pragmatism and the gradual shift from dependency to neoliberalism: the world bank, african leaders...

WorldDevelopmentVol. 31,No. 10, pp. 1655–1672, 2003� 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

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Pragmatism and the Gradual Shift from

Dependency to Neoliberalism: The World

Bank, African Leaders and Development

Policy in Africa

FRANCIS OWUSU *

Iowa State University, Ames, USA

Summary. — The long-standing disagreement between the international community and Africanleaders over an appropriate development strategy has been settled by the World Bank’s Com-prehensive Development Framework (CDF) and African leaders’ New Partnership for Africas De-velopment (NEPAD). Both documents support neoliberalism and see increased global integrationas the key to Africa’s development. This paper traces Africa’s journey from the dependency/neoliberalism debate in the early 1980s to the current endorsement of neoliberalism. It is arguedthat the overwhelming global attention and support enjoyed by NEPAD derives from its embraceof Western development ideas as well as changes in the global political economy that have madereformist ideas more acceptable. NEPAD’s success will, however, depend on how African leadersand the international community respond to the initiative.� 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Key words — Africa, neoliberalism, globalization, the World Bank, comprehensive development

framework (CDF), new partnership for Africa’s development (NEPAD)

For the first time, there is a comprehensive plan [NE-PAD] dealing with all aspects of the African plight.For the first time, it is constructed with reformingAfrican leaders as partners, not passive recipients ofaid. . . it is a new departure. It is a real signal of hopefor the future and it is up to us now to make it a real-ity. . . Africa does matter; to us and to humanity (Brit-ish Prime Minister, Tony Blair, Statement on the G8Summit to the House of Commons, July 1, 2002).

*The author wishes to acknowledge insightful com-

ments on earlier versions of this paper by Elizabeth

Asiedu, Padraig Carmody, Samuel Zalanga, Joseph

Oppong and Heather Sauer. Final revision accepted:

31 December 2002.

1. INTRODUCTION

At no time in the short history of indepen-dent Africa has there been such a close con-vergence in development thinking. Twentyyears ago, there were strong disagreementsbetween African leaders and international fi-nancial institutions over the causes of the con-tinent’s underdevelopment, the solutions to thecrisis and what should be the focus of devel-opment effort. The debate, which reflected thedominant ideological positions in the explana-

165

tion of Africa’s dilemma, was represented bythe Organization of African Unity (OAU). 1

Economic Commission of Africa (ECA) on theone side and the World Bank (henceforth, theBank) and other international financial insti-tutions on the other. The OAU/ECA and othersupporters of the dependency approach blamedthe continent’s underdevelopment on externalfactors, including foreign capital arising out ofthe world capitalist system and the massivecapital and resource hemorrhage from thecontinent. The Bank, the International Mone-tary Fund (IMF) and other neoliberals, how-ever, insisted that the extant political andeconomic arrangements in Africa created thedisabling environment and slowed the rate ofdevelopment. Over the years, as these positions

5

WORLD DEVELOPMENT1656

were hotly debated and each camp accumulatedsome experience, the gulf between them hasnarrowed.In 1998, the Bank adopted a new approach

to development called the Comprehensive De-velopment Framework (CDF) that signaled ashift away from the donor-led developmentassistance strategy of the past two decades tothe development of a country strategy led bya country itself. Three years after the releaseof CDF, African leaders also published theNew Partnership for Africa’s Development(NEPAD), which abandoned the dependencyapproach and signified the continent’s en-dorsement of neoliberalism. This paper wasprompted by the remarkable similarities be-tween the CDF and NEPAD and the latter’sdeviation from previous initiatives. NEPAD,which is being promoted by a group of Africanleaders who are sympathetic to Western ideas,should not come as a surprise because opposi-tion to neoliberal policies by African leadershas gradually been eroding over the years asdemonstrated by the widespread adoption ofstructural adjustment programs (SAPs) in the1980s. But NEPAD is also being touted byproponents and the international media as thefirst African-created vision that can potentiallyaccelerate growth and sustainable development,eradicate widespread and severe poverty, andhalt the marginalization of Africa. There is noquestion that NEPAD represents a significantstep in the debate over African developmentpolicy––it has brought new life to the devel-opment debate; it seeks to take advantage ofthe favorable global political and economicenvironments and transform African econo-mies; it shows the willingness of all involved inAfrican development to talk to each other; andit has created a new sense of optimism andexcitement. NEPAD, however, is not the first‘‘home-grown’’ solution to the African crisis; infact, African leaders have never been short ofgrand proposals. Past initiatives were ignoredby the international community partly becausethe international environment at the time wasnot ripe enough for alternative solutions andpartly because they contained issues that con-tradicted policies supported by the interna-tional community.A discussion of Africa’s gradual embrace of

neoliberalism culminating in the adoption ofNEPAD is important and timely for severalreasons. First, although NEPAD is widely be-ing discussed by the media and at many inter-national forums, it has surprisingly received

little attention in the development literature.Second, one is also struck by the lack of his-torical context in the media’s discussions ofNEPAD. Third, the international communityand in particular, the Bank’s indirect influenceon the development of NEPAD through theCDF, has remained unexplored. Fourth, thequestion of whether Africa’s embrace of neo-liberalism would necessarily create favorableconditions for the continent’s development hasbeen assumed but not discussed. Finally, thearticulation of NEPAD’s implication for de-velopment policy in Africa has so far been leftto politicians because the academic communityhas not given the initiative the vigorous scru-tiny that it deserves. This paper is an attempt toaddress these issues and stimulate academicdiscussion of NEPAD. After all, NEPAD isprobably the most influential initiative to comefrom African leaders since 1989. The paperhas three major objectives: (a) it provides thecontext for understanding the NEPAD bychronicling the shift from the dependency/neoliberalism debate of the 1980s to the currentconvergence of ideas on African development;(b) it explores two main factors that accountfor NEPAD’s support in the internationalcommunity––its endorsement of neoliberalismand a more receptive international environ-ment; and (c) it undertakes a preliminary as-sessment of NEPAD and suggests what Africanleaders and the international community mustdo to make NEPAD succeed.The remainder of the paper is divided into

four sections. Section 2 reviews Africa’s searchfor development by reviewing the major OAU/ECA and the Bank policy documents from1980 to the present. Section 3 discusses the in-ternational community’s reactions to NEPAD.Section 4 is a preliminary assessment ofNEPAD. The final section summarizes the mainideas of the paper and provides a conclusion.

2. AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENTCHALLENGES AND THE SEARCH FOR

SOLUTION

Although Africa has never been considered‘‘developed,’’ most countries performed rela-tively well from independence till 1973 whenthe economies began a downward spiral (Jes-persen, 1992). In agriculture, during 1960–70,only 17 out of 45 countries had negative annualgrowth rates of per capita food production; for1970–76, however, the number had increased

THE SHIFT FROM DEPENDENCY TO NEOLIBERALISM 1657

to 29 countries. The drop in agricultural pro-duction led to massive food imports with atotal food import bill rising from $1.9 billion in1973 to $6 billion in 1980 for all non-oil pro-ducing African countries (Onimode, 1998). Sim-ilar trends can be identified in GDP growth––while 12 African countries had negative annualGDP growth rates per capita during 1960–70,20 countries had negative annual growth ratesin 1970–76. At the same time, Africa’s foreigndebts kept piling up, rising from $9.02 billion in1970 to $49.6 billion in 1978. Manufacturingproduction also rose at sustained rates until1973, when it began to stagnate. This economicgrowth occurred at a time when African statesdominated their economies and the crisis in the1970s coincided with the oil crisis and theslump in the global economy. But Africancountries were also saddled with domesticproblems. The political scene was characterizedby coups, civil strife and ethnic violence creat-ing political instability. The public sector suf-fered from underproduction, while the numberof urban unemployed and underemployed inthe countryside continued to soar. There werealso widespread administrative corruption, in-efficiency and institutional anarchy. Thus, de-spite the initial promise of many Africancountries, the situation at the beginning of the1980s had turned very bleak.The crisis prompted responses from interna-

tional agencies including the OAU/ECA andthe Bank, but they offered contrasting answersto the following questions: Are domestic orexogenous factors to be blamed for Africa’scrisis? Should African countries continue thestate-led introverted development strategy ofthe previous decade, or should the states’ rolebe limited to removing impediments to the ef-ficient operation of markets? Should develop-ment policy focus on production (i.e., thepromotion of economic growth) or distribution(i.e., reduction of income inequality, povertyand unemployment)? Both the OAU/ECA andthe Bank based their answers on their ideo-logical positions; the former adopted a depen-dency approach while the latter supported aneoliberal position.

(a) Early 1980s––Poles apart

The first comprehensive response to the Af-rican crisis was the OAU’s Lagos Plan of Action(LPA) published in 1980. LPA was a classicdependency interpretation of the African di-lemma. It exonerated African leaders and

blamed the historical injustices suffered by thecontinent and the continued dependence onexternal forces for the crisis:

. . .despite all efforts made by its leaders, [Africa] re-mains the least developed continent. . . Indeed Africawas directly exploited during the colonial period andfor the past two decades; this exploitation has beencarried out through neo-colonialist external forceswhich seek to influence the economic policies and di-rections of African states. . . We view, with disquiet,the overdependence of the economy on our continentof the export of basic raw materials and minerals. Thisphenomenon had made African economies highly sus-ceptible to external developments and with detrimen-tal effects on the interests of the continent (OAU,1981, p. 7).

Having diagnosed the problem as essentiallyexogenous, the solution was obvious: it mustinvolve ‘‘far-reaching regional approach basedprimarily on collective self-reliance’’ (OAU,1981, p. 5). LPA envisaged continental coop-eration among African states to culminate inthe establishment of an African EconomicCommunity by the year 2000. African stateswere assigned increased roles in their econo-mies, and national-based strategies and pre-scriptions were proposed on issues rangingfrom food and agriculture to women and de-velopment. It promoted both economic growthand income distribution.In 1981, the Bank also issued its first major

report on Africa, titled Accelerated Develop-ment in Sub-Sahara Africa (Berg Report). TheBerg Report’s diagnosis of the continent’sproblems and the solutions it proposed were indirect opposite to the LPA. It held Africanleaders responsible for the crisis and blamed iton domestic factors including failed domesticpolicies, corruption, mismanagement, etc. Toaddress these problems, the report recom-mended a series of market-oriented policieswith macroeconomic stability at their core,collectively known as SAPs. The main aimswere to ‘‘get prices right,’’ promote economicgrowth through production increases, espe-cially in the export sector, while downplayingdistributional concerns. SAPs also entailed asignificant reduction in the role of the state inthe economy and the reliance on market forcesfor the allocation of resources (World Bank,1981).As the blaming and the finger-pointing went

on, the situation in many African countriescontinued to deteriorate. The debt load in-creased and debt servicing began to take a


heavy toll on many countries. Natural disastersalso ravaged the continent, particularly in 1984when there were alarming reports of famine,starvation and death. The crisis affected gov-ernments’ ability to provide basic services andfueled political instability. Regimes saw theirsurvival as linked to access to external financialassistance, but the OAU could not back itsinitiative with the necessary funds. 2 The Bankand other international financial institutionsthat controlled the financial resources made theimplementation of SAPs a prerequisite forgetting loans and aid. Desperate for funds,African leaders abandoned their ‘‘home-grown’’ initiative and adopted World Bank/IMF-supported SAPs. Moreover, most weremore concerned over the management of thecrisis (and SAPs promised to address them)than the long-term self-reliance of the LPA. Bythe mid-1980s, it was clear that LPA had beenabandoned in preference for SAPs.The inability of the OAU to secure funds to

support its initiative taught African leadersimportant lessons. First, they realized thatblaming exogenous factors and the interna-tional community for Africa’s crisis was notgood politics, especially if access to foreign fi-nancial resources is an integral part of the so-lution. Second, they were forced to confronttheir own contribution to the crisis. Finally,they recognized that compromise, rather thanconfrontation, with the international commu-nity is necessary to ensure the continued flow ofdesperately needed funds into Africa. Theselessons have influenced subsequent Africaninitiatives.

(b) Mid-1980s––The search for a middle ground

By 1985, it was clear that LPA had failed togenerate the desired attention and support forAfrica’s cause, so the OAU devised anotherproposal, titled African Priority Program forEconomic Recovery 1986–1990 (APPER). Whileupholding the general principles of LPA, theAPPER embraced some ideas from the BergReport. Particularly important was the frankacknowledgement by African leaders that ‘‘in-ternal factors’’ were partially responsible forthe crisis: ‘‘We are fully aware of the fact thatshortcomings in development policies havecontributed to the present debt crisis’’ (OAU,1985, p. 5). APPER, however, maintained thatexogenous factors also deserved some of theblame, arguing that ‘‘it is evident that the majorcauses of our countries’ debt servicing prob-

lems are external ones and such causes areunfortunately beyond our control’’ (OAU,1985, p. 5). It blamed exogenous factors in-cluding international recession, commodityprice collapse, adverse terms of trade, decline inreal terms of ODA, increasing protectionism bydeveloped countries, high interest rates, cur-rency fluctuations, high debt and debt-servicingobligations for contributing to the continent’spredicament. The OAU also saw a compromisebetween external and internal factors as a wayout of the quagmire, and concepts such as‘‘shared responsibilities’’ and ‘‘genuine part-nership’’ became its trademarks. It admittedthat ‘‘effective mobilization and judiciousexploitation of our national and collectivepotentials, on the basis of well-formulated de-velopment strategies and plans’’ (OAU, 1985,p. 4) were critical for pulling Africa out of thecrisis. Thus, APPER was an effort by Africanleaders to move away from their previousextreme, blame-the-international-communityposition to a more central position thataddressed both exogenous and internal fac-tors. 3

The United Nations (UN) was very receptiveof APPER and called the first-ever session ofthe General Assembly to discuss the problemsof a region. Through the United Nations Pro-gramme ofAction forAfricanEconomicRecoveryand Development 1986–1990 (UN-PAAERD),the UN adopted APPER and pledged interna-tional support for the initiative. It appealed tothe developed countries to change their rela-tionship with Africa, arguing that eliminationof protectionism, higher prices for agriculturalcommodities, greater balance of paymentssupport and a reduced debt burden were criticalfor creating a favorable global economic envi-ronment for Africa’s development (UnitedNations, 1986). Despite UN endorsement ofAPPER, African leaders were under no illusionthat SAPs were still a prerequisite for accessto assistance from the international commu-nity; therefore, African governments resignedthemselves to SAPs, although the policiesdid not address the injustices in the globaleconomy. The inherent weakness in enforce-ability of the UN’s recommendations meantthat its endorsement of the OAU’s posi-tion was merely symbolic, as observed byIhonvbere:

The UN was unable to force African leaders tobecome more responsible and accountable, it couldimpose no sanctions on leaders for intimidating popu-


lar groups and communities, it could not get do-nors to redirect foreign aid to NGOs and to needyAfrican states, it could not convince investors toreturn to or continue to invest in Africa, and it couldnot challenge the hostile conditions in the globaleconomy which continued to mediate OAU andECA prescriptions for recovery (Ihonvbere, 1996,p. 23).

APPER is significant because it represented afirst step toward resolving the ideological gapbetween the OAU/ECA and the Bank. By ad-mitting that domestic and exogenous factorswere both responsible for the continent’s crisis,African leaders lost the moral leverage forcastigating exogenous factors without firstputting their own houses in order. It elevatedthe role of domestic problems while down-playing the contribution of exogenous factorsto the crisis. As a result, the pressure on Africanleaders to address their domestic problems be-came more intense, the international commu-nity became less sympathetic to countries thatrefused to do so, and support for SAPs con-tinued to increase in the international commu-nity. Moreover, the financial incentives thatcame with the implementation of SAPs madethem irresistible to African regimes that werestarved of resources. No wonder then, thatduring 1980–89 about 241 adjustment pro-grams were initiated by 36 sub-Saharan Africancountries (Jespersen, 1992) while the ‘‘home-grown’’ APPER gathered dust.

(c) Late 1980s––Going after SAPs

By the end of the 1980s, three issues in thedebate over Africa’s crisis were clear. First,African leaders had lost the fight over the roleof external factors in the crisis and domesticpolicy mismanagement had become the centralconcern of development policy. Second, SAPswere a short-term palliative measure and didnot address the structural causes of the con-tinent’s crisis. Third, the social cost of ad-justment was too high and threatened thelong-term development of the continent. Theserealizations led the ECA to reexamine its pre-vious analysis of the development challengesleading to the publication of the African Al-ternative Framework to Structural AdjustmentProgrammes for Socio-Economic Recovery andTransformation (AAF-SAP) in 1989. AAF-SAPdevoted its attention to developing an alter-native strategy for addressing the crisis andarticulating the role of the state in the de-

velopment process. It did so by going afterSAPs.Mackenzie (1992) discusses the main high-

lights of the ECA framework. First, althoughAAF-SAP recognized the need for adjustmentin African economies to correct past domesticpolicy inefficiencies, it insisted that SAPs arenot appropriate for Africa. It distinguishedbetween structural transformation and struc-tural adjustment––the latter focuses on selectedmacroeconomic variables, while the former is a‘‘holistic package’’ that would transform socialand economic relations. It argued that SAPsfocus on short-term objectives, but what Africaneeds is a long-term social and economictransformation of societies:

Africa has to adjust. But in adjusting, it is imperativethat it is the transformation of the structures thatfundamentally serve to aggravate the African socio-economic situation that constitutes the focus of atten-tion. As such, adjustment and transformation mustbe conceived and implemented as inextricably linkedand intertwined processes such that progress will bemade simultaneously on the two fronts (ECA, 1989,p. 32).

Second, AAF-SAP contended that SAPsfocus exclusively on economic issues, but Africa’sdevelopment challenges extend beyond eco-nomics. Drawing from the political economyperspective, it proposed a comprehensive ap-proach to development that would transformthe economic, social and political structures inAfrica that hamper development. The docu-ment also drew attention to the various formsof inequalities inherent in African societies andwarned that failure to address them could leadto a possible breakdown of societies. The ECAwas also concerned about the lack of demo-cratic political structures and called on Africancountries to embrace democracy and increasedaccountability. Third, the framework was alsoan attempt to redefine the debate over the roleof the African state in development. It did so bydrawing attention to the need for good gover-nance and state-capacity building in the conti-nent. It described public administration inAfrica as consumed by ‘‘ad hoc crisis manage-ment’’ that hampers long-term economic plan-ning (ECA, 1989, p. 33). It also pointed to theincreased rounds of negotiations for loans anddebt rescheduling, which it argued, constrainthe scope for independent policy-making andrational economic management. The key torestructuring African economies therefore, ac-cording to AAF-SAP, is to improve the


capacity for national economic management.In sum, as a framework for development policy,AAF-SAP was ambitious but more ‘‘human-centered’’ and ‘‘holistic’’ than SAPs. It advo-cated the need to protect vulnerable groups, toretain state presence in areas with social re-sponsibility to society, and to go beyond merefinancial perspectives on the causes of the crisis.Its immediate impact was minimal, however, asSAPs continued to dominate African develop-ment policy.In 1989, the Bank also published yet another

major report on Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa––From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective Study. The report was inresponse to SAPs’ criticisms from UN agenciessuch as the UNICEF, the OAU, the ECA, andmany scholars and therefore sounded morereconciliatory. It admitted that: ‘‘Responsibilityfor Africa’s economic crisis is shared. Donoragencies and foreign advisers have been heavilyinvolved in the past development efforts alongwith African governments themselves’’ (WorldBank, 1989, p. 2). Yet it defended the record ofSAPs: ‘‘More than half [of African countries]have embarked on structural adjustment pro-grams. The countries that have persisted withreforms since the mid-1980s are showing thefirst signs of improvement. These give groundsfor believing that recovery has started’’ (WorldBank, 1989, p. 3). The Bank also began tobroaden the focus of its policy to include theneed for good governance, but unlike AAF-SAP, its concern was to enable African states tomeet their global obligations and to better im-plement SAPs. In sum, although the Bankchanged its rhetoric in the 1989 report, it wasstill confident in the efficacy of SAPs andtherefore did not significantly alter its policiestoward Africa. As a result, SAPs effectivelyreplaced any form of development planning inAfrica for the next decade, and African leaderssurrendered their right to design and implementpolicies for their countries. 4

(d) 2000s––Converging views on development?

The two decades of ideological debate be-tween the Bank and African leaders did notimprove the lives of ordinary Africans. Indeed,in many cases, the situation at the beginning of2000 was no better than it was in the 1960s witha large number of people still living in poverty.The persistence of underdevelopment com-pelled both the Bank and African leaders toreevaluate their approaches to development,

and the process has brought these two institu-tions much closer than anyone could have an-ticipated 20 years ago. The Bank’s CDF andthe African leaders’ NEPAD differ from theirprevious approaches and exhibit an amazingconsensus over the cause of the continent’sunderdevelopment, what should be the focus ofdevelopment policy and how to achieve devel-opment. The CDF represents the Bank’s mostaggressive effort yet to address the concerns ofits critics, albeit in a neoliberal framework.NEPAD also endorses neoliberalism throughits support for globalization and calls on Afri-can leaders to put their houses in order in ex-change for increased foreign investment. Thetwo approaches are discussed below.

(i) CDF––World Bank’s new developmentframeworkThe appointment of the Bank’s current

president, James Wolfensohn, in June 1995 wasan opportunity for the Bank to reinvent itself.His 1998 address to the Board of Governors,titled The Other Crisis, was a frank admissionthat the Bank’s policies have contributed to thecrisis, which has dashed the hopes of many andcreated ‘‘dark searing images of desperation,hopelessness and decline’’ (Wolfensohn, 1998,p. 2). At a time when there were concerns overthe financial crisis in East Asia, he called at-tention to ‘‘the other crisis’’––the crisis ofpoverty faced by an increasing number ofpeople, many of whom lived in countries thathave religiously followed the Bank’s advice. Hedeclared: ‘‘We talk of financial crisis while inJakarta, in Moscow, in sub-Saharan Africa, inthe slums of India and the barrios of LatinAmerica, the human pain of poverty is allaround us’’ (Wolfensohn, 1998, p. 3). He wascritical of SAPs, arguing that ‘‘Development isnot about adjustment. . . Development is aboutputting all the component parts in place––together and in harmony’’ (Wolfensohn, 1998,p. 11). He charged the Bank to come up with anew development framework that would notfocus exclusively on macroeconomic stability,but one that would address the social, political,environmental, and cultural aspects of society:a more balanced development. A few monthsafter the speech, he proposed the CDF, whichhas since become central to the Bank’s devel-opment policy (Wolfensohn, 1999).CDF is based on four principles, namely, a

holistic long-term strategy; the country in thelead, both ‘‘owning’’ and directing the devel-opment agenda, with the Bank and other


partners each defining the support in their re-spective business plans; stronger partnershipamong governments, donors, civil society, theprivate sector and other development stake-holders in implementing the country strategy;and a transparent focus on development resultsto ensure better practical success in reducingpoverty (World Bank, 1999). CDF differs fromSAPs in many ways. First, unlike SAPs, whichfocus on macroeconomic stability, CDF en-dorses AAF-SAP’s call for a broader view ofdevelopment that focuses on the economic,social, political, environmental and culturalaspects of a society. Second, unlike SAPs,which are excessively pro-growth, CDF’s focuson poverty reduction puts it closer to past Af-rican initiatives such as LPA and APPER. TheCDF, together with the Poverty ReductionStrategy Papers (PRSP), 5 demonstrates therenewed interest in poverty reduction efforts;although the Bank still believes that the bestway to alleviate poverty is through growth.Third, SAPs and CDF differ on the question ofownership of the development policy. UnderSAPs, countries seeking financial assistance arerequired to implement a standard set of eco-nomic policies designed by the Bank and theIMF officials, often with little or no input fromthe country. The CDF emphasizes countryownership and participation in the decision-making process and supports the developmentof capacities within countries to create and di-rect their own development programs.The distinction between CDF and SAPs,

however, should not be taken too far, especiallyon the issue of conditionality. SAPs are basedon coercive conditionality while CDF promisescountry ownership, but country ownershipdoes not imply a lack of conditionality in de-termining eligibility. In fact, Hopkins, Powell,Roy, and Gilbert (2000) argue that condition-ality is unavoidable as it allows the Bank tofulfill the core functions of a bank and a de-velopment agency. They suggest that sincepolicy-change conditionality (as practiced un-der SAPs) proved to be ineffective, policy-levelconditionality (eligibility based on current pol-icies of the borrowing government) should bepursued under CDF. Interest in policy-levelconditionality is based on research that sug-gests that aid is more effective in countries withgood policies (Burnside & Dollar, 1997; WorldBank, 2001). Thus, policy-level conditionalitywould allow donors to be more selective andlimit foreign aid to countries with good a policyenvironment where it is more likely to be ef-

fective in promoting development. Govern-ments that continue to pursue poor economicpolicies would be denied financial aid and in-stead be offered the Bank’s development advice.In other words, the principle of selectivityinherent in CDF means partial reinstatementof conditionality––what Killick (1998) calls‘‘agreed conditionality.’’Selectivity based on good policy environ-

ment, however, presents some practical prob-lems. There is the problem of defining ‘‘goodpolicy environment.’’ Pender (2001) speculatesthat based on the current thinking of the Bank,good policy environment may refer to govern-ments with clear commitment to establishingpro-poor policies as the overarching priority ofall government activity. The ambiguous defi-nition of what constitutes a good policy envi-ronment and the potential subjectivity involvedare major challenges to CDF. Some also arguethat the selectivity criteria are tantamount toupfront conditionality, which is not compatiblewith CDF’s principle of country ownership(Wood & Lockwood, 1999). As Pender (2001,p. 409) argues: ‘‘the scope of ownership in theCDF approach seems to be severely con-strained, if we understand ownership. . . tomean the freedom of a government to formu-late and implement its own economic develop-ment policy.’’ Another problem is whether poorcountries around the world can be neatly cat-egorized into those with wholly poor policiesand those with wholly good policies––a situa-tion that can complicate the implementation ofCDF (Hopkins et al., 2000). Furthermore,funding based on good policy environment mayalso conflict with the Bank’s mandate of pov-erty reduction, precisely because most of thedesperately poor people live in countries with apoor policy environment, where the Bank’s aidmay be most needed.The change in the Bank’s approach from

SAPs to CDF should be put in perspective,however. Its introduction a few years after theBank’s 50th anniversary, which was marked byintense criticisms of its activities, and the ‘‘FiftyYears is Enough’’ campaign led by many non-governmental organizations (NGOs), is note-worthy. Particularly important were criticismsfrom powerful Western elites, including some inWashington who called for reforms in theBank’s activities, its abolition or privatization.The CDF was also an effort by the Bank toclearly distinguish its activities from its sisterinstitution, the IMF. The blurred relationshipwith the IMF (which has the responsibility for


ensuring macroeconomic stability) has been asource of criticism of the Bank (Meltzer, 1999;Walters, 1994). In other words, the Bank hadno option but to propose a new developmentframework to ensure its own survival. TheCDF was an attempt to deflect criticisms of itsactivities and address some of the concerns ofits critics (Pender, 2001).Nonetheless, the CDF embraces some of the

ideas that have been proposed in past Africaninitiatives. The CDF agrees with African lead-ers that development should not be limitedto macroeconomic stability, but must involvesocial, cultural, political and environmentalissues. In addition, its focus on poverty allevia-tion is an indication that the Bank now con-siders income distribution as important aseconomic growth. Moreover, the Bank seemsto realize that for development policy to beeffective, country ownership is critical. Al-though conditionality is still an integral part ofthe Bank’s activities, it has been redefined evenif still ambiguous. All these are, however, donewithin a neoliberal framework.

(ii) NEPAD: another African initiativeNEPAD is a promise by African leaders to

deliver good governance, peace and security inreturn for increased foreign investment. Theinitiative, which is a merger of the Omega Planand the Millennium Partnership for Africa’sRecovery Program (MAP), is the brainchild ofSouth African President Thabo Mbeki, Nige-rian President Olusegun Obasanjo, and Sene-galese President Abdoulaye Wade. 6 However,Mbeki is the main architect and cheerleader,leading the effort to promote NEPAD in theinternational community. Thus, an insight intohis plan for Africa is critical for understandingNEPAD.NEPAD evolved from Mbeki’s vision of

‘‘African Renaissance,’’ 7 which has been aforeign policy guiding principle of the SouthAfrican government in its dealings with Africancountries. According to Ajulu (2001), Mbeki’sAfrican Renaissance is based on two principles:that economic development results from fos-tering the productive forces of capitalism, andthat political stability and accountability drawauthority and legitimacy from the will of thepeople. To Mbeki, African rebirth hinges on itsgreater integration into the global economicand political system (i.e., globalization). Hisideals have been criticized by some as an en-dorsement of neoliberalism––a support for afree market and a desire to make Africa safe for

overseas multi-national investments and pri-vate capital (Kornegay & Landsberg, 1998).Others defend the vision and argue that Mbekiis not just a supporter of globalization; he alsorecognizes the unequal nature of the processand its negative impacts on African countries.But unlike many past African leaders who havesought to disengage from the process, Mbeki ismore pragmatic; he has embraced it and is at-tempting to change the rules of the game fromwithin. In other words, he is not only advo-cating for globalization but he is also the con-tinent’s vociferous emissary for ‘‘conscious anddeliberate intervention in the process of glo-balization. . . to produce the results of ethics,equity, inclusion, human security and sustain-able development’’ (Mbeki, 1999). Mbeki is notalone in advocating Africa’s strategic engage-ment with the world; many African leadersincluding Obasanjo and Wade, Algeria’s Ab-delaziz Bouteflika, and Egypt’s Hosni Muba-rak––the so-called ‘‘emerging transnationalelites’’ and many others who have implementedneoliberal economic policies in their owncountries––agree with him. 8 But nowhere inAfrica has the acceptance of neoliberalism beenmore dramatic than Mbeki’s South Africa.Post-Apartheid South Africa’s journey fromself-reliant, anti-imperialist political-economicphilosophy to an endorsement of neoliberalismand the implementation of a ‘‘home-grown’’structural adjustment has taken less than fiveyears to complete (Bond, 2000; Carmody,2002). 9 The approach however, has a built-intension between the support for global freetrade and a commitment to change the rules ofthe system to ensure greater equity (Taylor &Nel, 2002). We will discuss how this tensionplays out in NEPAD.NEPAD is a regional initiative that aims to

eradicate poverty and to place African coun-tries, both individually and collectively, on apath of sustainable growth and developmentand halt the continent’s marginalization in theglobalization process. Its goals include GDPgrowth of 7% per annum and the achievementof the international development goals by theyear 2015. NEPAD identifies a set of conditionsfor achieving sustainable development and setsup special initiatives for achieving them, in-cluding the Peace and Security Initiative, De-mocracy and Political Governance Initiative,and Economic and Corporate GovernanceInitiative. NEPAD also selects priority sectorsat the subregional and continental levels, andsuggests ways of bridging the infrastructure


gap. The initiative requires an annual inflow ofabout $64 billion, much of which is expected tocome from external sources through debt re-duction, ODA and private capital. To helpachieve the projected inflow of funds, the ini-tiative has set up the Capital Flows Initiativeand Market Access Initiative. 10

Paradoxically, NEPAD has more in commonwith the CDF than it has with past Africaninitiatives. For one thing, its tone is differentfrom the confrontational tone of the earlierinitiatives, especially the AAF-SAP. Anotherstriking feature of NEPAD concerns its diag-nosis of the causes of the crisis. As already in-dicated, African leaders began to acceptresponsibility for the continent’s crisis in AP-PER; however, the rhetoric then was ‘‘jointresponsibility.’’ NEPAD goes further thanAPPER and attributes nearly all of Africa’sproblems and nearly all the responsibility forsorting them out to Africa itself. After brieflytalking about the contribution of colonialism,the Cold War, and the workings of the inter-national economic system to the crisis, itquickly zooms in on domestic problems:

Post-colonial Africa inherited weak states and dys-functional economies that were further aggravatedby poor leadership, corruption and bad governancein many countries. . . Many African governments didnot empower their peoples to embark on developmentinitiatives to realize their creative potential. Today,weak state remains a major constraint to sustainabledevelopment in a number of countries. Indeed, one ofAfrica’s major challenges is to strengthen the capacityto govern and to develop long-term policies (NEPAD,2001a, p. 5, emphasis added).

This represents a significant departure fromthe dependency approach of the earlier Africaninitiatives. 11 NEPAD’s dramatic turn awayfrom self-reliance, which had been central to allAfrican initiatives to endorsement of Africanintegration into the global economy is alsonoteworthy. NEPAD’s proponents argue thatthe global political economy has changed sig-nificantly and that Africa cannot shield itselffrom globalization without risking furthermarginalization. Further, although globaliza-tion is inherently an unequal process, the plightof Africa has been worsened by countries’ in-ability to take advantage of the many oppor-tunities the process presents. They insist thatwhile ‘‘structural impediments to growth anddevelopment in the form of resource outflowsand unfavorable terms of trade’’ are partlyresponsible for the continent’s inability to

participate fully in globalization, ‘‘failures ofpolitical and economic leadership in many Af-rican countries impede the effective mobiliza-tion and utilization of scarce resources intoproductive areas of activity in order to attractand facilitate domestic and foreign investment’’(NEPAD, 2001a, p. 7). NEPAD’s support forglobalization is, however, tempered by an ap-peal to the developed world to change the rulesof the game, because inequality inherent in theprocess poses a serious threat to both the de-veloped and developing nations and threatensto derail the globalization process. Accordingto the document, the imperative of develop-ment ‘‘not only poses a challenge to moralconscience; it is in fact fundamental to thesustainability of the globalization process’’(NEPAD, 2001a, p. 8). In addition, advocatesview state-private partnership as fundamentalto the globalization process, precisely becauseglobalization does not automatically reducepoverty and inequality. They therefore call forcommitment on the part of governments, theprivate sector and other institutions of civilsociety to genuinely integrate all nations intothe global economy and body politic. Thegreatest advantage of NEPAD, however, is thecaliber of leaders who are promoting the ini-tiative and their determination to succeed.NEPAD’s leadership includes democraticallyelected officials with legitimacy within theircountries who are highly respected in the in-ternational community. The promise of jointresponsibility for the continent’s developmentthrough an enforcement of a peer-review sys-tem also makes NEPAD unique (Kanbur,2002). The leaders have also promised to en-gage with civil society and call on Africans ‘‘totake up the challenge of mobilizing in supportof the implementation of this initiative’’ (NE-PAD, 2001a, p. 11).NEPAD not only deviates from past African

initiatives, it also has more in common with theBank’s neoliberal-based CDF. Even the choiceof words in NEPAD is strikingly similar toCDF’s principles. NEPAD is described as a‘‘holistic, comprehensive, integrated and stra-tegic framework for the socioeconomic devel-opment of Africa’’ (NEPAD, 2001b, p. 2), andis centered on the concepts of ‘‘African own-ership and management’’ (NEPAD, 2001a, p.9). It calls for a new global partnership ‘‘basedon shared responsibility and mutual interest’’(NEPAD, 2001a, p. 1) but not only on aid; onethat ‘‘takes the country programmes as a pointof departure’’ (NEPAD, 2001a, p. 48) and sets


performance targets and standards for bothdonors and recipient. NEPAD also shares itspoverty reduction objective with the CDF.

3. NEPAD AND THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY

NEPAD has generated a lot of excitement inthe international community about Africa’sdevelopment prospects. The document has alsoreceived high accolades from major worldleaders, international financial institutions andthe private sector. A recent visit by BritishPrime Minister Tony Blair to several Africancountries and the recent invitation of a numberof African leaders to Paris by French PresidentJacques Chirac are examples of internationaleffort to galvanize support for NEPAD (Anony-mous, 2002). Canadian Prime Minister JeanChr�eetien, the host of the 2002 G8 Summit inKananaskis, Canada, was at pains to retainAfrica’s concerns as top priority despite thethreat by the US war on terrorism and Israeland Palestine conflict to steal the show. SomeAfrican leaders were invited to address thesummit which is traditionally reserved forleaders of the member states. Italy and Ger-many have also declared their support forNEPAD. Support for NEPAD has also comefrom UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, theManaging Director of IMF Horst K€oohler,the Director General of WTO Mike Moore, theWorld Bank’s Wolfensohn as well as PeterWoicke, executive vice-president of the Inter-national Finance Corporation, the Bank’s pri-vate-sector arm and the biggest investor inAfrica. Furthermore, the Corporate Council onAfrica, which represents over 80% of all USprivate direct investment in Africa, has de-clared its support for NEPAD (Hayes, 2002).Although not directly related to NEPAD, the12-day joint visit by the conservative USTreasury Secretary Paul O’Neill and Irish rockstar Bono, dubbed ‘‘the odd couple tour,’’ isseen by some as the Bush administration’sattempt to become more engaged in the con-tinent’s development efforts (Financial Times,2002).Mbeki and the other supporters of NEPAD

have also been given unprecedented opportu-nities at international forums and unlimitedaccess to international media to promote NE-PAD. For instance, almost all of the majornewspapers in the G8 countries had articles onNEPAD in the weeks preceding the 2002 G8

summit. The leaders also are playing prominentroles in discussions relating to the restructuringof the international political economy. For in-stance, Mbeki, Obasanjo and Buoteflika at-tended the G8 Summit in Okinawa in July2000. Mbeki has been a guest at many inter-national summits, including the EuropeanUnion Summit in Portugal in late 2000, theGenoa G8 summit and the 2002 Nordic Sum-mit in Molde, Norway. Bouteflika also ad-dressed the closing session of the 53rd AnnualUN Conference. Prominent African leaderswere also at the 2001 World Economic Forumat Davos to promote NEPAD.Although NEPAD is not the first African

‘‘home-grown’’ initiative, it is the first to receivesuch overwhelming global attention and sup-port. The global support for NEPAD and theattention granted to its proponents, however,raise many questions. Why has the inter-national community become receptive to‘‘home-grown’’ initiatives? Does NEPAD offeranything new? Does its acceptance have some-thing to do with its avoidance of the conten-tious issues in previous initiatives? Or has theinternational community ‘‘seen the light’’ andbecome more receptive to ideas originatingfrom poor countries? If that is the case, how dowe account for this change in attitude? Thesequestions are addressed next and it is arguedthat NEPAD derives its widespread supportfrom two sources: the message of NEPAD ismore appealing to international audience andchanges in the global political economy haveopened a back door for new ideas to becomemore mainstream. Let us examine each of thesefactors.

(a) NEPAD: an African endorsement ofneoliberalism?

In the hope that it might win them aid andextra debt relief, African leaders appear to havetold the rich world everything it wants to hear,including the endorsement of neoliberalism as alegitimate solution to Africa’s crisis. NEPAD isthe first initiative conceived and developed byAfricans for Africa that does not blame theWest for the continent’s socioeconomic demiseand puts the responsibility for cleaning up themess on Africa. As already argued, unlike otherAfrican initiatives that advocate self-reliance,NEPAD embraces free-market principles. Byevoking the globalization imperative, NEPADconveniently avoids the domestic-versus-exo-genous-factors debate and plays down the


injustices in the global economy. NEPAD isalso similar in many ways to the current Bankand IMF approaches, including the CDF andthe Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)program. These qualities make the initiativeacceptable to many in the international com-munity. How important is NEPAD’s embraceof neoliberalism? The proponents of the ini-tiative may have learned from experience thatin order for the voices of African leaders to beheard in discussions about the future of thecontinent, they must learn to speak the lan-guage of the hegemonic discourse––the lan-guage of neoliberalism. Moreover, they mayhave realized that Africa would not get theneeded support from foreign donors throughretelling of past exploitation and cries aboutthe injustices in the world economy. Thus,NEPAD’s endorsement of neoliberalism couldbe seen as a pragmatic solution to the conti-nent’s development quagmire: it provides anopportunity for the developed countries toparticipate in Africa’s development effortswithout admitting their role in creating thecrisis. But for those who seek transformation inthe global political economy in favor of Africancountries, the initiative is a great disappoint-ment.Despite this, NEPAD’s views on democracy,

governance and the role of the state in devel-opment make it attractive to many in the in-ternational community (Kanbur, 2002). In thepast two decades of neoliberal hegemony, therole of the state in the economy has been de-bated and African states in particular havecome under severe attack for mismanagementof the economy, corruption, authoritarianismand abuse of power, poor human rights re-cords, ethnic conflict and wars, and generalinefficiency (Ayittey, 1998; Frimpong-Ansah,1991; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982; Sandbrook,1986; Young & Turner, 1985). As a result, Af-rican leaders have been on the defensive andthe international financial institutions have re-quired countries to pursue minimalist statepolicies. Unfortunately, years of experimenta-tion with such policies have not produced thedesired results, leading many in the develop-ment community to search for new ways todiscipline the African state. NEPAD’s promiseto deliver good governance in exchange forinvestment therefore meets the demands ofdonors and gives legitimacy to the Bank’s new‘‘policy-level conditionality’’ for disbursing de-velopment aid. Furthermore, we have alreadydiscussed the importance of NEPAD’s re-

spectable and credible leadership in promotingthe initiative in the international communityand how such legitimacy could make NEPADacceptable to Africans.In sum, NEPAD’s global attraction has to do

with African leaders’ decision to turn awayfrom a dependency approach and adopt aWestern development approach. The initiativefalls short of demanding structural transfor-mation in the global political economy that hasbeen at the heart of past African initiatives.As Taylor and Nel (2002, p. 178) remind us:‘‘African-based initiatives are vitally needed,but . . . what is emerging is a nascent reformism,emanating from key elites in the develop-ing world, that far from ushering in a twenty-first century NIEO, remains rooted in anorthodox discourse that benefits but a smallelite.’’

(b) A more receptive international environment?

In addition to the conciliatory tone ofNEPAD, a series of events in the internationalcommunity and the development experiences ofsome non-Western countries have compelledbureaucrats and consultants of the interna-tional financial institutions to question the ef-fectiveness of the policies that they require poorcountries to pursue. The claim that the statewas the problem and therefore Africa musthave less of it is now seen as overly simplisticand is subscribed to by only a few. Instead, thediscussion has shifted to state-capacity buildingand good governance. In addition, many nowview development not as something to beachieved through the manipulation of macro-economic statistics; the social, cultural, politicaland environmental components are increas-ingly being recognized. These changes in ideaspartly account for the general acceptance ofNEPAD; hence an understanding of the causesof the change is critical.The end of the Cold War and the emergence

of the United States as the only superpower isperhaps the most significant event that hastransformed the global political economy andinfluenced current development thinking. Thedemise of the Soviet Union and communismgave legitimacy to Western ideas of governanceand the introduction of uncontested globalstandards of democratization––including po-litical pluralism, allowing the existence of sev-eral political parties and workers’ unions, fair,open free and democratic elections––into thedevelopment debate. Western political ideas


have become the global norm, and the en-forcement of democratic principles under USdirection has become the main function ofmany international development institutions(Olsen, 1998; Stokke, 1995). Global demo-cratization has also led to demands for trans-parency, accountability, integrity, respect forhuman rights and the promotion of the rule oflaw, and these have made it difficult for Africanleaders to hide behind the cloak of culture,tradition and national sovereignty to continueabuse and trample on the rights of citizenswithout commanding the wrath of their owncivil society and the international community.Western political ideas also underpin the con-sensus over the nature of development process,the centrality of ‘‘good policy environment’’in the development debate, and the willingnessof the international community to listen toleaders with legitimacy and the mandate of thepeople.Another reason for the shift in development

thinking draws from the development experi-ences of non-Western nations, especially theEast Asian ‘‘tigers.’’ By the late 1980s, whenevidence about the causes of the region’s phe-nomenal economic growth began to emerge, itcontradicted the market-oriented policies pre-scribed by the Bank and other internationalagencies for Africa and other poor nations. Theevidence confirmed that the economic miraclein the region was spurred by developmentalstates that often intervened in the economy todeliberately get relative prices ‘‘wrong’’ (Ams-den, 1989). Wade (1990) also argued that EastAsian states often ‘‘governed the market’’through policies, while at the same time al-lowing the vigorous functioning of the marketto guide resource allocation. The idea that thestate and the market could work together toengineer rapid industrialization and producesuch significant economic growth was veryradical at the time. In fact, the Bank rejectedthe state-based interpretations of the region’sexperience and instead saw the cases as vindi-cation of its market-friendly policies (WorldBank, 1993). Wade (1996) disagreed with theBank’s interpretation, calling it a desperate at-tempt at ‘‘paradigm maintenance.’’ As the evi-dence continued to pile up, some of the Bank’svocal advocates of market-friendly policiesbegan to admit that left to itself, the marketwould not always result in the most efficientand effective outcome and openly questioned

the institution’s unexamined faith in the ap-propriateness of free-market policies in Africa.The East Asian development experience thuschallenged the hegemony of neoliberal policiesand compelled the Bank and others in the in-ternational community to change their view onthe role of the state and to focus on buildingstate capacity.Africa’s own experience with SAPs may have

compelled many in the international communityto change their views on development optionsfor the continent. SAPs in Africa have beensubjected to intense criticism, and attention hasbeen drawn to their excessive focus on macro-economic stability (Mosley, Subasat, & Weeks,1995); their harsh impacts on the vulnerable inthe society, especially women and children(Cornia, Jolly, & Stewart, 1987); their neglect ofthe social sector (Stein & Nafziger, 1991); andits negative impacts on local manufacturing(Samatar, 1993; Carmody, 2001). Moreover,SAPs have negatively impacted institutions andsocial processes that are critical for the opera-tion of free markets (Owusu, 2000). Althoughthe Bank responded to some of the criticismsby creating new programs such as the SocialDimensions of Adjustment (Hutchful, 1994),overall SAPs were unable to generate the eco-nomic development promised by their archi-tects. The Bank’s confidence in the policies wasalso shattered by severe economic crisis sufferedby one of its model countries, Mexico, in 1994–95 (Pender, 2001). Thus, by the end of the 1990s,many in the international community wereconvinced that SAPs could not solve Africa’sproblems and that it was time to look for al-ternative approaches.Another factor responsible for creating a

more receptive international community hasbeen the prevalence of street protests againstglobalization and the international institutionsthat manage the process. Street protests andriots against the IMF and the Bank-supportedausterity programs are nothing new in Africaand other developing countries (Walton &Seddon, 1994). But it was the violent protests atthe 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle that exposedmany in the developed world to the injusticesinherent in the way the globalization process ismanaged. Protesters now greet virtually everymajor meeting of the IMF, the Bank, the WTOand the G8. The media attention given to suchprotests serves as a constant reminder to thoseattending these summits that the world is


watching. Such awareness may have helpedkeep the concerns of the poor on the agendas ofmajor global summits and made other ideasmore acceptable. The choice of a remote andinaccessible location in Alberta, Canada, forthe 2002 G8 meeting is a testimony to the im-pact of street protests and riots.Finally, the world has changed significantly

since September 11, 2001. More important forour purpose is the causal linkage betweenpoverty and terrorism that is easily evoked bymany world leaders and ordinary people in therich nations, especially in the United States.The abject poverty in Afghanistan and Sudan,countries that have provided save havens forOsama bin Laden and his al’Qaeda operatives,is seen by many as evidence of the linkage be-tween poverty and terrorism and the need forthe United States to expand the war on ter-rorism to include eradication of poverty. TheBank’s president, for instance, argued that ‘‘theworld will not be stable if we do not deal withthe question of poverty. If it is not stable, wewill be affected by migration, crime, drugs andterror’’ (Wolfensohn, 2002). In March 2002,President Bush surprised many when he an-nounced an increase in US development aid topoor countries up to $5 billion over threeyears––a move that many saw as an attempt tobalance the war against terrorism with an at-tack on the conditions that nurture it. Theterror of 9/11 is a reminder that we live in aglobal village and that the unilateralism anddisengagement that characterized the early partof the Bush administration posed a threat toglobal security. As Wolfensohn (2002) noted,‘‘If a wall ever existed between the developingand developed world, the image of the WorldTrade Center collapsing destroyed that worldforever.’’ The events of that day changed theview of many and the adoption of NEPADaround the time of the incident may havehelped generate international support for theinitiative.In sum, NEPAD is receiving international

support partly because its message is more ap-pealing to the international community andpartly because the current global politicaleconomy has become more receptive to alter-native proposals. If NEPAD was proposed inthe 1980s, it may not have stood any betterchance of acceptance and may have been ig-nored just like the LPA, the UNPAAERD, andthe AFF-SAP. Similarly, the LPA would not

have been popular even in a post-9/11 world.The current global political economy has cre-ated opportunities that would make it possiblefor African leaders to negotiate a better dealfrom the international community. NEPAD isan important beginning in this direction, butits ability to lead Africa out of the crisis willdepend on other factors.

4. NEPAD AND AFRICANDEVELOPMENT: A PROVISIONAL

ASSESSMENT

Years of acrimony between the internationalcommunity and African leaders over the ap-propriate development strategy is partly re-sponsible for the current sorry state of affairs inthe continent. Hence the apparent convergenceof ideas is itself significant, even if the partiesdo not always agree on the meaning of con-cepts. Yet there are still important questionsabout the NEPAD and the future of Africa.Will a compromise necessarily lead to Africa’sdevelopment? NEPAD is still a work-in-pro-gress; hence, only a provisional assessment canbe undertaken now, but it seems that its fatewill depend on the following factors: (a) WillAfrican leaders deliver on their promise ofgood governance? (b) Will the internationalcommunity provide the necessary funds tosupport NEPAD’s initiatives? (c) Can Africanleaders and the international community bal-ance the continent’s short-term needs with thelong-term objectives of NEPAD? (d) CanMbeki and other proponents convince thedeveloped countries to help create a globalpolitical economy that is favorable to poorcountries? Regarding the first question, NE-PAD’s critics, who are anxiously waiting to seewhether African leaders can deliver on theirpromise of good governance and enforce thepeer-review mechanism, may not have to waitfor long. Already, Mbeki and his colleagueshave been criticized for their unwillingness tocondemn human rights abuses and the electionsin Zimbabwe, which were widely condemned asunfair. The architects of NEPAD also seem tobe reneging on the commitment to implementthe peer-review process by shifting responsibil-ity for enforcing it to the newly created AfricanUnion (DevNews, 2002c). In addition, recentdevelopments in Africa raise questions abouttheir commitment to NEPAD in general and


the peer-review process in particular. A senioradvisor at the ECA recently suggested thatAfrican leaders would not likely rush to em-brace the peer-review process until they see itsbenefits (DevNews, 2002a). Moreover, Bots-wana, one of the few Africa countries to expe-rience significant economic growth in recentyears, has also decided against endorsing someaspects of NEPAD (DevNews, 2002b). Thewavering commitment to the peer-reviewprocess, which is seen as the cornerstone ofNEPAD by the international community, com-pelled the Canadian prime minister to warnthat NEPAD risks losing international supportand the $6 billion pledge in extra annual aid ifAfrican leaders fail to ensure its proper func-tioning (DevNews, 2002c). Moreover, despitethe excitement about NEPAD in the interna-tional community, many Africans are notaware of the initiative precisely because it wasdrawn up by a tight clique of leaders with vir-tually no public consultation. If NEPAD is tobecome the ‘‘African developed, managed andowned’’ program, then the leaders must do abetter job of selling their intentions to ordinaryAfricans as they have so far done so effectivelyin the international community.Moreover, the global political economy may

have made an African initiative more accept-able, but it could also divert attention from thecontinent. This is critical since NEPAD’s suc-cess would depend on financial assistance fromthe international community, but Africa mustcompete with other regions for such funds. Theinternational community could easily shift itsfocus to other regions of the world in responseto changes in global geopolitics. For instance,the escalating Palestinian and Israeli conflictand the need to rebuild Palestinian cities de-stroyed by Israel’s invasion could divert re-sources away from Africa. Similarly, the war onterrorism and the need to rebuild Afghanistanthreatens to divert resources from Africa. Al-ready, despite the endorsement of NEPAD bythe G8 at the 2002 Summit, only $6 billion outof the $65 billion requested by African leadersis committed to NEPAD. Moreover, unex-pected domestic problems in Africa, such as thecurrent threat of drought in southern Africaand the pressure on foreign governments torespond, could shift the focus of the interna-tional community from NEPAD to short-termcrisis management.Probably the biggest obstacle to NEPAD is

the willingness of developed countries to help

create a favorable global political economy.The popular slogan of African leaders––‘‘tradenot aid’’––reflects their belief that the long-termdevelopment of African countries depends ongreater access to the markets of developedcountries and not on foreign aid. Unfortu-nately, the message from the rich nations con-tinues to be ‘‘we subsidize, you liberalize,’’demonstrated by protectionist barriers, parti-cularly in agriculture. It is estimated that theEuropean Union, the United States and Japanspend an estimated $1 billion a day to shieldtheir farmers from external competition, mostlyfrom the developing world. The decision by theBush administration to increase US agricul-tural subsidies and the threat by other devel-oped countries to respond with similar policiesindicate that agricultural subsidies are here tostay. Such subsidies and other protectionistpolicies of the rich countries have crippled Af-rica’s chances to export its way out of povertyat the same time that its countries are be-ing pressured to open up their economies andembrace globalization. Clearly, NEPAD’s stra-tegic engagement with the global politicaleconomy may be more difficult to achieve thanMbeki and the other proponents would like toadmit.Whether or not NEPAD would succeed is

still an open question. But even if NEPAD wereto succeed, not all countries in the region wouldbenefit equally from integration into the globaleconomy. As in other places, some countrieswould benefit more from the process thanothers. Indeed, it may end up serving ‘‘the in-terests of externally oriented fractions withinkey African states while leaving the rest of thecontinent to sink or swim, as it were, with theglobalization current’’ (Taylor & Nel, 2002, p.166). It is probably not by accident that thecountries pushing NEPAD such as Egypt,Nigeria and South Africa have traditionallyreceived most of the foreign direct investmentto Africa. To get the support of all Africancountries, NEPAD has to address the specialneeds of countries that might be marginalizedin the process and not benefit from capital in-vestment (even if they delivered good gover-nance).

5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The central concerns over Africa’s develop-ment at the beginning of the 1980s involved the


causes of the crisis, the appropriate develop-ment strategy and the focus of developmentpolicy. At that time, the OAU/ECA adopted adependency approach while the Bank sup-ported a neoliberal approach, and both sidesseemed not to agree on any issue. But, due to itsimmense financial resources and internationalsupport, the Bank’s views became dominant asAfrican countries overwhelmingly chose prag-matism over ideology and implemented Bank-supported SAPs. In the following two decades,the ECA and the OAU continued to insist onthe need to address both domestic and externalcauses of the continent’s crisis. They also de-manded that the objective of developmentpolicy should be broadened to include eco-nomic, social, cultural, political and environ-mental considerations, and that the state mustcontinue to play a role in Africa’s development.Unfortunately, their efforts yielded very littleresponse from the international communityand resulted only in cosmetic changes in theBank’s policies, partly because the leadersthemselves were unwilling and/or unable toaddress the domestic problems and thereforelost the moral authority for demanding changesin external factors. Ironically, while the ECAand the OAU were debating with the interna-tional community over the appropriate devel-opment strategy, many African countries werebusy negotiating with the international finan-cial institutions for loans and implementingSAPs. Thus, even though by the end of the1990s SAPs were being implemented in manyAfrican countries, the OAU and ECA did notofficially support the policies. After years ofsupporting SAPs as a condition for grantingloans to poor countries, the Bank was alsocompelled to change its development approachfrom SAPs to CDF largely to deflect criticismsof its activities.At its 2001 Summit, the OAU unanimously

adopted NEPAD. This is generally seen as anew chapter in African development policybecause of the document’s embrace of neolib-eralism and its similarity with the Bank’s CDF.The convergence of ideas appears to dovetailFukuyama’s (1992) claim that we are at ‘‘theend of history’’ because there are no seriousalternatives to neoliberalism and therefore themajor political and economic trends can beexpected to remain essentially unchanged.Fukuyama is right in the sense that no radicaltransformation in the global political economyseems to be on the horizon, and power con-

tinues to be in the hands of those who possess itwhile the poor continue to remain powerless.We have seen this with Africa’s acceptance ofneoliberalism in the hope that it would bring inforeign investment. Fukuyama may also beright about the hegemonic position that liber-alism currently enjoys. In such a world, how-ever, neoliberalism will be held responsible forsocial problems since one can no longer blamecommunism, socialism, etc., for the failure ofeconomic and political systems. Thus, neolib-eralism both in its political or economic ex-pressions would be subjected to intensescrutiny; this could raise questions about itscredibility and potentially create avenues ofalternatives, even if such alternatives are lim-ited to reformism. For instance, widespreadcriticism of neoliberalism and the Bank’s ac-tivities led to the Bank’s shift from SAPs toCDF. Problems encountered by neoliberalismin Africa also compelled the internationalcommunity to be receptive to NEPAD. As towhether African leaders could have negotiateda better deal than what NEPAD offers is adifferent question. It seems that neoliberalism’shegemony does not necessarily shut the door toall alternatives; in fact, it may have createdopportunities for changing the dominant dis-course, if even such changes come in throughthe back door.In sum, NEPAD is a pragmatic strategy by a

new breed of African leaders who hope to bringthe continent’s problems to global attention. Itcertainly falls short of demands for structuraltransformation and the creation of new inter-national economic order, but it is an importantstep nonetheless. Its ability to end decades ofunderdevelopment and marginalization of thecontinent is doubtful, although not unattain-able. It would depend on how African leadersand the international community respond tothe initiative. One hopes that Mbeki and theother leaders would be able to convince theinternational community that turning a blindeye to the abject poverty and deprivation in thecontinent poses a threat to the global neoliberalagenda. The international community may alsorealize the need to broaden the war on globalterrorism by helping to eradicate the conditionsthat breed terrorism worldwide. But if even theinternational community fails to provide fundsfor NEPAD and ignores calls for the removalof protectionist barriers, Africans leaders stillowe it to their citizens to provide good gover-nance.


NOTES

1. The OAU was replaced by the African Union (AU)

in July 2002.

2. Many pro-socialist regimes in African soon realized

that their socialist allies were only willing to provide

military assistance and not the desperately needed

financial assistance. As a result, many regimes, including

the Rawlings regime of Ghana, abandoned their populist

rhetoric and adopted Western policies, which came with

financial assistance.

3. This shift in development policy did not occur only

in Africa; rather it was part of the global ascendancy of

neoliberalism under the direction of international insti-

tutions such as the World Bank, IMF and World Trade

Organization (WTO) (Stiglitz, 2002).

4. It is important to note that many other initiatives

were proposed by African leaders during 1980–2000.

Others include the 1987 Abuja International Conference

on the ‘‘Challenge of Economic Recovery and Acceler-

ated Development in Africa.’’ In December 1987 African

leaders also came out with ‘‘Africa’s Common Position

on External Debt,’’ which addressed the need for

external debt relief. The 1988 Khartoum International

Conference on the ‘‘Human Dimensions of Africa’s

Economic Recovery and Development’’ represents yet

another effort. In 1990, the ECA with the support of

other international agencies produced the ‘‘African

Charter for Popular Participation in Development and

Transformation.’’ Moreover, in 1991, a meeting of over

500 African leaders led to the development of the

Kampala Declaration that emerged from the ‘‘Confer-

ence on Security, Stability, Development and coopera-

tion in Africa (CSSDCA).’’ Although these initiatives

are important, they are more specialized and are focused

on aspects of Africa’s development and have therefore

had much influence on the overall debate over Africa’s

development options.

5. In September 1999, both the Bank and the IMF

agreed that nationally-owned participatory poverty-

reduction strategies should provide the basis for all their

concessional lending and for debt relief under the

enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)

Initiative. This approach, building on the principles of

the CDF, has led to the development of Poverty

Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) by governments

through a participatory process.

6. The Omega Plan was an effort by President Wade to

set goals and define the financial means to narrow the

infrastructural gaps between Africa and the developed

countries (NEPAD, 2001c). MAP was a proposal by

South Africa to help Africa present a common front in

its dealings with the developed world; to seek aid and

investment in return for good governance; and to unite

the countries against social and economic problems

(NEPAD, 2001d). The two documents were merged into

the ‘‘New African Initiative.’’ This document later

became known as NEPAD when it was unanimously

adopted at the OAU Summit in Lusaka on July 11,

2001.

7. African renaissance is related to Pan Africanism.

Pan Africanism began in the 1900s as people in the

Diaspora began to reassert African dignity and human-

ity. During Africa’s struggle for independence in the

1950s and 1960s, the concept again became the rallying

cry for leaders such as Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah,

Congo Republic’s Mobutu Sese Seko, Kenya’s Tom

Mboya, and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere. As Ajulu (2001)

observes, African renaissance has meant different things

to different people and the concept has historically

become a terrain of contestation between different social

forces.

8. According to Taylor and Nel (2002), transnational

elites originate from the developed countries but are able

to develop linkages with like-minded parties in the

developing world to form a truly global elite. Most of

the states in the forefront, advancing liberalization and

SAPs in many African countries, are led by such

transnational elites. For instance, South Africa’s finance

minister, Trevor Manuel, is the chairperson of both the

IMF and the World Bank’s Board of Governors.

9. The African National Congress’ (ANC) transition

to neoliberalism was achieved in a far shorter time

period than was the case in any other African nationalist

groups. For instance, it took Zambian, Mozambican/

Angolan and Zimbabwean nationalists 25, 15 and 10

years respectively to accomplish such transitions (Bond,

2000).

10. See Kanbur (2002) for a detailed discussion of the

structure and content of NEPAD. Kanbur argues that

since NEPAD is a regional initiative with democracy

and governance as its strongest points, it should focus on

this ‘‘comparative advantage’’ and not spread itself too

thin over the many issues.

11. Unlike the other initiatives, NEPAD does not call

for an end to SAPs which are described as a partial

solution that have worked for only a few countries

(NEPAD, 2001a).

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