presented by bob kamb mystic river partners llc lng marine ... · pdf file• engine room...
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Presented by Bob Kamb Mystic River Partners LLC LNG Marine Operations Consultants
DISCLAIMER Although Mystic River Partners LLC and its Principals, employees and representatives make every effort to ensure the accuracy of the information presented herein, no warranty, express or implied, including with respect to the correctness or completeness of the material, data, information and conclusions within this presentation is made. Mystic River Partners LLC will not be liable for reliance or usage by any third party of any information contained in this presentation.
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• HAZID risk assessment – concepts and considerations • Engine room safety options • Overcoming safety hazards when handling LNG • Crew training requirements • LNG location - safety requirements • Emergency response • Commercial implications of meeting the recommendations
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LNG Fueling: HAZID Risk Assessment USCG policy as stated in CG 521 “does not provide
guidance on operational aspects” of natural gas as a marine fuel
Operators are referred to USCG Office of Operating and Environmental Standards, CG-522
Operators can be expected to produce a formal risk assessment / HAZID for USCG review and approval
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Vessel and Facility Operating Standards Division (CG-OES-2) U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters (Room 1210) 2100 Second Street, SW Washington, DC 20593 202-372-1401
LNG Fueling: HAZID Risk Assessment 1.Operational Picture- Using Standard RA Approach: Develop operating scenarios Ports, routes, operating profile, cargo operations
Shipyard, drydocking, repairs, transit/repositioning
Contingency / Emergency / Incident Response
2. Identifying actual risks What can happen?
Grounding, Collision, Fire, Flooding, Fuel Release…
Occurrence of any one leading to failure “cascade”
Routine Hazards-Distinguish between increased likelihood of occurrence related to LNG vs normal shipping activities
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LNG Fueling: HAZID Risk Assessment
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Typical Risk Level Matrix • Probability vs Hazard Severity or
Likelihood vs Consequence • Express risk as the product of
probability of occurrence and its severity
• Based on experience of marine operations and vessel type and expected service
• Intersection of Probability and Severity indicates risk level
• This type of analysis will form the
basis of LNG Fueled Vessel Risk Assessment for consideration by USCG
Table 3. Risk Level Matrix PROBABILITY 1 Very Unlikely: Could only occur under a freak combination of factors. Acceptable Criteria (AC) [less frequent than 10-5 (0.00001 )] 2 Unlikely: May occur only in exceptional circumstances AC (10- 5 to 10-4) 3 Possible: Could occur at some time. AC (10-4 to10-2) 4 Likely: Would not require extraordinary factors to occur at some time. AC (10-2 to 10-1) 5 Frequent: Almost certain to happen if conditions remain unchanged
LNG Fueling: HAZID Risk Assessment
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HAZARD SEVERITY 1 Minor Minor Injury / Minimal pollution effect / No loss time / No internal disruption / No downtime 2 Moderate: Injury which requires medical attention / 1-3 day loss time / Minor pollution effect / Minor internal disruption / 1 Day downtime 3 Significant Potentially life threatening Injury causing temporary disability (e.g. fractures) and/or requiring medivac / Potential long term absence / Pollution with some onsite/offsite impact / Disruption possibly requiring outside help to manage / Downtime between 1 and 7 days 4 Serious: Major life threatening injury or causing permanent disability (e.g loss of limb) / Incomplete recovery / Pollution with significant impact / Very serious business disruption / Up to 4 weeks downtime 5 Catastrophic: Fatality or multiple fatalities, or multiple life threatening injuries causing permanent disabilities / Massive pollution with significant recovery work / catastrophic business impact and national/global media interest / Over 1 month downtime
LNG Fueling: HAZID Risk Assessment
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Table 3. Risk Level Matrix
1 VeryUnlikelyCould only occur under a freak combination of factors. AC(less
2 UnlikelyMay occur only in exceptional circumstances AC(10- 5 to 10-4)
3PossibleCould occur at some time.AC(10-4 to10-2)
4 LikelyWould no require extraordinary factorsto occur atsome time. AC(10-2 to 10-1)
5 FrequentAlmost certain to happen if conditions remain unchanged. AC(10-1 to 1)
1
MinorMinor Injury / Minimal pollution effect / No loss time/ No internal disruption / No
1 2 3 4 5
2
ModerateInjury w hich requires medical attention / 1-3 day loss time / Minor pollution effect / Minor internal disruption / 1 Day
2 4 6 8 10
3
SignificantPotentially life threatening Injury causing temporary disability (e.g. fractures) and/or requiring medivac / Potential long term absence / Pollution w ith some onsite/offsite impact / Disruption possibly requiring
/
3 6 9 12 15
4
SeriousMajor life threatening injury or causing permanent disability (e.g loss of limb) / Incomplete recovery / Pollution w ith signif icant impact / Very serious business disruption /
4 8 12 16 20
5
CatastrophicFatality or multiple fatalities, or multiple life threatening injuries causing permanent disabilities / Massive pollution w ith signif icant recovery w ork / catastrophic business impact and
5 10 15 20 25
PROBABILITY
HAZA
RD SE
VERI
TY
Courtesy of Micoperi Marine Contractors
LNG Fueling: HAZID Risk Assessment
High risk area: there is the need to identify and schedule protection and prevention measures to be adopted in order to reduce the probability of the potential hazard (the shall be considered as urgent).
16 ≤ R ≤ 25
Medium risk area: there is the need to identify and schedule protection and prevention measures to be adopted in order to reduce or the probability P or the potential damage S.
9 ≤ R ≤ 15
3 ≤ R ≤ 8 Moderate risk area: there is the need to verify that the potential hazards are under control and improve the measures already adopted.
1 ≤ R ≤ 2 Low risk area: the potential hazards are under control
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Priority of Actions: Risk Scores are the starting point for defining priorities and scheduling protection and prevention measures to be adopted Color coding provide a good visual indicator or your priority mitigations
LNG Fueling: HAZID Risk Assessment
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Table 1. Risk Reduction
RISK REDUCTION OR CONTROL MEASURES HIERARCHY 1 Eliminate the risk by removing the hazard – “design out” the problem at the source
2 Reduce the risk by substitution of a less hazardous process, activity or substance
3 Isolate (protect everyone) by effective controls such as enclosing the hazard, removing the person from the hazard or reducing the person’s exposure time to the hazard
4 Install protective devices such as guards, emergency stops and trip switches etc
5 Enforce Permit-to-Work, special rules and procedures to closely control the hazard(s)
6 Provide proper supervision, supported by training, instruction and relevant information
7 Provide Personal Protective Equipment only as a “last resort” and in support of the above control measures
Courtesy of Micoperi Marine Contractors
LNG Fueling: HAZID Risk Assessment
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Courtesy IPIECA, the global oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues
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LNG Fueling: HAZID Risk Assessment
ITEM HAZARD CAUSE POTENTIAL EFFECTS
SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS
Grounding Release of Gas or Liquid
Damage to Fuel Tank or System
Vessel Damage/steel fracture
Fire – Own Vessel
Fire – Other vessel(s)
Gas Cloud
Design and Construction
Navigation Equipment Operational Safeguards
Crew Training/Emergency Procedures
Design ER to Inherently safe standards
Proper Nav Equip/Procedures
Provide emerg response trainingf for crew
Collision Release of Gas
or Liquid
Own ship Sinking
Damage to Fuel Tank(s) / Fuel System
Fire – Own Vessel
Fire – Other vessel(s)
Gas Cloud / Flammable Hazard
Design & Construction
Crew Training
Gas Detection / Fire Supression System
Contingency Planning / Emergency Procedures
Robust design / Construction elements based on projected impact forces
Allision Release
Damage to shore infrastructure
Damage to Fuel Tanks / Fuel System
Striking bridge, pier, lock, tower
Fire / Gas Cloud
Personal Injury ( people on shore)
Port / shore disruption
Design & Constr
Nav Equipment
Crew Training
Insurance
Placement of fuel tanks, protection against release, training in navigation, emerg response
use of tugs, traffic control Fire High pressure
gas release
Tank failure
Relief valve discharge
Tank Failure 12
• Typical Risk Elements that form the framework of HAZID • The key is to identify the actual risks based on realistic scenarios • Recognize that normal shipping hazards / risks do not increase likelihood of
occurrence due to the addition of LNG
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HAZID Risk Assessment: Identification and Evaluation of Activities- Risk Exposures
LNG Fueling: HAZID Risk Assessment 3. Developing Mitigations
Vessel Design & Construction Build to current standards, reviewed and approved by USCG
and/or Class “Inherently Safe” concept most practical from acceptance
standpoint Safety Systems and Equipment
Explosion proof Disconnects from electrical power on ESD
Gas Detection Capable of stopping gas to ER, Fail Safe High, High-High and ESD capable
Training and Certification for personnel LNG / Cryogenic Fundamentals Operation Specific Equipment Specific
Local, State and Federal Regulation
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LNG Fueling: HAZID Risk Assessment 3. Developing Mitigations (Continued)
Operating Procedures Checklists, Operation Manuals, Equipment Manuals Port / Terminal Regulations, Industry Guidelines: NFPA59, OCIMF / SIGTTO, Class
Emergency Procedures and Contingency Plans Availability and capability of resources: local emergency responders Existing emergency and incident response plans Interoperability
Operations Area / Vessel Routes Ports, inland waterways, near coastal, offshore, international voyage Port Regulations- Specified docks, anchorages, operation hours Port Procedures- COTP inspection, regulated / approved service providers
Fuel Suppliers / Service Providers Storage, Transport, Delivery subject to equivalent design and equipment standards Training and certification of supplier personnel Local, State and Federal Regulation
Insurance / Protection & Indemnity Financial Responsibility Acceptable risk transfer Conditions of Acceptable Use
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LNG Fueling: HAZID Risk Assessment
Enhanced operational security measures, to include: Positive control of other vessel movements during LNG
vessel transits and operations; Review of LNG vessel escort protocols and operations to
improve the ability to enforce exclusion zones through enhanced standoff and active interdiction approaches;
Review port operational contingency plans to ensure procedures are in place to address larger spills, to include options for moving the vessel to a safe anchorage to monitor, inspect, and assess damage, and for longer-term response options, including vessel lightering;
Review of emergency response coordination and procedures for the LNG vessel, terminal or port, port authority, and emergency response groups to reduce the overall impacts and consequences of larger spills; and
Review LNG vessel design, equipment, and operational protocols for improved fire protection to the LNG vessel, terminals, and vessel personnel from a large LNG fire.
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Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Safety Research | Page 24 Risk management options should be focused on approaches that can be used to actively prevent or mitigate larger spills. Some risk management approaches that can be considered to help reduce the possibility of an event occurring, or reduce the hazards to the vessel and the public should an event occur include:
HAZID Risk Assessment: Applicable Regulations to be considered in Risk Assessment Process
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HAZID Risk Assessment: Applicable Regulations to be considered in Risk Assessment Process
LNG fueling could be subject to the following regulations, documents , guidelines and current LNG transportation best practice: 1. IMO International Gas Carrier Code (IGC) 2. IMO Interim Guidelines on Safety for Natural gas-fuelled Engine Installations in Ships MSC 285/86 3. USCG Policy Letter CG-521 No. 01-12 19 April 2012 Equivalency Determination-Design Criteria for
Natural Gas Fuel Systems 4. Draft International Gas Fueled Vessel Code (IGF, Adoption 2014 ? Implementation 18 months later) 5. ISO TC67 Working Group 10 Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) installations and equipment
1. (Draft ISO/AWI TR 18683- Guidelines for systems and installations for supply of LNG as fuel to ships) 6. 33CFR127 WATERFRONT FACILITIES HANDLING LNG/LHG 7. NFPA 59A STANDARD FOR THE PRODUCTION, STORAGE AND HANDLING OF LNG 8. 46CFR154 SAFETY STANDARDS FOR SELF-PROPELLED VESSELS CARRYING BULK LIQUEFIED GASES 9. ABS Rules for Gas Fueled Ships 10. DNV Rules Part 6 Chapter 13 Gas Fueled Engine Installations 11. US DOT Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 12. 49 CFR 172 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TABLE, SPECIAL PROVISIONS, HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
COMMUNICATIONS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION, TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, AND SECURITY PLANS
13. Local /COTP / Terminal / Port Regulations 14. Local Roadway HazMat / Fire Dept Regulations 15. Plus: OCIMF / SIGTTO / ISGOTT / PIANC
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Engine Room Safety Options Basic Configuration Options: Inherently Gas Safe- gas safe under all conditions, uses
double wall piping or ducting for gas supply within machinery spaces
ESD Protected Machinery Space- non-hazardous under normal conditions but may have potential to become gas hazardous Rules apply to internal combustion engines Safety assessment must be completed for “new designs and
concepts”
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Engine Room Safety Options Per CG-521 Policy Letter 01-12: IMO Interim Guidelines require demonstration of “Equivalent Level of Safety” as traditional systems subject to inspection for certification- Applies to New-Builds and Conversions of “Gas Safe”
configuration ESD Protected Machinery spaces are considered on a case
by case basis (CG-521)
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© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 24
11 October 2007
Engine Room Safety Options Inherently gas safe engine room Double piping into engine (similar to IGC code) Withstand pressure build up from gas pipe rupture Double pipe / duct pressurised and filled with inert gas or ventilated to
atmosphere fitted with gas detectors
Room is ordinary space without special requirements Concept for high pressure piping (>10 bar).
Gas pipe
Double pipe
Engine Room
Engine
Engine Room Safety Options Basic Configuration Options: ESD Protected ESD Protected Machinery Space- non-hazardous under
normal conditions but may have potential to become gas hazardous In the event of abnormal conditions involving gas hazards,
emergency shutdown (ESD) of non-safe equipment (ignition sources) and machinery shall be automatically executed
equipment or machinery in use or active during these conditions shall be of explosion protected design.
Engines for generating propulsion power and electric power shall be located in two or more engine rooms not having any common boundaries unless it can be documented that the common boundary can withstand an explosion in one of the rooms.
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© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved Slide 26 11 October 2007
Gas engine room, ESD protected potential gas danger
Gas engine room, ESD protected
ESD protected machinery space
• Ventilation: 30 air changes / hr
• 3 Gas Detectors / space:
• 1 @ 20%LEL
• 2 for ESD and elec. disconnect
• Automatic shut down of gas supply and disconnection of electrical equipment
• Excess gas flow shut down
• Single wall gas piping for low pressure service (< 10 Bar)
Single wall
Engine Room Safety Options
Engine Room Safety Options Arrangement and Installation Criteria (MSC 285/86)(21 Criteria, pg 4-5) 1. Minimize Hazardous Areas 2. Minimize equipment installed in hazardous areas 3. Prevent gas accumulations in hazardous areas (“under normal and foreseeable failure conditions” 4. Propulsion and power generation can operate if gas fuel system fails 5. Ventilation for personnel protection from asphyxiation 6. Minimize ignition sources in hazardous spaces by design/arrangement/selection 7. Fuel storage and transfer without “leakage or overpressure” 10. Arranged so that fire/explosion does not render other machinery inoperable 11. Control engineering consistent with oil fueled machinery 13. Gas detection system for monitoring , alarm and shutdown functions 14. Protection against explosion effects 16. Provide fire detection, protection and extinguishment measures 17. Provide “level of confidence “ equivalent to oil fueled 18. Ensure commissioning , trials, maintenance achieve reliability, safety and availability goals 19. Procedures detailing safe routine and unscheduled inspection and maintenance 20. Operational safety through crew training and certification
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Engine Room Safety Options
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§ 27.211 What are the specifications for fuel systems on towing vessels whose construction was contracted for on or after January 18, 2000?
(c) Fuel restrictions. Neither you nor the master or person in charge may use fuel other than bunker C or diesel, except for outboard engines, or where otherwise accepted by the Commandant (CG–ENG).
Uninspected Vessels: CG-521 Policy Letter 01-12, Section 5.b cites 46 CFR 27.211 as existing regulation that requires Commandant acceptance of Natural Gas Fuel
(Photo courtesy Ship Architects, Inc.)
Engine Room Safety Options Basic Requirements: “Equivalent Level of Safety” as
conventional systems Minimize equipment in hazardous areas to reduce risk to
personnel Equipment for hazardous areas to be certified safe Propulsion and power gen equip capable of sustained
operation without gas fuel LNG Fuel tanks and machinery arranged so that
fire/explosion does not affect adjacent machinery & equipment
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Flammability of Methane, Oxygen and Nitrogen Mixtures
The graphic shows a flammability Triangle associated with Methane. The flammable range for Methane in air is approximately 5% to 15%.
Overcoming safety hazards when handling LNG
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Overcoming safety hazards when handling LNG
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• Understanding what you have in your piping and tanks at every phase of the operation is critical to safe handling of LNG
• Training your crew to thoroughly understand the properties and characteristics of LNG is essential
• A robust program of gas meter training, maintenance, calibration and certification • Understanding how to control the
flammability of the mixture within your system is crucial to safe operation
• Insuring that Oxygen and gas never mix within the flammable range is the simplest way to insure maximum safety
Overcoming safety hazards when handling LNG • Transfer should replicate conventional practice with due
consideration for special handling required for LNG • None of the “routine hazard” elements are different from
conventional fuel transfers– no additional risk is created by LNG transfer
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Driver or designated bunker facility operator and Vessel Person in Charge (PIC) for fuel transfer conduct pre-transfer conference and complete Bunker Operations Safety Checklist
Overcoming safety hazards when handling LNG What’s wrong with this picture?
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Overcoming safety hazards when handling LNG http://blogs.dnv.com/lng/2012/06/a-step-by-step-description-of-lng-bunkering/
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Crew Training Requirements
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Per USCG CG 521 Policy Letter 19 April 2012: The word “training” is mentioned twice… Operational requirements of IMO Interim Guidelines are “outside
the scope” of USCG equivalency determination Specifically does not address crew proficiency standards (Sect
5.d) But: Additional or alternative operational and training provisions
may be required by the Coast Guard’s Office of Operating and Environmental Standards (CG-522), or the cognizant Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection
According to USCG OES, as of Feb 2013, specific policy is being developed for submittal to Federal Register for industry input, but—
Expect USCG to follow the principles, concepts and guidelines set forth in international regulation i.e IMO Interim Guidelines, IGC / IGF/STCW A-V/1-2, Reg V-1-2
Crew training requirements Per IMO MSC 285 (86) Interim Guidelines: Preamble, Part 3: Operational safety through crew training and certification Chapter 8
The whole operational crew should have training in gas-related safety, operation and maintenance prior to the commencement of work on board
Crew members with direct responsibility for operation of gas related equipment should receive special training- The company should document that personnel have acquired
and maintain the necessary knowledge Gas related emergency exercise conducted at regular intervals A Training Manual should be developed
Training program and exercises specially designed for each individual vessel and its gas installation
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Crew Training Requirements
Crew training requirements Per IMO MSC 285 (86) Interim Guidelines: Training Categories A, B & C: Category A: Basic training for basic safety crew
Basic understanding of natural gas fuel (LNG 101) Technical Properties: Explosion Limits, Ignition Sources Risk reduction: Safe handling rules and procedures Emergency Procedures
Requirements: Assumes 0 knowledge of gas, gas engines and systems Instructors should include equipment and system providers, or- Specialist with in-depth knowledge of gas operations and installed
systems Training Methodology
Theoretical and Practical Exercises on gas and relevant systems PPE to be used while handling liquid / compressed gas LNG / gas firefighting at an approved safety center
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Crew Training Requirements
Crew training requirements Per IMO MSC 285 (86) Interim Guidelines: Training Categories B & C:
Categories B (Deck ) & C (Engine) : Divided technically between deck and
engineer officers Training manager (HSSE Guy) and Master
to determine division
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Crew Training Requirements
Requirements “Ordinary” Crew members participating in bunkering, gas purging and working on
engines or systems should have all or part of B & C training Company and Master responsible for arranging training based on evaluation of crew
member’s job instruction/area of responsibility Master / Chief Engineer should give final clearance to basic safety crew prior to
entry into service aboard Same instructors as outlined for Cat A
Crew Training Requirements Training of crew and personnel will be addressed by USCG in
design phase (Vessel and Facility Operating Standards Division (CG-OES-2))
Companies have to have a plan for training crew Qualified trainers An approved Manual for each vessel Provide for training of new / promoted / transferred
personnel Provide for recurrent training
Current standards of training are not practical for LNG fueled vessels (STCW Tankerman PIC LG, requires 3 month service on LNG tankers) – but may be needed for LNG Bunker Barge
Engine, Equipment, System and Fuel Providers will need to offer training based on their respective installations
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LNG Location – Safety Requirements
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Aboard Vessels: As Specified by IMO, ABS, DNV, USCG 521: Generally, Risk Analysis / Safety Concept to be submitted / approved for gas fueled designs, new build or retrofit IMO Interim Guidelines, Sect 2.8 • Design in accordance with IGC • On open deck, b/5 from side, not less than 760mm (except pax
vessels) • In enclosed space, as close as possible to c/l, B/5, B/15, not less
than 760mm • Tank space to act as secondary barrier, same design temp as tank,
also referred to as “tank room”
LNG Location – Safety Requirements
DNV Rules H 402 Tanks on open deck to be located at least B/5 from the side, but (x-pax ships):
Capacity less than 1000m3, d=800mm 1000m3 – 5000m3, d= .75 + Vol x .20/4000 5000m3 – 30,000m3, d = 0.8 + Vol/25,000 Greater than 30.000m3, d=2m
DNV Rules H 502
Tanks in enclosed spaces: Maximum acceptable pressure (liquid) 10 Bar Minimum lesser of B/5 and 11.5m from ship side Mimimum lesser of B/15 and 2m from bottom shell plating Smaller permitted distances based on tank capacity: Volume less than 1000m3, d= 800mm Volume 1000m3 to 5000m3, d= 0.75 + Volume x .20/4000 Volume 5,000m3 to 30,000m3, d= 0.8 + Volume/25,000 Volume greater than 30,000m3, d = 2m
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LNG Location – Safety Requirements ABS, Gas Fueled Ships Section 2 LNG Storage Tank Location • Above deck storage acceptable; A-60 insulation from accommodation • Enclosed space storage only less than 10 Bar • At least b/5 from the ship’s side, as close as possible to c/l, not less than
800mm (except passenger vessels) • At least B/15, not less than 2m from bottom plating • Not to be located adjacent to Cat A machinery spaces, separated by
900mm cofferdam • Exceptions and alternatives accepted if certain criteria met USCG • Not to be located below accommodation, service or control spaces • Tank room boundaries arranged to prevent entry of gas to
accommodation, service, or control spaces • Tank design in accordance with detailed specification in 46 CFR 154.401 to
.471
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LNG Location – Safety Requirements On Land / Waterfront Facilities Per NFPA 59A & 33 CFR 127 PART 127—WATERFRONT FACILITIES HANDLING LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS AND LIQUEFIED HAZARDOUS GAS
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Section 5 Plant Siting and Layout: Written site evaluation to “authority having jurisdiction”
Potential incidents and mitigations, Adjacent activities, Severe weather (100 year period), Natural Hazards, Security
Impoundment and drainage Radiant heat flux limits to property lines, occupancies Design spill criteria Spacing of storage tanks and process equipment Pier or dock for pipeline transfer 100 ft from any bridge, Loading connection 50 ft from uncontrolled ignition
source, process equipment , storage tanks, occupied structures
Emergency Response
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IMO Interim Guidelines 8.1.3 : • Gas related emergency exercises
at regular intervals • Safety and response systems for
defined hazards and accidents reviewed and tested
• Identified and developed during initial risk assessment phase
• Training required in rules and procedures for emergency situations (8.2.1.1.1)
Emergency Response Specific requirements: Fire Protection, Safety & Security NFPA 59A Chapter 12: (For Facilities)
Fire protection by evaluation of local conditions, hazards and exposure to / from other property to determine: Type, quantity and location of fire detection and control equipment Requirements for fire protection water systems, fire extinguishers
and other control equipment Equipment and processes within the ESD system and process
subsystems; requirements for depressurizing vessels / equipment in case of fire
Response availability of personnel within the plant and external emergency responders
Any protective equipment, specialized training and qualification needed
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Emergency Response
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Basic Considerations: Emergency Response Assessment • Proper identification and assessment during Risk
Assessment phase determines the nature and extent of emergency response
• Participation and early input from local emergency services and public safety officials needed
• Identify available resources, provide gap analysis, implement and document mitigations
Emergency Response
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Basic Considerations: • Robust drill program with method of accountability, follow up
and management of change • Periodic review based on lessons learned and changes to risk
assessment / operating environment • Specific Training of personnel on LNG emergency response,
safety equipment & systems • Incorporation / interoperability of other stakeholders’ incident
response plans
Incident Response
Your Ship
Port
Fuel Supplier/ Terminal
Local Emergency Responders
Commercial Implications- Meeting the Recommendations
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• Design and develop Safety Assessments, HazId, HazOp as initial stage of design / construction process
• Design in mitigations and optimize safety measures as early in the project as possible
• USCG participation in Risk Assessment essential to lay basic foundation for moving the project forward
• Bring in stakeholders from the beginning, including port, emergency response / public safety officials, shipyard project team, fuel supplier, equipment provider, infrastructure operators, terminal
Commercial Implications- Meeting the Recommendations
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• Expect to have many meetings and be prepared to repeat yourself • LNG adds another dimension in care and handling, but does not affect the
routine hazards and acceptable risks associated with conventionally fueled vessels
• There will be a premium in time and money for LNG fueled vessels that must be weighed against economic benefit
• It is not unreasonable to ask stakeholders to share costs, particularly suppliers who have a vested interest in the rapid acceptance and development of LNG fuel infrastructure
100 years to revolutionize propulsion…1812, sail to steam…
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200 years ago, in 1812, the Scottish passenger vessel "The Comet" sailed as the first steamship in open sea.
Coal fired steam to diesel, 1912…
Exactly 100 years later, M/S Selandia initiated the diesel era with her maiden voyage to Bangkok.
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It’s 2013-Diesel to LNG?
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LNG
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• Understand the risk, know and implement the mitigations • Know the safety, training and design standards before you
start – or at least get everyone to agree on them • One accident, however slight, can set back the whole
business