PRIL Digests 6 Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v Escolin (1974)

PCIB (administrator of Mr. Hodges estate) and Magno (administratix of Mrs. Hodges estate) are in disagreement as to the estate left by Mrs. Hodge. SC: Since the position now of PCIB is that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the law of Texas, should only be 1/4 of the conjugal estate, such contention constitutes an admission of fact. It would be in estoppel in any further proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less, irrespective of what might be proven later to be the actual provisions of Texas law.

Charles Hodge and his wife Jane (Texas citizen) provided in their wills that: They bequeath the remainder of their respective estates to their spouse during his/her lifetime Upon that spouses death, the remainder of what he/she will inherit from the other will be given to the brothers and sisters of the one who died first

MRS. Hodge died first. MR. Hodge was appointed executor of the will but no liquidation occurred. MR. Hodge allegedly stated to US inheritance tax authorities that he had renounced his inheritance from Mrs. Hodge in favor of her other heirs (siblings)

Mr. Hodge later on died.

Magno adminsitratix of MRS. Hodges estate PCIB administrator of MR. Hodges estate Probate proceedings were held jointy.

PCIB says: PHILIPPINE law applies Because the spouses were both Philippine residents, the estate left by MRS. Hodges to her siblings is ONE HALF of her share in the conjugal partnership, or LESS, even if she was a Texas citizen. Basis: Art 16 in relation to Arts 900 and 872 of the Civil Code.

Magno says: TEXAS law applies Texas law, where there is no system of legitime, applies. SO: The estate of MRS. Hodges is ONE HALF or MORE of her share of the conjugal properties.

HELD:PCIB is estopped from claiming that the estate of Mrs. Hodges is less than , because it already said that it is under Texas law (?)

RATIO:

What the laws of Texas state is NO longer of consequence

PCIB allegedly averred that under the laws of Texas (although it was arguing that RP laws apply), there is such legitime of 1/4 of the said conjugal estate So PCIB would be estopped to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it (which is initially at least 1/2 of the estate), for admissions by a party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any other controverted fact, create estoppel.

Issues that can be decided by the court:

1. Regardless what law is applicable and regardless of whether or not Mr. Hodges did renounce his share, it is clear from the inventory submitted by Mr. Hodges himself as executor of his wife's estate that there are properties which constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges which should be distributed among her heirs pursuant to her will

2. Whatever be the provisions of Texas Law applicable, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is AT LEAST 1/4 OF THE CONJUGAL ESTATE OF THE SPOUSES Existence and effects of foreign laws are questions of fact Since the position now of PCIB is that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the law of Texas, should only be 1/4 of the conjugal estate, such contention constitutes an admission of fact Consequently, it would be in estoppel in any further proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less, irrespective of what might be proven later to be the actual provisions of Texas law...

3. Special Proceeding for the settlement of testate estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed, should proceed, there having no proper and legal adjudication or distribution yet of the estate4. Magno remains to be the Administratrix of Mrs. Hodges's estate

What cannot be decided:1. WON Mr. Hodges renounced his share2. WON estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than 1/4 of the conjugal property

(case is remanded to trial court to allow the parties to present evidence in relation to these issues)

Court does NOT make a determination as to the validity of testamentary dispositions

Since under the Civil Code, the nationality of the testator is controlling, and since Mrs. Hodges is a US citizen, the case must be remanded so that the parties can prove what Texas law provides

In Re Estate of Johnson (1918)Johnson was a US citizen, whose will was probated in Manila. His daughter now wants to annul the probate because his will was not made in accordance with Illinois laws.SC: Found that the probate judge took judicial notice of Illinois law by reading an annotated book on the Revised Statutes of Illinois. This is a mistake because courts can only take judicial notice of acts of the US Congress, not of laws of different states. BUT court did not annull probate.

Emil Johnson US Citizen, died in Manila He left a holographic will Signed by himself and 2 witnesses only (Code of Civil Procedure requires 3 witnesses)

A petition for probate was filed on the ground that at the time of his death, Johnson was a citizen of Illinois and the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of Illinois so, it could be properly probated here under the Code of Civil Procedure So, the will was admitted to probate

Later on, his alleged daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, moved for the annulment of the decree of probate and commencement of intestate administration of the estate

Daughter says:a. Johnson was NOT a RESIDENT of Illinoisb. Will was not probated in accordance with the laws of Illinois

ISSUE:W/N the will was validly admitted to probate YES

RATIO:NO allegation that Johnson is NOT a CITIZEN of Illinois

The daughters petition only says that he is a RESIDENT of the Philippines did not deny US citizenship So, probate cannot be set aside for lack of necessary citizenship

Probate judge erred in taking judicial notice of Illinois law

The Court cannot rule on whether the will was executed in accordance with Illinois law because no witness testified on the law of Illinois The trial judge took judicial notice of Illinois law he examined the Revised Statutes of Illinois in an annotated book The judge was MISTAKEN

Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the courts are authorized to take judicial notice of acts of the legislative department of the US These refer to Acts of the Congress of the US, and NOT the laws in different states Even reference to those similar to the enumeration in the Code cannot refer to the different laws of the states SO: The proper RULE is to require proof of the statutes of the States when their provisions are determinative of the issues in an action litigated in Philippine courts

BUT: Doesnt bolster daughters case even if the judge erred in taking judicial notice

1. The daughters petition does not state that Illinois law is different from what the court found2. The judges error was not raised in the assignment of error.Effect of failure to plead 1: Dismiss case

Walton v Arabian American Oil Co (1956)

Parties are US citizens; accident occurred in Saudi Arabia. Court refused to take judicial notice of Saudi Arabian laws, because unlike those of Britain it cannot be easily comprehended.Also, processual presumption does NOT apply because Saudi Arabia might have different tort principles.

Walton Citizen and resident of Arkansas Seriously injured while temporarily in Saudi Arabia by a truck owned by Saudi ARAMCO Saudi ARAMCO Incorporated in Delaware Licensed to do business in NY Engaged in extensve business activities in Saudi Arabia

Walton sued Saudi Aramco in NY.

No evidence of Saudi Arabian law alleged by plaintiff, nor did the defendant offered to prove it.

NY TC Defendant was negligent under NY law

HELD:

Substantive law applicable to alleged tort is the LAW OF THE PLACE WHERE THE ALLEGED TORT OCCURRED - So should apply Saudi Arabian law

BUT Saudi Arabian law was not proved.

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal court must receive evidence if it is admissible according to the rules of evidence of the state in which the court sits. So, it might seem that the judge erred in refusing to take judicial notice of Saudi Arabian law, in light og Siegelman v Cunard White Star

In Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, court took JN of foreign law but this is an exception because US Court can easily comprehend of ENGLISH decisions, which are like those of any state in US

IN THIS CASE: It involved Saudi Arabian Law: Comprehension of foreign "law" is, to say the least, not easy, then, according to the somewhat narrow interpretation of the NY Statute by NY courts, a court "abuses" its discretion under that statute perhaps if it takes judicial notice of foreign "law" when it is not pleaded, and surely does so unless the party, who would otherwise have had the burden of proving that "law", has in some way adequately assisted the court in judicially learning it

No processual presumption

In countries where the common law does not prevail, our doctrines relative to negligence, and to a master's liability for his servant's acts, may not exist or will be vastly different. So Walton can't argue that the rudimentary tort principles should have been presumed to be recognized in Saudi Arabia. Though it deemed unjust, as this involves both US citizens, the court said it should strictly enforce its laws

Leary v Gledhill (1951)Leary and Gledhill entered into a contract in France (loan). Leary sued Gledhill for the payment in a New Jersey court.

Court: court presumed that the law of France in common with that of other civilized countries recognizes a liability to make repayment

While they were in France, Gledhill mentioned to Leary that he needed a sum of money. When Leary returned to Germany, he mailed Gledhill a check for $1500, without indicating what it was for. Later on, Leary sued Gledhill to recover the loan.

Gledhill moved to dismiss on the ground that there was no pleading or proof of the law of France, where the transaction occurred.

ISSUE:Which law applies, France, or New Jersey? NEW JERSEY

RATIO: Transaction occurred in France France is not a common law jurisdiction (Court took JN): so inappropriate to presume that the principles of common law prevail there BUT HERE (cf. Walton v. Saudi Aramco): even if did not present French law, not deemed to have lost COA and the court could presume any the ff:1. French law same as law of forum2. French law recognizes certain fundamental principles, e.g. that the taking of a loan creates an obligation upon the borrower to make repayment3. parties by failing to prove the law of France have acquiesced in having their dispute determined by the law of the forum

So the court presumed that the law of France in common with that of other civilized countries recognizes a liability to make repayment under the facts here present, and its decision is not w/o substantial merit

BUT this approach has a limitation: Its difficult to determine WON the question presented was of such a fundamental nature as reasonably to warrant the assumption that it would be similarly treated by the laws of all civilized countries

Here: the presumption # 2 (that forum law applies when parties fail to prove foreign law) is universally applied regardless of the nature of controversy

Zalamea v CA (1993)NY law re overbooking was pleaded but not proved.

Zalamea spouses and their daughter purchased 3 airline tickets from Manila agent of Tans World Airlines Inc One on full fare, 2 for 75% All tickets confirmed in Manila and re-confirmed in NY

(Probably in NY) the 3 were wait-listed as their seats were already taken. As Mr. Zalamea was holding the full-fare ticket, he was allowed to board the plane and Mrs. Zalamea and their daughter were compelled to buy tickets back to Manila from other airlines

Zalameas filed ACTION FOR DAMAGES based on breach of contract of carriage before RTC Makati

RTC: for Zalameas, refund ticket price + MD + Atty's fees

CA: MD cannot be recovered, overbooking being an accepted practice in US Airlines so no fraud nor bad faith on the part of TransWorld Airlines

ISSUE:W/N the Zalameas should have been awarded for Bad faith on the part of Transworld YES

RATIO:

The US law allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Code of Federal Regulations fo the Civil Aeronautics Board Transworld Airlines relied solely on the statement of its customer service agent that their aeronautics laws allows overbooking BUT aside from this statement, no official publication of the law was presented in evidence

IN ANY CASE: Even if the Code of Federal Regulations does exist, it is NOT applicable to this case Why? Because we adhere to the principle of lex loci contractus Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law would be Philippine law

So applying Philippine law Jurisprudence states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling passengers to an award of moral damages.

Processual Presumption

Miciano v Brimo (1924)Since the brother failed to prove Turkish law, the court presumed that Turkish law was the same as Philippine law, and allowed the testamentary dispositions.

Joseph Brimo Turkish national, executed a will in the Philippines Juan Miciano judicial administrator of the estate of Brimo Filed a scheme for partition, which was opposed by one of Brimos brothers Basis of opposition: The will was not in accrodance with Turkish laws. Hence, they are void for violating the Philippine Civil Code provision that provides that testamentary successions shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question

BUT The oppositor failed to prove that the testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with Turkish laws. Turkish laws were not proved.

HELD: The approval of the scheme of partition was NOT erroneous

In the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. SO: There is no evidence on record that the national law of Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions Not being contrary to our laws, the dispositions must be executed.

Suntay v Suntay (1952)

Jose Suntay Filipino citizen and resident Died in Amoy, Fookien in China Left properties in the Philippines One of his children from a first marriage was appointed administrator of his estate. His will (executed in the Philippines in 1929) was not probated because a copy could not be found.

After the Pacific War, his son from his second marriage, Silvino, claimed that he had found among the documents of Jose a will in Chinese characters which was allegedly probated in the Amoy district court.

Silvino filed a petition for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines in 1929, or the will executed in Amoy, China in 1931.

ISSUE:W/N the wills may be probated NO

RATIO:

1929 will in the Philippines

Falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the lost will must be proved by at least 2 credible witnesses

Will in China

Court enumerated some facts which had to be proved:1. That the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court2. The law of China providing the procedure for the probate of wills3. Legal requirements for the execution of the valid will in China

IN THIS CASE: These things were not proven What was presented was just the statements of the Consul General of China (depositions) These are INADMISSIBLE because:1. Consul General is not necessarily an expert on Chinese law on procedure in probate matters2. The proceedings in the Amoy court were only for the taking of depositions of witnesses, and not for the probate of the will

In the absence of proof that the Amoy court is a probate court and on the Chinese rules of procedure, it may be presumed that the proceedings are the same as those under Philippine laws.

So, applying Philippine rules

Probate is a proceeding in rem, for which personal notice and publication to interested parties must be made IN THIS CASE: Notice requirement was not complied with

CIR v Fisher (1961)The pertinent English law that allegedly vests in the husband full ownership of the properties acquired during the marriage has NOT been proven.

Walter Stevenson British, married to Beatrice who is also British Stevenson died in 1951 and instituted his wife as his sole heiress. Later on, the administrator of the estate filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return

CIR says: The taxable estate is the whole of the decendents estate The property relation of the spouses should be determined by English law, and not by Philippine law, since they are British English laws do NOT recognize legal partnership between spouses Under English law, all properties acquired during the marriage belong exclusively to the husband.

CTA Reduced taxable net estate to . Applied Philippine law without an ante-nuptial agreement, conjugal partnership applies.

ISSUE:What law applies ENGLISH LAW, but Court applied processual presumption

RATIO: The case is governed by the Old Civil Code since the marriage of the spouses in the Philippines took place in 1909 Its true that the relevant articles in both the old and new Civil Code adhere to the nationality theory in determining the property relation where one of the spouses is a foreigner and they have made no prior arrangement pertaining to their property relations. In such case, the national law of the HUSBAND applies in determining the property relaitons

BUT: there are differences in the 2 articles: Art 124 NCC provides that it shall be applicable regardless of whether the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or abroaed Art 1325 OCC limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land

HOWEVER: The said provisions apply only to MIXED marriages (one is a Filipino, the other is foreign) Manresas view: the applicable law is the English law, since both of them are foreigners.

BUT: the pertinent English law that allegedly vests in the husband full ownership of the properties acquired during the marriage has NOT been proven.

So Court applied processual presumption presumed that the law of England is the same as our law

Board of Commissioners v Dela Rosa (1991)

Commission on Immigration and Deportation commenced deportation proceedings against William Gatchalian, an alleged Chinese citizen, for violation of the Immigration Act.

CID says:1. The marriages of Gatchalians Filipino grandfather Santiago to a Chinese in China, and the marriage of his father also in China, were not supported by evidence except their own self-serving testimony.2. There was no showing what the laws of China were.3. For the marriages to be valid in the Philippines, it should have been shown that they were valid in China.4. SO: Since Santiago was born out of a valid marriage, he followed the citizenship of his mother (Chinese)

ISSUE:W/N Santiago Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen NO

RATIO:

Court applied processual presumption Apply processual presumption: In the absence of proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law.

Why no evidence was presented Lack of proof of Chinese law cannot be blamed on the grandfather, much less Gatchalian himself who was only 12 then. The grandfather was not pressed by the CID to prove China marriage laws it was believed that the marriage certificate was lost during the Japanese occupation of China.

Statements regarding pedigree or family relation The testimonies of the grandfather and the father before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each other are admissible in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree. In accordance with Rules of Court, Civil Code, Family Code

Philippines follows the Lex loci celebrationis All marriages performed outside RP in accordance with the laws in force in the country were performed and valid there shall also be valid in this country (FC 26) All presumptions favor the solidarity of the family (CC 20) He who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our laws bear the burden of proof to present the foreign law

Since the marriages are valid, Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen (because rule is that a legitimate child follows the citizenship of his father)

NOTE: At first, it was Gatchalian who was required to prove the existence of Chinese law to prove that the marriages of his grandpa and papa were valid. But with the presumption in favor of the solidarity of families, the burden of proving that the marriages were not valid, thus, of proving the Chinese law which says so, was transferred to CID.

Public policy exception

Pakistan Intl Airlines Corp v Ople (1990)

PIA, a Pakistan corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed to separate contracts of employment with the 2 respondents. Contract provides: Contract of employment is for 3 years Clause 6(b) PIA may terminate the employment contract at any time, with one month advance notice 1st clause Par 10: Agreement shall be construed and governed under the laws of Pakistan 2nd clause par 10: Only the Court of Karachi, Pakistan will have jurisdiction over any matter arising out of the contract

1 year and 4 months before the expiration of the contracts, PIA terminated the flight stewardesses conformably to clause 6(b)

Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal

ISSUE:W/N PIA may dismiss the employees pursuant to the contract NO

RATIO:

Par 10 1st clause (application of Pakistan law)

The first clause of Par 10 cannot be invoked to prevent application of Philippine labor laws to the employment relationship between PIA and the respondents. That relationship is much affected with public interest and Philippine laws cannot be rendered illusory by the agreement of the parties.

Par 10 2nd clause (use of Pakistan Court)

This clause also cannot be invoked. There ware multiple and substantive contacts between Philippine law, Philippine courts, and the relationship of the parties.1. Contract was executed and performed here2. Respondents are Philippine citizens3. PIA is licensed to do business here and has a resident here4. Respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights These contacts point to Philippine courts as the proper forum.

In any case PIA did not plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law. SO: processual presumption: Presume that Pakistan law is the same as Philippine law

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