priscian of lydia, commentator on the « de anima » in the tradition of iamblichus

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005 Mnemosyne, Vol. LVIII, Fasc. 4Also available online – www.brill.nl

*) The first version of this paper was written during a stay at Wolfson College,Oxford, founded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). For helpful com-ments I thank Richard Sorabji, Rosa Maria Piccione, Gregor Staab, ChristianTornau and Michael Schramm. My English was corrected by Nicolas Marquez-Grant, Adrian Stannard, Mark Winstanley and Jörn Müller. Of course, all short-comings remaining are my own fault.

1) This has been suspected by Cameron (1970, 100-5); but cf. Hadot 1996, 24 f.,n. 54.

2) It has been suspected that they settled in fact in Harran in NorthernMesopotamia; e.g. Hadot 1996, 8-50; there is, however, no reliable evidence forthis, cf. Luna 2001.

PRISCIAN OF LYDIA, COMMENTATOR ON THEDE ANIMA IN THE TRADITION OF IAMBLICHUS*)

M. PERKAMS

A

It has been argued that Priscian of Lydia (around 530), to whom the manu-scripts ascribe only two short treatises, is the author of an extended com-mentary on the De anima, which is transmitted under the name of Simplicius.Our analysis confirms this: Priscian’s Metaphrase of Theophrastus’ Physics isthe text which the commentator mentions as his own work. Consequently,its author, Priscian, also wrote the De anima commentary. The parallelsbetween both texts show that the commentator sometimes does not quoteIamblichus directly, but borrowed Iamblichean formulations from theMetaphrase. As for the dating of his works, a comparison with Damascius’writings makes it probable that his On principles is a terminus post quem forthe De anima commentary and a terminus ante quem for the Metaphrase. It islikely that both works were composed before 529.

1. The Authorship of the De anima Commentary

The historian Agathias, perhaps relying on a Neoplatonic source,1)reports that a man called Priscian of Lydia was, along with Damasciusand Simplicius, one of the seven philosophers who left the ByzantineEmpire for Persia in 529 AD.2) It has been argued that this man,to whom the manuscripts ascribe only two short treatises, is theauthor of an extended commentary on the De anima, which is

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PRISCIAN OF LYDIA 511

3) Bossier & Steel 1972; Steel in Huby & Steel 1997, 105-40.4) Hadot 1978, 193-202; Urmson 1995, 2-4; Blumenthal 1996, 66 f.; 2000, 1-7;

Huby 1999, 65; Finamore & Dillon 2002, 18-24; Perkams 2003, 84-9. The attri-bution of the commentary to Simplicius has been recently defended by Hadot(2002); on her argument cf. Perkams 2003, 58 n. 3; 88 f., n. 71 and below nn. 20and 27.

5) Cf. Bywater’s description of the manuscripts in Bywater 1886, vi-viii.6) Hadot (2002, 180) has correctly stated that Metaphrasis was used already in

antiquity. This does not exclude the possibility that the title in the manuscripts isof Byzantine origin.—On the Metaphrase cf. Huby 1993; 1999, 1-3, 65, 84-9;Finamore & Dillon 2002, esp. 258-65, 270-4; Steel 1978, esp. 121-54.

7) Steel 1978; Perkams 2002; 2003; Welt 2003, 90-7.

transmitted under the name of Simplicius. This theory, which wasput forward in 1972 by Ferdinand Bossier and Carlos Steel,3) hasreceived a divided reaction: while most scholars accept that thecommentary cannot be by Simplicius, they doubt if the argumentsby Steel and Bossier are sufficient to ascribe it to Priscian.4) Thisquestion does not only concern the attribution of a certain work toa certain author, but also the philosophical standpoint and intel-lectual development of a leading figure of late Neoplatonism as wellas his relations with his contemporaries. It is also relevant to thereconstruction of the lost parts of Iamblichus’ De anima, for whichwe have to rely on Priscian’s Metaphrase of Theophrastus’ Physics andthe De anima commentary, whose authorship is in question. Thus,there are enough reasons to resume the question and to discussagain the arguments that have been put forward.

The hypothesis that the De anima commentary (from now on: C)falsely ascribed to Simplicius is in fact by Priscian rests on a com-parison with Priscian’s explanation of Theophrastus. Parts of thiswork are transmitted in the manuscripts as two ‘Metaphrases’ on theparts of Theophrastus’ Physics which deal with sense-perception,imagination, and, after a gap, with thinking. A large part of theparaphrase, however, including the original beginning, is lost,5) andit is far from certain that Priscian himself called the whole work aMetaphrase (I will use this title in what follows).6) C itself has beenrecognized as an outstanding Neoplatonic text offering an unusualinterpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine of the entelechy, a sophisticatedaccount on the substantial variability of the soul, and an interest-ing argument on what man is.7) Relevant to our question is that itpresents a coherent philosophical system in a very personal language.


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8) On this distinction cf. Lamberz 1987. That C is a written explanation (cf.Lamberz 1987, 6 f., n. 23), is shown by the way in which it uses the Metaphrase(cf. below). This excludes that it could be a commentary épÚ fvn∞w Simplik¤ou(against Blumenthal 1996, 70 f.).

9) Bossier & Steel 1972, 764-6; Steel in Huby & Steel 1997, 127-9.10) Bossier & Steel 1972, 766-89; Steel in Huby & Steel 1997, 129-34.11) Finamore & Dillon 2002, 20.12) Hadot in Blumenthal & Lloyd 1982, 94; Finamore & Dillon 2002, 19 f.;

Huby 1999, 2; Blumenthal 1996, 69 f.13) The only exceptions are, as far as I know, Combès, in Westerink & Combès

1986, xviii n. 2; van Riel 2000, 143 n. 25, and Dillon 2000, 832. Dillon has, how-ever, obviously changed his view in his edition of the fragments of Iamblichus’ Deanima together with Finamore, cf. the preceding note.

14) Huby in Blumenthal & Lloyd 1982, 95; Blumenthal 1996, 68; Finamore &Dillon 2002, 23 f.; most fully argued in Huby 1999, 65.

This internal coherence and the elaborate style show that we aredealing here with a written commentary, rather than with a col-lection of lecture notes which may have been edited by a student.8)Hence, we have to look for one single author who composed thewhole work.

The argument of Steel and Bossier in favour of Priscian’s authorshipcan be summarized in two points: (1) The De anima-commentator(from now on only: commentator) refers the reader to his ownEpitome of the Physics of Theophrastus, where he will find a more elab-orate explanation of the problem of how we perceive through amedium. Indeed, this theme is treated at length in Priscian’s Metaphrase,and the terminology, the problems raised, and the solutions are thesame as in the De anima commentary.9) (2) That Priscian’s Metaphraseis the work mentioned by the commentator, is confirmed by thefact that the commentator used some passages of Priscian’s work toformulate his own argument.10) Even scholars who deny that Priscianwas the author of C agree that there is, “even where the vocabu-lary differs, [. . .] a strong unity of doctrine between the two texts”.11)

It is widely admitted that these arguments very strongly suggestthat, indeed, Priscian was the author of C.12) If most scholars donot agree with Steel and Bossier as regards Priscian’s authorship,13)their doubts are primarily based on three arguments: (1) The com-mentator does not refer to Priscian’s Metaphrase, because he wouldnot have called such an extended treatment of a text §pitomÆ, i.e.an abridgement, of Theophrastus.14) (2) The alleged parallels between



15) Huby 1999, 3; Finamore & Dillon 2002, 20-3.16) The evidence is collected by Finamore & Dillon (2002, 22 f.).17) Huby 1999, 65.18) Huby in Blumenthal & Lloyd 1982, 95.19) Steel in Huby & Steel 1997, 130-2.

both texts can be explained by the use of a common source, suchas the lost De anima of Iamblichus, which is mentioned in bothworks.15) (3) There are some doctrinal differences between bothtexts.16) Hence, “there is a growing consensus that the work is nei-ther by Simplicius nor by Priscian”.17) This widespread positionimplies, however, the not very convincing hypothesis that there wasan unknown intellectual twin of Priscian. This person would notonly have a style similar to the very personal one of the Lydianphilosopher; he would also be interested in the same questions andwould rely to the same extent on Iamblichus—which is unusualeven within the school of Damascius, who was sympathetic to theSyrian Neoplatonic. Furthermore, he would have written a work onTheophrastus’ Physics, in spite of the fact, that, according to thesame Pamela Huby, “Priscian’s extended study of it is unique”.18)Steel and Bossier’s assumption, on the other hand, does not involveconsequences of this sort; both works are ascribed to one authorwho fits all the criteria available perfectly, being both an admirerof Iamblichus, being related with the school of Damascius, andbeing strongly interested in Aristotle’s psychology. Thus it is worthwhile to check, if there are, indeed, substantial arguments in favourof Priscian’s authorship.

2. Did the Commentator Use Priscian’s Metaphrase?

I wish to start with the most fundamental question of how thesimilarities between both works can be explained: Did they drawfrom a common source or did one of them use the other? Steeland Bossier compared primarily 1.11-2.6 of Priscian’s Metaphrase(from now on: P) with 125.25-34 of C and P 3.1-20 with C 126.11-6. These two texts contain some sentences which are identical wordfor word. Some other phrases are tightened up in C. Steel andBossier take that as typical characteristics of one author—the com-mentator—using the other text to formulate his own argument.19)


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I shall try to corroborate their argument by quoting and dis-cussing some more passages. The passages quoted by Bossier andSteel mark the beginning and the end of a longer section in whichC is using P, which is to say that C 125.25-126.16 is dependenton P 1.9-3.20. There are some passages in P that have not beentaken over by C, but there are still some more parallels in this sec-tion. The most obvious is the following passage, which is the imme-diate continuation of one passage quoted by Bossier and Steel(underlinings mark word for word parallels, or parallels which con-tain changes in grammatical form or position, or parallels of con-tent in slightly different formulations):

P 2.6-14: tÚ dØ toioËton §n to›w afisyhthr¤oiw k¤nhma ımoioËtai to›wafisyhto›w e‡desin …w ëma ÍpÉ aÈt«n te ka‹ katå tØn prÚw aÈtå t∞wzvtik∞w §n t“ afisyhthr¤ƒ §mfãsevw di°gersin §gginÒmenon. éllÉ oÎpvtoËto <≤> a‡syhsiw, tÚ §n t“ afisyhthr¤ƒ prÚw tå afisyhtå ımo¤vma,pãyhma ¯n mçllon µ §n°rghma, ka‹ svmatoeid¢w ka‹ meristÚn ka‹xrÒnƒ parateinÒmenon, ka‹ speËdon m¢n efiw e‰dow oÎpv d¢ ¯n §n t“e‡dei éllÉ §n kinÆsei ¶ti: ≤ d¢ a‡syhsiw émer¤stvw te tØn érxØn ka‹m°sa ka‹ t°low toË afisyhtoË perilambãnei, ka‹ §n°rgeiã §sti ka‹ kr¤siwtele¤a ka‹ §n t“ nËn ëma ˜lh, ka‹ katå tÚ e‰dow ≥dh toË afisyhtoËßsthke.‘Indeed such a motion in the sense-organs is made like the sensibleforms in that it is produced at the same time by them and also byway of the arousing in the sense-organ of the representative imageconnected with life wich occurs in response to them. But this, thelikeness of the sensible objects in the sense-organ, is not yet percep-tion; it is rather a passive than an active thing, and is corporeal anddivisible and stretched out in time, and is hastening towards form butis not yet in its form but is still in movement; but perception encom-passes without division the beginning, middle parts and end of thesense-object, and it is an activity and a perfect judgment and alto-gether as a whole in the instant, and exists directly by way of theform of the sensible object.’ (trans. P. Huby (1997, 10), with changes)

C 125.34-126.3: ka‹ tÚ toioËton ımoË pãyhma ka‹ §n°rghma ÍpÒ tet«n afisyht«n ka‹ katå tØn prÚw aÈtå t∞w §n t“ afisyhthr¤ƒ zv∞wdi°gersin §gginÒmenon ımoioËtai to›w §n to›w afisyhto›w e‡desin. éllÉoÎpv toËto ≤ a‡syhsiw, oÈ kayarÚn §n°rghma ka‹ meristÚn ka‹ svma-toeid¢w Ípãrxon ka‹ xrÒnƒ parateinÒmenon: émer¤stvw går ≤ a‡syh-siw érxØn ka‹ m°sa ka‹ t°lh toË afisyhtoË perilambãnei, ka‹ §n°rgeiã§sti kr¤siw oÔsa tele¤a ka‹ §n t“ nËn ëma ˜lh •st«sa katå tÚ e‰dowtoË afisyhtoË.

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‘Such a joint affection and activity, which comes about as caused bysensible objects and according to the arousal towards them of the lifein the sense-organ is made similar to the forms in the sensible objects.But that is not yet perception, since it does not occur as a pure activ-ity, being divided and corporeal and extended in time. For percep-tion indivisibly encompasses the beginning, middle and end of thesense-object, and it is an activity, being a perfect judgment and stand-ing still at once as a whole in the instant at the form of the sensibleobject.’ (trans. C. Steel (1997, 155))

The text of C consists almost entirely of expressions that can befound in P, but it is much shorter and shows some signs of a sys-tematic abridgement: there is a new introductory particle to makethe text fit in its new context (ka¤ instead of dÆ), some longer expli-cations are deleted and some words of P are replaced by new ones(ımoË pãyhma ka‹ §n°rghma instead of k¤nhma). At the end, the texthas been stylistically improved by replacing the finite verbs by par-ticiples in order to construct a better link to the new relative clause.In this case, C has the same grammatical structure as P has in katåtØn prÚw aÈtå t∞w, while changing the philosophical termini (zvÆinstead of zvtikØ ¶mfasiw). Elsewhere, C retains the words, butchanges the syntax, while introducing some variations at the begin-ning and at the end:

P 3.18-20: P«w oÔn ımoioËtai to›w afisyhto›w ≤ cuxÆ; oÈ t“ d°xesyaiti épÉ aÈt«n, éllå t“ katå tÚn lÒgon aÈt«n §nerge›n diÉ §mfãsevwt«n §ktÚw efid«n.‘In what way then is the soul made like the sensible objects? Not byreceiving something from them, but through being active in accor-dance with their logos, through the representative image of the exter-nal forms.’ (trans. P. Huby (1997, 11), with small changes)

C 126.13-5: ımoioËtai to¤nun to›w afisyhto›w ≤ cuxØ oÈ t“ d°xesyaiti épÉ aÈt«n, éllå t“ katå tÚn ofike›on aÈto›w lÒgon §nerge›n.‘Therefore, the soul becomes like its sensible objects not by receivingsomething from them but through being active in accordance withthe concept appropriate to them.’ (trans. C. Steel (1997, 155))

Again, C has ofike›ow, but not ¶mfasiw. All these changes do notconcern the general train of thought. They can be easily explainedif C used P to formulate his argument.

Is it possible to explain these parallels also by the use of a com-mon source? I do not think so: Both texts are not close enough to


516 M. PERKAMS

20) Similar cases, where one text depends on another one to formulate his argu-ment, can be found in e.g. Luna in Hoffmann & Luna 2001, 337. Compare withthis the parallels quoted by Hadot (2002, 177 f.), which are borrowed practicallyverbatim either from the earlier parallel or from a common source.

infer a common original. The changes are just abridgements andimprovements in style and content.20) One could assume that P con-tains direct quotations from the common source while the samepassages have been taken from there by C in an abbreviated form;however, C gathers his quotations from a passage of three pagesin P which do not quote another source. Priscian himself under-lines that he paraphrased his main source, Iamblichus’ De anima,and that he did not cite him verbatim. That this treatise is by nomeans the common source of P and C is clear from another par-allel. In the sections on imagination (fantas¤a), we find the fol-lowing texts:

P 24.1-6: ÉAllÉ efi ka‹ tåw êllaw épotupoËtai zvåw katå tÚn ÉIãmblixonka‹ aÈtåw tåw logikãw te ka‹ noeråw §nerge¤aw, p«w ¶ti élhy¢w tÚÉAristotelikÒn, tÚ ÍpÚ t«n afisyhtik«n efid«n kine›syai tØn fan-tas¤an; µ efi ka‹ tåw kre¤ttouw épotupoËtai §nerge¤aw pãsaw, ˜mvwkatå tå afisyhtikå épeikon¤zetai e‡dh morfvtik«w ka‹ merist«w.‘But if, as Iamblichus says, it also represents in itself the other livesand the rational and intellective activities themselves, how is whatAristotle says still true, that imagination is moved by sensible forms?Even if it takes impressions of all the superior activities, it still rep-resents them in a way involving shape and division in accordancewith the sensible forms.’ (trans. P. Huby (1997, 33), with small changes)

C 214.18-20: ka‹ går efi ka‹ tåw logikåw ≤m«n, …w ı ÉIãmblixowboÊletai, épotupoËtai §nerge¤aw pãsaw, ˜mvw katå tå afisyhtåépeikon¤zetai e‡dh morfvtik«w ka‹ merist«w.‘Indeed even if, as Iamblichus would have it, it takes impressions ofall our rational activities, it still represents them in a way involvingshape and division in accordance with the sensible forms.’ (trans. H.J.Blumenthal (2000, 74))

C presents, in a concise form, P’s explanation of why Aristotle’stheory of imagination is not at odds with Iamblichus. The name ofIamblichus appears in the same place in both texts: even if theyrelied on a common source, it would have contained the name ofIamblichus, so it cannot have been written by him.



21) A parallel to Priscian’s paraphrase of Iamblichus’ doctrine of phantasia canbe found in Michael Psellus, De omnifaria doctrina 56.8-11 (13?); cf. Steel 1978, 16n. 44.

22) Trans. P. Huby in Huby & Steel 1997, 33.23) Huby (1993, 7) and Finamore & Dillon (2002, 261) understand l. 24.1-4 as

borrowings from Iamblichus. I cannot see, however, why we should not trustPriscian to ask a question which is a direct consequence of his own exposition.

24) In de An. 1.18-20.

An analysis of the relevant section of P demonstrates howeverthat one does not have to assume a common source at all: First,Priscian summarizes Aristotle’s (21.1-13) and then Iamblichus’ posi-tion on imagination (23.14-23).21) Then, after some preliminary con-clusions from this comparison, indicated by the êra in 23.23, headdresses the systematic problem posed by his two sources: howcan one reconcile Aristotle’s position that the imagination is movedby sensible forms (24.3 f. reproduces a formulation of 23.9 f.) withIamblichus’ assumption that it can also form impressions of ratio-nal activities (24.2 f. draws on 23.16 f.), which are essentially differentfrom sensible forms because of being immaterial? Priscian’s answeris that in the case of phantasia also the rational activities are impressed inthe way of sensible forms, ‘in shape, and as divided up’ (morfvtik«wka‹ merist«w).22) The formulation in P depends on Priscian’s ownpresentation of the problem, not necessarily on a text of Iamblichus.23)

C, in turn, did not take over P’s summary of Iamblichus’ opin-ion on imagination, but stated only his own opinion on what Aristotlesaid. But, having committed himself in his introduction to follow-ing Iamblichus’ philosophy,24) he had to explain how Aristotle’s posi-tion could be reconciled with that of Iamblichus. In order to doso, he gave a very compressed summary of the text in P withoutmentioning the name of Aristotle again, whose opinion is clearlythe subject of the whole passage. By doing so, C did not useIamblichus’ text directly, but relied on P, from where he took overthe problem, the solution, and its formulation.

If Iamblichus cannot be the common source of both texts, onehas to look for another explanation of their similarities. As has beenstated by Steel and Bossier, it can be found in the text itself:

P 12.10-7: âAra oÔn aÈtå m¢n tÚ diafan°w, toËto d¢ kine› tØn ˆcin,oÂon morfvy¢n aÈtÚ ÍpÚ t«n xrvmãtvn; éllÉ oÏtv toË diafanoËwín peponyÒtow ±syanÒmeya ka‹ oÈ toË xr≈matow: efi d¢ toË xr≈matow,


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25) P 8.1-15.5; cf. Steel in Huby & Steel 1997, 127-30.

toËto ín ka‹ tØn ˆcin kino¤h. éllå toË diafanoËw—tÚ d¢ diafan¢wka‹ kayÉ aÍtÚ kinhtikÚn t∞w ˆcevw, ˜tan fvt¤zhtai, oÈ diÉ •t°rouka‹ …w ÍpÚ t«n xrvmãtvn kinhy°n—t¤w oÔn ≤ k¤nhsiw; ·na ka‹ ˜pvwaÈtå tå ır≈mena diå toË metajÁ kine› tØn ˆcin gnvr¤svmen.‘Is it then that they move the transparent, and it moves the sight, asif it were given shape by the colours? But if the transparent wereaffected in this way we would perceive it and not the colour; but ifwe perceive the colour, this would also move our sight. But as fortransparent—the transparent is also of itself a thing which moves sight,when it is illuminated not by means of something else and not in theway that it is moved by colours—what then is its movement? So thatwe may know also how the things seen themselves move sight throughthe medium.’ (trans. P. Huby (1997, 20))

C 136.25-9: diÚ ka‹ tÚ diafan¢w épostãntow toË xr≈matow oÈk°tikatÉ §ke›no kine› tØn ˆcin. efi d¢ kayÉ aÍtÚ §k¤nei tØn ˆcin tÚ diafan°w,aÈtoË §xr∞n e‰nai tØn a‡syhsin éllÉ oÈ toË kexrvsm°nou. nËn d¢§ke¤nou ka‹ toË metajÁ diastÆmatow éntilambanÒmeya. ka‹ saf°sterÒnmoi taËta §n tª §pitomª t«n Yeofrãstou Fusik«n di≈ristai.‘Therefore the transparent also no longer moves the sight on its ownwhen colour is absent. But if the transparent moved sight by itself,the perception would have been of that and not of the colouredobject. As it is, we grasp both it and the intervening interval. I haveexplained this more clearly in the epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics.’(trans. C. Steel (1997, 168), with small changes)

Steel and Bossier have shown that P and C ask here the same ques-tions, give the same answers, and use a similar vocabulary.25) Thefull quotation shows, furthermore, that the allusion to the Epitomefollows immediately upon a borrowing from P. The author’s refer-ence to his earlier work coincides with the end of this parallel; Ccontinues with an exposition of Aristotle’s text. He does not wantto discuss in detail the problem already treated in his Epitome fromwhere he has just borrowed its formulation. This borrowing is easyenough to identify, and consequently it is sufficiently clear whichtext C refers his reader to: P. Furthermore, after explaining Aristotle’slemma, C also resumes the results of the discussion about the mediumwhich we find in P:



P 12.17-28: …w kayãper tÚ fvt¤zon teleio› tÚ diafan¢w [. . .] …w ka‹aÈtoË katå tØn xvristØn §n°rgeian teleioum°nou, oÏtv ka‹ tÚ xr«malampruny¢n §nerge› efiw tÚ diafan¢w xvrist«w aÈt“ §poxoum°nhn§n°rgeian, ka‹ diå toËto oÈ katå diãdosin éllÉ éyrÒvw ka‹ ımoËpant‹ ka‹ ˜lhn émer¤stvw pantaxoË aÈt“ paroËsan [. . .] diÚ ka‹émig«w tª ˆcei pãrestin ≤ toË xr≈matow §n°rgeia, ka¤toi oÈk êllvwparoËsa µ t“ §poxe›syai t“ diafane›, §peidØ émig«w §poxe›tai.‘Just as the thing which gives light perfects the transparent [. . .] asitself also being made perfect by way of that separate activity, so alsocolour, when illuminated, acts on the transparent with a separate ac-tivity, which is borne upon it, and for this reason is present to it notby transmission but immediately and in all of it altogether and as awhole individedly everywhere [. . .]. Hence also the activity of colouris present to sight in an unmixed form, and yet is not present in anyother way than as being borne on the transparent, since it is borneupon it without being mixed with it.’ (trans. P. Huby (1997, 20 f.))

S 136.8 f.: tÚ d¢ fvtisy¢n kine› oÈ payhtik«w, éllÉ …w ka‹ tÚ fvt¤zonkatÉ §n°rgeian. ka‹ går tÚ xr«ma teleivy¢n t“ fvt‹ §nerge› ka‹ aÈtÚefiw tÚ §nerge¤& diafan¢w.‘But the illuminated moves, not affectively but, like the thing whichgives light also, actively. For the colour also that is perfected by lightacts on the actually transparent.’

S 137.3-5: ÍpÚ xr≈matow kine›tai tÚ afisyhtÆrion t“ diafane› §p-oxoum°nhn tØn efiw tÚ afisyhtÆrion §ndidÒntow §n°rgeian, xvrist«w ka‹émig«w t“ metajÁ §poxoum°nhn. diÚ ka‹ éyrÒvw pãresti ka‹ ımoË ˜lh.‘The sense-organ is moved by the colour which supplies the activitywhich is borne upon the transparent to the sense-organ, borne sep-arately and in an unmixed form upon the intermediate. Thereforethe activity is present all at once and as a perfect whole.’ (trans. C.Steel (1997, 167 f.), with changes)

C distributes the material from P over two distinct lemmata, butthe parallels in content, terminology, and syntax are sufficientlyclear. As a consequence, the resulting text in C is stylistically awk-ward and hard to understand. Especially conspicuous is the strangerepetition of §poxoum°nhn in the second passage. It can, however,be well explained if C took over a sentence from P containing §p-oxoum°nhn and continued with other extracts from P, which con-tain émig«w §poxe›tai. This confirms that the text which is used byC to formulate his argument is also the text which the commenta-tor mentions as his own work. P, then, is nothing else but the textmentioned by C, and its author, Priscian, also wrote C.


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26) Huby 1999, 3. This general difference between Neoplatonic philosophy andTheophrastus’ Peripatetic terminology excludes also that Theophrast was the com-mon source of the two works in question, as has been suspected by Hadot (2002,179).

27) Opelt 1962, 944-6.28) Whittaker 1990, xiii f.29) Clem.Al. Strom., in: GCS Clemens Alexandrinus 3, 105-33; cf. Nautin 1976,

268 f.; Le Boulluec 1997, 288-90.30) Cf. Piccione 1999, 174 f. with 175 n. 1, and Arrian’s own remarks in his let-

ter to Lucius Gellius 2 f., Hershbell 1989, 2152 f., and Laurenti 1989, 2109-13.

3. Why is P Called an §pitomÆ?

But is it possible that Priscian referred to his paraphrase ofTheophrastus as an §pitomÆ? This has been contested by P. Hubybecause §pitomÆ would denote an abridgement of an existent text,while P is an extended paraphrase, which was by no means shorterthan the work of Theophrastus. Huby’s assumption is, however, notreconcilable with C’s own characterization of his Epitome of Theophrastus’Physics: C refers the reader to his §pitomÆ because he has discussedthe question of the medium there in more detail than in his com-mentary. This cannot have been achieved by an abridgement ofwhat Theophrastus himself says because his theory is not easily rec-oncilable with the Neoplatonic assumptions of C. As has beenobserved earlier, the Neoplatonic adaptation of Theophrastus wasa “tour de force”26) and could not have been done by a mere sum-mary of Theophrastus’ words. Instead, the text referred to in Cmust be an interpretation of some length.

The meaning of the term §pitomÆ does not contradict this con-clusion: the word denotes not only summaries of longer texts, eitherby their author or by another person, but also systematic presen-tations of certain doctrines.27) With this signification, §pitomÆ can beapplied to such different works as Alcinous’ Didaskalikos,28) a man-ual of Middle Platonism, Clemens’ excerpts of Theodotos’ summaryof the doctrine of the Valentinians,29) and Theodoros’ reports aboutthe diatribai of the Cynic Teles. The latter text is of the same kindas Lukios’ and Arrian’s reports about the teaching of their mastersMusonios and Epictet, which are relatively free reports of what themasters had said.30) Indeed, even when summaries of a work by thesame author are concerned, the sense of the ancient term §pitomÆis much wider than its modern counterpart, as Michel Perrin states



31) Perrin 1987, 26.32) Cf. the enumeration of Opelt (1962, 950 f ).33) Simp. in Ph. 291.21-3; Prisc.Lyd. Solut. ad Chosr. 42.10 f.34) Todd 2000, 476. Todd presupposes a t∞w to be added before t«n in the

transmitted text ÑO d¢ ÉAl°jandrow filopÒnvw l°jin tinå toË Gem¤nou parat¤yhsin§k t∞w §pitom∞w t«n Poseidvn¤ou Metevrologik«n §jhgÆsevw tåw éformåw épÚÉAristoteloËw laboËsan. It is also possible to leave the text unchanged and torelate §jhgÆsevw with the following words, as Kidd (1988, 129) does. In this case,Priscian’s use of commentum for Simplicius’ §pitomÆ is even more striking.

35) Kraus & Walzer 1951, 8. Cf. Steel in Huby & Steel 1997, 137.36) Arnzen 1998.37) Westerink 1959. The fragments preserved show clearly that this was not a

full-style commentary, but an exegetical paraphrasis.

for Lactantius: “Le résumé du livre 1 est un épitomé, au sens françaisde ce mot; le reste est autre chose”.31)

As far as §pitoma¤ of philosophical texts are concerned, we can-not tell what was their relation with the excerpted works becauseno such work has survived.32) There is, however, some evidence thatthe term was not clearly defined in later Neoplatonism: Simpliciuscalls Geminos’ §pitomÆ of Posidonius’ Meteorologica an §jÆghsiw, whilethe same work is referred to as commentum in Priscian’s Solutiones.33)Robert Todd thinks that it was “une paraphrase exégétique”,34) thesame kind of text as Priscian’s paraphrase of Theophrastus.Furthermore, all philosophical paraphrases which we know fromLate Antiquity are more than pure summaries of the texts com-mented. They read the commented text in the light of their ownphilosophical presuppositions; examples are Galen’s paraphrase ofthe Timaeus,35) the paraphrases of Themistius, the anonymous para-phrase on the De anima, which is transmitted only in Arabic,36) andthe fragments of Proclus’ explanations of Plotinus’ Enneads.37) Thus,the word §pitomÆ does not indicate that the author of C wrote asummary of Theophrastus’ Physics. This would be a remarkableexception within the Neoplatonic literature known to us and wouldin itself require an explanation.

We can draw a first conclusion now. We can discard the hypo-thesis that P and C used a common source independently. Instead,there are very good arguments to see the words of C at 136.29about having used his own Epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics as a ref-erence to the text which we know as Priscian’s Metaphrase. In orderto avoid this conclusion, one would have to assume that C used


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38) Finamore & Dillon 2002, 20.39) Huby in Huby & Steel 1997, 55 n. 123; Finamore & Dillon 2002, 22, 275.

two paraphrases of Theophrastus, one by himself and another oneby his colleague Priscian. This theory, in itself very complicated andimplausible, does not find any support in the texts. On the otherhand, Priscian’s authorship of both works is corroborated by manysimilarities in diction and style, as has been shown by Steel andBossier.

4. The Alleged Differences Between the Metaphrase and the Commentary

After establishing the authorship of Priscian, the alleged doctri-nal differences between his two works still need to be dealt with.Differences of this kind are, however, difficult to argue in discus-sions about authorship. If someone were to compare different writ-ings of either Ludwig Wittgenstein, Hilary Putnam, or Priscian’scontemporary John Philoponus, he would find very fundamentaldifferences, although there can be no doubt that their respectiveworks are by the same author. If different philosophical statementsare inspired by the same questions and stated in a similar termi-nology, they need not be seen as an argument against commonauthorship, but should be explained by the intellectual developmentof one author. In what follows, I shall presuppose Priscian’s author-ship and try to explain doctrinal differences between P and C fromthis point of view. In any case, those differences are quite small,even according to scholars contesting Priscian’s authorship of C.38)

Scholars have alleged two differences between the two texts. Theyconcern the role of light in the theory of vision39) and the relationof certain levels of intellect to the human soul. The first differenceseems to be due to a misunderstanding of P’s complicated text at10.17-11.14. Priscian addresses the question of why vision needs thepresence of light to function and does not react immediately, as theother senses do, to the presence of its object, i.e. of colour (10.16-22). Priscian’s answer is that the relation of vision to a higher sourceof visibility, i.e. light, is a sign of its higher rank and not of itsdeficiency (10.22-30). Before repeating this answer at 11.9-14 hediscusses another objection against his theory of light: a strong light



40) Cf. also the development of Priscian’s theory of intellect; Steel 1978, 150-3; Bossier & Steel 1972, 770-80; Steel in Huby & Steel 1997, 134.

41) Huby in Huby & Steel 1997, 68 n. 386; Finamore & Dillon 2002, 22, 259.42) Phlp. in de An. 3, versio latina ed. Verbeke 45.39-52; cf. Stephanus Alexandrinus

(= Ps.-Phlp.) in de An. 535.29-31.43) Cf. Prisc.Lyd. in de An. 6.12 f.; Iambl. An. 6 (30.3-10 Finamore & Dillon =

1.365.7-17 Wachsmuth); Steel 1978, 38-45; Perkams forthcoming.

tends to conceal colours instead of making them visible (11.1-5). Inorder to make this objection understandable to the reader, Priscianfirst states his own position more clearly, namely that colours arenot visible by themselves, but by the help of light (10.30-11.1).However, he introduces this explanation already with the formula‘Perhaps someone may say’. This makes the reader suppose thatthe objection starts already here. In fact, it starts only at 11.1, wherehe repeats the formula introducing the objection (‘someone mightsay’), and is refuted at 11.5-9, before Priscian repeats his own viewat 11.9-14. The disputed passage P 10.30-11.1, which is very closeto C 135.25-136.2, represents then the opinion of Priscian, whichhe repeats in his commentary on the De anima.

The second difference concerns the doctrine of intellect.40) PamelaHuby has suspected in this regard that P 31.32-32.5 could be acritic of C’s statement at 240.8-10 that there is double intellect.41)But while it is true that C argues against a a distinction of two sep-arated (diespasm°naw) substances within the human soul, he con-cedes that one can distinguish between two relations, concepts, orlives, because in this way the unity of both parts can be retained(32.5-8). There is nothing in C that contradicts this assumption.The criticisms at P 31.32-32.5 are probably directed against Plotinus,who is also charged in Philoponos’ De anima commentary of dis-tinguishing two intellects in our soul, one that is totally unchang-ing, and one that is in connection with our bodies.42) Maybe Priscianreproduces here a criticism of Iamblichus.43)

5. The Doctrine of the Double Entelechy

There is, however, at least one more difference between the twotexts. P never mentions a crucial doctrine on which C’s whole inter-pretation of the De anima is based, namely the theory of a double


524 M. PERKAMS

44) Cf. on this Perkams 2003, 57-84, where some of the relevant texts arequoted.

45) Prisc.Lyd. in de An. 4.17-27.46) Prisc.Lyd. in de An. 4.17-9, 28-32; cf. e.g. 59.2-11; 85.17 f.; 90.29-34.47) Prisc.Lyd. in Thphr. 7.13-6.

entelechy. This doctrine is discussed already in the introduction ofthe Commentary, and it is presupposed in the explication of thedifferent levels of the soul, the so-called vegetative, the non-ratio-nal, and the rational soul.44) This theory defines the connection ofsoul to body in two ways: the soul has to form the body as its firstentelechy, so that it can move and use it as its second entelechy.45)The first entelechy is called by Priscian the principle ‘according towhich’ the animal is moved (tÚ kayÉ ˜), and he calls the secondone the principle ‘by which’ it is moved (tÚ ÍfÉ o). This higherprinciple is also called the using soul (tÚ xr≈menon or ≤ xrvm°nh[cuxÆ]), while its tool (tÚ ˆrganon) is the living body or the animal(tÚ z“on).46)

No traces of this theory can be found in the Metaphrase. Moreover,it can be shown that Priscian, while writing his earlier work, didnot yet hold it. He never uses the term tÚ xr≈menon or ≤ xrvm°nhin the technical sense of the Commentary. Instead, he speaks of imag-ination using the perceptible forms (23.10; 24.26) or of perceptionusing the transparent (12.25). In fact, the Metaphrase distinguishes,in a more traditional way, the soul itself, which is not essentiallyconnected with the body, from ‘the common life of the composed’(≤ koinØ toË suny°tou zvÆ). For example, the embodied life of thesense-organ is different from the ‘perceptive soul’ which projects the concept of the perceived object so as to arrive at judgementand understanding.47) In the Commentary, however, he ascribes thewhole ‘perceptive life’ to the soul, which is connected with the body(123.30-2).

How can these shifts be explained if Priscian was the author ofboth texts? Of course, the attempt to characterize even the soul, whichmoves and uses the body, as the formal cause of a living body maybe traced back to his new task of explaining Aristotle’s psychology.However, his acquaintance with the latter’s work is sufficiently clearalready in the Metaphrase. Hence, the need to interpret his text ishardly a sufficient explanation for the innovations.



48) Steel 1978, 128 n. 29.49) Dam. Pr. 1.47.2 Westerink & Combès.50) Dam. Pr. 1.47.5-12 Westerink & Combès.51) Dam. Pr. 1.47.1-48.6, esp. 47.5 Westerink & Combès.52) Dam. Pr. 1.48.7-49.4 Westerink & Combès.

Another explanation is possible: Priscian’s distinction between theprinciples ÍfÉ o and kayÉ ˜ can also be found in Damascius’ Onprinciples.48) This parallel is even more important than it has beenrealized up to now. Damascius introduces the principle kayÉ ˜ toexplain how one can ascribe self-movement (aÈtokinhs¤a) to non-rational beings like animals. He starts from the assumption: ‘It isthe soul that moves and the body that is moved’ (kine› m¢n ≤ cuxÆ,kine›tai d¢ tÚ s«ma),49) which is insufficient to describe the natureof non-rational beings. He distinguishes them from natural bodies,which are only moved externally, and admits that they have theirprinciple of movement in themselves; in fact, because they form ahylemorphic union with their body, it is impossible to separate theirprinciple of movement.50) They are, however, only apparently self-movers because they lack the principle by which (ÍfÉ o) they aremoved. Rational beings, on the other hand, have such a principleas their rational soul which is clearly distinguished from its body.Therefore, it can be the moving principle, by which the ensouledanimal (tÚ z“on) is moved.51) From this Damascius deduces a moregeneral distinction between the two principles ÍfÉ o and kayÉ ˜,one of which is the cause of movement and life, while the other isthe inherent principle by which something moves and lives.52)

Reading Priscian’s introduction to his Commentary, one can seethat he relies on Damascius’ description, but develops it in a some-what different direction: He distinguishes the principle kayÉ ˜, whichforms a living body, capable of being moved by the soul, from thesoul itself, the principle ÍfÉ o (4.14-9). He also interprets this prin-ciple as a formal cause or entelechy of the animal (4.19 f.) andtraces the distinction of the two principles back to Aristotle (4.20-8), according to whom ‘it is the soul that moves and the animalthat is moved’ (kine› m¢n ≤ cuxÆ, kine›tai d¢ tÚ z“on; 4.28). Thislast quotation reproduces the sentence of Damascius quoted above,even in its strange word-order; but Priscian replaces Damascius’‘body’ by ‘animal’, following De anima 3.10.433b18 and underlining


526 M. PERKAMS

53) Cf. Dodds 1963, 315-7.

the importance of the first entelechy, which he interprets as thenecessary presupposition for the connection of body and soul. Indeed,his interpretation of this principle is different from Damascius, inso-far as it is a principle of being moved, and not a principle of motion(cf. 302.9-14; 303.29-37). As such, it exists in all ensouled beings(in plants, animals and humans; 4.14 f.), and everywhere it is con-nected with the principle ÍfÉ o (4.36-8). This is a thorough rein-terpretation of what Damascius had said, removing the structuraldifference between vegetative, non-rational and rational souls andassuming that every kind of soul has to be described according tothe same ontological assumptions. This doctrine is further elabo-rated by the identification of the ensouled body with the tool andthe ÍfÉ o with the using soul from Plato’s Alcibiades maior 129c-130c. Hence, the doctrine of the two entelechies was a response toDamascius’ On principles and presupposes that Priscian knew theopinion expressed here. Probably, he got acquainted with it at sometime between the composition of the Metaphrase and the Commentary;there is no need to assume that both works are not by the sameauthor.

This refined theory of the soul in the Commentary also helps toexplain some smaller differences between Priscian’s two works. Onsense-perception and on phantasia the Commentary gives explanationswhich are not to be found in the Metaphrase, concerning the ques-tion of how the using soul is connected with the living body: at126.7-9 C stresses that the concepts of the perceptible forms arecontained in the using soul, not in the soul, which forms the tool,that is they are in the higher and not in the lower entelechy. At213.34-214.8 Priscian explains that imagination relies on the sametool as sense-perception, namely the pneuma, which is connected withour rational soul too. Thus, he introduces the idea that every soulis connected with a bodily tool formed by the first entelechy intothe doctrine of imagination and thinking. This pneuma is, accordingto a common assumption of the Neoplatonists,53) identified with thevehicle (ˆxhma) of the non-rational soul (cf. 17.16 f.). There is noneed to assume that the greater stress on the pneuma or the vehi-cle in the Commentary, compared with the parallel passage in the



54) Finamore & Dillon 2002, 22.55) Combès in Westerink & Combès 1986, xix.56) Combès in Westerink & Combès 1997, xxiii-xxvi.57) Steel 1978, 159.58) Combès in Westerink & Combès 1997, xxvi.59) Prisc.Lyd. in de An. 238.14-6.60) Prisc.Lyd. in de An. 89.33-5; 240.35-241.1.

Metaphrase, is due to an independent use of Iamblichus, as has beensuspected.54) Priscian reformulated his former text according to hisrefined theory of the soul. This should admonish us to use theCommentary only carefully for the reconstruction of Iamblichus’ Deanima, especially when there are parallels to Priscian’s Metaphrase.

6. Life and Intellectual Relationships of Priscian

If Priscian knew the On principles when he wrote his Commentary,Damascius’ work is a terminus post quem for the De anima commen-tary and probably a terminus ante quem for the Metaphrase, which doesnot show any traces of the relevant doctrine of Damascius, in spiteof treating the same questions as the Commentary. The On principlesis a result of Damascius’ philosophical teaching at Athens, whichstarted not later than 515 AD and ended probably in 529, whenDamascius, Priscian and the other philosophers left for Persia.55) Itmust have been composed some time before the end of Damascius’time in Athens because later on he wrote extended commentarieson the Timaeus and on the Parmenides.56) Thus, the Commentary mayhave been written before 529. This fits neatly with Steel’s obser-vation57) that it does not show any acquaintance with Damascius’arguments in favour of a substantial change of the human soul.Damascius does not yet accept this doctrine in the On principles, butonly in his later Parmenides commentary, which had been writtenbefore 529 AD too.58) Because Priscian stresses that his theory ofthe soul’s substantial changeability is a personal opinion of his59)and refers to the authority of Iamblichus to justify it,60) it wouldhave been natural to rely on Damascius’ arguments against the con-trary opinion of Proclus. If he did not do so, he probably did notknow Damascius’ Commentary while writing the De anima commen-tary. He must, however, have been acquainted with Damascius’


528 M. PERKAMS

61) According to two Byzantine manuscripts, quoted by Steel (1978, 7 n. 4),and more fully by Whittaker (1974, 456 n. 29; cf. 1987, 279 f.). Also MichaelPsellus, Opera philosophica minora 2.77.26 reckons Priscian among the physikoí.

62) Steel 1978, 7.63) For the Commentary on the Physics: Prisc.Lyd. in de An. 198.5 f., 35.14; on

the Metaphysics: 28.20; 217.26. There is no evidence that Simplicius ever wrote acommentary on the Metaphysics, as has been shown by Rashed (2000).

64) Cf. the different opinions of Steel (1978, 159); Combès in Westerink &Combès 1986, xviii f., n. 2.

65) Hoffmann 1994, 560.66) Prisc.Lyd. in de An. 1.11.67) Dam. Isid. 58.6-8 Zintzen; Simp. in Ph. 795.15-7.68) Dam. Isid. 58.4 f., 61.12-5 (including, however, a reference to Proclus’ teacher

Syrianus).

arguments after 529 AD when both of them travelled together toPersia. This matches well with the notice that Priscian was criti-cized by Philoponus,61) which presupposes that his opinions werearound 529 AD important enough to be discussed. The fact thathe wrote the answers to Chosroes while being in Persia suggeststoo that he was at that time a renowned philosopher.62) Before theDe anima commentary, he had written explanations of Aristotle’sPhysics and Metaphysics.63)

These arguments speak in favour of Priscian not being a studentof Damascius before the voyage.64) While it is clear that both ofthem went together to Persia, we do not know if both came fromAthens.65) I see three reasons which speak against the assumptionthat Priscian was a student of Damascius: (1) His free and not uncrit-ical adaptation of Damascius’ idea of the two principles of move-ment does not seem to be the reaction of a pupil, but of anindependent teacher. (2) It is hard to explain that Priscian’s expla-nation of why the soul changes substantially is independent fromDamascius’ account, if the former was a pupil of the latter. (3)While Priscian stresses his allegiance to Iamblichus emphatically,66)for Damascius and his pupil Simplicius the Syrian philosopherremains one authority among others.67) It may be that Priscian oweshis special respect for Iamblichus to Isidore of Alexandria, who had,according to Damascius, a comparable attitude towards this man.68)It is possible, then, that Priscian worked neither in Athens nor inAlexandria, but in another place. We know, for example, thatAphrodisias in Caria, which is close to Priscian’s home-country



69) Esp. Dam. Isid. 187.20-3; Roueché 1989, 87-93; Goulet 1989, 626-31.70) Joh.Lyd. mag. 3.26 (172.12-23).

Lydia, was for some years the residence of Isidore’s teacherAsclepiodote; maybe it also had a philosophical school.69) Anotherpossibility is Constantinople itself, where John Lydus in 511 ADstudied with Proclus’ pupil Agapius the usual philosophical courseof Aristotelian and Platonic studies.70)

In any case, Priscian devoted a considerable amount of time tothe question of how Iamblichus’ and Aristotle’s teaching on the soulcould be reconciled, writing an interpretation of Theophrastus beforecommenting on the De anima itself. This painstaking scholarly endeav-our deserves our appreciation not only because of its result, theinteresting theory of the soul in Priscian’s De anima commentary.

Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, NWG SpätantikeD-07737 [email protected]

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priscian of lydia, commentator on the « de anima » in the tradition of iamblichus

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