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Process Stories: How News Coverage of Political Conflict Shapes

Policy Support

Mary Layton AtkinsonThe University of North Carolina at Charlotte

[email protected]

June 1, 2016

Abstract

Research shows that journalists have strong incentives to focus on the conflict-ladenprocess of policymaking as opposed to the substance of proposed laws. This study examinesthe effects of this framing on individual-level support for policies under debate. I argue thatjournalists’ focus on political conflict heightens the salience of that information—informationthat many Americans view as a sign of a broken political system. As a result, individualsmay reject policies with provisions they like because their opinions are strongly influenced bynegative considerations about the rancorous debate surrounding them. I test this hypothesisusing two experiments and find that the association of a policy with intense conflict decreasessupport for it. The implications of these findings are as clear as they are troubling—manyAmericans will reject policies designed to give them what they want because they are turnedoff by the partisan battles that produced them.

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Decades of research demonstrates that the national news media devote more attention to

political conflict than to the substance of campaign platforms and proposed laws (e.g. Capella

and Jamieson 1996; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Jamieson 1992; Morris and Clawson 2005; Pat-

terson 1993). Journalists can heighten the entertainment value of their reports by focusing on

competition among political elites—and so they craft headlines alluding to battles on Capitol

Hill, highlighting elite strategies, handicapping candidates, and tracking the popularity of pro-

posed laws (Iyengar, Norpoth, Hanh 2004; Zaller 1999). This type of conflict-focused reporting

is, in fact, so common that scholars have identified it as a “generic news frame,” or thematic

template, routinely used by journalists to structure public affairs reports (e.g. de Vreese 2002;

Neuman, Just and Crigler 1992; Semetko and Valkenburg 2000). And while the frame has been

successful in developing running storylines that attract news consumers, its use also increases

public cynicism (Cappella and Jameison 1996), decreases trust in government leadership, de-

creases confidence in the political system (Forgette and Morris 2006), and decreases approval of

Congress (Durr, Gilmour and Wolbrecht 1997). Americans prefer to see their leaders working

together to solve the nation’s problems and view protracted debate as a sign that the government

is broken (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).

Exposure to partisan conflict has, thus, been shown to have a variety of important con-

sequences for political attitudes. To date, however, researchers have not investigated the role

exposure to partisan conflict plays in shaping individual attitudes toward specific policies. Here,

I develop a novel theory outlining the mechanisms by which information about the tenor of elite

debate shapes attitudes toward the policies under consideration. I hypothesize that policies as-

sociated with heated, partisan conflict will receive less public support than will identical policies

associated with lower levels of conflict. I use two experiments (one with student data and one

with a national sample) to test this hypothesis.

I find that the tenor of elite debate (as reported by the news media) is a powerful signal

that shapes public policy opinion in two important ways—both of which are distinct from

simple partisan cue-taking. First, the association of a given bill with partisan conflict has a

direct, negative impact on policy support among individuals who view such debate as a sign

of dysfunction in government. Second, the presence (or absence) of partisan debate acts as

a cue about the ideological content of legislation—shaping attitudes indirectly by altering the

perceived location of the bill on the left/right ideological spectrum. In the aggregate, policies

associated with partisan conflict receive less public support.

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These findings help to illuminate the political strategies that underscore the gridlock and

partisanship evident on Capitol Hill during recent Congressional sessions. They suggest that

those who want to stymie the majority party’s legislative agenda have an incentive to generate

controversy around the majority’s proposals—even when (and perhaps especially when) the

substance of the legislation is publically popular. If the opposition can obstruct the bill’s

passage and extend heated deliberations, they can heighten support for the status quo. But

this is only because the corrosive effect of conflict leads to declining approval for policies whose

substantive goals may have broad and unchanging public support. In fact, opponents of a piece

of legislation often focus their objections on the lawmaking process itself, claiming, for instance,

that the bill is being pushed through Congress with parliamentary maneuvers that limit minority

party input. Such arguments are designed to bypass the substance of the law altogether and

focus attention on the strategic, combative elements of lawmaking that the public dislikes. I

discuss these implications of my findings in greater depth in the conclusion.

Conflict in the News

Public affairs journalists and editors have incentives to focus on the conflicts inherent in the

process of lawmaking. Doing so increases the entertainment value of their reports (Iyengar,

Norpoth, Hanh 2004; Zaller 1999), and provides a running story line that can be updated

regularly (Patterson 1993). By focusing on the “two sides” of the story, the conflict frame’s use

also conforms to journalistic norms of “balanced coverage” (Patterson 2007).

These incentives lead journalists to track the successes and setbacks of each party, often

to the exclusion of other information. For instance, Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) analyzed news

coverage of the Clinton health care reforms. They found that over the course of the debate,

reports about the health care system and its problems were supplanted by reports about elite

strategies and politics. The strategy reports ultimately dominated news coverage about the

reforms, just as they did in the more recent debate over the Affordable Care Act. The Pew

Research Center categorized news coverage about the ACA and found that a plurality of it

(40%) focused on the politics of reform (Pew 2010).

News coverage of policy debates like these could be framed differently—focusing on the

substance of proposed laws, the likely effects of the proposals, if passed, or the societal problems

that require policy solutions. And in fact, some do highlight these factors. But by focusing

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disproportionately on partisan debate, the news media amplify elite disagreement. For instance,

Eric Montpetit (N.D.) shows that when covering lawmaking, reporters seek out the opinions

of a few “celebrity politicians and other elected officials with extreme positions” (N.D., 5).

Reporting the views of these officials helps journalists to construct a clear, two-sided debate.

Reporters are less likely to quote other participants in the policymaking process who have more

moderate views—such as bureaucrats and non-governmental experts. By excluding the views

of these more moderate actors and focusing on the most controversial aspects the debate, the

news media magnify the disagreement. As Montpetit puts it, “The disagreements covered by

the media are so out of proportion that they can only inspire a strong sense of disapproval

among citizens” (N.D., 6).

The assertion that the media’s focus on conflict is off-putting to the American public is

confirmed by a number of scholars. Forgette and Morris (2006), for instance, find that “conflict-

laden television coverage decreases public evaluations of political institutions, trust in leadership,

and overall support for political parties and the system as a whole” (447). Durr, Gilmour and

Wolbrecht (1997) find that periods of heightened conflict in Congress and the reflection of

that conflict in the news have a negative impact on Congressional approval. Cappella and

Jameison (1996) show that campaign coverage focused on strategy and tactics results in higher

levels of public cynicism as compared with reports focused on policy platforms. Exposure to

negativity and incivility in campaign advertisements has been shown to decrease turnout (Kahn

and Kenney 1999), decrease political trust (Lau, Sigelman and Rovner 2007; Mutz and Reeves

2005), and decrease feelings of political efficacy (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Lau et al.

2007).1 And finally, Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) show that in the aggregate, the shift toward

strategy-focused coverage during the Clinton health care debate was associated with a decrease

in public support for the reforms.

Why do Americans Dislike Political Conflict?

Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) argue that many Americans respond negatively to policy

debate because they view it as politically motivated and unnecessary. They find that Americans

generally believe there is consensus around the goals government should pursue—like a strong

economy, low crime, and quality education—and think lawmakers should “just select the best

1But note that in the context of campaign ads, negativity has also been found to have some positive effects,such as increased political knowledge (Lau et al. 2007) and increased political engagement (Brooks and Greer2007).

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way of bringing about these end goals without wasting time and needlessly exposing people

to politics” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, 133). This is especially true for individuals who

know little about how the government works and have weak policy preferences. Because these

individuals are not invested in a particular policy solution, they look for cues that lawmakers

are pursing “good” policies that are in the public interest. If a policy solution is not selected

quickly and cooperatively, it must be because lawmakers are working to advance their own

political goals rather than “the true consensual, general interest” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse

2002, 157). Periods of heated, protracted debate—which are highlighted by the news media—

may, therefore, lead members of the public to view the lawmaking process as broken and corrupt.

How Conflict Shapes Policy Opinion in Two Distinct Ways

There is good reason to believe that these negative attitudes toward debate can shape people’s

assessments of the policies at the center of the debate—just as they shape opinions about the

government as a whole and the institutions that comprise it. The first reason for this is because

the process of attitude formation is generally thought to be an aggregative one that incorporates

all the information an individual associates with a given target (like a policy, a political figure, or

a government institution) (e.g. Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Chong and Druckman 2007; Fishbein

and Hunter 1964; Nelson, Clawson and Oxley 1997). This central tenet of the expectancy value

model of attitude formation suggests that individuals will not compartmentalize information

about the policymaking process and consider it separately from information about the policy

itself. Instead, individuals will construct associative maps in their minds that connect all the

information they encounter about a policy (e.g. Anderson 1983, 1993; Lodge and Taber 2013;

Read and Miller 1998; Smith 1999)—including information about its substantive provisions,

its supporters and detractors, its partisanship, and the degree of controversy surrounding it.

Everything the individual associates with the policy will contribute to his or her overall opinion

of it.2

All things being equal, if the target is associated with mostly positive considerations, the

individual will express an overall positive attitude toward the target. But all things are rarely

2Scholars disagree as to whether the information shaping opinions will be learned and retained in the longterm memory, or whether attitudes are updated in an “online” process that records the sentiment attached tothe new information but not the information itself (see Lodge and Taber 2013). This debate does not need to beresolved here. Whether learned or simply felt, the key for the theory developed here is that attitudes are shapedby the concepts individuals associate with a given target.

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equal. When some considerations become more salient or accessible in an individual’s mind, they

come to the top-of-the-head more readily and weigh more heavily in the individual’s evaluation

of the policy (e.g. Fazio 2007; Lodge and Taber 2013; Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992).

This is where the news media come in.

Mechanism One: The Influence of Media Frames

The frames employed by the news media can influence the weighting of considerations associ-

ated with a target. News frames provide “a central organizing idea” that focus attention on

one dimension of an issue or event (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 3; also see: Entman 1993).

In so doing, they elevate the salience of particular considerations and demote the salience of

others—implying what information is central and what should be “left out, treated as secondary,

tertiary, or less” (Cappella and Jamieson 1997, 45; also see: Druckman and Nelson 2003; Iyengar

and Kinder 1987; Miller and Krosnick 2000; Nelson and Kinder 1996). Because most individ-

uals are ambivalent toward most issues—meaning they hold some positive and some negative

considerations in mind—this reweighting can alter the individual’s overall opinion of the target

(Zaller and Feldman 1992). In this way, changes in news frames have been shown to influence

policy preferences on a broad range of issues, including capital punishment (Baumgartner, De-

Boef and Boydstun 2008), the Kosovo War (Berinsky and Kinder 2006), government spending

(Jacoby 2000), affirmative action (Kinder and Sanders 1990), gun policy (Haider-Markel and

Joslyn 2001), and many others.

In the case of the generic conflict frame, the news media’s focus on partisanship and elite

strategies will elevate the salience of this information in the minds of news consumers. Figure

one provides a stylized representation of how this process shapes policy preferences. Over the

course of a well-publicized policy debate, individuals will learn a range of information about the

proposal, including information about its substantive provisions and about the politics of the

debate. As they learn this information, it becomes linked with the policy in their minds.

The individual represented in the figure likes the plan’s four major substantive provisions

and these positive evaluations are denoted with plus signs. The individual does not like the tenor

of the debate, which has been partisan, divisive, and in this individual’s assessment, politically

motivated. These negative considerations are denoted with minus signs.

If all the considerations the individual associates with the bill were equally weighted, she

would form a positive opinion of it because positive considerations outnumber negative ones

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Figure 1: Associative Map: Conceptions Linked to a Bill

four to three. But because news coverage focuses predominantly on the ugly political process of

lawmaking rather than the bill’s provisions, information about that process is much more salient

in the individual’s mind. As a result, she weights negative considerations about the policymaking

process more heavily when she aggregates across the mix of information associated with the

bill. This weighting leaves her with an overall negative impression of the policy.

Mechanism Two: The Indirect Influence of Ideological Cues

The second mechanism by which exposure to policy debate shapes individual opinions is rooted

in the need to simplify complex issues and form opinions without investing a tremendous amount

of time and effort in the task. This can be done with the use of cues or “heuristics.” “Heuristics

are judgmental shortcuts, efficient ways to organize and simplify political choices ...” (Snider-

man, Brody and Tetlock 1991, 19). Individuals use heuristics like partisanship, ideology, elite

endorsements, candidate “likeability,” and so on to help them decide whether to support can-

didates, incumbents, policies, and ballot measures (e.g. Brady and Sniderman 1985; Boudreau

2009; McKelvey and Ordshook 1984, 1985; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Lupia 1994; Sniderman et

al. 1991). Of these, ideological cues are among the most frequently used (Lau and Redlawsk

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2001). Individuals look for information that can help them quickly assess whether a given target

is liberal or conservative, extreme or moderate. With this information, they can guage how far

the target is from their own ideological preferences and thus, whether to support it.

The presence or absense of heated debate has the potential to serve as just this type of

ideological cue. When the political parties are locked in a standoff over a piece of legislation,

onlookers may assume that the policy under debate is ideologically extreme. This is because

heated debate signals that the two parties are far apart in their preferences and are having diffi-

culty reaching a compromise. If the policy proposal were more moderate, this line of reasoning

suggests political elites could quickly and cordially work out their differences. As a result, heav-

ily debated Democratic bills will been seen as very liberal while heavily debated Republican bills

will be seen as very conservative. On the other hand, policies that foster cooperation between

the parties will be viewed as moderate.

This cue-taking has the ability to alter support for contentious policies because few Ameri-

cans favor ideological extremism. Most view themselves as moderates and say they would like to

see more bipartisanship on Capitol Hill. In the aggregate, it is this penchant for moderatation

that underscores the well-known “thermostatic response” (Wlezien 1995). When citizens see

their government enacting policies that are too liberal, the public responds by calling for more

conservative legislation and vice versa. In this way, public opinion reins in ideological extremism

at the macro-level (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002).

At the individual level, citizens should similarly reject policy proposals that they believe are

far from their own ideological preferences. To the degree that partisan dispute over legislation

is taken as a cue that the policy itself is ideologically extreme, moderate citizens (along with

those at the opposite end of the political spectrum from the policy) will view the policy as being

further from their own preferences and become less likely to support it. Only individuals with

extreme preferences themselves will favor extreme policy proposals. Those who are extremely

liberal should favor proposals seen as very liberal and those who are extremely conservative

should favor proposals seen as very conservative.

Notice that this process of ideological cue-taking is distinct from reactions based on parti-

san attitudes toward specific policies. This is not because the conflict frame does not highlight

the partisan nature of legislation—it does. News reports that focus on conflict in Washing-

ton naturally emphasize partisan divisions because the two sides of the debate are typically the

Democrats and the Republicans. Highlighting this divide provides a useful signal for partisans—

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clearly indicating which side of the issue their team is on. We might expect this cue to generate

increased support among members of the party that proposed the legislation, decreased sup-

port among members of the opposition party, and to have no impact on independents. But I

hypothesize that the influence of the conflict frame will go beyond these party cues and depress

policy support for partisans and independents alike. If so, this would allow policy opponents

to use the conflict frame as a powerful rhetorical weapon and to chip away at public support

among members of the proponent’s own party.

The Dual Influence of the Conflict Frame

In sum, the conflict frame is expected to influence policy attitudes in two ways, which are

summarized by Figure 2. First, the conflict frame can affect policy attitudes directly, through

the associative process described. When policies are linked in people’s minds with negative

concepts like partisanship and divisiveness, these concepts become part of the mix of information

that is aggregated across in the formation of an overall attitude toward the policy. In this way,

these associations can depress support for policies at the center of a political battle.

The conflict frame can also influence policy attitudes indirectly by affecting the perceived

distance between the individual and the bill on the ideological spectrum. Policies associated

with intense debate will be viewed as ideologically extreme—with Democratic bills viewed as

very liberal and Republican bills viewed as very conservative. While individuals with similarly

extreme preferences will believe these proposals are close to their own preferences and favor

them, those who do not will believe the proposals are far from their own preferences and will

be less likely to support them as a result. In the aggregate, the signal that a bill is ideologically

extreme will have a negative net effect on support for the bill because few Americans place

themselves at either extreme of the ideological spectrum.

Whether the effect is direct or indirect, most Americans will be more critical of policies

associated with heated debate than they will be of policies not associated with such debate—

even if they like the specific provisions that comprise the legislation. Using an experimental

design, I test this hypothesis. I also examine the impact of exposure to debate on the belief

that the policymaking process is broken, and on citizen’s assessments of the bill’s ideology.

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Figure 2: Direct and Indirect Influence of Conflict on Policy Opinion

Study Participants

The experiment was first conducted using a student sample at a large public university and

then replicated (with minor alterations) as part of the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election

Study (CCES). The results of both administrations of the experiment are reported here because

each has particular strengths and weaknesses. The adult sample provided by the CCES is

more representative of the general population than is the student sample. For instance, CCES

participants range in age from 18 to 87, with the average age being 53. Nearly 28 percent of

the sample had never attended college. These demographic characteristics stand in contrast

to the student sample, for which the mean age is 19, and of course, all respondents have

had college courses. However, the CCES sample was collected within the context of a national

election campaign—creating pretreatment effects that likely influenced levels of public cynacism

(Druckman and Leeper 2012). As Patterson (1993) and others have demonstrated, campaign

coverage is particularly focused on the horserace; meaning public affairs reports during this

period should have been especially focused on the aspects of political debate that this study

seeks to investigate. Because CCES respondents may have been saturated with exposure to

political conflict before receiving the experimental treatments, the survey is a poor venue to

test the factors that shape general perceptions of dysfunction in governmet.3 CCES repondents

are, however, still expected to hold more negative views of policies directly associated with

conflict and more positive views of policies created through a cooperative process—allowing for

3In fact, roughly 80% of CCES respondents believed that debate in Washington shows that the policymakingprocess is broken. (As compared to roughly 40% of the student sample.) This belief does not vary to a statisticallysignificant degree across treatment groups.

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a thorough test of this paper’s main hypothesis.

In contrast to the CCES data, the student data were collected during the fall of 2011, outside

the context of a national election. This makes the timing of the student study preferable to the

CCES study. The use of student data also presents a hard test of my hypothesis. The policy

described in the experimental treatments proposes to increase funding for public education.

Students are particularly apt to favor education funding, giving them a reason to support the

policy even when it is associated with conflict. In these ways, the two samples complement each

other and provide strong evidence when taken together. I discuss each in turn below.

Experimental Design: The Student Sample

Participants in the student study were first asked to complete a questionnaire that gathered de-

mographic information as well as information such as party identification and political ideology.

Participants were then randomly assigned to one of six treatment groups and asked to read a

short vignette about an education policy. Education was chosen because it was not a topic of

national debate while the experiment was in the field, thereby minimizing the influence of real

world policy debate on the experimental findings.

The vignettes were modeled after real New York Times articles about the Affordable Care

Act (where education was substituted for health care). As many verbatim statements from

the real articles were used as possible. The vignettes were also designed by a graphic artist

to look like articles downloaded from The New York Times. However, while the real articles

attribute quotes to named party leaders (like Nancy Pelosi), no actual members of Congress

were referenced by name in the treatments. The treatments reference speakers with titles, such

as “Committee Chairman,” or use made up names. This was done to prevent attitudes toward

specific political figures from influencing participant responses.

All of the treatments open with a lead paragraph that describes the education bill as one

“designed to reform K through 12 education by providing vastly more resources for schools

and teachers.” All of the treatments also outline the sticking points causing debate between the

parties, such as how to pay for the plan and whether key provisions will be effective.4 In this way,

4Descriptions of the substance of the debate were varried across treatments. Some respondents read aboutdisagreement over spending, others read about disagreement over the efficicay of provisions, and a third groupread about disagreement over the addition of a bundle of amendments to the bill. Heated and civil versions ofall three substantive treatments were developed, creating a 3X2 experiment. (The amendments treatments wereomitted in the CCES administration of the experiment.) All of the models reported here were first specified withthe inclusion of dummy variables for the various substantive versions of the heated and civil treatments. These

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the treatments provide realistic descriptions of the substance of a partisan disagreement. The

treatments differ by framing the debate as either a heated or civil one. The “heated” treatment

describes intense partisan conflict over the bill and begins with the headline, “Partisan battle

on education heats up.” The body of the article describes the bill as “hotly contested,” notes

that “the debate has deteriorated into a partisan brawl,” and state that, “Democrats will have

to close ranks and vote as a bloc to pass the bill without Republican support.” In contrast, the

civil debate frame describes the bill as a bipartisan one, notes that the bill is gaining momentum

in the Senate, and states that lawmakers are working “to find common ground.”

After reading the article to which they were assigned, all participants were asked to respond

to several questions (the order of which was randomized). To assess perceptions of the policy-

making process, respondents were asked: “Do you think the education reform process shows

more that our policymaking process is working as intended, or more that our policymaking

process is broken?” Respondents were also asked whether they supported or opposed the policy

and where they would place the policy on a seven-point ideological scale.

Analysis and Findings: The Student Sample

One of the key assumptions on which the primary hypothesis is built is that many Americans

view partisan conflict as a sign of dysfunction in the lawmaking process. I examine the veracity

of this assumption by comparing the proportion of respondents that stated the policymaking

process is broken in the heated debate group with that of participants in the civil debate

group. Table 1 shows the results of t-tests measuring the difference in proportions between

these treatment groups. Here we see that individuals who received the heated debate treatment

were 22 percentage points more likely to view the policymaking process as broken than were

individuals who received the civil debate treatment. This difference is significant at a level of

95% confidence.

I further explore the factors that affect attitudes toward the policymaking process by mod-

eling the likelihood of a “broken” response as a function of exposure to heated conflict, and of

opposition to the education bill. By including both of these variables in the model, I can test

preliminary models showed no statistically significant differences between the substantive treatments. For thatreason, the models reported in the body of the paper collapse the treatments into the categories of “heated” and“civil.” The fully specified versions of the main models (estimating support for the education bill) are providedin Supporting Information A, along with short descriptions of the substantive treatments. The full text of thetreatments is provided in Supporting Information B.

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Table 1: Proportion of Respondents Who Agree that thePolicymaking Process is Broken, by Treatment Group

Treatment Heated Debate Civil Debate DifferenceProportion 0.51 0.29 0.22*

* Indicates 95% confidence

Table 2: Likelihood of Believing the Pro-cess is Broken

Variable Coefficient

Heated Debate Treatment 0.98*(0.22)

Opposes the Bill -0.50(0.33)

Constant -0.85*(0.17)

N=367; Pseudo R2=0.04

* Indicates 95% confidence. Standard errors arein parentheses. Results are from a logit model.

the degree to which attitudes toward the policymaking process are a function of the amount

of conflict inherent in the process as compared with approval or disapproval of the legislation

produced by the process. The results of the model are shown in Table 2. They indicate that

exposure to conflict is a statistically significant predictor of the belief that the policymaking

process is broken, while opposition to the proposed bill is not. These findings provide strong

evidence that heated, partisan debate is interpreted by many members of the public as a sign

of dysfunction in government, which leads to more negative evaluations of the policymaking

process.

Conflict as an Ideological Cue

Next, I expect conflict to influence conceptions of the ideological content of the bill at the center

of the debate. Individuals who received the heated conflict treatment should view the education

bill’s provisions as more ideologically extreme than should those who received the civil debate

treatment. In this case, because the bill is a Democratic one that increases education funding,

“more extreme” means more liberal. To test this hypothesis, Table 3 compares the average

ideological placement of the bill by respondents on a seven-point scale, across treatment groups.

Lower values indicate a more liberal placement of the bill and higher values indicate a more

conservative placement of the bill.

This analysis provides evidence in support of the ideological cue-taking hypothesis. The

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t-test shows that respondents who were exposed to heated conflict evaluated the bill as more

liberal than did respondents who received the civil debate treatment. Those who received the

heated debate treatment assessed the bill as being half a point more liberal (on a seven-point

scale) as compared with other respondents.

Table 3: Average Ideological Placement of Bill on a SevenPoint Scale

Treatment Heated Debate Civil Debate Difference

Proportion 2.8 3.3 -0.5*

* Indicates 95% confidence. Lower values indicate a more liberal assess-ment of the bill’s ideology, higher values indicate a more conservativeassessment of the bill’s ideology.

To understand whether an individual will support or oppose a bill that they view as extreme,

we need to take the individual’s own ideology into account. Individuals with extreme preferences

will support extreme bills. In the case of the education bill, strong liberals who are exposed to

the heated debate treatment should place the bill closer to themselves, as the presence of debate

should signal the extreme (very liberal) nature of the bill. Both moderates and conservatives

should place the bill further from themselves on the ideological spectrum when it is associated

with heated debate.

To test this hypothesis, I first generate a variable that measures the absolute value of the

distance between the individual’s placement of the bill on a seven-point ideological scale and

the individual’s placement of him or herself on the same scale (which was assessed with the

pre-treatment questionnaire). The variable has a mean of 1.6 and ranges from zero to five with

a standard deviation of 1.2. I then model this distance as a function of exposure to heated

debate separately for strong liberals (respondents who placed themselves at one or two on the

seven-point scale), strong conservatives (respondents who placed themselves at six or seven on

the seven-point scale), and all other respondents.

Table 4: Absolute Value of Distance Between Ideological Self-Placement and Placement of Bill (student data)

Treatment Strong Liberals Strong Conservatives Others

Heated Debate -0.42* 0.22 0.11(0.17) (0.18) (0.13)

Constant 1.34* 2.97* 1.14*(0.13) (0.13) (0.09)

N 95 84 185R2 0.06 0.02 <0.01

* Indicates 95% confidence. Results are from an OLS model.

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Table 4 displays the results of the three models. The first model shows that strong liberals

who were exposed to partisan conflict placed the bill about four-tenths of a point closer to

themselves (on the seven-point scale) than did strong liberals who were not exposed to heated

debate. The effect of the conflict treatment is not statistically significant in the case of strong

conservatives or “others” (although the coefficients are positive in both cases, as expected).

These findings provide mixed support for my hypothesis. Strong liberals viewed bills associated

with conflict as more ideologically extreme and placed them closer to themselevs as a result.

Strong conservatives, however, were not influenced to a significant degree by the heated debate

treatment.

The Effect of Conflict on Policy Support

The ultimate goal of the experiment is to assess the impact of exposure to heated partisan debate

on policy opinions. Thus far, we have seen evidence in support of the hypothesis that exposure

to conflict affects policy attitudes directly, and support for the hypothesis that conflict affects

attitudes indirectly (by causing citizens to alter their placement of the bill on the ideological

spectrum). As a means of testing these hypotheses against one another, I model the likelihood of

support for the education bill as a function of exposure to conflict and the distance between the

ideological placement of the bill and the individual’s ideological self-placement. I also control

for the respondent’s partisan affiliation.

If conflict has a direct effect on policy attitudes, the coefficient on the conflict variable

should be negative and statistically significant. If exposure to conflict affects policy attitudes

indirectly, the coefficient on the ideology variable should be negative and statistically significant.

If conflict affects policy attitudes both directly and indirectly, we should see the coefficients for

both variables attain statistical significance.5

Table 5 displays the results of the logistic regression model. The coefficient on the conflict

variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating that the association of a bill with

heated conflict lowers support for it. The coefficient on the ideology variable is also negative and

statistically significant, indicating that individuals who place the bill further from themselves

on the ideological spectrum are less likely to support it. These findings indicate that conflict

has both a direct and an indirect effect on policy support. 6

5Note that the level of correlation between the conflict variable and the ideology variable is just 0.007, so theinclusion of both variables does not raise concerns about collinearity.

6I also find that Democrats are more likely to support the bill than are others; however, the Republican

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To help interpret the substantive significance of the coefficients, I have calculated predicted

probabilities based on the regression results. The top portion of Table 6 shows the impact of

the conflict treatment on the predicted probability of support while holding the other variables

constant. The probability of support for the education bill was 21 percentage points lower

among those exposed to heated conflict and this difference is statistically significant at a level

of 95% confidence. This finding provides strong evidence that exposure to partisan conflict has

a direct, negative, substantively meaningful impact on policy attitudes.

Table 5: Support for the education bill


Heated Debate -0.84*(0.23)

Absolute Value of Distance Between Respondent -0.32*Ideology and Bill Ideology (0.12)

Democrat 1.14*(0.31)

Republican 0.02(0.30)

Constant 1.11*(0.28)

N=364; Pseudo R2=0.11

* Indicates 95% confidence. Results are from a logit model.

Table 6: Predicted Probability of Support

Independent Variable Probability 95% CI

Civil Debate 0.65 [0.338, 0.541]Heated Debate 0.44 [0.543, 0.749]

Absolute Value of Distance Between 0.585 [0.496, 0.674]Self-Placement and Bill Placement =1Absolute Value of Distance Between 0.427 [0.297, 0.559]Self-Placement and Bill Placement =3Absolute Value of Distance Between 0.284 [0.091, 0.476]Self-Placement and Bill Placement =5

Predictions are calculated for an Independent and the ideological distance variable isheld at its mean (1.60) unless otherwise noted.

The bottom portion of Table 6 shows the probability of support for various levels of the

ideological distance measure. The probability of support for an individual who believes the bill is

one unit away from him or herself is 59%, as compared with 43% for an individual who places the

bill three points away, and 28% for an individual who paces the bill 5 units away. The predicted

dummy variable fails the significance test. This failure might be due to the high level of correlation between theRepublican variable and the ideology variable. The correlation coefficient for the two is 0.58.

16

probabilities, therefore, seem to indicate that perceived ideological distance plays an important

role in shaping policy support. But note that these differences are only statistically meaningful

when comparing large changes in the distance variable—the difference in the probability of

support is not statistically significant when comparing a one unit versus three unit distance,

but is significant when comparing a one unit versus a five unit distance.

Replication with CCES Data

The main findings from the preceding analysis were replicated using a national adult sample

as part of the 2012 CCES. The treatments were altered slightly for this second administration.

They were lightly edited to remove descriptions of conflict from the body of the news articles.

After editing, descriptions of conflict appear in the opening two sentences and the closing

sentence only—making the bodies of the treatments identical. This change was intended to

create a harder test of the conflict hypothesis.

I begin the analysis by examining perceptions of the bill’s ideology. Table 7 compares

the average ideological placement of the bill by respondents on a seven-point scale, across

treatment groups. As with the student experiment, I expect respondents to view the bill as

more ideologically extreme when it is associated with conflict—and this is precisely what I find.

Respondents given the heated debate treatment placed the bill at 3.19 on the seven-point scale

as compared with 3.39 by those given the civil debate treatment. This difference of .2 percentage

points is statistically significant at a level of 95% confidence. These findings comport with those

from the student data. They show that the association of a bill with heated partisan conflict

causes individuals to believe the bill is more ideologically extreme.

Table 7: Average Ideological Placement of Bill on a SevenPoint Scale, by Treatment Group


Proportion 3.19 3.39 -0.20*

* Indicates 95% confidence. Lower values indicate a more liberal assess-ment of the bill’s ideology, higher values indicate a more conservativeassessment of the bill’s ideology.

To show how this belief in the extremism of the bill influences the perceived distance between

the individual’s ideology and that of the bill, I again create a measure of the absolute value of

the distance between the two. I then model this distance as a function of exposure to heated

debate for strong liberals, strong conservatives, and all other respondents. Table 8 displays the

17

results of the models.

Table 8: Absolute Value of Distance Between Ideological Self-Placement and Placement of Bill (CCES data)

Treatment Strong Liberals Strong Conservatives Others

Heated Debate -0.04 0.38* 0.04(0.16) (0.18) (0.14)

Constant 1.97* 3.50* 1.23*(0.11) (0.13) (0.09)

N 176 256 366R2 <0.01 0.02 <0.01

* Indicates 95% confidence. Results are from an OLS model.

The regression results show that for strong conservatives, the conflict frame had a significant

effect on how far individuals believed the bill was from their own ideological preferences. In

the absence of conflict, strong conservatives placed the bill 3.5 points from themselves on the

ideological scale. When exposed to conflict, conservatives placed the bill an additional .38

points further from themselves on this scale. These findings show that conservatives believed

the proposal to be more ideologically extreme when it was associated with conflict, which in

turn led them to view it as out of step with their own preferences. Strong liberals, however,

saw the bill as being better aligned with their own ideological preferences whether or not it

was associated with conflict. On average, strong liberals placed the bill about two points from

themselves on the ideological scale and this was not altered significantly by the association of

the bill with conflict.

Support for the Bill: The CCES Sample

The final question to address is whether participants who received the heated conflict treatment

were less likely to support the bill than were others. To answer this question, I first examine

differences in levels of support across treatment groups (see Table 9). Support for the bill

was 10 percentage points lower among those who received the heated treatment as compared

with the civil treatment. This difference is statistically significant and supports my primary

hypothesis—bills associated with heated debate receive less support than do identical bills not

associated with such debate.

Next, I model the likelihood of support for the education bill as a function of exposure to

conflict and as a function of the distance between the respondent’s ideological self-placement

and his or her placement of the bill. As with the student data, the respondent’s partisan

18

Table 9: Proportion of Respondents who Support the Edu-cation Bill, by Treatment Group


Proportion 0.38 0.48 -0.10*

* Indicates 95% confidence

affiliation is also included in the model as an independent variable. Additionally, I include level

of education as an additional control (one that was not needed with the student data because

all respondents were enrolled in college courses). Table 10 displays the results of the model.

Table 10: Likelihood of Supporting the Bill


Heated Debate Treatment –0.39*(0.16)

Absolute Value of Distance Between Respondent –0.42*Ideology and Perceived Bill Ideology (0.07)

Democrat 1.08*(0.18)

Republican –0.92*(0.19)

College Degree 0.40*(0.17)

Question Order Control –0.24(0.16)

Constant 0.60*(0.20)

N=798; Pseudo R2=.19

* Indicates 95% confidence. Results are from a logit model.Respondents answered two blocks of questions, one of which contained the ex-

periment described here. The order of the blocks was randomized. The “questionorder control” variable is coded as one for respondents who received the experi-ment block first and zero otherwise.

First, notice that the coefficient on the variable indicating exposure to heated debate is

negative and statistically significant. As expected, individuals who were exposed to heated,

partisan conflict were less likely to support the bill than were other respondents. The calculation

of predicted propabilities shows that for an average individual, the likelihood of supporting the

bill drops from 45% when the proposal is not associated with heated conflict, to 36% when it

is (see Table 11). This difference of nine percentage points is both statistically significant and

substantively meaningful. It indicates that the tone of elite dilogue and—and the news media’s

amplification of that tone—could make the difference between strong public support and weak

public disapproval for a policy under consideration. Policies that generate intense debate are

clearly disadvantaged.

19

The sign on the ideological distance variable is also negative and statistically significant.

Individuals who view the bill as being farther from their own ideological preferences are less likely

to support it. The substantive impact of this ideological calculation is large and statistically

significant. Generating predicted probabilities shows that likelihood of support for the bill drops

from 53% for an individual who places the bill one point from him or herself on the ideology

scale, to 33% for an individual who places the bill three points from him or herself.

Table 11: Predicted Probability of Support

Independent Variables Predicted Probability 90% CI

Civil Debate 0.45 [0.41, 0.50]Heated Debate 0.36 [0.31, 0.40]

Absolute Value of Distance Between Self-Placement 0.53 [0.49, 0.57]and Bill Placement = 1Absolute Value of Distance Between Self-Placement 0.33 [0.29, 0.36]and Bill Placement = 3

Conclusion

Taken together, the results from the two administrations of the experiment provide strong

evidence supporting the theory advanced here. The results from the logit models estimating

the likelihood of support for the bill show that respondents exposed to heated debate were less

likely to support the legislation even when accounting for their party identification and their

beliefs about the ideology of the bill. The mere association of a policy with intense conflict

results in decreased support for that policy.

Both administrations of the experiment also provide support for the ideological cue-taking

hypothesis. When Americans see the parties locked in a standoff, they assume the bill under

consideration is either very liberal or very conservative and that this extremism is preventing

the parties from finding a compromise. Because few Americans favor ideological extremism and

most reject policies that are far from their own moderate preferences, this belief translates into

decreased support for controversial legislation.

These findings are troubling from a normative perspective. We would hope to see lawmakers

rewarded for pursuing policies with provisions favored by the public. Instead, they are punished

for proposing bills that generate debate. For this reason, lawmakers—and particularly those

in the majority party—are “damned if they do and damned if they don’t.” The failure to act

on issues of societal concern will surely galvanize public criticism, but just a surely, proposing

20

solutions that generate debate will also produce public disapproval. Realizing this, members of

the minority party have every incentive to argue, obstruct, battle, and brawl over the proposals

put forward by those in the majority. In doing so, they signal the extreme nature of the

legislation (whether or not the provisions of the bill warrant such a label) and turn off those

who become disgusted by the tenor of the debate.

When this tactic is used to keep one party from achieving a political win, rather than to

block legislation about which the opposition is genuinely concerned, politicians give legitimacy

to the fear that debate signifies dysfunction in the government. Sometimes debate does grow

heated and protracted because lawmakers are pursuing political goals. At other times, debate

arises because lawmakers disagree about what is best for the country. Most often, it’s probably

a little bit of both. But I contend that it is the role of journalists to figure out when lawmakers

are crying wolf and to hold them accountable for doing so.

The findings presented here show that conflict-focused reporting is not unbiased—it is ex-

actly the type of coverage that policy opponents hope to generate because it systematically

advantages the status quo. Journalists should consider this when covering lawmaking and ex-

pand their definition of “balanced coverage” to include an even-handed use of generic frames.

They might also place a greater emphasis on fact checking the claims politicians make about

pending legislation—both positive and negative—by seeking more input from bipartisan policy

experts. If wild claims about the extreme nature of bills with popular provisions are exposed

for what they are, we might see such bills gain higher levels of public support and observe less

gridlock on Capitol Hill.

21

Supporting Information A: Substantive Treatments

The three different substantive treatments each focus on a distinct facet of real world policy

debate, as reported by the news media. Those facets are the parliamentary tactics being em-

ployed by the respective parties (omitted in the CCES administration), the program’s cost, and

the efficacy of the plan’s provisions. Varying the substance of the debate in this way allows for

greater generaliziability from the experimental findings. It allows for the possibility that some

Americans may view certain types of debate as legitimate (like disagreements over a policy’s

potential efficacy) and other types of debate as illegitimate (such as disputes over parliamentary

tactics).

Table 12: Description of Experimental Treatments

Heated Debate Civil Debate

Tactics FRAME: “Partisan brawl,”“hotly contested bill”

FRAME: “bipartisan bill,”“working toward a compromise”

SUBSTANCE Bundle of amend-ments attached to bill

SUBSTANCE: Bundle of amend-ments attached to bill

Spending FRAME: “Partisan brawl,”“hotly contested bill”


SUBSTANCE: Disagreementover bill’s effect on deficit

SUBSTANCE: Disagreementover bill’s effect on deficit

Efficacy FRAME: “Partisan brawl,”“hotly contested bill”


SUBSTANCE: Disagreementover efficacy of provisions

SUBSTANCE: Disagreementover efficacy of provisions

The tactics treatments provide minimal substantive information about the bill being consid-

ered. They provide the description of the bill that is common to all of the treatments regarding

“vastly more spending” and note the party affiliation of the bill (Democratic—also common to

all the treatments). The tactics treatments are focused on the attachment of a bundle of amend-

ments to the bill. The amendments are described by the Democrats as “delay tactics” in the

heated conflict version of the article, and described as a method of insuring bipartisan support

in the civil debate version of the article. The tactics treatments are, therefore, designed to show

the impact of partisan debate on policy attitudes in an instance where very little substantive

information is available.

The spending and efficacy treatments provide a more moderate level of substantive infor-

mation about the bill. These treatments give arguments for and against the passage of the

legislation, describing the particular elements of the bill about which the parties disagree. In

22

the two “spending” treatments, Republicans reject Democrat’s claims that the proposal will

decrease the deficit. In the two “efficacy” treatments, Republicans assert that some of the

bill’s provisions might do more harm than good because they are “risky” and “untested.” The

Democrats reject these arguments, claiming the plan will increase student test scores. All four

of these treatments, therefore, describe the substance of the policy debate. The civil and heated

versions of the treatments manipulate the tone of that debate. This allows the treatments to

mimic real news articles about lawmaking, which typically outline the opposing views of those

on both sides of a debate.

The tables below estimate support for the education bill using the student data and CCES

data respectively. They include dummy variables for each of the substantive treatments. The

comparison category is the civil debate version of the efficacy treatment. In both models, the

respondents who received a heated debate treatment were less likely to support the bill than were

respondents who received the civil version of the efficicay treatment. These findings comport

with those provided in the body of the paper.

Table 13: Student Data—Support for the education bill (with substative treat-ments)

Variable Coefficient 95% CI

Heated Debate (Efficacy) –1.13* [–1.96, –0.30](0.42)

Heated Debate (Spending) –0.99* [–1.83, –0.14](0.43)

Heated Debate (Tactics) –1.18* [–1.98, –0.39](0.41)

Civil Debate (Spending) –0.65 [–1.50, 0.21](0.44)

Civil Debate (Tactics) –0.13 [–0.99, 0.74](0.44)

Absolute Value of Distance Between Respondent –0.31* [–0.55, –0.07]Ideology and Bill Ideology (0.12)

Democrat 1.16* [ 0.54, 1.78](0.32)

Republican 0.03 [–0.57, 0.62](0.30)

Constant 1.36* [ 0.60, 2.12](0.39)

N=364; Pseudo R2=0.11

* Indicates 95% confidence. Results are from a logit model. Civil Debate (Efficacy) is thecomparison category.

23

Table 14: CCES Data—Support for the education bill (with substative treat-ments)

Variable Coefficient 95% CI

Heated Debate (Spending) –0.64* [–1.09, –0.19](0.23)

Heated Debate (Efficacy) –0.39+ [–0.84, 0.05](0.23)

Civil Debate (Spending) –0.32 [–0.77, 0.13](0.23)

Absolute Value of Distance Between Respondent –0.40* [–0.51, –0.29]Ideology and Bill Ideology (0.06)

Democrat 1.12* [ 0.75, 1.48](0.18)

Republican –0.92* [–1.38, –0.47](0.30)

Question Order –0.21 [–0.53, 0.11](0.16)

Constant 1.12* [ 0.57, 1.67](0.28)

N=798; Pseudo R2=0.19

* Indicates 95% confidence. + significant at 90% confidence. Results are from a logit model.Civil Debate (Efficacy) is the comparison category.

24

Supporting Information B: Treatment Wording

Student Treatments

Heated Debate, Spending

Headline: Partisan Battle on Education Heats Up

A hotly contested Democratic bill designed to reform K through 12 education by providingvastly more resources for schools and teachers is pitting Democrats against Republicans.

The debate has deteriorated into a partisan brawl centered on what the plan will costand how it will be paid for. While Democrats argue the plan will reduce the federal deficit,Republicans vehemently reject these claims, saying the plan will cost far more than Democratsestimate.

Senate Democrats rely on the Congressional Budget Office projections, which show the costsmore than offset by new taxes and fees and reduced government spending over the next ten years.“Republicans need to stop scaring everyone with their false claims about deficit spending,” saidDemocratic Senator Mike Luna. “The CBO estimates show that our plan is fiscally sound andresponsible.”

Senate Republicans take a different view, saying that it is unlikely that Congress wouldfollow through on many of the cost-saving measures included in the bill and that the projec-tions are therefore misleading. “The Democrats are playing a shell game to hide the true costof the legislation,” said the chairman of the Senate Republican Conference. “We need firmcommitments to rein in wasteful government spending as a precondition of increasing educationfunding.”

Despite the controversy, the bill is expected to make it out of committee and to be consid-ered by the full Senate in the coming weeks. Senate Democrats will have to close ranks andvote as a bloc to pass the bill without Republican support.

Civil Debate, Spending

Headline: Panel’s Progress on Education Reflects Bipartisan Support

A bipartisan bill designed to reform K through 12 education by providing vastly moreresources for schools and teachers is gaining momentum in the Senate.

Efforts to reform the education system have moved ahead rapidly, with committee mem-bers on both sides of the aisle making concessions designed to build a consensus on the mainingredients of legislation. Now members of the Senate are turning to the last key issue of thedebate—how to pay for the plan—hoping they can reach a compromise there too.

Senate Democrats rely on the Congressional Budget Office projections, which show the costsmore than offset by new taxes and fees and reduced government spending over the next tenyears. “The CBO estimates show that the plan is fiscally sound and responsible.” said SenateDemocrat Mike Luna. “The Democrats are ready to move forward with it.

But Senate Republicans say that it is unlikely that Congress would follow through on manyof the cost-saving measures included in the bill and that the projections are therefore overly

25

optimistic. “We need firm commitments to rein in wasteful government spending as a precondi-tion of increasing education funding,” said the chairman of the Senate Republican Conference.“We can not take a wait-and-see approach to financing this program.”

Leaders of both parties have pledged to find common ground and resolve their differencesover spending before the upcoming Congressional break. “We are all working toward a commongoal here,” said Luna. “We won’t let politics get in the way of that.”

Heated Debate, Efficacy

Headline: Partisan Battle on Education Heats Up


The debate has deteriorated into a partisan brawl centered on whether several key provisionsof the legislations will be effective. While Democrats argue the plan will help failing schoolsimprove, Republicans vehemently reject these claims, saying the plan will lead to unintended,negative consequences.

“If we do nothing, I can almost guarantee you that test scores will continue to fall over thenext 10 years, because that’s what they did over the last 10 years,” said Democratic SenatorMike Luna. “ This plan will reverse that trend by providing our schools with the resources—likeskilled teachers, new computers, and high speed internet access—that they need to provide allof our children with a first-rate education. Republicans need to stop their obstructionist tacticsand get on board.”

Republicans concede the need for education reform, but contend the plan could do moreharm than good. “The overhaul is a risky experiment that Democrats are trying to ram throughCongress,” said the chairman of the Senate Republican Conference. “Many of the bill’s pro-visions are untested, irresponsible, and could cause some students to fall further behind. Wewant to see more proven methods added to the legislation.”

Despite the controversy, the bill is expected to make it out of committee and to be consid-ered by the full Senate in the coming weeks. Senate Democrats will have to close ranks andvote as a bloc to pass the bill without Republican support.

Civil Debate, Efficacy



Efforts to reform the education system have moved ahead rapidly, with committee memberson both sides of the aisle making concessions designed to build a consensus on the legislation.Now members of the Senate are turning to the last key issue of the debate—whether more canbe done to insure the program’s effectiveness—hoping they can reach a compromise there too.

“If we do nothing, test scores will continue to fall over the next 10 years, because that’swhat they did over the last 10 years,” said Democratic Senator Mike Luna. “The Democrats feelconfident that this plan will reverse that trend by providing our schools with the resources—like

26

skilled teachers, new computers, and high speed internet access—that they need to provide allof our children with a first-rate education.”

“I agree that we need to fix the educational system,” said the chairman of the SenateRepublican Conference, “but I don’t want to rush into anything that hasn’t been fully vetted.There’s always a risk of unintended, negative consequences with a new program, which couldcause some students to fall further behind. We want to see more proven methods added to thelegislation.”

Leaders of both parties have pledged to find common ground and resolve their differencesbefore the upcoming Congressional break. “We are all working toward a common goal here,”said Luna. “We won’t let politics get in the way of that.”

Heated Debate, Tactics

Headline: Panel’s Battles on Education Highlight a Broader Split


The debate has deteriorated into a partisan brawl, with both sides employing parliamentarymaneuvers designed to stall the other’s efforts. Most recently, Senate Democrats swatted downRepublican attempts to make fundamental changes to their legislation on Wednesday as theFinance Committee voted on a wide range of amendments that highlighted the deep partisandivide over the issue.

Democratic Senators characterized the amendments as “delay tactics.” Senator Mike Lunasaid, “There is a substantial slow-walk taking place in this committee.” The Committee Chair-man said he hoped the committee would approve the bill this week, so it could be merged witha separate bill approved in July by the Senate Education Committee.

Republicans argue that Democrats are attempting to ram the legislation through the Senate.The chairman of the Senate Republican Conference, said: “Democrats have insisted on usingeducation reform as a weapon against Republicans. They’ve been cynically exploiting people’sfears, making responsible debate almost impossible.”

Despite the controversy, the bill is expected to make it out of committee and to be consid-ered by the full Senate in the coming weeks. Senate Democrats will have to close ranks andvote as a bloc to prevent a Republican filibuster from effectively killing the bill.

Civil Debate, Tactics



Efforts to reform the education system have moved ahead rapidly, with committee memberson both sides of the aisle making concessions designed to build a consensus on the legislation.Now, Senate Democrats are working with Republicans to add a final series of amendments tothe bill. The amendments are a compromise between the parties, designed to insure bipartisansupport.

27

Democratic Senators expect the bill to move smoothly through the committee process.Senator Mike Luna said, “The committee is making excellent progress with regard to this bill.”The Committee Chairman added that he believes the bill will be approved this week and willthen be merged with a separate bill approved in July by the Senate Education Committee.

Republicans are also pleased with the progress of the bill. “We are all working toward acommon goal here,” the chairman of the Senate Republican Conference said. “Members of bothparties are working together to guarantee that the legislation will enjoy broad support and willbe considered in a timely fashion.”

Thanks to the efforts of senators on both sides of the aisle, the bill is expected to make itout of committee and to be considered by the full Senate in the coming weeks. The measure isexpected to pass easily with majorities of both parties approving the legislation.

28

CCES Treatments

Panel’s Progress on Education Reflects Bipartisan Support

WASHINGTON — A bipartisan bill designed to reform K through 12 education by providing more re-sources for schools and teachers is gaining momentum in the Senate.

Efforts to reform the education system are moving ahead rapidly, with committee members on both sides of the aisle making conces-sions designed to build a consensus on the legislation. Now members of the Senate are turning to the last key issues of the debate – how much it will cost and how to pay for it – hoping they can reach compromis-es there too.

Democrats rely on Congressional Budget Office projections, which

show the costs more than offset by new taxes and reduced govern-ment spending over the next ten years. “The CBO estimates show that our plan is fiscally sound and that it will reduce the deficit in the long run,” said Democratic Senator Thompson. “The Democrats are ready to move forward with it.”

Republicans take a dif fer-ent view, saying it is unlikely that Congress will follow through on many of the cost-saving measures included in the bill and that the CBO projections are, therefore, mislead-ing. “We need an objective mea-sure showing the true cost of this legislation,” said the chairman of

the Senate Republican Conference. “And we need firm commitments to rein in wasteful government spend-ing as a precondition of increasing education funding.”

Leaders of both parties have pledged to find common ground and resolve their differences before the upcoming Congressional break.

Figure 3: Spending, Civil

29

Partisan Battle on Education Heats UpWASHINGTON — A hotly con-

tested bill designed to reform K through 12 education by provid-ing more resources for schools and teachers is pitting Democrats against Republicans.

The debate has deteriorated into a partisan brawl centered on what the plan will cost and how it will be paid for. While Democrats argue the plan will reduce the federal defi-cit, Republicans vehemently reject these claims, saying the plan will cost far more than the Democrats estimate.

Democrats rely on Congressional Budget Office projections, which

show the costs more than offset by new taxes and reduced govern-ment spending over the next ten years. “The CBO estimates show that our plan is fiscally sound and that it will reduce the deficit in the long run,” said Democratic Stewart Thompson. “The Democrats are ready to move forward with it.”

Republicans take a dif fer-ent view, saying it is unlikely that Congress will follow through on many of the cost-saving measures included in the bill and that the CBO projections are, therefore, mislead-ing. “We need an objective mea-sure showing the true cost of this

legislation” said the chairman of the Senate Republican Conference. “And we need firm commitments to rein in wasteful government spend-ing as a precondition of increasing education funding.”

Despite the controversy, the bill is expected to make it out of com-mittee and to be considered by the full Senate in the coming weeks.

Figure 4: Spending, Heated

30

Panel’s Progress on Education Reflects Bipartisan Support

WASHINGTON — A bipartisan bill designed to reform K through 12 education by providing more re-sources for schools and teachers is gaining momentum in the Senate.

Efforts to reform the education system are moving ahead rapidly, with committee members on both sides of the aisle making conces-sions designed to build a consensus on the legislation. Now members of the Senate are turning to the last key issue of the debate – whether more can be done to insure the pro-gram’s effectiveness – hoping they can reach a compromise there too.

“If we do nothing, I can almost guarantee you that test scores will continue to fall over the next 10 years, because that’s what they did over the last 10 years,” said Democratic Senator Thompson. “This plan will reverse that trend by providing our schools with the re-sources – like skilled teachers, new computers and high speed internet access – that they need to provide all of our children with a first-rate education.”

Republicans concede the need for education reform, but contend the plan could do more harm than

good if changes aren’t made. “Some of these provisions could cause kids to fall farther behind by diverting funds from proven initiatives – like voucher programs – to risky, un-tested ones,” said the chairman of the Senate Republican Conference. “We want to see more proven meth-ods incorporated into the bill.”

Leaders of both parties have pledged to find common ground and resolve their differences before the upcoming Congressional break.

Figure 5: Efficacy, Civil

31

Partisan Battle on Education Heats UpWASHINGTON — A hotly con-

tested bill designed to reform K through 12 education by provid-ing more resources for schools and teachers is pitting Democrats against Republicans.

The debate has deteriorated into a partisan brawl centered on whether several key provisions of the legislation will be effective. While Democrats argue the plan will help failing schools improve, Republicans vehemently reject these claims, saying they will lead to unintended, negative conse-quences.

“If we do nothing, I can almost

guarantee you that test scores will continue to fall over the next 10 years, because that’s what they did over the last 10 years,” said Democratic Senator Thompson. “This plan will reverse that trend by providing our schools with the re-sources – like skilled teachers, new computers and high speed internet access – that they need to provide all of our children with a first-rate education.”

Republicans concede the need for education reform, but contend the plan could do more harm than good if changes aren’t made. “Some of these provisions could cause kids

to fall farther behind by diverting funds from proven initiatives – like voucher programs – to risky, un-tested ones,” said the chairman of the Senate Republican Conference. “We won’t let the Democrats ram this legislation through without a thoughtful debate.”

Despite the controversy, the bill is expected to make it out of com-mittee and to be considered by the full Senate in the coming weeks.

Figure 6: Efficacy, Heated

32

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process stories: how news coverage of political con ict ...€¦ · successful in developing...

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