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Problems of Political Development in a Ministate: The French Territory of the Afars and theIssasAuthor(s): Nancy A. ShillingSource: The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Jul., 1973), pp. 613-634Published by: College of Business, Tennessee State UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4190061.
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8/11/2019 Problems of Political Development in a Ministate: The French Territory of the Afars and theIssasAuthor(s): Nancy A.
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The Journal
of
Developing
Areas 7 (July 1973):
613-634
Problems
of Political
Development
in a
Ministate:
The
French
Territory
of
the Afars and
the Issas
NANCY
A. SHILLING
The
proliferation
of
ministates
in
the postwar
world
is
a
phenomenon
directly related
to the end
of
the
colonial
era
and
the
acceptance
of the
legitimacy of self-determination by peoples, no matter how few in number
or how
limited their
economic,
social,
and
political resources.
Societies
of
extremely
limited
size,
whose
political
leadership
in
earlier eras would
never seriously have
contemplated
political independence,
now
clamor
for
international recognition as
sovereign
states and for
admission
to
multinational
bodies.'
Historically, there
have
existed
a number
of small
states
(Luxembourg,
Iceland, Monaco,
Licbtenstein,
San
Marino)
whose
right to
statehood
and
whose
ability to fulfill
international
commitments have
never been seri-
ously
questioned. Because such
states were
few
in
number and often
enjoyed
a
protected
status
vis-h-vis a
stronger
neighbor, size
per se as a
prerequisite for statehood or international participation occasioned little
study or
concern.
Ministates
Generally
Academic interest
in the
political, economic, and social
consequences
of
smallness is
relatively new, occasioned in
part by the problems pre-
sented to international
organizations by the
proliferation of
what we now
Assistant
Professor
of
Political
Science at
Hunter
College,
City
University
of
New
York;
formerly
Research
Associate,
Georgetown
Research
Project,
Atlantic
Research
Corporation,
Washington,
D.C.;
recipient
of a
New
York
State
Fellowship in
Com-
parative
Politics
(1969) and
a Ford
Fellowship
(1956-58);
research in
Middle
Eastern
as
well as
African
politics.
1
Ministates
admitted
to
the
United
Nations
include
Lesotho, Mauritius,
Equatorial
Guinea,
Fiji, and the
Gilbert
and
Ellice
Islands.
See
United
Nations
Institute
for
Training and
Research
(UNITAR),
Status
and
Problems
of
Very
Small
States
and
Territories,Series no. 3 (New York, 1969), pp. 9-17.
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8/11/2019 Problems of Political Development in a Ministate: The French Territory of the Afars and theIssasAuthor(s): Nancy A.
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614
Nancy A.
Shilling
term
ministates or
miniterritories. Questions have been
raised as
to
whether such
minuscule territories can long
enjoy genuine
independence
and whether they can fulfill the obligations of international sovereignty
sufficiently to
merit full, voting
membership in
international bodies.
Although the quantitative
limits of ministatehood remain to
be defined,
it is generally recognized that
some minimum levels of
territory, popula-
tion, and
resources are probably essential
for permanent, successful
political
independence and
for fulfillment of international
obligations.3
Establishing
these critical
lower limits is the problem.
Many
pertinent variables have been
suggested for measurement: size,
class structure
(particularly
its elite element),
bureaucratic efficiency,
economic
sufficiency, and iinstitutional
stability and strength.
These
and
related variables have been studied by the World Data Analysis Program
of
Yale University to
determine suitable criteria for defining
a ministate;
their
conclusion
was that all derived
definitions
were
relatively arbitrary
and subject to
serious qualifications. Smallness in
territory
or population
may be more
than balanced
by rich economic resources
(Kuwait), an
efficient
bureaucracy (Luxembourg,
Iceland), or well-institutionalized
political
processes (Monaco, Lichtenstein).
Countries may thus be small
in
one or more variables but
large in others relevant to
national viability.
Establishing lower limits for
these variables
and determining their rank-
ing and
interaction has thus far proven
impossible.4
Qualifications abound even
with regard to essential
definitional com-
ponents. Is all the territory, for example, contiguous (Luxembourg, 2,586
sq. km.)
or is it scattered (Pacific
Islands, 1,779 sq. km. composed of
2,100 islands,
only
96
of
which are
inhabited, spread
over
7,700,000 sq.
km.
of water)?
Is
the location of
the
territory, contiguous
or
scattered,
such
that
the
population
is
involved
in
the
world's
political, economic,
and intellectual
mainstream?
In addition to the
number
of
people,
their
density
and life
style (nomadic, agricultural,
urban) may
be
extremely
pertinent.5
Some
states,
small in
territory
and
population,
seem to
exhibit
more
potential
in
terms
of
resources, capital investment,
development
prospects,
and
land
for
population
growth
than do
larger
states
dependent
2
UNITAR,
Status
and Problems, pp.
26-50. Of
96
countries
currently
considered
small or
mini,
with
populations
of one million
or
less,
24 are
independent;
of
these
17
are
U.N. members. Twenty-nine
are
nonself-governing territories administered
under
chapter
11 of the U.N. Charter and
2 are U.N. trust
territories. The remaining
48 are
either
colonies or
fall
into
other
categories.
3
For
discussion of
possible
criteria for determiiininig iniinistatehood,
see
UNITAR,
Status and Problems, Burton Benedict, ed.,
Problems of Smaller Territories (London:
Athlone
Press for
the University
of London, 1967),
Paitricia
Blair,
The Ministate
Dilemma, Occasional Paper no. 6 (New
York: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, October 1967); Jacques Rapoport,
E.
Nluteba,
anid
J.
Therattil,
Small States
and Territories:
Status and Problems
(New
York:
Ar-no, 1971). See
also
Jacques
Rapo-
port, The Participation
of
Mini
States in
International Affairs, Proceedings of the
American Society for
International Law (April 1968), pp.
155-88;
William L.
Harris,
Microstates in the United Nations: A Broader Purpose, Columbia Journal of Trans-
national Law 9 (Spring 1970): 23-53; Francis Plimpton, The United Nations Needs
Family Planning, New
York
Times Magazine, 18 September 1966, pp. 13-14, 97-100.
4
For further discussion of definitional criteria and limits, see Benedict, Problems, pp.
2-10, 45-55; Nadim A. Khalaf, Economic
Implications of the Size of Nations (Leiden:
Brill, 1972); and UNITAR, Status and Problems, pp. 23, 206-28.
5 Benedict, Problems, p. 29.
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Problems
of Political Development
in a
Ministate
615
upon
single primary
crops (Senegal)
or
with
significant population
pres-
sures
(Egypt).6
Although a precise definition of a ministate must await further research,
in general
terms which
ignore the
examples
of qualification
mentioned
above, it
seems obvious
that small states and territories
share many
of
the
development problems
of large
states.
These common
problems
are also
usually more
serious
in their
impact
on
the small states.
For
example,
the
paucity
of human and
physical
resources
may reach levels beyond
which
the
most elemental needs
of a
population
cannot
be
met
at
reasonable
costs. A country with
10 million people
may
have 1 doctor per 100,000
inhabitants
yet
still provide a
minimal public
health service of 100
doctors,
including some
specialists.
A territory with
a
population
of 100,000
and
the same ratio, however, would have only 1 doctor for the entire country.
The achievement and maintenance
of economic
and
political
stability
is
also
apt to
be more difficult
for a small
state than
for
a
large
one. Its
income base
will
generally
be
too small to finance
the
increasingly
expen-
sive technological
and educational apparatus
required
for a
standard
of
living comparable
to that enjoyed
in
more complex and
wealthier societies.
The citizenry
of a ministate,
however,
will
expect
these levels of
living
and the related
government
services,
having
been made aware of
them
through
mass
communications
media. Because
of the
greater
government
visibility
and accountability
in ministates,
the potential
internal instability
is high when
the people
are disappointed
in their
expectations. Though
the opportunity for government control and manipulation of population
exists in a
ministate,
the chances
for intense
public reaction to
government
failures
seem the more
likely.
Serious external political
problems
coexist
with the
internal political
problems.
The government
of a ministate can
often expect
to remain
inde-
pendent
only upon
the sufferance
of stronger
states-whether
neighbors
or
major
world powers. The
prospects
for
regular
manipulation
or control
by stronger
states therefore
becomes
probable, with
a consequent
restric-
tion of
policy
options
available to
political
decision makers
within the
state.
If external
political
pressures
make it
difficult for larger,
wealthier,
and
politically
more
developed states,
such as
Nigeria,
India, and
Indo-
nesia, to establish and maintain political stability and independence, they
are
likely
to
overwhelm ministates
whose political,
economic, and
social
resources are
so
much more severely
limited.
Because
of their inherent
susceptibility to
foreign
pressures, the
pro-
liferation
of ministates, with little
or no actual
or potential
power, has
raised
serious questions
relating to
the transformation
of
international
relations
thereby
effected. The United
Nations,
for
example,
is seriously
considering
the creation of
an
associate membership
category
for
mini-
states.7
This status
would permit
full participation
with voting rights in
all committees and subsidiary bodies
of the U.N.
and full participation
with no vote in the General Assembly. The impact of ministate dependence
on
stronger
powers
as
a factor
in
determining
major
U.N.
decisions
would
thus
be reduced.
The
limitation of
voting
rights would
be offset by reliev-
6
Luxembourg, Kuwait,
Malta,
and
Barbados,
for example.
7
UNITAR,
Status and Problems, pp. 130-42;
see
also
U.N.,
General Assembly Reso-
lution
742
(8) of
27 November
1953,
and
Harris,
Microstates, pp.
40-50.
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8/11/2019 Problems of Political Development in a Ministate: The French Territory of the Afars and theIssasAuthor(s): Nancy A.
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616
Nancy
A. Shilling
ing ministates of
the burden
of
proportional
inancial
participation
n
the
U.N.,
a
cost which
most could
carry only through
subsidies
from
wealthier
states.
Introduction to a
Specific Potential
Ministate
It is with the questions
of
possible independence
for a
potential
mini-
state and its
potentialities
for
national integration
and continuation
as
a
viable,
independent political entity that
this
study
is concerned.8 The
specific area
selected is the French Territory
of
the Afars and
the
Issas.9
As one of the few remaining vestiges of
European colonial control
in
Africa, apart from the Portuguese and South
African areas
to
the south,
the
logic
of
twentieth century political
change
on the continent would
suggest the impossibility of the area remaining a colonial enclave much
longer.
In
recent years, moreover, a significant
nationalist movement has
arisen within the
territory, and
on
two occasions the people's attitude
toward
continued
colonial
status
has
been
officially sought.
Yet the
terri-
tory's history and
geographic location as well as its limited land area,
population, and
resources render the
attainment and maintenance of
political independence a dubious proposition
at best.
The analysis will be presented in two
sections. The first will deal with
the
problems
of
nation building within the
territory, i.e., the economy,
cultural
pluralism, elite formation, political consensus
building,
and insti-
tution formation,
as manifested in the referendums of 1958 and 1967 and
their aftermaths. The second section will consider the external variables
which impinge on the territory's
nation-btuilding potential-tlhe
interests
of
adjacent
states
and great powers which
may facilitate or impede the
territory's
capacities to attain nationhood and viable, independent state-
hood.
The territory
is
in
an unenviable position
with respect both to its present
sitluation and future prospects. Built on a
volcanic wasteland, virtually
devoid of known
or suspected natural resources, it possesses a small,
heterogeneous
population whose existing
ethnic, cultural, and political
differences have
been
exacerbated by French policy and the policies of
its
immediate
neighbors, Ethiopia and the Somali Republic, both of whom
for vastly different reasons have territorial designs on the French depen-
dency.
The
possibility
of
internal
development sufficient to permit a viable
independence, already slight because of
domestic conditions, is further
diminished
by
these
conflicting
interests of
France, Ethiopia, and Somalia.
Just
as
the
territory
came into
existence as a
separate colonial entity
through
the
working
of forces
beyond
the
control of
the
indigenous
population,
so
its
ultimate
political
future
is
likely
to
be
determined,
neither by
rational
considerations
of
its
potential viability
nor
by
the will
of
its
inhabitants,
but
by
the
impact
of external
forces
largely beyond
its
control
and unconcerned
with
the
present
or future
well-being
of
its
people.
8
This research was undertaken
as an extension of that done for the Atlantic Research
Corporation in
1966
on
conflict
potential
in
the
Horn of
Africa.
9
Formerly
French
Somaliland,
it
was
officially
renamed
Territoire Francais des
Afars
et des
Issas
by
the
French
government
on
3
July
1967.
For
the sake
of readability,
it
will be referred
to
interchangeably
as the
territory,
French
Somaliland, and Somaliland.
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Problems of Political
Development
in
a Ministate 617
The Economy
French Somaliland has movcd into the modern world with serious
handicaps in terms of its potential for national integration and political
independence among these are the limitations of its economy. Since the
closing of the Suez Canal in 1967, Somaliland has little hope of surviving
as an independent state without extensive and regular infusions of
foreign
aid. Half of the Somali population is concentrated in the only significant
town, the port of Djibouti, which derives its income almost exclusively
from direct or indirect participation in international commerce. Since 1967
a large proportion of its population is chronically unemployed. The re-
mainder of the people are pastoral or nomadic and do not participate
in
the modern money economy. Date culture and market gardening constitute
the only significant agricultural activities in the territory, and these are
not important as exports. For the rural population generally, animals con-
stitute
the sole source of wealth and food. The herds of the nomads are
seldom eaten or sold, as they represent the status and prestige of their
owners. These herds are too numerous for the available water and grass,
but there is little immediate prospect of substantially reducing their size
or of
making them economically profitable.
The economic
picture
is
depressing elsewhere, too. There
is little
industry except
for limited
service and processing activities
in
Djibouti,
including meat-packing plants which use cattle imported from Ethiopia
and Somalia for
export
to Aden
and other former British dependencies on
the Red Sea. A 1961 geological survey indicates that the territory does not
possess oil or
minerals
in sufficient quantities to warrant extraction.10 Salt
was
the only important export until 1957 when it lost its Ethiopian market.
France,
with a domestic
salt monopoly, refuses to import foreign salt,
so
the French-financed
and French-run salt industry has been closed.
Since
then, only limited quantities of rawhides and shells have been exported to
Red
Sea countries.
Prior to 1967 there
was still some
hope
for the
economy.
Somaliland's
geographic
location on the
Gulf of
Tadjoura
and the Red
Sea
permitted
it
to
serve
as a transfer center for
Ethiopian exports
and
imports,
and after
1960 as a service and supply port for ships traveling via the Suez Canal
and Red Sea to the
Indian
Ocean.
In
1948
Djibouti
handled
407,000
tons
of merchandise
in
transit,
but after
1952,
when
Ethiopia
and Eritrea
federated,
the
percentage
of
Ethiopian
trade
through Djibouti steadily
decreased.
At the same
time,
the
territory's exports virtually ceased,
and
reexport
of
imports
to countries other than
Ethiopia
also
declined.
Dji-
bouti's
importance
as a
fueling
and
provisioning center, however, rapidly
increased
as
its
utility
in
transshipping Ethiopian goods
declined.
How-
10Virginia Thompson
and
Richard
Adloff, Djibouti
and the Horn
of Africa
(Stan-
ford, Calif.: Stanford
University
Press, 1968), pp.
176-80.
11Between 1955 and 1965 the number of ships calling at Djibouti increased 81
percent.
In 1965 the
port
handled
2,254,000
tons of
merchandise connected with
its
fueling and
provisioning functions,
as
compared
with
801,000
tons
of
exports and
imports,
largely
for
Ethiopia,
handled in 1950.
See
La
Coite
Francaise des
Somalis,
Marche
Tropicaux
et Mediterraneens21
(25
December
1965): 3294-96;
H. P.
Douteau,
Le Port de
Commerce de
Djibouti 1965,
Revue
Francaise
de
l'Elite
Europeenne, no.
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618 Nancy A. Shilling
ever, the closing of the Suez Canal as a
result of the June War
has
reduced
the port's operations
to 25 percent of capacity. Somaliland's
potential
for
economic survival as an independent state is thus minimal.
Cultural Pluralism
The Issa Somali constitute 46 percent
of the territory's population, and
the
Afar, a subdivision of the Ethiopian
Danakil tribe, constitute 38
per-
cent.'2
Both are of Hamitic stock, Muslim,
and fundamentally nomadic in
cuilture. They speak
different languages, inhabit separate
areas of the
country, and possess a
growing
consciousness of themselves as
culturally
distinct from one
another. While the Afar have retained their
nomadic
life
style, the Issa have increasingly settled in
the towns and are now largely
concentrated in the capital, Djibouti, which has a population approxi-
mately 75 percent Somali.
A
Somali cultural
consciousness has
been awakened in the Issa Somali
as
a result of their
exposure to two primary influences over
the past 25
years. The ideas of
nationalism and
self-determination began to permeate
the isolated tribal
societies of the territory
during and after World War
II
and
were strongly encouraged by the
growth of
pan-Somalism
in
former
British and Italian
Somaliland. The Issa thus came to embrace
two nation-
alisms-the first limited to the community
of Issa Somali, the
second, and
now
more prevalent,
to a territorial state including all
Somali. Pan-
Somalism in the territory has thus sought
the right of self-determination
from France, initially for political independence but subsequently for the
creation
of an
all-inclusive Somali state.
While
Issa political
consciousness seems largely to have
been a natural
result of their adaptation to urban life and
their response to
the influences
of
modernization, the
politicization of the more traditional
and nomadic
Afar
was mainly due to deliberate
French policy. To counteract Issa
demands for
independence in the late
1950s, the French government urged
a
policy
of
continued association upon the Afar.
Playing upon,
and
to
some
extent inducing, Afar fears of
subjugation and loss of cultural
iden-
tity
in
a larger Somali
state, the French convinced the Afar
that the best
guarantee of their autonomy would come from continuation of the colonial
status quo.
Emphasizing the ethnic, linguistic, and
economic differences
between the Afar and the Issa, the
French undertook in 1958 the pro-
tection of the Afar
against the Issa.
This
policy was at variance
with previous French
policy
with
respect
to
the
indigenous
inhabitants of the
territory.13
From the consolidation
of
French control
in 1885
until after World
War
II,
France was able
to
govern
Somaliland
with little
regard
for internal
political
demands.'4
The
182 (November
1965), pp. 35-42;
and
Cote Francaise
des Somalis,
Europe-France
Outre Mer,
no. 423 (April
1965), pp.
13-24.
12
The remaining
16 percent of
the population,
largely urban immigrants,
is com-
posed
of
Arabs,
Indians,
and
Europeans.
13
C6te
Francaise des
Somalis,
Tropiques, no. 373 (May
1955),
pp. 10-12, 73-77.
14
For a summary
of the
French acquisition of
Djibouti, see John
Drysdale,
The
Problems of French
Somaliland,
Africa Report
11 (November
1966): 11-12.
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Problems of Political Development in a Ministate 619
barren,
backward
enclave
provided
little
opportunity
or incentive for
the
growth of
political
consciousness,
and
France
took
care
to
isolate
equally
all inhabitants from external contact. Increased contact with foreign
nationals
due to
Djibouti's strategic
importance
during World
War
II,
and
the
economic and
urban
development which
were
by-products
of
this,
politicized
the
more urban Issa
and thereby
established the
basis
for
political
challenge and
change
within
the
territory.
To
forestall a
possible indigenous
demand
for
representative
govern-
ment, the
French
created
a
Representative
Council
in
1946,
the
first
step
toward
constitutional
government for
the
territory.Fifty
percent
of
the
Council
members
were
representativesof the
resident
French
community;
the
other
half was
composed of
representativesof
the
indigenouspopula-
tion. Two Somali, two Afar, and two Arabswere to be elected by their
respective
communities,
and
the remaining
four
representativeswere to
be
appointed
by the French
government
from delegates of
chambers of
commerce,
professionalgroups,
and
trade unions.
This system
gave
disproportionate
representationto the
French and
Arabs;
more importantly
n terms of
the
currentpolitical
conflict based on
ethnic
origins and the
long-range
prospects
for national
integration, the
communalvoting
system
encouraged Issa
and Afar
to view
themselves,
not
only
as
culturally
and economically
distinct, but
as
politicallyseparate
entities with
fundamentally
different if not
irreconcilable
nterests.15
The
French
loi cadre
of 1956
correctedthe
imbalance n
Somali
representation,
thus slowing the growth of pan-Somalismwithin the territory.The pros-
pect
of
internal
political
autonomy also
tended to
deemphasize
intertribal
differences.
The
majority
of seats in
the first
election in 1957
was won
by
the
Union
Republicaine,a
nationalistcoalition
party of
Issa, Afar, and
Arab.,,
The
impending
independence
of the
Somali Republic
and its
potential
as a homeland
for all
Somalis
stimulated
Somali
nationalismamong the
Issa,
however, and
political
cooperationbetween
Afar and Issa
waned.
Moreover,
the
Issa
again
demonstrated
mpatience
with the
gradual pace
of
constitutional
progress
toward
autonomyand
renewed
their pressures
on the
French
for
further
reforms. A
movement within
the
territory for
its inclusion in the new Somalistate gained momentum,given
impetus by
pressuresfrom
Somalia
and encouraged
on grounds
of Islamic
brotherhood
by
Radio Cairo
broadcasts.
By
1958
when
the
referendum
on
the
proposed
constitution
of the
Fifth
Republic took
place, pan-Somalism
had
become an
open
and
important
issue in
Somaliland's nternal
politics,
and
it
claimed
widespreadsupport
among
the
territory's
ssa.
Due
to
Issa
inexperience
in
political
organiza-
15This
electoral system is
reminiscent of
that
introduced
by the
French
into Leb-
anon
in 1922,
which
has also
perpetuated and
reinforced
distinctions-not
only between
Christian and
Muslim, but also
among
Greek
Orthodox,
Protestant,
Maronite,
Sunni,
and Shia-and has made the task of national integration more difficult. For further
discussion see
Kamal S.
Salibi,
The
Modern
History of
Lebanon
(London:
Weiden-
field and
Nicolson,
1965),
and S. H.
Longrigg, Syria
and
Lebanon
under
French Man-
date
(London: Oxford
University
Press,
1958), esp.
p.
127.
16Ioan
M. Lewis,
Modem
Political
Movements in
Somaliland,
Africa 28
(October
1958): 345.
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620 Nancy A. Shilling
tion
and confrontation
tactics, their
earlier ineffectiveness
had allowed
France
officially to ignore the
movement. By 1958,
however, it was neces-
sary for France, while continuing to deny the reality of the movement,
to issue official regulations
to combat
and contain
it.17 For example,
the
French
administration gerrymandered
the electoral districts prior
to the
referendum
to give the Afar
the edge.
Until
1956 the
French had treated
the Afar and the
Issa impartially.
Both were denied
any significant political
role,
either within the adminis-
tration or through their political
organizations.
Between
1956 and 1958
France generally
supported the progressive
Issa
against the backward
Afar.
But in the
1958
referendum
campaign, the Issa
organized
Nvidespread,
effective political
opposition
in
an attempt to
attain a no
vote
on
con-
tinued association with
France. When the
Afar provided
an almost
unanimous yes vote for continued
association,
the French
shifted their
support
to
Afar political interests and ambitions
within
the territory
and
extended them protection
against the Issa.'8
France has since
consistently
adhered
to this position as Issa
Somali nationalism
has grown stronger
and
more adamantly
anticolonial.19
The 1958 Referendum
and
its Aftermath
The
1958 constitutional
referendum
was presented as
a
choice
between
continued
association
with France (a
yes vote) and
independence
with
the
object
of forming a
Greater Somalia ' (a
no
vote).
France
made
it
clear that independence would mean the immediate withdrawal of all
French personnel
and financial support.
The yes forces
won easily
with
75
percent
of
the
votes.
An
analysis
of
the methods
for determining
voter eligibility
and of
the
ethnic components
of
the
vote is illuminating
in
view
of recent troubles
and
the
1967
referendum
results.
Only
French
citizens over
21
years
of
age
whose
papers
were
in
order
were eligible to
vote.
Before
1958
there
were two categories of voters:
those with civil
status ( citizens )
who
held citizenship
in
metropolitan
France and those
with personal status,
including Africans and Asians,
who
were bom in the territory.20
Since
records
were
often
not
kept
within the territory
and where
kept were
highly inaccurate, administrative regulation permitted proof of birthplace
to
be
provided by
witnesses. In administering
this
regulation,
a
presump-
tion
of
birth
in
the territory was made
more frequently for
potential
Afar
voters than for
Issa Somali;
the latter
were often required
to provide the
unavailable
documentary proof,
even when they were
known
to
have
qualified
in
the
1956
elections. Wealthy Arab
and Indian immigrants
could often buy
the required proof,
while the poorer Somali
immigrants
and
many local Somali
could not.
Not
only
were
more
Afar
than Issa enfranchised,
on election day
more
than 27 percent
of
the registered
voters
did not vote. A
high proportion
17
See Thompson and Adloff, Djibouti, pp. 66-75.
18
For
discussion of Afar interests, see Thompson and Adloff, Djibouti, pp.
72-73.
'Ioan MI.Lewis, Prospects in the Hom, Africa Report
(April 1967), p.
37.
20
Thompson and Adloff, Djibouti, pp. 39-41.
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Problems of Political Development
in a Ministate
621
of the
nonvoters
were
Somali
who
boycotted
the
polls
to
protest
what
they
viewed
as deliberate
French
manipulation
of
the electoral
rolls. A
majority
of the Somali voted no, while the Afar and Europeans almost unani-
mously voted yes.
1
Of 15,914 eligible
voters,
11,733
went to the polls;
8,882 yes votes were
cast
and
2,851
no.
Immediately
following
the
referendum, the French
suspended Somali Premier
Muhammad
Harbi
from office, apparently
because he had campaigned against
continued
association with France.
They also dissolved
the
Assembly
and
called
for
new
elections.
Election contests after 1958 followed communal
lines, partly as a result
of
French policy
discouraging intertribal political alliances, and
partly
as
a
result of the distrust
sown between the
two communities by the events
surrounding the 1958 referendum. Though nationalist parties had pre-
viously rejected ethnic
and communal exclusivity, this became
increasingly
the
rule after the 1958
election with its arousal of ethnic
feelings. For
some time communal
rivalry was focused
prinarily
on
internal issues.
Local and clan rivalries
within the Somali
community superseded Somali
nationalism as broad
ideological and constitutional issues
were subordi-
nated to traditional
divisions within each community.22
The
Issa Somali, who constitute the
vast majority of the territory's
Somali population, are a
good example of such separatist
inclinations.
Divided between French
Somaliland,
Ethiopia, and Somalia, the Issa
before 1958
were
more concerned with
unification in an Issa-governed
polity than with integration into the Somali Republic.23 Their prosperity
as a trading
community within a trading nation could only
be diluted
by political union with a
large, impoverished nomadic state
needing tax
revenue from trade for development
purposes-thus the Issa reluctance to
cooperate with the pan-Somali movement
before 1958.
Issa separatism from
non-Somali groups within the territory,
however,
was
essentially an expression
of
dissatisfaction with the
lack
of
opportunity
for
their own education and
economic
development-defects
for
which
the
French administration
was
blamed.
This growing
dissatisfaction
with
internal
problems
and
the
lack of viable
alternatives for
resolving
them
have
encouraged
Issa
political leadership
to
move
away
from
separatism
toward support
of
Somali
political unity.
Moreover
the
importance
of
Islam
in
pan-Somalism
(i.e.,
Muslim
dislike of infidel
rule)
cannot
be
overlooked
as
a
force
for
Somali
unity beyond
the
territory's
borders.
The
most
vigorous supporters
of
Somali
unity
are the
younger
genera-
tion
of
Issa
who
have
grown up
in
a
relatively prosperous
urban
environ-
ment and
have
acquired
some education.
Many
of
them, along
with
the
younger
Arab
generation
in
Djibouti,
formed
the Parti du
Mouvement
Populaire
in
1962;
its
purpose
was to
press
for internal
political autonomy
'A report of Ethiopian troops
massed
on the frontiers
in case
of a
no
vote,
circulated in
Afar areas
during
the referendum
campaign,
undoubtedly
influenced
many
Afar to vote yes. See Thompson and Adloff, Djibouti, p. 71, and Philippe Marchat,
Nuages
sur
Djibouti,
Revue Militaire
Generale
(December 1966), pp. 585-610.
22
See
Saadia
Touval,
Sonmli
Nationalism
(Cambridge,
Mass.:
Harvard
University
Press, 1963), pp. 128-29,
and
Thompson
and
Adloff, Djibouti, pp. 61-101.
23I
oan
M.
Lewis,
A
Modern
History of
Somaliland
(New
York:
Praeger, 1965),
p.
19.
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622
Nancy
A.
ShilUlng
and eventual
independence
for the territory.
The formation of this
party
marked the entry of
Somali youth
into organized
politics
and
was seen as
an expression of dissatisfaction with the older politicians who had per-
mitted
personal and
clan
rivalries to
distract them
from
anticolonial
pursuits.
De
Gaulle's
Visit
to
Somaliland
and the 1967
Referendum
The growing
Somali
frustration
with the
French regime
and their
increasing
determination
after
1958 to
secure freedom
from
colonial
rule
and political
unity
with Somalia
led to demonstrations
during
General
de Gaulle's August
1966 visit to
Djibouti. It
was his
first stop
on a world
tour planned
to criticize
U.S.
Vietnam policy
and to
enhance France's
prestige as a leader in foreign policy and decolonization. On arriving in
Djibouti,
de Gaulle
was faced with
demonstrations
by Somali
nationalists.
Originally intended
to protest
the
political favoritism
shown
by the
terri-
tory's leadership
(with
strong
French
backing)
toward older
political
aspirants,
as
well as the
French
manipulation
of previous
elections,
the
demonstration
was
turned into a
demand
for immediate
independence
by
the many young,
unemployed
Somali workers
of
Djibouti
among the
demonstrators.24
After
clashes
between
nationalists
and the French
police, de
Gaulle
cancelled his
scheduled
public
speech and
addressed
the
territorial Assem-
bly.
In
the course of his speech,
he
obliquely
hinted that
independence
was now possible for the colony. Shortly after his visit, the French gover-
nor was
replaced and
a referendum
for
March 1967
on the
status
of the
territory was
announced.
Again the
French
government
made it clear
that
if
independence
was
chosen,
all French
financial support
would stop
and
all
French
officials
and troops
would be
withdrawn-presumably
as
in
Guinea.5
President
de Gaulle
believed
that such
a referendum
would
again
undermine the
political strength
of the pan-Somalism
within
the
territory
and
vindicate France's
role as
a decolonizer.
The latest official
estimate
of 1966 listed
58,000 Somali,
48,000
Afar,
and
19,050
Europeans,
Arabs,
and
Indians in the
territory.
Of the total
of
125,050, 37,850 were classified as aliens, of which 11,500 were Somali.26
Of
the
87,200
classified
as
French
citizens,
29,800
were Somali and
48,000
were
Afar.
Of
all the citizens,
only
39,024
were declared
eligible
to
vote
in the
1967
referendum,
for the
eligibility
regulations
were altered
to
en-
franchise
just
those who met the
age requirement
and had lived
in the
territory
for
more than
3
years.
This
change
was accompanied by
massive
24
Thompson
and
Adloff,
Djibouti,
pp. 61,
84-86.
25 For
de Gaulle's
explicit
threats on
a no vote
and
his
ambiguous
rewards
for a
yes
vote,
see
Monde,
29 October
1966;
New York
Times,
26 and
27
August
1966;
and
Economist,
5
November
1966, pp. 570-71.
On the
aftermath
of
Guinea's
no
vote
in 1958, see Gwendolyn M. Carter,
Independence
for Africa (New
York:
Praeger,
1960),
pp.
119-26.
26
It
is
interesting
to note that
until
September
1966,
when
France
decided
to hold
the referendum,
official
French
estimates
of
the population
were 82,000
to
86,000.
In
September
the
administration
revised
its estimate
upward
to 104,000
to
108,000;
finally
the
official
government
newspaper,
Reveil de
Djibouti,
on 11 March
1967
put
the figure
at 125,050.
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Problems of
Political Development
in a Ministate
623
deportations of suspected aliens. Possibly 8,000 Somali, many
with
citizen-
ship papers, were deported, thus eliminating a sizable segment of the
population favoring independence.27 For the remaining Somali, a presump-
tion of noncitizenship was again apparently widely made. Of the
39,024
registered under the new regulations, 14,689 were Somali (25 percent of
all
Somali
in the territory), 22,004 were Afar (46 percent of
all
Afar),
1,408
were
Arab, and 923 European.
The large number of eligible Afar is surprising since nomadic Afar could
be expected to have greater difficulty demonstrating residence than the
more urban Somali. It is also suggestive that with the difficulties involved
in registering a nomadic, rural population, so many more Afar than Somali
were enrolled. Finally, although Djibouti contains over half of the terri-
tory's population (and a heavy concentration of Somali), it was accorded
only 25 percent of the registered electorate.28 The final list of voters thus
produced, as in 1958, an electoral base skewed toward the result which
France desired.
With more
Afar than Issa voting, a victory for French policy
was
assured
because of the consistency of ethnic voting patterns on the issue. Of
the
37,292 votes cast,
22,523
(60 percent) favored continuation of the existing
relationship with France, while 14,734 opted for immediate indepen-
dence.29
But
this result
can
hardly
be
taken as
a
genuine expression
of
territorial
sentiment.
As
observers
for
European newspapers
there at the
time
pointed out, though any rigging of the actual election
on
voting day
via threats, disallowance of ballots, etc., was possibly minimal (as the
French claimed),
in
any case it was superfluous due to preelection activi-
ties.30 The
electoral
rolls had already been sufficiently manipulated by
qualifying all Afar (including women) and declaring large numbers of
Somali (including
all
women) ineligible
to
make
the
result
almost
certain.3'
The rioting following
the
referendum and
the
refusal of Moussa
Ahmad
Idriss,
the
only
Somali
deputy
to the
previous
French National
Assembly,
to
stand
for reelection indicated that the referendum
had,
if
anything,
exacerbated
French
Somaliland's internal
political problems.
It
further
polarized
the
political relations
of
the
Afar
and
the
Issa
and
so
broadened
27
loan
M.
Lewis, The
Referendum
in
French Somaliland:
Aftermath
and
Prospects
in
the Somali
Dispute, World Today
23
(July 1967): 310,
and
Lewvis,
Prospects
in
the
Horn, p. 37;
Paul
Mousset,
Referendurn 'a
Djibouti,
Revue des
Deux
Mondes,
no. 4
(15
April 1967), p.
488;
and
Thompson
and
Adloff,
Djibouti,
pp.
94-95. The
Somali National
News
Agency
claimed
that
4,300
were
deported between
September
1966 and March
1967.
28
Lewis,
Referendum, p.
310.
`
The
U.N.
report
gave
the
figures as
22,555 for, 14,666
against,
but both New
York
Times,
21
March
1967, and
Thompson
and Adloff,
Djibouti, p.
96,
agree on the
slightly different figures
cited. French
Somaliland was
included in the 1965
report of
the Committee
of
Twenty-Four
as a
territory
to
which
General
Assembly Resolution
No.
1514
(15)
on
decolonization
applied.
For
discussion
of
the
pressures
exerted by
the French at
the time of the
referendum,
see L'Affaire
de Djibouti,
Revue
des
Deux
Mondes, no. 4 (1
February 1967), pp.
321-39; P. Chaleur,
Referendum
'a Djibouti,
Etudes
(December 1966), pp.
669-76;
Economist,
25
March
1967, p.
1128; and Somali
News,
17
February
1967.
3'
Africa Report
(May 1967), p.
24,
and Somali
News, 20
March 1967.
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Nancy A. Shilling
the
mistrust between
Somali in
the
territory
and France that the
Somali
refused
thereafter
to participate in
any
foirmal
politics.:32
The
polarization
between Afar and Issa temporarily increased the cohesion among Somali
political
forces
in the
territory,
and
in June
1967 several
small
liberation
movements
merged
into the
Somali
Coast Freedom
Party.33
A few
weeks
later,
the French
government
without
explanation
dissolved
the Parti
du
Mouvement Poptulaire
(PMP),
the
official
Somali
political
organization.
Under
the
statute of
autonomy
granted
by
France following
the
refer-
endum,
and purportedly
designed
to gradtially
increase political
participa-
tion, the
first
territorial
elections
were
held
in November
1967
to choose
32 representatives
for
5-year terms
in the
Chamber
of
Deputies.34
Accord-
ing to the
stattute,
16
Afar,
1
1
Issa, 4 Europeans,
and
1 Arab
were to
be
elected.35 The disparity between Afar and Issa representation, given the
division of population
in the
territory,
caused
many
Issa to
refuse
to stand
for
election,
to run
token campaigns,
or to
discourage
their
supporters
from voting.
Partly
becatuse
of this,
23 of the
32
seats were
won
by
candi-
dates
of the
governing
Afar Parti pour
le
Progres
et la
Defense
des
Interets
du
Territoire
Francais
des Afars
at des
Issas,
led by Ali
Aref
Bourhan.
It
was the successor
to
the Rassemblement
Democratique
Afar which
had
led the
interim
government
between
the
referendum
and the
election.
The opposition
party,
the
Union
Populaire
Africaine (UPA),
led
by
Hassan
Gouled Aptidon,
won
six seats
in
Djibouti;
another
Issa
party,
the
Union des Issa,
won three.
Bourhan
was elected
president
of the
Conseil
du Gouvernement by a vote of 2.5-6. Because the Issa parties reftused to
name
candidates
for
his cabinet,
the eight
selected
were
from
the
Afar
party.36
The Afar
candidate
for the
French
National
Assembly,
Abdoul
Rader
Moussa
Ali, easily wvon
the
seat left
uncontested
by Idriss
because
the new Somali
candidate
campaigned
minimally
and the
election
was
again
boycotted
widely
by
Somali
voters.37
Since
1967, there
has therefore
been no effective
Somali
participation
in administration
or
legislation
in
the
territory
or
in
France.
To
strengthen
its
Afar political
support,
France announced
a
post-
referendum
increase
in aid to Afar
areas;
the new
total
was
US$3
million
a year. Shortly after Issa criticism of such discrimination, and possibly
to ensure political
tranquility
in
the
November election,
France
announced
a
$4.4
million
grant
to
expand
the
port
facilities at Djibouti.38
While
Africa
Report (May
1967),
p. 24, and
New
York
Times,
21 and
26 March
1967
and
6 April
1967.
33
Reported
by
Radio
'Mogadiscio,
8 June
1967.
`
On
12 September
1967 the
Somali
Republic
protested
to
the
U.N.
Committee
of
TIvent
y-Four
concerning
the French
statute
under which
the
election
was
to be
con-
ducted.
It claimed
that, aside
from
the uneven representation
of Issa and
Afar
voters,
the
stattute made
the
territory a
veritable
nineteenth-century
viceroy. Africa
Report
(November
1967), p.
37.
35
Africa Report
(February
1969),
p. 28.
36
Reveil
de
Djibouti,
18
and 22
November
1967.
37
New York
Times, 24
April
1967.
38
New York
Times,
23 March
1967,
and Agence
France-Presse,
22
April
1967.
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Problems
of
Political
Development
in a Ministate
625
economically
advantageous
to
France
at
the
time
(before
the
closing of
the Suez
Canal),
this move
indirectly
benefited the Somali
who are
coni-
centrated in Djibouti, many of whom were employed directly or indirectly
in
port
operations. In
further
courting
of Afar
support,
France
took
advan-
tage of
Somali refusal to
cooperate
politically
and
gave
the
territorial
government broader
powers
than
were
politically
feasible
with
a
Somali-
dominated
regime.
France
has
also insisted
that the leader
of
any future
government
be
an
Afar, since
Afar voters
outnumber
Sonmali
oters.
By
early
1968 the
Issa appeared
willing
to
abandon
their
unsuccessful
attempts
to
force
concessions
from
France.
In
an
apparent
gesture to
reduce
political
tensions,
Aptidon,
the
leader
of the
outlawed
PMIP,
held
a
press
conference
in
January 1968
and
set
forth
his
party's
conditions
for
normnalizing he
political
situation :
(1)
rename
the territory
with
a title
more
representative of
ethnic
realities ;
(2)
amend the 1967
statute
of
autonomy
to create
a
vice-presidency
whose
incumbent
must be
of
an
ethnic
origin
different
from that
of
the
president ; (3)
adopt
an
electoral
law
providing
proportional
representation. He
indicated that while
his
party
considered
these
demands
negotiable,
Somali
participation
in
the November
1968
local
elections
would
depend on a
generally
favorable
French response
to
these issues.
Aptidon also
suggested
that the Somali
Republic's
participa-
tion
in
Issa
activism
would
increase
if
no
satisfactory
political formula was
reached. There
was no
official
French
response to
these
demands,
but
shortly
afterwards
Aptidon
was exiled
from
the
territory.39
France thus made clear its unwillinaness to give the Somali a propor-
tionate share
with the
Afar in
governing
the
territory; the
result
was
several
incidents of
political
violence
attributed to
or
acknowledged by
local
Somali
liberation
groups.
These
included
two
assassination
attempts in
mid-1968, one
against
Prime
Minister
Bourhan
and
another
against
the
minister of
information.
In the
second
attack the
vice-president of
the
Afar
party
was
accidentally
killed.
The Prime
Minister
attributed
the
attack
on
him
to
foreign
powers
trying to
destroy unity
between Afar
and Issa.
40
With
its
pro-Afar
policy
becoming
counterproductive
by
increasing Issa
eohesion and
militancy within
the
territory and by
reinforcing
Somalia's
determination to
press
its
claims
to
the
territory, in October 1968 the
French National
Assembly
increased
the
number
of
territorial
Assenmbly
deputies from
Issa-dominated
constituencies by one
and
correspondingly
reduced the
number
from Afar
constituencies.
Moreover, the
territorial
government
increased Issa
representation in the
council
froim
two to
three
nembers
out
of
nine.41
These
gestures toward
reconciliation
with the
Issa have
been
insufficient
to
reduce
the
extreme
polarization
effected
after the
1967
referendum, yet
39
He
continued his efforts from
Paris
where
he
called for
independence for
the
terri-
tory as
the
only
way
of
attaining
Somali
political
rights-but
with
continued
association
with
France.
Monde,
31
May
1968.
40
Reveil
de
Djibouti,
8
May 1968.
41 Africa
Report
(February
1969),
p.
28.
In
an
earlier
conciliatory
gesture,
the
High
Court of Somaliland
had
dismissed
charges
of
complicity
in the
1966
riots
against
seven
leaders of
the
outlawed Issa Parti
du
Mouvement
Populaire.
Africa
Report
(Janu-
ary
1968), p.
26.
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626 Nancy A. Shilling
the Issa Somali, with few exceptions, have apparently displayed such a low
profile of political activism as to have gone virtually
unreported in the
world press. The territorial press is heavily controlled by the French and
simply ignores unacceptable political events, but even
the official organ of
neighboring Somalia, Stella d'Ottobre, has found little to report on political
activities within the territory.42European, Arab, and
U.S. newspapers also
reported no political activity within the territory after
the 1968
assassiina-
tion attempts-with two exceptions.
In January 1970 a terrorist grenade attack on a restaurant in Djibouti
injured 16 Europeans. It was the
first
Issa political violence
directed against
Europeans. Leaflets of the Somali Coast Liberation Front
were later found
nearby.43 A few months later the men convicted in the
May 1968 assassina-
tion attempts escaped from jail in Djibouti. They kidnapped several French
hostages, including the French commissioner in the territory
and demanded
a
plane and safe conduct to the Somali Republic. These
demands were
granted by the French territorial governor, and they made good their
escape. Such isolated instances of Issa violence against French favoritism
and repression may continue. The Issa are in no position,
however, to wage
a
regular activist campaign for eitlher greater political
rights or indepen-
dence. The activists are few in number, most in exile
in Aden and else-
where, with little financial support. French military
control makes it ex-
tremely difficult for them to move into and out of the territory. Also, since
the military coup
in
Somalia, its military-busy with internal problems
and efforts to decrease regional conflicts with Ethiopia and Kenya-has
not been eager to encourage militant activities by clandestine territorial
protest organizations.
The
Issa now seem to realize that
they can never
win a military victory over the French; with territorial elections scheduled
for
1973, they may decide to wait and try for power through
the ballot box.
While
this
course of
action seems
logical,
the Issa
are
extremely dejected
by what they
view as continued
French
maniptulation
of the
political
machinery
in
order to prevent genuine
self-determination and
to
deprive
the
Issa
of
their
rightful
share of
political power.
If
Somali
estimates
of
their
own
support are correct, a referendum in which all adult resi(lents
of the territory could participate would result in independence. Given the
continuing
resentment
over France's failure to
provide
such an
opportunity
for self-determination and
over
French
favoritism
to
the
Afar
under current
local autonomy,
the
renewal
of violence
by
Issa
against
Afar and the
French
remains
an
unlikely
but
possible option.
The
Political
Prospects
The
political
future
of French Somaliland will be determined
by
the
course
of
its
internal
politics
and
by
the interests of several
nations, i.e.,
France, Ethiopia,
and
Sonalia
directly,
and the U.S.
indirectly
because
of
its
unique treaty
relations with
Ethiopia.
If the Somaliland
question
42
In reviewing
some
700 issues of
the
daily
Stella
d'Ottobre
published
in
Mogadiscio
between September
1968
and
April 1972,
in other
words,
both before and
after
the
Somali Republic's coup
d'etat
of 21 October
1969,
no reference
to
any
political activity
within the territory was found,
despite
extensive
political coverage
of
African and
Arab countries.
O
New York
Timws,
26
January
1970.
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Problems
of Political
Development
in a Ministate
627
is made a
cause celebre
at
some
point,
mnoreremote interests
might also
embroil the
U.A.R.,
the
U.S.S.R.,
and
conceivably
China
and
others.44
Five alternatives with respect to the tcrritory's political future seem to
emerge from these
varied domestic and
foreign
attitudes:
(1)
continuation
as a
French
colony, (2)
independence, (3)
total annexation
by either
Ethiopia or
Somalia, (4)
partition and
then
annexation
by Ethiopia and
Somalia, or (5)
independence wvith
international
(possibly U.N.) guaran-
tees. Each of
these alternatives will
now be
examined
in
terms
of
its
feasibility and its
political
implications for the
people
of
French
Somaliland
and
for the
Horn of
Africa as a
whole.
Continuation
as
a
French Colony.
France is
reluctant to
withdraw
from
the
area so long as
any suggestion
exists
that the
growth of internal
political
opposition is forcing her to do so. This reluctance was demonstrated in
1966
by de
Gaulle's
reaction to the
open
opposition to
France voiced by
Somali
nationalists
during his
visit and by
French conduct of
the
subsequent
referendum.
This
reluctance to
permit
self-determination by
open
plebescite is sur-
prising
given the
fragility of
her rationale
for
continued
colonial rule.
Although the
territory
once served as
a vital fueling
stop
on the route to
Indochina,
the
contraction of
the French
colonial empire
has rendered
this
strategic
consideration negligible.
Moreover, the
financial
cost of main-
taining her
position in
Somaliland far
outweighs any present
or
conceivable
future
return she
might derive
from it.45
Somaliland's economic drain on France is indeed appreciable. The ter-
ritory has
almost no
exports. Nearly
half of
its imports
come from the
sterling
bloc
and
almost 90
percent of its
exports go to that
bloc,
primarily
to
Aden. Its
budget is
derived
mainly from
French
subsidies which are
continually
increasing. Of
US$11.5
million budgeted in
1947-48, $8.5 million
were
derived from
French military
and civilian
expenditures, $2 million
from transit
trade, and
$1 million from
Djibouti port
services. In addition
to
annual
subsidies, between
1947 and 1959
France spent
FF7,029
million
(French
francs) on
economic
development.
Combined
forms of
French financial
aid to the
territory
in
1958 amounted
to SF26 million (Somali francs), and in 1965 to SF160 million. The direct
contribution
by France to
the
1967 budget
was
SF113.9 million;
this ex-
cludes
investment, equipment
supply,
development
funds for
the port, and
direct
military/civilian
expenditures.
The
closing of the
Suez Canal in
spring
1967 further
reduced
the
territory's
income
and
increased the
amount
of French
subsidy required.
From
June
to
November of
1967 the
deficit
in
the
port
of
Djibouti
ran
to
SF120 million
(US$560,000)
which
France had
to
largely
absorb.
If the
financial
outlay
required to maintain
political
control
by
force
is
added,
the
value
to
France of
maintaining its
colonial
rule
appears
further
diminished.46
Because
France's
sense of a mission
civilatrice
is
still a
significant
factor
44For a
discussion of U.A.R.
interests
in the
territory
and
its
motives
for possible
active
involvement,
see A.
A.
Castagno,
Conflicts in
the Horn
of
Africa, Orbis 4
(Summer 1960):
204-15.
i
See La Documentation
Francaise,
La
Cote
Francaise
des
Somalis, Notes
et Etudes
Documentaires,
no.
1321
(28 April 1950).
6
Thompson
and
Adloff, Djibouti, pp.
186, 188,
and New
York
Times, 19
March 1967.
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628 Nancy A. Shilling
in her colonial planning, it is conceivable
that
she may
be
contemplating
a
strengthening
of her
position
in the
Horri,
now that the British have
withdrawn from Aden.
Interestingly, in August 1966 President
de
Gaulle
offered assistance
to Ethiopia
in
building a
rail link with the
present
Djibouti line to enisure
increasing use of the line and possibly
to conmnmit
Ethiopia
to the
developnment
of Djibouti. Stuch development
might be
expected to enhance
French
poNver
and prestige around the
Red Sea and
the Gulf of Adcn. Djibouti at that time
had begun
to
win refueling
business
from
Aden, aind
France may therefore have seen
a
good
economic
and
political future
in retaining French Somaliland.
Althou
gh
the closing
of the Suez
Canal in 1967 drastically
curtailed
these prospects,
so far, political (and possibly
strategic) considerations seem
to have outhveigled the finanicial in France's attitude toward Somaliland.47
The 1967
referendum was intended therefore
to prove to
the
territory's
people and to the world that
nationalist sentiment
wvas
ephemeral,
if not
totally illusory.
Had it achieved that aim,
it might have laid the groundwork
for indefinite colonial status.
As
it turned
out,
the strengtlh
of
the
opposition reaction undermined
the
French position, made
a
sham of
her
stated
willingness to
abide by the
political
wishes
of
the populace, and encouraged the
Somali to
further
illegal and clandestine
efforts.48 Realistically, it does not secm
likely that
France will continue
to be willing to bear the increasing costs
of main-
taining
her
presence
in
French Somaliland in the face of cointiinued
nternal
unrest.
Her interests in
Somaliland aside, however,
a precipitate French with-
drawal could invite invasion by Ethiopia
and/or the
Soinali
Republic.49
Since either of these
alternatives would
be
uinacceptable
to approximately
one-half
of
the resident
population and since they are aware of
the likeli-
hood
if
France withdraws,
botlh Afar and Somali leaders may be
willing in
the
short
run to suffer
French rule. This
prospect seems to be France's
best hope of restrainiina the political restiveness
of the Somali
mallking
her
colonial
rule economically and politically
feasible for the time
being.50
Independence. Given its limited ecoiiomic
development, severe lack of
resources, and limited potential for signiificantly changinig its economic
dependency
on
others, permanent independence
for French Sonialiland
seems
unlikely.
Heavy subsidies would be required and, since
it is now
For discussion
of
France's
remainring
strategic
interests, see
Cote
Francaise
des
Somalis, pp.
77-79; Castagno,
Conflicts
in the Horn,
pp.
207-8;
and L'Affaire
de
Djibouti,
pp. 321-39.
48
Ioan
M. Lewis, Recent
Developments
in
the
Somali Dispute,
African
Affairs
66
(April
1967):
104-12,
and Djibouti-l'ind6pendance
dans cinq
ans, Jeune
Afrique,
no.
319
(19
February
1967),
p.
25.
49As
Chaleur suggests
in Referendum
a
Djibouti,
p. 676;
see also L'Affaire
Dji-
bouti,
p. 339,
and
Mousset,
Referendum, p.
486.
A resort
to violence in
this problem
which both Ethiopia and Somalia consider nonnegotiable is a distinct possibility. Since
1960,
when the
Somali Republic
became independent,
a consistent pattern
of
conflict
and coexistence
by
both states can
be traced,
undertaken
as tactical
moves
in
ptirsulit
of unchanging
objectives.
See, for example,
E.
A.
Bayne,
Brinkmanship
in the
Horn
-
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Problems of
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economically
dependent on French
capital
and
technical
skill,
it seems
likely that an
independent
Somaliland
would
have to continue to look
for
external help. Thus indirect economic domination would be substituted for
direct political
control. This
would not solve, and
might
exacerbate,
Somali-
land's
internal
problems.
Offers of
subsidy from
the
Somali
Republic, the
United Arab
Republic,
or
Ethiopia might
be
forthcoming, but
these sources
would prove
un-
acceptable to
the
major ethnic
groups vithin
the
country, since each
would
imply a
political
orientation
which the
other
would find
abhorrent. The
Somali
would
reject
stronger ties with
Ethiopia.
The Afar,
too, would
reject
these ties
unless
the alternative
seemed to
be
absorption by
the Somali
Republic. The Afar
would also reject
U.A.R.
subsidy
of an
independent
Somaliland as an indirect means of strengthening pro-Somali political forces
within
the
country, since
the Somali
Republic and
the
U.A.R. are
politically
and
economically allied.
The most
significant
barrier to
independence as a
solution of
Somaliland's
status
is