preface in w ritin g a centenary monograph on bannockburn the author has had in view both the need...

PREFACE

IN w riting a centenary monograph on Bannockburn theauthor has had in View both the need to study an

important war in the light of constitutional history, (fortoo often military and constitutional matters are put intodifferent chapters and the connection between the two islost) and the need to study war as illustrating nationalcharacter . An attempt is made to trace the influence ofthe struggle for the Confirmation of the Charters and theOrdinances on the War of Scottish Independence , fromwhich are seen the aims of the Anglo-Norman baronage .

The study of the size and capacity of a typical Edwardianarmy brings out the character of the medieval English asa fighting race

,and the crushing defeat makes one think of

the altered conditions under which the same English wereVictorious in the Hundred Years .The author feels that the battle can best be understood

on the spot . One enters into the spirit of old days bytramping over the ground where a great event took place

,

and the importance of Stirling in Scottish history can onlybe appreciated at Stirling . Therefore he has tried toprovide the right pictures to help his readers to realise thesurroundings . He had the advantage of a day ’ s explorationof the new and the old sites with Mr W . M . Mackenzie , and has felt that the balancing of the argumentsfor and against the transference of the battle from the

vi PREFACE

upland to the plain did much help his historic outlook ;he has come to think more highly of Barbour , and at thesame time to appreciate the English chroniclers who seemto have recorded faithfully what their informants saw ofsome restricted part of the battle . The book would nothave been offered to the public if Mr Mackenzie had notalready written on the subj ect . The author

’ s aim has notbeen to enter into competition or to go one better , but toamplify in some degree and to present the story from theEnglish point of View . For this purpose any relevantpassage in any English chronicle has been given in full andcriticised .

The legend of an army of men , devotedly believedfor many centuries , is now dead but it died only a veryshort time ago . It is therefore wrong to sneer at thosewho rewrite certain portions of history in the light of recentinvestigation , for the very effort to rewrite is stimulating .

We now know far more of Nelson than we did in the centenaryyear of Trafalgar , for the blue book published last yearshows that the men who rebelled in 1905 against the acceptedaccount of his tactics were on the right lines . Mr Mackenziehas done similar good work in rewriting the tale of Bannockburn . Whether fought on the upland or fought on theplain the battle had a mighty result , and we are stimulatedand cannot but profit when we go into details to decide forourselves where it was fought .

'. E . M.

BEDFORD ,

April 19 14 .

CHAPTER

E'DWARD IAN ARM'

THE HISTOR'IANS OF B ANNOCKB URN

MONDA' 'UNE 2 4TH ,

INDE'

ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS

I . P an oram ic Vi ew of th e re pu'te d s rte of the ba ttle

From Stlrlin g look in g e a s t

Su g ge s te d s i te of ba ttle s on 'un e

St N in ian ’

s Kirk a n d th e fla t

S tirlin g from the n orth

B a ttle -pla n of Ha lidon H i ll

Ha lidon Hrl'

l from B e rw rck

Map of th e ba ttle s of B a nn ockburn , 13 14 A t e n d

Ba nnockburn tak e n from a bove Foot 0’

G re e n fa rm .

1 be h ind St N in ia n 's a n d the Bore s ton e .

CHAPTER I

THOUGHTS ON BANNOCKBURN

THE 60 0 th anniversary of Bannockburn is an event thatought to make people think . Scotsmen are jubilant , andrightly so Englishmen would do well to be thoughtful ,and as

,although medi eval conditions do not exist to-day,

human nature is much the same at all periods, certainreflections do not come amiss . One result of the studyof old quarrels is the acknowledgement that war has hada greater influence than the school of J . R . Green , thescorner of the drum-and—trumpet theory of history

,would

allow . It has influenced constitutional progr ess . Of courseGreen himself knew this . All his admirers know the passagewhich couples Chateau Gaillard with Runnymede the fallof the great Norman Castle and the subsequent loss of Normandy to the French made Magna Carta possible. Just inthe same way the wars of Wallace and Bruce brought to ahead the ceaseless contest between the English Crown andthe Baronage

,and made Magna Carta effectual . From the

purely military point of view England was passing througha crisis under the three Edwards . The development oflong-bow archery, which proved the value of the peasantin war can be traced from Wales and the Welsh wars

,

2 THOUGHTS ON BANNOCKBURN [CH

through the Wallace and Bruce period , down to the dayof Crécy . War in itself is revolting yet it is impossiblenot to admire the combination of coolness and skill whichmakes for victory . More than that ; war brings out anation ’ s resources and moulds national character . Thusa few minutes of reflection on an old battle w i ll at leastsuggest the old and ever—needed lesson of readiness , ofmodesty

,of profiting by mistakes , and of unanimity and

a complete absence of class hatreds,if a nation is to be

successful .Bannockburn cannot be studied by itself . It is one

event in a series . The most important it may be , yet oneto be studied in the light of what came both before andafter . It shows the evolution of the peasant to be as gooda fighting man as the lord

,but only on the condition that

he is well led . The foot spearman triumphed over themounted knight in all his pride the man who kept hisplace in the ranks triumphed over the man who rode j ealousof his neighbour the nation whose King was supportedboth by nobles and by peasants triumphed over the nationwhose nobles scorned alike their King

,the peasant archers

of their own army,and the peasant spearmen Opposed to

them . Bruce won independence for Scotland ; he al sotaught the English to abate their pride and to combine

,

noble with archer , in future wars , or rather to t e - learn aprevious lesson of combination

,which the English barons

in their pride and faction s opposition to their King hadput aside .

The history of Bannockburn,when taken with the

history of the wars before and after,helps us to understand

I] THOUGHTS ON BANNOCKBURN 3

the Anglo-Saxon character . The man of restless energy,who loves adventure for itself

,who fights because fighting

gives him something to do and enables him to show hismasterfulness , who thinks that none but he has the rightto fight , who if he is not fighting is engaged in a con stitution al struggle against his King—whi ch indeed is partly aclass trouble and partly personal to himself, for the baronsby no means always pulled together— who , at intervalswhen nothing else is stirring

,crusades in Palestine or

Africa or Prussia,who in fact must always be up and

doing , is the Norman baron . The Anglo- Saxon is thestay- at- home . His ancestors indeed had come as piratesand conquerors , but the next generations settled down onthe land the pirates turned farmers , forgot how to fight ,cowered before the Danes , rallied when well led and inspiredby Alfred and Edward the Elder and their successors

,col

lapsed once more when even the House of Alfred producedan Ethelred , were unable to rally to any purpose underEdmund Ironsides , and so let their country fall at one blowbefore William . They let the burden of fighting be borneby the House of Godwin and a few energetic thegns anda professional bodyguard of house- carles . When onceHastings was fought and won and the few fighting menwere dead, partly because Wessex and Mercia , East Angliaand Northumbria

,could not combine for lack of leadership

and a common bond of union , mostly because the churlsand boors were rooted to the soil as peaceful farmers

,they

received new masters and sank to be villeins or semi-serfs .Spasmodically they showed some spirit . Rufus called someof them out . Henry I carried over some of them to

1—2

4 THOUGHTS ON BANNOCKBURN [CH .

Normandy,and with their help beat Robert . The men of

the North rose at the call of the Church, and beat back theScots at the battle of the Standard . Henry II saw theirvalue

,and by his Assize of Arms reorganised the old Anglo

Saxon fyrd or militia . But a militia has inherent defects ,for it cannot be trained systematically, and if it is calledout for any length of time farming suffers

,so that

,although

Spasmodi cally a militia force may be raised to a certaindegree of excellence

,the system as a system is a bad one .

Now the Norman barons were restive under the Will iamsand Henries because , having come to England as adve n

tu re rs and having received lands in a conquered country,

they resented the strong control of the Crown,the royal

insistence upon strict payment of feudal dues,and the

power of the Royal Court over their Manor Courts . Eachwanted to be a little King over his own estates . Therefore their ideal was individualism . But the strong rule ofHenry II created an official class which enabled the Crownto prevail against them . Of course with the reign of KingJohn the problem was changed . Normandy was lost

, an d

every baron had to decide whether he should be henceforward an Englishman or a Norman . All those who preferred the Island Kingdom to the Duchy were now

,however

pure might be their Norman blood,English barons

, an d

they tended more and more to unite as a class against theCrown until they extorted from John their class liberties .Their strongest stand they made on the question of feudalservice . William the Conqueror had gra nted lands to theirancestors on condition that they should fight for him without pay but he was then both King of England and Duke


of Normandy,whereas John was only King— the Duchy of

Aquitaine does not count , for Henry II was the first to holdit , whereas feudal service had been instituted by William 1.

Therefore the cry of No feudal service across the seadirectly preceded the demand for the Great Charter . Ofcourse their obj ect in extorting the Great Charter was towin their own liberties

,not the freedom of all classes of

unborn Englishm en for generations to come ; n ot the control of all taxation by the Commons , which did not yetexist , but their special right not to have to pay aids andscutages without their ow n consent . An aid was amoney grant upon a special occasion ; scutage wasmoney paid in lieu of feudal service and both were inproportion to the number of knights that each baron , orindeed even quite humble men who held land di rectly fromthe Crown , owed for war . Therefore the military con s e

qu e n ce of the Great Charter was that the King could notdeclare war or enforce feudal service or collect a scutagewithout consent . If he fought on his own initiative hemust do it at his own cost . Both for men and for moneyfor a serious undertaking he was dependent upon his barons .Men here means mounted men exclusively the feudalsystem provided the King with heavy cavalry only .

To understand the Norman spirit we have to look atone special district— the Marches of Wales . For a periodof about two centuries the Norman lords were able to showtheir love of adventure in this particu lar district wherethere was no restraint upon them . The Crown , partly itwould seem to give to the barons just that something todo for which their souls yearned and therefore to divert


their attention from England,and partly to reduce the

breezy and freedom- loving Welsh by a cheap method ,allowed certain lords to wage war and to conquer on theirown behalf as much of Wales as they could . As a matterof fact the Earls of Chester conquered but very little ofNorth Wales ; and the Mortimers conquered some , butnot very much, of mid-Wales but in the century betweenWilliam I and Henry II most of South Wales was won .

There the March estates were created there were erectedthe castles

,first the moated earthen mounds, which were

crowned with wooden stockades and towers , and later thestone keeps , which are the outward and visible sign s ofthe earlier and the later Norman periods . The Welshoffered a keen resistan ce

,particularly in the Valley of the

Usk , the land of Gwent . But , when at last overcome ,they fought under their Norman lords against other Welsh .

They followed Strongbow and his brother raiders to Ireland ,

and in battle the native Irish an d the Irish Danes wentdown before the combination of mailed Norman horse an dSouth Wales archers . For this is the main fact the landwhere the true long-bow was first effectively used was SouthWales . It was a bow of wild elm ,

ugly,unpolished

,rough

,

but stiff and strong so says the native historian of Wales ,Gerald de Barry , and the conclusion to which he comes isthat in the field mounted men and archers should always becombined . The whole of Stronghow ’ s army of invasion wassomething short of 40 0 horse and 2 0 0 0 archers . It was aNorman-Welsh , far indeed from being an English , invasionof Ireland .

We do not possess about any arm y of Richard 1


such definite information as the actual pay—rolls give usfor Edward I . We simply know that the Anglo-Normancontingent at Acre and Arsuf was but a fraction of thecrusading host . We can guess that it was mostly Normanhow many or how few were the Saxons in the retinues ofRichard himself and his barons we cannot determine , butthat they were quite few is practically certain . That allCrusaders knew the value of good archers , whether mountedor on foot

,to combat the Turkish horse archers is clear .

The tactics in the East consisted of putting a screen offoot , mostly bow-armed, to shield the horses of the mailedmen against the arrows of the Turks, and of then givingthe word for the horsemen to charge through the screenat the right moment . This was done by Philip of Franceat Acre before Richard ’ s arrival , as well as by Richardhimself at Arsuf . But the typical bow-men of a crusadingarmy were crossbow-men , Genoese an d Pisans , and it wasthe cross-bow that had the best repute . Richard himselfwas alive to the value of the long-bow and tried to obtainSouth Welsh archers , but they were doubtless few in numbers and not anxious to enlist for distant service in Palestineor France . For this fact is prominent , and it is entirelygermane to our purpose

,that in Western Europe infantry

were of no account in spite of the experience of the Crusades . For instance , at the battle of Bouvines in 1 2 14 amass of foot was pushed forward in front of the mailedcavalry

,but was entirely useless in the battle and may be

said to have been merely exposed to be slaughtered . InEngland the cross-bow was valued and considered to be thebest missile weapon down to the reign of Edward I

,but the

8 THOUGHTS ON BANNOCKBURN [CH

crossbow-men were quite few in numbers , and those feww ere chi efly professional mercenaries . Some indeed wereLondoners , but most were Netherlanders or Gascons and, asmercenaries

,they came under the ban of the Great Charter .

As a critical period, both from the constitutional andfrom the military point of View

,let us take the days of

Simon de Montfort . Constitutionally the barons of hisperiod appeared to be contending for their class privilegesagainst the Crown so as to make the Great Charter effectual .But it is well known that by no means all the barons wereMon tfortian s . The personal element came in , as it alwaysmust come in . Take Gilbert of Clare , Earl of Gloucester ,who fought side by side with Sim on at Lewes an d againstSimon at Evesham . Why was this ' Chiefly it was b ecause Llewelyn of Wales was Simon ’ s ally

,for

,as the result

of the whole baronial struggle of the reigns of John andHenry III, the Welsh had been gaining ground as againstthe Lords Marchers . As Lord of Glamorgan

,Gloucester

was one of the chief Marchers . He was keen enough tostand up as Earl against King in England

,but he was not

going to allow Llewelyn to grow to such strength as toweaken him as Lord Marcher ; Llewelyn being Simon

’ sally, Glamorgan was in danger . Also , from the militarypoint of view , the actions at Lewes and Evesham are ofinterest because the barons and the mounted men alonewere deemed to be of any value . As we saw just now

,the

lesson of the Crusades had been thrown away and the baronswished to keep to themselves the fighting

,even as they put

themselves and their ow n liberties forw ard against the King .

That is to say , they themselves wished alone to be in

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1 0 THOUGHTS ON BANNOCKBURN [CH

cannot but have given a stronger idea of English nationality .

A baron cannot fight in Wales or in Scotland without feelinghimself to be an Englishman , however pure his Normanblood may still be . But we have to make a strong di stinction between the Welsh and the Scottish campaigns .In Wales all the barons of Edward I served as a feudalduty

,but their hearts were not in a war in Scotland . The

reason is that as Lords Marchers they were determined tosupport their King in crushing Llewelyn and the stil l independent section of the Welsh . Almost every magnate waslikewise a Lord Marcher . Not only was Gloucester Lord ofGlamorgan Humphrey Bohun , hereditary Constable andEarl of Hereford

,was Lord of Brecknock Roger Bigod ,

heredi tary Marshal and Earl of Norfolk , was Lord of Chepstow the King ’ s own brother , Edmund of Lancaster , wasLord of Monmouth the Earl of Lincoln in the course ofthe last war against Llewelyn received the marcher lordshipof Denbigh Roger Mortimer had great estates in Shropshire and Herefordshire , and likewise in mid-Wales . And soall the lords, whether great or smal l , whether Mon tfortian s

or Royalists in the last reign , followed Edward I againstLlewelyn as a matter of course . In 1 2 77 they served forfive months ; in 1 2 8 2 —3 for 15 months ; and then againon the rising of Rhys in 1 2 8 7 , and of Madoc in 1 2 94

—5 .

Each seemed to consider it to be a point of honour to serveunpaid , for thus the Crown was under an obligation tohim , and he was defending his own march lands as well asfighting for the King of England . It is important to insistupon this point because , if thes e men served the Crown asa feudal duty , they were likewise intensely keen to maintain

1] THOUGHTS ON BANNOCKBURN 1 1

their privileges as free and almost independent princes onthe marches of Wales . When Edward I made a royal progre ss through Wales after the conquest of 1 2 83 ,

Gloucesterreceived and entertained him in Glamorgan as if he were abrother monarch rather than a subj ect .Edward I distinctly wished to suppress the customs of

the marches, and in particular the right claimed by all themarcher lords to wage private war at their own will. Incourse of time Gloucester gave him the opportunity thathe sought , for he continually rai ded Hereford

’ s lands inBrecknock . The King was very patient and tried to bringthe Earl to reason , even giving to him his own daughterin marriage , but Gloucester was proud and defiantly wagedhis private war . The scene of battle was a strip of debatable land lying up in the mountains between the Claremarch of Glamorgan and the Bohun march of Brecknock .

Edward at last asserted him self,and ordered both Earls

to appear to answer for their conduct . Hereford appearedbefore the Royal Judges , but Gloucester refused . TheJudges on the King ’ s order tried to empanel a jury of theother marcher lords so as to secure through them a verdictcondemning the greatest marcher lord. They refused tosit as a jury or to swear on the Book . It was , they sa id ,against the use and custom of the marchers . The Judgesanswered that by his prerogative the King was above bothuse and custom , but the lords prevailed and a jury of menof lower station had to be empanelled . The facts wereproved and a verdict returned against Gloucester . ThenEdward went in person to Wales and held his Court atAbergavenny. Gloucester , at last cowed , now put in an

1 2 THOUGHTS ON BANNOCKBURN [CI-I .

appearance . Sentence was finally pronounced against himat Westminster Because the Earls had dared to do bytheir own liberty of the march violent deeds which wouldhave met with condign punishment elsewhere outside themarches

,they were committed to prison and their lands

confiscated for life . As a matter of fact they were soonallowed to redeem their bodies by payment of fines , Glouce ste r of marcs

,Hereford of 1 0 0 0 , and their lands

were restored to them .

Two points are clear . Firstly , Gloucester was the chiefoffender in waging this private war

,but Hereford , who had

only been on the defensive originally, was also imprisonedand fined . And, secondly, the whole body of lords marchersevidently resented the Royal interference as a blow againstthe independence of them all . They valued march privile ge because only in this corner of the country could theyclaim to be free from Royal restrictions .Gloucester died a sadder and a w iser man ,

leaving byhis royal wife three daughters and a son

,who was killed

at Bannockburn . Hereford lived nursing a sense of injury,

and in alliance with Norfolk defied Edward in 1 2 97 and1 2 98 . And indeed Edward had made a mistake by bringingdown his mailed fist too strongly, for he had offended aclass and had been over- severe on one particular earl ofthat class .

In the last Welsh war of 1 2 95 Edward offended Norfolkand deposed him for a time from the Marshalship ; he thengave a formal written promise that when he ordered hisMarshal to serve in a different region of Wales away fromhis royal person it was not to be taken as a precedent

.


Evidently Norfolk was now on the look- out for some Opportun ity to defy the masterful King when law and customwere on his side . Let us remember that in this very year1 2 95 Edward summoned his model Parliament . Faced bywar in Wales, war in Scotland, and war from France , hewished to confer with Parliament that what concernedall should be approved by all

,and common dangers should

be met in common , and Parliament voted to him liberalsupplies .Victorious over the Welsh in 1 2 95 , Edward beat Bal liol

at Dunbar in 1 2 96 , annexed Scotland as he thought washis right as Ba lliol’ s overlord , and garrisoned the castles .Next he turned his attention to the French war . Andthen the storm broke over his head . The story is wellknown , but it is not out of place to give the facts here sothat the clerical and baronial opposition may be put clearlyin relation to events in Scotland . Our main authorityfor the details is Walter of He m in gburgh , but the datesand the wording of various royal writs of summons mustbe carefully considered , for here , if at no other period inEnglish history , foreign war and civil strife must be studiedtogether .Parliament met at Bury St Edmunds on November 3 ,

1 2 96 , then in London on January 14 , 1 2 97 a tax of onetwelfth on property was demanded from the people

,one

eighth from town s , one-fifth from the clergy . Robert ofWinchelsea , Archbishop of Canterbury , relying on a papalbull

,refused to allow the clergy to pay . Edward promptly

outlawed the clergy. The Archbishop- elect of York,and

several bishops and others , gave way and put the fifth


where the royal servants could find it the lands of Canterbury were seized . Next Edward seized the wool and hidesof the export-merchants

,and requisitioned vast supplies of

corn and meat he had the right to a custom on wooland the right of pre- emption on victuals , and he gavereceipts for what he took but he went beyond bounds .Et m u lta e fie bcm t oppre s s ion e s in popu lo te rm e . Here wasthe opportunity of the Earls . At Salisbury, February 2 4 ,

in a parliament without the clergy,' the magnates refused

to serve oversea,evidently basing their refusal on the hi s

toric opposition to John . Hereford the Constable andNorfolk the Marshal were the leaders , and their privatereasons for revenge on the King , discussed just now, cou ldbe satisfied at last . The professed law- loving King hadput himself in the wrong . He might threaten that theyshould go or hang

,but the Marshal could retort with right

on his side N e c i bo n e c pen debo, for feudal service outside the island could not be exacted . Supported by manybarons , they armed and turned away from their lan dsthe tax—collectors . Then they demanded that he shouldconfirm the Charters .Edward , it seems clear from the facts of hi s wars , pre

ferred paid service to feudal ; if he could raise enoughmoney by parliamentary grants , he was much more freeto act and to command obedience on the field the Earlspreferred to do feudal service

,because thus they put him

under an obligation to them for a war in Wales or Scotland .

But by insisting that they could not be compelled on theirfeudal tenure to cross the sea they seemed to extort from himthe very thing that he really preferred

,namely payment


for service . As regards the wool and victuals , he distinctlypromised repayment to the last farthing

,and excused him

self as he was acting in the cause of the people ratherthan of himself as their protector and defender . A nationalwar against France should be supported by the nation , andthe King ’ s Prerogative alone could secure national unity .

Reconciled temporarily to the Archbishop , leaving himand the veteran soldier Reginald Grey as guardians toPrince Edward , refusing to confirm the Charters immedia te ly as he had not then his full council w i th him , andcalling on the two Earls not to do any harm to the countryin his absence , Edward sailed on August 2 2 for Flanders .He already knew of Wallace ’ s rising , but the Confirmationof the Charters was the great question at stake

,and he had

no fears about Scotland . Norfolk and Hereford and theirparty were in arms . Grey and the Prince ’ s council issuedvarious writs to men to come armed to Rochester on September 8 , ostensibly to discuss measures for the defence ofthe coast Norfolk and Hereford and others were summonedto London on September 30 two Knights from each shirewere to come to London on October 6 to receive their copiesof the Confirmation of the Charters then three loyal earls

,

several barons and knights who had served Edward in Walesand Scotland, sheriffs of counties and arrayers of troops ,were to bring knights and s e rvi e n te s to London on October 6at the royal wages . Two facts stand out here it was evide n tly intended that the Confirmation should be granted ,and the loyalists were to be armed as against Norfolkand Hereford . But on September 1 1 fell a bolt from theblue , for Wallace , know n already to be in arms but despised


as a beggarly outlaw , destroyed at Stirling Bridge a bodyof English horse . It was not a battle on a great scale ;with the King in Flanders , and both rebel and loyal baronsarming in anticipation of a stormy Parliament a monthhence

,there cannot have been a very large number of

English soldiers in Scotland . But the result was as trem e n dou s as if thousands had fought on either side . Panicfell upon the English garrisons in Scotland, and castles weredeserted . Wallace raided Cumberland and Northumberland .

It was not the time for an armed di spute at home . PrinceEdward issued the Confirmation on October 10 . The loyalbarons swore on the Gospels that they would hold Norfolkand Hereford guiltless towards the King . Troops , raisedapparently to fight Norfolk and Hereford if the need shouldarise

,were ordered northwards . All the circumstances

tend to show that the defeat at Stirling saved England,if

not from certain civil war , at least from the imminent dangerof civil war . King Edward accepted the position , and confirm ed the charters in Flanders . A force of both loyali stsand recalcitrant lords went up north for a winter campaign ,

and saved Roxburgh and Berwick .

Returning to England in March , 1 2 98 , Edward wascollecting a new army . But a further difficulty arose .

His son had confirmed in England , and he had confirmedin Flanders . Norfolk and Hereford now demanded thathe should confirm again , himself and in England . Hepositively refused ; this was equivalent to doubting hisroyal word . Then they refused to march towards Scotland .

There was a deadlock . At last Antony Bek , Bishop ofDurham , and the loyal Earls swore a personal oath that

18 THOUGHTS ON BANNOCKBURN LGB .

found it their best weapon against them that he shouldneed their unpaid feudal services ; and that year sawmerely a campaign of 40 days and the fall of one castle .

In 13 0 1 in a Parliament at Lincoln he confirmed againfully and unconditionally

,and in 1 30 1 there was a paltry

campaign of two months , but no formal feudal muster .But the tide at last turned . The Pope claimed Scotland

as a fie f of the papal see , and Archbishop Winchelsea pressedthe claim . The Barons then joined their King , for theyresented such outside interference . Perhaps a gr eat manyhad opposed Edward as they had seen the success of Norfolk ’ s and Hereford ’ s first opposition , and by a reactionwere satisfied as he had given way . At least now the twochief leaders were losing their influence . The Archbishopwas exiled . Norfolk was stripped of lands

,earldom

,mar

s ha lship , and received them back for life only the officialexcuse that he made a voluntary surrender in order tospite hi s brother who was his heir is to use modern slang

,

a little too thin , and the obvious fact IS that Edward , havinggot Norfolk in his power now that the other barons weresatisfied by the unconditional Confirmation

,seized hi s oppor

tun ity and stripped him to the skin . Then Edward calleda formal feudal muster for 13 0 3 ,

remained in Scotlan dcontinuously through the winter in face of all difficulties ,recaptured Stirling Castle by means of a powerful artilleryin 1304 , and seemed at last to be victorious . But thespirit of the Scots , roused by Wallace in 1 2 97 ,

had notbeen extinguished, and from Edward ’ s point of viewbaronial factiousness had wasted six years an d allowedthat spirit to get strong . When Bruce , having time after


time sworn fealty to Edward,killed Red Comyn and

elected finally to be King and patriot,the chance of crush

ing Scotland was gone . Edward I di ed on his way up toScotland in 13 07 .

The connection between Bannockburn and the Ordinances must be studied as closely as that between Wallace ’ srising and the Confirm ation . Bishop Stubbs has pointedout to us how the aims of the united barons who won theGreat Charter from John were no longer the aims of Norfolkand Hereford in 1 2 97 , or of the Lords Ordainers in 1 3 10

onwards . Personal ambition , a love of thwarting the Crownwhen Scottish affairs gave them their chance

,an open desire

to get the control of England into the hands of a smallparty, are too apparent . Edward II meant to crush opposition with a high hand , even as his father at last , thoughonly at the cost of unconditional surrender on the mainquestion of the Confirmation , had crushed Norfolk andWin chelsea . But we know that he had not his father ’ shi gh ideas , and he had Piers Gave s ton as his favourite ,the Gascon upstart who j eered at the Earls and foundnicknames for them . So between 13 0 7 and 13 10 nothingwas done , and Bruce grew in strength . In March

, 13 1 0 ,

the Lords Ordainers were acknowledged formally by Edwardas a Committee of Control

,so to speak

,and in August

they drew up certain Ordinances ; the Archbishop pron oun ce d excommunication against all who should violatethem . In expectation that hi s submission would inducethe barons to support him in Scotland

,Edward in June

summoned a feudal muster , and in August sent a secondsummons the rendezvous was to be at Berwick on

2— 2

2 0 THOUGHTS ON BANNOCKBURN [CH.

September 8 th . But a very poor muster it was . Hereford,son of Edward I ’ s old enemy

,and heredi tary Constable

by right,failed to appear , and on September 19th merely

ten men- at-arms were registered as hi s feudal contingent .Thomas of Lancaster

,the King ’ s cousin and son of Edmund

of Lancaster who had always been loyal to Edward I , andGuy

,Earl of Warwick , and many others, sent similarly each

a bare minimum of soldiers . The feudal host came in bydriblets

,and in the whole month of September only 50 0 men

were registered, and of these only 37 were knights . Twentymen came as late as October . A feeble in road of barely

40 days was the result .We pass on to the acceptance by Edward of the Ordi

nances , the exile , the return ,the surrender

,and the e xe cu

tion , in violation of faith , of Piers Gave s ton . The selfishnessand p e rfidy of the Lords Ordainers were too bad even forthose days . Gloucester , son of Edward I

’ s enemy andEdward I ’ s daughter , was converted to loyalty . So wasAym er of Valence

,Earl of Pembroke

,grandson of King

John ’ s widow, for he was especially offended in that Piershad surrendered to him originally . Even Hereford wastouched . But Lancaster and Warwick were grim ly satisfie d with what they had done . In 1 3 13 there was a hollowreconciliation , and Lancaster and Warwick were formallypardoned by the King . But in the meanwhile castle aftercastle in Scotland had fallen to Bruce . Stirling in 13 14was in danger, and was to be surrendered un less rescuedbefore the end of June . Edward had quite enough spiritfor war, and hoped that the reaction against the Earlsafter the murder of Piers was strong enough to justify

I] THOUGHTS ON BANNOCKBURN 2 1

him . So , without the consent of hi s barons in Parliament ,he summoned a feudal muster . Says a contemporarychronicler

,who wrote the Vita Edw a rdi S e cun dz

'

, TheKing ordered his Barons and Earls to come to his help .

The Earls answered that it would be better for all to cometo a Parliament

,for the Ordinances demanded it . He said

the matterwas urgent,and he could notwait for a Parliament .

They refused to come that they might not offend againstthe Ordinances . But hi s private advisers counselled himto summon the feudal retinues and proceed boldly to Scotland . What about the Earl of Gloucester ' they said ,what about Pembroke and Hereford

,Robert Clifford, Hugh

Despenser,and the royal household and other barons '

All these will come with their soldiers and there is no needto be anxious about the other Earls . And a later chton icle r

, Abbot Burton of Meaux , reviewing the defeat ofBannockburn says , The misfortune of the defeat wasimputed , not so much to the presumption and pride of theEnglish , as to the excommunication to which they madethemselves liable by going against the Ordinances . Thatthis is true is wonderful ly confirmed by the coincidencethat none of the Lords Ordainers who fought in the battleescaped capture or death

,except Pembroke

,who fled

unarm ed . And so we come to a final conclusion ; as longas King and Barons were violently opposed to each otherthere was no chance of a successful war in Scotland . Brucealone profited by the Ordinances .

CHAPTER II

A T'P ICAL EDWARDIAN ARM'

THE question before us is , was the English Army atBannockburn strong ' First we have to considerthat the chroniclers of the period were all clerics , exceptindeed Gray of Hetou who was a soldier and thereforeour prime authori ty . Chroniclers did not understandnumbers or meant nothing to them .

Partly they loved to exaggerate , and partly also a sort ofinborn love of blood and slaughter must have influencedthem an d their readers , just as to-day an evening edi tionsells best when it can advertise a very large loss of life .

Another consideration is that the old chroniclers,and modern

historians also , have been misled by the need of multiplyingfigures, whether those of the Bannockburn campaign , orthose of Crecy and indeed in all wars

,such as the ancient

Persian Wars as described by Herodotus , we find the sameproblem . The historian has certain figures

,right or w rong

usually wrong ,— and on his own authority doubles or treblesor quadruples because he thinks that for every soldier theremust be a certain proportion of inferior soldiers or cam pfollowers . A great many of Frois s a rt’ s errors can be rectifie d in this way . Let us say that he is told there were1 0 0 0 knights in an army he promptly multiplies by four

CH. 11] A TYPICAL EDWARDIAN ARMY 2 3

or five to include the inferior mounted men . If he hadbeen told that there were 2 0 0 knights and that he mustmultiply by five to give a total of 1 0 0 0 , he would have beenright . It will be seen that this argument is of very greatim portance when we come to consider the details of thefeudal system . Modern historians sometimes fall into thi serror with their eyes open

,accepting un s cie n tifica lly the

old untrustworthy figures for the Bannockburn campaign ,and it is probable that national patriotism has had its sharein making the to be generally accepted .

The last chapter showed us the importance and pride ofthe barons . Therefore if we are to consider any typicalEdwardian army we must take the barons first . In theMon tfortian War , both at Lewes and Evesham , they alonewere in evidence with their mounted retinues . In hisWelsh wars

,in the two pitched battles at Builth and Maes

madoc,and then again in the Scottish campaign at Falkirk ,

Edward I and his officers knew well the need of combinationof horse with foot . But in all those three battles the horsemen began the attack w ithout the foot , and it was not untilthe foot had been brought up that the victory was gained .

The evidence is to be found in certain documents . Forsome years we possess the Marshals ’ Registers on whichwere enrolled the exact numbers of all the feudal contingents brought to the King ’ s Standard , together with themen ’ s names . For several campaigns we also possess thePay-Rolls , which give us the exact numbers of the horseor foot engaged . But the series of the Pay-Rolls is by nomeans complete , and frequently in some critical year we aredeprived of their assistance . Another class of documents

2 4 A TYPICAL EDWARDIAN ARMY [CH .

is the series of Horse-Lists on which were enrolled thename of every horseman in the King ’ s pay, togetherwi th the value and colour and points of his horse , so thatif the animal was killed on the King ’ s service the valuecould be made good to the owner . When we possess aHorse-List we have first- class evidence of some campaignwhich cannot be controverted . Lastly upon certain Rollscalled the Rotu lz

'

Scotia e are entered the official duplicatesof every wr it connected with Scotland sent out by the Kingin some particular year and amongst other entries we aretold that such and such a baron or one of his followers hasthe King’ s protection

,that is to say

,a sort of passport

declaring that he was under the King ’ s protection duringthe campaign and therefore anybody who di d harm to theman ’ s property in England would offend the King . Ofcourse one cannot imagine that every single mountedsoldier in a campaign had such protection

,but we do gain

in this way the names of at least a large proportion of thosewho were serving . Now for the year 1 3 14 ahn os t everydocument has disappeared . We have no Marshals ’ Registerbecause it was not a strictly feudal campaign we have noPay-Roll and no Horse-List . But we have the ScottishRoll of the year , and by it we know that at least 8 30 earlsand barons of high degree and retainers were on their wayto Scotland , even if they did not all actually reach the fieldof Bannockburn .

Here must be added that the father of all genuine origi nalwork on this period of Scottish history is Mr Joseph Bain ,who edited in four volumes the Cal endar of Docum entsrelating to Scotland .


Then at the end of a feudal campaign the sheriff of eachcounty drew up a list of the sums of money owed by wayof scutage in case none of the tenants had served in the warand , if they had served, they had to prove it and so be quitof scutage . Therefore for the reigns of Henry III andEdward I we are very lucky in possessing scutage listswhich tell us the exact number of knights owed in eachcounty they are to be found in the accounts of the sheriffsof the counties which were fastened together and rolledup in Pipe Rolls .But in course of tim e this system of raising horsemen

was changed, and one would say that either inabil ity toacknowledge that the change was made , or perhaps downright ignorance , has contributed largely to continue theerror of high numbers . Of course no war can possiblybe finished in 40 days therefore very naturally a Kingwould say to his barons , Bring fewer horsemen and servelonger . John and Henry III certainly did thi s

,and the

new system was in full working order when Edward Icame to the throne . A baron was said to recognisesome small number as his sufficient quota in place of thegross total . Thus the Earl of Gloucester in place of 455knights brought to Edward I ’ s standard ten the Earl ofHereford in place of 1 2 5 brought three the Lord of Odellin place of 30 brought three the Abbot of P e te rborough

’

s

60 was reduced to five , but the Abbot of St Albans , probably owing to the increase in wealth of his Abbey sincethe Conquest , was still rated at six . How the new numberswere fixed it is impossible to state . Probably each baronor cleric made his own bargain with the King

,and the

II] A TYPICAL EDWARDIAN ARMY 2 7

result is that we have now two separate sets of figures , thescutage lists in the Pipe Rolls based upon the old figures ofWil liam I , and the Marshals

’ Registers showing exactlyhow many horsemen in small quotas were brought in someparticular feudal campaign .

Now we have to state very definitely that in the sameinterval the meaning of the word knight had changed.

Under William I a knight or m i le s was the ordinaryhorseman of the period as we see him depicted in theBayeux Tapestry . The evidence of Domesday Book isslight

,for it was a register of the value of land for taxation ,

but occasionally the word m i le s is used, and we findthat such a man was of quite an inferior position andby no means a knight of chivalry . But by the reign ofEdward I knight or m i le s did mean the superiorhorseman of chivalry

,who had been dubbed

,who is

called Cheva li e r or dom in a s or sir ,' and is of rank

distinctly above the ordinary horseman . The word s e r

vi e n s or s ca tzfem s or con sta ba la ria s or va letta s or hom o

ad a rm a is now given to the inferior horseman inthe ranks . Therefore if we compare Gloucester

’ s figuresin the two reigns

, 455 would be the gross total of horsemenof all ranks owed to the King

,but the ten knights actually

brought to the King ’ s standard were superior horsemen ordam i

'

m'

, and the conclusion is that the 455 are not tobe multiplied, but that the ten must be multiplied so asto give a proportion of inferior to superior horsemen .

Perhaps we should not do wrong in multiplying by five .

In that case Gloucester ’ s contingent of ten knights re presents a troop of 50 of all ranks , and the Lord of Odell

’ s


three would represent 1 2 to 15 . Chroniclers accustomedto multiply would be very easily tempted to multiplyWilliam ’ s figures al so , and so our gross total of 640 0 wouldbe raised to which is the actual figure given inHenry III ’ s reign by an official of the Treasury , who oughtto have know n better .The practical result of thi s change of system was that

when Edward I went to war against Llewelyn in 1 2 77 theMarshal registered at headquarters a little over 2 0 0 knights ,representing the feudal retinues of magnates , a few clerics ,and several barons of medium standing . Many smalltenants contributed one or two or three s e rvi e n te s , andtwo s e rvi e n te s might be sent to the army as the equivalentof one knight . It may be calculated that the full strengthof heavy feudal cavalry in that campaign was about 10 0 0men . But it is quite clear that the magnates

,as they are

called , Le . the earls and the greater barons,served for the

whole campaign , and preferred to serve as a ri ght or a feudalduty without pay . The medium and lesser barons might

,

and usually did , sandwich a period of 40 days without paybetween two periods of pay .

Now, in the last chapter we saw that when matters werebadly strained between Edward I and his barons theirstrongest weapon against the King was that they were notcompelled to serve more than 40 days , and that they thusreduced war to a farce . In 1 2 98 ,

130 0 ,and 130 1 ,

therew as a mere 40 days

’ campaign,and yet the barons had

only brought to the King the reduced quota of men thatis to say, they brought a bare minimum of a retinue , andyet claimed that they need only fight for the 40 days .

Il l A TYPICAL EDWARDIAN ARMY 2 9

If they could do this against Edward 1, they naturallycould put more pressure upon Edward II , and in 13 1 0 notonly was the campaign a paltry affair of 40 days , but alsothe feudal contingents were almost all sent in s e rvi en te s

only and not in knights at Berwick that year 37 knightsand 472 s e rvi e n te s were registered by the Marshal , andhere we cannot multiply . In fact there are three distinctsteps to a popular war against Llewelyn the lords bringa quota of knights

,to whom must be added lesser horsemen ,

and serve for the whole campaign to an unpopular warin Scotland

,tempore Edward I

,they bring similar quotas

,

but serve only for 40 days ; to a war in Scotland, temporeEdward II

,they do not bring

,but merely send to represent

them the lowest possible number of inferior horsemen .

The legendary number of of William the Conquerorturns out to be a great exaggeration for 60 0 0 or a triflemore practically a king may expect about 10 0 0 horsemenat a feudal muster , but Edward II obtains 50 0 of the worstquality .

B . P a id Cava lry .

Obviously a system of pay was to the King ’ s advantage .

It gave promise of discipline and enabled him to bri gadevari ous units of horse into an organised body

,whereas

the individual feudal contingents , especially if they weresmall ones

,would have had little power of combination .

The normal rates of pay at the period were 45 . a day foran earl

,or baron , or one of those professional captains who

were the King ’ s chief officers and are known as bannerets,

30 A TYPICAL EDWARDIAN ARMY [CH.

2 3 . for an ordinary knight , and I s . for an inferior horsemanor s e rvi en s . These were the rates paid by the King , andthe men or the captains of the contingents had to findtheir equipment and their food

,so how much of the money

finally descended to the men in the ranks cannot be calcu la te d. Even earls , much as they wished to make theKing dependent on them in war

,were willing to take his

pay for an extraordinary campaign ,as in 1 2 8 7 when Rhys

ap Meredyth revolted in South Wales , and again in thewinter of 1 2 97—8 after Wallace

’ s victory at Stirling Bridge .

The pay brought into most prominence the professionalcaptain or banneret ; it would be unfair to call him amercenary . He might indeed be a tenant- in - chief of theKing owing the service of a few knights . Such men servedEdward I in war after war

,were always in evidence as

his chief arrayers of troops,and between wars frequently

garrisoned his castles . They usually served the King undercontract . We have a good instance when Aym er de Val ence ,titular Earl of Pembroke and the King ’ s cousin

,contracted

wi th the King to keep on foot in time of peace a smal lnumber of men

,and in war to bring him a squadron of 50

Thomas and Maurice of Berkeley sub- contracted with Aymerto bring most of the 50 . These contracts are extant , andmay be seen in Mr Bain ’ s Ca le n da r , vol . II and there musthave been many of the kind .

There were many landowners and men of substan ce inEngland who were not feudal tenants . These were by theStatute of Winchester compelled to have suitable arm s andarmour and horses ready at the King ’ s call when he shouldneed them , provided that they had property of £2 0 and over .

H] A TYPICAL EDWARDIAN ARMY 3 1

Others whose property was £15 and over were expected tohave inferior arms an d horses . Besides this , Edward I com

p e lle d the men of the £2 0 class to take knighthood. Theevidence that we have makes it an indubitable fact that suchmen were paid whenever they took the field . There wasno effort on the part of any King of England to compeleither the £2 0 or the £15 class to serve as a feudal duty .

To the paid cavalry must next be added the King ’ s household— knights and s e rvi en te s regi s

— many of whom wereforeigners, but in this period of history the employm entof foreign mercenaries was not at all common . Once inWales Edward I had a corps of Gascons for a few months2 1 0 horse and 13 13 foot . In 1 2 98 he had just over 1 0 0

Gascon horse . From time to time we find a handful ofGermans in England, and in the early years of Edward IIIa few Ha in au lte rs who came over in the train of John

,uncle

of Philippa of Hainault . One of them,Jehan le Bel , we

may remark e n pa s s ari t, was afterwards the best chroniclerof Edward III

’

s wars . Just a few Irish were brought over,

but at rare intervals in 1 2 96 Edward I had in his pay

3 1 0 men- at-arms , 2 66 light cavalry, 2 570 foot , under

the command of the Earl of Ulster and seven bannerets ;and in 1 3 0 1 2 64 men- at- arms , 391 light cavalry , 158 0 foot .But ever since the days of the Great Charter Englishmenhad viewed mercenaries with suspicion .

Now when we reckon together the feudal and the paidcavalry in particular campaigns we find that 10 0 0 is theaverage figure in Edward I ’ s Welsh wars

,some 40 0 or 50 0

paid, and perhaps an equal number of feudal contingentscontinuing to serve after the 40 days were over . When he

3 2 A TYPICAL EDWARDIAN ARMY (on .

went to Flanders in 1 2 97 and it was decided that all thetroops were to be in his pay and none feudal , a Horse-Listgives us 8 0 0 as the exact figure . In the winter of 1 2 97—8while Edward I was still in Flanders , 750 caval ry were inpay on the border of Scotland against Wallace . At thebattle of Falkirk in 1 2 98 two Horse-Lists , one of the King

’

s

household and one of paid cavalry not in the household,

give us a total of 1 30 0 and the feudal contingents on thatoccasion may have been anything between 50 0 and 10 0 0 .

We have no Marshal ’ s Register for that year and there wasno scutage taken for non- service , and therefore it w as nota strictly feudal campaign but the Scottish Roll of theyear gives us a large number of names of men who wereserving with the important earls and barons . A verygenerous calculation might put the total of the cava lrythat year at 2 40 0 , but that is an extreme figu re .

The horsemen of both grades , knights and s e rvi e n te s

are to be reckoned as heavy cavalry . The armour of theperiod is well known to us from many a brass and othermonumental evidence . Superior men wore mailed shirtsand leggings , and a heavy helm which rested upon theshoulders . Small additional pieces of plate armour werejust beginning to be fashionable , and these would have beenstrapped on to protect the vulnerable j oints

,such as the

knee or shoulder or elbow . But it is highly probable thatthe inferior men substituted boiled leather in place of ironmail . The horses were likewise armoured or

,in medi eval

language , were coépe rti , that is to say, covered . Theywere big and heavy animals and cost anything between £5and £10 0 , money of that day , and as a rule it is considered


had had a year to prepare for the campaign . Documentaryevidence is not lacking on this point , and Edward II hada bare two or three months in which to get ready . Therewas no regular feudal levy by consent of Parliament theKing simply called upon his barons to produce their continge n ts , and though the Earls of Lancaster and Warwickrefused to serve in person because the war had not beensanctioned, they sent their men to represent them . It isthus assumed that a full feudal muster was made

,and

several writers have dwelt upon the fact to show thatEdward had after all a large force of caval ry . But luckilywe have the Marshal ’ s Register for 13 1 0 , when also a feudalmuster was summoned , and the recal citrant earls sent thebarest min imum of men after the strictest interpretation offeudal custom . In 13 1 0 Lancaster sent four knights andfour s e rvi e n te s , Warwick one knight and 13 s e rvi e n te s , Oxfordone knight and three s e rvi en te s Surrey and Arundel sentnone in 13 1 0 , and if they sent a bare minimum in 13 14 theywould have been represented by about 15 and 1 0 horsemenrespectively . Of the great barons only Lord Mortimerwas conspicuously absent in 13 14 , and he sent one knightand four s e rvie n te s in 1 3 10 . Therefore the num ericalstrength of these retinues would come to about 60 horsemen . We have no clue at all as to how many churchmensent their feudal retinues in 13 14 2 7 bishops and abbotssent , between them , two knights and 152 s e rvi en te s in 13 10 .

Turning from those who may have unwillingly contributeda few soldiers to those who served loyal ly and willingly

,we

have a little direct evidence . The protections as givenin the Scottish Roll of the year show us 8 30 horse of all ranks,

II] A TYPICAL EDWARDIAN ARMY 35

and this of course is a minimum figure . The Earl of Glouce ste r had protections for 13 1 followers Aym er de Valencefor 8 6 , of whom at least six were ban nerets and 2 0 knightsthe two Despensers for 62 the Earl of Hereford for 45Richard de Grey for 2 6 John Mowbray for 2 4 HenryBeaumont for 2 9 ; and Robert Clifford for 1 2 , of whi chnumber, however , at least eight were knights . It is quitepossible that the 8 30 represent a full total of 2 0 0 0 or 2 50 0 .

Now an absolutely contemporary English chronicler putsthe total at 2 0 0 0 , of which 50 0 were raised by the Earl ofGloucester alone . A contemporary Scottish rhymer , AbbotBernard of Arbroath , is quoted by a much later chronicleras putting the English total at m i llia te r qa oqa e ce n tum ,

and this has been interpreted by di fferent writers to meanor 3 1 0 0 . If he really meant 3 1 0 0 he was making

a pretty good guess for a chronicler of the period . TheIrish and foreign ers in the campaign may be neglected .

It is very easy to exaggerate the numbers of the Gasconswho helped to garrison Edward’ s castles in Scotland

,and

such phrases as the dead bodies of Gascons covered theplains must be used with caution . Certainly some Irishwere summoned and shipping was provided for them

,but

there is no evidence that they were up at Bannockburn .

Correct figures of the numbers of Gascons and Irish w ho

are proved by documents to have been in Edward I ’ s payhave been given above .


Horsemen could be raised in any part of England , wherethe baron or the professional captain of paid troops mightchoose . But foot were raised by Edwards I and II bycounties — except , indeed, the crossbowmen , who were veryfew in numbers , never more than 350 and rarely more than1 0 0 in any army, and who were chi efly in garrison in thecastles . In the war of 1 2 77 in Wales Edward I massedtogether foot

,but of these 90 0 0 were South Welsh

serving as hi s allies under their marcher lords againstLlewelyn ’ s North Welsh, and only 60 0 0 were Engli sh .

Firstly it must be noted that this is the largest force ofinfantry that he ever collected together at one time andin one body in Wales . He soon broke the army up intosmaller corps , and rarely had more than 50 0 0 under hispersonal command, whi le detached bodi es were serving inother di rections . Secondly , the men were partly archers ,partly foot spearmen but choice bodies of a few hundredswere purely archers and were brigaded with the crossbowmen . Thirdly , they served for short spells , and relayscam e to relieve those in the field with star tling rapidi ty .

The custom was for the King to summon foot onlyfrom the counties nearest to and most interested in the war

,

namely Lancashi re , Cheshire , Shropshi re and Staffordshirewhich had a sheriff in common

,Herefordshire , and Glouce s

te rshire . Only once did Lincolnshire send foot to Wal es ,and once Westmoreland . But Nottinghamshire an d


Derbyshire , also counties under one sheriff, steadi ly sentinfantry to every war in Wales and almost every campaignin Scotland these were not border counties

,yet we expect

to find keen fighters coming from Sherwood forest and theneighbourhood

,whether pardoned outlaws or countrym en

who had learnt archery from them,and though the rea l

Robin Hood has never yet been di scovered it is interesting tosee that his county supplied good infantry . In a campaignin 1 2 87 against the rebel Rhys ap Meredith an army of

foot was quickly raised,of whom 70 0 0 were Welsh

and the rest came from Cheshire,Shropshire

,Herefordshire ,

and Nottingham shire and Derbyshire .

When the war against Balliol began,Edward I according

to the custom summoned foot from North England . Butobviously they were not good soldiers , and he had to alterthe custom . In the w inter of 1 2 97

—8 a great force offoot was collected from the North and from Wales

it seems to have been a rabble and was soon dismissed

750 horse and 2 50 crossbows were a lso then serving . In1 2 98 the King summoned against Wallace Welshand 2 0 0 0 men of Cheshire and Lancashire , evidently preferring his old allies and old enemies of Wales and his trustymen of the border of Wales to the inexperienced levies ofNorthumberland or Yorkshire the archers of this levy wonthe battle of Falkirk . In succeeding years he had greatdifficulties in raising both horse

,as we saw in the last section

,

and foot . In 130 0 he summoned from the Northcounties of England ; 40 0 0 appeared early in July , 90 0 0were present for a fortnight

,and in August the number

dropped to 50 0 0 ; the men had deserted . There is no doubt


of the fact . Edward issued proclamations against thedeserters . In Wales he had never once had to do this .In fact

,the men of the counties bordering Wales and

of Nottingham shire and Derbyshire excepted , Englishmenthen were not warlike . Just as in the eighteenth andnin eteenth centuries we raised large numbers of German merce n arie s to fight the French , and conquered India mostly bymeans of Sepoys in our own service , so in Edward I

’ s tim emost of the foot in an English army were Welshm en . Itwas from Wales that the use of the bow was learnt

,for in

the first chapter we saw how Strongbow invaded Irelandwith Norman horse and South Welsh bowmen . The bordercounties of Wales may have had in them men of partlyWelsh blood

,and probably owin g to many border wars of

which history has taken no account hadfinaturally taken to

fighting . Southerners never and midlanders rarely served ,and the five northern counties had no stomach for war , didnot like service , turned up in insufficient numbers , andconstantly deserted . It is extremely difficult to think of aNorthum bria n or a Yorkshireman as a coward or a deserter

,

but the fact remains,and it may be said that the defeat

of Bannockburn and the subsequent raids made by Bruceover the border year after year , when he levi ed blackmailupon clerics and laymen alike and spread a reign of terrordown as far as York , forced the Englishm an of these counties to be warlike

,one might almost say , against hi s will .

All this seems to be characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon raceit is slow to begin , it makes use of al lie s an d foreignerswhen and where it can , needs a salutary lesson , in fact hasto be forced to defend itself

,back to the wall , and then at


last becomes pugnacious . And so it came to pass that aftermuch slackness and re fu s al to fight in the days of Edward Iand Edward II

,after having suffered woe at the hands of

Bruce’

s ra iders,the men of the North Country at last warmed

in self- defence ; and, whereas they were abj ectly cowedfrom 13 14 down to 13 2 7 ,

they were able to defend themselves w ithc on s ide rab le effect in 1346 when they alone wonthe battle of Nevi lle ’ s Cross

,whilst their King with the

main army of the rest of England lay before Calais . Inthis evolution of a good fighting infantry everything seemsto depend upon the use of the efficient weapon . No armyof Edward I or Edward II was entirely armed wi th bows ,but obviously the proportion of bowmen to other foot wasgrowing during these reigns

,until all the English infantry

at Crécy was bow- armed and whereas the use of the bowwas learnt from Wales and slowly caught on as an Englishweapon

,in the days of Crecy it had become the English

weapon par excellence , and it was the non-archer knifearmed Welshman who was looked down upon and paid thelower rate of twopence per day when the English archerdrew threepence .

The reign of Edward II is the bad period in this historyof the evolution of the English archer . ApparentlyEdward II himself did not believe in archers . In 13 1 1 hesent writs to the sheriffs of all the counties of England toarray and send to rendezvous at Roxburgh one man fromeach village . These are writs addressed to a ll the sheriffsof all the counties , and there is nothing said about the menbeing archers . Judging by a later year of his reign , 13 2 2 ,

one would suppose that he meant it to be a levy of foot

40 A TYPICAL EDWARDIAN ARMY [CH .

spearmen . These writs indeed were cancelled , and therefore the year 13 1 1 cannot be quoted as the first occasionwhen all the counties of the whole of England were summ on e d to Scotland ,

but the fact that the King issued thesewrits at all is of considerable importance . In 13 14 he firstsummoned foot on March 9th : 2 0 0 0 archers from Yorkshire ,1 0 0 0 from Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire

,1 0 0 0 from

Northumberland , and 50 0 from Lincolnshire , with bows andarrows and other competent arms ; these writs were cancelledand, being cancelled , have not been printed in the officialcopy of the Scottish Rolls . On March 2 4th he summoned

foot,but we cannot possibly tell what proportion were

expected to be bowm en . The levies evidently were beingraised too slowly to suit him . His third writs of summonsare dated May 2 7th . He says , We had ordered the men tobe ready by a date already past . The enemy is striving toassemble great numbers of foot in strong and marshy placeswhich it is very difficult for the cavalry to reach . Thereforeyou are to exasperate and hurry up and compel the men tocome .

'

The following is the list

' orksh ireNotts . a n d De rbyNorthum be rlan d 2 0 0

Salop a nd Sta ffordshi reWa rw ickshire a n d Le ice s te rshi reLan ca shi re

L in coln shi reTh e B ishop of Durh amNorth Wa le sSouth Wa le s

Glam orga n

B re ckn ockAbe rga ve n n yTh e Mortim e r Ma rch e sP ow y sHope'am e s de Pirar

Th e Fore s t of De a nCh e sh ire

CHAPTER III

TACTICS BEFORE BANNOCKBURN

IN medieval warfare,almost more strikingly than in

other periods,success depended on combination . Horse

unsupported by missile-armed foot could not break a steadystand of pikes . Unsupported pikemen were powerlessagainst archers . And in their turn archers , surprised andtaken in flank or re ar

,were powerless against horse This

is all so clear,and the experience of both Strongbow in

Ireland and Richard in Palestine showed so strongly theneed of combination

,that it is almost amazing to find how

the barons despised and neglected infantry . At Lewes an dEvesham

,though infantry were present , all the fighting

fell on the horsemen . Moreover the mailed and mountedmen were terribly awkward . It took a long time to dressthem in line

,and at Lewes Earl Simon alone was able to

do thi s elementary work . They charged clumsily straightahead, and one doubts if they could wheel at a trot .Certainly Edward I did his best in Wales and Scotland tointroduce anew the much needed combination . Yet by nomeans all of his foot were archers . Curiously enough atboth of the battles in Wales where combination triumphedEdward was not present in person .

CH . 111] TACTICS BEFORE BANNOCKBURN

In 1 2 8 2 on the banks of the e on,a tributary of the Wye

near Builth , Roger l’

Es tran ge in command of the men ofHerefordshire and Shropshire came upon the army ofLlewelyn . The English could not at first cross the river inface of resistance

,but later got over unseen by a ford higher

up an d coming along the bank attacked the Welsh up hill .Llewelyn had been absent and was hurrying to the soundof battle , when a certain Stephen Frankton ran him throughthe body with his lance

,not knowing who he was . The

Welsh were le aderless, but they stood in their troops onthe brow of the hill awaiting their lord and prince

,but in

vain . As our men mounted the hill,the Welsh shot their

arrows and darts upon them . But through our archers ,who were fighting by concert in between our cavalry , manyof them fell , all the more so because they stood up boldlyexpecting Llewelyn . Finally our cavalry gained the top ofthe hill , and cut them down or put them to flight . (Walterof He m in gbu rgh . )Early in 1 2 95 during Madoc

’ s risin g Edwa rd I was beingbesieged in Conway Castle

,and the Earl of Warwick was

hastenin g to his relief . At Maes Madoc , about 18 milessouth of Conway , Warwick , hearing that the Welsh hadassembled in great strength in a plain between two forests ,with a picked force of cavalry with crossbowmen andarchers pushed on by night an d surrounded them on allsides . They rested the butts of their spears on the ground ,and presenting the points when the English horse chargedheld them off. But the earl posted a crossbowman betweeneach pair of horsemen — or an archer

,for the number

of crossbows was very small , and when many of the

44 TACTICS BEFORE BANNOCKBURN [CH .

spearmen had been brought down by the bolts, the horsecharged again and defeated them with greater slaughterthan

,it is thought

,had ever been suffered by them in

past times . (Nicholas Trivet . )A comparison of these two battles shows that the

English tactics were the same at each . At Builth someat least of the Welsh were archers of the South , but atMaes Madoc they were all spearmen of the North . Thi swas a characteristic difference between North and SouthWelshmen

,and is mentioned by Gerald who chronicled

Stron gbow’

s wars .

In the Scottish war of 1 2 98 , before the battle of Falk irk ,

two things have to be noticed . Firstly , Edward I’ s army

was much straitened for want of victuals,which he had

hoped to receive by sea,and he was on the point of retreat

towards Edinburgh when he was told that Wallace waspreparing to attack him the difficulty of feeding an arm yin Scotland appears in every war . Secondly, the Welshlevies

,who formed the bulk of Edward ’ s foot

,in a drunken

brawl killed some English , and several of them were killedin revenge . Edward warn ed that they would desert tothe Scots

,replied

,Let them go ; they are both our

enemies,and we will be revenged on them together . So

says the chronicler . But a large proportion of his Welshfoot were from the marches which had always been loya lto him . In the battle the Scots formed all their peoplein four bodies in rings

,on hard ground on one side (of a

morass) near Faw kirk ; their spearmen had their spea rssloping upwards , and they stood shoulder to shoulder withtheir faces outwards . Between the rings were spaces where

III] TACTICS BEFORE BANNOCKBURN 45

stood their archers,and in the rear were their

The earls who commanded the first English brigade , Norfolkthe Ear] Marshal

,Hereford (the Constable) , and Lincoln ,

advan ced in a straight line not knowing that there was alak e between so they had to draw off to the westwardsand were somewhat delayed . The Bishop of Durham

(Antony Bek) , with the second brigade of 36 banners , wasaware of the lake and turned to the east to pass round it .As the men were pu shing on toofa s t s o a s to have the hon our

of a ttacking firs t, the bishop bade them wait for the Kin gand the third brigade , but Ralph Basset of Drayton criedout , Mind your own business and say mass ; we soldierswill do our proper work .

’ So they hastened and chargedthe nearest ring of the Scots

,and the three earls with the

first brigade charged on the other side . Soon the Scotshorse fled without striking a blow , except a few who wereofficers of the rings of infantry called s chiltron s . . .And theScots archers of Selkirk Forest , tall and handsome men ,being killed with their commander

,our men concentrated

their attack on the spearmen in their rings who were likea thick wood

,and cou ld n ot force the ir w ay in be cau s e of the

n um ber of spe ars , though they struck and stabbed some onthe outside . But ou r foot shot a t them w ith a rrow s , andsome with stones which lay there in plenty . So many wereslain and the front ranks pushed back on the rear ranks inconfusion

,and then our horse broke in and routed them .

(Hem in gbu rgh ,vol . II . pp . 176

The narrative speaks for itself. The English lords rodej ealous and without discipline . The s chiltron s of Scots

,

j ust like the Welsh at Maes Madoc , were quite able to beat

46 TACTICS BEFORE BANNOCKBURN [CH .

horse alone,but not to stand up to ar chers, whom they

could not attack in turn without losing their formation .

The English and Welsh foot were obviously in the rear atfirst

, an d did not come up till the first charges of horse hadbeen repulsed . The brigades (a ci e s , or battle s ) were of horsealone

,and the foot were massed separately . The handful

of Scots horse were powerless , and there is no need to callthem traitors . The Scots archers were never numerous .Each of these points requires consideration , because Bruceevidently took the lesson to heart ; at Bann ockburn hedrew up hi s s chiltron s more scientifically , kept his smallforce of cavalry in reserve out of sight so as to launch itsuddenly on the English archers

,and had a certain number

of archers in his ow n ranks who were far from useless .Ralph Basset , the boaster , does not seem to have done

much in the battle after all . He is registered in a horselist as serving in the paid cavalry with two knights an dnine s e rvi en te s , but not one of their horses was damaged .

Of other leaders of paid cavalry , Thomas of Lancaster ,Edward I ’ s nephew and Edward II ’ s bitter enemy, lost1 1 horses in a squadron of 45 , Aym er de Valence lost 5 outof 50 , Hugh Despenser 8 out of 50 , Robert Clifford 10 outof 35 , and Henry Beaumont 4 out of 10 . All these , exceptLancaster , were present at Bannockburn . Yet not one ofthem took to heart the lesson of Falkirk , an d Clifford and

Beaumont were most conspicuous at Bannockburn by theirheadlong charge of horse unsupported by archers againstMoray ’ s ring of pikes . Also at Falkirk in the retinue ofDespenser rode a squir e named Giles of Argentine we shallfind him at Bannockburn , and in the in terval he won a

I II] TACTICS BEFORE BANNOCKBURN 47

reputation as a crusader and the third most famous knightin Christendom .

In 130 2 the French fought the Flemings at Courtrai ,mailed cavalry against foot pikemen

,and to the surprise of

Europe they were beaten . Here were the knights andheroes of chivalry humbled by plebeian town smen . Yetthe English lords still refused to learn the lesson . On thecontrary one of our best chroniclers , Gray of He ton , tellsus that Bruce did learn , and that he formed up his s chiltron sat Bannockburn in imitation of the Flemings . Gray isreally wrong . Doubtless Bruce knew about Courtrai , butFalkirk was fought four years before that , and if he imitatedany one he imitated Wallace . In truth he had no need tolearn even from Wallace , or Wallace from the spearmen ofNorth Wales

,or the Flemings or Swiss from the Scots . A

long shaft of wood with an iron head has been used by footin all ages . It is nature

’ s weapon for poor or untrainedmen against professional mounted men . Welsh , Scots ,Flemings

,Swiss

, a ll these could make an impenetrablehedge . But a stand of pikes cannot easily manoeuvre ;men must be dr il led to advance , or to form up rapidly inface of a surprise attack , when they are carrying long andheavy poles . The merit of Bruce is that he did train hisScots to advance and not only to meet standin g a charge ofhorse so did Phil ip and Alexander of Macedon of old

,and

the Swiss leaders at Morgarten and Morat ; so too didCromwell in an age when half the foot were still pikemen

,

though the other half had muskets . Wallace ’ s s chiltron swere rin gs of men unable to countercharge Bruce ’ s

schiltron s in the main battle of Bannockburn were lines

48 TACTICS BEFORE BANNOCKBURN (on .

which Charged, slowly it may be , but effectively and steadily ,

though in the fight overnight Moray formed a ring to resistClifford and Beaumont .The word, variously written as schiltron , s chiltrom e ,

s chiltrum ,meanin g shield-wall

,is found in the English

chroniclers Hem in gbu rgh and Gray . Barbour does not useit of the Scots themselves , but only of the nine brigades ofEnglish horse who were crowded together so that they wereunmanageable bot in a s chiltrum it s em yt thai war a lland some .

We may take it then that the secret of Bruce ’ s tacticswas his training of his s chiltron s to advance in an orderlyformation en échelon ,

while he kept such of hi s light cavalryas he needed where they would not be out-numbered anduseless . He established a tradition that Scots should takethe offensive , and they did so at Dupplin Moor and HalidonHill and Neville ’ s Cross with disastrous results

,for the new

English formation of archers and dismounted knights wasmuch too powerful for them after Bruce ’ s death . Butwithout anticipating the English reform which avengedBannockburn

,let us by way of contrast turn again to the

medieval baron . Whether English or French ,he was greedy

of fighting but ambitious to be himself alone in action hewas practically untrain ed and unable to manoeuvre ; hefound hi s enemy and rode at him without any science .

He wanted to be ahead , not only of the mass of Engli sh orWelsh foot whom he despised, but also of hi s own comradesin -arms . He nearly spoilt Edward I

’

S chances at Fa lkirk,

and quite ruined Edward II at Bannockburn . He neededthe lesson of defeat . The second Edward was no coward

,

CHAPTER IV

THE HISTORIANS OF BANNOCKBURN

THE most celebrated and most often quoted historian ofBannockburn is John Barbour of Aberdeen

,but he wrote at

the end of the 14th century about sixty years after thewar . It is quite notorious how people who draw upon theirmemory only make mistakes , not only because it is di fficultto remember , but because the facts are already lost in themists of antiquity, or at least appear out of proportion atthe tim e when the hi storian records what he thinks thatthey were . We can only criticise such a man as Barbour intwo ways . Did he use contemporary authorities and understand them when he used them and is hi s work , as judgedby intern al evidence , consistent with itself and with theaccounts of other historians ' Now we know that therewere contemporary rhymers at work on Bannockburn . Wehave already quoted Abbot Bernard , but from the linesattributed to him we cannot say that he is responsible forany valuable information .

There was also a certain poor Carm elite Friar,by name

Robert Baston , who was celebrated as the chief Englishrhymer of the day , an d was taken to Scotland by EdwardII to write a poem in honour of the coming victory bein g

CH . Iv] THE HISTORIANS OF BANNOCKBURN 51

made prisoner by Bruce he was compelled to write a poemon the defeat . The lines given to us as Easton ’ s in anotherlater Scottish chronicle

,called the Scotichron icon ,

begun byFordun and continued by Bower about a century after thebattle , give us nothing definite but one fact , viz . that Bru cereally did dig little pits or pots in front of his army .

Barbour is the chief authority for the existence of the pits ,and two Engli shmen

,Geoffrey Baker of Sw in broke ,

andAbbot Burton of Meaux

,repeat the story

,both of them

obviously from Baston . Also one line of Baston reads :Anglicola e qu a s i Coe li cola e splen dore n ite s cu n t, and Barboursays how the English army shone like angels

,and Baker ,

remembering the old j est,speaks of his fellow countrymen

as Angles and not Angels . Baston is the only first- handauthority that we know to have been used by Barbour

,and

what Barbour obtained from him am ounts to very little .

But when we apply the second criticism to Barbour weare bound to state that , although we are strongly prejudicedagainst a man who wrote 60 years after the event , hisaccount is entirely consistent with itself . He never contradicts himself many of his statements are completelyborne out by the English contemporary authorities

,and

a literal interpretation of Barbour enables us to understandthe general plan of the campaign . A hi storian , wishing toget at the truth , is amply justified in taking Barbour

’ saccoun t and testing it step by step against the shorterEnglish accounts

,and it will then be seen not only that we

have an in telligible story , but also that the various Englishstatements fall into place like bits of a puzzle when oncethe key is found . Of course there is another reason for

5 2 THE HISTORIANS OF BANNOCKBURN [CH .

prejudice Barbour is one of the worst statisticians and ischi efly responsible for the myth of an arm y of Buthe himself supplies the antidote he gives as thefigure of all the English cavalry , but 30 0 0 as the numberof the covered horse only the 30 0 0 need be counted ,and the exaggeration is not very bad

,while the may

be rej ected altogether . The main point is this if we getfrom him an intelligent account which satisfies militarycritics , it is probably a true account if he was inventing ,he would be sure to make mistakes . But his account isintelligent , and we can easily put away our prejudice againsthim on the score of his absurd figures .Of the English writers by far the most important is Sir

Thomas Gray of He ton , son of another Sir Thomas Graywho fought at Bannockburn and was taken prisoner

,but

was afterwards ransomed and defended Norham Castleagain st Bruce . The writer was also Governor of Norhamin later days and was also taken prisoner by the Scots

,and

when in prison in Edinburgh he tells us that he read severalchronicles in French and in English , in prose and in verse ,which encouraged him to write his own hi story . He callsthis the Sca la cron ica , because he dreamt that he ascendeda ladder to the top of a high wall , beyond which he sawvarious things going on . It is the work therefore of asoldier and the son of a soldier who had actually been in thebattle . It has been edi ted by the Maitlan d Club ,

but isunluckily out of print . Sir Herbert Maxwell (Ma cle hos e ,

Glasgow) has issued an English translation .

The s o-called Chron icle of Lan e rcost was written bya succession of Franciscans of Carlisle , and the particular

Iv] THE HISTORIANS OF BANNOCKBURN 53

section which deals with Bannockburn was written by acontemporary who quotes his authority This I was toldby somebody worthy to be believed

,who was present there

himself and saw it . It has also been edited for the MaitlandClub , and translated by Sir Herbert .The Vita Edw a rdi S e cundi , edited by Bishop Stubbs

(Rolls Series) , is almost contemporary, and seems to be thework of a monk of Malmesbury Abbey , who was writing upto 13 2 5 . It is a fairly long piece of work and gives us manyimportant facts . For instance it is here that we have thedefinite statement that the English cavalry were 2 0 0 0 strongof which the Earl of Gloucester led at his own cost 50 0 .

There is a short reference to Bannockburn in a good contemporary chronicle which comes from Bridlington Prioryin Yorkshire , and a Slightly longer account comes from Johnof Troke low e

,one of the many chronicler monks of St

Albans . Towards the end of the century Abbot Burton ofMeaux wrote a history, mostly of his own Abbey, but alsoof general matters of interest he was clearly using someolder material , and if we cannot consider him as contem

pora ry , at least he represents the English point of Viewwhich had become traditional . All these are to be found inthe Rolls Series .Lastly , we have to consider Geoffrey Baker of Sw in broke .

He is our chief authority on military matters in the HundredYears ’ War . It is not only that he has written on Crecyand Poitiers much more intelligently than Froissart ; healso understood , or was coached by somebody who understood , the evolution of the Edwardi an tactics of combiningfoot and horse . Baker deliberately tells us that at Crécy

54 THE HISTORIANS OF BANNOCKBURN [CH .

the ar chers were posted on the wings where they pouredtheir arrows like lightning into the flanks of the attackingFrench cavalry , whereas at Bannockburn the bulk of thearchers were useless in rear of their own cavalry . Nowsome of Baker ’ s statements about Bannockburn are ob

viou s ly wrong , probably because he took the facts literallyfrom Friar Baston , and embroidered or wrote them out without a critical examination . For instance he talks about theEnglish army glittering, as Baston tells us , and then addswrongly on his ow n authority that the English had the su nin their eyes . He has entirely neglected the preliminaryfighting on the first day of the battle . But it is impossibleto pass over him as a chief authority

,for it is absurd to

consider him as the best writer to follow for Crecy and rej ecthim for Bannockburn . His chronicle has been edited bySir E . M . Thompson (Clarendon Press) .Modern historians , one feels as one reads them , have had

some trouble to explain Bannockburn . Each one choosesan authority, it may be Gray or Baker or the Lan e rcos tchronicler , and seems to despair of fittin g in the detailsgiven by others . The main fact is plain enough , the routof horse by foot , and that alone seems to be essential . Yetwe want to understand more , and in particular from theEnglish side we want to see how the nation was so badlyhumbled in 13 14 which was so brilliantly successful onanother scene in 1346 . The typical description of Bannockburn is not convincing , and one has felt in trying to de scribeit oneself that one has not been convincing . The bestaccount has been that of Sir Evelyn Wood

,who was years

ago an officer in garrison at Stirling,frequently visited

IV] THE HISTORIANS OF BANNOCKBURN 55

the reputed field of battle , and left some notes whichultimately came into the hands of Sir Herbert Maxwell .

His is a soldier ’ s description of the battle . He asked himselfwhere Moray must have been posted before he foughtClifford , where and how the main force of English cavalrycrossed the burn

,where the archers came into action . But

there is this flaw . Sir Evelyn only knew of the reputedsite , and every other historian has taken thi s as the onlypossible Site , even Andrew Lang whose flair is so wellknown . Much of the chronicled evidence will not fit intoany account of the battle fought on this site . It has onlybeen the traditional site sin ce Nirnm o wrote his Hi storyof Stirlingshire in the late 18 th century . We all knowthat I learnt it at school and therefore it is true

,or the

guide-book says so , is no argument . This is the sameargument as that which still bin ds some people to the

Yet we have been slaves, an d tried to make the

evidence fit the site,and not the Site the evidence . Suddenly

Mr W . M . Mackenzie chooses a different site and a ll is plain .

And how does he break the spell He Simply takes Barbourand Gray , the only two authorities who do precisely giveany statement at all , follows them literally , locates thebattle on the Carse , and at once all is plain .

Mr Round in an article in hi s Com m un e of Lon donhas blamed Professor Oman ’ s account

,or rather hi s various

accounts in different books . Certainly it is di fficult tofollow an historian who in one version puts the archers inthe front

,and in another in the rear , in the one case following

the Lan e rcos t chronicle and in the other Baker . Yet thisis but typical of many historians who have found the battle

56 THE HISTORIANS OF BANNOCKBURN [CH. IV

difficult to explain . But Professor Oman in his Art ofWa r in the M iddle Age s has made some serious mistakesbesides those of inconsistency, and one must point themou t, because others follow him an d perpetuate the error . Heputs the English army as strong in horse andin foot

,and then assumes that of these were in com

parable archers . This he does by adding 70 0 0 light horseto the 3 0 0 0 covered horse mentioned by Barbour, andby arg uing that if Edward summoned 2 1 ,540 foot from somecounties a gross total of came from all England.

Each fallacy has been exposed above . Worse still , he givesa plan of the battle in whi ch horse and foot are brigadedtogether in each of the ten battles of which Barbourtells us . But Barbour clearly states that each of the tenwere of horse alone , and the combination of archers w ithdismounted cavalrymen was the post-Bannockburn reformwhich made Crécy possible . Let us try to imagine theEnglish going in to action according to this plan in firstline three bodies of horse , and foot immediately behindthem in second line the same formation in third line thesame formation the result would be confusion so hopelessand ludicrous that one can hardly believe even Edward IIat Bannockburn to have been so crazy as to array his armyin such a way . It is a minor detail that Barbour dividesthe ten into a van and nine behind on a side , and ProfessorOman depicts nine in three lines in front and the tenth as

a reserve . This plan has been copied into other histories asif it were perfect .

58 SUNDAY , JUNE 2 3RE , 13 14 [CH .

and horses and whatever they fancied . This,of course , is

with a purpose . A tale of defeat has as its prelude anaccusation of wrong done to the Church . Yet any soldierof the period would have agreed that the King had theright to requisition supplies and transport from those whocould not fight friar and monk had no right to the Kin g ’ sprotection if they grudged payment for it .We continue from the Vita Edw ardi S e cu ndi . After

emphasising that the war was without consent of Parliament , Edward merely relying on the voluntary servicesof Gloucester and Hereford and Pembroke and many baronswho had turned to loyalty in disgust at Gave s ton

’

s murder ,though five earls sent their strict quotas only

,the author

continues : Six or seven days before the feast of St Johnhe left Berwick with m ore than 2 0 0 0 a rm ed hors e a n d a ve ry

n um e rou s infan try . There were enough men there to marchthrough the whole of Scotland

,and some thought that if all

Scotland were collected together it could not resist theKing ’ s army . N eve r in ou r tim e did su ch an a rmy qu it

England. The multitude of carts stretched out in a linewould have taken up twenty leagues . The King , in hisconfidence

,hastened day by day towards hi s goal . Short

time was allowed for sleep,shorter for meals . Horses ,

horsemen,and infantry

,overcome by toil and want of food ,

are not to be blamed for their failure in battle .

To this we can add that the route taken was from theTweed up Lauderdale and beneath Soutra Hill to Edinburgh ,for on June 18 Edward addressed from Soltre a letterto the Archbishop of Canterbury . (Bain , vol . III , NO .

Here , says Mr Mackenzie , stood a hospital for travellers

v] SUNDAY,JUNE 2 3RD , 13 14 59

since the 1 2 th century and a main modern road traversesLauderdale betw een the Tweed and Edinburgh . Thereforewe have proof that the army marched in land and not bythe difficult coast from Berwick to Dunbar . Thi s was anopen and thinly populated moorland

,and often enough on

other occasions the Scots had no need to fight,but let their

foes wear themselves out and starve . But now the longline of carts at least bore victuals enough for the first fewweeks of the campaign . There was a definite obj ective ,Stir ling . Bruce preferred to make his stand in the woodsthrough which ran the road to Stirling

,and made no attempt

to harass the army strugglin g in such hot haste up Lauderdale . When Edinburgh was reached we may suppose thata halt was made to allow the rear and the baggage train toclose up

,for that such an army straggled is self- evident .

Barbour tells us that on Saturday June 2 2 it marched thewhole distance from Edinburgh to Falkirk

,twenty miles

and a bit more , a somewhat difficult feat for even muchbetter disciplined troops .But there is no reason to doubt what Barbour says about

Bruce ’ s plans,and we can continue with him for our guide .

The rendezvous for the Scots was the Torwood, the forestnorth of Falkirk

,through which the English would have to

pass by the medieval road ; it is quite possible that aRoman road once ran from Antonine ’ s wall to cross theForth at Stirling

,thence on to Ardoch cam p , but skil led

authorities profess they are unable to trace it now . Therethen Bruce arrayed his army ; he himself took the rearthe van he gave to Thomas son of Randolph , Earl of Moray ,his nephew two other brigades, or battles in medieval

60 SUNDAY, JUNE 2 3RD , 13 14 [CH.

language , he assigned respectively to his brother EdwardBruce

,and to young Walter Stewart , who was directed by

James Douglas. This order is of some importance , and itwas the order for retreat and not for battle . Moray wasleading the retreat

,and Bruce was covering the army by

his rear—guard against the English advan ce , while EdwardBruce and Douglas were behind and to the side of th e van .

It was a sort of diamond formation

Moray

Douglas Edward

Bruce

Such was the array at least on the Friday, and on Saturday ,as word came of the English march from Edinburgh , theyall fell back to the next forest , the New Park , whi ch coveredStirling to the south .

The gr eat rock of Stirlin g, like a wedge lying on its Side ,overhangs the Forth a few miles below the tidal limit . Thetown and castle guard the bridge , the first bridge over theriver a s one goes up , at a point very far inland. To this factthe place owes its fam e . It commands a wide view to eastand west , eastwards over the loops of the Forth as it tw i stsand twines , westwards up the fertile valley which lies b etween the Campsie Fells and the Ochils . The Highlandsshut in the view, and on most days Ben Ledi and BenLomond can be seen . Such a fortress in the waist ofScotland , so far inland , and a bridge-place , has ever been of

great military im portance .

2 . From S tirl ing Church Tow e r l ook ing e a stw a rds dovVn th e F or tha n d s how rn g the w m drn g s of th e rive r

3 . From S t ir l ing Church Tow e r look ing nor th - w e s tw a rds,

a n d s how m g the H ig h la nds be yond the C a s t le .

v] SUNDAY,JUNE 2 3RD ,

13 14 61

Bruce , we are told by Barbour , deliberately chose theNew Park for his stand . An upland rises from the northbank of the Bannock and the road to Stirling climbs up tostrike through the Park . From the front of the positionthe approach of the English could be clearly seen a frontalattack could be prepared against a flanking movement toreach Stirling by the flat ground of the Carse to the eastcould be also foreseen . So Bruce himself was ready toprotect the entry of the road into the wood , with hisbrother Edward near him Moray was posted further backnear the Kirk of St Ninian

,with Douglas in support , and the

kirk stands near the sharp edge of the high ground beneathwhich is the Carse

,stretching to the Forth . From all

the detailed accounts, Barbour’ s, Gray

’ s , the La n e rcostChron icle and the Vita ,

we find such frequent references tothe wood that it is certain that the New Park covered mostof the upland . The Scottish arm y was hidden ,

ready tomove out to meet the English , whether the advance camefrom the front' or by the flank .

Posted here Bruce,on the Saturday , ordered to be dug

the famous pits or pottis . Where were they and whatpart did they play in the battle The prime authority isthe friar and rhymer

,Robert Baston . The words are

,A

device full of woe is formed for the horses’

feet , hollow ,wi th

spikes,that they may not pass wi thout fal l . The commons

dig di tches that on them the cavalry may trip . That isall . The English chronicler , Baker of Sw in b roke , takes

Easton’ s fact and builds up a story of a long ditch or ditches

,

sin gular or plural in different parts of hi s narrative , threefeet wide and three deep , covered with hurdles and screened

62 SUNDAY , JUNE 2 3RE , 13 14 [C H

with grass, constructed I will not say deceitfully butcan nily . He takes another fact , the tripping of the Englishcavalry in the bed of the burn when they broke and fledafter Monday ’ s main battle . He puts the two facts togetherand tells us that on Monday

’ s charge they tripped in theditches . Abbot Burton of Meaux quotes straight fromBaston Iron spikes had been placed in hollows underthe ground so that both horse and foot might trip . Onecan say from Baker and Burton that tradition in England

,

in the generations after Bannockburn , considered the pitsan essential feature of the battle . In Tytle r

’

s Hi s tory ofScotland (3rd edition 1845 , vol . I , p . is given theevidence of a certain Lieutenant Campbell

,who vi sited the

accepted Site of the battle at a time when the marshesbordering the Bannock were being drained . He saw anumber of circular holes about 18 inches deep , very closeto one another , wi th a sharp pointed stake in the centre ofeach . The stakes were in a state of decomposition . . . Therewere some swords , spear—heads, horse- Shoes , horse-hair

(the latter generally mixed with a whi tish animal matterresembling tallow) found in them . The statement is precise

,but is not corroborated by anybody . Were no Scots

a century ago keen enough to follow up the question an d

see if Campbell was right His evidence is mentioned inthe first edition of Tytler in 1 8 2 8 , disappears from thesecond

,is given at length in his own words in the third

,and

again disappears from later editions . The pits , he says ,were at the western end of Halbert Marsh , near the Bannock ,and it seems— for Campbell does not write clearly— thatthey swept round from the marsh along the w e stern foot of

64 SUNDAY , JUNE 2 3RE , 13 14 [CH .

conveniently named , and so the myth was begu n and hasbeen adopted by everybody since .

Let us stand to- day on the high ground above the farmcalled F oot 0 ’ Green . We are on the English side of thevalley, our faces to the north . The Bannock runs belowfrom west to east its banks are in places low

,but beyond

ri ses the upland before mentioned which is about the 1 8 0 footcontour to west and east the northern bank rises steep

,

and would be quite impossible for heavy cavalry . Behin dthe upland to our left is the well-wooded Gillies ’ Hill , in thecentre Coxe t Hill with Stirling Castle Showing above inmiddle distance , to our right the Carse and glimpses of theForth . Again st the sky are the Ochils with Wallace ’ sAbbey Craig as a sentinel in front , and away to thenorth-west the higher mountains . Ben Ledi peeps over theshoulder of Gillies ’ Hill . It is a fair view . But the Old

conditions were very different . The bed of the Bannock isnow farmed to the edge , and a millstream runs off the mainstream of the burn to meet it again lower down the wateris to-day controlled and kept in its place . In old daysthere were swamps in places , Halbert Bog and Milton Bog,between the burn and the foot of the upland . Mr Mackenziedoes not believe this . But we have the evidence of Lieut .Campbell that the land w as being drained in the early 19th

century ; Professor Oman says he has seen 18 th centurymaps showing the swamps ; old citizens of Stirling havetold the present w ri ter that there used to be swamp andwater where now is the bowling-green beneath Bore ston eBrae , and that they used to skate there . True, the battlewas fought in midsummer , and the weather was hot , for

v] SUNDAY , JUNE 2 3RD ,13 14 65

Barbour says that the Scots sweated with their efforts .But if there were swamps down in the Carse , as Mr Mackenzie tells us, why not also near the Bannock especiallyas Mr Mackenzie makes no allowance for the artificial millstream which now pens in the water . The point is ofimportance

,for

,if Monday’ s battle took place here , the

English cavalry could only have crossed on a very narrowfront in places between the swamps . He thinks thatMonday’ s battle was not fought here , no more do I butone reason to my mind for putting the battle elsewhere isthe difficulty of a passage here by the cavalry , which isSir Evelyn Wood ’ s chief contribution to the elucidation ofthe battle . Secondly, and far more important than thequestion of swamps

,comes the fact that the upland, to-day

open,in 13 14 was wooded . That the New Park covered

nearly all the ground where most wri ters have located thebattle is clear . It was argued a few paragraphs back onBarbour ’ s evidence that Bruce chose the position for thevery reason that it was wooded , so that his army was hidden .

The chroniclers are quite definite in their language . The

Scots issued from the wood unexpectedly, both on Sundayand on Monday .

Three roads now cross th e burn and climb the slope tomeet near St Nin ian ’

s Kirk . Which of them , if any, marksthe di rection of the old road it would be hard to say , but thegeneral line of straightness from Falkirk to Stirling seemsto indicate the middle one of the three it passes east ofand below Foot 0 ’ Green farm , crosses both the burnitself and the millstream , and mounts to the east of thebore s ton e . The oldest map that I have seen in the British

M . B .

66 SUNDAY , JUNE 2 3RE , 13 14 [CH.

Museum , though on a small scale , gives the general direction .

Along it let us imagine that Edward ’ s van advanced .

Let us go back to our chroniclers . Sir Thomas Graywrote , Sir Philip Mowbray— governor of Stirling Castlemet the King three leagues from the castle on Sunday

,the

Eve Of St John , and said that there was no reason why heshould come any nearer to effect a rescue he a lso told him

how the e n emy had blocked a ll the n a rrow paths through thew ood. But the young soldiers did not halt , but pushed on .

The van , led by Gloucester , entered on the road throughthe Park , and were soon thrown back by the Scots who heldthe road,

and Sir Peter Montfort was slain it is said byBruce ’ s own hand with an axe . Every other writer givesthis honour to Henry Bohun , but the mistake does notlessen our respect for Gray’ s narrative .

In the Vita Edw a rdi S e cundi we read The Earls ofGloucester and Hereford led the van . On Sunday, the Eveof St John

,having already passed through a forest— the

Torwood— and drawing near to Stirling , they s a w som e Scots

s catte red n e ar a w ood— the New Park— and apparently inretreat . Henry Bohun with some Welsh troops pursuedthem to the entry of the wood, in hope to find Bruce thereand kill or capture him . Suddenly Bru ce appe a red out ofthe w ood, and Henry seeing the Scots in great numbersturned his horse . But Bruce broke his head Open w i th an

axe . Then there was a sharp fight , in which Gloucesterwas unhorsed

,Clifford was forced to flee , and as our men

pursued the Scots (s ic) many fell on both sides . Here too isan inaccuracy , for Clifford fled on another side of the field ,but the narrative is not spoilt thereby. Henry Bohun was ,

v] SUNDAY,JUNE 2 3RD , 13 14 67

of course , a kinsman of th e Earl of Hereford , and his nameoccurs in the list Of those who had protections inHereford ’ s retinue . Robert of Reading, in the Flore s Hi storia rum

, contributes an interesting sentence , though otherwise he says nothing about the battle . A mad rivalrybroke out between Gloucester and Hereford about thecontrol of the army and the office of Constable . The King,in contempt of Hereford

,gave the office to Gloucester ,

though belonging by hereditary right to Hereford and hisline . Naturally enough Edward preferred Gloucester ,because Hereford had been contumacious and refused toattend the feudal levy in 13 10 . Naturally also Herefordresented it , and the impetuous attack now was caused byj eal ous riding . Their fathers had been rebellious againstEdward I as well as personal rivals . But Gloucester hadbeen brought over to Edward II ’ s Side and was madeConstable . It was unpardonable folly for Edward II to letsuch rivals ride together in the van .

Barbour ’ s details of Bohun ’ s charge upon Bruce who wasmounted on ane gray pa lfrav litill and j oly, Bruce ’ sdexterous swerve , the terrific blow which killed Bohun ,

andhis moan over his hand- ax—schaft that he had broken

,

are familiar . It must be added that Barbour says the Scotsthen charged forward and overtook and slew a few English

,

but their horses ’ feet saved the rest of the van . AlsoEdward Bruce debouched in rear of Robert . It was in facta serious action between the van of one army and the rearof the other , but the truth of this is lost by those who onlylook at the romantic side of the King

’

s personal duel .Meanwhile Clifford and Beaumont wi th a body of horse

5— 2

68 SUNDAY , JUNE 2 3RD , 13 14 [CH.

crossed the Bannock and skirted the Park to the east , orelse they made a wide detour beyond the present little townof Bannockburn at least they were out of sight of Morayand his men posted near St Ninian ’ s Kirk . Bruce blamedMoray and told him that ane rose of his Chaplet wasfaldyn ,

' and as he had chosen the New Park on purposebecause he could see the English , whether they Should makea frontal attack like Bohun , or should try to ou tflank likeClifford

,very naturally his condemnation was strong . The

Lan e rcost chronicler assumes that Moray deliberatelyallowed them to ride round him until Clifford was somedistance away

,and then he and his men showed themselves

,

and cutting them off from the centre charged upon them ,

killing some and routing the rest . Of the place of fightin gthere can be no doubt at all . It was n e u th the kirk . .

to the p layn feld .

' Clifford had indeed turned the Scots ’

position,and had a clear way before him to the castle .

But when M oray appe ared from the w ood with 50 0 spearmenon foot

,the English preferred to fight rather than effect

a formal rescue of the castle . They formed up to charge ,but first gave the Scots time to form their national ring

,

even as Wallace drew up his rings at Falkirk . The hedgehog or hyrch e ou n e of pikes corresponded to the hollowsquare of muskets against cavalry . The English could notbreak in

,they only impaled their horses on the pik es , they

had no archers in attendance to shoot down the Scots,and

vainly threw darts and knives , swords and maces , at theirsteady foes . Douglas , whose brigade supported Moray ,begged leave of Bruce to move up . But already Moraywas beginning to advance on the baffled horsemen ,

and the

v] SUNDAY , JUNE 2 3RD , 13 14 69

sight of Douglas only completed the rout . Yet Barboursays definitely that the fight lasted a long time , beginnin gbefore Bruce ’ s affair with Bohun and ending after it , andthat the Scots sweated much and were weary . Barbourgives 8 0 0 horse under three bannerets as the number ofClifford ’ s command .

But we have a much more competent authority thanBarbour

,namely Sir Thomas Gray

,whose father was in the

charge and was dragged in on foot into the rin g as a prisoner .He puts the number at 30 0 horsemen . He makes Beaumontresponsible for givin g Moray time to form up , not Clifford .

He says nothing of Douglas movin g up . But otherwise heshows how excellent was Barbour ’ s information . Meanwhile Robert Lord Clifford and Henry Beaumont with 30 0men- a t- arms rode round the wood on the other side towardsthe castle

,and he ld the open fie lds . Thomas Randolph , Earl

of Moray and nephew of Bruce , who was in command ofthe Scots ’ van , had heard that his uncle had driven back theEnglish on the other Side , and thought that he would liketo have his share of the fighting s o he i s s u edfrom the w ood

with his division,and took up a position in the open towards

the two English lords . Let us give ground a little ,’ said

Beaumont ;' let them come on give them space ' — In

the usual quarrel of words , as in man y medieval battles,Beaumont taunted Gray

,the author ’ s father , for cowardice .

Then Gray spurred his horse , and Sir William Dayn cou rt

did ' the same , and they charged right into the enemy ;Dayn cou rt was killed , and Gray taken prisoner , hi s horsebeing speared and himself dragged in on foot by the Scots

,

who totally routed the two lords . Som e of the Engli sh fled

70 SUNDAY , JUNE 2 3RD , 13 14 [CH.

to the ca stle , and some to the King’ s main army

,which had

retired from the road through the wood .

'

Baker,we have seen

,is silent on the Sunday ’ s fighting .

The Vita Edw a rdi S e cu ndi only mentions Bohun ’ s attack ,and seems to imply that Clifford was routed on that side .

John of Troke low e says shortly that , when tents had beenpitched, some of the English rode in among the wedges ofthe Scots and attacked them fiercely . But they resistingmanfully killed many English nobles that day

,and the

English, bitter because of their repulse , vowed to be revengedon the morrow or die .

Where did the English pass the night Every modernwriter has assumed that they encamped to the south ofthe Bannock . But Mr Mackenzie says that they encampedacross the Bannock in the Carse , in the loop which thattributary makes with the Forth . And his evidence issimple , just the plain statements of Barbour and Gray .

These are the only two authorities who tell us where theencampment was they are our best authorities on the oneor the other side . The inference is plain , and we have noright to doubt them . Yet we wonder that nobody beforeMr Mackenzie has taken them at their word . Gray w rote ,the main army had come to a plain towards the waters ofForth beyond B an n ockbu rn ,

a bad and deep watery marsh .

There the English encamped and passed the night . ' Bar'

hou r is equally precise They harboured them that nightdown in the Ca rs e (Kers) . . and, for in the Carse werepools , houses and thatch they broke and bore to makebridges where they might pass and some say that the folkin the castle , when night fell , bore doors and windows with

72 SUNDAY , JUNE 2 3RD ,13 14 [CH. v

doubtless of the best of men , they were bitter because oftheir repulse and vowed to be revenged on the morrow ordie . . they were hungry and had had no sleep . FriarBa s ton

’

s words are While they thus boast with wine inthe night revelling , They kill thee , Scotland , wi th vain wordsupbraiding . They sleep , they snore . Baker , following thi slead , tells of revelry and the dr in king of healths . It isinteresting to know that tongues were used to kill Brucenearly six centuries before Kruger was heard of . Butindeed are not accounts of the night before the battle usuallymore than a little coloured so that the fortunes of the battleitself may have a proper setting The main point is thatthe English crossed the burn , and Slept , or did not sleep , on

the open ground towards Stirling .

CHAPTER VI

MONDA' , 'UNE 2 4TH, 13 14

THE previous sections have shown that there is much tobe said for Mr Mackenzie ’ s theory that the main battle ofBannockburn was fought on the Carse , not on the uplandwhere it has been usually located . The evidence is veryclear and strong that the English army crossed the Bannockafter the double repulse of Bohun and Clifford , and e u

camped outre B an n ockbu rn on the swampy ground where itmeets the Forth . Clifford had fought on a plain fieldbeneath the Kirk of St Ninian , some of his men had fled toStirlin g Castle , and the garrison had come out to help themain army as it encamped ; likewise on Monday KingEdward fled to the castle and many with him Barbourand Gray and the more nearly contemporary writers tell usthis explicitly , and it is perfectly obvious that no fugitivescould reach the castle after a fight on the upland with thevictorious Scots in between . If Clifford fought on the flatfirm ground in the Carse

,the same land was also possible

for Monday ’ s battle there was space enough though notmuch to Spare near the Forth indeed were pools , but at the

50—foot contour and near to the foot of the upland the

ground was known in the 1 8 th century as the dry lands ,'

and this recalls the a rida te rra where Friar Baston puts

74 MONDAY , JUNE 2 4TH, 13 14 [OH .

the battle ; vide the Old Stati stica l Accou n t of Scotland,

quoted by Mr Mackenzie . The word cam pu s , used by twochroniclers, may indeed merely mean battlefield ,

' yetseems to point to a really flat stretch of ground, which suitsthe Carse and not the upland . These are general considerations based on good evidence . Then when we take thedetails of Monday ’ s battle we have two military facts whichmake the matter certain .

Firstly , on the Sunday Bruce with the rear , his brotherEdward supporting him , repulsed Bohun and the Englishvan Moray with the Scottish van , supported by Douglas ,routed Clifford . These were the rear and van of the armyin retreat . Therefore Bruce was nearest to the English lin eof attack by the high road and Moray was furthest off untilClifford rode round . But In Monday

’ s battle Edward Brucecame first into action

,then Moray on his flank , then Douglas

on Moray ’ s flank , while the King was in the rear of themall . Thi s is from Barbour

,who writes clearly and circum

stan tia lly , while no English chronicler gives any such closedetails . If Barbour is right and if Monday ’ s fight was onthe upland , then Bruce acted in an incomprehensiblemanner he drew up his four brigades in a new pos ition ,made them cross each other , and generally ran a risk ofclubbing his army and involvin g it in confusion , a risk sucha s no able tactician would ever run . But if Barbour isright and the fight was in the Carse , what happened wasthat the Scots simply faced to their left , and each brigadein its own place came into action and there was no crossing .

Thus Edward Bruce was now on the right flank , Moray inthe centre , Douglas on the left , all en eche lon by the right ,

VI] MONDAY , JUNE 2 4TH, 13 14 75

and the King was now furthest from the enemy and inreserve . In fact Barbour has pointed out the Carse as thebattlefield

,and the Carse justifies both Barbour as an

historian and Bruce as the able tactician that we alwayshave believed him to have been .

Secondly , our best authorities indicate that the uplandwas wooded, it may be thickly wooded, by the New Park .

The Scottish army was at first hidden . The English vanon Sunday did not expect to find the whole of the army sonear them , and after Bohun

’ s death retreated hastily as notonly Bruce ’ s rear brigade but also Edward Bruce ’ s supporting brigade debouched from the wood . Again , on theMonday morning early the Scots debouched from the woodand the English van attacked impetuously because thebattle was forced on them , and the nine other brigades ofhorse came on behind and to a side in a disorderly m ob .

Now is it possible to imagine that , with the Bannockbetween , there was any need to accept battle so hastily,the rear being quite open But let us grant , though it isagainst the evidence , that the English attack was hurriedon by mere pride an d over-confide n ce . They had to crossthe burn

,and Sir Evelyn Wood, who examined the ground

with a soldier ’ s eye , has pointed out that they could onlycross at three places and on a narrow front at each place

,

for to right and left the banks were too steep for the horses,

and in front were swamps at interval s where the banks werelow ; we argued previously that Mr Mackenzie must bewrong in denying the existence of Milton Bog and HalbertBog . They would have crossed very slowly, made someattempt to reform on the north bank , and ascended the

76 MONDAY , JUNE 2 4TH, 13 14 [CH.

slope to get within distance to charge and to put theirlumbering horses into a canter . Meanwhile Bruce waslooking on . If he was the able tactician he would havetumbled them all in to the bed of the burn long ago . Or ,if he had deliberately waited for all the English mountedmen to be across so that he might lure them all to de struction

,where was the open ground necessary for a charge of

2 0 0 0 horses Or , if the New Park did not cover most ofthe upland and if there was sufficient space what are weto think of the chroniclers who make so prom In e n t a featureof the wood In fact , if we are obsessed by the idea thatthe battle took place on the uplan d , difficulties meet us onevery side

,and thus we see how no two modern historians

give the same account of the fighting . The most saneaccount is Sir Evelyn ’ s

,and it must stand if we accept the

upland ; it explains how the thing was done on the condition s of the site , but goes against the evidence . But nosooner do we shift the scene to the Carse than everycondition is satisfied, as Mr Mackenzie alone has had thewit to see . The Scots debouched in their three brigades enéchelon ,

advanced on the flat , forced the English to come onbecause they had caught them in the loop of the Forth andthe Bannock

,and continued to advance to the attack ,

merely halting to present a steady front at the moment ofthe English cavalry’ s disorderly charge . There were bothtime and space for the manoeuvres described , and yetneither time nor space for the English to array their lin esproperly . Therefore again we can say that Barbour indicates the Carse as the battlefield , and the Carse justifiesboth Barbour as an historian and Bruce as a tactician .


Let us next take the English chroniclers so that we cansee where they corroborate or supplement Barbour . Variousproblems will be suggested

,and then we shall be able to

make a consistent account of the battle . Only let usremember that no general statement need be taken tooliterally, even if the evidence of an eye-witness is quoted.

Any man only sees a part of a battle , and a chronicler maysoon make a mistake if he infers too much from a statementwhich has to be conditioned by other circumstances of thebattle . And first once more we place Sir Thomas Graybecause he was a soldier , and his father was , since Clifford

’ sdefeat

,a prisoner in Bruce ’ s hands . Barbour says that

Bruce had overn ight held an informal council of war , hadasked if his lords were ready to fight , and had been assuredthat they were . Gray ’ s opening statement is quite compatible with Barbour ’ s .

The S cots in the w ood thought they had done wellenough thi s day, and w e re on the poin t of bre aking cam p andretiring by night to the stronger country of the Lennox

,

when Alexander Seton , who had come with the army in theallegiance of the King of England, came s e cre tlv to Brucein the wood

,and said : Sire , now is the time , If ever , to

think of re—conquering Scotland ; the English have lostheart and are discouraged , and expect nothing but a suddenopen attack .

’ So he told him of their condition,and de

clare d,upon his head and under pain of being hung and

drawn , that if he w ou ld cha rge upon them in the m orn ing he

w ou ld defe at them e a s i ly wi thout loss to himself . Excitedby this information the Scots made ready to fight

,and at

sunrise they debau ched from the w ood in thre e battle s on foot,

78 MONDAY , JUNE 2 4TH, 13 14 [CH .

and m arched stifily upon the Engli sh , who had remained underarms all night with their horses bridled, and w hon ow m oun ted

in gre at ha ste they were not accustomed to dismount tofight on foot , whereas the Scots had followed the exampleof the Flemings who had previously at Courtrai routed onfoot the power of France . The Scots cam e on in a lin e in thes chiltrom formation

,and charged upon the brigades of the

Engli sh ,w ho w ere crow ded togethe r and cou ld not force their

way towards them,so much were the ir hors e s spe a red through

the bow e ls . (Here it is safe to adopt the punctuation ofSir Herbert Maxwell ’ s translation ; otherwi se there is nosense in the passage . ) The re arm ostEngli shfe ll ba ck uponthe cha n n e l of the B an n ockbu rn , tripping over each other.Their brigades thrown into confusion by the thrusts of thespears upon the horses commenced to fly . Those who wereappointed to ride at the King ’ s bridle perceived the mischief

,

and dre w the King out of the ba ttle tow a rds the ca s tle muchagainst his will . AS the Scots on foot laid hold of thehousing of the King ’ s charger to stop him , he struck out sovigorously with his mace that he felled every man that hetouched . The famous knight Sir Giles Argentine said,Sire

,your rein was entrusted to me there is the castle

where your body will be safe . I am not accustomed to fly,and I am not going to begin now .

’ So he spurred into thethick of the fight and was killed . The King , mounted ona fresh horse , rode round the Torwood to Lown ess , and soto Dunbar

,thence by sea to Berwick .

'

Next in value we place the Chron icle of Lan e rcost,because one fact at least

,and from it presumably the whole

account , comes from an eye-witness . It is a very minor


matter that here the Scots are said to be in two brigadesabreast , while Barbour makes them advance in three enéchelon before they came abreast .

The next day either side made ready for battle . The

Engli sh a rche rs w en t ahe ad of the m a in battle and met theScots

’

archers , and on either side some were slain andwounded , but the English soon routed the others . Butwhen the two armies came close together

, a ll the Scotsknelt down to repeat the Lord ’ s Prayer and commendedthemselves to God ; the n they advan ced boldly upon the

English . Their army was so arrayed that two brigadespreceded the third, these two marching abreast , and in thethird in the rear was Bruce . Whe n the shock of battle cam e

an d the gre at hors e s of the Engli sh da shed upon the Scotti sh

spe ars a s upon a de n s e fore st, there arose a great and horribledin from the broken lances and the wounded horses

,and so

for a time they stood locked together . But the English w ho

w e re com ing up from the re ar cou ld n ot re a ch the Scots , be ca u s e

the ir ow n fron t lin e w a s in the w ay , nor could they help them ,

and nothing remained but to think of flight . This I he a rd

from a tru stw orthy ey e-w itn e s s . And thi s misfortune also

befell the English before the battle they had had to crossa gre at ditch up w hich the tide com e s from the s e a , ca lled the

B an n oke bu rn e , and,w hen in the ir confu s ion they tri ed to

r etre at, m any in the pre s s fe ll in to it, and some escaped withdifficulty

,while others were never able to extricate them

selves ; this Ban n oke burn e was on Englishm e n’

s tonguesfor many years to come . Forth absorbed many wellequipped w ith horses and arms, and Bannock mud manywhose very names we know not [this is a quotation

8 0 MONDAY , JUNE 2 4TH, 13 14 [CH.

from some poem ] The King with many others fled toDunbar

,led by a Scot who knew the country . Those who

were slow in flight were slain by the fiercely pursuing Scots ,but these had bravely formed themselves into a body andreached England safely .

The Vita Edw ardi S e cundi rather wastes tim e on thefate of Gloucester , and is badly wrong in giving the commandto Douglas in place of Edward Bruce and in putting thestrength of the Scots at But it gives a picture ofan English partisan ’ s thoughts on the battle . In themorning it was known that the Scots w e re re ady for battle ingreat numbers . The Older and more experienced advisedthat the battle should be put off to the morrow, because ofthe feast—day and of the w e arin e s s of the a rmy . The youngermen called this good advice cowardice . Gloucester was infavour of the delay, but the King hotly accused him oftreachery. Meanwhile Bruce arrayed his men , and fed andinspirited them and w hen he s a w that the Engli sh lin e s had

com e out on to the pla in ,he led hi s out of the w ood. They

were strong and in three brigades , all on foot , and al lwearing light but sword-proof armour , axe at side and spea rin hand . They marched in close order , and not easily couldsuch an array be broken . When the armies came to thepoint of meeting

, j am e s Dougla s , w ho com m a n ded the firs tbrigade of Scots , sha rply a tta cked Glou ce ste r

’

s lin e . The Earlwithstood him manfully, and once and aga in broke into thewedge , and would have been victorious if his men had beenfaithful . But , as the Scots charged home , his horse waskilled and he fell . Unsupported and weighed down he couldnot rise

,and of his whole contingent of 50 0 men- at- arms

v1] MONDAY,JUNE 2 4TH, 13 14 8 1

whom he brought to the war at his own expense hardlya man but himself was killed . . Som e s a id tha t Glou ce ste r

w a s ki lled be cau s e of his ow n ra shn e s s . For there w a s riva lrybetw e e n him s e lf and Hereford, an d e a ch cla im ed the right to

le ad the van , so that when the Scots came on quickly h edashed forward to have the glory

,and thus was unsupported

and killed . Twenty men could have rescued him,but out

of 50 0 not one was found. Giles of Argentine tried to

succour him , but could not he did what he could and di edwith him . Those with the King saw the Earl ’ s line broken

,

and said that it was dangerous to remain there and the Kingshould retire . So he left the pla in an d ha s te n ed to the Ca stle .

When his standard was seen in retreat the Whole armyscattered . Over 2 0 0 knights neither drew sword nor strucka blow . O famous nation

,invincible in days of old

,you

who used to conquer on horseback,why fly before infantry

You won at Berwick and Dunbar and Falkirk,and now you

turn your backs to Scots on foot . . .Whilst our men werein flight following the King

, a gre a t ditch e ngu lfed m any anda great number died in it . The King reached the castleand expected to have refuge there , but was repulsed as ifhe were an enemy the bridge was up and the gate closed .

The governor has been accused of treason,and yet he was

seen that day in arms for the King . I neither hold himguiltless nor accuse him , but confess that it was God

’ s doingthat the King did not enter the castle, for he could not buthave been taken pri soner . Our men fled unarmed

,and

the Scots pursued for 50 miles . The countrymen,who had

pretended to be peaceable , now slew the English or capturedthem to win the reward proclaimed by Bruce . Especially

M . B . 6

8 2 MONDAY , JUNE 2 4TH, 13 14 [CH .

were the Scots anxious to take the magnates for theirransom . Hereford, and over 50 0 who were thought to bedead

,were afterwards ransomed . But most of the Scots

turned to plunder the camp , for otherwise , if they had all

been keen in the pursuit , few English would have escapedto Berwick . I have n eve r he ard of su ch an army having be en

so sudde n ly routed by infa n try , except w he n the flow e r ofFran cefe ll before the Flem ings at Cou rtra i . Pride was the rea son ,and j ea lousy of any of higher rank , and love of wealthand plunder . It is thus that noble families die out

,or

inheritance passes to women .

'

The Chronicle of Geoffrey Baker of v in broke is ofvalue for the one definite statement that the English archerswere useless in the rear . He clearly misunderstood whathe was told about the pits , the sleepless night , the sunflashing on the armour .

To Stirling the King brought his forces with all thepomp usual at that date w he n the chiva lry of Engla n d s ti ll

fought on hors eba ck, with curveting chargers and flashingarmour

,and when men in their arrogant rashness were so

confident that,in addi tion to the necessary equipment of

horses and arms and provisions , they brought gold an d

silver vessels such as are used at the banquets of the m i ghtyof the earth in days of peace . Men of that day had neverseen such an overweening array of chivalry , as that poorCarmelite

,friar Baston

,in his poem on the campai gn , at

which he was present and was taken prisoner by the Scots,

bewailed bitterly . That night'you might have seen the

English— not angels— dre n ching them s e lve s w ith w in e an d

drinking he a lths , while the Scots kept watch and fasted .

v1] MONDAY , JUNE 2 4TH,13 14 83

Next morning the Scots chose a fine position , and dugdi tches three feet deep an d three wide along the whole oftheir front from ri ght to left , coverin g them over w ithintertwined branches , that is to say, hurdles , screened bygrass , across which indeed infantry might pass if they knewthe trick , but which could not bear the weight of cavalry.

None of the Scots were al lowed to mount their horses , anda rrayed in bri gades as usual they stood in a closely formedline behind the aforesaid cannily, I will not say deceitfu lly,constructed ditch . A s the Engli sh m oved from the w e st the

ri s ing su n shon e on the ir gilded shi e lds and he lm ets . Sucha general as Alexander would have preferred to try conclu s ion s on some other ground or other day, or at leastwould have waited till midday when the sun would havebeen on their right . But the impetuous and headstrongobstinacy of the English preferred death to delay . In the

fron t lin e w ere the cava lry with their heavy chargers , unawareof the conceal ed ditch ; in the s e con d w e re the infan try ,

in cluding the arche rs who were kept ready for the enemy ’ sflight in the rear the King , w ith the bishops and otherclerics

,amongst them that foolish knight , Hugh the Spenser .

The fron t lin e of cava lry cha rged, and a s the hors e s’

legs w e re

caught in the ditch through the hu rdle s , dow n fe ll the m en anddied before the enemy could strike and at their fall oncame the enemy, slaughtering and taking prisoners , andsparing only the rich for ransom . There died Gilbert

,Earl

of Gloucester, whom the Scots would willingly have savedfor ransom , if they had recognised him , but he was notwearing his coat- armour . M any w e re ki lled by the a rche rs

of the ir ow n a rmy ,w ho w ere n ot pla ced in a s u ita ble pos ition

,

6—2

84 MONDAY , JUNE 2 4TH , 13 14 [CH .

bu t stood behind the m e n - at- arm s , w here a s at the pre s e n t daythe cu stom i s to post them on the flanks . When they saw theScots charging fiercely on the horsemen who had fallen atthe ditch , some of them shot their arrows high in the a ir tofall feebly on the enemy ’ s helmets

,some shot ahead and hit

a few Scots in the chest,and many English in the back .

SO all yesterday’ s pomp came to naught .Three short extracts from minor English chr oniclers are

useful for one or another detail . Abbot Burton of Meaux,writin g from earli er materi al

,represents the current ideas of

a later generation . The other two are all but contemporary.

The M e a ux Chron icle So the Engli sh and Scots meton the pla in of B an n ock near Stirling , the English veryproud and confident in their strength and numbers

,the

Scots after confession and communion calling on God aloneas their protector . The armies being arrayed against eachother, the Scots put forw ard the ir foot in the fron t lin e , a n dthe Engli sh the ir hors e , and at the first onset fortune gavevictory to the Scots

,and the English tu rned their backs

and were slain . . .because iron spikes had been placed inhollows under the ground so that both horse and foot mighttrip . . .Edmund de Ma nl e y ,

the King ’ s Seneschal in hisflight was intercepted by the water and drowned .

John of Troke low e , a monk of St Albans ' The nextday each army made ready for battle

,and about the thi rd

hour they were drawn up in formidable array . . The

Engli sh le ade rs pu t in the ir first lin e the ir infan try , a rche rs

an d spe a rm en their caval ry,centre and wings

,they drew

up behind . . The Scots , inspirited by the speeches of theirleaders , resolutely aw a ited the a tta ck they were all on

86 MONDAY , JUNE 2 4TH, 13 14 [CH.

for the plain fact is that the battle was in the Carse wherenone were dug . All the other chroniclers , Barbour himselfincluded

,tell us of a straight charge of English horse on

the Scottish pikes wi thout any hint of pits or trippin g .

But the English tripped in their flight as they were driveninto the Bannock .

That the Scots attacked and forced on a battle is beyonddoubt . Once decided not to retreat to the stronger countryof the Lennox

,Bruce w a s wise to attack . Whether dis

heartened or over- confide n t, the English w ere but an armedmob . Sunday had proved that . If only he could trust hi smen to be steady the game w a s in hi s hands , and his menwere steady after many years of hard w ork and adventurousdeeds against the castles of Scotland and their Englishgarri sons . In the meanwhile the English barons had onlybeen w ran glin g about their rights at home against Edward II .

Aym er de Valence , Beaumont , Clifford, Despenser , and manyothers

,had already fought an d had lost many of their

horses at Falkirk ; thev knew that pikes could repulsecavalry

,but were powerless against well-posted archers ,

and that on the Sunday Moray had beaten two of themyet they had no notion of an orderly attack . It was nolight task for pikemen to advance in good order even againsta mob of horse . Llewelyn ’ s Welsh and Wallace ’ s rings ofScots at Falkirk could stand against horse

,but Bruce ’ s

superiority over them was that he could make his men moveforward in lines without losing their formation

,though

encumbered with their long pikes , like the Macedonians ofold and the Swiss of the middle ages . It was traditionalafter Bannockburn for the Scots to move to the attack

,and

v1] MONDAY,JUNE 2 4TH, 13 14 87

they did so at Halidon Hill and at Neville’

s Cross where theywere beaten . But though he attacked, he must have trainedhis men to halt to receive cavalry a few moments before theimpact came technically he was on the offensive so as tobring the English nobles to make their impetuous charge ,but for the moment each body of pikemen was on thedefensive . Even so Henry V at Agincourt advanced, galledthe French and made them deliver their countercharge , andstood steady to receive it . There is no way otherwise ofunderstanding the nature of the shock of the mailed Englishhorse and horsemen , the din of the splintered spears, thesqueals of the speared animals , etc . see Gray and theLan e rcost Chron icle as above .

The Scots moved en échelon by the right . EdwardBruce led

,and Gloucester with the van made the counter

charge upon him we may suppose that the bend of theBannock protected the outer flank , which is ever the weakpoint of a solid line of infantry . The result is clear . TheVita im plies that the ea rl was ahead of his men and badlysupported

,but that the battle was fierce and long is allowed

even by Barbour . The English tried to break in and failed ,and the Scots

,the full force of the charge once expended

,

pushed on Slowly and relentlessly, stabbing the horses anddisembowelling them slowly it must have been

,for the

dead horses had to be passed cautiously so that the ranksshou ld not be broken . Meanwhile Moray ’ s men had movedup on Edward Bruce ’ s left till they were abreast

,Douglas

did the same on Moray’

s left for Barbour is clearly describing the events in order of time . Both received the mobof nin e other brigades of English horse . Who counted nine

8 8 MONDAY , JUNE 2 4TH, 1 3 14 [CH .

does not appear , and among the English chroniclers notone gives that number . It is quite immaterial . Medievalarmies had a right or van , main , left or rear , and reservecorps the sub- division of these was rare . But in any casethe nine were massed, says Barbour , into one s chiltrom , onemob of shields . There was no effort to manoeuvre , no timeto form squadrons for alternate attack , no space to do it in ,no wish and no ability to do aught else than charge straightahead . The eye-witness who informed the Lan e rcost

chronicler tells the same tale as Barbour and Gray .

Meanwhi le , we ask , where were the English archers '

The Lan e rcos t chronicler and Troke low e put them in thefirst line Baker puts them in the rear Gray and the Vitaand Abbot Burton say nothing about them , and considerthe battle to have been an affair of horse on one Side andfoot on the other . May not they all be right , each fromhis own point of View ' We have just read how Barbourdescribed the battle from the Scottish right flank towardsthe left , as Edward Bruce , Moray, and Douglas came inturn into action . We are next told , after Douglas hasstruck in , how the English archers shot so fast that it hadbeen hard to Scottish men . Clearly they were shooting onthe extreme Scottish left . We are quite justified in sayingthat the English King di d throw out a skirmishin g line ofarchers, that probably they did not intervene betweenEdward Bruce and Gloucester , but that , after scatteringfor a time the Scottish archer skirmishers , they gradual lydr ew to their right , i . e . northwards, so as to allow thosenine brigades of horse to charge Moray an d Douglas , andthat then they were shooting into Douglas ’ left flank . But

90 MONDAY , JUNE 2 4TH, 13 14

the pits and sun in the eyes of the English ' Commonsense shows that Gray and others thought only Of the

cavalry charge , the Lan e rcost man thought most of thecavalry but knew that there was an archer line of skirm ishe rs , and Bak er neglecting these skirmishers insisted on

the bulk of the archers being out of action in the rear .Barbour has enabled us to understand where the comparative ly small number of archers did come into action and atwhat moment of the battle . He al so adds that the Scottisharchers now came into action and contributed to the confusion of the English .

The end of the battle is easy to narrate . Bruce , seeingthe English horsemen powerless and the archers routed ,thought the moment ready to put in his reserve which wasassembled on a Side whether this was on EdwardBruce ’ s right or on Douglas ’ left does not appear . Theirfoes were rushed

,

' yet they still fought on . All fourbrigades of Scots pressed on , and the Scottish archers,beaten off by the English archers at the first onset , nowcontributed to the final rout . The last episode , the chargeof the camp- followers— who are not termed gillies byBarbour , but yhem e n sw an y s and pou e ra ill, i . e . yeomenand swains and poor men— has been exaggerated . TheEnglish would have broken and fled, if the charge had nottaken place . We finish by acknowledgi ng that Barbourdoes justice to the fighting qualities of the English , KingEdward included , and indicates that it was a long and hardbattle .

A glance at the passages given above will satisfy an y

serious student of history that Edward II did escape from

VI] MONDAY,JUNE 2 4TH, 13 14 91

the field to the castle . That Mowbray w a s wise in refusingto adm it him is beyond doubt . Certain capture would haveresulted . He fled beneath the castle

,round by the Round

Table , and ultimately to Linlithgow,thence to Dunbar ,

thence to Berwick by boat . He was not a coward , and hadfought in the battle fiercely with his mace . Other Englishmen fled as best they could , if once they escaped fromdrown ing in the Forth and Bannock . The Scots slew verymany, but the temptation to pause and plunder the campwas great . Also their hope of making money by ransomis in dicated by more than one chronicler . The Earl ofHereford was captured after escaping to Bothwell Castle onthe Clyde . Aymer of Valence alone of the great men gotclear away. The most complete li st of the slain is given inthe An n a le s Lon din i e n s e s

,and includes Gloucester

,Clifford

,

Tib e tot, William and Anselm Marshal , Bohun ,Edm und

Mauley the Seneschal of the Household, Edmund and JohnComyn , Dayn cou rt, in all 37 nobles an d knights . Severalof the names can be identified as those of men in Gloucester ’ sand Hereford ’ s retinues who had letters of protection forthe campaign . A certain amount of in terest is attachedto the fate of Giles of Argentine, who rode at his King

’ srein and sacrificed him self to let the Kin g escape the Vitamakes out that he died in trying to save Gloucester , butthe author has Gloucester on the brain . Giles was one ofthose landed proprietors of comparatively humble positionwho rose as fighting men to some eminence , like JohnChandos and Nigel Loring, the close comrades of the BlackPrince a generation later . He had served at Falkirk as asquire in the retinue of Hugh Despenser, and as a knight in

9 2 MONDAY , JUNE 2 4TH, 13 14 [CH. VI

13 10 in the feudal contingent of Piers Gave s ton , Earl ofCornwall . He was famed as a Crusader , but never had achance of showing himself to be a tactician as well as a merefighter . One may , indeed , fin d fault with Barbour becausehe has made people think too much of the unim portantthings , the digging of the pots , the deaths of Bohun andArgentine , the charge of the camp- followers , whi ch thingsthe thoughtless love to read, and think to be of moreimportan ce than the tactics . Yet he has Shown us the realcause of the victory, namely the steadiness of the pikemen ,

their abili ty to advance in good order , and the cleverhandling of the whole army of foot and light horse by agreat tactician .

CHAPTER VII

AFTER BANNOCKBURN

AFTER Bannockburn)Bruce raided the Border Counties

every year and spread terror far and wide . His purposewas not to fight a pitched battle

,but to devastate and to

levy black—mail . The account which is given to us of theraid in 13 2 7 , conducted by James Douglas when Brucehimself was on his deathbed

,is probably typical of many

similar raids it is given to us by Jehan le Bel,a Ha in au lte r

who had come to England in the train of John of Hainault,

uncle of Philippa the future 'ueen of England, from whomFrois s a rt drew his account of many of the events of theearly part of Edward III

’

s reign . The Scots were a ll

mounted on ponies , and carried , besides their light armourand weapons

,bags of oatmeal and gridirons from which

they made girdle cakes , but otherwise they subsisted uponthe cattle that they captured . They were always able tokeep a little distance ahead of the heavier cava lry of theEnglish and Ha in a u lte rs , so that the bones of the pursuersached as they continued to ride day after day

,ever clothed

in their iron armour and unable to catch their nimble foes .But this account is of the first year of Edward III and atleast shows that the English court made an effort to savethe Northern Counties Edward II himself between 13 14and the end of his reign did very little indeed

,being ever

94 AFTER BANNOCKBURN [CH .

troubled by the continued insubordination of Lancaster andHereford and their party.

In Cumberland and Westmoreland, the En glish havingto defend themselves as best they cou ld, there came to thefront Andr ew de Harcla : we know that in 13 1 0 he was aknight in the retinue of John Cromwell , the husband ofa great Westmoreland heiress, and from 13 1 2 onwards hewas custodian of the town and castle of Carlisle . In 13 14

after Bannockburn,and again in 13 15 , he raised considerable

forces to check the raiding Scots , besides defending Carlislesuccessfully

,but in 13 16 he was prisoner in Bruce

’ s hands,and was afterwar ds ransomed . The special point of interestis that Andr ew appears to have done most to raise a lightcavalry that could move as quickly as the Scots themselves .In the regular armies of Edward I and Edward II we hardlyever find any mention of light cavalry except when a fewhob e lars were brought over from Ireland . In Andrew ’ sforce in garrison in Carlisle in 13 14 we find three knights, 50men- a t-arms, 3 0 hob e lars , and 1 0 0 archers

,but in 13 19 he

took to the army which was raised to try to recaptureBerwick 98 0 foot and 38 0 hob e la rs without any heavycavalry at all . It would seem that these men were arrayedand equipped in imitation of the light Irish caval ry, and thatthe name hob e lar was applie d to them from the Iri sh .

In 13 2 2 the contest between King Edward and Lancastercame to a crisis Andr ew came down from Westmorelan dto help his king , and took up a position to contest the passageof the river Ure at Boroughbridge against Lan caster andhis ally Hereford . He di smounted his horsemen

,most of

them presumably hob e lars , to defend, in a solid body of

VII] AFTER BANNOCKBURN 95

spears , both the bridge and ford' in the Scottish manner,

i . e . in a s chiltrom ,and on the flanks of each s chiltrom he

arrayed his archers . Hereford was killed at the bridge , andLancaster was repulsed at the ford and surrendered nextday . In a Similar manner Sir Thomas Gray

,who had been

ransomed since Bannockburn , and who was commissionedby Edward II in 13 2 2 to be custodi an of Norham Castlethe Bishop of Durham ’ s garrison at Norham was thoughtto be too weak , and therefore the King claimed hi s right tosend a custodi an of his own choosing— fought in the Scottishmanner with hi s spearmen in a schiltrom on foot we havethe description of his son , the author of the Sca la cron ica , ofa sortie made by the garrison of Norham on foot

,while a

certain adventurous knight , Sir William Marmion ,who had

come thither to do some desperate feat of arms for love ofhis lady

,charged recklessly ahead on horseback Marmion

was borne to earth , but Gray and his spearmen on foot cameup in time to rescue him and beat off the Scots by Spearingtheir horses and then the women of the garrison broughtup their horses for them to mount and pursue .

But when Edward II , hoping after Lancaster’ s death

that he might be able to invade Scotland and reversethe verdict of Bannockburn , raised an army in 1 3 2 2 ,

hecompletely misunderstood the military needs of the time .

Instead of raising hob e lars whom he could dismount andconvert into foot spearmen in battle , while they could moveas quickly as the Scots before battle , he deliberately summou ed from all the counties of England foot spearmen only

,

and these were not summoned with archers but instead ofarchers . The force of folly could no further go ; such an

96 AFTER BANNOCKBURN [CH.

army could only march very slowly , and as Bruce remainedtrue to his principle of refusing pitched battle , the entireforce

,some strong, half of them Welsh , half of them

Englishmen toiled painfully over the moors , and starved ,and a sadly reduced number returned home in a state ofterrible disorder .At last

,in the early years of Edward III , somebody, we

do not know who it was, saw that the only chance of victorythat England had depended on the application of the tacticsused byHarcla and Gray, that the employ ment of foot spearmen was useless unless they were mounted for marching

,and

unless they were supported by archers . In 133 2 after thedeath of Bruce Edward Balliol made a bid to conquer hisfather ’ s throne , and was accompanied by some Englishadventurers . He invaded Scotland by sea and landed onthe coast of Fife . On his way towards Perth he encountereda superior force of the Scots at Dupplin Moor . The heavycavalry were dismounted and drawn up in the centre

,and

archers were posted on either wing the Scots charged,of

course on foot , and nearly broke the English centre , but thearrows from the two wings threw them into disorder an dblinded them

,and they collapsed . Next year King

Edward 111 of England invaded Scotland as the open allyof Balliol

,and laid Siege to Berwick the Scottish army

appeared to save the town ,for by treaty it was to be surren

dered unless relieved by a given date . The English weredrawn up on the north side of Halidon Hill , barring the wayagainst the relieving Scots . They were form ed in threebrigades and a reserve . The formation of Boroughb ridgeand of Dupplin Moor was adopted, but with a difference

98 AFTER BANNOCKBURN [CH.

practice . .The two armies came together , and after afierce resistance barely up to mid-day , the Scots having losta great number of men and their three brigades rolled upinto one

,the King and his men mounted their horses and

quickly pursued,slaying

,capturing

,and driving the enemy

into ponds and swamps . ' The Lan e rcos t Chronicler says ,' the Scots of the first brigade were so wounded in the faceand so blinded by the multitude of arrows as in the previou s battle of Gle de nm oor (Dupplin Moor) that they werequite helpless and tried to turn away their faces . And asthe English were formed like the Scots into three brigadesBalliol being on the left of the three

,the Scots swerved out

of their original line of attack and fell upon him , but weresoon routed

,similarly the other two brigades were routed

then the English mounted in pursuit .

' These are generaldescriptions which give the honour of the victory to thearchers

,backed as theywere by the dismounted men- at- arms ,

and posted in their hollow wedges in such a way that theirflanks could not be turned

,so that the enemy was forced

into making a frontal attack . The Chronicler of Bridlingtonis the authority who definitely states that the archers wereposted on each wing of each brigade, and he adds that whilethe leading Scots brigade attacked Balliol on the left , andtheir second attacked the English centre

,the third wheeled

against the English right and held up just long enough toallow a picked body of 2 0 0 well-horsed Scots to charge roundalong the foot of Halidon Hill to carry the needed relief toBerwick if these should reach the city walls a formal reliefwould be effected according to the ideas of the age . ButKing Edward also had a picked body of horse in readiness

,

8 . B a t t le -p la n of Ha l idon H i ll .

9 . Ha l idon H i l l from B e rw rck .

1oo AFTER BANNOCKBURN [CH .

There is yet one more military form to be noticed wehave hardly any documentary evidence about the campaignof Halidon Hill

,we Simply know that the archers were there ,

and that they were in considerable numbers we also knowfrom the Scottish roll of 1 333 that all sorts and conditionsof men had been impressed into the ranks , and pardons weregiven to criminals who had served there . But we do notknow if the horse- archer had yet been invented . The firstoccasion when we know that the bulk of the archers in aparticular army were mounted was when the Earls ofSalisbury and Gloucester laid siege to Dunbar 1337

—8 .

At this siege all the archers were mounted Yorkshiresupplied 40 0 ,

Northamptonshire 140 ,Lancashire 1 3 0 , Lin

coln shire 1 2 0 ,Norfolk 1 14 ,

Nottinghamshire 1 0 0,Derbyshire

1 0 0, and other counties smaller numbers but the whole of

England was represented,except the counties of the south

and southwest coast from Sussex round to Somerset Kentsent 96 , and even Rutlandshire 40 . The total came to justover 19 2 0 men , while Wales supplied 466 foot archers . Thenext development was that barons and bannerets who raisedsoldiers for the King by contract levied almost equalnumbers of heavy armed cavalry and horsearchers . Atthe Siege of Calais, in the month before the town fell , whenEdward III had received large reinforcements in anticipationof the French attack

,there were present about 1 0 0 0 knights ,

40 0 0 men- at- arms , and 50 0 0 horsearchers , while the footarchers came to and the Welsh contingent was 440 0 .

The same year to patrol the borders of Scotland aga instthe Scots the north-country English lords had out 48 0heavy cavalry and 2 8 0 0 horsearchers . Meanwhile the

VI I] AFTER BANNOCKBURN 10 1

hob e lar has almost disappeared from a normal Englisharmy ; there were merely 50 0 hob e lars present at the siegeof Calai s .It is clear therefore that the defeat at Bannockburn made

Engli shmen think . The im mediate effect we saw previouslywas that in Cumberland and Westmoreland self-defenceshowed the necessity of mounting men who were lighta rmed on ponies , so as to catch up wi th the swiftly movingScottish raiders , who simply mocked the Clumsy mailedknights on heavy horses . Edward II

,we saw

,was stupid

enough to consider the defeat at Bannockburn due to thedeficiency of the archers , and put in their place heavy speararmed infantry, who were worse than useless . Harcla firstdi smounted hi s hob e lar s for pitched battle . But who wasthe reformer who copiedHa rcla ’

s method and beat the Scotsat Dupplin Moor on a smal l scale , and at Hal idon Hill ona large scale , who saw that the mounted archer would bemore efficient than the hob e lar , for he could ride as fast andthen shoot on foot , we do not know . Clearly the problemwas to use the efficient bowman an d at the same time toprotect him from a sudden attack of cava lry from the flank .

The problem was solved , and thus the northern counties ,which had been paralysed by Bru ce ’ s raids , were able in1346 to defend themselves without cal ling upon Edward IIIto send a man home from his encampment before Calais .In fact Scotland taught England to be warlik e , and Francesuffered in consequence . The victories of the HundredYears ’ War were certa inly not beneficial to the Englishthemselves ; that they became proud and loved fightingfor fighting

’

s sake is only too apparent . But while we

7

1 0 2 AFTER BANNOCKBURN [CH.

moral ise upon the wickedness of war we can at leastacknowledge that self-defence is a necessity .

NOTE .

Since this book was in print I made a find in the RecordsOffice which I am able to add to the last chapter. Thepay-roll of part of the English army at Ne ville ’ s Cross ise xtan t , and tells us that in Lancashire were raised 960 horsearchers and 2 40 foot archers , and in Yorkshire 3 2 0 0

horsearchers ; but as the Lancashire men were paidup to October 17 and received in addition £2 0 pro bon o

appa rata su o u ltra vadi a s u a de dono regi s , and theYorkshiremen were only paid up to October 16 , the latterand bigger contingent was not up in time for the battlewhich was on the 17th . The roll moreover tells us thatDavid Bruce was seriously wounded, for two barbersurgeons of York were paid to go to Bam b orough ,

wherehe lay s agitta vu ln e ratu s , ad dictam s agittam extrahe ndam .

Further detail s will be published in the Tran s a ction s ofthe Royal Historical Society . Of course the north- countrylords must have had out some heavy cavalry . Otherhorse-archers must have been supplied by the four countiesnearer to the border , but serving in self- defence they wouldnot be paid . The main interest of the roll is that mountedinfantry in 1346

—47 were raised as a matter of course .

At this date the mounted archer had 4d. a day as his pay,

his corporal or vin te n ar 6d an d the foot archer 2 d. as inthe reigns of Edwards I and II , if they served in Englan dbut the horse had 6d. and the foot 3d. when they served inFrance .

1 04 AFTER BANNOCKBURN [CH .

the question of the extent of the New Park which hidthe Scots

,or of the change in the Scottish line of battle .

As for what he says about the difficulty that the Englisharmy would experience in makin g on Sunday evening awide detour to an encampment in the Carse while Bru ce

was ready to pounce on the flank , I would an swer thatBruce was then meditating retreat , an d that Barbour maybe fairly considered to indicate that the passage of theburn— which may have taken place a good way down ,

i . e . at the present town of Bannockburn— occupied mostof the night .Sir James Ramsay

,I neglected to say in the text , made

a battle-plan of the archers drawn up in hollow wedges atAgi ncourt

1 before Mr Hereford George wrote on this point .Also it is due to Sir James Ramsay more than to any oneelse that the old belief in very large armies is now dyin g out .But he seems too quick to rush to the opposite extreme .

I agree that the feudal levy of 13 1 0 was very smal l in deed ,but I submit that practically every baron that year sentto the muster the barest minimum of men on a very narrowinterpretation of strict feudal duty . However in 13 14 onlysome few barons sent their bare de bitum s e rvitium , and theothers voluntarily served wi th retinues which , from theevidence of the letters of protection , were of considerablestrength and my contention is that the difference betweena retinue raised under compulsion and a retin ue rai sedvoluntarily or even eagerly would be considerable . Lastly,as Sir James Ramsay writes with such authority thatmany take his descriptions as ips o fa cto proved, I wish

I In h is volum e s on Lan ca s te r a n d 'ork.

VII] AFTER BANNOCKBURN 1 05

respectfu lly to protest against hi s assumption that Brucedrew up his men for battle always in rings Wallace did atFalkirk , Moray did in Sunday

’ s fight against Clifford , but ifBruce did so on Monday his men could not have advanced .

The hollow ring is strictly defensive . But the Scots, as Icontend that Mr Mackenzie rightly argues , attacked on theMonday , though they stood to receive the impact of theEnglish cavalry and the Scots charged at Dupplin Moorand Halidon Hill with Bannockburn ’ s example in theirminds . There is nothing to force us to believe that thes chiltrom s were always rings .

INDE'

Arch e ry : In Wa le s , I ,6

, 36—46 ,

a t B a n n ockburn, 79 ,

8 3 ,8 8—8 9 ,

9 6—9 ; h ors e a rch e rs , 7 ,1 0 0—1 0 1

Arge n tin e , Grle s of, 46 47 , 78 , 8 1 ,

9 1—9 2

Bake r of Sw in b roke , ch ron icle r , 5 1 ,

5 3 1 6 1 » 7 2 :8 2 - 8 5 » 8 8—9 0 : 9 7

B a rbour , 3 3 , 5 0 , 59 , 63 , 70 ,8 5—9 2

B as ton , fri a r , 50 , 5 4 , 6 1 , 7 2 ,8 2 , 8 5

B e a um on t, He n ry , 3 5 , 46 , 4 8 , 67 ,8 6

B e rw ick, I 6 , 2 9 , 58 , 9 1 , 9 4 , 9 6

B ohu n , He n ry, 63 ,

66—67B oroughbr idg e , ba ttle of

, 9 4 , 96

B r id l in gton, ch ron icle , 53 , 8 5 , 9 8

B ruce , Edw a rd, 60 , 67 , 74 , 8 7 ;

Robe rt , 3 8 , 46 , 59 if .

Cars e , th e , 6 1 , 70 , 73—76

Cava lry, h e a vy , 3 2—3 3 , 4 2

—48 ,

8 7 , 9 3 ,

(d ism oun te d) 9 6—9 8 , 1 0 0 ; ligh t ,3 3 , 9 4 , 1 0 0

Clifford , Robe rt , 2 1 , 35 , 46 , 48 ,66—69 ,

8 6 , 9 1

Courtra i , ba ttle of, 47 , 78 ,8 2

Crécy . ba ttle of. 39 . 53—54 .

8 9 . 9 7Cros s Wm e n , 7 , 3 6

—3 7

De spe n s e r , Hugh , 2 1 , 35 , 46 , 8 3 , 8 6 ,

9 1

Dougla s , 'am e s , 60 ,68

, 74 , 8 0 ,8 7 ,

9 3Dupplin Moor , ba ttle of, 4 8 , 9 6 , 9 8

Edw a rd I, 36

-

3 7 .

4 2-

44 57Edw a rd II . 19 . 34 . 39 . 5 7

—9 5 Pas sw

104 8,

2 6—2 8 ,

Edw a rd III 9 6

Fa lkirk ,ba ttle of, 1 7 , 2 3 , 3 2 , 3 7 ,

44—4 6 . 59 . 68 , 8 1 . 8 6 . 9 1

Fe uda l sys te m , 5 ,1 0 , 14 ,

1 7 , 19 ,2 1 ,

2 3 . 2 5—2 9

G a s con s , 8 , 3 1 , 3 5G a ve s ton , P ie rs , 1 9 ,

2 0 , 5 8 , 9 2

G l ouce s te r , Ea rl of (fa th e r) , 8 ,1 0—1 2

2 6 ; (s on ) 2 0 ,2 1

, 3 5 , 5 3 , 58 , 66 ,

8 0 , 9 1

Gray , Th om a s (it; h e r) , 5 2 , 69 , 7 1 ,

9 5 (s on ) ch ron icle r , 2 2 , 47-

48 , 5 2 ,

66,69—7 1 , 77

—78 ,

8 8

Ha in a ult, 3 1 , 9 3

Ha li don HIll,ba ttle of, 4 8 ,

8 7 , 9 6—9 9H a rola ,

An dre w , 9 4H e m in gb u rgh , ch ron icle r , 1 3 ,

1 7 , 3 3 ,

43 . 45 . 4 8

H e re ford , Ea rl of (fa th e r) , I O—I 7 , 2 6 ,45 ; (son ) 2 0—2 1 , 5 8 , 66 ,

8 1 , 9 1 , 9 4Hob e la rs , s e e Cava lry , ligh tHors e s , 2 4 , 3 2

—3 3 , 46

Ke ith ,Robe rt , 8 9

Kn igh t , m e an in g of, 2 7 ; s e e Fe uda lsys te m

Lan ca s te r , Ear l of, 2 0 , 34 , 46 ,

9 4La n e rcos t . chron icle of, 5 2

—53 ,

68 , 7 1 , 78—79 ,

8 8, 9 8

Ma e s Madoc , ba ttle of, 43—44

Ma gn a Ca rta ,I, 5 , I 4 , 3 1

B ' THE SAME A UTHOR

GREAT B R ITA IN AND IRELA ND

A H is tory for Low e r Form s

Crow n 8v0 . With 10 0 illus tra tion s a nd pla n s . In on e volum e , 3 8 . Or

i n tw o pa rts (divide d a t 1 5 8d e a ch . A s e parate part is a ls o is sue dcove rin g the pe riod 14 8 5

— 19 1 0 , price 2 5 .

This is a n e xce lle nt h istory of Eng la nd for schools, on e of the be st, in fa c t , tha t w e havehappe n e d upon for a ve ry cons ide rable tim e . . . It com e s righ t up to da te , including the re ignof Edw a rd VII to i ts close ; a nd i t m ake s som e a t te m pt to put be fore the boys of the

pre se nt day a n ide a of the proble m s w h ich the y W i l l ha ve to fa ce w he n the y a re m e n . If

h istory is to b e taugh t th is w ay in the schools , i t W il l be com e a re a l l ive th ing , not the dul ldry ske le ton hung W ith fig ure s a nd ha rd nam e s tha t i t too ofte n is. We congra tula te D r

Mom s on h is w ork.

'Globe

Dr Mom s ha s m ade a gre a t ste p forw ard a n d de se rve s w a rm congra tula t ions . The

a uthor i s w e l l fitte d for h is a tte m p t . He is know n . to te a che rs a s th e Tre a sure r of the

H istorica l A ssoc ia t ion , w h ich has of re ce nt ye a rs sough t to im prove a nd stre ng the n thete a ch ing of h istory in schools . He ha s th e ne ce ssary e xpe rie nce of boys . He ha s re a l ise dtha t the y ha ve m inds , a nd not m e re ly m e nta l va cua , w h ich have to b e ca re fully a nd ta ctfullyfil l e d . Dr Morris ’ s book W i l l se rve for m any othe rs than the jun ior form s of schools . . [H e ]ha s w ri t te n a good pie ce of school l ite ra ture , a nd h is cam e ra ha s m ade i t a w ork of a rt a s

w e l l . ' j ou rn a l of Educa ti on

By P . H UME B R OWN , LL B .

H ISTORY OF SCOTLAND

to the Pre s e n t T im e

Roya l 8 v0 . In thre e volum e s . Wi th I 3 2 full-page pla te s a nd 1 1 m aps .

Ha lfm orocco, gilt top, sos n e t ; cloth , 3os n e t. Se parate volum e s a s follow sin cloth, 1 0 5 6d n e t e ach .

Volum e I . To the Acce s s ion of Ma ry Ste w a rt.Volum e II. From the Acce s s ion of Ma ry Ste w a rt to the Re volution of

168 9 .

Volum e III . From the Re volution of 168 9 to the ye a r 1 9 1 0 .

It is im possible to ove re st im a te th e va lue of this gre a t w ork, w hich has a lw a ys se e m e d

to us th e m ost ade q ua te pre se nta tion of th e l ife , g e n ius , and progre ss of the Scott ish pe ople .

The form e r e dit ion of D r Hum e Brow n ’s H istory ha s be e n use d by us constantly S ince i tspubl ica t ion a nd w e ha ve form e d an incre a sing and de e pe n ing confide nce in i ts sane and

fa ithful picture of the story of the Scott ish pe ople . A ll stude nts a nd adm ire rs of Dr Hum e

Brow n ’s form e r e di tion W lll fe e l de e ply inde bte d for th is m ag n ifice nt n e w e dition , w i th i tsla rge , ha ndsom e octavo volum e s , adorn e d w i th so m a ny pla te s , m aps , an d i l lustra t ions . For

the pre se nt a t le a st w e posse ss no be t te r or m ore re l iable History of Scotland. volum e

ha s va lua ble a nd a ppropria te i llustra t ions . C e rta inly Dr Hum e Brow n a nd the Cam bridgeUnive rsi ty Pre ss are to b e w a rm ly congra tula te d on the se m agn ifice nt volum e s .'Abe rde e n Fre e P r e s s

C row n 8vo. e dition (up to w ithout illus tration s . Ha lf m orocco,gilt top

,2 1 5 n e t. Cloth, i n thre e volum e s , 4 s 6d n e t e ach .

Ca m bridg e Un ive rs ity P re s sC . F. C lay, Ma nage r : Fe tte r Lan e , Lon don

preface in w ritin g a centenary monograph on bannockburn the author has had in view both the need...

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