presentation at 7 th annual wildland fire safety summit, toronto, ontario, canada 19th july,2003

1Systems & Electronics, Inc.SEI

THE SAFE AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL HEALTH MANAGEMENT OF AIRTANKER AND LEAD AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN FIREBOMBING

OPERATIONS

Presentation at 7th Annual Wildland Fire Safety Summit, Toronto, Ontario, Canada

19th July,2003

Steve Hall (Celeris Aerospace Canada Inc.)Dick Perry (Sandia National Laboratory)

Joe Braun (Systems and Electronics Inc.)


OVERVIEW Reasons for Structural Concerns Related to Aircraft Operating in the

Firebombing Role Potential causes of structural problems

Addressing the Structural Concerns Rationale behind the procedures and processes that need to be

implemented with particular reference to fatigue and damage tolerance Understanding the loads imposed on firebombing aircraft

Structural Health Management of Aircraft Involved in the Firebombing Role

Short and longer term issues related to the safe and economic use of these aircraft

Inspection, Maintenance and the Bottom Line Accumulating Knowledge Pending Activities Conclusions and Recommendations


SUMMER 2002 WING FAILURES

C-130A Built 1957 21,900 hours total Both wings failed June 2002

PB4Y-2 Single Tail Liberator Built 1944/45 timeframe 8,200 Special Mission hours Failure one wing July 2002


REASONS FOR CONCERN

Resulted in the formation of the Blue Ribbon Commission by the USDA/FS and BLM which reported in December 2002

Number of recommendations/observations including Many of the aircraft involved in the firebombing role were not

designed for this role Loads to which they have been subjected are largely unknown as is

their current structural health status There is a need to harmonize the inspection and maintenance of

firebombing aircraft with modern day certification approaches such as fatigue and damage tolerance

Approach to funding, contracts and the ongoing and modernization of the fleet needs to be reviewed


ADVERSE OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

C-130A and PB4Y-2 Fleets immediately grounded Loss of approx 10-12 Heavy Tankers

Major concerns about USDA/FS Beech Baron Lead Aircraft Immediate need for replacement?

Forest Service note that contracts will not be awarded to C-130A and PB4Y-2 aircraft

Heavy airtankers operating with a 15% reduction in payload for the 2003 fire season

Unanticipated expenses associated with additional inspection and maintenance actions

Delayed contract award and operational availability


OVERVIEW OF FIREBOMBING AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS AND OPERATIONS


FIREBOMBING AIRCRAFT

Air Tankers 800 – 1,200 gallons Translates to

approximately 8,000 to 12,000 lbs

Heavy Air Tankers 2,200 – 3,000 gallons and

above Translates to approximately

22,000 to 30,000 lbs retardant


FIREBOMBING AIRCRAFT (cont)

Lead Aircraft Initial Survey of Fire for

Escape Routes Guide Heavy Tankers in

over fire Ensure Fire Prevention

Officer has view of drop Spend far more time

over the fire than do the air tankers


AIR TANKER CONFIGURATION

Scoop

Internal Tank

External Tank


TYPES OF TANK

Constant Flow One pair doors Computer controlled Aperture changes to

ensure constant flow Consistent “Coverage

Level”

Sequenced Doors Two, four, eight or more Door sequence

automatically selected Release percentage of

load that is proportional to the number of doors

Coverage Level not as consistent


TYPES OF LOAD

Retardant or Foam Pre-mixed or mixed on board Drop as a barrier to the fire

Water Dropping on the fire


OPERATIONAL PROFILE AIR TANKERS

Transit to fire Depends on distance, if relatively close often below 2000 ft

AGL Holding pattern around the fire

Generally around 1,000 ft to 1,500ft around the fire Drop Zone

150 ft AGL (or 150ft parallel to terrain in mountainous drops) Airspeed around 110 – 120 knots

Flap often required (typically 50%, occasionally 100%) Want available power when retracted

Load, usually dropped in 50% increments, occasionally 100% Drop Time

Of the order of 4 -10 seconds depending on coverage level


Potential Causes of Structural Problems


SPECIAL MISSION AIRCRAFT

Aircraft that is operating in a role for which was not envisaged during its design

Firebombing Aircraft ILS/VOR Calibration Pipeline/Geological Survey Crop-Spraying Atmospheric Research (Hurricane Hunters)

Majority tend to operate in Low-level roles Low-level consistent use below 2,500 ft AGL Turbulent environment aircraft subject to an increased gust frequency Some roles involve increased manoeuvre spectrum for terrain avoidance

Note that even when an aircraft has been designed for the environment, care is required regarding the source of the design loads

Lots of data for low-level data is transit data and is not usually representative of consistent low-level operation

High-Level Role

Low-level Roles


WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT SPECIAL MISSION SPECTRUM?

Generally very little Limited number of health monitoring programs

completed to define the loadsNRCC/IAR Circa Mid 1970’s - 1988Limited NASA Work (Reliability Issue)FAA Collecting Low-level data, yet to be collated

However, from the limited data available some initial trends have been identified which indicate an urgent need for further work


LOADING MECHANISMS

Two mechanisms that have to be considered High Load Exceedance or Overstressing the aircraft

Over-g of the aircraft High Load at High Weight Concerns

Long-term impact of cyclic loading Fatigue and Damage Tolerance

Repetitions of cyclic loading and its accumulated impact A major focus of past analyses of special mission

aircraft has been the high load exceedance aspects Part of the picture and something of which we have to be

constantly vigilant However, it is by no means the full picture, nor the major

reason for the structural failures that have occurred


IDENTIFYING HARSH OR UNUSUAL USAGE

Exceedances/Hour (Log)

G-Level

Increasing SeverityIncreasing Severity

1.0g

-ve Spectrum +ve Spectrum


COMPARATIVE SEVERITY


F-27 DATA – SAMPLE 003

1.0E-02

1.0E-01

1.0E+00

1.0E+01

1.0E+02

-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

G-Level

Exc

eed

ance

s p

er H

ou

r

F-27 Total (003)

F-27 Heavy (003)

F-27 Light (003)


F-27 DATA – SAMPLE 004

1.0E-02

1.0E-01

1.0E+00

1.0E+01

1.0E+02

-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

G-Level

Ex

ce

ed

an

ce

s p

er

Ho

ur

F-27 Total (004)

F-27 Heavy (004)

F-27 Light (004)


FATIGUE CONCEPTS

Alt

ern

ati

ng

Str

es

s (

Sa

)

Number of Cycles (N)

Different Mean Stress Levels

(Sm)

Str

es

s

Time

Min Stress (Smin)

Mean Stress (Sm)

Max Stress (Smax)

Alt Stress (Sa)

R =Smin

Smax

Miner’s Cumulative Damage Law

1..........3

3

2

2

1

1 n

n

N

n

N

n

N

n

N

n

N1

Sa1


MAIN OBSERVATIONS Aircraft in Low-level Special Mission Roles see a much more

severe spectrum than comparable aircraft operating in the roles for which they were originally designed

Inordinate amount of relatively low-level loads Much more turbulent environment More Manoeuvres

Control Aircraft Terrain avoidance

Some high loads, but generally the majority of the structural damage can be attributed to the low level loads

A large amount of accumulated world-wide flying in the original design role is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for ongoing structural integrity in the special mission role

Acceleration of damage in critical areas Damage being sustained in previously unknown areas


ADDRESSING THE STRUCTURAL CONCERNS


SO WHAT? The previous slides have illustrated that the

limited data available suggests that from a cyclic loading perspective (fatigue) firebombing usage is more severe than many operational roles, including the roles for which the majority of the aircraft were designed

The next issue that has to be addressed is what are the implications of these loads for individual aircraft structures?


EVALUATING THE SIGNIFICANCE

Identify areas in the structure that are likely to be adversely impacted by firebombing usage and assess exactly how they will respond

Structural Analysis/Certification terminology these are termed critical areas, Principal Structural Elements (PSE’s) or Structurally Significant Items (SSI’s)

To do this we need to understand the cyclic stresses experienced at each location

Load is what is applied, stress is how the structure responds Typically we measure loads Mechanism of translating these to stresses (Use of “Transfer Functions”)

Detail structural configuration

Evaluate the structural health at each location Where are we starting from, ie: what has happened in the past Where are we going, ie: based on the starting point how fast is future usage

consuming the “health” of the structure?


COMPARISON ASW vs FIREBOMBING

Data from Grumman Tracker (S2) Canadian Forces ASW OMNR Firebombing (Undulating) West Coast Firebombing

(Mountainous) Assuming similar weights and

Stress/g of between 5ksi/g and 10ksi/g

Firebombing is approximately 1.8 to 2.0 times as severe as ASW

FIREBOMBING

MOUNTAINOUS

FIREBOMBING

MOUNTAINOUS

FIREBOMBING

UNDULATING

ASW OPERATIONS

ASW OPERATIONS

FIREBOMBING

UNDULATING


CHALLENGES OF SPECIAL MISSION AIRCRAFT

Generally older aircraft May or may not be supported by the OEM or a type

certificate holder Frequently not supportive or consider it not cost-effective to

generate data for this role Liability/Risk issues

Engineering data is often limited Regular data collection and validation is not easy as aircraft

are frequently geographically dispersed Frequently not equipped with a data-bus that facilitates the

straightforward capture of many parameters


HOW DO YOU GO ABOUT EVALUATING THE ONGOING STRUCTURAL HEALTH OF AN

AIRCRAFT?

What do you measure, what criteria do you use?


ACTIONS INITIATED USDA/FS & Sandia Laboratory inspection base-lining program

Development of Structural Health Management Plans by some operators

Including generic and specific parameters

Instrumentation of a C-130A Aircraft and development of initial firebombing profiles

Sponsored by the FAA and TBM/IAR

Initial instrumentation and limited preliminary analysis of North American Based Airtankers

Sponsored by the USDA/FS and Sandia Laboratories 2003 – P2, P3, DC-7 and possibly CV-580 2004 – Additional aircraft


BASELINE INSPECTION PROGRAM


PURPOSE

Reduce risk of major structural failure One time for 2003 season Enhanced Inspection Program

Determine the condition of the fleet Basis for continuing program for long-term

airworthiness Standardization among contractors and types Identify best practices


PROCESS

Documentation search Historical information OEM and other user documents

Site visits to all large air tanker contractors Inspection documentation Inspection practice Damage histories


SANDIA FINDINGS Damage Tolerance Assessment

P-3US Navy missions most relevant to P-3CFull scale fatigue testing (P-3C, 2002-2003)

P-2VNo relevant data identified

C-54-DC, DC-6, DC-7SID on DC-6 only1992Based on service history


SANDIA FINDINGS (cont)

Inspection Programs (AIPs) Wide variation in depth and detail of AIPs No FAA process for standardization or periodic

review Wide variation in use of NDI beyond visual

inspection


SANDIA FINDINGS (cont)

Existing history data and inspection practice are less effective than true damage tolerance assessment as air tanker time builds in relation to prior mission time

Flight environment and loads data are essential elements of a damage tolerance based continuing airworthiness program, for both current and future air tankers


IMPLEMENTING A STRUCTURAL HEALTH MONITORING PROGRAM


Certified, Safe and

Economically Viable Aircraft

Inspection, Maintenance and Overhaul Intervals

Fatigue and Damage

Tolerance Analysis

Critical Area Identification

Previous Flight or Full-Scale Tests

Past Service History

Maintenance Records as

a Firebomber Aircraft Configuration and Model Variants

Loads Actually Experienced by the Aircraft in Critical

Areas

Critical Area Geometry Factors

Relevant Materials Data

Parameters to be Monitored

Recorders and Instrumentation

Operational Data Acquisition and

Validation

Data Analysis and Dissemination

Development of New Techniques

Depot LevelField Deployable

Structural Health Management Plan Considerations


PROGRAM SCOPE Limited Survey and assume representative of fleet usage

Loads Environment Stress Survey (LESS) Most severe Safety Factors Finite Commitment

Repeat periodically to assess validity LESS plus limited Individual Aircraft Tracking (IAT) program

Representative IAT aircraft to confirm LESS data remains valid Safety Factors not as severe Ongoing commitment

Repeat LESS when significant change in usage occurs LESS program plus full IAT program

Generally subset of LESS parameters on IAT aircraft Least severe safety factors Ongoing commitment

Repeat LESS when significant change in usage occurs

Initially Required for Firebombing as “representative” usage may not exist


SELECTING PARAMETERS

Principle # 1: Minimize parameters to be monitored

Even though cost of additional channels and sensors relatively cheap

Avoid “If we are not sure let’s monitor it syndrome” AKA “More data has to be better”


IDENTIFYING PARAMETERS Requirements

New requirements Service History Testing

Use of Existing or Development of Transfer Functions Stress Analysis, Test Data, etc.

Durability/Reliability in Operational Environment If you cannot reliably measure it or if robust sensor cannot be installed, the

parameter is of little use Integration with aircraft systems

Avoid impact on critical systems or structure Do not want airworthiness or certification issues

EMI/EMC has to be considered Components themselves Installed in aircraft


GENERIC vs SPECIFIC PARAMETERS Generic parameters are “universal” parameters that

characterize the phenomena being measured Vertical Centre-of-Gravity Acceleration (Nzcg)

Specific parameters are parameters which represent the actual response of the structure to the phenomena

Strain gauge readings measured at specific locations on a structure

Location specific Ideally, require as many generic parameters as

practicable Practice: Require a combination of both


SIGNIFICANT PHASES OF FLIGHT?

LANDING

“HEAVY”TAXI/TAKE-OFF

“LIGHT”

“BOMBING RUN”


DATA CAPTURE REQUIREMENTS

Taxi/Take-Off

HeavyBomb Run

Light Landing

C.G Acceleration X X X X XStrain Readings (?) X X X X X

Aircraft Weight X X X X XAircraft Configuration X XType of Drop (Full or Partial Salvo) XAltitude XAirspeed X X X X XFlap Position X X XDifferential Cabin pressure ? ? ? ? ?Sink Speed XTouch and Go X

Location X XTime Synchronization/Correlation X XMission Type (Ferry, Firebomb, etc.) XWeather Conditions XAmbient Temperature X

Item

Read or Derived from Aircraft

Instrumentation or Data Bus

Installed Sensors

Source Function

Manual or Automatic Meta Data Extraction

What you "want"

What you may need to interpret what you

"want"

What you may need to interpret what you

"want"


HOW/WHERE WILL IT BE OBTAINED? For each parameter you need to know

Measured Direct reading? Computed on Aircraft or Post-Flight?

Constant Recording or Discrete Signal What triggers/toggles recording on/off?, eg:

Application of Aircraft Power Weight-on-Wheels Airspeed below a certain value for a certain time

Derived from data on Aircraft Bus Computed on Aircraft or Post-Flight?

Derived from Ground (Meta) Data Interrogation of hard-copy data from form? Interrogation of electronically stored data?

Will data be obtained from a central location or from geographically dispersed locations?


POTENTIAL PARAMETERS Continuous

Airspeed Centre-of-Gravity

Acceleration (Nzcg) Roll acceleration Pressure Altitude Radar Altitude Flap Position Aileron Position Elevator Position Float Position ( Continuous

Flow)

Discrete Weight-on-wheels Firebomb door sequencing

(weight) Supplementary Data

Fuel Load (Average Fuel Burn rate)

Flying Hours Configuration

Expansion 4-8 channels to address type

related issues if required Probably with strain gauges


O p e ra t io n a lB a s e # 1

O p e ra t io n a lB a s e # 2

O p e ra t io n a lB a s e # N

C e n t r a l P r o c e s s in gF a c i l i t y

E n g in e e r in gA n a ly s is

S t r u c t u ra lA n a l y s i s

C o r ro s io nA n a l y s i s

L i f e - C y c l eM a n a g e m e n t

I n s p e c t io n a n dM a in te n a n c e

O p e r a t o rF e e d b a c k

I n s p e c t io n sC o m p le te d

In s p e c t io n s /M a in te n a n c e

R e q u ire d

In s t r u m e n ta t i o nM a i n t e n a n c e a n d

S u p p o r t

“D a y - to -D a y ”M a n a g e m e n t

M e d iu m /L o n g -T e rm

M a n a g e m e n t


SOURCES OF DATA ERROR

Hardware Faulty Recorders and or Sensors Sensor installation problems Incorrect recorder initialization procedures

Software Incorrect data downloading and/or transcription Incorrect configuration tracking

Universal implementation of fleet-wide modifications Inappropriate application of Fill-in data


TYPES OF DATA ACQUISITION ERROR

Two general classifications Logical Errors - Errors that can easily be identified

as right or wrongRange checksEvent response frequency

Potential Errors - Errors which only become apparent over time and/or require detailed analysis by skilled personnelStrain gauge drift


FINAL DATA VALIDATION

Confirming initial (logical error) checks performed at operational bases

Evaluating potential error checks Strain gauge drift

Over time, implicit need for historical data Have to compare like data, implicit need to track data by

configuration Tracking initialization readings a good first start

Statistical Validation Beware of self-fulfilling prophecy Look for change in usage

Value of Exceedance curves and other tools


OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Primary requirement is to provide a minimal increase in operational workload

You will not get the data you require if: Acquisition equipment requires:

Too much hand holdingTakes too much time to download Is not straightforward to useCannot easily be maintained or supported

Benefits of collecting data you do not require!!!


PRELIMINARY CHARACTERIZATION OF FIREBOMBING ROLETBM/IAR/FAA C-130A FLARE PROGRAM

(YUMA ARIZONA February, 2003)


C-130A AIRCRAFT (3,000 gallon)

Flight Test at U.S Army Test Range in Yuma Arizona

End February 2003 Defined Profiles (No Fire)

Calibration Flights Typical Firebombing Terrain

Level and Mountainous Twelve Continuous

Parameters Accelerations Strains Control Positions

Eight Discrete Parameters


REMOVABLE TANK INSTALLATION


RECORDER HARDWARE


CONTROL POSITIONS


door closeddoor open


door opendoor closed


door closed

door open


OPERATIONAL DATA ACQUISITION ACTIVITIES2003 FIRE SEASON


OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES - 2003

TBM DC-7B Tanker 66 Approx 30 hrs Operational

Data

IAR C-130A Tanker 31 (Spain) Approx 50 hrs Operational

Data

Minden Aircraft P2-V7 Tanker 55 (Final Stages Instrumentation)

Aero Union P3-A Tanker 55 (Final Stages Instrumentation)


SEI CUMULATIVE FATIGUE RECORDER (CFR) MODEL A1002

The CFR Model A1002 made by SEI is capable of recording 24 analog signals, 16 digital signals and global positioning as an option

The analog signals will be 12 high level and 12 low level signals. The low level signals will be capable of accepting strain gauge type signals (millivolts).

The recorded flight data will be stored on a 32 megabyte PCMCIA card.

The weight of this unit is less than 3 pounds.

It is designed to DO-160 for environmental and EMI.


AIRCRAFT DATA ACQUISITION PROCESSING AND TRACKING (ADAPT) (Secure Web-based Download and Analysis)


WORLD-WIDE DATA MANAGEMENT AND ACCESS


INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS

Preliminary Aircraft Survey Three to four days

Production of Survey/Installation Report and approval by Local Regulatory Agencies (eg: FAA/FSDO)

One Week to ?????? Manufacture and Distribution of Installation Kits

Six to Eight weeks Initial Running of Wires and Equipment (Operator Personnel)

About one week of continuous effort Connection of equipment and validation of operation (SEI/Celeris Aerospace

Personnel) Connection of Sensors Continuity Checks etc. (approximately 1 day) Ground Calibration Checks (approximately 1 day) Flight Checks (approx 2 hours flying with some simulated drops using water) Training of Operational Crews on Data Upload System (approx 1 day, undertaken in

conjunction with calibration process


= 422nZ + 454 ± 59 (95%) = 366nZ + 445 ± 49

(95%)

Zero-g Strain Calibration


C-130A SPANISH DATA


C-130A SPAIN (High G – Flaps Down – Global View)


C-130A SPAIN (High G – Flaps Down – Detail View)

11500 12000 12500 13000TIME

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

-200.0

300.0

800.0

1300.0

1800.0

0.0

1000.0

2000.0

3000.0

4000.0

5000.0

NZ by TIME

STR.2 by TIME

ALTITUDE by TIME


EXAMPLE WING LOCATIONS - TBM DC-7

Centre-Spar Close View Left (Port Side) Wing, Looking Aft

Up

Inboard

Strain Gauge Location

Vertical c.g and Roll Accelerations

Control Position transducers

Discrete Signals to delineate flight phases

Strain Gauges:

3 Wing Locations (Matching Left and Right

1 Horizontal Stabilizer

1 Vertical Stabilizer


DC-7B CALIFORNIA FIRES(Steep Descent – High G Flaps Down)


DC-7B CALIFORNIA FIRES(Two Sequential Drops – Global View)


DC-7B CALIFORNIA FIRES(Two Sequential Drops – Detail View)


P-3A INSTALLATION

Cumulative Fatigue Recorder and Synchro to Analogue Converter

Left Aileron Position Transducer (String-Pot)

Airspeed and Altitude Transducers (Interface with Aircraft Pitot-Static System)

Left Wing Lower spar Cap Strain Gauge (Looking Aft)

Up

Inboard


LESSONS LEARNED - IMPLEMENTATION

Preferable to do the installation in the off-season Should be starting now for 2004 Funding for these type of activities can be challenging

Need for consistency in approval process Depending on experience of local regulatory authorities approval can take

anywhere from one to ten plus weeks Central area in regulatory agencies with expertize in the installation of structural

health monitoring systems Remote support capability for troubleshooting is essential

Take advantage of inherent remote support capabilities of Windows XP Regular Data downloading essential

Every one to two days when active on fire as large amounts of significant structural activity

Essential to make this a bullet proof and straightforward process with minimal data footprint (slower modem connection compressed files)


LESSONS LEARNED – PRELIMINARY DATA

G-Levels limits particularly with flaps down are exceeded on a frequent basis

Appears to be during or after drop However, CORRESPONDING STRAIN/STRESS LEVELS ARE

NOT THAT HIGH G has traditionally been used as a proxy for strain Transport aircraft conservative but OK Firebombing where large instantaneous change in weight it may be

inappropriate For Firebombing harsh or unusual usage should be based on

combined G and strain criteria? Should ensure safe operation but minimize unnecessary in-field

inspections and or change-out of aircraft Better feel for this aspect once additional data has been

collected during the 2004 fire season


OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO LONGER-TERM ISSUES


THREE PRONGED APPROACH

ONGOING SAFE AND ECONOMIC

MANAGEMENT OF CURRENT FLEET

STRATEGIC FIREBOMBING MANAGEMENT

PLAN

(Ten Year Sliding Window)

REGULATORY AND CERTIFICATION

ISSUES

TRANSITIONING TO REPLACEMENT

AIRCRAFT


FLEET REPLACEMENT Based on current financial and practical limitations

current fleet replacement is realistically five to seven and more likely ten years away

Implies have to address issues related to current aircraft as there is no “short-term” fix

Two Implications There is a need to monitor the existing fleet as it is going to

be around for some time Efforts devoted to doing this will not be wasted as the data

collected will both help to ensure ongoing safety and provide a basis of selection for future firebombing aircraft

Prior to conversion and usage


REGULATORY AND CERTIFICATION ISSUES

Regulatory and Certification Authorities have to be involved in the process as ultimately they determine the airworthiness criteria against which the aircraft will be evaluated

Direct impact of their cost and economic viability

There are a number of issues which need to be addressed with the industry to ensure safe, economic and practical provision of firebombing services

Change Product Rule (CPR) Impact/Implications on future aircraft conversions

Pending NPRM on evaluation basis of operational aircraft over the next ten years Impact/Implications for existing firebombing fleet

Access to engineering and support data In the light of liability/risk concerns versus potential revenue streams Relevance of this data from an aging aircraft perspective

Agreed Firebombing Certification Methodology? Based on a recognition of the unique and challenging demands of this role


TRANSITIONING TO REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT

Fleet Replacement Suitable Aircraft

Capability to carry/deliver the retardant Evaluating the ability of the structure to perform in the firebombing

role Development of a firebombing specification ??

Economic Basis Investment in alternate aircraft Ongoing monitoring of firebombing aircraft Fatigue and Damage Tolerance Basis

Maintenance and Inspection Intervals Delivery and Payment Models

Significant re-thinking of these issues as it would appear that the costs associated with the Blue Ribbon panel recommendations are not compatible with the current levels of funding


ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS Addressing all the issues related to the ongoing safe and economic operation of

firebombing aircraft is a task for which no one organization would appear to have sufficient resources

Although this environment is a competitive one, there are significant economic benefits to collaboration on issues that effect everyone

Common recorder usage Common data collection and validation Combined efforts for fatigue and damage tolerance analysis of similar aircraft types

Now that the USDA/FS and SNL have developed the Infrastructure they are prepared to let other organizations can take advantage of this infrastructure on a cost recovery basis

Cost-effective way of implementation that allows everybody to benefit from generic data and trends

Coordination of efforts and regular exchange of information between regulatory agencies, client organizations and operators

Wealth of experience distributed through a variety of forums Can a system of meetings and working groups be set-up to disseminate information and develop policies and

procedures that would be beneficial to all?


THE MISSING LINKS

Predominantly focused on large airtankers Other aircraft involved in firebombing

operations may be just as critical as they all work in a similar environment Smaller multi-engine and single engine airtankers Lead Aircraft Spotter (Bird-dog?) aircraft Rotary Wing Aircraft


PENDING ACTIVITIES Collect data from existing instrumented aircraft and hopefully instrument more

aircraft during the 2004 fire season Funding Provisions are a challenge – more reliance on inter-agency collaboration? These activities need to be commenced within the next month

Develop a consistent and coherent certification and operational monitoring mechanism in collaboration with regulatory agencies and operators

Make best use of resources Avoid frustration

Develop a certification and fatigue/damage tolerance template using data from the existing program

Confidence and consistency of approach Cost-Effective as approval of a plethora of approaches will not be required

Develop collaborative efforts with other North American and non North American Agencies

Benefits of accumulating data to characterize the firebombing role quicker Shared lessons learnt improve both safety and the cost-effectiveness of

implementation


CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

There is an urgent safety and economic need to fully characterize the loads experienced in the firebombing role Existing Aircraft Develop specifications for future aircraft

Due to the variability of operation, individual aircraft (total fleet) tracking systems should be implemented as soon as possible

Initial data acquisition should be expanded to lead aircraft as soon as possible Appear to experience the most severe usage and yet are currently not monitored

Programs to assess how best lower capacity multi-engine aircraft, single engine aircraft and rotary wing aircraft can best be monitored should be explored as soon as possible

A consistent and coherent certification and evaluation mechanism should be developed between contracting agencies, regulatory agencies and operators as soon as practicable

Validation through a template based on analysis of one or more existing aircraft types

The establishment of a Strategic Firebombing Structural Health Management Plan (Rolling Ten Year Window) for the Acquisition and Ongoing Operation of all Fixed and Rotary-wing Aircraft Involved in Firebombing Roles is essential if the ongoing safe and economic operation of current and existing fleets is to be ensured

Reflect, current and future requirements together with associated funding levels It is hard to envisage how the approaches recommended by the Blue Ribbon panel as a consequence of the 2002 heavy airtanker accidents

can be implemented within the current funding structure

Inter-agency and International collaboration for the assessment of aircraft in the firebombing role will provide the quickest and most-cost-effective method of addressing the many common challenges that are faced by all agencies using aircraft in this role


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TBM, IAR who have initiated and supported a lot of this recent

work Woody Grantham/Fritz Wester (IAR) Norm Stubbs (TBM)

FAA, USDA/FS and Sandia Laboratories for their ongoing support of the recent work

John Howford, Tom Defiore, Carl Gray, Todd Martin and Steve Edgar of FAA

Tony Kern and Ron Livingston of USDA/FS

Staff members at Celeris Aerospace and SEI who have established an infrastructure for structural health monitoring of heavy airtankers and lead aircraft in an incredibly short time-frame


CONTACTING THE PRESENTER

Celeris Aerospace Canada Inc.880 Taylor Creek Drive

Orleans, Ontario

CANADA, K1C 1T1

Tel: (613) 837-1161

FAX: (613) 834-6420

InternetSteve Hall - [email protected]

Webpage - http://www.celeris.ca

presentation at 7 th annual wildland fire safety summit, toronto, ontario, canada 19th july,2003

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