Preparing to Be Unprepared:Preparing to Be Unprepared:Human ResourcesHuman Resources

Susanne Jul, PhDPacific Disaster Center

sjul@pdc.org

Presented by:Canadian Centre forEmergency Preparedness

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Disclaimer

• Work done, in part, at the Pacific Disaster Center under a National Research Council postdoctoral fellowship

• However, not directly related to PDC operations– PDC operations focused on geographic information

analysis (primarily for mitigation efforts)

• Research supplemented with personal experience with American Red Cross Disaster Services

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Anne

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To Be Prepared

We need to have a) More people

b) More planning

c) More training

d) More exercises

e) More supplies

f) More money

g) All of the above

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But, What About When

We don’t havehavea) More people?

b) More planning?

c) More training?

d) More exercises?

e) More supplies?

f) More money?

g) All of the above?

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Claim

• Preparedness is an illusion– It is impossible to prepare for all possible events

• Responders and response organizations need to function in situations and under circumstances for which they are unprepared

Preparedness Is An Illusion

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Sociological Evidence

• Disaster sociology has been a field of systematic study since ~1950

• Literature predominantly reflects responses to natural disastersnatural disasters in North AmericaNorth America

• Three dimensions of events correlated with response characteristics– Scale– Kind– “Anticipability”

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Local Emergency Local Disaster Disaster Catastrophic Disaster

Example 1997 Paris traffic accident

2006 Mountain View apartment complex fire

9/11 Terrorist attack,

1989 Loma Prieta earthquake

1918 Flu Pandemic,

2004 US hurricane season,

2005 Hurricane Katrina

Impact on community infrastructure

Localized effects, if any Localized damage or loss Extensive damage or destruction

Impact on response infrastructure

Largely unaffected Localized damage or loss Extensive damage or destruction, and/or completely overwhelmed

Adequacy of response measures

Within local planning Exceeds local capacity but within greater response capacity

Exceeds all planning and capacity

Organizational emergence

Only established organizations mobilized

Established and expanding organizations mobilized

Established, expanding, extending and emergent organizations mobilized

Scope Only part of single community and official jurisdiction affected

Single community and official jurisdiction affected

Multiple communities and official jurisdictions affected

Duration Hours-weeks Weeks-months Months-years

Scale

• A measure of the extentextent of the effects of an event 5, 6, 9, 12

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“DRC typology” 6

Organizational Emergence

• Emergence– Spontaneous involvement and behavior of individuals and

organizations 3, 4, 5, 6

Tasks

Routine Non-Routine

Operational Organizational

Structure

Same as pre-disaster

I. Established

(e.g., city emergency services)

III. Extending

(e.g., city council or church community)

New II. Expanding

(e.g., American Red Cross)

IV. Emergent

(e.g., community group formed to collect donations)

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Local Emergency Local Disaster Disaster Catastrophic Disaster

Example 1997 Paris traffic accident

2006 Mountain View apartment complex fire

9/11 Terrorist attack,

1989 Loma Prieta earthquake

1918 Flu Pandemic,

2004 US hurricane season,

2005 Hurricane Katrina

Impact on community infrastructure

Localized effects, if any Localized damage or loss Extensive damage or destruction

Impact on response infrastructure

Largely unaffected Localized damage or loss Extensive damage or destruction, and/or completely overwhelmed

Adequacy of response measures

Within local planning Exceeds local capacity but within greater response capacity

Exceeds all planning and capacity

Organizational emergence

Only established organizations mobilized

Established and expanding organizations mobilized

Established, expanding, extending and emergent organizations mobilized

Scope Only part of single community and official jurisdiction affected

Single community and official jurisdiction affected

Multiple communities and official jurisdictions affected

Duration Hours-weeks Weeks-months Months-years

Scale

There will always be a response that exceeds actual preparedness

Even small responses depend on responders and responding organizations with limited or no training, knowledge or experience in disaster management

• A measure of the extentextent of the effects of an event 5, 6, 9, 12

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Kind

• An indicator of the typestypes of effects of an event 6, 11, 13

Agency 10

Consensus Conflict

Affect 6

Community disaster Natural hazard event Social conflicts

Sector disaster Technology failure Sabotage

Trans-system social rupture (TSSR) 12

Pandemic Computer virus

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Kind

• An indicator of the types of effects of an event 6, 11, 13

Agency 10

Consensus Conflict

Affect 6

Community disaster Natural hazard event Social conflicts

Sector disaster Technology failure Sabotage

Trans-system social rupture (TSSR) 12

Pandemic Computer virus

Many responses depend on responders with specialized skills that are unrelated to conventional disaster management

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“Anticipability”

• A measure of the possibility of preparingpossibility of preparing for a particular event 7

Predictability = Imaginability + Believability

Easy Hard

Influenceability

Easy 1. Conventional

(e.g., 1986 Chernobyl)

2. Unexpected

(e.g., 1979 Three Mile Island)

Hard 3. Intractable

(e.g., 2005 Hurricane Katrina)

4. Fundamental

(e.g., 9/11 Terrorist attack)

There will always be a response that we have not imagined or believed could be needed

There will always be a response that we cannot anticipate

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Summary

1. Even small responses depend on responders and responding organizations with limited or no training, knowledge or experience in disaster management

2. There will always be a response that exceeds actual preparedness

3. Many responses depend on responders with specialized skills that are unrelated to conventional disaster management skills

4. There will always be a response that we have not imagined or believed could be needed

5. There will always be a response that we cannot anticipate

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In Other Words,

• Preparedness is an illusion– It is impossible to prepare for all possible events

• Responders and response organizations need to function in situations and under circumstances for which they are unprepared

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But Wait!

• Even if it were possible to prepare for all possible events, resource limitations make it impossible

• In fact, resource limitations make it impossible to prepare for those events for which it isis possible to prepare

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Resource Limitations

• Planners generally not resource controllers 1, 10

– Public vs. private sector– Staff vs. line management

• Given the reality of limited resources, resource controllers must prioritize certain, near-certain and immediate threats (i.e., routine events) 10

– Perceived low-probability and distant threats (i.e., disasters) lose out

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Scared?

• Can’t prepare for all possible events• Even if we could, we don’t have the necessary

resources• Yet everyone expects (and needs) us to be

prepared for any event!

What to do?What to do?

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Continue Conventional Preparedness

Prepare Not to Be Scared!

Work on getting a) More people

b) More planning

c) More training

d) More exercises

e) More supplies

f) More money

g) All of the above

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• Augment conventional preparedness• Prepare responders and response organizations

to leverage available resourcesleverage available resources– People– Supplies

Prepare to Be Scared!Prepare to Be Scared!

Prepare to Be Unprepared

Preparing to Be Unprepared (PUp):Human Resources

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Problem

• Current response model is expert modelexpert model– Prepare expert respondersexpert responders and teams to accomplish

response– Develop expertise beforebefore performing response tasks

Task-relevant knowledge

Task-specific General domain Little

Knowledge of disaster response

Extensive Super-expert Functional semi-expert Functional inexpert

Some Expert Semi-expert Functional inexpert

Little Specialist Semi-specialist Inexpert

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Problem

• Current response model is expert modelexpert model– Prepare expert respondersexpert responders and teams to accomplish

response– Develop expertise beforebefore performing response tasks

Task-relevant knowledge

Task-specific General domain Little

Knowledge of disaster response

Extensive Super-expert Functional semi-expert Functional inexpert

Some Expert Semi-expert Functional inexpert

Little Specialist Semi-specialist Inexpert

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Reality

• Experts are a scarce resource– We can’t train enough of them in advance– We can’t train the right expertise in advance– If further learning is not supported, crash courses are

often just that

Task-relevant knowledge

Task-specific General domain Little

Knowledge of disaster response

Extensive Super-expert Functional semi-expert Functional inexpert

Some Expert Semi-expert Functional inexpert

Little Specialist Semi-specialist Inexpert

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Reality

• Experts are a scarce resource– We can’t train enough of them in advance– We can’t train the right expertise in advance– If further learning is not supported, crash courses are

often just that

Task-relevant knowledge

Task-specific General domain Little

Knowledge of disaster response

Extensive Super-expert Functional semi-expert Functional inexpert

Some Expert Semi-expert Functional inexpert

Little Specialist Semi-specialist Inexpert

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PUp Strategy

• Plan for semi-semi- and inexpert respondersinexpert responders and response organizations to accomplish response

• Prepare for developing expertise whilewhile performing response tasks

• Reserve experts to guide, teach and mentorguide, teach and mentor

Task-relevant knowledge

Task-specific General domain Little

Knowledge of disaster response

Extensive Super-expert Functional semi-expert Functional inexpert

Some Expert Semi-expert Functional inexpert

Little Specialist Semi-specialist Inexpert

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PUp Techniques

• Prepare tools and matériel for inexpertsinexperts• Train coachcoach respondersresponders• Leverage remote expertiseremote expertise• Plan and train to co-source quotidian tasksco-source quotidian tasks• Get ready to catch the wavecatch the wave

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Prepare Tools and Matériel

• For use byby inexperts– Affix instructions critical to usage– Prioritize learnability in selection

• ForFor inexperts– Design to foster just-in-time and collateral learning– Promote dual-purpose tools

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Train Coach Responders

• Onsite trainertrainer– No direct response responsibilities

– Provides tactical “what” and “how to” guidance to semi- and inexpert responders

– Must have coaching skills and understanding of response tasks

– Should be kept informed about operational goals, strategies and needs

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Train Coach Responders

• Onsite team builderteam builder– Responsible for (or assists with) direct response

tasks

– Develops ad-hoc team of available responders to accomplish task

– Must have team development and leadership skills

– Can be paired with responders with knowledge of response task

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Leverage Remote Expertise

• Remote mentoringRemote mentoring– Expert or specialist responder supporting semi- or

inexpert responder, e.g., by phone– Relationships and trust developed at individual

personal level

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Leverage Remote Expertise

• Responder support serviceResponder support service, e.g., via hotline or website– Pool of expert or specialist responders as responder

support staff– Continuous service (potentially 24/7)– Pooled expertise– Relationships and trust

established at the organizational level

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Co-source Quotidian Tasks

• Quotidian– Daily, ordinary, common-place

• Quotidian task– Specialized, outsourceable, non-response-specific

• Dual-purpose organization 2

– Primary purpose not disaster-related, but capabilities are response-relevant

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• Engage non-response organizationsnon-response organizations to perform tasks that are part of theirtheir normal operationsnormal operations– Look for candidate tasks during planning

– Train responders to look for and recognize quotidian tasks and dual-purpose organizations

– Train responders to work with non-“command and control” organizational structures

– Develop response-time procedures for establishing and maintaining co-sourcing relationships

Co-source Quotidian Tasks

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Catch the Wave

• Allow external expertsexternal experts to take ownership of projects to benefit future responsesfuture responses– Compile “needed projects” descriptions in advance– Implement development projects (even if not

immediately deployable)– Solicit innovative solutions to operational needs (even

if not immediately practicable)– Evaluate and test development

projects using operational inputs (even if not actually deployed)

Summary

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Summary

• Three dimensions of disaster correlated with qualitative differences in ensuing responses

– Scale– Kind– Anticipability

• Preparedness is an illusion– It is impossible to prepare for all possible events– Even if it were possible to prepare for all possible events,

resource limitations make it impossible

• Must prepare responders and response organizations to leverage available resourcesleverage available resources

Jul, S. (2007). Who’s Really on First? A Domain-Level User, Task and Context Analysis for Response Technology. Proceedings of the 4th International ISCRAM Conference.

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Summary

• Techniques for preparing to leverage available human resources– Prepare tools and matériel for inexpertsinexperts– Train coachcoach respondersresponders– Leverage remote expertiseremote expertise– Plan and train to co-source quotidian tasksco-source quotidian tasks– Get ready to catch the wavecatch the wave

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Prepare

to be scaredto be scared

to be unpreparedto be unprepared

not to be scarednot to be scared

&&to be preparedto be prepared

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Thanks to

• The Pacific Disaster CenterPacific Disaster Center and the US National US National Research CouncilResearch Council for financial support

• Steve HaileySteve Hailey, American Red Cross, for leading by example

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References

1. Auf der Heide, E. (1989). Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination. St. Louis, MO: C.V. Mosby Company.

2. Bankoff, G. (2002). Cultures of Disaster: Society and Natural Hazards in the Philippines. Routledge.3. Drabek, T.E., McEntire, D.A. (2002). Emergent Phenomena and Multiorganizational Coordination in Disasters: Lessons

from the Research Literature. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 20(2):197-224.4. Drabek, T.E., McEntire, D.A. (2003). Emergent Phenomena and the Sociology of Disaster: Lessons, Trends and

Opportunties from the Research Literature. Disaster Prevention and Management, 12(2):97-113.5. Dynes, R. R. (1970). Organized Behavior in Disaster. Lexington, MA: Heath Lexington Books.6. Dynes, R. R. (1998). Coming to Terms with Community Disaster. In Quarantelli, E.L., What Is a Disaster? Perspectives

on the Question. Routledge:109-126.7. Gundel, S. (2005). Towards a New Typology of Crises. Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management, 13(3):106-115.8. Jul, S. (2007). Who’s Really on First? A Domain-Level User, Task and Context Analysis for Response Technology.

Proceedings of the 4th International ISCRAM Conference. Delft, the Netherlands, May 2007.9. Kreps, G.A. (1998). Disaster as Systemic and Social Event. In Quarantelli, E.L., What Is a Disaster? Perspectives on the

Question. Routledge: 31-55.10. McConnell, A., Drennan, L. (2006). Mission Impossible? Planning and Preparing for Crisis. Journal of Contingencies &

Crisis Management, Jun, Vol. 14 Issue 2, p59-70.11. Quarantelli, E.L. (1993). Community Crises: An Exploratory Comparison of the Characteristics of and Consequences of

Disasters and Riots. Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management, 1(2):67-78.12. Quarantelli, E.L. (2005/9/26). “Catastrophes are Different from Disasters: Some Implications for Crisis Planning and

Managing Drawn from Katrina.” Online posting. The Social Science Research Council forum: Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences. 2006/12/14.<http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Quarantelli/>.

13. Quarantelli, E.L. (2006). The Disasters of the 21st Century: A Mixture of New, Old, and Mixed Types. Online proceedings. The Third Annual MaGrann Research Conference.<http://geography.rutgers.edu/events/magrann_conference/2006/papers/quarantelli.pdf>.