presentation: actual and perceived effects of offshoring

Actual and Perceived Effects of Offshoring on Economic Security

William Milberg,Schwartz Center for Economic Policy AnalysisSchwartz Center for Economic Policy AnalysisNew School for Social Research

Deborah WinklerThe World Bank and the Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysisy

Peterson InstituteOctober 4th, 2011

E i I it i I d t i li d C t iEconomic Insecurity in Industrialized Countries2

Economic Performance, Golden Age versus Post-Golden Economic Performance, Golden Age versus Post Golden Age (CAGR unless otherwise indicated)

Denmark France Germany Japan United Kingdom

United States

Gross Domestic Product* (CAGR)

1950 1973 3 8% 5 0% 6 0% 9 3% 2 9% 3 9%1950-1973 3.8% 5.0% 6.0% 9.3% 2.9% 3.9%1980-2007 2.1% 2.0% 2.2% 2.3% 2.5% 3.0%

GDP per Person Employed* (CAGR)

1950-1973 2.9% 4.7% 4.7% 7.5% 2.4% 2.3%1950 1973 2.9% 4.7% 4.7% 7.5% 2.4% 2.3%1980-2007 1.7% 1.5% 0.8% 1.8% 2.1% 1.6%

Average Unemployment Rate (Percent of Labor Force)

1956-1973 1.1%** 1.9% 1.3% 1.5% 1.8% 5.0%

Source: Milberg and Winkler (2010b). Data: The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, January 2008. OECD Labor Force Statistics. *Converted at Geary Khamis PPPs. **Average based on 1960, 1965, 1967, 1969-1973.

1980-2006 7.2% 10.1% 7.6% 3.3% 7.9% 6.2%

E i I it i I d t i li d C t iEconomic Insecurity in Industrialized Countries3

Labor Share (% of GDP), 1970-2006Labor Share (% of GDP), 1970 2006

62 5%

65.0%

55.0%

57.5%

60.0%

62.5%

e (%

of G

DP)

47.5%

50.0%

52.5%

Labo

r S

hare

42.5%

45.0%

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Source: Milberg and Winkler (2010b). Data: OECD Annual National Accounts Statistics.

Denmark France Germany Japan United Kingdom United States

Elasticity of trade to world income, 1960-now

Freund (2009) Freund (2009) 1960s: 1.77 1970s: 1 94 1970s: 1.94 1980s: 2.75 1990 3 36 1990s: 3.36 2000s: 3.69

Different Labor Market Regimes5

Policy Indicators of Labor SupportPolicy Indicators of Labor Support

Denmark France Germany Japan UK USNet Unemployment Replacement Rate 2001 80.1% 73.9% 68.5% 61.4% 49.4% 58.8%Short-term (%) 2007 77.8% 71.4% 66.5% 59.7% 57.1% 55.7%

Net Unemployment Replacement Rate 2001 76.8% 53.6% 65.0% 55.4% 60.9% 28.9%Long-term (%) 2007 74.1% 53.0% 59.5% 55.9% 58.9% 24.3%

Public Expenditures for Active 1985 4.7% 2.1% 1.7% n.a. 2.3% 0.8%Labor Market Programs (% of GDP) 1991 5.9% 2.3% 2.9% 0.6% 1.5% 0.9%

2001 4.1% 2.6% 3.2% 0.8% 0.6% 0.7%

Source: Milberg and Winkler (2011). Data: OECD Social Expenditures and OECD Tax-Benefit Models. NB: Short-term benefits refer to unemployment benefits that are paid within the first year of unemployment.

Long-term benefits refer to unemployment benefits which are paid after five years of unemployment.

2008 2.6% 2.0% 1.9% 0.6% 0.5% 1.0%

Diff L b M k R i6

Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation

Different Labor Market Regimes

Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation

1991 2001 20081991 2001 2008Denmark 2.40 1.50 1.50France 2.98 3.05 3.05Germany 3 17 2 34 2 12Germany 3.17 2.34 2.12Japan 1.84 1.43 1.43United Kingdom 0.60 0.68 0.75United States 0 21 0 21 0 21

Source: Milberg and Winkler (2011). Data: OECD Labor Statistics. NB: Higher values indicate stricter regulation on hiring and firing. Scale from 0 (least stringent) to 6 (most restrictive).

United States 0.21 0.21 0.21

Diff L b M k R i7

Five Different Labor Market Regimes


“Anglo-Saxon model”: U.S., U.K., Australia, Canada, Ireland, and New Zealand “Mediterranean model”: France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain

Source: Milberg and Winkler (2010b). Data: OECD Employment Outlook 2004, OECD Social Expenditures and OECD Tax-Benefit Models.

Mediterranean model : France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain“Rhineland model”: Sweden, Germany, and Austria“Flexicurity model”: Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, and Belgium“East Asian model”: Japan and Korea

Diff L b M k R i8




Model Anglo-Saxon Mediterranean Rhineland Flexicurity East AsianLabor support low low medium to high high lowLabor flexibility high low medium to low medium to high mediumCountries Australia France Austria Belgium Japan

Canada Greece Germany Denmark KoreayIreland Portugal Norway FinlandNew Zealand Spain Sweden NetherlandsU.K.U.S.

Source: Milberg and Winkler (2011). Data: OECD Labor Force Statistics and OECD Going for Growth 2010 Database.* Public expenditures on Labor Market Programs include all measures except for “public employment services and administration”.

D i G i f Off h iDynamic Gains from Offshoring9

Static and Dynamic Effects of OffshoringStatic and Dynamic Effects of Offshoring •Substitution effect

Offshoring outputP DY I Output ProductivityinputP DL

DL

DL

Profits

y L•Productivity effect

outputP•Mark-up effect

DL•Scale effect

DYFinancialization

Source: Milberg and Winkler (2010a).

Off h i d th L b Sh i OECD C t iOffshoring and the Labor Share in OECD Countries10

We adopt Bentolila and Saint-Paul’s (2003) model of the labor share, LS, which assumes CES technology, yielding the following expression for the labor share of gy, y g g pincome:

(1) (1 )( ) 1 ( )B LLS A kγ

γα α− ⋅= = − ⋅

Capital intensity, i.e. the capital-output ratio, is defined as:

1 ( )( ) (1 )( )

LS A kA K B Lγ γ α

α α= = − ⋅

⋅ + − ⋅

(2)1/

Kkγγ⎛ ⎞

= ⎜ ⎟

The profit share, PS, is defined analogously, and thus

( ) (1 )( )k

A K B Lγ γα α= ⎜ ⎟⋅ + − ⋅⎝ ⎠

(3) 1PS LS+ =


• Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) identify two sources of Bentolila and Saint Paul (2003) identify two sources of deviation from this relationship:▫ capital-augmenting technological progress induced changes, for

example by import price fluctuations, and ▫ divergence between wages and productivity, brought on, for

example by a shift in labor bargaining power example, by a shift in labor bargaining power • This leaves four explanatory variables in the labor share

model: ▫ technological progress▫ capital intensity

d ▫ import prices and ▫ labor bargaining power


• Taking logarithms we obtain:Taking logarithms we obtain:

0 1 2 3 4ln ln ln ln lnit it it it ctLS A k MP UNDβ β β β β= + + + +

• We estimate the following version of the model:

0 1 2 3 4ln ln ln ln lnit it it it ct i t itLS LP k OFF UND D Dβ β β β β ε= + + + + + + +

• Interacting offshoring with a policy indicator at the country

0 1 2 3 4it it it it ct i t itβ β β β β

level yields the following equation:

0 1 2 3 4ln ln ln ln lnit it it it ctLS LP k OFF UNDβ β β β β= + + + +

1 1 2 1ln *it ct ct i t itOFF policy policy D Dδ δ ε− −+ + + + +


• Regression Results, Fixed Effects Estimator, 1991-2008Dependent variable: lnLSt 1991-2008 1991-1999 2000-2008

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) lnLPt lnkt lnOFF

-0.0434*** -0.0370** -0.0370** (0.006) (0.016) (0.017) 0.0904*** 0.0978*** 0.0978*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

0 0292*** 0 0292***

-0.0596*** -0.0438** (0.000) (0.014) 0.0883*** 0.1096*** (0.000) (0.000) 0 1154*** 0 0620***

-0.1020*** -0.1290*** (0.001) (0.000) 0.1207*** 0.1117** (0.003) (0.011) 0 0759*** 0 0620***

-0.0936** -0.1200*** -0.0332 -0.0339 (0.039) (0.009) (0.601) (0.601) 0.1658*** 0.1649*** 0.2484*** 0.2508*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0 0208 0 0172 0 1235 0 0039lnOFFt

lnUNDt lnOFFt*EPLt-1 EPLt-1

0.0292*** 0.0292*** (0.000) (0.000) 0.0004 (0.994)

0.1154*** 0.0620***(0.000) (0.000) 0.0969* -0.0059 (0.060) (0.918) -0.0333*** (0.000) -0.0442*** (0.007)

0.0759*** 0.0620***(0.002) (0.001) 0.0203 -0.0701 (0.774) (0.348) -0.0262*** (0.002) -0.0312 (0.302)

0.0208 -0.0172 -0.1235 0.0039(0.556) (0.499) (0.173) (0.931) 0.3280 0.4158** 0.1023 0.2197 (0.124) (0.049) (0.611) (0.297) 0.0006 (0.964) -0.0317 (0.328)

lnOFFt*LMPt-1 LMPt-1 lnOFFt*URB_STt-1 URB_STt-1

-0.6950*** (0.006) -2.6858*** (0.005)

-1.1893*** (0.001) -5.0643*** (0.000)

1.9128* (0.053) -1.3638 (0.631) 0.2366* (0.067) 0.5585*

(0.078)lnOFFt*URB_LTt-1 URB_LTt-1

( ) 0.0602 (0.422) -0.0599 (0.887)

R-squared (within) Observations Countries Sectors by country

0.11 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.1 4,443 4,234 4,234 4,073 3,665 15 15 15 15 15 302 302 302 302 302

0.16 0.18 2,201 1,918 15 15 302 261

0.16 0.19 0.18 0.18 1,570 1,486 1,268 1,268 15 15 15 15 302 302 302 302

Source: Milberg and Winkler (2011). NB: p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.01 The regression analysis covers 21 manufacturing sectors in 15 OECD countries.

Sectors by country Fixed year effects Country-year clusters F-test of joint significance: lnOFFt + lnOFFt*policyt-1 = 0

302 302 302 302 302Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes p>F=0.0000 p>F=0.0001

302 261Yes Yes Yes Yes p>F=0.0051 p>F=0.0013

302 302 302 302Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes p>F=0.5269 p>F=0.1060 p>F=0.0366 p>F=0.1574


• Offshoring and the Labor Share by Country, Fixed Effects Estimator, 1991-2008

Dependent variable: lnLS t

Offshoring p-value Offshoring p-value Offshoring p-value1991-2008 1991-1999 2000-2008

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Australia 0.1268*** 0.0010 0.1404*** 0.0060 -0.0414 0.3400Austria 0.1246** 0.0140 0.0099 0.5270 0.3045+++ 0.0080Denmark -0.0021 0.8490 0.0283++ 0.0480 0.0363 0.4560Finland 0 0396+ 0 0780 0 0406 0 3650 -0 0989 0 1660Finland 0.0396 0.0780 0.0406 0.3650 0.0989 0.1660Germany 0.1255*** 0.0000 0.1179*** 0.0070 0.1484++ 0.0430Italy 0.0503++ 0.0170 -0.0449* 0.0680 -0.0435 0.2550Japan -0.0277+ 0.0700 0.0088 0.6390 -0.0868+ 0.0770Korea 0.0139 0.3400 0.0502* 0.0860 -0.0307 0.1720Netherlands 0.1390*** 0.0080 0.0611 0.1860 0.2340++ 0.0120Norway 0.0803** 0.0480 0.0139 0.7670 0.0045 0.9410Portugal -0.0269 0.1880 -0.0595** 0.0420 -0.0769** 0.0200Spain -0.0331** 0.0420 -0.0653** 0.0310 -0.0931*** 0.0000Sweden 0.0436 0.1140 -0.0009 0.9810 0.1715* 0.0730UK 0.0001 0.9980 0.0139 0.7800 0.0589 0.4770US -0.1369** 0.0140 -0.0609 0.2050 -0.2268+ 0.0950

Source: Milberg and Winkler (2011). NB: p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.01 for instantaneous effect of offshoring (lnOFFt). p+<0.1, p++<0.05, p+++<0.001 for lagged effect of offshoring (lnOFFt-1).


• Offshoring and the Labor Share by Country Grouping, Fixed Effects Estimator, 1991-2008

Dependent variable: lnLSt Anglo-Saxon model Mediterranean Rhineland Flexicurity East-Asian model model model model

(1a) (1b) (2) (3) (4) (5) lnLPt lnkt

-0.0280* (0.098) -0.0503 (0 113)

-0.0109 (0.499) -0.1129*** (0 000)

-0.1298** (0.024) 0.1378* (0 089)

-0.1971*** (0.001) -0.0233 (0 412)

-0.2606*** (0.000) 0.1434*** (0 000)

0.0048 (0.772) 0.1224*** (0 000)

lnOFFt lnUNDt

(0.113)0.0472** (0.018) 0.2498** (0.014)

(0.000)-0.0425* (0.078) 0.8931** (0.019)

(0.089)-0.0316*** (0.004) -0.1387 (0.100)

(0.412)0.0741*** (0.000) 0.3408** (0.015)

(0.000)0.0330** (0.030) 0.2680* (0.093)

(0.000)-0.0029 (0.798) 0.6473*** (0.000)

R-squared (within) 0.08 0.21 0.13 0.31 0.33 0.17q ( )Observations Countries Fixed year effects C t l t

875 Australia, UK, US Yes Y

560 UK, US Yes Y

533 Portugal, Spain Yes Y

827 Austria, Germany,Sweden Yes Y

856 Denmark, Finland, Netherlands Yes Y

620 Japan, Korea Yes Y

Source: Milberg and Winkler (2011). NB: p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.001 (p-values in parentheses).

Country-year clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Summary of Econometric Results

Over full sample (15 OECD countries, 21 sectors, Over full sample (15 OECD countries, 21 sectors, 1990-2008): Greater offshoring intensity associated with higher labor share.gBut this veils important variation over time and space:pFor 2000-2008: Offshoring associated with lower labor share.Effect varies by country, esp. by labor market “regime”.U.S. estimate is negative and significant.

Off h i d P ti f E i I it17

Correlation of Actual and Perceived Insecurity due to

Offshoring and Perceptions of Economic Insecurity

Correlation of Actual and Perceived Insecurity due to Offshoring

AT*0 30

0.35

008

NL*

AT

SE*

DE*0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

he labor share,

ountry, 2000

‐20

IT*DK

UK

PT*FI

‐0.05

0.00

0.05

0.10

offshoring

on th

oefficients by

co

ES* FI

‐0.15

‐0.10

‐4 ‐2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16Effect of o

regression

co

"When you hear the word 'globalisation', what comes first to mind?"

Source: Milberg and Winkler (2011). Survey data: Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the EU, various surveys. * Significant estimates.

Answer: "Relocation of labour to countries where labor is cheaper"% points change, Fall 2004 ‐ Spring 2008

Off h i d P ti f E i I it18

Correlation of Actual and Perceived Insecurity due to

Offshoring and Perceptions of Economic Insecurity

Correlation of Actual and Perceived Insecurity due to Globalization

AT*0 30

0.35

008

AT*

DE*

NL*

SE*0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

he labor share,

ountry, 2000

‐20

DK

DE

IT*PT*

UK

‐0.05

0.00

0.05

0.10

offshoring

on th

oefficients by

co

FI

ES*‐0.15

‐0.10

‐25 ‐20 ‐15 ‐10 ‐5 0 5 10Effect of o

regression

co

"Which of the following two propositions is the one which is closest to your opinion

Source: Milberg and Winkler (2011). Survey data: Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the EU, various surveys. * Significant estimates.

with regard to globalisation?" Answer: "Threat to employment and companies"% points change, Spring 2006 ‐ Fall 2008)

Gains from offshoring: Static and Dynamic

Static gains: Efficiency gains from lower cost of inputs Static gains: Efficiency gains from lower cost of inputs and focus on « core competence. » Dynamic gains: lower input costs and higher profits y g p g pgenerate business expenditure (investment) bringing employment, productivity growth and innovation.

With dynamic gains, offshoring may raise the profit share in the short run but generate long-run growth.

Research on dynamic gains focuses on the U.S. case.

Off h i d Fi i li ti i th U SOffshoring and Financialization in the U.S.20

• U.S. Profit Shares, 1970-2007

40%

45%

GV

A

30%

35%

40%

its a

s sh

are

of G

20%

25%

%

Gro

ss p

rofi

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Gross corporate profits as share of corporate GVAGross nonfinancial corporate profits as share of nonfinancial corporate GVAGross financial profits as share of financial corporate GVA

Source: Milberg and Winkler (2010a). Data: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.NB: Gross profits are calculated by adding net operating surplus and consumption of fixed capital. Their sum is divided by gross value added. Gray bars correspond to U.S. business cycles recessions according to the definition of the NBER.

Gross financial profits as share of financial corporate GVA

U.S. Import, profit, and investment shares, 1970 2006/071970-2006/07

Source: Milberg and Winkler (2010). Data: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and ProductAccounts; UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. NB: Gross profits are calculated by adding net operating surplusand consumption of fixed capital. Their sum is divided by gross value added. Gray bars correspond to U.S. business cycles recessions according to the definition of the NBER.

U.S. Investment Shares, Total and Non financial Corporations 1970 2007

22

Non-financial Corporations, 1970-2007

100%

ts 20.0%

I

85%

90%

95%

e of

gro

ss p

rofit

ate

busi

ness

)

12.5%

15.0%

17.5%

as s

hare

of G

DI

70%

75%

80%

stm

ent a

s sh

are

nanc

ial c

orpo

ra

5 0%

7.5%

10.0%

ed in

vest

men

t a

60%

65%

70%

70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07

Fixe

d in

ves

(non

fin

0.0%

2.5%

5.0%

Priv

ate

fix

197

197

197

197

197

197

197

197

197

197

198

198

198

198

198

198

198

198

198

198

199

199

199

199

199

199

199

199

199

199

200

200

200

200

200

200

200

200

Fixed investment as share of gross profits (nonfinancial corporate business)

Private fixed investment as share of GDI

6 October, 2011Based on a paper of William Milberg and Deborah Winkler

Source: Own illustration. Data: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts. U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, Flow of Funds Account, Schedule Z.1. NB: Gross profits of nonfinancial corporate business are calculated by adding net operating surplus and consumption of fixed capital. Gray bars correspond to U.S. business cycles recessions according to the definition of the NBER.

Net Dividends plus Share Buybacks as % of Internal Funds, 1960-2008, U.S. Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business

23

1960 2008, U.S. Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business

160%

120%

140%

60%

80%

100%

20%

40%

0%

196

0-I

196

1-I

196

2-I

196

3-I

196

4-I

196

5-I

196

6-I

196

7-I

196

8-I

196

9-I

197

0-I

197

1-I

197

2-I

197

3-I

197

4-I

197

5-I

197

6-I

197

7-I

197

8-I

197

9-I

198

0-I

198

1-I

198

2-I

198

3-I

198

4-I

198

5-I

198

6-I

198

7-I

198

8-I

198

9-I

199

0-I

199

1-I

199

2-I

199

3-I

199

4-I

199

5-I

199

6-I

199

7-I

199

8-I

199

9-I

200

0-I

200

1-I

200

2-I

200

3-I

200

4-I

200

5-I

200

6-I

200

7-I

200

8-I

6 October, 2011Based on a paper of William Milberg and Deborah Winkler

Source: Own illustration. Data: U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, Flow of Funds Account, Schedule Z.1. NB: Quarterly figures are seasonally adjusted annual rates; share buybacks correspond to negative net new equity issues. Graybars correspond to U.S. business cycles recessions according to the definition of the NBER.

Dual role of offshoring in the leakage of dynamic gains from tradedynamic gains from trade

1. Raises profits that provide internal funds for 1. Raises profits that provide internal funds for financial asset purchases.2. Lowers the need for domestic investment since 2. Lowers the need for domestic investment since “tasks” are performed offshore.

Repurchases and Dividend payments, Top 30 Nonfinancial, Non-energy Corporations (percent of company net i 2000 2007)

25

income over 2000-2007)Rank Company

Stock repurchases

Cash dividends

Stock repurchases plus cash dividends

1 Microsoft 80 63 1432 IBM 63 15 783 Pfizer 76 61 1373 Pfizer 76 61 1374 General Electric 29 49 795 Ciscco Systems 151 0 1516 Intel 93 18 1107 Procter&Gamble 80 44 1248 Hewlett-Packard 128 33 1609 H D t 54 16 709 Home Depot 54 16 70

10 Wal-Mart Stores 31 20 5111 Johnson & Johnson 39 37 7612 Dell 136 0 13613 Time Warner -56 -4 -6014 Oracle 92 0 9215 AT&T Inc 25 65 9016 Pepsico 64 35 9917 United Health Group 95 1 9518 Amgen 126 0 12619 Altria Group 26 56 8220 Walt Disney 92 27 11820 Walt Disney 92 27 11821 UPS 64 34 9922 CBS -70 -9 -7823 Texas Instruments 108 10 11924 Merck 34 53 8725 3M 58 43 101

ld26 McDonalds 64 30 9427 Boeing 69 33 10228 Allstate 49 27 7729 Anheuser-Busch 69 37 10630 Wellpoint 99 0 99

Implications for sustainability of globalization

1. Trade liberalization will increase task trade. 1. Trade liberalization will increase task trade. 2. Labor market institutions and regulations significant in mediating effect of offshoring on significant in mediating effect of offshoring on economic security. More labor market support associated with more positive effect.p3. Corporate financial considerations can significantly affect the capture of dynamic gains from trade.4. Fear of offshoring not rooted in myth: Actual and perceived effects of offshoring are correlated.

Thank you!y

[email protected]@newschool.edu

Backup slidesp


Offshoring Intensities in OECD Countries, 1991-2008Offshoring Intensities in OECD Countries, 1991 2008Manufacturing imports from low and middle income countries in total manufacturing imports

22%

16%

18%

20%Norway

Denmark

A i

8%

10%

12%

14% Austria

Sweden

P t l

4%

6%

8%

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Portugal

Source: Milberg and Winkler (2011). Data: UN Comtrade. NB: Manufacturing imports comprise imports to sectors 15 to 36 at the two-digit ISIC Rev 3 level.



32%

24%

28%

Finland

Italy

12%

16%

20% Netherlands

Spain

4%

8%

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

UK




40%

45%

50%

55%Japan

US

25%

30%

35% Korea

Australia

10%

15%

20%

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Germany


presentation: actual and perceived effects of offshoring

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