preemption for mout · motivations to investigate the problem by examining the options ......

225

Appendix H

PREEMPTION FOR MOUT:REVISITING AN OLD STRATEGY

Dr. Randy Steeb, RAND

PREEMPTION FOR MOUT

Revisiting an Old Strategy

This annotated briefing describes new concepts of operation forurban warfare with an emphasis on defensive preparation ratherthan eviction of an enemy after he has become entrenched in a cityor town. The work includes motivation for investigating the prob-

226 The City’s Many Faces

lem, description of alternative concepts, and discussion of synergiesbetween the concepts and expected outcomes. This research is pre-liminary, with the intent of creating a dialogue on such concepts.The effort represents a portion of the work being performed on theArroyo MOUT project at RAND under the sponsorship of SARDA.

Preemption for MOUT: Revisiting an Old Strategy 227

Background

• Significant tactical combat advantage lies withdefending force in MOUT environment

−Recent history suggests anywhere from 8-10 to 1advantage to defender

−Small forces can hold off much larger forces, evenwhen “siege” tactics have been employed

• Nonetheless, current emphasis of MOUT is onimproving the offensive, attack operations

• While offense may be essential, it is prudent to plan to shift more of the battle to defense

History, exercises, and analysis have all shown that forcible evictionof an entrenched defender in an urban area is a daunting proposi-tion, and heavy casualties may be expected. Many of the develop-ment thrusts of the MOUT ACTD and the focus of service exercises inurban areas have been on such offensive operations, however. Itmay be far more efficient and expedient, on the other hand, to investin means to protect urban areas at risk: shifting the mission to delay,disruption, and defense rather than flushing out a dug-in defender.


Objective

• Explore improving MOUT through a morecomprehensive preemptive strategy thatincludes:

− Identifying early urban preparatory methodsand corresponding technologies

− Examining extremely responsive and reactiveforce capabilities

− Considering the impact of indirect or “offset”concepts

There are three major components to the comprehensive preemptivestrategy we envision for future MOUT operations. The first is pre-emptive preparation of the avenues of approach and interiors of anurban area at risk. This should slow the attacker and make him abetter target for the second two components of the strategy—rapidreaction forces and “offset” engagement. Rapid reaction forces areground, air, and naval forces quickly brought in to isolate and attritthe enemy force, while offset engagement concepts are used to dis-able and attrit any enemy forces that do penetrate the urban areas.In this way, the concept for operations embodies a mix of offensiveand defensive components at both the tactical and operationallevels.


Outline

• Why preemptive MOUT?

• Basic components

• Concept synopsis

• Observations

The organization of the document is straightforward. First we look atmotivations to investigate the problem by examining the optionsopen to the United States in urban areas. Next, we look at the basiccomponents of a preemptive strategy, along with recent enablingtechnologies. The third section describes how a typical engagementmight occur, and the final section summarizes our observations.


Current MOUT Focus May Be Too Narrow

• Appears to be well below strategic level(e.g., tactical and operational)

−ACTD focus on tactical

−USMC Urban Warrior focus on operational

• May resolve near-term deficiencies but may notrespond to evolving nature of threat (future,advanced threat)

• Does not account for possible manpower-to-threat-mismatch

The motivation for redirecting MOUT toward preemption springsfrom several sources. Key MOUT initiatives—the MOUT ACTD andthe Urban Warrior experiment—tend to be necessarily limited infocus and extent because they have to demonstrate new capabilitiesin the very near term. There is still an emphasis on close combatwith either a tactical or operational level of application. These effortsmay make room-to-room and building-by-building clearance some-what faster and more survivable, but they do not solve the largerproblems of dealing with evolving threats or widening conflicts.Each of these issues will be discussed in the following slides.


Visit with Engineer School Illustrated Difficulty of Breaching a Modern Urban Defense

Tiered defense concept*• Defense of city begins well outside city borders

− Obstacle belts, WAMs, AHMs− Fires from artillery and direct fire

• Border is heavily defended− MOPMS, Volcano, and other obstacles

• Streets of city defended− Claymores (command detonated)− Snipers

• Interior of buildings defended− Booby traps− Demolitions to drop building

Infantryweaponssuperimposed

* Camp Lejeune MOUT site

For example, many MOUT demonstrations involve friendly forcesquickly dislodging enemy infantry occupying a few buildings. To seewhat a capable opponent might do in this situation, we presented aplan map of Camp Lejeune to U.S. military officers at the EngineerSchool at Fort Leonard Wood, and asked them to prepare a defensiveplan for this complex. They quickly developed a tiered defensiveconcept in which an engineer platoon, along with an infantry com-pany for overwatching fires, could effectively defend the townagainst a battalion or possibly a brigade of attacking Blue forces.Approximately four truckloads of equipment were estimated to beneeded—smart mines, command detonated explosives, booby traps,and building demolitions were all part of the notional plan. The ideais that the force would engage the attacking force at range along thelikely avenues of approach, continue to activate belts of defenses asthey approached, and then bring down the buildings themselves asthe Blue force penetrated. It was noted that the Engineer School hadpreviously used this type of defense very successfully in exercises atFort Hood.


The Engineer School plan is diagrammed here over the layout of theCamp Lejeune MOUT site. They defended the town utilizing Bluesystems and tactics. The outer layer of defenses are shown by circlesrepresenting wide area mines (H = Hornet, the wide area mine des-ignation) and Volcano (helicopter-deployed anti-tank mines). Inte-rior to these are MOPMS (Modular Pack Mine System) commanddetonated mines and concertina wire. Finally, all buildings wererigged with explosive charges and could have been demolished.

The plan shown is limited to Blue options. If carried out by enemyforces instead, it could have been expanded to include anti-personnel mines, booby traps, use of hostages as shields, and evenapplication of weapons of mass destruction.


0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

World urban population(billions)

U.S. Army size(millions)

?

Year

Numbersofpeople

Military Size Is Not Keeping Pace with the World’s Urban Population and City Sizes

Even if such an attack could be successfully carried out against a fewbuildings, the U.S. military would be hard pressed to free an urbanarea having tall buildings or large defended areas. Worldwide urbanpopulation trends and U.S. military strength, as shown in the abovechart, highlight the increasing difficulty of the problem.


Outline




• Observations

This section will delineate the basic components of the preemptivestrategy.


A Preemptive MOUT Strategy Might InvolveThree Critical Components

1) Indigenous preparation of urban environment

2) Highly responsive forces

3) Adopting new “offset” capability

These are the three critical components of the strategy. Each will bedescribed in turn.


Location of Hotspots Can Often Be Predetermined

Counter proliferationof WMD

North Korea

UN peacekeepingoptions

SomaliaCounter proliferationof WMD

Libya

Embassy protection

Southwest Asia

Restore order withUS forces

Caribbean

Hostage Rescue

Andean Region

PeaceEnforcement

Balkans

Preemptive preparation of urban areas begins with identification ofthe areas at risk. Potential hotspots around the globe are highlightedin this figure.

As noted earlier, a rapid reaction force may be equipped withsophisticated equipment, but may not be able to deploy to the urbanarea for several days.1 In this time the enemy could have taken thecity, forcing the rapid reaction force to attack an entrenched foe.

A more effective option might be to prepare our allies’ vulnerablecities with many of the technologies described. These systems couldthen delay and attrit the advancing enemy, buying time for the rapidreaction force. Such an action might even deter an enemy fromconsidering an attack on the urban area.

______________ 1Even the very light Division Ready Brigade of the 82nd Airborne, tasked to be the“first to fight”, requires as much as 4-6 days to deploy to distant locations such asSouthwest Asia.


Preparing the Cities May Constitute MostEffective Part of the Strategy*

• Prepare cities at risk by equipping and trainingthe local forces, and by installing networks ofsystems

• Initiate defensive systems to delay, isolate, orattrit invading forces, buying time for rapidreaction forces

• Isolate and engage slowed enemy systems usingfires from rapid reaction forces and standoffweapons

* The first two steps are similar to 1994 Chechen preparations of Grozny

The first steps in this preparation/preemption process are to instru-ment the city with secure, surreptitious sensors and to pass thisinformation on to both decisionmakers locally and back to CONUS.The sensors should be able to collect information about enemy activ-ities, locations, force sizes, battle damage, weapon types, noncom-batant status, environmental conditions, and road trafficability.There should even be intrusion sensors in some key buildings whichindicate occupancy.

Distribution of the resulting information needs to be made throughredundant secure lines. These will probably need to be high band-width in order to support voice, data, and images and to overcomebandwidth loss due to encryption. Software radios will need to begiven to trained, trusted members of the local populace to facilitatepassage of HUMINT. These radios will also have to be controllable incase they fall into enemy hands.


Each Defensive Prep Function RequiresDifferent Technologies (2 of 3)

• Ensure infrastructure protection

− Design protected systems to deny enemy control ofwater, power, gas, phones, etc.

− Proliferate backup power, comms

• Install obstacle network to slow or disable invasion

− Emplace controllable vehicle barriers (barricades,superlubricants, foams, combustion inhibitors, RFbombs)

− Emplace jammers with notch frequencies for friendlycomms and navigation

− Place smoke generators at critical locations

Those structures critical to the safety and well-being of the urbanarea will have to be protected. There will also need to be backupgenerators, communication systems, emergency water supplies, andmedical treatment facilities.

A key element in the protection of the urban area is the installation ofremotely controlled obstacle networks. Pop-up commercial vehiclebarriers are currently available; these can be placed on avenues ofapproach to the built-up area (such as those currently in place inSouth Korea) or on city streets themselves. More futuristic obstacles,such as superlubricants, sticky foams, and smoke generators, can belocated at key canalizing points. Jammers, RF bombs, and othercanister or munitions-type systems can be placed or lofted asneeded.


Each Defensive Prep Function RequiresDifferent Technologies (3 of 3)

• Control and protect inhabitants

− Ensure sufficient emergency/medical shelters,underground evacuation routes

− Install public communications system

− Distribute “tags” for noncombatants, friendlies

• Coordinate actions using mobile command centers

− Acquire mobile command and control vehicles withplanning and visualization tools, comms within area,and contact with rapid reaction forces

− Load databases with structural maps, critical nodeanalyses, population characteristics

• (Extreme case) Install remotely controlled lethal andnonlethal weapons

Noncombatant control can take the form of ensuring marked routesto shelters, dispensing tags for noncombatants and neutral forces,and even using calmatives or incapacitators for controlling mobs.

All of these actions need to be controlled using command centers.Some of these should be mobile to avoid detection, localization, andneutralization by the enemy, while others can be located in pro-tected structures. The C2 centers should have access to buildingblueprints, city infrastructure plans, and other information neededto coordinate a response.

The most extreme case for preparation of the city is installation ofweapons that can be remotely detonated. These, of course, have thegreatest chance of being subverted by the enemy or activated acci-dentally. They should be implemented only in areas of high risk;they must be kept under close control.






The second component involves insertion of and coordination with arapid reaction force. Unfortunately, this force may take many daysto arrive.


In Most Instances, an Air-Based“Halt Campaign” Cannot Accomplish the Job

Kilometers to objective

Number of

axes of

advance

Note: * “May halt” means the enemy might not reach the urban area* Number of axes in the examples above could vary* Computations are based on spreadsheet and high resolution analysis

May halt

100 150 250200 300 350 400 450

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Can not halt

Seoul

Tel Aviv Warsaw

Even air force “halt” options, in which bombers are to deploy quicklyand deliver hundreds or even thousands of smart munitions andGPS-guided weapons, require time and space to employ. The abovechart, summarizing outcomes from high-resolution simulation runsand a weapon effects computational model, shows that many real-world situations are not suited to such responses.2 The enemy hasplenty of time to enter and secure key objectives in cities such asSeoul and Tel Aviv before bombers can significantly attrit them.

______________ 2Data analysis and chart provided by John Gordon IV, RAND.


Current Ground Forces Probably Cannot Be Inserted Quickly Enough

• Neither airlift or fast sealift can close in a few days- Airlift assets constrained by availability, brigade requires 4–6 days- Far future 80-knot fast ships can travel 8,700 nm in 4 days

• Prepositioning ashore and afloat near areas of vitalstrategic interest can be used, but also has limitations

0

5

1015

20

2530

35

4045

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Airlift (C-5s/C-17s)Fast Sealift(1 ship)Fast Sealift(4 ships)

Days

Assumptions: 40% strategic airlift availability; 80 kt/10,000 ton SEV-B2;~8700 nm range to theater (Middle East as example)

Tons(1000s)

BattleForce

82dn DRB

In a similar fashion, ground forces are also limited in their ability toclose quickly and block an enemy from reaching key urban areas.The above figure shows that even a very light force (82nd Airborne)requires many days to close and be ready for combat. Heavier, moremechanized forces may be able to close quickly with future fastsealift, but even these may arrive too late to prevent an enemy fromoccupying key urban areas.


New Fast Reaction Forces Such as ThoseProposed for AAN May Reduce Timelines

Lighter versions can be deployed faster than82nd DRB. Once in place, these forces candetect and destroy enemy forces in the openand, to some extent, under cover

Many concepts have been proposed for light fast-reaction forces.These include more mechanized concepts such as the U.S. Army’sArmy After Next battle force, the USMC’s Sea Dragon concept, andlighter, less-maneuverable force concepts such as DARPA’s SmallUnit Operations teams. These concepts potentially have extensiveamounts of precision firepower available, but they will still require atleast several days to close.3

______________ 3Images of V-22 courtesy of Boeing Aircraft Inc., fiber optic guide missile courtesy ofJanes International.






The last component of the strategy is the use of new “offset” capabil-ities for engaging an enemy in urban areas from standoff locations.


Advanced Concepts for MOUT: Are Other Options Available to U.S. Forces?

• Focus has been on close combat eviction of enemy

• However, our examination of advanced concepts notes:− Many aspects of intelligence gathering, planning, and maneuver

can be carried out at standoff or from behind cover

− New technologies may allow physical and organizational isolationof enemy units

− Precision fires can add surgical attrition of exterior and someinterior targets

Much of the training and preparation for MOUT has emphasizedclose combat. In fact, the focus of the MOUT ACTD appears to be onnear-term demonstration of new technologies primarily designed toaid the warfighter in room-to-room, building-by-building clearing.4

In this section we will discuss options that should minimize thishigh-attrition close combat through the use of remote means forintelligence gathering, isolation of enemy units in the city, and pre-cision fires from range.

______________ 4For a detailed discussion of the MOUT ACTD and of current doctrine and trainingstatus, see the ACTD web site (http://yorktown.dc.isx.com/mout/) and Glenn (1998).


New “Offset” Concepts May Be Able to Force Combat to Outside of Buildings and Cities

Key concepts:− Sector-and-seal

− Nodal warfare

− Noncombatant control

• Underlying principles

− Localize combat to key areas, nodes

− Sector off key areas

− Force combat to outside of buildings

− Turn defenders into unfavorable locations

− Interior engagements use robotics

Three concepts make up our “offset” approach to MOUT. Two ofthese, termed “sector and seal” and “nodal warfare,” represent majordepartures from current tactics. The sector and seal conceptinvolves use of standoff sensors to determine enemy locations andthen deployment of isolation devices from afar to seal off the enemyfrom sensing or attacking our own forces. Nodal warfare also usesstandoff sensors and weapons, but the main goal is to locate and dis-able key nodes such as C2 sites, communications relay platforms,power sites, water supplies, airports, and air defenses. These meth-ods also extend current concepts such as ejecting entrencheddefenders though use of comprehensive situation awareness andstandoff weapons. One notion is to predetermine enemy egressroutes and then flush them out in a desired direction. Thus, ratherthan playing into the strengths of an urban defense, these concepts“entomb” the would-be defenders, deny them infrastructure access,and force them into disadvantageous positions. The third concept,noncombatant control, uses technology to identify, tag, and movenoncombatants out of the combat zones. In some cases, the inhabi-tants may even be enlisted to gather intelligence and coordinate


movements. It is likely that implementation of these concepts mayrequire expansion of the time required to complete a given mission,thereby resulting in a “reduced casualties for increased hours”tradeoff.

The underlying principle behind these concepts is that the mainproportion of the urban fight may be carried out at standoff ranges,and that the enemy may be forced away from his favorable positions.Risky interior engagements should be relegated to unmanned air andground systems as much as possible.


These Concepts Focus on ForciblyExpelling an Entrenched Enemy

Instead, it maybe safer,cheaper, andmore effectiveto block andattrit the enemybefore the forceenters theurban area

SATCOM

PrecisionWeaponRobotic

Foam GunPenetrating

Sensor

AcousticWeaponRSTA,

C2

Application of these concepts to urban areas is illustrated here. Evenin a relatively simple situation, such as eviction of a sniper team,there may be requirements for special sensors, nonlethal devices,command and control vehicles, and precision weapons. It may beeasier to use many of these techniques on an approaching enemyrather than one already entrenched in a building.


Outline




• Observations

This section describes how the three components can go together asan effective strategy.


Expected Sequence of EventsFor Prepped City Under Attack

• With little warning, invading forces approach outskirts

• Overhead and ground sensors determine size, speed, anddirection of force

• Obstacles are deployed, slowing and channeling force indesired directions

• Jammers, anti-materiel devices, smoke, local fire supportused to further confuse and slow forces

• Enemy forces which succeed in penetrating city aredetected and tracked; non-combatants cleared from area;local forces provide intel and reactive fires

• C2 centers coordinate precision fires from rapid reactionand standoff platforms, attriting stalled/slowed/ isolatedenemy vehicles and infantry

An example scenario for a prepared urban area might start with asurprise attack from a nearby border. The enemy force is quicklydetected by the prepositioned air and ground sensor net. Obstaclesset in belts outside the city soon slow the attack to a crawl. Coordi-nation of the enemy force is degraded quickly by jammers, smoke,and coalition rocket, cannon, and mortar fire, along with air attacks.

Nevertheless, some portion of the attack may succeed in the first fewhours or days and part of the city might be occupied. The invadersare then tracked, slowed, and isolated using in-town obstacles.When the rapid reaction force from neighboring areas or CONUS isable to close, its fires are immediately directed from mobile and sta-tionary C2 centers. Long-range naval, USAF, and ground fires aresimilarly targeted from the C2 centers. A portion of the ground forcemay be designated to clear any enemy strongholds in the city. Thiswould be done using offset engagement.


Intent Is to Deter First, Then Defeat

• Defenses make city unattractive as target; they may actto deter prospective enemy attack

• Key concept if enemy does attack: preparations slowenemy, delay sufficiently to allow coordinated responsefrom local forces and rapid reaction units

Enemy attacks

Belts of defenses

Standoff precisionfires

City

RapidReactionforces

II

Indigenousforcereactions

This graphic illustrates some of the process. Prepositioned defensivebelts extend far from the city periphery, allowing precision fires fromthe city and from rapid reaction forces to concentrate on the slowedtargets. These belts allow a coordinated fall-back with increasingcanalization of the attackers.

Part of the key to successful defense outside city boundaries is therecent development of wide area (smart) mines and other new tech-nologies. Smart mines can cover large areas, killing or slowingground vehicles and low-flying helicopters. Higher-altitude airmobile operations may be stopped using increasingly capable man-portable and vehicle-mounted air defense systems. Software radiosand tactical internets can coordinate indigenous, rapid-reaction, andlong-range fires. Fast-setting foams can set up obstacles or canestablish bridges over broken terrain. Robotic air and ground vehi-cles can resupply the defenders with additional sensors, obstacles,and weapons as they are needed. Ground forces equipped with fast-reacting weapons can engage fleeting targets, and standoff precisionfires can go after key nodes and moving targets in the open.


Preemptive Preparation Alone WillProbably Not Be Enough to Stop the Attack

Time

36 hrs 72 hrs

Responseeffective-ness

Indigenous reaction

Defensiveprep alone

Unopposedenemy attack

Degreeof enemycontrol

This is the first of a series of three slides intended to show the ex-pected synergy between the three components. If unopposed, anenemy attack on a large urban area might take several days to occupyand defend the area. Indigenous reaction without any concertedpreparation of the city might take some time to initiate a response,and then would likely have little effect on the outcome. Preemptivedefensive preparations would have an immediate effect and wouldresult in more enemy attrition and disruption, but without additionalfires would probably also simply delay the occupation.


Rapid Reaction Force and Long Range Fires May Act Too Late

Time

36 hrs 72 hrs


Indigenous reaction

Defensiveprep alone

Rapid reaction alone



OffsetCapability alone

The effects of long-range fires and rapid reaction forces are alsoexpected to be insufficient by themselves. These responses mayarrive after much of the enemy force is already established in theurban area. The rapid reaction units would then be forced to rootout the enemy forces at high cost. Long-range fires, even precisionones, could cause extensive collateral damage and noncombatantlosses when targeted against enemy positions in the city.


Synergy Is Expected to Be Key

Time

36 hrs 72 hrs


Indigenous reaction

Defensiveprep alone

Rapid reaction alone


Prep + rapidreaction + offset capability


Offset Capability alone

The effects of all three components are expected to be highly syner-gistic. Defensive preparations used in concert with rapid reactionforces should work together to prevent entry, disrupt the enemyattack, produce slow-moving targets for mid- and long-range fires,and result in substantial attrition. Those enemy units that do achievea lodgment in the cities can then be isolated and evicted using offsetengagement techniques combined with limited numbers of closecombat operations.


There Are Many Key Technologies To Focus On

• Long-life, LPI, WFOV, surreptitious,ubiquitous sensors

• C2 and comm systems piggybacking oncommercial networks

• Inexpensive, pervasive bands ofobstacles

• Infrastructure protection devices

• Rapid force deployment, coordination,and engagement systems

Many of these technologies are only nowbecoming available

Preemptive preparation of urban areas against attack is not a newidea. Seoul, Tel Aviv, Grozny, and many other cities have extensivepreparations on avenues of approach. One difference between thosetraditional defenses and the concepts put forth here are the manynew technologies that enable flexible, effective disabling of enemyattacks. Only in the last few years have new microsensors, mobilecommercial communication systems, 3-D visualization tools, roboticsecurity and resupply systems, special foams, and other technologiesmatured to the point where they can contribute to flexible, cost-effective defenses. Many of these systems can be shifted quickly tothe specific areas being attacked, unlike historic defenses such aswalls, ditches, minefields, and protective fires. They can also capital-ize on the principles of massed fires, hitting an enemy’s most vulner-able points, seizing the initiative with counterattacks, and usingmultimode, redundant systems that cannot be easily defeated bycountermeasures.


Modeling And Simulation Will Also Require Enhancements to Examine the Concept

• Modeling deployment dynamics,building-up of forces, link up with localcommanders (SS, NW, NCC)

• Non-lethal effects on personnel andmateriel (SS, NCC)

• New MOEs: disruption, disorganization,slowing, penetration (UP, SS, NW, NCC)

• Synergistic effects of obstacles andprecision weapons (UP, SS)

UP: Urban preparationSS: Sector and sealNW: Nodal warfareNCC: Noncombatantcontrol

JCATS MOUTsimulation

Replicating the complexity of these activities will require enhance-ments to traditional wargaming and simulation systems. Augmenta-tions needed include representation of the interactions betweenindigenous, rapid reaction, and standoff forces, particularly withrespect to how obstacles and mid- and long-range fires act synergis-tically. At the same time, post-processing must characterize manynew measures of effectiveness such as incapacitation of personnel,disabling of vehicles, isolation of units, and impairment of commandand control. Systems such as JCATS have some of these capabilitiesincorporated in their code, but much of this functionality will requirenew programming.


Outline




• Observations

The last section summarizes our observations and insights to thispoint.


Observations/Insights• In many situations, U.S. will not be able to respond

quickly enough to prevent occupation of urban areas

• Ejecting an entrenched enemy from a town is far moredifficult and costly than preventing his entry

• Preemptive defensive measures can slow or disruptinvasion, but may not be enough in themselves toprevent loss of city

• C2 systems pre-wired into cities at risk must be able tocontrol both indigenous defenses and external rapidreaction forces

• High resolution modeling and analysis needed todetermine the most effective investment strategy—acquisition of obstacles, comm nets, C2 systems,weapons platforms, etc.—taking into account possiblecountermeasures

Many of the observations to this point are simple ones. It is becom-ing increasingly clear that the United States and its allies cannotrespond quickly enough to stop an aggressive force from taking overmany key urban areas. Going in and driving out an entrenchedaggressor from a newly occupied urban area could be costly, evenwith dramatic new tactics and technologies. Preemptive preparationcan buy time, but in itself is probably not enough to stop or deter anaggressor.

The approach with the most promise appears to be a combination ofpreemption, rapid response ground forces, and standoff fires. Thesedisparate capabilities need to be orchestrated from a unified com-mand and control center to achieve the greatest shock, delay, anddisruption of the enemy attack.

The next questions concern the most effective investment and appli-cation strategy. How should scarce R&D and acquisition resourcesbe parceled out? How much should the host country be required toshoulder? What agreements should be in place for best application


of the system? Should control of the response be with the host coun-try, a coalition, or the joint task force? Some of these questions maybe answered though high-resolution simulation and some throughanalysis and negotiation.

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