Pressure Counterplan 1NC

TextThe United States federal government should increase its economic/diplomatic pressure on the People’s Republic of China to [insert affirmative mandate].

SolvencyPressure solves the aff – a tough stance on China on every issue is necessary AFP 2016Associated Foreign Press, “G7 needs ‘clear and tough stance’ on territorial disputes: Tusk,” May 26, 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3610121/G7-needs-clear-tough-stance-territorial-disputes-Tusk.html

The Group of Seven needs to take a "clear and tough stance" on China's controversial maritime claims and the Russian annexation of Crimea, European Council President Donald Tusk said Thursday. Speaking on the sidelines of a G7 summit in Japan, Tusk warned that the credibility of

the club of rich nations was on the line. "The test of our credibility at the G7 is our ability to defend the common values that we share," he told reporters. "This test will only pass if we take a clear and tough stance on every topic of our discussions here... I refer in particular to the issue of maritime security and the South and East China Seas and (the) Russia-

Ukraine issue." Tusk added: "If we are to defend our common values it is not enough these days to only believe in them. We also have to be ready to protect them." Beijing has angered some of its Southeast Asian neighbours, including the Philippines and Vietnam, by claiming almost all of the South China Sea . Beijing is also locked in a dispute with Japan over rocky outcroppings in the East China Sea, stoking broader concerns about China's growing regional might and threats to back up its claims with force, if necessary. "The policy of the G7 is clear: any maritime or territorial claim should be based

on international law and any territorial dispute should be resolved by peaceful means," Tusk said. "Unilateral action and the use of force or coercion will not be accepted." Russia and Ukraine have been locked in a bitter feud since Moscow annexed Crimea in 2014 and was then accused of fuelling a bloody separatist uprising in the east of the country. The crisis has pushed ties between Russia and the West to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War, and drawn sanctions against Moscow. "The European Union and the entire G7 continue to believe that this crisis can only be resolved in full compliance with... international law, especially the legal obligation to respect Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence," Tusk said. Progress on the Minsk peace accords, designed to resolve the crisis, is slow, Tusk added. "I want to state clearly that our stance vis-a-vis Russia, including economic sanctions, will remain unchanged as long as the Minsk agreements are not fully implemented," he said. "Unfortunately there is much less progress on the implementation of Minsk than we had hoped for one year ago."

Net Benefit

Japan Re-ArmJapan’s confident in our assurances now, but is closely monitoring our foreign policy to determine security reliance---China’s keyEinhorn 2015 [Robert, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, and is the former special advisor to Secretary of State Clinton for nonproliferation and arms control, M.A. in public affairs and international relations from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, 5/1/15, “Ukraine, Security Assurances, and Nonproliferation”, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 38, Issue 1, pp. 47-72]//SC

Japan and South Korea Among the states often considered potential candidates to join the nuclear club are Japan and the R epublic o f K orea . Both clearly have the tech nical skills, infrastructure , and economic resources to produce nuclear weapons . Both face growing military threats from neighbo ring countries that possess nuclear weapons. And both have entertained the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons in the past.38 But the Ukraine case will not materially affect prospects for either country to reconsider its nonnuclear status in the future. Instead, they will be affected primarily by factors much more directly relevant to the two countries’ own security situations—the evolution of regional military threats, the state of their bilateral relations with potential regional adversaries,

the development of their own conventional military capabilities, and the perceived reliability of the U.S. alliance commitment to their security. Japan is concerned by China’s military modernization efforts and its greater regional assertiveness, especially Beijing’s claim to what Tokyo regards as the Japanese Senkaku Islands. It is also concerned by North Korea’s growing nuclear and

missile capabilities as well as by the continuing bilateral tensions with both North Korea and China over historical grievances. But at the present time , there is little reason to believe that these concerns will lead to a Japanese interest in pursuing nuclear weapon s . Prime Minister Abe’s determination to strengthen Japan’s self-defense capabilities as well as his government’s reinterpretation of Japan’s constitution to permit collective defense efforts have increased confidence within Japan regarding its ability to address regional security threats. Moreover, the perception in some parts of the world that the United States may be pulling back from its global responsibilities does not seem to have shaken Japanese confidence in the U.S. security guarantee. In addition to continuing to station sizable military forces in Japan, the United States has taken a variety of steps to reinforce the credibility of the mutual defense relationship including support for Abe’s defense policies, close cooperation on missile defenses, a challenge to China’s unilateral declaration of an A ir Defense Identification Zone, and President Obama’s April 2014 public assertion that U.S. obligations under the U.S.– Japan mutual defense treaty cover all territories under the administration of Japan, including the disputed Senkaku Islands.39 Moreover, while members of Japan’s national security establishment have from time to time privately debated whether Japan should acquire nuclear weapons, the

Japanese public remains firmly opposed to Japan becoming a nuclear weapon state.40 The South Korean public is much more comfortable with the idea of Seoul possessing nuclear weapons,41 and some ROK politicians have openly advocated the return of U.S. tactical weapons to South Korean territory and even consideration of the possibility of the ROK producing its own nuclear weapons.42 But ROK officials continue to reject the nuclear option. While some South Korean observers have voiced concerns about U.S. willingness to continue meeting its overseas commitments, senior officials and military officers seem well satisfied with current bilateral defense cooperation, including stepped-up preparations for countering possible North Korean provocations, continued robust joint military exercises despite protests from Pyongyang, and the U.S. decision—in light of the continuing North Korean threat—to honor the ROK request to once again defer the transfer of operational control over South Korean forces in wartime from U.S. to South Korean commanders. Japan and South Korea will both follow

the crisis in Ukraine closely and will be attentive to any U.S. actions that might provide clue s about Washington’s readiness to meet its security commitments to them. But both governments understand the difference between U.S. responsibilities

toward Ukraine and U.S. security guarantees to its allies. They will find U.S. responsiveness to the concerns of its NATO allies more relevant to their security than U.S. actions vis-a`-vis Ukraine. However, far and away the most relevant indications of U.S. reliability will not be U.S. actions on the other side of the world, but U.S. actions directly in support of bilateral security commitments to them. And at least at the present

time , Japanese and South Korean perceptions of the reliability of U.S. security guarantees do not seem to have give n them grounds for altering their non-nuclear status.

Maintaining Japanese confidence is critical to prevent an allied arms racingLind 2016 [“Keep, Toss, or Fix? Assessing US Alliances in East Asia” by Jennifer Lind – Associate Prof of Government at Dartmouth, Sustainable Security: Rethinking American National Security Strategy, edited by Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino, Pub: 2016, Acc: 4/20/2016, The Tobin Project, Oxford University Press, http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Lind%20-%20Keep,%20Toss,%20or%20Fix.pdf]//SC

Critics of the current US grand strategy identify “buck-passing” as one of its costs. Indeed, current US national security policy has encouraged buck-passing among friendly and potentially militarily powerful countries. As Barry Posen writes, America’s Cold War alliances “have provided US partners in Europe and Asia with such a high level of insurance that they have been able to steadily shrink their militaries and outsource their defense to Washington.” Since the end of the Cold War, European countries that previously contributed to balancing against the Soviet Union now collectively spend only 1.6 percent of the GDP on defense—lower than either the United States or the global average in defense spending.120

Similarly, Tokyo (during and since the Cold War) has pursued a low level of defense spending for a great power—less than one percent of its GDP. Japan’s high GDP means that this is a nontrivial sum, so even with this low level of effort, Japan developed a capable maritime military force.121 However Japan’s level of defense effort, and its regional and global leadership, could be far greater . Critics of US grand strategy argue that an

important negative effect of the US commitment to Japan is that it has led one of the most potentially powerful countries in the world, a wealthy liberal democracy friendly to the United States, to act as a secondary diplomatic and military power. Importantly, Japanese buck-passing is not an unfortunate cost of the current grand strategy: it is a goal of the current grand strategy. Allied buck- passing means that countries are not balancing against the preponderance of American power. Furthermore, allied buck-passing means that countries in key regions are not building up independent capabilities that could trigger security dilemma dynamics. As discussed earlier, the prevention of arms racing is an explicit US national security goal. Therefore, far from being a cost of the

current grand strategy, allied buck-passing is the manifestation of its goals being achieved.

That triggers global nuclear warCimbala 2014 [Stephen J. Cimbala, professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University, “Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Perils and Prospects”, Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 6, No. 1, March 2014]//SC

Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basin ( Russia , China , Japan , South Korea , and North Korea – not including the United States , with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption . Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy.19 In Paul Bracken’s terms, North Korea can use its nuclear weapons to support either a “strategy of extreme provocation” or one intended to “keep the nuclear pot boiling” without having crossed the threshold of nuclear first use.20 In October 2013 there were reports of the DPRK renewing nuclear

activities, and perhaps preparing for new nuclear tests. A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked , in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan , and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran . An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place US proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and

call for more drastic military options , not excluding preemptive war , defenses, and counter- deterrent spec ial op eration s . In addition, an unrestricted nuclear arms race in Asia would most likely increase the chance of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war . It would do so because : (a) some states in the region already have histories of protracted conflict ; (b) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems , especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation ; (c) unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction resulting in an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch , by rogue commanders; (d) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption .

Negative Stuff

Solvency

A2 – Pressure failsChina will not allow engagement to solve – this means that pressure is the only solutionBrown 2015Andrew Browne, Senior Correspondent and Columnist at the Wall Street journal, was a member of a team of Jou8rnal reporters in Beijing that won the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting in 2007, “Can China be contained?” June 12, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/can-china-be-contained-1434118534

The disappointment in the U.S. today is heightened by the fact that engagement with China has promised so much and progressed so far. Trade and technology have transformed China beyond anything that Nixon could have

imaged, and the two countries are each other’s second-largest trading partners. China is America’s biggest creditor. More than a quarter million Chinese students study at U.S. universities. But the ideological gap hasn’t narrowed at all—and now Mr. Xi has taken a sharp anti-Western turn. Mao Zedong made the bold decision to cut a deal with Nixon, confident enough to embrace American capitalists even while pressing the radical agenda of his Cultural Revolution. Later, Deng Xiaoping struck a pragmatic balance between the opportunities of economic engagement with the West and the dangers posed by an influx of Western ideas.

“When you open the window, flies and mosquitoes come in,” he shrugged. Today, Mr. Xi is furiously zapping the bugs. A newly proposed law would put the entire foreign nonprofit sector under police administration, effectively treating such groups as potential enemies of the state. State newspapers rail against “hostile foreign forces” and their local sympathizers. The Chinese Communist Party’s “Document No. 9” prohibits discussion of Western democracy on college campuses. And as Mr. Xi champions traditional Chinese culture, authorities in Wenzhou, a heavily Christian coastal city dubbed China’s “New Jerusalem,” tear down crosses atop churches as unwanted symbols of Western influence. The backlash against the West extends well beyond China’s borders. For decades, China accepted America’s role as a regional policeman to maintain the peace and keep sea lanes open. But in Shanghai last year, Mr. Xi declared that “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security

of Asia.” Washington feels a certain sense of betrayal. America’s open markets, after all, smoothed China’s export-led rise to

become the world’s second-largest economy, and the two economies are now thoroughly enmeshed. Still, it would be a mistake to assume that mutual dependence will necessarily prevent conflict. Pre-World War I Europe was also closely entwined through trade and investment. Even the U.S. business community, once Beijing’s staunchest advocate in Washington, has lost some of its enthusiasm for engagement. James McGregor,a former chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China and now the China chairman of APCO Worldwide, a

business consultancy, recalls helping to persuade U.S. trade associations to lobby for China’s admission to the World Trade Organization, which happened in 2001. That unity of purpose, he says “has been splintering ever since.” Today, “they all believe that China is out to screw them.”

Pressure has already worked on China with cybersecurity – proves the counterplan can solveRibeiro 2016John Ribeiro, Bangalore Correspondent and IDG News Service, “Chinese hacking slows down after public scrutiny and US pressure,” June 20, 2016, http://www.pcworld.com/article/3086295/chinese-hacking-slows-down-after-public-scrutiny-and-us-pressure.html

U.S. warnings and public scrutiny of hacks by groups believed to be China-based may have led to an overall decrease in intrusions by these groups against targets in the U.S. and 25 other countries , a security

firm said. From mid-2014, after the U.S. Government took punitive measures against China, including indicting members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army for computer hacking, economic espionage and other charges, and raised the possibility of sanctions, FireEye has seen a notable decline in successful network compromises by China-based groups in these countries. “We suspect that this shift in operations reflects

the influence of ongoing military reforms, widespread exposure of Chinese cyber operations, and actions taken by the U.S. government,” according to the report released Monday by FireEye’s iSIGHT Intelligence. The

unit reviewed the activity of 72 groups that it suspects to be operating in China or supporting Chinese state interests. Other security firms have also commented previously on the possible decline of hacks by China-based groups after strong measures by the U.S. But in April, Admiral Michael Rogers, Commander of the U.S. Cyber Command, told a Senate committee that cyber operations from China are still "targeting and exploiting" U.S. government, defense industry, academic and private computer networks." Starting with measures like the indictment of the five PLA members in May 2014, President Barack Obama authorized in April 2015 the sanctioning of individuals or entitiesthat “engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities

that create a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States.” There were reports subsequently suggesting that the U.S. government could also impose sanctions on China for cyberespionage. During a September visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to the U.S., he and Obama agreed that the two countries will not conduct or support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property like trade secrets. The activity by China based groups, measured by active network compromises, has dropped from over 60 intrusions in February 2013 to just a few in May this year, according to FireEye. The decline in number of attacks does not necessarily suggest a lack of interest from the Chinese groups, but could be a shift in focus from quantity to quality, experts said. “Through late 2015 and 2016, we saw suspected China-based groups compromise corporations’ networks in the U.S., Europe, and Japan, while also targeting government, military, and commercial entities in the countries surrounding China,” according to FireEye. Among the targets this year were a U.S. government services company, in an apparent bid to get information on military projects, and four firms with headquarters in the U.S., Europe and Asia that made semiconductors and chemicals used in the manufacture of the devices.

Japan

A2 – No rearm The impact happens fast – Japan could re-arm in a few daysBrumfiel 2004Geoff, Cites Paul Leventhal, Head of the Nuclear Control Institute, “Nuclear proliferation special: We have the technology”, Nature 432, 432-437 (25 November 2004) | doi:10.1038/432432a; Published online 24 November 2004, http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v432/n7016/full/432432a.html)

Paul Leventhal, head of the Nuclear Control Institute, a non-profit watchdog in Washington, says that Iran is taking the

path followed by one of the United States’ most steadfast allies: Japan. Since its first nuclear-power plant became operational in 1966, Japan has developed a large civilian nuclear programme that has produced several tonnes of plutonium -239, the

other metal commonly used for nuclear bombs. Leventhal says that many consider Japan to be little more than “ a screwdriver away ” from a nuclear weapon. “Most think it could get a bomb in a matter of weeks to

months, if not days ,” Leventhal says .

Full re-arm isn’t even necessary – preemptive wars will still happenFriedberg 2015PhD, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton (Aaron, “The Debate Over US China Strategy,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 57.3)

If it were to happen overnight, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by current US security partners in East Asia (perhaps including Taiwan, as well as Japan and South Korea) might improve their prospects for balancing against

Chinese power. But here again, there is likely to be a significant gap between theory and reality. Assuming that

Washington did not actively assist them, and that they could not produce weapons overnight or in total secrecy, the interval during which its former allies lost the protection of the American nuclear umbrella and the point at which they acquired their own would be one in which they would be exposed to coercive threats and

possibly pre-emptive attack . Because it contains a large number of tense and mistrustful dyads (including

North Korea and South Korea, Japan and China, China and Taiwan, Japan and North Korea and possibly South Korea and Japan), a multipolar nuclear order in East Asia might be especially prone to instability .48

Their defense doesn’t assume the link – decline of confidence in the U.S. is the one development that could flip Japan’s security calculationsCurtis 2013 (Gerald, Burgess Professor of Political Science, Columbia University, “Japan's Cautious Hawks”, Foreign Affairs. Mar/Apr2013, Vol. 92 Issue 2, p77-86)

It is worth noting that Japan's opposition to becoming a leading military power cannot be chalked up to pacifism. After all, it would be an odd definition of pacifism that included support for a military alliance that requires the United States to take up arms, including nuclear weapons, if necessary, to defend Japan. Most Japanese do not and never have rejected the use of force to protect their country; what they have resisted is the unbridled use of force by Japan itself . The public fears that without restrictions on the military's

capabilities and missions, Japan would face heightened tensions with neighboring countries and could find itself embroiled in foreign wars. There is also the lingering concern that political leaders might lose control over the military, raising

the specter of a return to the militaristic policies of the 1930s. Furthermore, the Japanese public and Japan's political leaders are keenly aware that the country's security still hinges on the United States' dominant military position in East Asia. Some on the far right would like to see Japan develop the full range of armaments, including nuclear weapons, in a push to regain its autonomy and return the country to the ranks of the world's great powers. But the

conservative mainstream still believes that a strong alliance with the United States is the best guarantor of

Japan's security. ISLANDS IN THE SUN Given Japan's pragmatic approach to foreign policy, it should come as no surprise that the country has

reacted cautiously to a changing international environment defined by China's rise. Tokyo has doubled down on its strategy of

deepening its alliance with the United States; sought to strengthen its relations with countries on China's periphery; and pursued closer

economic, political, and cultural ties with China itself. The one development that could unhinge this strategy would be a loss of confidence in the U.S. commitment to Japan's defense.

A2 – rearm goodMiscalc and accidentsMizokami 2015 (Kyle, defense and national security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch, “China’s Ultimate Nightmare: Japan Armed With Nuclear Weapons,” The National Interest, October 31, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-ultimate-nightmare-japan-armed-nuclear-weapons-14214?page=2)

Still, it’s an interesting proposition. Nuclear phobias and the lack of a pressing need aside, there’s certainly no reason why Japan,the

third largest economy in the world, couldn’t build nukes. What would a Japanese nuclear deterrent look like? Let’s examine the traditional nuclear triad of land-based ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and ballistic missile submarines and each leg of the triad’s suitability for Japan’s circumstance. For the sake of argument, let’s say Japan can choose just one leg to invest in. We’ll also set the number of nukes at

roughly 300. Japan’s high population density would mean that the destruction of just a handful of cities could kill or injure the majority of the country’s civilian population. Against an adversary such as Russia or China, Japan must be able to inflict similar losses. Land-based missiles Japan could invest in a small arsenal of land-based missiles, each carrying one or more nuclear warheads. The missiles could be stationed in hardened silos, like the American Minuteman III, or on mobile launchers like the Russian RS-24 Yars. A Japanese ICBM would be smaller, not needing the range and fuel to reach North America. The ability to reach all of China, European Russia and the Middle East would be sufficient. Eventually, Japan might settle on a force of 100 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, each equipped with three 100 kiloton warheads. The missiles could be based in hardened silos in eastern Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost island, or moved around on mobile launchers. This is the least survivable of the three ideas. Japan’s close proximity to China means that in the event of a nuclear attack from the latter it would need to have a “launch on warning” doctrine to ensure the missiles survived. That would considerably increase the possibility of accidental nuclear war, as a hardware or software malfunction in Japan’s early warning system could be incorrectly interpreted as an attack.

Even reconsideration triggers the collapse of the NPT and regional prolifBakanic 2008Elizabeth Bakanic, Department of Homeland Security Graduate Fellow for Science and Technology, 2008. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, “The End of Japan’s Nuclear Taboo,” http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-end-of-japans-nuclear-taboo

So why should the world be concerned about Japan's fading nuclear allergy? Because Tokyo's attitude toward nuclear weapons is incredibly important to Japan's neighbors and the nonproliferation regime, meaning subtle changes in its attitude could carry serious security consequences for both. Historically, Japan has maintained complicated relations with many of its neighbors--specifically China, North Korea, and South Korea. While functional relationships do exist, deep mistrust and suspicions persist, creating a paranoid security environment where an innocuous change from an outside perspective sets off alarm bells in the region. So what may seem like a natural shift in Japan's nuclear attitudes may be a destabilizing change for those less trustful and less objective. Therefore, if discussing nuclear weapons becomes more acceptable in Japan, China and the Koreas might perceive this as a dangerous development and use it as an excuse to increase their military capabilities--nuclear or otherwise. In terms of the teetering nonproliferation regime, a change in Japan's attitude toward nuclear weapons would be a serious blow. To date, Tokyo has been a foremost advocate of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, campaigning against proliferation and rejecting the idea of developing nuclear weapons despite possessing the best nuclear capability of any non-nuclear weapon state and having two nuclear weapon

states near its borders. The binding nature of international agreements relies on such attention and support from its signatories. So although Japan may never violate the treaty, if Tokyo is perceived as being less supportive as it opens up domestically on the nuclear issue, the effect on NPT morale could be dire, which speaks directly to the NPT's current vulnerability. Some element of the changing attitude toward nuclear weapons in Japan must be due to discomfort with the status quo and a security need that the NPT or the country's other security partnerships isn't satisfying. Therefore, a disturbing factor of Japan's nuclear normalization is what it may symbolize for the NPT overall.

Affirmative Stuff

A2 – Solvency

Pressure FailsPressure only antagonizes China and turns the counterplan – economic interdependence requires the maintenance of good relations Shixin 2015Jiao shixin, Associate Professor at the institute of International Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. “The Problem with American ‘Engagement’ with China,” September 29, 2015, http://chinaus-icas.org/materials/problem-american-engagement-china/

All in all, the US engagement strategy has been motivated by two impossible goals. It is revealing that even when the United States makes significant other gains by cooperating with China, many American scholars are nonetheless disappointed by the engagement strategy. Ultimately this is because they judge the success or

failure of engagement by reference to its unrealistic and impractical strategic intentions. How should the United States adjust its China policy? Some American scholars have suggested that US take tougher policy toward China, either by containing or punishing China. These recommendations raise significant concerns. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the United States implemented a policy of containment and isolation for a long time, but the policy was certainly a failure. The United States had to return to the strategic orbit of cooperation with China in the Nixon era. Today, China is very different than it was then. It is broadly integrated with the rest of the world, and has become the world’s second largest economy. The gap in relative power between China and the United States continues to narrow and China and the United States have established relationships of mutual dependence in the economic, security and global governance domains, among others. It is very difficult for us to imagine the consequences of the US implementing strategy of containing China. The Chinese saying comes to mind, 杀敌一千，自伤八百, “sacrifice eight hundred men in order to kill one thousand.” It should be obvious that strategies of containing or acting tough on China lack sense, and would lead the US into the dead-end of power politics . Since the cold-war thinking of containment is not feasible, how should U.S adjust its strategy of engagement with China? The first adjustment should be to abandon its unreasonable strategic objectives and build a China strategy on the basis of equality. China is very different from the United States, China has its own historical and national conditions, and its own political genetic makeup. Policymakers in the United States should realize that the engagement strategy is incapable of altering China’s path of developing its own model of socialism. The United States should not expect to transform China through “peaceful evolution.” Even if China somehow adopted American-style democracy, it would not behave according to America’s will. Russia introduced Western democracy after the cold war, but what happened? Russia’s experience with democracy has not improved its relations with the US, and it doesn’t conform to America’s strategic vision. The United States should not assume that the “peaceful evolution” of countries towards an American model will ensure alignment with its interests. The second adjustment is that American needs embrace the concept of “harmony without sameness.” This idea can be found in traditional Chinese thought. It means even when there are differences between people, they can still enjoy peace, harmony and cooperation. China and the United States have very different histories, political systems and paths of development. These are not a reasons for them to clash with one another, but can be reasons for establishing mutual respect, exchange and a complementary relationship. Unfortunately, the logic of the US engagement strategy is precisely opposed to this thinking. Nonetheless, we are pleased to see that some of America’s friends have accepted the Chinese way of thinking on such matters. On September 17, President Xi Jinping had a meeting with some American business representatives and former officials in Beijing. They agreed that China and US should establish “harmony without uniformity,” and should build cooperative relations. If the United States adjusts its strategy towards this direction, then engagement with China will update to Version 2.0. This revised principle of engagement should not only be the mantra for US-China relations, but also for the entire world. Third, the United States should be wary of the temptations of “global leadership” or hegemony. World politics is changing, all kinds of global issues and challenges will continue to arise that no single country can cope with alone. The world must work together to deal with global governance. This is a truth that United States also understands. In an increasingly interdependent world, leadership in global governance also means assuming greater responsibility, which is different from traditional hegemonic leadership. Unfortunately, the United States’ current engagement strategy is still to defend the international order with a view to maintaining America’s leadership. Assessed by this criteria, the strategy has been considered by many scholars to have failed already. If the United States still cannot resist the temptation of hegemony, and cannot, together with China and other big countries, assume the responsibilities and obligations of global governance the engagement strategy will not have a successful future, and it will be difficult for both China and the US to build a new type of great power relations.

China cannot be contained – engagement is the only route to peaceful relations with ChinaParker 2014Elton C. Parker, III, Elton C. Parker III is currently serving as the Special Assistant to the President and Military Assistant to the Provost of National Defense University. A career naval aviator, his most recent tour was as Speechwriter and Special Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The views expressed here are his own and do not represent the views, opinions, or positions of the National Defense University, The U.S. Navy, or the Department of Defense. “China: Engagement vs. Estrangement,” May 4, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/china-engagement-vs-estrangement/

“We welcome Chinese participation, and we welcome quite frankly the growth of China as a military power in the Pacific. There is nothing wrong with that.” Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, made that statement recently when discussing the acceptance by China’s People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) of an invitation to take part in RIMPAC, the world’s largest international maritime exercise. RIMPAC will take place in June off the coast of Hawaii, and for the first time in its 23 previous iterations, will include PLA-N forces. As a matter of fact, this will also mark the first time any Chinese forces have ever taken part in a large, U.S. military-led naval exercise, anywhere. For some, the fact that the number two U.S. admiral in the Pacific theater — his immediate boss is ADM Sam Locklear, commander of all U.S. forces in the Pacific Command area of operations — would make a statement that “we welcome” the growth of China as a military power lacks credulity, or is grossly Pollyannaish, or worse. I disagree. There is more to gain by engaging with the Chinese where we have shared or common interests, than there is by continuing to treat and view their rise in almost exclusively negative terms, or by thinking the United States can contain that rise in some way through isolation. First, hearkening back to the omnipresent importance of the narrative, our words absolutely matter, but what matters most is that the deeds match the words. The lack of that alignment is precisely what does us in (impacts our reputation, our credibility, our cachet, etc.) with unintended strategic communication missteps in examples like “the pivot”, the Syria red line, and a host of other examples that Wikileaks and Snowden have made public. Furthermore, when we look to the west, as President Obama’s recent trip shows, our audience is not only — nor at times even primarily — China. Foreign audiences are still studying and weighing our words with painstaking effort; and words without synchronized action eventually mean about as much as campaign promises. Ultimately, we must be able to account for not only the intention of the words, images, and deeds, but perhaps even more importantly, how they will be perceived, interpreted, and then translated by our multiple audiences. Thus, we need to find the fundamental and harmonic frequencies — those that resonate best and most deeply — and then zero in on transmitting them in an unrelenting fashion. As George Bernard Shaw once said, “The single biggest problem with communication is the illusion that it has taken place.” This skillset is certainly not lost on our Chinese brethren, as described in an article in theWashington Free Beacon last month, which cited a study on the PLA’s embrace of a concept called“Three Warfares”, produced for the Office of Net Assessment. This report highlights the emphasis being placed on “psychological, media, and legal attacks” by China as part of an effort to “diminish or rupture U.S. ties with the South China Sea littoral states and deter governments from providing forward basing facilities or other support.” According to the report, the Pentagon defines psychological warfare as “efforts to influence or disrupt an enemy’s decisions-making capabilities, to create doubts, foment anti-leadership sentiments, and device opponents”. As such, this darker side of strategic communication — information operations — would include actions such as increasing diplomatic pressure, false narratives, harassment, and other forms of media or public opinion warfare. So how does one go about countering the so-called Three Warfares? The report advocates, logically enough, three distinct approaches: forceful legal action (“lawfare”), freedom of navigation exercises (presence), and bolstering public diplomacy (strategic messaging). Putting aside the legal lane for the lawyers leaves physical engagement and communication. Returning to Admiral Harris’s comment about welcoming the rise of China as a military power in the Pacific, I do not think his remark stretches credulity at all. Nor do I believe that he made this statement off the cuff. Instead, this measured and strategic outlook is the result of several years of critical thinking honed while a student at Harvard, Georgetown, and Oxford, and earned on the job in challenging positions wearing dual hats (a NATO one in Naples, Italy, and a State Department one in his most recent job as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). Both of those positions repeatedly reinforced — and his current one undoubtedly even further underscores — that in this increasingly globalized and hyper-connected world, very rarely, if ever, does a large challenge or threat to security affect only one nation; nor can the U.S. be everywhere, being all things to all people. Thus, working together, building and then leveraging partner capability and capacity are the bread and butter; the keys to confronting and then overcoming those shared transnational and even trans-regional threats and challenges. It is also a relatively safe bet that he is in lockstep with his boss, who just last week reiterated thatclimate change was the biggest long-term threat to the Asia Pacific region, emphasizing, … the increasing frequency of storms, the increasing likelihood that large tsunamis would impact as we’ve seen in Aceh and we’ve seen in Japan, impacting large population areas which will put many people at risk and disrupt the security environment. And you add to that the fact that 70% of all major disasters occur in my area of responsibility. And the admiral is not alone, nor is Mother Nature the only culprit. The recent multinational effort still underway in trying to locate and discern what exactly took place with Malaysia Airlines flight MH 370 shows that we can work together in close proximity and cover a much wider operating area than any one nation attempting to “go it alone.” This activity has reminded some of the South China Sea Workshop Process started in 1989, which is a continuing dialogue process that aims to prevent, or at least mitigate, potential conflicts by exploring areas of cooperation among the littoral states in the South China Sea area. We can pursue this line of reasoning further. There are many shared challenges and threats to security that confront both China and the United States, as well as the other inhabitants of the Asia-Pacific neighborhood. Even with “the pivot,” we cannot and should not attempt to be everywhere, patrolling every strait, ensuring access to every common, enforcing freedom to all navigation, countering every pirate, etc. To the extent that we can start/continue to rely upon another nation/other nations to bring their considerable capability and capacity to the table to cooperate and collaborate — even pursuing the same objectives in parallel and for different reasons — still yields a net complementary benefit and helps to serve our greater national interests. Furthermore, as these examples show, threats and challenges do not have to be existential to create bonds. True, the bonds, like the threats and challenges, can be temporal and thus temporary; and the magnitude of the threat can also affect the strength and duration of those bonds. But what can make these bonds eternal is the element of trust, which is built primarily through persistent engagement, working together to confront and overcome shared threats and challenges, and undergirded by open, honest, and transparent communications. An example of such messaging took place a couple weeks ago when U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel met with both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Minister of Defense General Chang Wanquan. Secretary Hagel asserted that he U.S. seeks military ties with China “to deepen practical cooperation in areas of common interest, and to manage competition and differences through openness and communication.” President Xi reciprocated this when he responded that the secretary’s visit to China “this time will definitely push forward the development of our new model of military-to-military relationship.” Granted, we have to apply a healthy dose of realism to this discussion; thus,

we need to remember that China, as any other power, will operate first and foremost to support, protect, and further their own national interests. In fact, General Chang specifically addressed this shortly after the meeting with President Xi when he emphasized that “with the latest developments in China, it can never be contained,” and later added, “I’d like to reiterate that the territorial sovereignty issue is China’s core interest.” Thus, China may not share our perspective or agree to the same set of shared challenges; nor might it see any benefit or welcome working with others to confront those challenges, as evidenced by General Chang’s comment, “We are prepared at any time to cope with all kinds of threats and challenges … The Chinese military can assemble as soon as summoned, fight any battle and win.” But based on their words, deeds, and sizeable expenditure of resources when it comes to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, counter-piracy missions, counter-terrorism missions, and relations with other inhabitants of the Asia-Pacific region, the Chinese already confront many of the same threats and challenges to security in the region that the United States does. Furthermore, they have publicly acknowledged the reality of working together — or at least in close proximity to — the U.S. military, as well as those of the other maritime security forces in the region, by signing the “code of conduct” agreement announced last week between the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, the Chinese chief of the PLA-N, and the heads of 22 other nations’ maritime security forces. Of course there are already caveats to when and how the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea will be enforced or be applicable, but it does establish English as the standard language used in bridge-to-bridge communication, as

well as using U.S.-standard code word terminology and phonetic alphabet for abbreviated transmissions. There will be growing pains as this is the region’s first code of conduct for unplanned encounters between ships and aircraft. When we meet each other in the air or on/under the sea, friction will more than likely be present. However, this is more than we had several months ago when the USS Cowpens was almost collided with by a PLA-N cruiser. As Admiral Wu Shengli, the PLA-N head, stated, “This is a milestone document that is highly significant to navies in the region in promoting communication and reducing misjudgment and misunderstanding.” In addition, this is a direct result of doing exactly what both ADM Harris and ADM Locklear have called for: engaging more often, more closely,

and more directly. The top two economies in the world benefit far more by working together against threats to their common markets and pursuits, than working in isolation or even at crossed purposes. As the United States has learned and shown successfully in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Europe, when we build partnerships based on persistent engagement and mutual trust, then as our partners’ capabilities and eventually their capacities grow, good things happen. Ideal? Not always. Good? More often than not. Thus, in partial response to John Mearsheimer’s lingering question of “Can China rise peacefully?” my answer would be “Maybe.” But we, the United States and our vitally important

partners and allies in the region, have far more say in that than some would like to admit, particularly when we work together. More engagement, not less, is the recommendation for building trust between two powers like China and the United States. Presence, adherence to the rule of law, and messaging — both physical (training and exercises, and sharing of best practices) as well as verbal — our Americanized version of the Three Warfares. Again, words matter; however, the “pivot/rebalance” is nothing without action. Therefore, it comes down to presence: persistent physical presence with a purpose. Unpredictable or shadow presence like episodic unplanned/unsynchronized flyovers, ship visits tied to no exercise, brief touch-and-go of a few boots on the ground, and promises of future capabilities have little lasting effect. Forward-basing the USS George Washington and the U.S. 7th Fleet in Japan makes a statement; permanently basing another aircraft carrier or a large deck amphibious ship or even one of our hospital ships in Singapore makes a statement; moving an air wing/element from Kadena to Vietnam or the Philippines makes a statement. But so, too, do the appointments of high quality professionals with political clout to key leadership positions like ambassador and assistant secretary, as does leaving these posts vacant for extended periods of time. Take back control of the narrative — say what we think, say what we will do, and then do it. This action should help answer the questions increasingly being asked about our commitment, our credibility, and our focus. We must make our case to the world of what is and what is not acceptable behavior (based on international law), announce treaty obligations (both what allies expect of us, as well as what we expect from them), and then continue to engage often and directly with our Chinese counterparts and partners and allies in the region. We can start with shared and overlapping interests, and work outward from there to see what else is possible. Ultimately, the bottom line is this: I see more good from pursuing a strategy of engagement than one of estrangement. I think we do our interests and ourselves a disservice by only painting the rise of China as solely adversarial. Competitor? At times, absolutely. Occasional cooperator and collaborator? Why not? If we continue to label “them” as adversarial (or even as being more prone to competitor than collaborator), we are likely to see that become a self-fulfilling prophecy. A realistic perspective says we have to take steps toward creating the ideal, while always planning for the worst. We have enough plans already on the shelf to deal with all of the negatives should “competition” turn into “conflict.” So why not focus the majority of the rest of our time on taking the long view, being assertive but not aggressive, and focusing on potential areas for cooperation to influence a positive strategic environment and series of relationships that seek to remove as many sources of potential conflict as possible? We should take advantage of this “rise” while we can, and while both countries are here near the top of the heap, because ultimately, both of us will not be here forever.

Pressure advocates do not account for the evolution of US-Chinese interests – engagement is the only option that can solveRussel 2014“Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secreatary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC,” June 25, 2014, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/06/228415.htm

This year marks the 35th anniversary of the establishment of official diplomatic relations between the United States and China. We have made

remarkable progress since the era of back-channel messaging and secret trips. The scope of today’s U.S.-China relationship was unimaginable when President Nixon made his historic visit in 1972 to China. Yet there is still enormous potential for progress in the U.S.-China relationship. Progress that will yield benefits to the citizens of both countries, our neighbors, and the world. To realize this progress and these benefits, we seek to ensure that the relationship is not defined by strategic rivalry, but by fair and healthy competition, by practical cooperation on priority issues, and by constructive management of our differences and disagreements. Where interests overlap, we will seek to expand cooperation with China. These areas include economic prosperity, a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue, and a reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases. Where they diverge – and we have significant and well-known areas of disagreement – we will work to ensure that our differences are

constructively managed. Mr. Chairman, there are those who argue that cold war-like rivalry is inevitable and that the United States and China are condemned to a zero-sum struggle for supremacy, if not conflict. I reject such mechanistic thinking. As anyone who has served in government can tell you, this deterministic analysis overlooks the role of leaders who have the ability to set policy and to shape relationships. It gives short shrift to the fact that our two economies are becoming increasingly intertwined, which increases each side’s stake in the success of the other. It undervalues the fact that leaders in Washington and Beijing are fully cognizant of the risk of unintended strategic rivalry between an emerging power and an established

power and have agreed to take deliberate actions to prevent such an outcome. And it ignores the reality of the past 35 years – that, in spite of our differences, U.S.-China relations have steadily grown deeper and stronger – and in doing so, we have built a very resilient relationship. We view China’s economic growth as complementary to the region’s prosperity, and China’s expanded role in the region can be complementary to the sustained U.S. strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific. We and our partners in the region want China’s rise to contribute to the stability and continued development of the region. As President Obama and Secretary Kerry have made very clear, we do not seek to contain China; to the contrary, we welcome the emergence of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China. We believe all countries, and particularly emerging powers like China, should recognize the self-benefit of upholding basic rules and norms on which the international system is built; these are rules and norms which China has participated in formulating and shaping, and they are rules and norms that it continues to benefit from. In this context, we are encouraging China to exercise restraint in dealing with its neighbors and show respect for universal values and international law both at home and abroad. A key element of our approach to the Asia-Pacific region, often called the rebalance, is strengthening America’s alliances and partnerships in the region. This contributes directly to the stable security environment that has underpinned the region’s – and China’s – dramatic economic growth and development. A second element is working to build up regional institutions in order to uphold the international rules-based system and create platforms for the countries and leaders to work on priority strategic, economic, and other issues. These institutions help develop habits of cooperation and promote respect for the interests of all parties. A third key element has been expanding and deepening our relationships with important emerging countries such as China, including through regular and high-level dialogue. In just two weeks, our countries will hold the sixth round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue – the “S&ED” – in Beijing. This annual dialogue is unique in its level and scope. It is led on the U.S. side by Secretaries Kerry and Lew and brings a number of Cabinet-level and other senior U.S. government officials together with their Chinese counterparts to work on the major issues facing us. The breadth of the agenda in the two tracks – strategic and economic – reflects the breadth of modern U.S.-China relations. The S&ED is an important vehicle for making progress in the pursuit of a cooperative and constructive relationship; for building a “new model” that disproves the thesis that the United States and China are somehow destined for strategic rivalry and confrontation. The S&ED is an important forum for the United States and China to take stock of and set goals for the bilateral relationship, to review regional and international developments and explain our respective policies, to coordinate and seek practical areas of cooperation on important issues of mutual interest, and to constructively manage areas of difference through candid, high-level discussions. Let me preview of some of the topics for upcoming discussions at this year’s S&ED: We will exchange views and explore prospects for progress on regional challenges, including Sudan, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, Ukraine, Iraq, and maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas; The world’s two largest economies will work on strengthening the global economic recovery; The world’s two biggest energy consumers and carbon emitters will work on combating climate change, and expand cooperation on clean energy; We will discuss global challenges ranging from cyber security to counterterrorism to wildlife trafficking, and the United States will raise our concerns over human rights; Secretary Kerry will co-chair the annual U.S.-China High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange, which supports exchange programs that build the foundation for mutual understanding and trust; And Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns and his Chinese counterpart will hold the U.S.-China Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD), our highest-ranking joint civilian-military exchange with China, where we will conduct frank discussions on some of the most sensitive strategic issues in the relationship. The S&ED and our numerous other dialogues and official exchanges with the Chinese each year reflect the importance we attach to managing this relationship. This level and pace of engagement show

the commitment of both sides to producing tangible benefits for our two peoples, the Asia-Pacific region, and the global community. The United States and China have a vital stake in each other’s success. That is why we maintain an intensive schedule of engagement; President Obama and President Xi met in Sunnylands, California, a year ago and have met twice more since then. The President plans to visit Beijing in November when China hosts APEC. Secretary Kerry, as well as numerous Cabinet and sub-Cabinet

officials, have visited China already in 2014 and have met with Chinese counterparts in the United States or at international fora. We work with China in virtually all important international arenas, including the UN, the G20, the East Asia Summit, and APEC where we are cooperating closely on regulatory transparency, supply chain efficiencies, promoting clean and renewable energy, cross-border education, and combatting corruption and bribery. Our relationship touches on nearly every regional and global issue, and, as such, requires

sustained, high-level attention. Moreover, few of these issues can be effectively addressed if China and the United States do not cooperate.

Engagement is the only tenable solution to ChinadeLisle no dateJacques deLisle, University of Pennsylvania and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “China’s Uneven Human Rights Progress and the Problem of Causation,” no publication date provided, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/delisle.pdf

Human rights conditions in the PRC remain inadequate, but they have improved greatly , if unevenly, over

nearly three decades during which the United States has pursued a policy of engagement. Improvement has been greatest in the last decade and a half when the U.S.’s policy of engagement has become more robust.

Gains in economic and social rights, which China emphasizes, have been significant. Almost thirty years of nearly double-digit growth has created the means. Although inequality has soared, new wealth has been shared sufficiently widely that Chinese enjoy a far higher standard of living than a generation or a decade ago. Hundreds of millions have risen from poverty that precluded basic economic rights. Reforms to economic laws and policies have created meaningful if incomplete property rights. Economic and political reforms have greatly increased mobility, replacing the near-serfdom of the hukou system established under Mao. Political freedoms have increased although they

remain limited. The regime no longer requires citizens to engage in political movements or voice support for official ideology. Although still facing severe restrictions, domestic media are freer to report government malfeasance. Access to foreign media has greatly increased. Tolerance for religion has grown. Tens of millions of Chinese participate in state-approved institutions and underground “house churches” and similar organizations that survive despite crackdowns. Although the law on the books and its implementation remain inadequate, reformer laws are far more compatible with international human rights norms than was true during the Mao and Deng eras. In 1979, the PRC’s first systematic substantive criminal law and criminal procedure law promised to end tyrannical and chaotic imposition of punishment under color of political authority. Two decades later, these laws’ successors removed provisions that were most objectionable on human rights grounds: politically charged “counter-revolutionary” crime (although substituting disturbingly similar crimes of endangering state security and disturbing public order), lack of a presumption of innocence, permissibility of punishment by analogy, and limited access to counsel, opportunity to confront evidence and other due process protections (although the 1990s changes promised only limited improvement on these latter matters). Accession to the U.N. Covenant entails further reforms. Formally non-criminal but liberty-depriving “reeducation through labor” and “shelter and investigation” have undergone substantial if incompletely implemented reforms, with the former restricted to shorter terms and subjected to judicial review and the latter officially banned. 2 Ordinary Chinese now bring, and often win, lawsuits challenging state actions, participate in nascent public hearings on laws and regulations, and join nongovernmental organizations. China now has media and academic outlets for regime critics ranging from the pro-liberalization “right” such as Cao Siyuan (a policy entrepreneur who presses for constitutionalism and human rights) or Li Jianqiang (a lawyer, essayist and leader in the weiquan movement that seeks enforcement of legal rights as a means to social change) to the “new leftist” Wang Hui (editor of Dushu and critic of China’s rising inequality) or Gong Xiantian (the Peking University professor whose critique of the “anti-socialist” property law helped delay the legislation’s passage until March 2007). Although they have faced harassment and threats to their livelihoods and freedom, gadflies and mavericks dot the Chinese landscape: AIDS activists (such as Gao Yaojie, who was prohibited and then grudgingly allowed to travel abroad to receive awards), whistleblowers (such as People’s Liberation Army doctor Jiang Yanyong who exposed the SARS cover-up), criminal defense lawyers taking politically charged cases (such as Mo Shaoping and Gao Zhisheng), lawyer-activists representing expropriated property rights-holders or victims of coerced sterilization (such as Zhu Jiuhui and Chen Guancheng), and policy-intellectuals pressing for human rights, constitutionalism, civil society and economic reform (such as Yu Keping and Cao Siyuan). While the drama here pales in comparison to Democracy Wall in 1978 and Tiananmen in 1989, this sustained, multifaceted, mutually independent, and partially tolerated set of reformers and critics was unimaginable three decades ago and nonexistent through much of the 1990s. Some areas, including political speech, organized political participation and religion, have lagged. The regime still tolerates no meaningful political party other than the Communist Party. Organized dissent such as the Tiananmen Movement, fledgling autonomous political organizations such as the China Democracy Party, and less conventional groups with political agendas such as Falun Gong have been quashed. Harsh sanctions have befallen leaders and, sometimes, followers in the “incidents” (now numbering around 80,000 in official counts) of protests by workers who have been laid off by declining state-owned enterprises, peasants whose land rights have been expropriated by local governments collaborating with developers, and others. Democratic elections reach only the lowest-level committees in the countryside and are often manipulated. Unauthorized religious groups (such as “house churches”) encounter intermittent suppression and “cults” (such as Falun Gong) face systematic repression. Although brutal methods and strict implementation of the so-called “single child family” policy have waned, restrictions on reproductive freedoms persist, as do coercive means to enforce them. Criminal justice and not-formally-criminal sanctions remain deeply troubling, with trial processes remaining cursory and sometimes secretive (especially in politically charged cases), multi-year incarcerations still dispensed without court process, torture continuing despite official prohibitions, and executions in China outnumbering those in the rest of the world (and for acts that would not be capital offenses in other 3 death penalty jurisdictions but that fall among China’s nearly seventy crimes punishable by death). Human rights progress also has faced reversals. The most striking came after Tiananmen Movement of 1989, with imprisonments and executions imposed after perfunctory procedures, and silencing of officials, journalists, academics and others who had sympathized with the movement. Earlier, more modest retrenchments came with drives against crime (bringing harsher penalties and weakened procedural protections, especially for acts threatening social order), “spiritual pollution” (targeting liberal ideas that came with the first market-oriented reforms and opening to the outside world), ideas of “alienation” under socialism and Marxist “humanism” (quashing reform-minded intellectuals within the Party), and “bourgeois liberalization” (ending a period of relative political openness and toppling designated successor Hu Yaobang whose death in 1989 was the catalyst for the Tiananmen Demonstrations). “Strike hard” campaigns and anti-corruption drives began in the middle 1990s and have increased criminal sanctions and undercut procedural protections. In the 1990s and 2000s, the most notable setback has been the crackdown on Falun Gong, declared an “evil cult” and the most severe challenge to the Party and state since 1989. Its adherents have faced detention and abuse, some of it fatal. Periodic campaigns targeting “house churches” have limited religious liberties of adherents to more mainstream faiths. In some areas, the Hu Jintao period has brought troubling turns. Intellectuals report a chilled atmosphere for heterodox ideas for political and legal reform. Long in decline, restrictions on media—especially “new media”—recently have increased. Bold journals such as Bingdian and Nanfang Zhoumou have faced closure, firings or criticism for their temerity in exposing inconvenient truths or offering critical views. Among conservative elements in the top elite, arguments against greater legality have resurfaced, including calls for limits to the independence of the legal system

and warnings that foreign and hostile forces—including those with human rights agendas—are using China’s legal institutions to undermine the system. Although it did produce greater transparency in government, the SARS crisis triggered regime reactions that were not human rights-friendly, including mandating severe penalties for those charged with spreading false information. Despite Hu-era “populism,” the social safety net has continued to fray. Rising concern about unrest has brought repression and prosecution of those involved in protests and scrutiny of civil

society organizations. Nonetheless, overall progress in Chinese human rights has marked the post-Mao Reform Era, and has

coincided with the American policy of engagement that accompanied normalization of U.S.-PRC relations in 1979. The Post-Tiananmen and “second wave” Reform Era reacceleration of improvement in human rights conditions corresponds to deepening and expansion of U.S. engagement during the Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies. This has reflected growth of government-to-government interactions, including on human rights-related issues, that attended a steep rise in trade (which grew from near-zero levels in 1979 to over $30 billion in 1992 to approximately $300 billion today) and investment (which now includes 20,000 U.S.-invested enterprises 4 and around $60 billion in cumulative investment, much of it since 1992). Increased engagement also included a new emphasis on human rights as the shock of the Tiananmen Incident and the end of the Cold War removed “veils” or “lenses” that had made human rights peripheral to Washington’s post-normalization China (if not broader foreign) policy. Correlation, of course, is not causation. Many of the factors that have contributed to human rights gains are not products of U.S. policy. U.S. policy has only sometimes— and often only indirectly—affected them. Counterfactuals also obscure causation. It is impossible to show that human rights conditions in China would not have been better if U.S. policy had been tougher.

Nonetheless, much evidence supports the claim that engagement has worked better than a much harder line would have.

A2 – Japan

No Rearm/alliance collapseUS-Japan relations are resilient, despite conflicts – overwhelming security motivationsCossa 2004Ralph A. Cossa, Prof and Pres. Pacific Forum @ CSIS, 11-8-2004, “U.S. Security Strategy in Asia,” IIPS Int’l Conf., http://www.iips.org/04sec/04asiasec_cossa.pdf

U.S. security strategy in Asia today is built today, as it has been for the past half century, upon the foundation of a solid U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. This foundation, which has seen its fair share of cracks and quakes, appears remarkably resilient at present. In fact, the depth and breadth of defense cooperation between Washington and Tokyo in recent years have been unprecedented. While Japan may not yet be the “U.K. of Asia,’ as once envisioned by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, it is not too far a stretch to call Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro Asia’s answer to Tony Blair. Prime Minister Koizumi is one of a small, select group of Asia-

Pacific leaders who have won Washington’s utmost trust and confidence (and sincere gratitude), given his unyielding support for the U.S. war on terrorism in all its manifestations and his willingness to buck domestic public opinion to provide support to the two major campaigns in Washington’s ongoing war Afghanistan and Iraq. This has paid handsome dividends in helping to

achieve what both sides generally agree are the “best relations ever.”

It’s empirically denied, we’ve had major trade friction with Japan in the pastMalaby 2006Sebastian Mallaby, Columnist for the Washington Post, “Trade And the China Card,” March 6, 2006,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/05/AR2006030500943.html

So the United States and China may be headed toward serious trade conflict. Both sides feel they have shown more than adequate good faith; both have political reasons not to make further efforts. Back in the 1980s and early 1990s, similar friction between the United States and Japan created poisonous resentment on both sides: U.S. politicians smashed Japanese products with sledgehammers, and in 1995 an anti-American demonstration in Japan became the biggest protest march in a quarter of a century.

No risk of an arms race – economic linkages between countries preventCorrespondents Rerport 2008Correspondents Report, Asian arms race overstated: thinktank, 6 July , 2008, http://www.abc.net.au/correspondents/content/2008/s2295364.htm

Asia though is getting richer. Asia is spending more on military hardware. What do you see as the difference between modernisation and an arms race? ANDREW DAVIES: Well modernisation, think of it this way - that the countries of Western Europe routinely buy very sophisticated tanks, aircraft, ships and submarines. And no one bats an eyelid. They've been doing it for decades and decades and decades. It's almost seen as just what sophisticated nations do, they spend a proportion of their money on that sort of equipment. And to some extent we're seeing that in Asia as well, particularly in South East Asia. I think what's going on there is that

the countries are starting to do what countries elsewhere have been doing for generations. What are your military fears then for Asia? If it isn't an arms race, what should the region be worrying about? ANDREW DAVIES: I think the region should be worrying about a number of things. We're entering a period that we've never been in before, where all of the historic great powers of Asia are simultaneously strong. We'll have Russia, China, India, Japan and South Korea all wealthy and strong at the same time. And we have no experience of that. And then you add the United States into the mix and these are uncharted waters. We've literally never been here before. And it will take some careful diplomacy and shared understandings to thrash out a cooperative future. GRAEME DOBELL: Do you see a cooperative future? ANDREW DAVIES: I think there's plenty of scope for a cooperative future because the degree of economic linkage between the countries of the world today is much greater than it was in the past. And it's not a matter of a couple of colonial powers fighting over regional

assets. It's a matter of countries that are going to be enduring powers having to find a way to live with

one another, without coming to blows which would do enormous damage to both the stability and the economics of the region.

Re-Arm GoodJapanese Re-Arm would create a more stable regionChellaney 2015Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, a fellow of the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin and other prestigious titles. “Why Japan Should Rearm,” October 20, 2015, https://chellaney.net/2015/10/20/why-japan-should-rearm/

Japan’s political resurgence is one of this century’s most consequential developments in Asia. But it has received relatively little attention,

because observers have preferred to focus on the country’s prolonged economic woes. Those woes are real, but Japan’s ongoing national-security reforms and participation in the new 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership have placed it firmly on the path to reinventing itself as a more secure, competitive, and internationally engaged country. Japan has historically punched above its weight in world affairs. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Japan became Asia’s first modern economic success story. It went on to defeat Manchu-ruled China and Czarist Russia in two separate wars, making it Asia’s first modern global military power. Even after its crushing World War II defeat and occupation by the United States, Japan managed major economic successes, becoming by the 1980s a global industrial powerhouse, the likes of which Asia had never seen. Media tend to depict Japan’s current economic troubles in almost funereal terms. But, while it is true that the economy has stagnated for more than two decades, real per capita income has increased faster than in the US and the United Kingdom so far this century. Moreover, the unemployment rate has long been

among the lowest of the wealthy economies, income inequality is the lowest in Asia, and life expectancy is the longest in the world. In fact, it is Japan’s security, not its economy, that merits the most concern today – and Japan knows it . After decades of contentedly relying on the US for protection, Japan is being shaken out of its complacency by fast-changing security and power dynamics in Asia, especially the rise of an increasingly muscular and revisionist China vying for regional hegemony. Chinese military spending now equals the combined defense expenditure of France, Japan, and the UK; just a decade ago, pacifist Japan outspent China on defense. And China has not hesitated to display its growing might. In the strategically vital South China Sea, the People’s Republic has built artificial islands and military outposts, and it has captured the disputed Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines. In the East China Sea, it has unilaterally declared an air-defense identification zone covering territories that it claims but does not control. With US President Barack Obama hesitating to impose any costs on China for these aggressive moves, Japan’s leaders are taking matters into their own hands. Recognizing the inadequacy of Japan’s existing national-security policies and laws to protect the country in this new context, the government has established a national security council and moved to “normalize” its security posture. By easing Japan’s longstanding, self-imposed ban on arms exports, boosting defense spending, and asserting its right to exercise “collective self-defense,” the government has opened the path for Japan to collaborate more actively with friendly countries and to pursue broader overseas peacekeeping missions. To be sure, Japan’s security-enhancing efforts have so far been limited in scope, and do not open the way for the country to become a militaristic power. Restrictions on deployment of offensive weapons, for example, remain in place. Nonetheless, the government’s moves have proved divisive in a country where pacifism is embedded in the constitution and widely supported by the population. A recent survey by the Pew Research Center found that only 23% of Japanese want their country to play a more active role in Asian security. Another survey last year revealed that only 15.3% of Japanese – the lowest proportion in the world – were willing to defend

their country, compared to 75% of Chinese. But the reality is that ensuring long-term peace in Asia demands a stronger defense posture for Japan. Indeed, reforms that enable Japan to defend itself better, including by building mutually

beneficial regional partnerships, would enhance its capacity to forestall the emergence of a destabilizing power imbalance in East Asia. It is now up to Japan’s government to win over its own citizens, by highlighting the difference between pacifism and passivity. Japan would not encourage or support aggression; it would simply take a more proactive role in securing peace at the regional and global levels. A more confident and secure Japan would certainly serve the interests of the US, which could then depend on its close ally to take more responsibility for both its own security and regional peace. Americans increasingly seem to recognize this, with 47% of respondents in the Pew survey supporting a more active role for Japan in Asian security. But there remain questions about precisely how self-sufficient Japan would have to be to carry out this “proactive pacifism” – a term popularized by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe – consistently and effectively.

Would Japan need to become a truly independent military power, with formidable deterrent capabilities like those of the UK or France? The short answer is yes. While Japan should not abandon its security treaty with the US, it can and should rearm, with an exclusive focus on defense. Of course, unlike the UK and France, Japan does not have the option to possess nuclear weapons. But it can build robust conventional capabilities, including information systems to cope with the risk of cyber warfare. Beyond bolstering Japanese security and regional stability, such an effort would likely boost Japan’s GDP and

yield major profits for American defense firms. As a status quo power, Japan does not need to match Chinese military might. Defense is, after all, easier than offense. Still, the rise of a militarily independent Japan would constitute a game-

changing – and highly beneficial – development for Asia and the rest of the world.

Allies already support a rearmed JapanPilling et al 2012David Pilling, Roel Landingin, and Jonathan Soble, Asia-Pacific writers for the Financial Times, “Phillippines backs rearming of Japan,” December 9, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/250430bc-41ba-11e2-a8c3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz4DaKUVV7q

The Philippines would strongly support a rearmed Japan shorn of its pacifist constitution as a counterweight to the growing military assertiveness of China , according to the Philippine foreign minister. “We would welcome that very much,” Albert del Rosario told the Financial Times in an interview. “We are looking for balancing factors in the region and Japan could be a significant balancing factor .” The unusual

statement, which risks upsetting Beijing, reflects alarm in Manila at what it sees as Chinese provocation over the South China Sea, virtually all of which is claimed by Beijing. It also comes days before an election in Japan that could see the return as prime minister of Shinzo Abe, who is committed to revising Japan’s pacifist constitution and to beefing up its military. A constitutional revision that upgraded Japan’s Self-Defence Forces to a fully fledged military would allow it far more freedom to operate and could change the military balance in Asia. In spite of its official pacifism, Japan’s armed forces do not lack for hardware. Its navy has about 50 large surface ships, compared with China’s 70-odd. Support from other Asian nations for a rearmed Japan could embolden Mr Abe to change the constitution. Beijing has long raised the spectre of a return of Japanese militarism. The attitude towards Japanese rearmament in the Philippines, itself colonised by Japan, suggests regional fears of an assertive China may be beginning to trump memories of Japan’s aggressive wartime actions. This month, the Philippines objected strongly to an announcement that maritime police from China’s Hainan province would intercept ships entering what it considered its territorial waters. Beijing has started issuing passports that include a map of its “nine-dash” claim to almost the entire South China Sea, parts of which are also claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Taiwan and Indonesia. The Philippines has refused to stamp the new passports in protest. “The Philippines has contended all along that the nine-dash claim is an excessive claim that violates international law,” Mr del Rosario said. Southeast Asian countries concerned about what they see as an abrupt change in China’s “peaceful-rise” diplomacy have welcomed the renewed commitment to the region by the US in the form of its “pivot”. Mr del Rosario said Manila had

agreed to more US ship visits and more joint training exercises. The region is also closely watching Beijing’s stand-off with Tokyo over the Japanese-controlled Senkaku islands , known as the Diaoyu in China. Regional countries have struggled to present a united front against China, which prefers to deal with each capital bilaterally. Last June, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations failed to issue a final communiqué after Cambodia refused to endorse language referring to recent naval stand-offs with China. In July, Japan and the Philippines signed a five-year agreement to strengthen military co-operation though exchanges of personnel and technology. Japan is providing 12 new patrol ships for the Philippine coast guard, financed with a combination of soft loans and foreign aid grants.