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Probation Violations New Misdemeanor Defender Training

Jamie Markham September 2012

• 100,000 probationers

• About 35% get revoked

• Over half of new prison admissions come from probation violations

“Probation is an act of grace . . .”

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Notice • DCC-10

(Violation Report)

• 24 hours minimum (unless waived)

• Controls scope of the hearing

Arrest and Bail

• Probationers generally entitled to bail

• Exceptions for “dangerous” probationers:

–With felony charges pending

–Ever convicted of a sex crime

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Preliminary Hearings • Required under G.S. 15A-1345(c)

– Within 7 working days of arrest

– Only required if probationer is detained

• If not held within 7 working days, probationer must be released pending final violation hearing

Final Violation Hearings • Proper venue:

– Where probation imposed

– Where violation occurred

– Where probationer resides

• The court may return a case to the district of origin or residence

• Sentencing judge may limit jurisdiction (unsupervised only)

Final Violation Hearings

• Class H & I felonies in district court – By default, violation hearing in superior court

– May be held in district court with consent of the State and the defendant

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Hearing Procedure • Not a formal trial

• Probationer may confront, cross-examine

• Rules of evidence don’t apply

– Hearsay admissible

– Exclusionary rule inapplicable

• Proof to judge’s “reasonable satisfaction”

Hearing Procedure

• Violations must be “willful or without lawful excuse” – State shows violation

– Burden shifts to defendant to show “good faith inability to comply”

Hearing outcomes

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Hearing Outcomes • Termination

• Transfer to unsupervised

• Continuation (reinstate probation)

• Modification

• Extension

• Contempt

• Special probation (split)

• Confinement in Response to Violation (CRV, or “dunk”)

• Revocation

Termination • Court may terminate probation at any time

• “Terminate unsuccessfully”

Transfer to Unsupervised • Upon payment of moneys

Modification • At any time, for good cause shown

– No violation need have occurred

• Form AOC-CR-609

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Extending Probation • Two types: ordinary and special purpose

• How long can someone be on probation?

Ordinary Extensions • At any time prior to expiration, for good cause

shown, the court may extend probation to the 5-year maximum

– No violation required

– May happen multiple times

– No limitation to last 6 months

Special Purpose Extensions • Extension by up to 3 years beyond the original

period if:

– Probationer consents

– During last 6 months of original period, and

– Extension is for restitution or medical or psychiatric treatment

• Only this type of extension may go beyond the 5-year maximum

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Contempt • Chapter 5A procedures apply

– Proof beyond a reasonable doubt

• Up to 30 days in jail

• Note: Counts for credit (State v. Belcher)

Special Probation • A “split sentence”

• May be added in response to violation

• Continuous or noncontinuous (weekends)

• Max jail time: ¼ of imposed maximum

– Note: For DWI, it’s ¼ of statutory maximum

Revocation • Activate a suspended sentence

• Upon revocation, judge may:

– Reduce sentence within the same grid cell

– Change the sentencing judge’s decision on consecutive/concurrent sentences

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Limit on Court’s Authority to Revoke • Court may only revoke probation for:

– New criminal offense

– Absconding (under new statutory condition)

– Offenders who have already received two prior “CRV” confinement periods

Confinement in Response to Violation (CRV)

• Permissible in response to violations other than “commit no criminal offense” and “absconding”

–Misdemeanor CRV: “Up to” 90 days

–Felony CRV: 90 days

• After two CRV periods, the court may revoke for any violation

“Elect to Serve”/Invoke • No longer an option by statute

• Probationer can admit to a violation

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Credit upon Revocation • Pre-trial confinement

• Pre-hearing confinement

• Active portions of prior split sentences

– But NOT electronic house arrest

• DART—Cherry

– But NOT private treatment

• Contempt (Belcher)

• Prior CRV periods

Appeals • Statutory right to appeal revocation or

imposition of a split sentence to superior court

– No clear authority to appeal CRV

• Class H/I felony revocations in district court are appealed to superior court

Defenses

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General Framework for Defending Violations

Jurisdiction

• The court may act…“[a]t any time prior to the expiration or termination of the probation period”

• Court may act after expiration if violation report filed before probation ends (G.S. 15A-1344(f))

Jurisdiction • Was a violation report filed (and file stamped)

before the probation period expired?

– Consider the possible effect of “tolling” if probationer had pending charges (p. 3-4)

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Jurisdiction • Was the initial period of probation lawful to

begin with?

Improper Probation Period

• Misdemeanor–Community 6-18 months

• Misdemeanor–Intermediate 12-24 months

• Felony–Community 12-30 months

• Felony–Intermediate 18-36 months

Jurisdiction • Has there ever been an unlawful extension of

the defendant’s probation?

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Improper Extension • 1 Feb 2001: 36-month probation begins

• 1 Feb 2004: probation set to expire

• 26 Feb 2004: defendant consents to 24-month extension (to Feb 2006)

• 9 January 2006: defendant consents to another 24-month extension (to Feb 2008)

• Probation revoked on 30 April 2007

State v. Satanek (2008)

No jurisdiction to extend

Goes beyond 5 years; not a “special purpose”

extension

No jurisdiction to revoke

Proper Condition? • Did the defendant receive written

notice of the condition?

• Was the condition valid? – Regular conditions are valid

– Statutory special conditions valid

– Ad hoc conditions must be reasonable

Willfulness • “Good faith inability to pay”

• Be prepared to show defendant’s living expenses, employment, etc.

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Consider alternatives • Extend probation

• House arrest

• “Quick dip” or weekend split

• Substance abuse treatment

If revocation, mitigate • Reduce sentence

• Run sentences concurrently

• Make sure all jail credit applied

Questions?

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ProbationViolations2012NewMisdemeanorDefenderTrainingJamieMarkhamSeptember2012ThispapersetsoutthelawandproceduresapplicabletoprobationviolationhearingsinNorthCarolina.Unlessotherwiseindicatedthediscussionappliestosupervisedandunsupervisedprobationersalike.

PreliminaryIssues

Notice.Insupervisedprobationcases,theviolationprocesstypicallybeginswhenaprobationofficerfilesaviolationreport(formDCC‐10)withtheclerk.UnderG.S.15A‐1345(e),whenaprobationerisallegedtohaveviolatedprobation,theStatemustgivetheprobationer“noticeofthehearinganditspurpose,includingastatementoftheviolationsalleged...atleast24hoursbeforethehearing,”unlesssuchnoticeiswaivedbytheprobationer.TheDCC‐10constitutesnoticeoftheallegedviolations,andprobationshouldonlyberevokedbasedonviolationsallegedinthenoticeprovidedtothedefendant.Statev.Cunningham,63N.C.App.470(1983).Aviolationreportneednotindicatepreciselywhichconditiontheprobationerhasviolated;rather,itneedonlyallegefactsthatamounttoaviolation.Statev.Hubbard,198N.C.App.154(2009).

Incasesinvolvingunsupervisedprobation,violationsaregenerallyreportedbytheclerk’sofficeorbycommunityservicestaff.NoticeofahearinginresponsetoaviolationofunsupervisedprobationmustbegivenbyeitherpersonaldeliverytotheprobationerorbyU.S.Mailaddressedtothelastknownaddressavailabletothepreparerofthenoticeandreasonablybelievedtoprovideactualnotice.Ifmailed,thenoticemustbesentatleast10dayspriortoanyhearingandmuststatethenatureoftheviolation.G.S.15A‐1344(b1).FormAOC‐CR‐220maybeusedtoprovidenoticeofahearingonviolationofunsupervisedprobation.

CommunityservicestaffmustreportsignificantviolationsofcasesundertheirpurvieweitherinpersonorbymailasprovidedinG.S.143B‐708(e).Inthosecases,thecourtmustconductahearingevenifthepersonorderedtoperformcommunityservicefailstoappear.Ifthecourtdeterminesthattherewasawillfulfailuretocomplyitmustrevoketheperson’sdriverslicenseuntilthecommunityservicerequirementismet.Onlywhenthepersonispresent,however,maythecourttakeotheractionsgenerallyauthorizedinresponsetoviolationsofprobation.Id.

Arrest.Aprobationerissubjecttoarrestforviolationofaconditionofprobationbyalawenforcementofficerorbyaprobationofficer,uponeitheranorderforarrestissuedbyajudicialofficialoruponthewrittenrequestofaprobationofficer,accompaniedbyaviolationreport.G.S.15A‐1345(a).Aprobationofficermayarrestaprobationerwithoutawrittenorderormotionwhenheorshehasprobablecausetobelievethataviolationhasoccurred.Statev.Waller,37N.C.App.133(1978).

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Bailforallegedprobationviolators.AprobationerarrestedforanallegedviolationofprobationmustbetakenwithoutunnecessarydelaybeforeajudicialofficialtohaveconditionsofreleasesetinthesamemannerasprovidedinG.S.15A‐534forcriminalcharges.G.S.15A‐1345(b).Someprobationersaresubjecttorulesthatpotentiallydelaythesettingofreleaseconditions.Ifaprobationereitherhaspendingchargesforafelonyoffenseorhaseverbeenconvictedofanoffensethatwouldbeareportablesexcrimeifcommittedtoday,thejudicialofficialsettingreleaseconditionsmust,beforeimposingconditionsofrelease,determine(andrecordinwriting)whethertheprobationerposesadangertothepublic.Iftheprobationerposesadangertothepublic,heorshemustbedeniedreleasependingarevocationhearing.Iftheprobationerdoesnotposeadanger,releaseconditionsaresetasusual.Ifthejudicialofficialhasinsufficientinformationtodeterminewhethertheprobationerposesadanger,theprobationermaybeheldforuptosevendaysfromthedateofarrestforajudicialofficial,orasubsequentreviewingjudicialofficial,toobtainsufficientinformationtodeterminewhethertheprobationerposesathreattothepublic.G.S.15A‐1345(b1).TherequisitefindingscanberecordedonsidetwoofformAOC‐CR‐272.Failurestoappear.WhenaprobationerfailstoappearforaprobationviolationhearingthecourtmayissueanorderforarrestunderG.S.15A‐305(4).Ahearingextendingormodifyingprobationmaybeheldintheabsenceofaprobationerwhofailstoappearafterareasonableefforttonotifyhimorher.G.S.15A‐1344(d).Probationshouldnot,however,berevokedinthedefendant’sabsence—particularlyifthesuspendedsentenceismodifiedinanywayuponrevocation,asthiswouldviolatethedefendant’srighttobepresentwhenthesentenceisimposed.Statev.Hanner,188N.C.App.137(2008).

Ifanunsupervisedprobationerdoesnotappearinresponsetoamailednotice,thecourtmayeither(a)terminatetheprobationandenterappropriateordersfortheenforcementofanyoutstandingmonetaryobligationsasotherwiseprovidedbylaw,or(b)provideforothernoticetothepersonasauthorizedbyChapter15Aforaviolationofprobation.G.S.15A‐1344(b1).

ViolationHearings

Jurisdiction.Acourt’sjurisdictiontoreviewaprobationer’scompliancewiththetermsofhisorherprobationislimitedbystatute.Thecourtgenerallyhaspowertoact“atanytimepriortotheexpirationorterminationoftheprobationperiod.”G.S.15A‐1344(d).Onceaperiodofprobationexpires,thecourtgenerallylosesjurisdictionoverthedefendant.Statev.Camp,229N.C.524(1980).

AnexceptiontothatruleissetoutinG.S.15A‐1344(f),whichgrantsacourtjurisdictiontohearprobationmattersafteraperiodofprobationhasexpiredifcertainconditionsaremet.Thisextendedjurisdictionbecomesimportantwhenanoffenderviolatesprobationbeforehisorherperiodofprobationhasexpiredbuttheviolationhearingcannotbeheldbeforeexpirationbecause,forexample,theallegedviolationoccurredveryneartheendoftheperiodofprobationortheprobationerabsconded.

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Thecourtmay“extend,modify,orrevokeprobation”aftertheexpirationoftheperiodofprobationif:

(1) TheStatefilesawrittenviolationreportbeforetheexpirationoftheprobation

period;(2) Thecourtfindsthattheprobationerviolatedoneormoreconditionsofprobation

priortotheexpirationoftheperiodofprobation;and(3) Thecourtfindsforgoodcauseshownandstatedthatprobationshouldbe

extended,modified,orrevoked.

Tobeconsideredfiled,aviolationreportshouldbefilestampedbytheclerkbeforetheperiodexpires.Statev.Hicks,148N.C.App.203(2001);Statev.Moore,148N.C.App.568(2002).Intheabsenceofafilestampedmotiondatedbeforetheperiodofprobationexpires(orsomeotherevidenceprovingbeyondareasonabledoubtthataviolationreportwastimelyfiled),thetrialcourtiswithoutjurisdictiontoconductaprobationviolationhearingaftertheendoftheprobationaryperiod.ThosejurisdictionalprovisionsapplywithequalforcetosupervisedandunsupervisedprobationersandtothoseonprobationunderG.S.90‐96.Statev.Burns,171N.C.App.759(2005).Theprovisionslikelyalsoapplyindeferredprosecutioncases,althoughthereisnoappellatecasesayingso.Generally,uponexpirationorearlyterminationofaperiodofprobationimposedaspartofadeferredprosecution,thedefendantisimmunefromprosecutiononthechargesdeferred.G.S.15A‐1342(j).Priortoamendmentstothelawin2008,inordertopreserveitsjurisdictiontoactaftertheperiodofprobationexpired,thecourthadtomakeafindingoftheState’s“reasonableefforttonotifytheprobationerandtoconductthehearingearlier.”Statev.Hall,160N.C.App.593(2003);Statev.Bryant,361N.C.100(2006).Underthe2008amendmentstothelaw,thecourtnolongerhastomakeafindingoftheState’s“reasonableefforts”topreserveitsjurisdictiontoactaftertheperiodofprobation.ThosechangesweremadeeffectiveforviolationhearingsheldonorafterDecember1,2008.S.L.2008‐129.Ifaperiodofprobationexpiresbeforeaprobationviolationreportisfiled,thetrialcourtlackssubjectmatteroverthecase.Statev.Camp,299N.C.524(1980).Similarly,ifanearlierextensionofprobationwasimproper,thecourtlosesauthoritytoactonthecase.Statev.Reinhardt,183N.C.App.291(2007);Statev.Satanek,190N.C.App.653(2008).Tolling.“Tolling”intheprobationcontextmeansthatnotimerunsofftheoffender’speriodofprobationwhileheorshehasacriminalchargepending.In2011,theGeneralAssemblyrepealedthetollinglawforpersonsplacedonprobationonorafterDecember1,2011.S.L.2011‐62.Thereare,however,manyprobationerswhowereplacedonprobationbeforethatdate,andthussubjecttothelawthatexistedbeforehand,describedbelow.

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Thetollingstatute,formerlysetoutinG.S.15A‐1344,providedthat“[i]ftherearependingcriminalchargesagainsttheprobationerinanycourtofcompetentjurisdiction,which,uponconviction,couldresultinrevocationproceedingsagainsttheprobationerforviolationofthetermsofthisprobation,theprobationperiodshallbetolleduntilallpendingcriminalchargesareresolved.”AsinterpretedinStatev.Henderson,179N.C.App.191(2006),andStatev.Patterson,190N.C.App.193(2008),underG.S.15A‐1344,“adefendant’sprobationaryperiodisautomaticallysuspendedwhennewcriminalchargesarebrought.”So,whenaprobationerhasapendingchargeforanyoffenseotherthanaClass3misdemeanor(which,bystatute,couldnotresultinrevocationevenuponconviction),timestopsrunningontheperson’speriodofprobationimmediately,byoperationoflaw,whenthechargeisbrought,anddoesn’tstartrunningagainuntilthechargeisresolved,bywayofacquittal,dismissal,orconviction.

In2009theGeneralAssemblymadeseveralchangestothetollinglaw.S.L.2009‐372.First,thelawwasmovedfromG.S.15A‐1344(d)toG.S.15A‐1344(g).Second,thelawmadeclearthataprobationerremainssubjecttotheconditionsofprobation,includingsupervisionfees,duringthetolledperiod.Third,thelawprovidedthatifaprobationerwhosecasewastolledforanewchargeisacquittedorhasthechargedismissed,heorshewillreceivecreditforthetimespentundersupervisionduringthetolledperiod.Thoseprovisionsapplyto“offensescommitted”onorafterDecember1,2009,whichprobablymeansoffendersonprobationforoffensescommittedonorafterthatdate.

Withthatrecentlegislativehistoryinmind,thereareprobablythreeclassesofprobationerswhenitcomestotolling:(1)thoseplacedonprobationonorafterDecember1,2011,forwhomthetollinglawisrepealed;(2)thoseplacedonprobationbeforeDecember1,2011,withoffensedatesonafterDecember1,2009,whoaresubjecttothetollinglawbutwhoareeligibleforcreditbackagainsttheirprobationperiodifthechargethattolledtheirprobationisdismissedortheyareacquitted;and(3)thoseplacedonprobationbeforeDecember1,2011,foranoffensethatoccurredbeforeDecember1,2009,whoareprobablysubjecttotollingandnotentitledtoanycreditbackagainstthetolledperiodevenifthechargethattolledtheprobationisdismissedoracquitted.1

PreliminaryViolationHearingsUnderG.S.15A‐1345(c),apreliminaryhearingonaprobationviolationmustbeheldwithinsevenworkingdaysofanarrest,unlesstheprobationerwaivesthepreliminaryhearingorafinalviolationhearingisheldfirst.Thepurposeofthepreliminaryhearingistodetermine

                                                            1 Thereissomeargumentthattheeffectivedateofthe2009changestothetollinglawleftnothingofG.S.15A‐1344(d).Asstatedinthemaintext,thetollinglawwasmovedfromG.S.15A‐1344(d)toG.S.15A‐1344(g)in2009byS.L.2009‐372(SB920).G.S.15A‐1344(g)wascreatedinsection11(b)ofthatbill;thetollingportionof1344(d)wasstrickeninsection11(a)ofthebill.Thebill’seffectivedatestatesthatsection11(b)ofthebilliseffectiveforoffensescommittedonorafterDecember1,2009;section11(a)ofthebillwasmadeeffectivefor“hearingsheldonorafterDecember1,2009.”Thus,forahearingheldafterDecember1,2009,section11(a)ofthebillarguablyoperatestoremovetheoriginaltollingprovision,leavingnoneinitsplaceforapersononprobationforanoffensethatoccurredbeforeDecember1,2009. 

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whetherthereisprobablecausetobelievethattheprobationerviolatedaconditionofprobation.Ifthehearingisnotheldtheprobationermustbereleasedsevenworkingdaysafterhisarresttocontinueonprobationpendingahearing(unlesstheprobationerhasbeendeterminedtobeadangertothepublicpursuanttoG.S.15A‐1345(b1),inwhichcaseheorshemustbehelduntilthefinalrevocationhearing).Thereleasedoesnotdismisstheviolation;rather,itjustmeanstheprobationercannotbedetainedanylongerwithoutahearing.

Thepreliminaryhearingshouldbeconductedby“ajudgesittinginthecountywheretheprobationerwasarrestedorwheretheallegedviolationoccurred.”Nostatutorylanguagelimitsauthoritytoconductpreliminaryhearingtoajudge“entitledtositinthecourtwhichimposedprobation”(asisthecaseinG.S.15A‐1344(a),limitingauthoritytoalterorrevokeprobation).Thus,itappearsthatanyjudge—districtorsuperiorcourt—mayconductthepreliminaryhearing,regardlessofwhethertheunderlyingcrimeisamisdemeanororfelony.

Apreliminaryhearingisnotrequiredwhentheprobationerisreleasedonbailpendingthefinalviolationhearing.Statev.O’Connor,31N.C.App.518(1976).Failuretoholdapreliminaryhearingdoesnotdeprivethecourtofjurisdictiontohearafinalviolationhearing.Statev.Seay,59N.C.App.667(1982).TheStatemustgivetheprobationernoticeofthepreliminaryhearinganditspurpose,includingastatementoftheviolationsalleged.Atthehearing,theprobationermayappearandspeakinhisorherownbehalf,maypresentrelevantinformation,andmay,onrequest,personallyquestionadverseinformantsunlessthecourtfindsgoodcausefornotallowingconfrontation.Formalrulesofevidencedonotapply.G.S.15A‐1345(d).Thereisnoclearstatutoryrighttocounselatthepreliminaryhearing,butmanyprobationersprobablyhaveaconstitutionalrighttocounselatthathearing.SeeGagnonv.Scarpelli,411U.S.778,790(1973)(notingthatcounselshouldbeprovidedincaseswheretheprobationerdeniestheallegedviolation,incaseswheretherearesubstantialreasonswhichjustifiedormitigatedtheviolationandthosereasonsarecomplexorotherwisedifficulttodeveloporpresent,andincaseswhereitappearstheprobationermayhavedifficultyspeakingeffectivelyforhimself).Ifprobablecauseisfoundatthepreliminaryhearing(orifthehearingiswaived),theprobationermaybedetainedforafinalviolationhearing.Ifprobablecauseisnotfound,theprobationermustbereleasedtocontinueonprobation.FinalViolationHearings

Propercourtandvenue.Anyjudgeofsamelevel(districtorsuperiorcourt)asthesentencingjudge,locatedinthedistrictwhere(a)theprobationwasimposed,(b)theallegedviolationtookplace,or(c)theprobationercurrentlyresides,hasauthoritytomodify,extend,terminate,orrevokeprobation.G.S.15A‐1344(a).Thereisalimitedexceptiontothisruleforunsupervisedprobationers:underG.S.15A‐1342(h),ajudgewhosentencestheoffendertounsupervisedprobationmaylimitjurisdictiontoalterorrevoketheprobationtohimselforherself.

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Someadditionalrulesapplywhenprobationmattersariseinplacesotherthanthedistrictinwhichtheprobationwasinitiallyimposed.First,acourtmayalwaysonitsownmotionreturnaprobationerforhearingtothedistrictwhereprobationwasimposedorthedistrictwheretheprobationerresides.G.S.15A‐1344(c).Second,thedistrictattorneyoftheprosecutorialdistrictinwhichprobationwasimposedmustbegivenreasonablenoticeofanyhearingtoaffectprobationsubstantially.G.S.15A‐1344(a).Third,ifajudgereduces,terminates,extends,modifies,orrevokesprobationoutsidethecountywherethejudgmentwasentered,theclerkmustsendacopyoftheorderandanyotherrecordstothecourtwhereprobationwasoriginallyimposed.Ifprobationisrevoked,theclerkinthecountyofrevocationissuesthecommitmentorder.G.S.15A‐1344(c).

Deferredprosecutions.WhenapersononprobationpursuanttoadeferredprosecutionagreementunderG.S.15A‐1341(a1)isallegedtohaveviolatedprobation,theviolationmustbereportedtothecourtandtothedistrictattorneyinthedistrictinwhichtheagreementwasentered.G.S.15A‐1342(a1).Thecourt,notthedistrictattorney,determinesthroughordinaryprobationhearingprocedureswhetheraviolationoccurredandwhetherto“orderthatchargesastowhichprosecutionhasbeendeferredbebroughttotrial.”G.S.15A‐1344(d).TheNorthCarolinaAttorneyGeneralhasadvisedthatprobationmattersindeferredprosecutioncasesshouldbemanagedonlybythecourtofthedistrictinwhichtheagreementwasenteredinto,as“[b]ringingthechargestotrialwouldbetheresponsibilityofonlythedistrictattorneywhobroughtthecharges.”AdvisoryLetterfromAssistantAttorneyGeneralElizabethF.ParsonstoDepartmentofCorrectionGeneralCounselLaVeeHamer,Nov.1,2010.UnderG.S.143B‐708(e),hearingsinitiatedbycommunityservicestaffmaybeheldinthecountyinwhichadeferredprosecutionagreementwasimposed,thecountyinwhichtheallegedviolationoccurred,ortheoffender’scountyofresidence.InlightoftheguidancefromtheAttorneyGeneral’soffice,however,thebestpracticeisprobablytoholdthehearingwheretheagreementwasimposed,notwithstandingthestatute’sbroaderlanguage.

G.S.90‐96.G.S.90‐96isaconditionaldischargeprogramthatallowseligibledefendantswhopleadguiltytoorarefoundguiltyofcertaindrugcrimestobeplacedonprobationwithoutentryofjudgment.ForpersonsenteringapleaorfoundguiltyonorafterJanuary1,2012,deferralunderG.S.90‐96(a)ismandatoryforeligible,consentingdefendants.S.L.2011‐192.SubsectionG.S.90‐96(a1)providesforasimilarconditionaldischargeprogramthatisavailabletoabroadergroupofdefendantsinthediscretionofthetrialcourtjudge.Undereithersubsection,ifthedefendantsucceedsonprobationthecourtdischargesthedefendantanddismissestheproceedingwithoutadjudicationofguilt.Ifthedefendantviolatesprobation,thecourtmayenteranadjudicationofguiltandsentencethedefendant.

Ingeneral,violationhearingsforcasesfallingunderG.S.90‐96shouldbetreatedunderthesamerulesapplicabletoordinaryprobationcases.Statev.Burns,171N.C.App.759(2005)(“Intheabsenceofaprovisiontothecontrary,andexceptwherespecificallyexcluded,thegeneralprobationprovisionsfoundinArticle82ofChapter15Aapplytoprobationimposedunder[G.S.]90‐96.”).Thereare,however,somedifferencesbetweenviolationsofG.S.90‐96probationandviolationsofordinaryprobationmatters.First,becausethereisnounderlying

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suspendedsentenceinaG.S.90‐96probationcase,theredoesnotappeartobeanybasisforthecourttoorderspecialprobation(asplitsentence);confinementinresponsetoviolation(CRV,discussedbelow);or“quickdip”confinementinaG.S.90‐96case.Second,thelimitationsonthecourt’srevocationauthoritysetoutinG.S.15A‐1344(a)(discussedbelow),allowingrevocationonlyinresponsetoanewcriminaloffenseorabsconding,donotappeartoapplyinG.S.90‐96cases.Rather,G.S.90‐96(a)providesthatthecourtmayenteranadjudicationofguilt“uponviolationofatermorcondition”—whichpresumablyincludesanytypeofviolation.Third,thereissomesensethatthedistrictofconvictionistheonlypropervenueforaprobationhearingunderG.S.90‐96(andthatviolationhearingsshouldnotbeheldinthedistrictwheretheprobationerresidesorthedistrictwheretheviolationoccurred).Evenifareturntothedistrictoforiginisnottechnicallyrequired,becausethedefendantmustbesentencedifrevoked,themostefficientpracticeisprobablytoholdtheviolationhearinginthedistrictofconviction.

ThecourtmayuseFormAOC‐CR‐622torevokeormodifyG.S.90‐96probation,ortodismissthecasewhenadefendanthassuccessfullyfulfilledthetermsandconditionsoftheprobation.

ClassHandIfeloniespledindistrictcourt.UnderG.S.7A‐272(c),withtheconsentofthepresidingdistrictcourtjudge,theprosecutor,andthedefendant,thedistrictcourthasjurisdictiontoacceptapleaofguiltyornocontesttoaClassHorIfelony.Ifapersonentersafelonypleaindistrictcourt,isplacedonprobation,andislaterallegedtohaveviolatedthatprobation,theviolationhearingis,bydefault,heldinsuperiorcourt.G.S.7A‐271(e).ThedistrictcourtcanholdtheviolationhearingiftheStateandthedefendantconsent(consentofthejudgeisnotrequiredunderthestatute).Appealofaviolationhearingheldindistrictcourtistothesuperiorcourt,nottothecourtofappeals.Statev.Hooper,358N.C.122(2004).

Supervisionoffelonydrugtreatmentcourtoratherapeuticcourtindistrictcourt.Withtheconsentofthechiefdistrictcourtjudgeandtheseniorresidentsuperiorcourtjudge,thedistrictcourthasjurisdictiontopresideoverthesupervisionofaprobationjudgmententeredinsuperiorcourtinwhichthedefendantisrequiredtoparticipateinadrugtreatmentcourtprogramoratherapeuticcourt(acourtthatpromotesactivitiesdesignedtoaddressunderlyingproblemsofsubstanceabuseandmentalillnessthatcontributetoaperson’scriminalactivity).G.S.7A‐272(e).Incaseswheretherequisitejudgesgivetheirconsent,adistrictcourtjudgemaymodifyorextendprobationjudgmentssupervisedunderG.S.7A‐272(e).ThesuperiorcourthasexclusivejurisdictiontorevokeprobationofcasessupervisedunderG.S.7A‐272(e),exceptthatthedistrictcourthasjurisdictiontoconducttherevocationproceedingwhenthechiefdistrictcourtjudgeandtheseniorresidentsuperiorcourtjudgeagreethatitisintheinterestofjusticethattheproceedingsbeconductedbythedistrictcourt.G.S.7A‐271(f).Unlikenon–drugtreatmentcourtcases,however,ifthedistrictcourtexercisesjurisdictiontorevokeprobationinacasesupervisedunderG.S.7A‐272(e),appealofanorderrevokingprobationistotheappellatedivision,nottothesuperiorcourt.G.S.7A‐271(f).

Thenatureofthefinalprobationviolationhearing.Aprobationviolationhearingisnotacriminalprosecutionoraformaltrial.Statev.Duncan,270N.C.241(1967);Statev.Pratt,21N.C.App.538(1974).Nevertheless,certainproceduralprotectionsapplyasamatterofstatuteandconstitutionaldueprocess.Atthehearing,evidenceagainsttheprobationermustbe

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disclosedtohimorher,andtheprobationermayappear,speak,andpresentrelevantinformation.

Theprobationermayconfrontandcross‐examinewitnessesunlessthecourtfindsgoodcausefornotallowingconfrontation.Confrontationinthiscontextisadueprocessright,notaSixthAmendmentrightundertheConfrontationClause.Statev.Braswell,283N.C.332(1973).Ifthecourtdisallowsconfrontationitmustmakefindingsthattherewasgoodcausefordoingso.Statev.Coltrane,307N.C.511(1983).InColtrane,thesupremecourtreversedaprobationrevocationwhenthetrialcourtdidnotallowtheprobationertoconfrontherprobationofficer(whowasnotpresentatthehearing)withoutmakingfindingsofgoodcausefornotallowingconfrontation.

Thedefendanthasastatutoryrighttocounselatthefinalviolationhearing,includingappointedcounselifindigent.G.S.15A‐1345(e).

Evidence.Therulesofevidencedonotapplyatprobationviolationhearings.G.S.15A‐1345(e).Hearsayisadmissible,thoughitprobablyshouldnotbethesoleinformationuponwhichrevocationisbased.SeeStatev.Hewett,270N.C.348(1967).Theexclusionaryruledoesnotapplyatprobationrevocationhearings.Statev.Lombardo,74N.C.App.460(1985).Therecordorrecollectionofevidenceortestimonyintroducedatthepreliminaryhearingisinadmissibleasevidenceatthefinalviolationhearing.G.S.15A‐1345(e).

Standardofproof.Toactivateasuspendedsentenceforfailuretocomplywithaprobationcondition,theStatemustpresentevidencesufficienttoreasonablysatisfythejudgethatthedefendanthaswillfullyviolatedavalidconditionofprobation,orthatthedefendanthasviolatedaconditionwithoutlawfulexcuse.Statev.White,129N.C.App.52(1998).Ifthedefendantoffersevidencethatheorshewasunabletocomplywiththeconditionsofprobation,thecourtmustmakefindingsthatthedefendant’sevidencewasconsidered.Statev.Hill,132N.C.App.209(1999).

Admittedviolations.Adefendantdoesnotplead“guilty”or“notguilty”toaprobationviolation.Rather,heorsheadmitsordeniestheviolation.Statev.Sellers,185N.C.App.726(2007).Whenadefendantadmitstoaviolation,thereisnorequirementthatthecourtpersonallyexaminehimorherpursuanttoG.S.15A‐1022(unlikewhenadefendantpleadsguiltytoacriminalcharge).Id.Adefendantisnotentitledtoacontinuanceonmattersrelatedtoprobationwhenatrialjudgerejectsapleabargaininanewcriminalcasethatincludesanagreementtocontinuethedefendantonprobationinapriorcase.Statev.Cleary,__N.C.App.__,712S.E.2d722(July5,2011).

Waiverofcounsel.ThecourtmustcomplywithG.S.15A‐1242whenacceptingawaiveroftherighttocounselataprobationviolationhearing,justasitmustattrial.Statev.Evans,153N.C.App.313(2002).Thecourtmustinquirewhetherthedefendant(1)hasbeenclearlyadvisedofhisrighttocounsel;(2)understandstheconsequencesofadecisiontoproceedwithoutcounsel;and(3)comprehendsthenatureofthechargesandtherangeofpermissiblepunishments.

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PotentialOutcomesofaViolationHearing

Reinstateprobation.Whetherornotaviolationisfound,thecourtmaycontinueaprobationeronprobationunderthesameconditions.

Modification.Forgoodcauseshown(i.e.,notjustafteraviolation),thecourtmayatanytimepriortoexpirationorterminationmodifytheconditionsofprobation.G.S.15A‐1344(d).Uponafindingthatanoffendersentencedtocommunitypunishmenthasviolatedoneormoreconditionsofprobation,thecourtmayaddconditionsofprobationthatwouldotherwisemakethesentenceanintermediatepunishment.G.S.15A‐1344(a).

Ifanyconditionsaremodified,theprobationermustreceiveawrittenstatementofthemodification.G.S.15A‐1343(c).Probationmaynotberevokedforviolationofaconditionunlessthedefendanthadwrittennoticethattheconditionappliedtohimorher;oralnoticealoneisinsufficient.Statev.Seek,152N.C.App.237(2002);Statev.Suggs,92N.C.App.112(1988).

Extension.TheGeneralStatutesdescribetwodifferenttypesofprobationextensions,ordinaryextensionsunderG.S.15A‐1344(d),andspecial‐purposeextensionsunderG.S.15A‐1343.2.(Theterms“ordinary”and“special‐purpose”areusedhereforclarity;theydonotappearintheGeneralStatutes.)

Ordinaryextensionsmay,afternoticeandhearing,beorderedatanytimepriortotheexpirationofprobationfor“goodcauseshown”(noviolationneedhaveoccurred).Thetotalmaximumprobationperiodforextensionsunderthisprovisionis5years.G.S.15A‐1344(d).Apersonmayreceivemorethanoneordinaryextensionoverthelifeofhisorherprobationcase.

Special‐purposeextensionscanbeusedtoextendtheprobationer’speriodofprobationbyupto3yearsbeyondtheoriginalperiodofprobation,includingbeyondthefive‐yearmaximum,ifallofthefollowingcriteriaaremet:

(1) Theprobationerconsentstotheextension;(2) Theextensionisbeingorderedduringthelastsixmonthsoftheoriginalperiodof

probation(note:ifprobationhaspreviouslybeenextended,theoffenderisnolongerinhisorheroriginalperiodofprobation);and

(3) Theextensionisnecessarytocompleteaprogramofrestitutionortocompletemedicalorpsychiatrictreatment.G.S.15A‐1343.2;‐1342(a).

Extensionsforthesespecialpurposesaretheonlywaytoextendaperiodofprobationbeyond5years,andonlywhentheoriginalperiodwas5yearscouldprobationbeextendedtoaslongas8yearsunderthisprovision.SeeStatev.Gorman,__N.C.App.__(June19,2012).

Termination.Thecourtmayterminateprobationatanytimeifwarrantedbytheconductofthedefendantandtheendsofjustice.G.S.15A‐1342(b).Theconceptof“unsuccessful”or“unsatisfactory”terminationdoesnotappearintheGeneralStatutesorappellatecaselaw.

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Transfertounsupervisedprobation.Thecourtmayauthorizeaprobationofficertotransferadefendanttounsupervisedprobationafterallmoneyowedispaidtotheclerk.G.S.15A‐1343(g).Aprobationofficeralsohasindependentauthoritytotransferalowriskmisdemeanantfromsupervisedtounsupervisedprobationifthemisdemeanantisnotsubjecttoanyspecialconditionsandwasplacedonprobationsolelyforthecollectionofcourt‐orderedpayments.Id.

Contempt.Ifaprobationerwillfullyviolatesaconditionofprobationthecourtmayholdhimorherincriminalcontemptinlieuofrevocation.G.S.15A‐1344(e1).Unlikeprobationviolations,contemptmustbeprovedbeyondareasonabledoubtusingtheproceduressetoutinArticle1ofChapter5AoftheGeneralStatutes.Asentenceforcriminalcontemptmaynotexceed30days.Timespentimprisonedforcontemptunderthisprovisioncountsforcreditagainstthesuspendedsentenceifitiseveractivated.Statev.Belcher,173N.C.App.620(2005).

Specialprobation.Withafindingofviolationthecourtmaymodifyprobationtoaddspecialprobation(asplitsentence).Thecourtmayrequirethatthedefendantsubmittocontinuousornoncontinuousperiodsofimprisonment,butthetotalamountofconfinementmaynotexceedone‐fourththemaximumsentenceimposed(or,inthecaseofimpaireddriving,one‐fourththemaximumpenaltyallowedbylaw).G.S.15A‐1344(e);‐1351(a).

“Quickdip”orderedbythecourt.ForoffendersonprobationforStructuredSentencingoffensesthatoccurredonorafterDecember1,2011,thecourtmayorderjailconfinementofnomorethansixdayspermonthduringanythreeseparatemonthsduringtheperiodofprobation.Thattimemustbeservedintwo‐orthree‐dayincrements.G.S.15A‐1343(a1)(3).

ConfinementinResponsetoViolation.TheJusticeReinvestmentActof2011substantiallylimitedacourt’sauthoritytorevokeanoffender’sprobation.UnderG.S.15A‐1344(a)and(d2),forviolationsthatoccuronorafterDecember1,2011,thecourtmayonlyrevokeprobationfor:

Violationsofthe“commitnocriminaloffense”conditionsetoutinG.S.15A‐1343(b)(1); Violationsofthestatutory“absconding”conditionsetoutinG.S.15A‐1343(b)(3); Anyviolationbyanoffenderwhohaspreviouslyreceivedatotaloftwoperiodsof

“confinementinresponsetoviolation,”describedbelow.

Forotherviolations—hereinafterreferredtoas“technicalviolations”—acourtmaynotrevokeprobation.Itmayinsteadimposeaperiodof“confinementinresponsetoviolation”(CRV)underG.S.15A‐1344(d2).SomehavereferredtoCRVinformallyasa“dunk,”withtheideathatitisaperiodofconfinementthatisgenerallyshorterthanarevocationbutlongerthana“quickdip.”Theterminologyisuseful,butitshouldbenotedthatthereisnoexpressstatutoryconnectionbetween“dips”and“dunks.”Itisnot,forexample,aprerequisitetoadunkthatapersonhavealreadyservedadip,anddifferentproceduresapplytoeachtypeofconfinement.

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Thecourt’slimitedauthoritytorevokeappliesinsupervisedandunsupervisedprobationcases,StructuredSentencingandimpaireddrivingcases,andtoallprobationersregardlessofthedateoftheoffenseforwhichtheyareonprobation.

Thecourtshoulduseamodificationorder,formAOC‐CR‐609,toimposeCRV.

FelonyCRV.Forapersononprobationforafelony,aCRVperiodmustbeaflat90days,nomoreandnoless.Ifthepersonhas90daysorlessremainingonhisorhersuspendedsentencethedurationoftheCRVperiodisforthatremainderofthesuspendedsentence.ACRVperiodenteredpursuanttothis90‐days‐or‐less‐remainingruleissometimesreferredtoasa“terminalCRV”or“terminaldunk,”becauseitbringsthepersontotheendofhisorhersentence.

MisdemeanorCRV.Formisdemeanants,theCRVperiodis“upto90days,”allowingajudgetoimposeaperiodshorterthan90daysinhisorherdiscretion.

AdditionalrulesrelatedtoCRV

Jailcredit.IfadefendantisdetainedinadvanceofaviolationhearingatwhichCRVisordered,thejudgemustfirstcreditthatpre‐hearingconfinementtotheCRVperiod,withanyexcesstimetobeappliedintheeventthatthesuspendedsentenceisactivated.G.S.15A‐1344(d2).Forinstance,ifafelonyprobationerisjailedfor20daysinadvanceofaprobationviolationhearing,andtheresultofthathearingisaCRVperiod,thecourtwillordera90‐dayCRVperiodwith20dayscreditappliedtothat90‐dayperiod.Thedefendantwillbeimprisonedfor70days.Ifthedefendanthasalreadybeenheldinpre‐hearingconfinementinexcessof90days,anyCRVorderedwouldbetotimeserved,withtheremainderofthecredittobeappliedtothesuspendedsentenceintheeventofactivation.

MultipleCRVperiods.Whenadefendantisonprobationformultipleoffenses,G.S.15A‐1344(d2)requiresCRVperiodstorunconcurrentlyon“allcasesrelatedtotheviolation.”Confinementistobe“immediateunlessotherwisespecifiedbythecourt,”suggestingapreference—butnotanabsoluterequirement—forimmediateserviceoftheconfinement.

PlaceofconfinementforCRV.GeneralStatute15A‐1344(d2)specifiesthatCRVperiodsareserved“inthecorrectionalfacilitywherethedefendantwouldhaveservedanactivesentence.”TheproperplaceofconfinementforafelonyCRVperiodisthustheDivisionofAdultCorrection,whichhasidentifiedsixfacilitiesthatwillhouseCRVinmates.2TheproperplaceofconfinementforamisdemeanorCRVperiodwillbeeitherthelocaljail,theMisdemeanantConfinementProgram,or,insomecases,prison,dependingonthelengthofthesentenceandwhetheritwasforacrimesentencedunderStructuredSentencingoranimpaireddrivingoffense.

                                                            2ThosefacilitiesareDanRiver,Greene,Odom,Tyrrell,WesternYouthInstitutionand,forwomen,FountainCorrectional.

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Revocation

Revocationmeansaprobationer’ssuspendedissentenceisactivatedandtheprobationerisorderedtojailorprison.ForviolationsofprobationbeforeDecember1,2011,anysingleviolationofavalidprobationconditionisasufficientbasisforrevocation,Statev.Tozzi,84N.C.App.517(1987),withthecaveatthatbystatuteprobationmaynotberevokedsolelyforconvictionofaClass3misdemeanor.G.S.15A‐1344(d).

UnderStructuredSentencing,anactivatedsentencemustbeservedinacontinuousblock;thecourtmaynotorderitservedonweekends.Statev.Miller,__N.C.App.__,695S.E.2d149(2010).(Note:ActivesentencesforimpaireddrivingmaybeservedonweekendsunderG.S.20‐179(s).)

Generallyasentenceisactivatedinthesameformitwasenteredbytheoriginalsentencingjudge,buttherevokingjudgehaslimiteddiscretiontomodifythesentenceinseveralways:

Reductionofthesuspendedsentence.Arevokingcourtcan,uponrevocation,reducethelengthofasuspendedsentenceofimprisonment.Forfelonies,thereductionmustbewithintheoriginalrange(i.e.,presumptive,mitigated,oraggravated)establishedfortheclassofoffenseandpriorrecordlevelofthesentencebeingactivated.Formisdemeanors,thecourtisrestrictedtotherangeofsentencedurationssetoutonthemisdemeanorsentencinggrid(everycellonthemisdemeanorgridbeginsat1day).G.S.15A‐1344(d1).

Consecutive/concurrentsentencesuponrevocation.UnderG.S.15A‐1344(d),a“sentenceactivateduponrevocationofprobationcommencesonthedayprobationisrevokedandrunsconcurrentlywithanyotherperiodofprobation,parole,orimprisonmenttowhichthedefendantissubjectduringthatperiodunlesstherevokingjudgespecifiesthatitistorunconsecutivelywiththeotherperiod.”Thecourtofappealshasinterpretedthelastclauseofthatprovisiontomeanthattherevokingjudgecanchangetheconcurrent/consecutivedecisionrenderedbytheoriginalsentencingjudge.Statev.Hanner,188N.C.App.137(2008);Statev.Paige,90N.C.App.142(1988).Therevokingjudgecan,underHannerandPaige,turnwhatwouldhavebeenconcurrentsentencesintoconsecutivesentences—even,apparently,whentheoriginalconcurrentsentenceswereenteredpursuanttoaplea.(TheoriginaljudgmentinHannerwaspartofaplea,thoughitappearsthattheoriginalsentencingcourtrancertainsentencesconcurrentlyeventhoughthedefendanthadactuallyagreedthattheywouldrunconsecutively.)

Revocation‐EligibleViolationsafterJusticeReinvestment

ForviolationsoccurringonorafterDecember1,2011,thecourtmay(butisnotrequiredto)revokeaperson’sprobationfortwotypesofprobationviolations:newcriminaloffensesandabscondingunderG.S.15A‐1343(b)(3a).Issuesassociatedwitheachcategoryofrevocation‐eligibleviolationarediscussedbelow.

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Newcriminaloffense.UnderG.S.15A‐1343(b)(1),itisaregularconditionofprobationthataperson“commitnocriminaloffenseinanyjurisdiction.”Formanyyearstherehasbeenadivisionofopiniononwhetherthatconditionisviolatedonlywhenapersonisconvictedofanewcriminaloffense,orwhetherapendingchargeorevenunchargedcriminalconductcouldbethebasisofaviolation.Practiceisdividedaroundthestate,withsomedistrictsroutinelyholdingviolationhearingsonunconvictedconductandothershavingaperseruleagainstholdingaprobationviolationhearingonanewcriminaloffenseuntilthedefendantisconvicted.

Therulethatemergesfromapatchworkofcasesdecidedoverthepastcenturyisthataperson’sprobationshouldnotberevokedbasedonanewcriminaloffenseuntilheorsheisconvictedofthatcharge,Statev.Guffey,253N.C.43(1960),unlesstheprobationcourtmakesanindependentfinding,toits“reasonablesatisfaction,”thatthedefendantcommittedacrime.Statev.Monroe,83N.C.App.143(1986).Probationshouldneverberevokedbasedonthemerefactthatanewcriminalchargeispending;rather,theremustbeaconvictionorsomeinquirybytheprobationcourtintotheallegedcriminalbehavioritself.Any“independentfinding”ofanewcriminaloffensemustbeafindingofbehaviorthatclearlyconstitutesacrime.Statev.Hardin,183N.C.815(1922)(settingasideatrialcourtorderactivatingasuspendedjudgmentwhentheprobationer’sallegedcriminalact,possessing150gallonsofwine,wasnotacrimeatthetime).Forinstance,apositivedrugscreendoesnot,withoutmore,constitutesubstantialevidencesufficienttoprovethatadefendantcommittedthecrimeofknowinglyandintentionallypossessingacontrolledsubstance.Statev.Harris,361N.C.400(2007).

Absconding.UndertheJRA,thecourtmayrevokeprobationforaviolationofthestatuteabscondingconditionsetoutinG.S.15A‐1343(b)(3a).ThatconditiononlyappliestopersonsonprobationforoffensesthatoccurredonorafterDecember1,2011.S.L.2011‐412,sec.2.5.Violationsofotherconditions(likethe“remainwithinthejurisdiction”conditionorthe“failuretoreporttotheofficer”condition)areineligibleforrevocation,eveniftheSectionofCommunityCorrectionsreferstothemcolloquiallyasabsconders.ForviolationsoccurringonorafterDecember1,2011,courtandcorrectionsofficialsshouldthusbecarefultodistinguishbetweenstatutoryabscondersandpolicyabsconders.Onlytheformermayberevoked,whereasthelatteraretechnicalviolatorssubjecttoCRVorothernon‐revocationresponseoptions.IfanoffenderallegedlyabscondedbeforeDecember1,2011,heorshewouldbeeligibleforrevocationundertheapplicablepriorlaw.

Evenforoffendersactuallysubjecttothenewstatutoryabscondingcondition,itisnotentirelyclearfromthelanguageoftheconditionitselfwhatitmeansforaprobationertoavoidsupervision,orhowlongaperson’swhereaboutsmustbeunknownbeforeheorshebecomesanabsconder.Thosethresholdswill,tosomedegree,beshapedbyotherconditionstowhichtheprobationermaybesubjectandbythecontactfrequencystandardsassociatedwithhisorhersupervisionlevel.Additionally,probationofficersarestillrequiredasamatteroftheirinternalpolicytoconductaspecializedinvestigationbeforedeclaringthatanoffenderhasabsconded.Thatinvestigationincludesattemptingtocontacttheoffenderbytelephone,visitingtheoffender’sresidenceinthedaytimeandintheevening,contactingtheoffender’slandlordandneighbors,visitingtheoffender’sworkplaceorschool,contactingtheoffender’srelativesandassociates,andcontactinglocallawenforcement,includingthejail.

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ProbationersallegedtohaveabscondedarestillsubjecttothejurisdictionalprovisionsofG.S.15A‐1344(f)regardingviolationhearingsheldaftertheexpirationoftheprobationaryperiod.Burns,171N.C.App.at762(“Themerenotationof“absconder”ontheorderforarrestdidnotrelievetheStateofitsdutytomakereasonableeffortstonotifydefendantunder[G.S.15A‐1344].”).RevocationaftertwoCRVperiods.Whenadefendanthaspreviouslyreceivedtwoperiodsofconfinementinresponsetoviolation,thecourtmayrevokeprobationforanysubsequentviolation,includingatechnicalviolation.G.S.15A‐1344(d2).Thelawthusoperatesasasortof“threestrikes”provision,suchthatapersonmaynotberevokedforatechnicalviolationuntilhisorherthirdstrike.Note,however,thatitisonlythepriorreceiptofCRVperiodsthatqualifiesapersonforrevocationforatechnicalviolation,notthepriorfindingsofviolationthemselves.Inotherwords,violationsrespondedtoinsomeotherway(byatermofspecialprobation,forexample)donotcountas“strikes.”

AdefendantmayonlyreceivetwoCRVperiodsinaparticularprobationcase.AdefendantmaynotreceiveathirdCRVperiodforathirdorsubsequenttechnicalviolation.Atthatpointthecourtmusteitherrevokeprobationorimposesomeotherformofmodification,includingspecialprobationorcontempt,forexample,ifthecourtisinclinedtouseaformofnon‐revocationconfinement.

Electionstoserveasentence.Technicallyaprobationermaynot“electtoserve”hisorhersentence;G.S.15A‐1341(c)usedtoallowforthat,butitwasrepealedin1995(S.L.1995‐429).Adefendantcan,ofcourse,admittoaviolationofprobation.ButnotethatforviolationsoccurringonorafterDecember1,2011,thecourtmayonlyrevokeprobationfornewcriminaloffensesorabsconding.Civiljudgmentsformonetaryobligations.Generally,restitutionmaynotbeordereddocketedasaciviljudgmentuponrevocationorterminationofprobation.OnlyincasescoveredundertheCrimeVictims’RightsAct(CVRA)mayrestitutionordersbe“enforcedinthesamemannerasaciviljudgment,”andonlywhentherestitutionamountexceeds$250.G.S.15A‐1340.38;‐1340.34.Inthosecases,thejudgmentmaynotbeexecuteduponthedefendant’spropertyuntiltheclerkisnotifiedthatthedefendant’sprobationhasbeenterminatedorrevokedandthejudgehasmadeafindingthatrestitutioninasumcertainremainsowed.G.S.15A‐1340.38.ThefindingthatarestitutionbalanceisdueuponrevocationorterminationofprobationshouldbemadeonformAOC‐CR‐612.AttorneyfeesowedbyindigentdefendantsmaybedocketedundertheproceduresetoutinG.S.7A‐455.UnpaidfinesandcostsmaybedocketedundertheproceduresetoutinG.S.15A‐1365.Licenseforfeitureuponrevocation.Ifafelonyprobationereither“refusesprobation”orhasprobationrevokedforfailing,intherevokingcourt’sestimation,“tomakereasonableeffortstocomplywiththeconditionsofprobation,”theprobationerautomaticallyforfeitsalllicensingprivileges.G.S.15A‐1331A(recentlyrecodifiedasG.S.15A‐1331.1.S.L.2012‐194,sec.45.(a).

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JudgescanuseSideTwoofAOC‐CR‐317toordertheforfeiture,whichcoversdriver’slicenses(regularandcommercial),occupationallicenses,andhuntingandfishinglicenses.Theforfeiturelasts“forthefulltermoftheperiodtheindividualisplacedonprobationbythesentencingcourtatthetimeofconvictionfortheoffense.”G.S.15A‐1331A(b).Theforfeitureperiodmustendwhentheprobationer’soriginaltermofprobationwouldhaveexpired.Forinstance,apersonwhoseprobationisrevoked23monthsintoa24‐monthperiodofprobationcanfaceonlyaone‐monthoflicenseforfeitureunderG.S.15A‐1331A(nota24‐monthforfeitureperiodbeginningatthetimeofrevocation).Statev.Kerrin,__N.C.App.__,703S.E.2d816(2011).ForpurposesoffillingouttheAOC‐CR‐317,thebeginningdateoftheforfeituretypicallywillbethedateoftherevocationhearingandtheenddatewillbethedatetheoriginalperiodofprobationorderedbythesentencingcourtwouldhaveexpired.Driver’slicenseforfeitureforviolationsrelatedtocommunityservice.Ifacourtdeterminesthatadefendanthaswillfullyfailedtocomplywitharequirementtocompletecommunityservice,thecourtshallrevokeanydriverslicenseissuedtothepersonandrevokeanydriverslicenseuntilthecommunityservicerequirementhasbeenmet.G.S.143B‐708(e).Creditfortimeserved.Ifprobationisrevokedandasentenceisactivated,theprobationershouldgetcreditforthefollowingtimeunderG.S.15‐196.1:

Theactiveportionofasplitsentence.Statev.Farris,336N.C.553(1994); TimespentatDART–Cherryasaconditionofprobation.Statev.Lutz,177N.C.App.140

(2006); Presentencecommitmentforstudy.Statev.Powell,11N.C.App.194(1971); Hospitalizationtodeterminecompetencytostandtrial.Statev.Lewis,18N.C.App.681

(1973); AfederalcourtinterpretedG.S.15‐196.1toallowcreditfortimespentinconfinementin

anotherstateawaitingextraditionwhenthedefendantwasheldintheotherstatesolelybasedonNorthCarolinacharges.Childersv.Laws,558F.Supp.1284(W.D.N.C.1983);

Timespentinthenow‐defunctIMPACTbootcampprogram.Statev.Hearst,356N.C.132(2002);

TimespentimprisonedforcontemptunderG.S.15A‐1344(e1).Statev.Belcher,173N.C.App.620(2005);

ConfinementinResponsetoViolationunderG.S.15A‐1344(d2). Short‐term(“quickdip”)confinementasaconditionofprobation,imposedbyajudgeunder

G.S.15A‐1343(a1)(3),orbyaprobationofficerunderG.S.15A‐1343.2.

Creditshouldnotbeawardedfortimespentunderelectronichousearrest,Statev.Jarman,140N.C.App.198(2000),orfortimespentataprivatelyrunresidentialtreatmentprogramasaconditionofprobation(inanon‐DWIcase),Statev.Stephenson,__N.C.App.__(July19,2011).

Workrelease.UnderG.S.15A‐1351(f),thesentencingcourtmayrecommendor,withtheconsentofthedefendant,orderworkreleaseforamisdemeanant.Whenadefendantissentencedto

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probation,thatrecommendationshouldnotbemadeuntilprobationisrevokedandthesentenceofimprisonmentisactivated.G.S.148‐33.1(i).

DefensestoProbationViolations

Improperperiodofprobation.G.S.15A‐1343.2(d)setsoutthepresumptivelengthsforperiodsofprobationimposedunderStructuredSentencingasfollows:

Misdemeanantssentencedtocommunitypunishment:6–18months. Misdemeanantssentencedtointermediatepunishment:12–24months. Felonssentencedtocommunitypunishment:12–30months. Felonssentencedtointermediatepunishment:18–36months.

Thesentencingcourtmayalwaysdeviatefromthesedefaultsandorderprobationofupto5yearsifit“findsatthetimeofsentencingthatalongerperiodofprobationisnecessary.”Thereisacheck‐boxontheAOCsuspendedsentencejudgmentformstoindicatethatthejudgehasmadetherequisitefinding.Sometimesacourtsentencesadefendanttoaprobationtermlongerthanthedefaultssetoutabovewithoutmakingtherequisitefindings.Whentheerrorisdiscoveredearlyonandthedefendantappeals,theappellatecourtsremandthecaseforresentencingwithinstructionstothetrialcourttomaketherequisitefindingororderashorterperiodofprobation.See,e.g.,Statev.Riley,202N.C.App.299(2010).TheprobationercouldalsofileamotionforappropriatereliefatanytimeunderG.S.15A‐1415(b)(8)onthegroundthatthesentencewasunauthorizedatthetimeimposed.Sometimestheerrorisnotdiscovereduntilthedefendanthasalreadyviolatedprobation.Itisnotclearwhetherthecourtretainspowertoactoveracasethatwouldhaveexpirediftheprobationtermhadbeenwithinthedurationallimits,especiallyiftheviolationoccurredafteralawfulperiodwouldhaveended.

Willfulness.Probationmaynotberevokedunlessaviolationwaswillfulorwithoutalawfulexcuse.Statev.Hewett,270N.C.348(1967).Oncethestateestablishesthatadefendantfailedtocomplywithaconditionofprobation,theburdenisonthedefendanttoproduceevidencethatthefailuretocomplywasnotwillful.Withrespecttomonetaryconditions,probationmaynotberevokedforfailuretopayallorpartofwhathasbeenorderediftheprobationermadeagoodfaithefforttopay.Theburdenisontheprobationertoshowthatheorshecouldnotpaydespiteaneffortmadeingoodfaith.Statev.Jones,78N.C.App.507(1985).Ifthedefendantshowsagoodfaithinabilitytopayafineorcourtcost,thecourtmay(1)allowadditionaltimeforthedefendanttopay,(2)reducetheamountowed,or(3)remittheobligationaltogether.G.S.15A‐1345(e);‐1364(c).

Ifthedefendantdoesnotofferevidenceofhisorherinabilitytocomply,theState’sevidenceofthefailuretocomplyissufficienttojustifyrevocation.Statev.Jones,78N.C.App.507(1985).Ifadefendantdoesputonevidenceofhisorherinabilitytocomply,thecourtmustconsiderthat

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evidenceandmakefindingsoffactclearlyshowingthatitdidso.Id.Forexample,thetrialcourterredbyfailingtomakefindingsoffactthatclearlyshoweditconsideredthedefendant’sevidencethathewasunabletopaythecostofhissexualabusetreatmentprogram.Thedefendantpresentedevidence,corroboratedbyhisprobationofficer,thathewasunabletopayfortheprogrambecausehehadlosthisjob.Statev.Floyd,__N.C.App.__(July19,2011).Ontheotherhand,adefendant’sexplanationthatshewasaddictedtodrugswasnotalawfulexcuseforviolatingprobationbyfailingtocompleteadrugeducationprogram.Statev.Stephenson,__N.C.App.__(July19,2011).

Invalidconditionsofprobation.Probationmaynotberevokedbasedonaninvalidconditionofprobation.TheregularconditionsofprobationimposedpursuanttoG.S.15A‐1343(b)areineverycasevalid.Similarly,thestatutoryspecialconditionssetoutinG.S.15A‐1343(b1)arepresumptivelyvalid.Statev.Lambert,146N.C.App.360,367(2001)(“[W]henthetrialjudgeimposesoneofthespecialconditionsofprobationenumeratedbyN.C.Gen.Stat.§15A‐1343(b1),theconditionneednotbereasonablyrelatedtodefendant’srehabilitationbecausetheLegislaturehasdeemedallthosespecialconditionsappropriatetotherehabilitationofcriminalsandtheirassimilationintolaw‐abidingsociety.”).

Adhocspecialconditions(thosenotsetoutintheGeneralStatutes)mustbereasonablyrelatedtotheoffender’srehabilitationandreasonablynecessarytoinsurethatthedefendantwillleadalaw‐abidinglife.Anyadhocconditionsmustalsobeararelationshiptothedefendant’scrime.Statev.Cooper,304N.C.180(1981)(upholdingaspecialconditionprohibitingadefendant,convictedofpossessionofstolencreditcards,fromoperatingavehiclebetweenmidnightand5:30a.m.).Theappellatecourtshaveinterpretedthecatch‐allprovisionbroadly,givingtrialjudges“substantialdiscretion”intailoringajudgmenttofitaparticularoffenderandoffense.Statev.Johnston,123N.C.App.292(1996).

Probationconditionsobviouslycannotplaceunconstitutionalconstraintsonaprobationer(e.g.,“GotochurcheverySunday,”or“Getmarried”).InLambert,forexample,thecourtofappealsnotedtheinvalidityofspecialprobationconditionprohibitingadefendantfromfilingcourtdocumentsunlesstheyweresignedandfiledbyalicensedattorney,asitunreasonablyinfringedonhisfundamentalrightofaccesstothecourtsandhisrighttoconducthisdefenseprose.146N.C.App.at364.

UnderG.S.15A‐1342(g),adefendant’sfailuretoobjecttoaconditionofprobationimposedunderG.S.15A‐1343(b1)atthetimetheconditionisimposeddoesnotconstituteawaiveroftherighttoobjectatalatertimetothecondition.The“atalatertime”languageofthestatutedoesnotgrantaperpetualrighttochallengeaconditionofprobation.Rather,thedefendantmustobjectnolaterthantherevocationhearing.Statev.Cooper,304N.C.180(1981).

DelegatedAuthority

InStructuredSentencingcases(butnotinimpaireddrivingcases),aprobationofficercan,incertaincircumstances,imposesomeconditionsofprobationwithoutactionbythecourt.Thedelegatedauthoritylawwasexpandedconsiderablyin2011aspartofJusticeReinvestment.Whatconditionstheofficermayimposeandwhendependsonthedateoftheoffenseforwhichtheoffenderisundersupervision.Inallcases,though,thetrialcourtjudgehasdiscretiontofindinits

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judgmentthatdelegationisnotappropriate,essentiallyun‐delegatingtheauthoritythatisotherwisedelegatedbydefault.Ifthejudgecheckstheboxonthejudgmentformindicatingthatdelegationisnotappropriate,theprobationofficerdoesnothavetheauthoritydescribedbelow.

ForoffensescommittedonorafterDecember1,2011andsentencedtocommunitypunishment,theprobationofficermayrequiretheoffendertodoanyofthefollowing:

(1) Performupto20hoursofcommunityservice,andpaythefeeprescribedbylawforthissupervision.

(2) Reporttotheoffender'sprobationofficeronafrequencytobedeterminedbytheofficer.(3) Submittosubstanceabuseassessment,monitoringortreatment.(4) Submittohousearrestwithelectronicmonitoring.(5) Submittoaso‐called“quickdip”inthejail,aperiodorperiodsofconfinementinalocal

confinementfacilityforatotalofnomorethansixdayspermonthduringanythreeseparatemonthsduringtheperiodofprobation.Thesixdayspermonthconfinementprovidedforinthissubdivisionmayonlybeimposedastwo‐dayorthree‐dayconsecutiveperiods.Whenadefendantisonprobationformultiplejudgments,confinementperiodsimposedunderthissubdivisionshallrunconcurrentlyandmaytotalnomorethansixdayspermonth.

(6) Submittoacurfewwhichrequirestheoffendertoremaininaspecifiedplaceforaspecifiedperiodeachdayandwearadevicethatpermitstheoffender'scompliancewiththeconditiontobemonitoredelectronically.

(7) Participateinaneducationalorvocationalskillsdevelopmentprogram,includinganevidence‐basedprogram.G.S.15A‐1343.2(e).

Thelistofavailableconditionsforoffenderssentencedtointermediatepunishmentisthesameasforcommunitypunishment,withtwoexceptions.First,inintermediatecasestheofficermayorderupto50hoursofcommunityserviceinsteadof20.Andsecond,inintermediatecasestheofficermayrequiretheoffendertosubmittosatellite‐basedmonitoringifthedefendantisasexoffenderdescribedbyG.S.14‐208.40(a)(2).G.S.15A‐1343.2(f).

ForoffendersonprobationforoffensesthatoccurredonorafterDecember1,2011,theofficermayimposeanyoftheabove‐listedconditionsexceptthe“quickdip”inthejailiftheofficerhasdeterminedthattheoffenderhasfailedtocomplywithoneormoreoftheconditionsimposedbythecourtoriftheoffenderisdeterminedtobehighriskbasedontheresultsoftheriskassessmentcompletedbyCommunityCorrections.TheofficermayonlyimposethequickdipconditionifCommunityCorrectionsdeterminesthattheoffenderfailedtocomplywithoneormorecourt‐imposedcondition,andthenonlyiftheoffenderwaiveshisorherrighttocounselandaviolationhearingasprovidedinG.S.15A‐1343.2.

Whenaprobationofficeraddsaconditionorconditionsthroughdelegatedauthority,heorshemustgivetheoffendernoticeoftherighttoseekcourtreviewoftheofficer’saction.Theprobationerisentitledtofileamotionwiththecourtforreview(althoughthestatuteissilentastohowandhowquicklythathearingmustbeheld),exceptinthecaseofthequickdipcondition,forwhichtheoffendershallhavenorightofreviewifheorshehassignedawaiverofhisorherright

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tocounselandahearing.Anyconditionsaddedbytheofficermaysubsequentlybereducedorremovedbytheofficer.G.S.15A‐1343.2.

Ifproperlyaddedbyaprobationofficerthroughdelegatedauthority,anewconditionofprobationisenforceablelikeanyconditionimposedbythecourt.

Appeals

Whenadistrictcourtjudgeactivatesasentenceorimposesspecialprobation,thedefendantmayappealtothesuperiorcourtforadenovorevocationhearing.If,atthedenovohearing,thesuperiorcourtcontinuesthedefendantonprobation,thecaseisconsideredtobeasuperiorcourtcasefromthatpointforward;allfutureproceedingsinthecasearehandledinsuperiorcourt.G.S.15A‐1347.Whenasuperiorcourtjudgeactivatesasentenceorimposesspecialprobation,appealistotheappellatedivisionunderG.S.7A‐27;G.S.15A‐1347.

Thereisnostatutorymechanismforaprobationertoappealmodificationsthatdonotinvolvespecialprobation.Statev.Edgerson,164N.C.App.712(2004).

ThereisnoclearstatutoryprovisionforappealingaCRVperiod.UnderG.S.15A‐1347andexistingcaselaw,thereisnorighttoappealprobationmattersotherthanactivationofasentenceorimpositionofspecialprobation.Statev.Edgerson,164N.C.App.712(2004)(“Defendant’ssentencewasneitheractivatednorwasitmodifiedto‘specialprobation.’Defendantthereforehasnorighttoappeal.”(citationsomitted)).Theremay,however,beanargumentthatimpositionofaCRVperiod—especiallyaterminalCRVperiod—fitswithinthelanguageofG.S.15A‐1347asanactivationorpartialactivation,althoughotherprovisionsinthatlawreference“judgmentsrevokingprobation.”Evenifthatstatuteisnotapplicable,otheravenuesforreviewmaybepossible.Forappealsfromsuperiorcourttotheappellatedivision,G.S.15A‐1442(6)(providingthatadefendantmayappealotherprejudicialerrorsoflaw)orG.S.7A‐27(b)(grantingjurisdictiontothecourtofappealstoreviewanyfinaljudgmentofasuperiorcourt)maybedeemedasufficientbasisforappeal.Asidefromthoseprovisions,adefendantmightalsoseekreviewthroughapetitionforawritofcertiorari,motionforappropriaterelief,petitionforawritofhabeascorpus,orotherextraordinarywrit,dependingonthenatureoftheallegederror.

WhenaviolationhearingforaClassHorIfelonypledindistrictcourtisheldindistrictcourt,theappealisdenovotosuperiorcourt,nottothecourtofappeals.Statev.Hooper,358N.C.122(2004).IfthedistrictcourtexercisesjurisdictiontorevokeprobationinacasesupervisedunderG.S.7A‐272(e),whichgovernssupervisionofcertaindrugtreatmentcourtortherapeuticcourtcases,appealofanorderrevokingprobationistotheappellatedivision.G.S.7A‐271(f).

Aggravatingfactorbasedonpriorviolation

UnderG.S.15A‐1340.16(d)(12a),itisastatutoryaggravatingfactorforfelonysentencingpurposesthatthedefendanthas,duringthe10‐yearperiodbeforethecommissionofthe

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offenseforwhichheorsheisnowbeingsentenced,beenfoundinapriorcasetobeinwillfulviolationoftheconditionsofprobationorpost‐releasesupervision.

Defendingaprobationviolation—Ageneralframework2012NewMisdemeanorDefenderTrainingJamieMarkhamSeptember20121. Doesthecourthavejurisdictiontoact?

Didthedefendantreceivepropernoticeoftheallegedviolation? Wastheoriginalperiodofprobationlawful(wasitwithinstatutorydefaultsordidthecourtfind

thatalongerperiodwasnecessary)? Hasthereeverbeenanunlawfulextensionofprobation? Wastheprobationviolationreportfiledandfilestampedbeforetheperiodofprobationexpired

(considertheeffectofanytollingthatmayhaveappliedbasedonnewcriminalcharges)?

2. Didthedefendantviolateapropercondition?

Didthedefendanthavewrittennoticeoftheconditiononhisorherjudgment? Ifaconditionotherthanaregularcondition,wasitreasonablyrelatedtothedefendant’s

rehabilitationandthedefendant’scrime?

3. Wastheviolationwillful?

Ifamonetarycondition,canthedefendantshowagoodfaithinabilitytopay?

4. Didthecourtconsideralternativestorevocation?

Housearrest “Quickdip” Specialprobation(splitsentence) DART–Cherry/BlackMountainforsubstanceabusetreatment 90‐dayconfinementinresponsetoviolation(“dunk”)

5. Wastheviolationrevocation‐eligibleafterJusticeReinvestment?

Newcriminaloffense(Hasthedefendantbeenconvictedofthatoffense?Ifnot,didthecourt

makeindependentfindingsthatthecriminalactoccurred?) AbscondingunderG.S.15A‐1343(b)(3a)(Isthedefendantonprobationforanoffensethat

occurredafter12/1/11?Ifnot,heorsheisnotsubjecttothe“don’tabscond”probationcondition.DidtheprobationofficerfollowtheCommunityCorrectionsinvestigationpolicybeforedeclaringthepersontobeanabsconder?)

6. Ifrevocation,didthecourtconsidermitigatingthesuspendedsentence?

Reducingthesuspendedsentence Makingconsecutivesentencesconcurrent