process safety study

7/21/2019 Process Safety Study

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Global Best Practices in Safety


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Why do we need Safety and Risk management?

Companies benefitted from Chilworth experience.

Some major disasters

Hazard control, how?

Contents

Global practices for Safety and Risk Management

Project stages and Risk management

Food for thought.

Questions?


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Dont wait for a major accident to identify need to improve

major hazard management.

Need to learn lessons from accidents Hindsi ht but dont

Why Do we need Safety?

rely on this approach

Manage risks via Foresight rather than Hindsight ie be

proactive rather than reactive.


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Wide spectrum of

Industrial Sectors..

Pharmaceuticals

Petrochemicals

Oil & Gas

Refinery

Our Clients

Specialty Chemicals

Textiles

Fertilizers

Paint & Coatings

Engineering

Building (Hotels,Hospitals, Corporate)


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More than 800valued clients worldover..

More than 200valued clients in

India..

Our Clients

any o emFortune 500Companies..


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BP Texas Refinery

BP AMOCO Refinery is on

1,200 acres with 30 refinery

units and is 71 years old.

1800 people work at there nery p us con rac ors

It is BPs largest plant, and the

USAs third largest refinery,

processing 460,000 barrels ofcrude oil/day, around 3% of

US gasolene supplies


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BP Texas Refinery The Aftermath


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Bruncefield, UK


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Piper Alpha


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Piper Alpha After the fire


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Texas City Explosion 23 March 2005

Direct Root Cause: Level Indicator Failure and

High Level Alarm failure

It cant happen to us!!!

Buncefield UK Explosion 11December 2005

Direct Root Cause: Level Indicator Failure and

High Level Alarm failure


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Prevention Controls

Elimination

Substitution

Engineering

Mitigation Controls

Ignition Prevention

Alarms and Procedures

Mitigation

Emer enc Res onse

Hazard Controls

Passive Devices

Prevention ofEscalation

from other incident

Prevention ofEscalation

to other vessel


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Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

MITIGATION

SYSTEM

COMMUNITY EMERGENCY

RESPONSE

Fire Protection

Emergency Scenario

Training

PLANT EMERGENCY

RESPONSE

PROCESS DESIGN

PROCESS

Process

Alarms

Operations

Supervision

Operating vs Design Verification

PSVs

SIS

RBI

PREVENTION SYSTEM

BPCS


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Hazard identification at various stages of project

Brainstorming with the use of guidewords

Prompt study team members to identify hazards

HAZID typically focuses on plant layout drawing, as it

aims to identif intrinsic hazards.

HAZID

HAZID is useful at an early stages of a new design so that

all potential hazards can be taken into account.

HAZID is also the technique of choice for identifying

hazards as the first stages of demonstration of ALARP.


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The basic premise of HAZOPS is:

All hazardous material incidents are instigated by a

deviation from the desired operating state or condition.

If we can predict all deviations and analyze them before

HAZOP

we opera e a new process en we can ea o e

undesired consequences.

Forewarned is Forearmed


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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODS:

- Process hazard checklist

- Hazard survey: DOW index

- HAZOP hazard & operability study

- Safety review

System description

Hazard identification

Scenario identification

RISK ASSESSMENT:

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

probability consequences

Risk determination

risk &

hazard

acceptable

?

Modify design

Accept system

Y

NEXTREMES

- Low probability

- Minimal consequences

- What can go wrong & how ?

- What are the chances ?

- Consequences ?


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Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is a statistical representation of

SIS when demand occurs.

But in its simplest form it assesses:

How high is your risk of anundesired event ?

What level of protection do you need?

Safety Integrity Level (SIL)

Do you have the required level of protection in your

design?

Typical Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS):

ESD

F&G Detection System

Blowdown System


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Escape, Evacuation & Rescue Analysis (EERA)

EERA comprises following two elements, with their objectives:

A goal analysis The objective of the goal analysis is to

confirm the adequacy of the EER facilities and

arrangements, and identify any areas of weakness.

An evacuation time analysis The objective of the

evacuation analysis is to assess if the muster area and

evacuation facilities are able to endure local fire events for

the period required for the POB to evacuate.


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EERA Goals

There are seven (7) EERA goals which will be assessed in the

EERA report and these goals are listed as below:

Goal 1 (Alarm);

Goal 2 (Escape);

Goal 3 (Muster);

Goal 4 (Decision to Evacuate);

Goal 5 (Primary Means of Evacuation);

Goal 6 (Secondary Means of Evacuation); and

Goal 7 (Rescue)


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Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis(ESSA)

To assess criticality of emergency systems

To determine if emergency system sub-components are

fail-safe;

To determine whether emergency system sub-

components are vulnerable to fire and explosion events;

To determine whether emergency system sub-

components have redundancy; and

To recommend risk reduction measures to increase the

survivability of emergency systems, which are vulnerable

to Major Accident Events, and are neither fail-safe nor

have redundancy.


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Safety Management System (SMS)

The SMS - identify, select, define, implement, monitor,

maintain, review and improve the range of control

measures

Errors, deviations and breakdowns in control measures and

corresponding parts of the SMS are tracked

Performance standards must be used to facilitate this

process.

Consistent with safety culture, companys overall business

management system


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Behaviour Based Safety (BBS)

BBS is a process approach to improving safety performance

by helping workgroup to,

Identify safety-related behaviours that are critical to

performance

Gather data on workgroup safety excellence

Provide ongoing, two-way performance feedback

Remove safety barriers to continuous improvement


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Why are people unimpressed by safety risks?

Risk taking a matter of choice

Familiarity breeds complacency

We get what we deserve work place injuries are fair

Risky work practices are accepted and becomes the

BBS - Risk Perception

NORM


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Finding out what people are doing that leads to incidents

and stopping them doing it. Or

Finding out what people are doing to avoid incidents and

getting everyone to do it

Behaviour Safety is based on:

Behaviour (unlike attitude) is visible, measurable and can

be directly influenced


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Planning Stage

Design stage

Construction

Safety at various Stages

Operations stage

Decommissioning and abandonment.


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Prevention of accidents should be the goal:

Design options (use of chemicals, technology etc)

Layout review (various locations and configurations)

Project HSE Review (PHSER)

Planning Stage

Hazard Identification (HAZID)

Risk Register


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Adequate Design suitable for operations:

HAZID (Hazard Identification)

HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study)

QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessment)

Design Stage

SIL (Safety Integrity Level)

SCE/PS (Safety Critical Elements / Performance Standards)

Dispersion EERA (Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis)

ESSA (Emergency Systems Survivability analysis)


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ALARP

RAM

Safety Case / COMAH

Design Stage (continued)

Fire Water network

Fire Fighting System and extinguishers

Emergency Response Plan Risk Register


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Safe Construction / commissioning and fit for operation:

HAZID

HAZOP (update, as built)

Construction Safety

Construction / Commissioning Stage

Subcontractor Safety

Transport Safety


Constructability Study

Risk Register

BBS


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Safe operation with no incidents:

Risk Based Inspection (RBI)

Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM)

Subcontractor Safety

Operations Stage

Transport Safety

Risk Register

SCE/PS update

Operations Safety Case

Safety / PSM / SMS Audits

BBS


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Safe abandonment and disposal:

HAZID

QRA


Decommissioning / Abandonment Stage

Risk Register


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To protect against major accidents and consequential losses, there aregenerally considered to be three layers (or types) of protection:

Asset Integrity 3 Primary Protection Layers

facilities

supply & maintenance

of plant, hardware,software, control

systems etc, alongwith their desi n and

processes

management systems,processes, procedures

and other work

systems to identify,

people

organisation, roles &

responsibilities,knowledge, training,

experience, resourcelevels and ca abilit

Food for thought

layout to eliminate,control or mitigate

risks and improveproductivitythroughout the asset

lifecycle

risks and to improveoperationalperformance

along with themindsets & behaviours

of personnel

Decreasing Reliability of Protection

Behaviours have a key role in improving Asset Integrity

Both Personal Safety and Asset Integrity Safety issues can be

addressed through BBS


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Contact

Jitendra Kumar, Vice President

+91 9811340933 [email protected]

Questions??

CHILWORTH TECHNOLOGY P. LTD.

Muskaan Complex, B-2, Plot No. 3,

Vasant Kunj, New Delhi - 110070

Tel: + 91 11 26136979; Fax +91 11 26135979www.chilworth.co.in

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