsInsurgents

TalibanLeading factionLeadership resides in PakistanLed by Mullah Mohammad Omar

Other insurgent groups activeHaqqani networkHezb-e-IslamiTora Bora MilitaryThe Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)Logical and political base in Pakistan

34Fall 2012

MILITARY - FactsTaliban - History

Born in Kandahar and the Deobandi madrassWarlords running Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawalClerics came together to take action against warlordsAttracted young Afghan refugees

Provided free educationHousingFood

Presented ideal of recovering homelandCreating a pure Islamic state

35Fall 2012

MILITARY - FactsTaliban - History

Conquered Kabul in 1996Controlled 80-90% of Afghaistan by September 2001Unable to defeat pockets in the north

Commanded by RabbaniMassoudDostumSayyafIsmail Khan

They joined together to create the Northern Alliance

36Fall 2012

MILITARY - FactsTaliban - Organization

Hierarchical structureAutonomous groupsLeadership located in Quetta

Taliban published code of conduct for fightersThe Lahya

StructureHierarchical organizationResponsibilities

37Fall 2012


38Fall 2012

Source: European Asylum Support Office.(2012, July). Afghanistan Taliban Strategies – Recruitment. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/european-asylum-support-office/bz3012564enc_complet_en.pdf


39Fall 2012

Source: Afsar, Shahid, Samples, Chris & Wood, Thomas. (2008, April 22). The Taliban: An organizational analysis. Retrieved 12/06/2012 from http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/MILREVIEW_Taliban_Organizational_Analysis.pdf

MILITARY - FactsTaliban - Funding

Jihadist networks in the Arab GulfMosquesIllicit companiesPakistani ISI is a main funderTaxes in the areas they control

Agricultural productsIncluding Opium

40Fall 2012

MILITARY - FactsTaliban - Recruitment

Afghan refugee camps, mosques and Deobandi madrassasLocal recruitment by mullahsReligious networksKin, community, schools and universitiesLocals in AfghanistanPakistani fighters

NATO estimates 40 percent of Taliban ranks

41Fall 2012

MILITARY - FactsTaliban - Motivation

Two categoriesHard-core fighters

Driven by ideologyMadrassa studentsYoungsters recruited by clerics

Non-core fightersLocal militiaMercenaryPart-time fighters

Taliban seek buy-in from local communitiesFighters and commanders deployed in own area

42Fall 2012

MILITARY - FactsTaliban - Motivation

PovertyGovernment failingsThe presence of foreign troopsUnemploymentCommunity conflictsOutcastsReligionIndoctrinationCo-opting former enemies

43Fall 2012

MILITARY - FactsTaliban - Non-Pashtuns

Recruitment of non-PashtunsTaliban attitude changed in 2006Now actively recruiting non-PashtunsUzbeks, Tajeks and Turkmen

Ethnically mixed Taliban fronts now being seen

Non-Pashtun appointed local commandersTo connect to non-Pashtun village elders

44Fall 2012

MILITARY - FactsEthnic Composition in the North

45Fall 2012

Source: European Asylum Support Office.(2012, July). Afghanistan Taliban Strategies – Recruitment. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/european-asylum-support-office/bz3012564enc_complet_en.pdf

MILITARY - FactsTaliban Insurgent Activity

46Fall 2012

Source: Radin, CJ. (2012, March 22). ISAF's new plan for Afghanistan. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/03/us_general_john_alle.php

MILITARY - FactsWarlords

Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989Soviet supported government fell in 1992Mujahideen factions formed coalitions

Tajiks and Uzbeks in the northHazaras in the centerPashtuns in the east and south

Civil war 1992 to 1996Competing factions

47Fall 2012


Government formed in 1992Some Uzbek and Tajik joined mujahideenRegional strongmen controlled local communitiesGovernment had no control

Competing factionsFought street battlesAbused local populationExtortion

48Fall 2012


Ousted by Taliban in 1996Small pockets in the north formed alliance

Fought against Taliban during coalition invasion

Invited to join Karzai in government

49Fall 2012

1. ANA ethnically fracture after 2014

2. ANSF unable to defeat the Taliban

3. ANSF members join insurgents and militias

50Fall 2012

ANA dominated by Pashtun and TajikEthnic minorities resort to bribery for time off

Many don’t returnSapping morale

Ethnic fissures and patronage networks

Commanders cultivate circle of ethnic friends

51Fall 2012

ANA Ethnically Fracture after 2014ANSF Ethnic Groups

52Fall 2012

ANSF Unable to Defeat the TalibanCapabilities

MinistriesMinistries of Defense and Ministries of Interior

Neither rated as capable of autonomous operations

ANSFHighest rated units have gone down

From IndependentTo independent with advisors

53Fall 2012

ANSF Unable to Defeat the TalibanCapability Milestone (CM) Rating

CM-1A: capable of autonomous operations

CM-1B: capable of executing functions with coalition oversight only

CM-2A: capable of executing functions with minimal coalition assistance

CM-2B: can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance

CM-3: cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance

CM-4: exists but cannot accomplish its mission

54Fall 2012

ANSF Unable to Defeat the TalibanMoD and MoI Capability Ratings

55Fall 2012


ANSF Unable to Defeat the TalibanCommander’s Unit Assessment Tool

Independent with Advisors:able to plan and execute its missionsmaintain command and control of subordinates

Effective with Advisors: Coalition forces provide only limited, occasional guidance to unit personnel

Effective with Partners: The unit requires routine mentoring

Developing with Partners: The unit requires partnering and assistance

56Fall 2012

ANSF unable to Defeat the TalibanCUAT ANSF Ratings-Quarterly Change

57Fall 2012


ANSF Unable to Defeat the TalibanANSF Literacy

86 percent of recruits illiterateCannot read

MapsTraining manuals

Specialized fields cannot be taughtLogisticsCommunications

58Fall 2012

ANSF Unable to Defeat the TalibanANSF Literacy

Hampering development of support systemsPersonnel managementLogistics

EquipmentFuel

Fuels corruptionSupervisors steal subordinates pay leads to:

ShakedownsIllegal checkpoints

Literacy training program started

59Fall 2012

ANSF unable to Defeat the TalibanANSF Drug Use

Drugs are a continuing problem

Drug tests 201017 percent tested positive

Rate likely understatedGhazni and Paktika Provinces

At least 50 percent positive

60Fall 2012

ANSF Unable to Defeat the TalibanANA Morale

Green on Blue attacksAffect moraleEroded trustHampered training effortsStruggle to fulfill mission requirementsStrained relationships

According to NATO/ISAF37 so far in 201225% had direct enemy planning support

61Fall 2012

ANSF unable to Defeat the TalibanANA Morale

Lack of leadershipQuick promotion of those who can read

Leadership abilities may not merit promotionOne of the reasons for low morale

Experienced NCOs in short supply

PaySoldiers not getting paid on timeMilitias pay moreInsurgents pay more

Soldiers going absent without leaveSoldiers go AWOL if fighting erupts

To join insurgents or militias

62Fall 2012

ANSF Members Join Insurgents/MilitiasBarracks and Garrisons Operation and Maintenance

ANSF lack personnel with technical skillsOperate and maintain critical facilities

MoD procurementUnable to provide O&M supplies

Slow procurement process

MoI budgetLate making allocation for O&M at police sitesFacilities

Poor construction qualityDifficulty obtaining parts and equipment

63Fall 2012

ANSF Members Join Insurgents/MilitiasFinancial Support

Paying for the ANSFFew taxes raised to pay for ANSF

Depends on US

ANSF target 352,000 by 2014Afghan government needs financial supportForce to be reduced to 228,500

125,000 soldiers unemployed Political disquietCriminalityConflict

ANSF members begin to join insurgents by mid 2015

64Fall 2012

Military Insurgents Judgments

1. Peace cannot be negotiated

2. Al-Qaida Sabotages Peace Efforts

3. Pakistan Sabotages Peace Efforts

4. Civil war in 3 to 4 years: 2015-2016

65Fall 2012

Peace cannot be negotiatedTaliban Demands

Precondition for talksWithdrawal of foreign troopsRecognition as legitimate interlocutor

Constitutional changesWill not accept current constitution

Greater role for Islamic law in legislation

Power sharingNot willing to join Karzai’s system

Karzai has power to make any changes he wantsNo guarantees deal will be respected in medium to long term

66Fall 2012

Peace cannot be negotiatedTaliban Demands

Afghan security forcesStaffed with bitter enemies

Taliban would not want to disarm

Financial packageMake up for lost revenue (e.g. Taxes)

67Fall 2012

Al-Qaida sabotages peace efforts

Forced back to Afghanistan from PakistanAmerican drone strikes

Joined up with TalibanProvide tactical and technical adviceTaliban dependent on Al-Qaida

Training Taliban bomb makersMaking bombs and IEDsPlanning sophisticated attacks

68Fall 2012

Al-Qaida sabotages peace efforts

Many Taliban leaders want peaceMany want to break ties with Al-Qaida

Breaking ties with Al-Qaida is a condition for talks

Taliban may refuseBecause of fear and pride

Al-Qaida pressuring to continue warTried to kill former treasury minister Mullah Agha Jan Motasim• Urged insurgents to seek political solution

69Fall 2012

Pakistan Sabotages Peace Efforts

Taliban in tribal regions of Pakistan

Pakistan wants to participate in any talksWilling to wreck negotiations if it is not

Arrested Taliban leader for negotiating without Islamabad

Sees Afghanistan as its sphere of influenceWants a regime loyal to Islamabad

Will not allow regime loyal to New Delhi

70Fall 2012

Civil WarWarlords

IranDoes not want a Taliban governmentSupports the northern alliance warlords

WarlordsFought with the coalition to defeat the TalibanDo not want to lose their government seatsCorrupt

71Fall 2012

Civil WarRegional Powers

PakistanWants a Pakistan friendly Afghan government

Doesn’t want an India friendly governmentSupports the Taliban and other proxies

Taliban controls most of its Afghanistan borderIncreasing support in readiness of NATO withdrawalNato not going to withdraw

Other regional powersIndia and Iran doing the same with their proxies

Could tip the balance towards civil war

72Fall 2012

Civil WarGovernment Forces

ANSFNot yet capable of defending country

Northern alliance re-armingIsmail Khan has called followers to reorganize

Have little faith in the ANSFMay hasten a conflict with Taliban

TalibanExpected to take back lost areas in south and east

Peace talksMay succeed in the short term

Differences between factions will likely lead to civil war

73Fall 2012

Civil WarAfghan Local Police

US Training local militiasProgram taking on life of its own

Militias asserting authorityCommitting crimes against civiliansGrouping into factions

Ruling over areas of AfghanistanCountry being divided into fiefdoms

Militias will join forces with warlordsFight against the Taliban when NATO leaves

74Fall 2012

Civil War

Start by end of 2015After build-up of forces

Impact on U.S.Must prevent Al Qaida establishing itself again

Destroy Al Qaida training campsKill leaders

Continue drone attacksSpecial forces presence

Support government and ANSFBear brunt of annual $4bn cost

75Fall 2012

Alternative Judgments

Pakistan collapses

Al Qaida Returns to Afghanistan

Power Devolved to the Provinces

76Fall 2012

Pakistan CollapsesMilitary carrying out operations against terrorists

Obligations to the U.S.

U.S. activities unpopular in Pakistan societyAnti-terrorist operations in border regions

People suffering and being killed

Taliban political resurgence in the westAfghanistan civil war

Islamic insurgency threatens Pakistan government

Fall 2012 77

Pakistan Collapses

Strengthening of political IslamReligious right alliance

Seeking political powerIslamism suffusing society

14 year old imprisoned for flying a kite

Pakistani TalibanSupporters of Afghan Taliban in tribal areas

Transitioned to Taliban forceReaction to Pakistani army incursion into tribal areas

78Fall 2012

Pakistan CollapsesIslamist Army Faction and Militant allies

Seize power to create radical Islamist stateGain control of some of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal

Supports Afghan TalibanConsolidate grip on Afghan southern and eastern regionsPakistan and Afghan Taliban join forces

Break away from Pakistan and AfghanistanCreate new state of Pashtunistan

RiskLow

Requires disintegration of the armyWar, ethnic or sectarian differences

Fall 2012 79

Pakistan CollapsesPashtunistan

80Fall 2012

Source: Zeb, Jahan. (2012, April 5). The Pashtun Land – Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, Afghanistan, Pakistan. Retrieved 12/06/2012 from http://pdc-afpak.blogspot.com/2012/04/pashtun-land-khyber-pakhtunkhwa-fata.html

Al Qaida Returns to AfghanistanGroup is active in Afghanistan

Spreading extremist messagesRaising moneyRecruitingProviding military expertise to the Taliban

Building ties with Afghan Islamic militant groupsPakistan-based Lashkar-e-TaibaNorth Afghanistan Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

Fall 2012 81

Al Qaida Returns to AfghanistanEastern Afghanistan

Expanded support networkStrong relationship with Haqqani network

Retains a command structure in AfghanistanWant to take advantage of Americans leaving

Increasing their numbersLaunch new attacks from AfghanistanRisk

High

82Fall 2012

Power Devolved to the ProvincesLong history of weak central government

Unable to govern in rural areas

Limited central governmentU.S. assistance to national government

Focused on supporting matters of stateTerritorial integrityInternal securityNational infrastructure development

Delegate power to local leadership councils

Fall 2012 83

Power Devolved to the ProvincesCedes south and east to the Taliban

Minority groups would not opposeUS support Pashtun militias in Afghanistan

Pakistan supports Haqqanis infiltration into AfganistanUS supports Afghan Pashtun militia infiltration into Pakistan FATA

Provides leverage over Pakistan

Prevents civil warRisk

Medium

Fall 2012 84

Military EstimateSummary

Peace cannot be negotiated Risk

HighWhen

Between 2012 and 2014Reasons

Taliban want greater role for Islamic law in legislationNot willing to join Karzai’s systemTaliban would not want to disarmPressure from Al-Qaida

85Fall 2012


ANA ethnically fracture after 2014Risk

HighWhen

Start to occur in early 2015Reasons

Ethnic divisions and patronage networksCultivation of friends from same ethnic backgroundPashtun minority in the army

Ethnic discriminationDesertions

86Fall 2012


ANSF members join Insurgents and MilitiasRisk

HighWhen

Start from mid 2015Reasons

ANA morale lowInsurgents and militias pay moreAfghan government cannot afford ANSF annual cost

ANSF to be reduced to 228,500125,000 soldiers unemployed

87Fall 2012


ANSF unable to defeat the TalibanRisk

HighWhen

2015 to 2016Reasons

Units aren’t readyDrug abuse and IlliteracyLack of Leadership and corruption

Ethnic tensionsLow moraleDesertions

88Fall 2012

Military EstimateSummaryCivil war

RiskHigh

WhenWar starts by end of 2015

ReasonsInsurgent leaders based in Pakistan will returnNot enough NATO troops to combat TalibanANSF not competent to defend against insurgentsPakistan and Al Qaida sabotage peace efforts

89Fall 2012

Political\Diplomatic estimateMap of Afghanistan tribal areas and neighboring countries

(NOTE: tribal areas bleed over national borders)

Source: United States Army Combined Arms Center. Retrieved from:http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/10-64/ch_4.asp

Fall 2012 90

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC - FactsPolitically Afghanistan is in the Muslim countries of the Mid-east region

Islamic Republic 34 provinces

Landlocked bordersPakistanIranTurkmenistanUzbekistanTajikistan China

Current Afghan Constitution found here: http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html

Fall 2012 91

http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html



POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC - Facts

Legal system mixedCivil, custom, Islamic law

Islamic law % not available

Current President Hamid Karzai (re-elected in 2009)Vice Presidents

Mohammad FAHIM KhanAbdul Karim KHALILI

25 appointed ministers

Fall 2012 92

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsEthnic Tribal Groups Percentages

Pashtun - 42%Tajik – 27%Hazara – 9%Uzbek – 9%Aimak – 4%Turkman – 3%Baloch – 2%Other – 4%

Fall 2012 93

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsEnthnicity

Ethnic group Members in Loya Jirga (including 68 women: 27%)

Pashtun 96

Hazara 61

Tajik 53

Uzbek 15

Aimak 8

Arab 8

Turkmen 3

Nuristani 2

Baloch 1

Pahhai 1

Turkic 1

Source: CIA world fact book Afghanistan. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

Fall 2012 94

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsParty Ideology

Party IdeologyAfghan Liberal Party SecularRepublican Party of Afghanistan RepublicanismAfghan Social Democratic Party Social DemocracyAll other legal parties Islamist

Currently the Taliban and also Communist parties are not legal

Source: Political parties/groups and leaders in Afghanistan. Retrieved from:http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/parties.html

Fall 2012 95

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsPolitical Party includes only political parties approved by the Ministry of Justice

Leader

Afghanistan's Islamic Mission Organization

Abdul Rasoul SAYYAF

Afghanistan's Welfare Party Meer Asef ZAEEFI

Afghan Social Democratic Party Anwarul Haq AHADI

Islamic Movement of Afghanistan Sayed Hussain ANWARI

Islamic Party of Afghanistan Mohammad Khalid FAROOQI and Abdul Hadi ARGHANDIWAL

Islamic Society of Afghanistan Salahuddin RABBANI

Islamic Unity of the Nation of Afghanistan Party

Qurban Ali URFANI

Fall 2012 96

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsPolitical Party includes only political parties approved by the Ministry of Justice

Leader

Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan Mohammad Karim KHALILIIslamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan

Haji Mohammad MOHAQQEQ

Law and Justice Party Hanif ATMARNational Islamic Movement of Afghanistan

Pir Sayed Ahmad GAILANEE

National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan

Sayed NOORULLAH

National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan

Pir Sayed Eshaq GAILANEE

National Linkage Party of Afghanistan Sayed Mansoor NADERYUnited Islamic Party of Afghanistan Ustad Mohammad AKBARI

Fall 2012 97

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsLanguages

Afghan Persian or Dari (official) 50%

Pashto (official) 35%

Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) 11%

30 minor languages Primarily Balochi Pashai 4%

Bilingualism is very present but Dari functions as lingua Franca

Fall 2012 98

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsPolitical Influencers

Minority religious groups and other sects within Sunni and Shia branches

Sunni – 84%Shia – 15%Other – 1%

Tribal leaders

Local leaders of the various ethnic groups

Taliban

Fall 2012 99

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsUS Ambassador to Afghanistan

James B. Cunningham

Afghanistan Ambassador to US

Ekil Ahmad HAKIMI

Age % of Population

Males Females

0-14 yos 43.2% 6.67 million

6.46 million

15-64 yos 54.4% 8.41 million

8.12 million

65 yos + 2.5% 350 ,000 401,000

Population 30 million (July 2012 est)Median age is 17.9 years

Source: CIA world fact book Afghanistan. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

Fall 2012 100

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsHealth

0.21 physicians per 1,000 population

Infectious diseaseBacterial and protozoal diarrhea Hepatitis ATyphoid feverMalaria Rabies

Malnourishment 32.9% of children under the age of 5

Fall 2012 101

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsAfghan Diplomatic Issues

Border issues with Pakistan and Iran

World’s largest producer of opiumRough relationship with US and other developing countries who struggle with drugs domestically Further increases challenges with neighbors through whom the drugs must pass to reach markets

Taliban still a major issueBehind the scene Terrorism complicating Af/Pak relationship further

Fall 2012 102

During January of 2010 a study collected by UNODC, examined the corruption within the Afghan Government

Determined bribery is an Issue

Fall 2012 103

Yes No Don’t remember No answer Total

East-central 53.1 36.6 1.9 8.4 100.0

Northern 60.9 30.5 3.8 4.7 100.0

Southern 61.5 28.5 2.0 8.1 100.0

Western 20.7 55.8 4.9 18.6 100.0

Total 52.2 36.4 2.9 8.5 100.0

Percentage of adult population who paid at least one bribe to a public official during the last 12 months, by region

Source: Corruption in Afghanistan. Retrieved from:http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Anti-Corruption/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_Bribery_Reported_by_Victims_2010-Eng.pdf

Fall 2012 104


Fall 2012 105

Higher incidence of bribery in small towns

i.e. Tirin Kot and Mihtar Lam bribe rates > 70%

Lowest figures were in large cities

< 40% in Kabul and Hirat

Fall 2012 106


Fall 2012 107

“At the moment, the Afghani people are under the impression that it is cheaper to buy a judge than hire a lawyer”.

-Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director, UNODC


Fall 2012 108


Fall 2012 109

40% of citizens were forced to pay an official a bribe

25% were forced to pay a bribe to police officers

18% were forced to pay a bribe to a judge

13% were forced to pay a bribe to a prosecutor

Fall 2012 110


Speed up procedure

Make finalization of procedure possible

Avoid payment of fine

Reduce cost of procedures for me

Receive better treatment

Receiving information on the process

No specific purpose

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

Bribes paid by purpose, as percentage of bribes paid (urban areas)


Fall 2012 111



Fall 2012 112

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsWater Issues with Iran

Water consumption in upstream Afghanistan negatively affects water supply to Iran

Afghan construction of hydro-electric damsIran perceives as direct security threat

Shared Iran and Afghan water sourcesHelmund and Harirod-Murghab basinsNo active agreement

Fall 2012 113

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsWater Issues with Iran – Afgan River Systems

Source: Hanasz, P. (2012, March 1). The Politics of Water Security between Afghanistan and Iran. Retrieved from http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/food-and-water-crises/416-the-politics-of-water-security-between-afghanistan-and-iran.html

Fall 2012 114

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsWater Issues with Iran

Increasing human strain on Sistan wetlandsStrain due to mass migration

Leads to environmental disaster

Unlikely issues will be resolved No positive collaboration between Iran and Afghanistan

Fall 2012 115

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsPashtun Tribal Lands

“Afghanistan shares borders with six countries, but the approximate 1500-mile-long Durand Line along Pakistan remains the most dangerous”

- Jayshree Banjoria (2009) Council on Foreign Relations

Pashtun tribal lands in Pakistan long claimed by Afghanistan as part of their own tribal region

Source: Bajoria, J. (2009, March 20). The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afghan-pakistani-border/p14905

Fall 2012 116

JUDGMENTS - Political\Diplomatic

High risk of Taliban led civil war by EOY 2015

High risk of infectious disease outbreaksFood/water-borne, vector-borne, animal-borne diseases

High risk of rapid expansion of drug trade

High risk of Infiltration of foreign agents from Iran, Pakistan and other extra-nationals

Fall 2012 117

Civil War - Political\Diplomatic

High risk of Taliban led Civil WarLongstanding tribal boundaries creates significant distrust between factions

Lack of funds for ANSF accelerates return of ANSF forces to their home villages

Warlords gain huge influx of trained soldiers

Fall 2012 118

Civil War - Political\Diplomatic

High risk of Taliban led Civil War (cont.)Taliban aiding farmers to grow poppies in south

Government unable to provide for their citizens

Citizenry less loyal to central government than to local leaders

Afghanistan vulnerable to insurgents from Taliban and Iran

Fall 2012 119

Civil War - Political\DiplomaticEvidence

ANA ethnically fracturing after 2014

ANSF inability to defeat the Taliban

Increasing Green on Blue attacks reveals influence of Taliban

Corruption at all levels of government leaving many feeling disaffected and overlooked

Fall 2012 120


85% of funds being spent on security

These funds at risk of shrinking rapidly due to donor fatigue and inability to meet Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework

Fall 2012 121


Coalition force leaving slows economy

Increasing pressure on politicians to improve economy

Corruption will increase

Fall 2012 122

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATICCivil War Risk

High risk of civil war due to:Deteriorating domestic security conditions

Reducing of foreign aid

Dependence on the poppy fields for GDP growth

Decreasing participation by the US and allied forces

Chaos due to Taliban efforts

Fall 2012 123

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATICHigh risk of infectious disease outbreaks

Coalition forces withdraw: Afghan left with weakened medical system

Just 21 doctors per 100,000

Increase of water/sanitation modest at best according to the WHO

Fall 2012 124


Source: Afghan Health Profile. Retrieved from: http://www.who.int/gho/countries/afg.pdf

Fall 2012 125


According to the WHO, contributing factors to the government’s inability to provide a higher level of health is due to:

Limited fiscal resources

Poor security Terrorism and criminals

Weak governmentCorruption

Poor business sectorTerrorism and drugs

Growing narcotics - opium

Fall 2012 126


High risk food/water-borne diseasesDiarrhea bacterialHepatitis ADiarrhea-ProtozoalTyphoid/paratyphoid fever

High risk vector-borne diseasesMalaria

High risk animal-contact diseasesRabies

Fall 2012 127

Disease - Political\DiplomaticTop 10 illnesses (2007) include diarrhea and Malaria

Source:http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccs_afg_en.pdf

Fall 2012 128

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATICDisease - Alternative

Easiest infectious diseases to fight are food/water borne through sanitation efforts

The WHO, US, and other international organizations may provide:

Free clinicsInoculation campaigns Production of crops to replace poppy crops in some regionsDigging of wells to provide safe water and better sanitation

Civil war may be averted avoiding deterioration of general health and welfare

Fall 2012 129

Drug Trade - Political\Diplomatic

High risk of rapid expansion of drug trade

Taliban helping farmers in south to grow poppy

Taliban as middlemen to sell drug cartels

Profits then used for pending civil war

Fall 2012 130

Infiltration - Political\Diplomatic

Infiltration of foreign agents from:IranPakistanOther extra-nationals such as Al Qaida

Afghani’s alienated by the government and weakly functioning state agencies

Fall 2012 131


State cannot be trusted (crimes unpunished)MurderExtortion Land theft

August 2012 Mullah Omar (Taliban leader) bragged of infiltration into Afghan forces

Fall 2012 132


UN acting to counter infiltration of ANSF

Iran denying refuge to Afghani’s creating opportunities for embedding agents

Iranian currency is growing in basic trade on Afghani market

Iran providing aid to bolster Afghanistan

Fall 2012 133


Afghani’s concerned about growing Iranian influenceNOTE growth of Iran friendly media outlets

Source: Behn, S. (2012, November 27). Afghans Worry About Iran's Growing Influence. Retrieved from:http://www.voanews.com/content/afghan-worry-about-iran-growing-incluence/1553651.html

Fall 2012 134


Iran and Afghanistan have long standing dispute over rights to water

Large migrations of displaced Afghani’s reignite old disputes

Iranian weapons found in Afghanistan19 tons of explosive devices48 Rockets range-20 kmExplosively formed projectiles (EFP)

Alleged spies claim to be trained by Iran Revolutionary Guard

Fall 2012 135


Iranian support of insurgentsTraining, arming, and directing attacks

Chinese-Afghanistan relations: China exports trade into Afghanistan

Pakistan is Afghanistan strongest neighboring trade partner

shares antagonists: Islamist insurgents in tribal regions

Fall 2012 136


Pakistan is an important ally to help Afghanistan survive a civil war

Only if Pakistan can avoid its own disintegration

Tribal regions in Pakistan support insurgents causing friction with Pakistan

Fall 2012 137


Very High Risk of infiltration due to:

Afghan Taliban placing agents into ANSF

Iran providing support to insurgentsTraining, arming, directing attacks for insurgentsLikely inserting agents into Afghanistan

Fall 2012 138

Infiltration - Political\DiplomaticAlternatives

Alternative: Pakistan may fall dragging Afghanistan with them into civil wars

Alternative: Iran will step in and provide a stabilizing force in exchange for concessions in trade and with the water supply

Fall 2012 139

Political\Diplomatic Summary

Civil WarRisk

HighWhen

EOY 2015Reasons

Deteriorating domestic security conditionsReducing of foreign aidDependence on the poppy fields for GDP growthDecreasing participation by the US and allied forcesChaos due to Taliban efforts

Fall 2012 140


Increased infectious disease outbreaksRisk

HighWhen

Mid year 2014Reasons

Poor Sanitation will worsen with reduced funding and no assistance from coalition forces

Fall 2012 141


Rapid expansion of drug tradeRisk

HighWhen

2014Reasons

Taliban helping farmers in south to grow poppyTaliban as middlemen to sell drug cartelsProfits then used for pending civil war

Fall 2012 142


Infiltration of ANSFRisk

Very HighWhen

2014Reasons

Afghan Taliban placing agents into ANSFIran providing support to insurgents

Training, arming, directing attacks for insurgentsLikely inserting agents into Afghanistan

Fall 2012 143

Economic Estimate

144Fall 2012

ECONOMIC – FactsCurrent State of Afghan Economy

Growing strongly

Significant growth Foreign aidGood harvest Services and construction sectors growing because of high military spending and external aid

145Fall 2012

ECONOMIC – FactsHistorical Trends Overview

Mid 1950’sLacked necessary social organization and institutions for modern economic activities

Also lacked managerial and technical skills

Afghanistan on a much lower stage of economic development than most of it’s neighbors

Fall 2012 146

ECONOMIC – FactsHistorical Trends Overview

Between 1956 and 1979Economic growth was guided by several five-year and seven-year plansAlso aided by extensive foreign assistance

Aid accounted for more than 4/5 of government investment and development expenditures

Primarily from the US and Soviet Union

Fall 2012 147

ECONOMIC – Facts Historical Trends Overview

Improvements during 1956 and 1979 include:Construction of roads, dams, power plants, factoriesIrrigation projects carried outEducation broadened

1970’sSale of natural gas to Soviet UnionAlbeit at a bargain priceMore than compensated in financing budget expenditures

Fall 2012 148


1990’sEconomic collapse – economy sunk lower than period of communist rule

Further declined under Mujahideen and Taliban governments

Economic activity flourished mostly in illicit enterprises

Growing opium poppies for heroin productionSmuggling goods

Fall 2012 149


OpiumBecame Taliban’s primary source of incomeOvershadowed the taxing of opium trafficking

By the late 1990’s Afghanistan became the world’s largest producer of opium

Afghan Opium field

Source: Afghanistan (n.d.). Brittanica. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/7798/Afghanistan/21426/Demographic-trends

Fall 2012 150

ECONOMIC – FactsGross Domestic Product (GDP)

Explaining GDPThe monetary value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders

Includes all of private and public consumptiongovernment outlays, investments, and exports less imports that occur within a defined territory

Fall 2012

Source: Gross domestic product - gdp. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp

151


GDP= C + G + I + NX :"C" is equal to all private consumption, or consumer spending, in a nation's economy

"G" is the sum of government spending

"I" is the sum of all the country's businesses spending on capital

"NX" is the nation's total net exports, calculated as total exports minus total imports. (NX = Exports - Imports)


Fall 2012 152


GDP- indicator of the economic health of a country and standard of living

Critics of using GDP does not take into account the underground economy

GDP is not intended to gauge material well-being, but serves as a measure of a nation's productivity


Fall 2012 153


Despite the progress the past few years, economy is poor

LandlockedHighly dependent on foreign aid

Much of population continues to suffer from:Shortages of housingClean waterElectricityMedical careJobs

Fall 2012 154


Challenges to future economic growth

Criminality

Insecurity

Weak governanceDifficulty in extending rule of law to all parts of country

Fall 2012 155


Medium outlook is optimistic

Foreign aid has been pledged at July 2012 Tokyo conference

16 Billion over 4 years

Long term outlook is less clearPolitical changes, corruption, violence, and reduction in foreign aid will have a large effect on state of the economy

Fall 2012 156


Population:30.2 million

GDP (PPP):$27.4 billion,8.2% growth in 2010 5-year compound annual growth 10.2% $907 per capita

Unemployment: 35.0%

Inflation (CPI): 8.0%

FDI Inflows: $75.7 million

Public Debt: n/a

Fall 2012 157

ECONOMIC – FactsGDP Growth

Fall 2012

Source: Brookings Institute: “Afghanistan Index”

158

ECONOMIC – FactsGDP Growth

Source: “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014”. The World Bank.

Fall 2012 159

ECONOMIC – FactsComposition of GDP Growth

Source: Center for Strategic & International Studies, “Creating the Economic Conditions”

Fall 2012 160

Economic-FactsDependency of Foreign Aid

Source: “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014”. The World Bank.

Fall 2012 161

ECONOMICDependency on Foreign Aid

Excluding international military spendingSource: “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond

2014”. The World Bank.

Fall 2012 162

ECONOMICAfghan Estimates and Indicators

Source: Poole, L. (2011). Afghanistan: Tracking major resource flows 2002-2010. Retrieved from http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/gha-Afghanistan-2011-major-resource-flows.pdf

Fall 2012 163

ECONOMICPast Assistance


Fall 2012 164

ECONOMICPast Assistance


Fall 2012 165

ECONOMICU.S. Assistance to Afghanistan: FY2009/2010 Appropriations and FY2010

Supplemental/FY2011 Requests (in $ millions)

Source: Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance. Curt Tarnoff. Specialist in Foreign Affairs. August 12, 2010

Fall 2012 166

ECONOMICCurrent Assistance

Source: Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance. Curt Tarnoff. Specialist in Foreign Affairs. August 12, 2010

Fall 2012 167

Economic Judgment

Afghanistan is too dependent of foreign aid

Fall 2012 168

ECONOMICAffect of Military Drawdown

Thousands of jobs held by Afghans under contracts financed by the State Department and USAID will be lost

American civilians working in the country expected to go down as the number of development projects decrease

Fall 2012 169

ECONOMICAffect of Military Drawdown

Troop withdrawals will hurt development aid in Afghanistan

Initial estimates indicate that it will cost $6 billion annually to maintain Afghan security forces following the drawdown

About three times Afghanistan’s current national tax revenues

Currently, 90 percent of the Afghan government’s budget comes from foreign sources

About 97 percent of the country’s GDP has come to depend on foreign aid and international military spending as well

Source: Byrd, W., Nassif, C., & Osorio, C. (2012). Retrieved from website: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Images/305983-1334954629964/AFTransition2014Vol2.pdf

Fall 2012 170

ECONOMICAfghanistan Faces Downturn

Risk of a deep financial crisis when foreign troops leave in 2014

If the United States is unable to overhaul its multibillion-dollar package of nation-building assistance

Source: Cassata, D. (2011, June 8). Report: Afghanistan faces economic downturn. Retrieved from http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/06/ap-report-afghanistan-faces-economic-downturn-060811

Fall 2012 171

ECONOMICAFGHANISTAN PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRT)

PRTs in Afghanistan are key instruments delivers assistance at the provincial and district level

Improve security support good governance and enhance provincial development

Combination of international civilian and military resources allows PRT to have wide latitude to implement their mandate

PRT generally covers one province in Afghanistan- currently 26 PRTs operating in Afghanistan

Source: Provincial reconstruction teams. (2012, April). Retrieved from http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/partnerships/partners_provincial_resconstruction_teams

Fall 2012 172

ECONOMICAFGHANISTAN PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

PRTs establish an environment that is secure and stable for aid agencies/civilian reconstruction efforts

PRTs able to deliver development and support to less secure areas

USAID’s programs attempt to work with PRTs to deliver services in less secure or underserved areas of Afghanistan


Fall 2012 173

ECONOMICAFGHANISTAN PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRT)

USAID has personnel in 19 PRTs across Afghanistan

USAID officers monitor all U.S. development efforts in the area of responsibility of the PRT

Implement PRT-specific programming

PRT works to: build relationships with local leadersidentify local needsreport on significant developments


Fall 2012 174

ECONOMICAFGHANISTAN PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

Troop withdraw presents challenges for the reconstruction effort

Difficult for U.S. agencies to implement and monitor projects at the provincial and local levels

NATO/ISAF troops have provided security for both the PRTs and officials traveling outside of Kabul

Likely to become harder for SIGAR and other oversight agencies to visit and assess projects

Fall 2012 175

ECONOMICAFFECTS ON POVERTY AFTER US WITHDRAWAL

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world

Reduction in foreign military will increase unemployment

Poverty has increased in the last ten yearsFailure to counter the root causes contributing to poverty despite billions of dollars of foreign aid

Fall 2012 176

ECONOMICREGIONAL AFGHAN MUNICIPALITIES PROGRAM FOR URBAN POPULATIONS

The Regional Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations (RAMP UP) assists governments in urban centers

increase the capacity of municipal officials

improve the delivery of municipal services

support economic growth initiatives

increase own-source revenues

Fall 2012 177

ECONOMICREGIONAL AFGHAN MUNICIPALITIES PROGRAM FOR URBAN POPULATIONS

USAID funds small service delivery improvements and small-scale infrastructure projects such as:

road pavingparkssolid waste management

Community projects seek to develop municipal management capacity while improving service and delivery

Increases the amount of locally generated revenue

Fall 2012 178

ECONOMICAfghanistan Workforce Development Program

USAID’s Afghanistan Workforce Development Program (AWDP) offers access for 25,000 Afghan men and women to:

labor-market-driven vocational education and training

business-development support

business-management training programs

financial credit

job-placement servicesSpecial Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, (2012). Quarterly report on afghanistan. Retrieved from website: http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2012-10-30qr.pdf

Fall 2012 179


Goal of the program isFacilitate job creationDevelop a skilled and semi-skilled workforceIncrease self-employment, and promote economic growth in Afghanistan

Program aims to provide alternatives to illicit economic and insurgent activities

Fall 2012 180


Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, (2012). Quarterly report on afghanistan. Retrieved from website: http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2012-10-30qr.pdf

Fall 2012 181

ECONOMICEmployment After Withdrawal

Combat vets hope to create Afghan jobs with footwear

Company is paying Afghan workers to produce high-quality flip-flops

Combat Flip Flops, an Issaquah-based online store selling flip-flops made in Kabul

Fall 2012 182

ECONOMICCurrent Job Market in Afghanistan

Agency coordinating body for afghan relief. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.acbar.org/

Fall 2012 183

ECONOMICEmployment/Military Relationship

Chart: Number of contractors in afghanistan will surge as u.s. troops withdraw. (2011, June 29). Retrieved from http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/06/29/256726/afghanistan-contractors-surge/?mobile=nc

Fall 2012 184

Judgments on Reduction of Foreign Troops

Military drawdown will reduce spending in Afghanistan

Jobs and revenue will decrease with decrease in foreign troop levels

Reduction in PRT will negatively impact growth

Fall 2012 185

ECONOMICNew Silk Road Initiative

The State Department’s “New Silk Road” initiative:

A key element of the U.S. development strategy in Afghanistan

Seeks greater regional economic integration Free movement of goods, services, capital, and people between Afghanistan and its neighbors

Fall 2012 186

ECONOMICNew Silk Road Initiative Issues

Afghan neighbors and regional powersLittle interest in investment or integrating their economies with Afghanistan

Chinese and Indian firms have won major mining contracts potentially worth billions

Neither has made the infrastructure investments required to start breaking ground

Fall 2012 187

Economic Judgment

“New Silk Road” won’t takeoff because of instability and lack of interest in Afghanistan investment

Fall 2012 188

EconomicCorruption will impede Foreign Aid

Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework:

Aid depends on government’s ability/willingness to reduce corruption

Reduce corruption in government, law, public finance

Improve human rights for children and women

Fall 2012 189

ECONOMICCorruption will impede Foreign Aid

Misspent foreign aid can lead to:CorruptionAltering of markets Lack of ability of the Kabul government to control its resources

World Bank found that 97 percent of the GDP in Afghanistan is linked to spending by the international military and donor community

Fall 2012 190

ECONOMIC Historical Examples of Aid Reduction- “Donor Fatigue"

Source: Center for Strategic & International Studies, “Creating the Economic Conditions”

Fall 2012 191

ECONOMICFailure to follow through on aid

Highly likely that much of the aid pledge at the Tokyo Conference will never make it to Afghanistan

Many governments have currently yet to come up with funding

Europe’s debt crisis has raised fears that some of the pledges won’t be fulfilled

Fall 2012 192

Economic Judgment

Donor fatigue and corruption will lead to reduction in aid

Fall 2012 193

ECONOMICAfghan Agriculture

Agriculture is volatile

Cannot be relied upon for economic prosperity

Source: Central Statistics Office (2011): http://cso.gov.af/en

Fall 2012 194

ECONOMICAfghan Agriculture

20-30% of the GDP depending on harvest and weather

Wheat makes up 75% of aggregated licit agriculture

Crops are highly dependent on rainDry seasons/drought determine %GDP

Fall 2012 195

ECONOMICAgriculture and GDP Relationship

Source: The World Band: “Afghanistan Economic Update”

Fall 2012 196

Economic Judgment

Agriculture is too volatile to be relied upon for economic growth and won’t sustain economy

Fall 2012 197

ECONOMICMining

Assessment, extraction processing, transportation and sales

Require high investment and significant time

Investment will be limited because of instability

Reduction in foreign assistance will delay startup costs

Fall 2012 198

ECONOMICMining

Current legislative and regulatory environment is unfavorable for investment

Progress in developing Aynak copper mine is lagging behind schedule

Developer has recently withdrawn most of its foreign staff due to security instability

Fall 2012 199

Economic Judgment

Mining affect on GDP is marginal and won’t amount to economic growth

Fall 2012 200

Alternative Judgment

Industrial and service based economy can sustain economy

-Because:Afghanistan’s Agricultural sector cannot sustain the economy

Fall 2012 201

ECONOMICAgriculture cannot sustain economy

Source: CIA World Fact Book https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

Fall 2012 202

ECONOMICAgriculture cannot sustain economy

Source: CIA World Fact Book https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

Fall 2012 203

ECONOMICAgriculture vs. Service and Industrial

Current state of Economics in AfghanistanCurrently 78.6% of the labor force works in agriculture

5.7% of the labor force is industrial, which accounts for 25% for the GDP

As seen in the previous two slides, industrial and services make up only 22% of the labor force, yet accounts for 65% of the GDP

Fall 2012 204


The main crop is not viable for long-term stability

Multi phase transitionContinued aid must be focused on Education and Infrastructure in order to provide for economic stability

End gameService-based economy such as Japan or the U.S.

Shift from Agricultural > Industrial > Service

Fall 2012 205


1%

72%

27%

Japan - GDP by Sector

AgriculturalServicesIndustrial

4%

70%

26%

Japan - Labor force by sector


Source: CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html

Fall 2012 206


17%

56%

26%

U.S. - GPD by Sector


52%

34%

14%

U.S. - Labor Force by Sector


Source: CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html

Fall 2012 207


Multi-phase approach > developing nation approach

Afghanistan economic development must happen in several phases

Industrial sector must first be developed

Focus on education to provide a innovative labor force to continue economic growth

Transition to service-based

Fall 2012 208

ECONOMIC Agriculture vs. Service and Industrial – India developing economy

17%

56%

26%

India - GPD by Sector


52%

34%

14%

India - Labor Force by Sector


Source: CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html

Fall 2012 209

ECONOMIC Agriculture vs. Service and Industrial

How do you get there?

Transition won’t be easily made, first, there must be a strong development in the industrial sector

Currently, approximately 15% of foreign aid is being devoted to Economic Infrastructure and Services development

Funds should be redirected to more impactful areas of the infrastructure

Fall 2012 210

ECONOMICODA = Official Development Assistance

Source: http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/44789608.gif

Fall 2012 211

http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/44789608.gif

ECONOMICAfghan Education

Less than 10% (roughly 6% based on the chart) is being devoted to Education

Necessary to increase in order to have a skilled work force to move Afghanistan towards industrial and service based

Fall 2012 212

ECONOMIC Agriculture vs. Service and Industrial

Once transition to Industrial is made, to continue growth as a world power

Service is the market to get into

Fall 2012 213

Alternative Judgment

Mining can sustain economy

Aid should be focused on industry-mineral / mining and the industries that are associated

If developed properly, mining could become one of Afghanistan’s primary industries

Officials claim deposits – copper, iron ore, oil, gas, niobium, cobalt, gold, molybdenum, silver and lithium could generate $3.5 billion a year

Fall 2012 214

ECONOMICAlternative Hypothesis: Mining Potential

Mining industry could provide the means for Afghanistan to move towards an industrial and service based economy

Mining generates secondary/tertiary industries

Refinement and manufacturing as secondary industries

Retail, trade, and financial as tertiary industries

Fall 2012 215

ECONOMICAlternative Hypothesis: Illicit Opium Economy

Decline in aid may create a reliance on the opium trade or other illicit means for finances

Opium crop provides livelihoods for many rural Afghans

Half of agricultural production is from opium

2011-Farm gate value of opium was 8% of GDP and overall contribution to GDP is around 33% (includes distribution)

Fall 2012 216

EconomicAlternative Hypothesis: Illicit Opium Economy

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: 2011 production value: increased 133% from 2010

1.4 Billion or 9% of GDP

2011 export value: 2.4 billion or 15% of GDP

Farmers can make 11 time more money than wheat

60% of surveyed farmers were “motivated” by profits

Fall 2012 217

ECONOMICOpium Production

Source: Brookings Institute: “Afghanistan Index”

Fall 2012 218

Summary of Military Drawdown Judgments

Military drawdown will reduce spending in Afghanistan

Jobs and revenue will decrease with decrease in foreign troop levels

Reduction in PRT will negatively impact growth

Fall 2012 219

Summary of Additional Judgments• Mining affect on GDP is marginal and won’t amount to

economic growth

• Too Dependent of Foreign Aid

• “New Silk Road” won’t takeoff because of instability and lack of interest in Afghanistan investment

• Agriculture is too volatile to be relied upon for economic growth and won’t sustain economy

• Donor fatigue and corruption will lead to reduction in aid

Fall 2012 220

Collective Summary of Economic Judgments

Won’t be able to sustain itself economically when foreign aid is reduced

Foreign military force reduction will negatively impact economy with troop reductions in 2014

Fall 2012 221

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analysis. Retrieved 12/06/2012 from http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/MILREVIEW_Taliban_Organizational_Analysis.pdf

Aziz, Kalid. (n.d.). Militancy In The Pashtun Belt; Perspective Of A Peace Jirga Participant. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from Http://Www.Khalidaziz.Com/Militancy_In_The_Pashtun_Belt_Final.Pdf

Bajoria, Jayshree & Masters, Jonathan. (2012, September 26). Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-new-generation-terrorists/p15422

Bajoria, J. (2009, March 20). The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afghan-pakistani-border/p14905

Barno, LTG David W. (2010, December). Responsible Transition Securing U.S. Interests in Afghanistan Beyond 2011. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_ResponsibleTransition_BarnoExum_2.pdf

Bisogno, E., del Frate, A.A. & Davis, P. (2010, January). UNODC. Corruption In Afghanistan: Bribery as reported by the victims. Retrieved from http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Anti-Corruption/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_Bribery_Reported_by_Victims_2010-Eng.pdf

Brummet, John. (2010, June 29). Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/2010-06-29audit-10-11.pdf

222Fall 2012

http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-new-generation-terrorists/p15422

http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_ResponsibleTransition_BarnoExum_2.pdf

http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_ResponsibleTransition_BarnoExum_2.pdf

References: PrimaryBudihas, Christopher. (2011, April). What Drives Pakistan's Interest in Afghanistan?

Retrieved 11/15/2012 from http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/Documents/LWP_82_web.pdf

Byrd, W., Nassif, C., & Osorio, C. (2012). Retrieved from website: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Images/305983-1334954629964/AFTransition2014Vol2.pdf

CIA. (2012). Retrieved from Central Intelligence Agency website: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

Checchia, Mark. (PDD). (2012, January). Corruption in the Afghan National Security Forces. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20AFG%20Security%20Archive/CFC_Afghanistan_Corruption-in-ANSF_Jan12.pdf

Cohen, Stephen P. (2011, January). The Future of Pakistan. Retrieved 12/06/2012 from http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/9/bellagio%20conference%20papers/01_pakistan_cohen

Council on Foreign Relations. (2012, July 08). Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/tokyo-mutual-accountability-framework/p28675

Dixon, J. (2009). What Causes Civil Wars? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings. Retrieved from http://www.tarleton.edu/Faculty/jdixon/dixon-cw-initiation.pdf

223Fall 2012

http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/Documents/LWP_82_web.pdf

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/9/bellagio%20conference%20papers/01_pakistan_cohen

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/9/bellagio%20conference%20papers/01_pakistan_cohen

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prof. randall nichols source: cyb 610 – z3fall 2012

Documents

military age

afghan economy reduction

foreign spending fall

military service males

corps kabul

growth of ansf

aid foreign military

security responsibility