primatech support worksheet report sample pdf

Worksheet - Cover Page

Printed: June 21, 2002, 2:53 PMCompany: SafetechLocation: Princeton, NJFacility: PrincetonPHA Method: HAZOPPHA Type: Initial

Process:

File Description:Chlorine Handling

Date:

Process Description:

Chemicals:

Purpose:

Scope:

Objectives:

Project Notes:

Filters: None

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc.

Worksheet

1 of 16Page:Company: SafetechFacility: Princeton

Session: (1) 07/02/00 Revision: 0Node: (1) Chlorine rail car

Drawings: CLC/01-07-66Parameter: Pressure

Intention: Normal operation is 100 - 150 psig. Target pressure is 125 psig.

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BYMore

Less

HigherPressure

LowerPressure

1. Fire exposure

2. High ambienttemperature

3. Relief valve RV-25 fails open

4. Empty rail car

5. Sudden changein ambienttemperature

1.1. Potentialoverpressurizationof rail car resultingin release ofchlorine.

1.2. Potentialrupture of the railcar if the rail carrelief valve fails.

2.1. Potentialincrease inpressure. Not likelyto approach ratedpressure of rail car.

3.1. Potentialexposure ofpersonnel andpotential offsiteimpact

4.1. Delay in treating

5.1. Potential for toolow flow to thetreatment system

1.1.1. Rail carsprovided with reliefvalve.

1.1.2. Rail carsinsulated

1.2.1. Location ofrail car minimizeslikelihood ofexposure.


2.1.2. Location ofrail car minimizeslikelihood ofexposure.

2.1.3. Pressureindicator, PI-1.

3.1.1. Railcaremergency leakpatch kit is availableon site.

3.1.2. Pressureindicator, PI-1.

4.1.1. Rail car isweighed uponreceipt


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9

8

:No recommendations

:No recommendations

:No recommendations

3.1.1. Considerconducting a failuremodes and effectsanalysis (FMEA) of atypical pressure reliefvalve.

:No furtherrecommendations


PWP


Drawings: CLC/01-07-66Parameter: Composition Intention: Chlorine with less than 5 ppm moisture.

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BYOtherThan

Other ThanComposition

1. Supplier loadsrail car withincorrect material

1.1. Consequenceswill depend uponwhat othermaterials could bedelivered in rail...

1.1.1. Analysis ofshipment bysupplier.

3 4 8 1.1.1. Considerchanging the SOP torequire a certificate ofanalysis be receivedwith each rail car and...

DSC


Worksheet



Drawings: CLC/01-07-66Parameter: Composition Intention: Chlorine with less than 5 ppm moisture.

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BYOtherThan(cont.)

AsWellAs

Other ThanComposition(cont.)

As Well AsComposition(contamination)

1. Supplier loadsrail car withincorrect material(cont.)

2. Rail car paddedwith incorrectmaterial (e.g. moistair) by supplier

...cars.

2.1. Moisture withchlorine will causeacceleratedcorrosion of systempiping

2.2. Consequenceswill depend uponwhat othermaterials could bedelivered in rail cars

1.1.1. Analysis ofshipment bysupplier. (cont.)

2.1.1. Analysis ofshipment bysupplier.

2.2.1. As for 2.1.1

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8

...be checked beforeaccepting the rail car.




Drawings: CLC/01-07-66Parameter: Level

Intention: Normal railcar liquid level varies between a maximum of 80 % of capacity to as empty as practical.

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BYNo

More

No Level

Higher Level

1. Rail car receivedempty

2. Leak in rail caror attached piping

3. Supplieroverloads



3.1. Potentialoverpressure of railcar due to thermalexpansion ofmaterial

1.1.1. Rail car isweighed uponreceipt

2.1.1. Chlorine gassensors around railcar unloadingstation

2.1.2. Emergency Ckit available for railcar leaks

3.1.1. Rail carweighed uponreceipt

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3

3

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4

10

8

8

:No recommendations

:No recommendations

3.1.1. *Verify the scalesare calibrated correctly

LSS


Worksheet


Session: (1) 07/02/00 Revision: 0Node: (2) Cl2 liquid to vaporizer

Drawings: CLC/01-07-66Parameter: Flow

Intention: Flow approximately 1 - 5 lbs/min of liquid chlorine, at 100- 150 psig, from the railcar to the vaporizer.

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BYNo No Flow 1. Control valve CV-

32 fails closed1.1. Interruption toproductionoperation due todeviation of Cl2 flowfrom setpointcausing controlsystem to shutdown process

1.2. Potentialoverpressure of Cl2piping if liquid-filled,closed piping heatsup

1.1.1. Failingclosed, oraccidentally closing,a single valve willnot result inoverpressure sinceline is open to eitherend

1.1.2. Operatorresponse to ashutdown of thesystem would beimmediate

1.1.3. Limit switchprovided on eachvalve which willindicate the valve isclosed

1.1.4. Micromotionflow meter, FTLIQA

1.2.1. All valves (ballvalves) in liquid Cl2service are providedwith a port to ventthe ball cavity

1.2.2. Rupture diskdischarging toexpansion tanks areprovided for thesection of the pipingbetween- VLIQA and VLIQB- PCVGASC andPCVGASB(downstream ofvaporizer)

1.2.3. Pressuretransmittersprovided onpotentially trappedsections of pipingbetween:- VRCA2 and VRCL- VRCB2 and...

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3

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9

8

:No recommendations

:No recommendations


Worksheet





GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BYNo(cont.)

No Flow(cont.)

1. Control valve CV-32 fails closed(cont.)

2. Control systemincorrectly activatesshutdown for"rupture" condition

3. Control valvecloses due toincorrect signal orsetting

1.2. Potentialoverpressure of Cl2piping if liquid-filled,closed piping heatsup (cont.)

2.1. Potentialoverpressure of Cl2piping if liquid filled,closed piping heatsup

3.1. Interruption toproductionoperation due todeviation of Cl2 flowfrom setpointcausing controlsystem to shutdown process

...VRCM- VRCL/M and VLIQA- VLIQB andPCVGASC

2.1.1. Rupture diskdischarging toexpansion tanks areprovided for thesection of the pipingbetween- VLIQA and VLIQB- PCVGASC andPCVGASB(downstream ofvaporizer)






3

4

4

4

8

9

:No recommendations(cont.)

2.1.1. *Investigate thedesign of the rupturedisks and expansiontanks and the pressuresetting (375 psig) of therupture disk

2.1.2. *Verify ChlorineInstitute requirementsfor venting valves withdesign of existing valves


LDS

JBS


Worksheet






No Flow(cont.)

3. Control valvecloses due toincorrect signal orsetting (cont.)

4. Manual blockvalve isaccidentally closed

5. Filter plugged

6. Micromotionmeter plugged

3.1. Interruption toproductionoperation due todeviation of Cl2 flowfrom setpointcausing controlsystem to shutdown process(cont.)



6.1. Interruption toproductionoperation due todeviation of Cl2 flowfrom setpointcausing control...







5.1.1. Operatorresponse to a shutdown of the systemwould beimmediate



6.1.2. Pressure...

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2

2

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7

:No furtherrecommendations(cont.)





Worksheet






No Flow(cont.)

6. Micromotionmeter plugged(cont.)

7. Dip pipe (inrailcar) plugged

8. Excess flowvalve closed

9. Line or flex hosefailure

...system to shutdown process



9.1. Release of Cl2to the atmosphere

...transmittersbefore and after themeter






9.1.1. Railcarsinspected betweeneach load bysupplier

9.1.2. Chlorine gassensors in thevicinity of the railcarand in the vaporizerbuilding

9.1.3. Pressurealong the piping ismonitored by controlsystem. If pressuredifferential exceeds40-50 psig between2 transmitters,control system will...

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4




9.1.1. Consideralternatives to thepresent hangerarrangements to allowtotal insulating of thepiping while minimizingexternal corrosion of thepiping.

9.1.2. Consider whetheralternative materials ofconstruction arepractical which willprovide better internaland external corrosionresistance

LDS

TLK


Worksheet






Less

No Flow(cont.)

Less Flow

9. Line or flex hosefailure (cont.)

10. Block valve(VRCG/H,PCVLIQA) to ventscrubber systemopen or passing

9.1. Release of Cl2to the atmosphere(cont.)

10.1. Potentialinterruption toproduction if flowdeviatessignificantly fromsetpoint

10.2. Potentialrelease to theatmosphere ifexceeds scrubbercapacity or scrubbernot operating

...initiate a "linerupture" shutdownwhich closes allvalves on the liquidCl2 piping

9.1.4. Pipingpressure testedprior to eachcampaign

9.1.5. Normalpreventivemaintenanceprogram for Cl2piping is to performnon-destructivetesting of wallthickness annually

10.1.1. Secondblock valve,PCVLIQB, on ventline from railcarstation would alsohave to beaccidentally open orpassing

10.1.2. Positionswitches providedon all valves leadingto the scrubbersystem from theliquid chlorine lines(VRCG, VRCH,PCVLIQA, PCVLIQB)which indicate if thevalve moves off thefully closed position.

10.2.1. All the valvesfrom the liquidchlorine lines to thescrubber (VRCG,VRCH, PCVLIQA,PCVLIQB) areinterlocked closedby the controlsystem when...

4

1

4

4

9

4

9.1.2. Consider whetheralternative materials ofconstruction arepractical which willprovide better internaland external corrosionresistance (cont.)




Worksheet





GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BYLess(cont.)

Less Flow(cont.)

More Flow

10. Block valve(VRCG/H,PCVLIQA) to ventscrubber systemopen or passing(cont.)

11. Partialpluggage of anycomponent orpartially closedvalve

12. Leak

13. N2

pressurizationvalve,VRCC/VRCD,opens duringpadding of railcar,and manual blockon tubing left open,displacing liquidCl2 in line with N2

10.2. Potentialrelease to theatmosphere ifexceeds scrubbercapacity or scrubbernot operating (cont.)

11.1. Potentialinterruption toproduction if flowdeviatessignificantly fromsetpoint


13.1. Potentialerratic flow due topresence of N2 insystem. Potentialoverchlorination ofproduct due tosurge of chlorineahead of N2. Impacton product quality.Potentialoverloading of...

...chlorine is in thesystem, preventingthe operator fromaccidentallymanually openingthe valve from theconsole.

11.1.1. Pressuretransmitter, PTRCF,on vent line fromrailcar station wouldincrease ifupstream valve(s)passing anddownstream closed

11.1.2. Temperatureindication, TTLIQA,on vent line to flashpot may indicatelower temperaturedue flashing of Cl2liquid

12.1.1. Chlorinesensor providednear atmosphericvent from scrubbersystem

12.1.2. Control valveon Cl2 gas flow toreactor, FCVGASA,will open to attemptto maintain set flowto reactor

13.1.1. Flowindication andcontrol (FICGASA)on chlorine flow toreactor will throttleto maintain set flow

13.1.2. Positionindicators on N2

valves (VRCC,VRCD) which...

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9



12.1.1. Review the bestavailable means forperiodic testing and/orexamination of thechlorine liquid pipingsystem to ensure thesystem integrity

:No recommendations

PWP


Worksheet






More Flow(cont.)

13. N2

pressurizationvalve,VRCC/VRCD,opens duringpadding of railcar,and manual blockon tubing left open,displacing liquidCl2 in line with N2

(cont.)

14. Higher thannormal pressure inrail car

15. Flow controlvalve, FCVGASA,opens wide due toincorrect signal orsetting

16. Suddenclearing of ablockage

...scrubber

14.1. Potentialerratic flow due topresence of N2 insystem. Potentialoverchlorination ofproduct due surgeof chlorine ahead ofN2. Impact onproduct quality.Potentialoverloading ofscrubber

15.1. Potentialerratic flow duepresence of N2 insystem. Potentialoverchlorination ofproduct due surgeof chlorine ahead ofN2. Impact onproduct quality.Potentialoverloading ofscrubber

16.1. Potentialerratic flow due topresence of N2 insystem. Potentialoverchlorination ofproduct due surgeof chlorine ahead ofN2. Impact onproduct quality.Potentialoverloading of...

...indicateswhenever the valveis off normallyclosed position.

14.1.1. Backupmanual valve on N2

line is normallyclosed except whenpressure testing thepiping.

14.1.2. Pressuremonitoring ofpipeline

15.1.1. Independentflow indication,FTLIQA, to allowoperator to verifyflow control reading

16.1.1. Flowindication andcontrol (FICGASA)on chlorine flow toreactor will throttleto maintain set flow

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2

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7


:No recommendations

:No recommendations

:No recommendations


Worksheet






Reverse

More Flow(cont.)

Reverse Flow

16. Suddenclearing of ablockage (cont.)

17. Blockage of thesystemdownstream of thevaporizer

18. Rupture of theN2 pressurizationline at the rail carwhen padding therail car

19. Failure of liquidchlorine line or flexhose

...scrubber due tosurge of chlorine

17.1. Vaporization ofliquid in vaporizerwill increasevaporizer pressurepushing liquid Cl2back to rail car

17.2. No flow,sensed byFICGASA, willinitiate a shutdown.Will close VLIQBand open VGASA tovent vaporizer to thescrubber

18.1. Release of Cl2to atmosphere


16.1.1. Flowindication andcontrol (FICGASA)on chlorine flow toreactor will throttleto maintain set flow(cont.)

17.1.1. Chlorine lineis open back to therail car preventingexcessive pressurebuildup

17.1.2. Pressureindication onvaporizer outlet,PTGASA

17.2.1. Flowindicators, FICGASAand FTLIQA, willindicate no flow

17.2.2. Lineupstream of VLIQBis open to the railcar

18.1.1. Pipingdownstream ofvaporizer is ventedto the scrubber thruVGASA

18.1.2. Rupture diskand relief valve onvaporizer ,discharging to catchpot T-22, if blockageis betweenvaporizer andVGASA. Additionalcapability tomanually vent linesthru VGASC orPCVLIQA

19.1.1. Pipingdownstream ofvaporizer is vented...

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:No recommendations

:No recommendations

:No recommendations

:No recommendations


Worksheet





GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BYReverse(cont.)

OtherThan

Reverse Flow(cont.)

Other ThanFlow

19. Failure of liquidchlorine line or flexhose (cont.)

20. Failure ofrupture disk onliquid line

19.1. Release of Cl2to the atmosphere(cont.)

20.1. Some flow ofchlorine to theexpansion tanks

20.2. Potential lossof expansioncapacity if rupturedisk released,expansion tanksfilled and pressurerise in expansiontanks not observedby operator.

...to the scrubberthru VGASA

19.1.2. Rupture diskand relief valve onvaporizer ,discharging to catchpot T-22, if blockageis betweenvaporizer andVGASA. Additionalcapability tomanually vent linesthru VGASC orPCVLIQA

20.1.1. Pressureindicator, PTLIQD,on line to expansiontanks

20.2.1. Chlorine gassensors in thevicinity of the railcarand in the vaporizerbuilding

20.2.2. Pressurealong the piping ismonitored by controlsystem. If pressuredifferential exceeds40-50 psig between2 transmitters,control system willinitiate a "linerupture" shutdownwhich closes allvalves on the liquidCl2 piping

20.2.3. Pipingpressure testedprior to eachcampaign

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10


:No recommendations

:No recommendations


Worksheet




Intention: Normal operating pressure is approximately 100-145 psig.

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BYMore Higher

Pressure1. Fire exposure

2. Steam exposure

3. High ambienttemperature

4. Change inambienttemperature afterpadding rail car

1.1. Potentialoverpressurizationof rail car resultingin release ofchlorine.

1.2. Potentialrupture of the railcar if the rail carrelief valve fails.

2.1. Potentialoverheating ifbroken steam linedischarges onchlorine line

3.1. Potentialincrease inpressure. Not likelyto approach ratedpressure of rail car


1.1.1. Chlorine lineinsulated except athangers

1.1.2. Chlorine lineopen to railcarand/or vaporizer


1.2.1. Rail carsprovided with reliefvalve

1.2.2. Location ofrail car minimizeslikelihood ofexposure

1.2.3. Pressureindicator, PI-1








4.1.2. Chlorine...

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:No recommendations




Worksheet




Intention: Normal operating pressure is approximately 100-145 psig.

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BYMore(cont.)

Less

HigherPressure(cont.)

LowerPressure

4. Change inambienttemperature afterpadding rail car(cont.)

5. Leak in rail caror relief valve failsopen

6. Empty rail car

7. Sudden changein ambienttemperature

4.1. Potential for toolow flow to thetreatment system(cont.)




...line open to railcarand/or vaporizer



5.1.1. Railcaremergency leakpatch kit is availableon site




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8






Drawings: CLC/01-07-66Parameter: Composition Intention: Chlorine to specification

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BYAsWellAs

As Well AsComposition

1. Water, or otheragents, in line aftercleaning

2. Use of non-compatiblematerials, such ashydrocarbon-containinggreases, duringmaintenance of...

1.1. Potential foracceleratedcorrosion of thepiping

2.1. Potentialreaction possiblycausing acceleratedcorrosion, fire orcontaminantsaffecting productquality

1.1.1. Normalprocedure forcleaning includesblowing the systemdry with N2 aftercleaning

1.1.2. Training ofmaintenancepersonnel workingon chlorine system

2.1.1. Normalprocedure forcleaning includesblowing the systemdry with N2 aftercleaning

3

3

4

4

8

8

1.1.1. Consider meansof cleaning the chlorinepiping system which donot involve the use ofwater or incompatiblematerials

2.1.1. Considermodifying the trainingprogram formaintenance personnelwho may work on thechlorine system toinclude coverage of...

LDS

TLK


Worksheet



Drawings: CLC/01-07-66Parameter: Composition Intention: Chlorine to specification

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BYAsWellAs(cont.)

As Well AsComposition(cont.)

...system 2.1. Potentialreaction possiblycausing acceleratedcorrosion, fire orcontaminantsaffecting productquality (cont.)

2.1.2. Training ofmaintenancepersonnel workingon chlorine system

...incompatible materials


Worksheet


Session: (1) 07/02/00 Revision: 0Node: (3) Cl2 vaporizer

Drawings: CLC/01-07-66Parameter: Flow Intention: Vaporize 100-150 pounds per hour. Target is 125.

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BYNo

AsWellAs

No Flow

As Well AsFlow

1. Exit valve is in offposition

2. Entrance valve isin off position

3. N2 purge streamvalve is open

4. Impure Cl2 feed

1.1.Overpressurizationof vaporizer

2.1. Product downtime

2.2. Excessive wearon pumps

3.1. Impure product

4.1. Impure product

4.2. Side reactioncausing exotherm.

1.1.1. Relief valveson vessel

2.1.1. None

2.2.1. Pumps haveautoshutoffswitches to preventoverheating

3.1.1. Feed is testedwhen it is unloadedfrom rail car

4.1.1. Feed is testedwhen it is unloadedfrom rail car

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1.1.1. *Verify reliefvalves undergo periodictesting



3.1.1. Consider updatingSOP to include a valveconfiguration flow sheet



LSS

LSS


Drawings: CLC/01-07-66Parameter: Pressure Intention: Vaporizer is intended to operate at 3 atm.

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BYMore

Less

HigherPressure

LowerPressure

1. Exit line fromvaporizer plugged

2. Chlorine supplyline has a greaterflow rate thandesigned

3. Supply lineplugged

4. Rupture in lineexiting thevaporizer

1.1. Failure toprovide adequatesupply to reactor

1.2. Pressure buildup in vaporizer

2.1. Pressure buildup in vaporizer

3.1. Loss ofproductivity due tolow chlorine supplyto reactor

4.1. Release ofchlorine toatmosphere

1.1.1. Low flowalarm present

1.2.1. Pressurerating on vaporizerexceeds that of thesupply tanks

2.1.1. Pressurerating on vaporizerexceeds that of thesupply tanks

3.1.1. Low flowalarm present.

4.1.1. Chlorine gassensors in the area

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5




3.1.1. *Check to see ifthis has ever been aproblem

4.1.1. Considerinstalling an automaticchlorine source...

LSS

JBS


Worksheet



Drawings: CLC/01-07-66Parameter: Pressure Intention: Vaporizer is intended to operate at 3 atm.


LowerPressure(cont.)

4. Rupture in lineexiting thevaporizer (cont.)

5. Leak in vaporizer

4.1. Release ofchlorine toatmosphere (cont.)

4.2. Loss of reactant

5.1. Release of Cl2to atmosphere

4.1.1. Chlorine gassensors in the area(cont.)

5.1.1. Chlorine gassensors in the area

4

1

5

5

10

5

...shutdown if thevaporizer pressuredrops below 1.5 atm.


5.1.1. Considerimplementing a periodiccheck of vaporizer toensure there are nopressure leaks

LDS


Worksheet - Index

Node 1: Chlorine rail car 1Parameter: Pressure 1Parameter: Composition 1Parameter: Level 2

Node 2: Cl2 liquid to vaporizer 3Parameter: Flow 3Parameter: Pressure 12Parameter: Composition 13

Node 3: Cl2 vaporizer 15Parameter: Flow 15Parameter: Pressure 15


primatech support worksheet report sample pdf

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