process framework for cybersecurity

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T-Systems South Africa Process Groups for Effective C 1 PG1 - Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices 2 PG2 - Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software 3 PG3 - Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Serve 4 PG4 - Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation 5 PG5 - Malware Defenses 6 PG6 - Application Software Security 7 PG7 - Wireless Device Control 8 PG8 - Data Recovery Capability 9 PG9 - Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps 10 PG10 - Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches 11 PG11 - Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services 12 PG12 - Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges 13 PG13 - Perimeter Defense 14 PG14 - Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs 15 PG15 - Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know 16 PG16 - Account Monitoring and Control 17 PG17 - Data Loss Prevention 18 PG18 - Incident Response Capability 19 PG19 - Secure Network Engineering 20 PG20 - Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises *Based on SANS Critical Security Controls http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls/

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Page 1: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

T-Systems South Africa Process Groups for Effective Cyber Defense*

1 PG1 - Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices

2 PG2 - Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software

3 PG3 - Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Servers

4 PG4 - Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation

5 PG5 - Malware Defenses

6 PG6 - Application Software Security

7 PG7 - Wireless Device Control

8 PG8 - Data Recovery Capability

9 PG9 - Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps

10 PG10 - Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches

11 PG11 - Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services

12 PG12 - Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges

13 PG13 - Perimeter Defense

14 PG14 - Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs

15 PG15 - Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know

16 PG16 - Account Monitoring and Control

17 PG17 - Data Loss Prevention

18 PG18 - Incident Response Capability

19 PG19 - Secure Network Engineering

20 PG20 - Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises

*Based on SANS Critical Security Controls

http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls/

Page 2: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

T-Systems South Africa Process Groups for Effective Cyber Defense*

PG3 - Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Servers

Page 3: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 1: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard) Public Location

1 IT Asset inventory management process

2 IT Asset onboard process

3 IT Asset decommissioning process

5 CMDB Management process

6 Network Admission control process

7 Critical Asset landscape maintainance process

“The processes and tools used to track/control/prevent/correct network access by devices (computers, network components, printers, anything with an IP address) based on

an asset inventory of which devices are allowed to connect to the network.”

Rationale - Many criminal groups and nation states deploy systems that continuously scan address spaces of target organizations waiting for new, unprotected systems to be

attached to the network. Additionally, attackers frequently look for experimental or test systems that are briefly connected to the network but not included in the standard

asset inventory of an organization.

Page 4: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 1: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices

Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

“The processes and tools used to track/control/prevent/correct network access by devices (computers, network components, printers, anything with an IP address) based on

an asset inventory of which devices are allowed to connect to the network.”

Rationale - Many criminal groups and nation states deploy systems that continuously scan address spaces of target organizations waiting for new, unprotected systems to be

attached to the network. Additionally, attackers frequently look for experimental or test systems that are briefly connected to the network but not included in the standard

asset inventory of an organization.

Page 5: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 2: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard) Public Location

1 IT Application management process

2 IT Software release management process

3 IT Approved Software list

4 Software Development/Procument process

5

6

7

8

Rationale - Computer attackers deploy systems that continuously scan address spaces of target organizations looking for vulnerable versions of software that can be remotely exploited. Some attackers also distribute hostile web pages, document files, media files, and

other content via their own web pages or otherwise trustworthy third-party sites. Without the ability to inventory and control which programs are installed and allowed to run on their machines, enterprises make their systems more vulnerable

Page 6: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 2: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software

Attach word (editable) version (if not published) Comments

Rationale - Computer attackers deploy systems that continuously scan address spaces of target organizations looking for vulnerable versions of software that can be remotely exploited. Some attackers also distribute hostile web pages, document files, media files, and

other content via their own web pages or otherwise trustworthy third-party sites. Without the ability to inventory and control which programs are installed and allowed to run on their machines, enterprises make their systems more vulnerable

Page 7: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Rationale - Computer attackers deploy systems that continuously scan address spaces of target organizations looking for vulnerable versions of software that can be remotely exploited. Some attackers also distribute hostile web pages, document files, media files, and

other content via their own web pages or otherwise trustworthy third-party sites. Without the ability to inventory and control which programs are installed and allowed to run on their machines, enterprises make their systems more vulnerable

Page 8: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Servers

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 Physical Security for Hardware

2 Secure Configurations for Laptops, Workstations operating Systems

3 Secure Configurations for Databases

4 Secure Configurations for server operating Systems

5

6

7

On both the Internet and internal networks that attackers have already compromised, automated computer attack programs constantly search target networks looking for systems that were configured with

vulnerable software installed the way it was delivered.

Page 9: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Servers

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

On both the Internet and internal networks that attackers have already compromised, automated computer attack programs constantly search target networks looking for systems that were configured with

vulnerable software installed the way it was delivered.

Page 10: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Servers

Comments

On both the Internet and internal networks that attackers have already compromised, automated computer attack programs constantly search target networks looking for systems that were configured with

vulnerable software installed the way it was delivered.

Page 11: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 4: Continuous Vulnerability Scanning and Remediation

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 Vulnerability scanning and Remediation process

2 Secure Baseline Configuration Scanning and remediation process

3

4

5

6

7

Rationale - Soon after new vulnerabilities are discovered and reported by security researchers or vendors, attackers engineer exploit code and then launch that code against targets of interest. Any significant delays

in finding or fixing software with critical vulnerabilities provides ample opportunity for persistent attackers to break through, gaining control over the vulnerable machines and getting access to the sensitive data

they contain. Organizations that do not scan for vulnerabilities and address discovered flaws proactively face a significant likelihood of having their computer systems compromised.

Page 12: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 4: Continuous Vulnerability Scanning and Remediation

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

Rationale - Soon after new vulnerabilities are discovered and reported by security researchers or vendors, attackers engineer exploit code and then launch that code against targets of interest. Any significant delays

in finding or fixing software with critical vulnerabilities provides ample opportunity for persistent attackers to break through, gaining control over the vulnerable machines and getting access to the sensitive data

they contain. Organizations that do not scan for vulnerabilities and address discovered flaws proactively face a significant likelihood of having their computer systems compromised.

Page 13: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

Rationale - Soon after new vulnerabilities are discovered and reported by security researchers or vendors, attackers engineer exploit code and then launch that code against targets of interest. Any significant delays

in finding or fixing software with critical vulnerabilities provides ample opportunity for persistent attackers to break through, gaining control over the vulnerable machines and getting access to the sensitive data

they contain. Organizations that do not scan for vulnerabilities and address discovered flaws proactively face a significant likelihood of having their computer systems compromised.

Page 14: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 5: Malware Defenses

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 Anti-malware management standard

2 Anti-malware management process

3 Anti-Malware Policy

4 Host Intrusion prevention Services

5 Website Risk Analysis

6

7

Malicious software is an integral and dangerous aspect of Internet threats, targeting end-users and organizations via web browsing, email attachments, mobile devices, and other vectors. Malicious code may

tamper with the system's contents, capture sensitive data, and spread to other systems. Modern malware aims to avoid signature-based and behavioral detection, and may disable anti-virus tools running on the

targeted system. Anti-virus and anti-spyware software, collectively referred to as anti-malware tools, help defend against these threats by attempting to detect malware and block its execution

Page 15: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

Malicious software is an integral and dangerous aspect of Internet threats, targeting end-users and organizations via web browsing, email attachments, mobile devices, and other vectors. Malicious code may

tamper with the system's contents, capture sensitive data, and spread to other systems. Modern malware aims to avoid signature-based and behavioral detection, and may disable anti-virus tools running on the

targeted system. Anti-virus and anti-spyware software, collectively referred to as anti-malware tools, help defend against these threats by attempting to detect malware and block its execution

Page 16: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

Malicious software is an integral and dangerous aspect of Internet threats, targeting end-users and organizations via web browsing, email attachments, mobile devices, and other vectors. Malicious code may

tamper with the system's contents, capture sensitive data, and spread to other systems. Modern malware aims to avoid signature-based and behavioral detection, and may disable anti-virus tools running on the

targeted system. Anti-virus and anti-spyware software, collectively referred to as anti-malware tools, help defend against these threats by attempting to detect malware and block its execution

Page 17: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 6: Application Security

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 Patch management standard - Applications

2 Operating Systems and third Party Patch management process

3 Secure SLDC process

4 Secure application Acquisition process/Standard

5 Database Patch management process

6 Release Management process - Applications

7

Attacks against vulnerabilities in web-based and other application software have been a top priority for criminal organizations in recent years. Application software that does not properly check the size of user

input, fails to sanitize user input by filtering out unneeded but potentially malicious character sequences, or does not initialize and clear variables properly could be vulnerable to remote compromise. Attackers can

inject specific exploits, including buffer overflows, SQL injection attacks, and cross-site scripting code to gain control over vulnerable machines. Many more web and non-web application vulnerabilities are

discovered on a regular basis.

Page 18: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

Attacks against vulnerabilities in web-based and other application software have been a top priority for criminal organizations in recent years. Application software that does not properly check the size of user

input, fails to sanitize user input by filtering out unneeded but potentially malicious character sequences, or does not initialize and clear variables properly could be vulnerable to remote compromise. Attackers can

inject specific exploits, including buffer overflows, SQL injection attacks, and cross-site scripting code to gain control over vulnerable machines. Many more web and non-web application vulnerabilities are

discovered on a regular basis.

Page 19: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

Attacks against vulnerabilities in web-based and other application software have been a top priority for criminal organizations in recent years. Application software that does not properly check the size of user

input, fails to sanitize user input by filtering out unneeded but potentially malicious character sequences, or does not initialize and clear variables properly could be vulnerable to remote compromise. Attackers can

inject specific exploits, including buffer overflows, SQL injection attacks, and cross-site scripting code to gain control over vulnerable machines. Many more web and non-web application vulnerabilities are

discovered on a regular basis.

Page 20: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 7: Wireless device control

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 Wireless management standard

2 Rogue WAP discovery process

3

4

5

6

7

Major data thefts have been initiated by attackers who have gained wireless access to organizations from nearby parking lots, bypassing organizations' security perimeters by connecting wirelessly to access points

inside the organization. Wireless clients accompanying travelling officials are infected on a regular basis through remote exploitation during air travel or in cyber cafes. Such exploited systems are then used as back

doors when they are reconnected to the network of a target organization. Still other organizations have reported the discovery of unauthorized wireless access points on their networks, planted and sometimes

hidden for unrestricted access to an internal network. Because they do not require direct physical connections, wireless devices are a convenient vector for attackers to maintain long-term access into a target

environment.

Page 21: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

Major data thefts have been initiated by attackers who have gained wireless access to organizations from nearby parking lots, bypassing organizations' security perimeters by connecting wirelessly to access points

inside the organization. Wireless clients accompanying travelling officials are infected on a regular basis through remote exploitation during air travel or in cyber cafes. Such exploited systems are then used as back

doors when they are reconnected to the network of a target organization. Still other organizations have reported the discovery of unauthorized wireless access points on their networks, planted and sometimes

hidden for unrestricted access to an internal network. Because they do not require direct physical connections, wireless devices are a convenient vector for attackers to maintain long-term access into a target

environment.

Page 22: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

Major data thefts have been initiated by attackers who have gained wireless access to organizations from nearby parking lots, bypassing organizations' security perimeters by connecting wirelessly to access points

inside the organization. Wireless clients accompanying travelling officials are infected on a regular basis through remote exploitation during air travel or in cyber cafes. Such exploited systems are then used as back

doors when they are reconnected to the network of a target organization. Still other organizations have reported the discovery of unauthorized wireless access points on their networks, planted and sometimes

hidden for unrestricted access to an internal network. Because they do not require direct physical connections, wireless devices are a convenient vector for attackers to maintain long-term access into a target

environment.

Page 23: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 8: Data Recovery Capability

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 Backup Process

2 Data recovery process

3

4

5

6

7

When attackers compromise machines, they often make significant changes to configurations and software. Sometimes attackers also make subtle alterations of data stored on compromised machines, potentially

jeopardizing organizational effectiveness with polluted information. When the attackers' presence is discovered, organizations without a trustworthy data recovery capability can have extreme difficulty removing all

aspects of the attacker's presence on the machine.

Page 24: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

When attackers compromise machines, they often make significant changes to configurations and software. Sometimes attackers also make subtle alterations of data stored on compromised machines, potentially

jeopardizing organizational effectiveness with polluted information. When the attackers' presence is discovered, organizations without a trustworthy data recovery capability can have extreme difficulty removing all

aspects of the attacker's presence on the machine.

Page 25: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

When attackers compromise machines, they often make significant changes to configurations and software. Sometimes attackers also make subtle alterations of data stored on compromised machines, potentially

jeopardizing organizational effectiveness with polluted information. When the attackers' presence is discovered, organizations without a trustworthy data recovery capability can have extreme difficulty removing all

aspects of the attacker's presence on the machine.

Page 26: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 9: Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 Security Awareness & Training Process

2 Process Compliance Training for technical teams

3

4

5

6

7

Any organization that hopes to be ready to find and respond to attacks effectively owes it to their employees and contractors to find the gaps in their knowledge and to provide exercises and training to fill those

gaps

Page 27: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 9: Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

Any organization that hopes to be ready to find and respond to attacks effectively owes it to their employees and contractors to find the gaps in their knowledge and to provide exercises and training to fill those

gaps

Page 28: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

Any organization that hopes to be ready to find and respond to attacks effectively owes it to their employees and contractors to find the gaps in their knowledge and to provide exercises and training to fill those

gaps

Page 29: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 10: Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 Firewall Security Management Process

2 IPS Security Management Process

3 Routing and Switching platform Security Management Process

4 Detection of uauthorised configuration changes in network infrastructure

5 APT

6 NTBA

7

Attackers take advantage of the fact that network devices may become less securely configured over time as users demand exceptions for specific and temporary business needs, the exceptions are deployed, and

those exceptions are not undone when the business need is no longer applicable. Making matters worse, in some cases, the security risk of the exception is never properly analyzed, nor is this risk measured against

Page 30: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 10: Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

Attackers take advantage of the fact that network devices may become less securely configured over time as users demand exceptions for specific and temporary business needs, the exceptions are deployed, and

those exceptions are not undone when the business need is no longer applicable. Making matters worse, in some cases, the security risk of the exception is never properly analyzed, nor is this risk measured against

Page 31: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

Attackers take advantage of the fact that network devices may become less securely configured over time as users demand exceptions for specific and temporary business needs, the exceptions are deployed, and

those exceptions are not undone when the business need is no longer applicable. Making matters worse, in some cases, the security risk of the exception is never properly analyzed, nor is this risk measured against

Page 32: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 11: Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1

Minimum Security Configuration Baseline Standards (OS, DB, AD, DNS,

File&Print, Exchange,Web...)

2 Secure Baseline Configuration Scanning and remediation process

3

4

5

6

7

Attackers search for remotely accessible network services that are vulnerable to exploitation. Common examples include poorly configured web servers, mail servers, file and print services, and DNS servers installed

by default on a variety of different device types, often without a business need for the given service. Many software packages automatically install services and turn them on as part of the installation of the main

software package without informing a user or administrator that the services have been enabled. Attackers scan for such issues and attempt to exploit these services, often attempting default user IDs and

passwords or widely available exploitation code.

Page 33: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 11: Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

Attackers search for remotely accessible network services that are vulnerable to exploitation. Common examples include poorly configured web servers, mail servers, file and print services, and DNS servers installed

by default on a variety of different device types, often without a business need for the given service. Many software packages automatically install services and turn them on as part of the installation of the main

software package without informing a user or administrator that the services have been enabled. Attackers scan for such issues and attempt to exploit these services, often attempting default user IDs and

passwords or widely available exploitation code.

Page 34: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

Attackers search for remotely accessible network services that are vulnerable to exploitation. Common examples include poorly configured web servers, mail servers, file and print services, and DNS servers installed

by default on a variety of different device types, often without a business need for the given service. Many software packages automatically install services and turn them on as part of the installation of the main

software package without informing a user or administrator that the services have been enabled. Attackers scan for such issues and attempt to exploit these services, often attempting default user IDs and

passwords or widely available exploitation code.

Page 35: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 12: Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 Administrative priviledge management process (approve/grant, revoke, account)

2

3

4

5

6

7

According to investigators of large-scale Personally Identifiable Information (PII) breaches, the misuse of administrator privileges is the number one method for attackers to spread inside a target enterprise. Two

very common attacker techniques take advantage of uncontrolled administrative privileges. In the first, a workstation user is fooled into opening a malicious email attachment, downloading and opening a file from

a malicious web site, or simply surfing to a website hosting attacker content that can automatically exploit browsers. The file or exploit contains executable code that runs on the victim's machine either

automatically or by tricking the user into executing the attacker's content. If the victim user's account has administrative privileges, the attacker can take over the victim's machine completely and install keystroke

loggers, sniffers, and remote control software to find administrator passwords and other sensitive data.

Page 36: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 12: Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

Administrative priviledge management process (approve/grant, revoke, account)

According to investigators of large-scale Personally Identifiable Information (PII) breaches, the misuse of administrator privileges is the number one method for attackers to spread inside a target enterprise. Two

very common attacker techniques take advantage of uncontrolled administrative privileges. In the first, a workstation user is fooled into opening a malicious email attachment, downloading and opening a file from

a malicious web site, or simply surfing to a website hosting attacker content that can automatically exploit browsers. The file or exploit contains executable code that runs on the victim's machine either

automatically or by tricking the user into executing the attacker's content. If the victim user's account has administrative privileges, the attacker can take over the victim's machine completely and install keystroke

loggers, sniffers, and remote control software to find administrator passwords and other sensitive data.

Page 37: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

According to investigators of large-scale Personally Identifiable Information (PII) breaches, the misuse of administrator privileges is the number one method for attackers to spread inside a target enterprise. Two

very common attacker techniques take advantage of uncontrolled administrative privileges. In the first, a workstation user is fooled into opening a malicious email attachment, downloading and opening a file from

a malicious web site, or simply surfing to a website hosting attacker content that can automatically exploit browsers. The file or exploit contains executable code that runs on the victim's machine either

automatically or by tricking the user into executing the attacker's content. If the victim user's account has administrative privileges, the attacker can take over the victim's machine completely and install keystroke

loggers, sniffers, and remote control software to find administrator passwords and other sensitive data.

Page 38: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 13: Perimeter Defence

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 DMZ Management process

2 Endpoint Web Services eg SiteAdvisor, RiskAdvisor

3 Web Content Management processes

4

5

6

7

Attackers focus on exploiting systems that they can reach across the Internet, which include not only DMZ systems, but also workstation and laptop computers that pull content from the Internet through network

boundaries. It should be noted that boundary lines between internal and external networks are diminishing through increased interconnectivity within and between organizations.

Page 39: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

Attackers focus on exploiting systems that they can reach across the Internet, which include not only DMZ systems, but also workstation and laptop computers that pull content from the Internet through network

boundaries. It should be noted that boundary lines between internal and external networks are diminishing through increased interconnectivity within and between organizations.

Page 40: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

Attackers focus on exploiting systems that they can reach across the Internet, which include not only DMZ systems, but also workstation and laptop computers that pull content from the Internet through network

boundaries. It should be noted that boundary lines between internal and external networks are diminishing through increased interconnectivity within and between organizations.

Page 41: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 14: Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 Log review process

2 Security Incident and Event Management Process

3 SOC process

4

5

6

7

Deficiencies in security logging and analysis allow attackers to hide their location, malicious software used for remote control, and activities on victim machines. Even if the victims know that their systems were

compromised, without protected and complete logging records, the victim is blind to the details of the attack and to the subsequent actions taken by the attackers.

Page 42: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 14: Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

Deficiencies in security logging and analysis allow attackers to hide their location, malicious software used for remote control, and activities on victim machines. Even if the victims know that their systems were

compromised, without protected and complete logging records, the victim is blind to the details of the attack and to the subsequent actions taken by the attackers.

Page 43: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

Deficiencies in security logging and analysis allow attackers to hide their location, malicious software used for remote control, and activities on victim machines. Even if the victims know that their systems were

compromised, without protected and complete logging records, the victim is blind to the details of the attack and to the subsequent actions taken by the attackers.

Page 44: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 15: Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 Logical Access Management process (RBAC Process)

2 Data Classification process

3 Asset Prioritisation Process

4

5

6

7

Some organizations do not carefully identify and separate their most sensitive data from less sensitive, publicly available information on their internal networks. In many environments, internal users have access to

all or most of the information on the network. Once attackers have penetrated such a network, they can easily find and exfiltrate important information with little resistance. In several high-profile breaches over

the past two years, attackers were able to gain access to sensitive data stored on the same servers with the same level of access as far less important data.

Page 45: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 15: Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

Some organizations do not carefully identify and separate their most sensitive data from less sensitive, publicly available information on their internal networks. In many environments, internal users have access to

all or most of the information on the network. Once attackers have penetrated such a network, they can easily find and exfiltrate important information with little resistance. In several high-profile breaches over

the past two years, attackers were able to gain access to sensitive data stored on the same servers with the same level of access as far less important data.

Page 46: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

Some organizations do not carefully identify and separate their most sensitive data from less sensitive, publicly available information on their internal networks. In many environments, internal users have access to

all or most of the information on the network. Once attackers have penetrated such a network, they can easily find and exfiltrate important information with little resistance. In several high-profile breaches over

the past two years, attackers were able to gain access to sensitive data stored on the same servers with the same level of access as far less important data.

Page 47: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 16: Account Monitoring and Control

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 Dormant Account Management process (Joiners, Leavers and Movers)

2 System & Application Account Management process

3

4

5

6

7

Attackers frequently discover and exploit legitimate but inactive user accounts to impersonate legitimate users, thereby making discovery of attacker behavior difficult for network watchers. Accounts of contractors

and employees who have been terminated have often been misused in this way. Additionally, some malicious insiders or former employees have accessed accounts left behind in a system long after contract

expiration, maintaining their access to an organization's computing system and sensitive data for unauthorized and sometimes malicious purposes.

Page 48: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 16: Account Monitoring and Control

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

Attackers frequently discover and exploit legitimate but inactive user accounts to impersonate legitimate users, thereby making discovery of attacker behavior difficult for network watchers. Accounts of contractors

and employees who have been terminated have often been misused in this way. Additionally, some malicious insiders or former employees have accessed accounts left behind in a system long after contract

expiration, maintaining their access to an organization's computing system and sensitive data for unauthorized and sometimes malicious purposes.

Page 49: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

Attackers frequently discover and exploit legitimate but inactive user accounts to impersonate legitimate users, thereby making discovery of attacker behavior difficult for network watchers. Accounts of contractors

and employees who have been terminated have often been misused in this way. Additionally, some malicious insiders or former employees have accessed accounts left behind in a system long after contract

expiration, maintaining their access to an organization's computing system and sensitive data for unauthorized and sometimes malicious purposes.

Page 50: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 17: Data loss Prevention

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 DLP Process

2 Data flow management process (atrest - Encrypt, Intransit - SecureVPN, SecureFTP)

3

4

5

6

7

In recent years, attackers have exfiltrated more than 20 terabytes of often sensitive data from Department of Defense and Defense Industrial Base organizations (e.g., contractors doing business with the DoD), as

well as civilian government organizations. Many attacks occurred across the network, while others involved physical theft of laptops and other equipment holding sensitive information. Yet, in most cases, the

victims were not aware that significant amounts of sensitive data were leaving their systems because they were not monitoring data outflows. The movement of data across network boundaries both electronically

and physically must be carefully scrutinized to minimize its exposure to attackers.

Page 51: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

Data flow management process (atrest - Encrypt, Intransit - SecureVPN, SecureFTP)

In recent years, attackers have exfiltrated more than 20 terabytes of often sensitive data from Department of Defense and Defense Industrial Base organizations (e.g., contractors doing business with the DoD), as

well as civilian government organizations. Many attacks occurred across the network, while others involved physical theft of laptops and other equipment holding sensitive information. Yet, in most cases, the

victims were not aware that significant amounts of sensitive data were leaving their systems because they were not monitoring data outflows. The movement of data across network boundaries both electronically

and physically must be carefully scrutinized to minimize its exposure to attackers.

Page 52: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

In recent years, attackers have exfiltrated more than 20 terabytes of often sensitive data from Department of Defense and Defense Industrial Base organizations (e.g., contractors doing business with the DoD), as

well as civilian government organizations. Many attacks occurred across the network, while others involved physical theft of laptops and other equipment holding sensitive information. Yet, in most cases, the

victims were not aware that significant amounts of sensitive data were leaving their systems because they were not monitoring data outflows. The movement of data across network boundaries both electronically

and physically must be carefully scrutinized to minimize its exposure to attackers.

Page 53: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 18: Incident Management

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 Security Incident Management process

2 CSIRT Plan - Critical Security Incident Response Team

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal of damage has been done to organizational reputations and a great deal of information has been lost in organizations that do not have fully effective incident response programs in place. Without an

incident response plan, an organization may not discover an attack in the first place, or, if the attack is detected, the organization may not follow proper procedures to contain damage, eradicate the attacker's

Page 54: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

A great deal of damage has been done to organizational reputations and a great deal of information has been lost in organizations that do not have fully effective incident response programs in place. Without an

incident response plan, an organization may not discover an attack in the first place, or, if the attack is detected, the organization may not follow proper procedures to contain damage, eradicate the attacker's

Page 55: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

A great deal of damage has been done to organizational reputations and a great deal of information has been lost in organizations that do not have fully effective incident response programs in place. Without an

incident response plan, an organization may not discover an attack in the first place, or, if the attack is detected, the organization may not follow proper procedures to contain damage, eradicate the attacker's

Page 56: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 19: Secure Network Engineering

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 DNS

2 AD

3 Sharepoint

4 Exchange

5 Proxy Systems

6 Content filtration Systems

7 Technology Maturity roadmaps

8

9

10

11

Many controls in this document are effective but can be circumvented in networks that are poorly designed. Without a carefully planned and properly implemented network architecture, attackers can bypass

security controls on certain systems, pivoting through the network to gain access to target machines

Page 57: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

Many controls in this document are effective but can be circumvented in networks that are poorly designed. Without a carefully planned and properly implemented network architecture, attackers can bypass

security controls on certain systems, pivoting through the network to gain access to target machines

Page 58: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

Many controls in this document are effective but can be circumvented in networks that are poorly designed. Without a carefully planned and properly implemented network architecture, attackers can bypass

security controls on certain systems, pivoting through the network to gain access to target machines

Page 59: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 20: Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises

Document name (Process*, Policy, Standard)

1 Penetration Testing Process & Guidelines

2

3

4

5

6

7

Attackers penetrate networks and systems through social engineering and by exploiting vulnerable software and hardware. Once they get access, they often burrow deep into target systems and broadly expand the

number of machines over which they have control. Most organizations do not exercise their defenses so they are uncertain about their capabilities and unprepared for identifying and responding to attack.

* We want to do this but don’t often have the opportunity.

Page 60: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Critical Control 20: Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises

Public Location Attach word (editable) version (if not published)

Attackers penetrate networks and systems through social engineering and by exploiting vulnerable software and hardware. Once they get access, they often burrow deep into target systems and broadly expand the

number of machines over which they have control. Most organizations do not exercise their defenses so they are uncertain about their capabilities and unprepared for identifying and responding to attack.

* We want to do this but don’t often have the opportunity.

Page 61: Process Framework for CyberSecurity

Comments

Attackers penetrate networks and systems through social engineering and by exploiting vulnerable software and hardware. Once they get access, they often burrow deep into target systems and broadly expand the

number of machines over which they have control. Most organizations do not exercise their defenses so they are uncertain about their capabilities and unprepared for identifying and responding to attack.

* We want to do this but don’t often have the opportunity.