pragmatic inference and default interpretations in current theories of discourse meaning

Summer Institute of the Chinese Cognitive Linguistics Association Summer Institute of the Chinese Cognitive Linguistics Association and the Mouton journal and the Mouton journal Intercultural PragmaticsIntercultural Pragmatics

‘Culture, Communication, Cognition’‘Culture, Communication, Cognition’Shanghai, 15-19 June 2008Shanghai, 15-19 June 2008

Pragmatic Inference and Default Pragmatic Inference and Default Interpretations in Current Theories Interpretations in Current Theories

of Discourse Meaningof Discourse Meaning

Kasia JaszczoltKasia JaszczoltUniversity of Cambridge, U.K.University of Cambridge, U.K.

http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21

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Lecture 2Lecture 2

Contextualism vs. semantic minimalismContextualism vs. semantic minimalism

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Truth-conditional semantics and truth-Truth-conditional semantics and truth-conditional pragmaticsconditional pragmatics

(1)(1) The janitor left the door open and the prisoner The janitor left the door open and the prisoner escaped.escaped.

(2)(2) The prisoner escaped and the janitor left the door The prisoner escaped and the janitor left the door open.open.

(3)(3) The janitor left the door open The janitor left the door open and as a resultand as a result the the prisoner escaped.prisoner escaped.

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pragmatic inferencepragmatic inference

radical pragmatics, sense-generality, semantic radical pragmatics, sense-generality, semantic underdetermination underdetermination

the Atlas-Kempson thesisthe Atlas-Kempson thesis(Atlas, Kempson, Wilson 1970s)(Atlas, Kempson, Wilson 1970s)

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Truth conditions of:Truth conditions of:

sentencessentences xxthoughts thoughts ??utterancesutterances

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Contextualism:Contextualism:

Logical form of the sentence becomes enriched Logical form of the sentence becomes enriched as a result of pragmatic inference before it is as a result of pragmatic inference before it is interpreted in truth-conditional analysis.interpreted in truth-conditional analysis.

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‘…‘…various contextual processes come into play in the various contextual processes come into play in the determination of an utterance’s truth conditions; not determination of an utterance’s truth conditions; not merely saturation – the contextual assignment of values merely saturation – the contextual assignment of values to indexicals and free variables in the logical form of the to indexicals and free variables in the logical form of the sentence – but also free enrichment and other processes sentence – but also free enrichment and other processes which are not linguistically triggered but are pragmatic which are not linguistically triggered but are pragmatic through and through. That view I will henceforth refer to through and through. That view I will henceforth refer to as Truth-conditional pragmatics (TCP)’.as Truth-conditional pragmatics (TCP)’.

Recanati (2002: 302)Recanati (2002: 302)

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(4)(4) Mary hasn’t eaten. Mary hasn’t eaten. (minimal proposition)(minimal proposition)(5)(5) Mary hasn’t eaten breakfast yet. (what is said)Mary hasn’t eaten breakfast yet. (what is said)

Modulation: a top-down pragmatically controlled Modulation: a top-down pragmatically controlled process (Recanati, e.g. 2004, 2005)process (Recanati, e.g. 2004, 2005)

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Radical pragmatization of semantics: truth conditions Radical pragmatization of semantics: truth conditions are predicated of (7) rather than (6).are predicated of (7) rather than (6).

(6)(6) Everybody came to Shanghai.Everybody came to Shanghai.(7)(7) Every invited lecturerEvery invited lecturer came to Shanghai. came to Shanghai.

x (x (??(x) (x) C(x)) C(x))x (x (II(x) (x) C(x))C(x))

No slots in the LF for No slots in the LF for II..

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ContextualismContextualism ‘‘Contextualism ascribes to modulation a form of Contextualism ascribes to modulation a form of

necessity which makes it ineliminable. necessity which makes it ineliminable. Without Without contextual modulation, no proposition could be contextual modulation, no proposition could be expressedexpressed…’ Recanati (2005: 179-180).…’ Recanati (2005: 179-180).

‘…‘…there is no level of meaning which is both (i) there is no level of meaning which is both (i) propositional (truth-evaluable) and (ii) minimalist (that is, propositional (truth-evaluable) and (ii) minimalist (that is, unaffected by top-down factors)’. Recanati (2004: 90)unaffected by top-down factors)’. Recanati (2004: 90)

avs29

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= post-Gricean, ‘radical’ pragmatics= post-Gricean, ‘radical’ pragmatics

Double role of pragmatics: Double role of pragmatics:

(i)(i) Enrichment, modulation of the output of sentence Enrichment, modulation of the output of sentence processing;processing;

(ii)(ii) Derivation of implicatures.Derivation of implicatures.

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Recanati’s ‘radical’ contextualism: modulation is Recanati’s ‘radical’ contextualism: modulation is independent of the grammar, ‘top-down’.independent of the grammar, ‘top-down’.

??Is modulation radical enough? Is modulation radical enough?

(8)(8) You are not going to die, Peter.You are not going to die, Peter.(8a)(8a) You are not going to die You are not going to die from this cutfrom this cut, Peter., Peter.(8b)(8b) There is nothing to worry about, Peter.There is nothing to worry about, Peter.

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Object of study in three versions Object of study in three versions of contextualism:of contextualism:

explicatureexplicature, relevance theory, relevance theory

what is saidwhat is said, truth-conditional pragmatics, truth-conditional pragmatics

primary meaningprimary meaning, default semantics, default semantics

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(8)(8) You are not going to die, Peter.You are not going to die, Peter.

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Ways to be a more radical contextualist:Ways to be a more radical contextualist:

I. Ludwig Wittgenstein, meaning as use (‘I. Ludwig Wittgenstein, meaning as use (‘meaning meaning eliminativismeliminativism’). Meaning construction does not proceed ’). Meaning construction does not proceed through the stage of abstraction from past uses and through the stage of abstraction from past uses and formulation of a core, context-independent meaning, but formulation of a core, context-independent meaning, but instead is permeated from the start with context-instead is permeated from the start with context-dependent modulation.dependent modulation.

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II. Eliminating the syntactic constraint on the modification of II. Eliminating the syntactic constraint on the modification of the logical form, as in default semantics (primary the logical form, as in default semantics (primary meaning, represented in merger representations of meaning, represented in merger representations of default semanticsdefault semantics, Jaszczolt), Jaszczolt)

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Alternative view: semantic minimalismAlternative view: semantic minimalism

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Semantic minimalismSemantic minimalism

The object of study of semantic theory should be clearly The object of study of semantic theory should be clearly separated from that of pragmatics. It should be free from separated from that of pragmatics. It should be free from the post-Gricean intrusion of intentional meanings. the post-Gricean intrusion of intentional meanings.

Modulated/enriched/developed logical form is outside the Modulated/enriched/developed logical form is outside the domain of semantic theory.domain of semantic theory.

The difference between semantic and pragmatic content The difference between semantic and pragmatic content is a natural and expected outcome. is a natural and expected outcome.

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Three versions of semantic minimalism:Three versions of semantic minimalism:

Emma Borg (2004), Emma Borg (2004), minimal semanticsminimal semantics

Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore (2005a, b), Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore (2005a, b), insensitive semanticsinsensitive semantics

Kent Bach (2006), Kent Bach (2006), radical semantic minimalismradical semantic minimalism

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Borg:Borg:

Semantic theory must remain unaffected by pragmatic considerations Semantic theory must remain unaffected by pragmatic considerations (speaker’s intended meaning):(speaker’s intended meaning):

‘‘The truth-conditional semantic theory is governed, not by rich (…) The truth-conditional semantic theory is governed, not by rich (…) inferential processes, but rather by formally triggered, deductive operations.’ inferential processes, but rather by formally triggered, deductive operations.’ Borg (2004: 8).Borg (2004: 8).

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Semantics is modular and truth-conditional: sentence Semantics is modular and truth-conditional: sentence meaning is processed in the computational language meaning is processed in the computational language module.module.

Pragmatics, the recovery of speaker’s intentions, is not Pragmatics, the recovery of speaker’s intentions, is not modular.modular.

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truth conditions truth conditions conditions of verification conditions of verificationliberalliberal truth conditions truth conditions

(9)(9) ‘That is red.’‘That is red.’is true iff the contextually salient object is red.is true iff the contextually salient object is red.

(10)(10) ‘Steel isn’t strong enough.’‘Steel isn’t strong enough.’is true iff steel isn’t strong enough for something or is true iff steel isn’t strong enough for something or

other, salient in the context. other, salient in the context.

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Cappelen and Lepore:Cappelen and Lepore:

Meaning of Meaning of sentencessentences. The role of pragmatic inference in . The role of pragmatic inference in semantics is limited to those context-dependent semantics is limited to those context-dependent expressions which are necessary for obtaining the expressions which are necessary for obtaining the complete, truth-conditionally evaluable representation. complete, truth-conditionally evaluable representation.

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personal pronouns (personal pronouns (I, youI, you)) demonstrative pronouns (demonstrative pronouns (this, thatthis, that)) adverbs adverbs here, there, now, today, tomorrow, here, there, now, today, tomorrow, etc.etc. adjectives adjectives actual, presentactual, present other context-dependent expressions such as forms of other context-dependent expressions such as forms of

grammatical tensesgrammatical tenses

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‘‘Semantics is about how best to specify the semantic Semantics is about how best to specify the semantic value of the lexical items and their contribution to the value of the lexical items and their contribution to the semantic values of complex expressions and sentences semantic values of complex expressions and sentences in which they occur.in which they occur.

On the other hand, when we think about and On the other hand, when we think about and describe what people say, i. e., when our aim is to describe what people say, i. e., when our aim is to represent or articulate what’s said by an utterance, we represent or articulate what’s said by an utterance, we aim to characterize a speaker’s act (that utterance), and aim to characterize a speaker’s act (that utterance), and in so doing our aim is to determine something about a in so doing our aim is to determine something about a particular act in a particular context…’particular act in a particular context…’

Cappelen and Lepore Cappelen and Lepore (2005a: 58).(2005a: 58).

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Consequence:Consequence: The meaning of the speaker’s utterance The meaning of the speaker’s utterance can be very different from the minimalist meaning.can be very different from the minimalist meaning.

Remedy:Remedy: Speech Act PluralismSpeech Act Pluralism. Each minimal . Each minimal representation may correspond to a wide representation may correspond to a wide variety of variety of speech actsspeech acts which it is capable of conveying. which it is capable of conveying.

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(8)(8) You are not going to die, Peter.You are not going to die, Peter.

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Bach:Bach:

The semantic properties of the sentence should be The semantic properties of the sentence should be regarded as analogous to its syntactic and phonological regarded as analogous to its syntactic and phonological properties. properties.

The object of study of semantics is grammatical form, The object of study of semantics is grammatical form, not the proposition. not the proposition.

Truth conditions are redundant as a tool.Truth conditions are redundant as a tool.

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‘‘It is just a brute fact about language that some It is just a brute fact about language that some syntactically complete sentences are not semantically syntactically complete sentences are not semantically complete.’ (‘The boy isn’t good enough.’) complete.’ (‘The boy isn’t good enough.’)

Bach (2004: 37)Bach (2004: 37)

‘‘As long as it is not assumed that the job of semantics is As long as it is not assumed that the job of semantics is to give truth conditions of (declarative) sentences, there to give truth conditions of (declarative) sentences, there is no reason to suppose that pragmatics needs to intrude is no reason to suppose that pragmatics needs to intrude on semantics.’ on semantics.’ Bach (2004: 42)Bach (2004: 42)

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*Propositionalism: *Propositionalism:

Grammatical form has to be completed to become a Grammatical form has to be completed to become a propositional representation, evaluable by means of a propositional representation, evaluable by means of a truth-conditional analysis.truth-conditional analysis.

(11)(11) He is too small.He is too small.(12)(12) That stick is not long enough.That stick is not long enough.

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‘‘The semantics-pragmatics distinction is not fit to be The semantics-pragmatics distinction is not fit to be blurred. What lies on either side of the distinction, the blurred. What lies on either side of the distinction, the semantic and the pragmatic, may each be messy in semantic and the pragmatic, may each be messy in various ways, but that doesn’t blur the distinction itself. various ways, but that doesn’t blur the distinction itself. Taken as properties of sentences, semantic properties Taken as properties of sentences, semantic properties are on a par with syntactic and phonological properties: are on a par with syntactic and phonological properties: they are linguistic properties. Pragmatic properties, on they are linguistic properties. Pragmatic properties, on the other hand, belong to acts of uttering sentences in the other hand, belong to acts of uttering sentences in the course of communicating. Sentences have the the course of communicating. Sentences have the properties they have independently of anybody’s act of properties they have independently of anybody’s act of uttering them. Speakers’ intentions do not endow them uttering them. Speakers’ intentions do not endow them with new semantic properties…’ with new semantic properties…’

Bach (2004: 27)Bach (2004: 27)

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Methodological questions:Methodological questions:

1. 1. Is propositionalism necessary in a theory of Is propositionalism necessary in a theory of meaning?meaning?

(11)(11) He is too small.He is too small.(12)(12) That stick is not long enough.That stick is not long enough.

??

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2. Is minimalism compatible with contextualism?2. Is minimalism compatible with contextualism?

Borg’s minimalism:Borg’s minimalism:

(i)(i) Liberal truth conditions apply not to the minimal Liberal truth conditions apply not to the minimal syntactic form but to a propositional form;syntactic form but to a propositional form;

(ii) (ii) Modular semantics is incompatible with (i)Modular semantics is incompatible with (i)

(iii)(iii) Psychological claims: the minimal proposition is a Psychological claims: the minimal proposition is a stage in utterance processingstage in utterance processing

xx

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Cappelen and Lepore’s minimalism:Cappelen and Lepore’s minimalism:

(i) Truth conditions are applied not to the minimal syntactic form (i) Truth conditions are applied not to the minimal syntactic form but to a representation enriched to a form of a (minimal) but to a representation enriched to a form of a (minimal) proposition. But this enrichment is dictated by syntax and proposition. But this enrichment is dictated by syntax and category membership. category membership.

√√(ii) Speech act pluralism is incompatible with the experimentally (ii) Speech act pluralism is incompatible with the experimentally identified main, intended meaning of the utterance. identified main, intended meaning of the utterance.

xx

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Bach’s minimalism: Bach’s minimalism:

what is saidwhat is said what is implicatedwhat is implicated

meaning implicit in what is saidmeaning implicit in what is said ((implicimpliciitureture))

Truth conditions are shifted outside semantics, Truth conditions are shifted outside semantics, to pragmatics to pragmatics xx

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Mid-way view:Mid-way view:

‘‘Much syntactic structure is unpronounced, but Much syntactic structure is unpronounced, but no less real for being unpronounced.’ no less real for being unpronounced.’

Stanley (2002: 152)Stanley (2002: 152)

Pragmatic enrichment is limited to filling in gaps Pragmatic enrichment is limited to filling in gaps in syntactic representation. in syntactic representation.

Stanley and Szabó 2000; King and Stanley 2005Stanley and Szabó 2000; King and Stanley 2005

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== minimalism because all meaning comes from the minimalism because all meaning comes from the grammargrammar

== contextualist because meaning goes significantly contextualist because meaning goes significantly beyond sentence meaningbeyond sentence meaning

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Stanley and SzabStanley and Szabó 2000ó 2000


NP

Det N

every <person, f(i)>

i – object provided by context

f – function mapping objects onto quantifier domains

√

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*NPi

Det N

every person

NPi violates compositionality

X

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*NP

Det N’

every N

CP is a hypothetical unarticulated relative clause

CP

C S person

X

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*NP

Det N

<every, i> person

N cannot be restricted separately from the quantifier: ‘Most people turned up. They are conscientious.’

X

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NP

Det N

every <person, f(i)>

i – object provided by context

f – function mapping objects onto quantifier domains

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??Do all kinds of modifications come from the grammar?Do all kinds of modifications come from the grammar?

(11)(11) It is raining It is raining +> in Shanghai+> in Shanghai..(12)(12) It was too late It was too late +> to save the patient+> to save the patient..

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Interim conclusionsInterim conclusions

We have a choice of what we want to study: the meaning We have a choice of what we want to study: the meaning of sentences, as dictated by the grammar and lexicon of of sentences, as dictated by the grammar and lexicon of the language, or the meaning intended by the speaker the language, or the meaning intended by the speaker (Model Speaker) and recovered by the addressee (Model Speaker) and recovered by the addressee (Model Addressee);(Model Addressee);

Sentence meaning may be just statistically predictable Sentence meaning may be just statistically predictable meaning, nothing else, if meaning eliminativism is correct meaning, nothing else, if meaning eliminativism is correct (no core, abstracted meaning is available);(no core, abstracted meaning is available);

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Intentional, speaker’s meaning can be approached using Intentional, speaker’s meaning can be approached using the tool of truth conditions when modulation is taken into the tool of truth conditions when modulation is taken into account (contextualism);account (contextualism);

Contextualism and semantic minimalism can be made Contextualism and semantic minimalism can be made compatible when the latter abandons propositionalism or compatible when the latter abandons propositionalism or when it abandons claims to psychological reality of the when it abandons claims to psychological reality of the minimal proposition.minimal proposition.

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End of Lecture 2End of Lecture 2

Thank you!Thank you!

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ReferencesReferences

Atlas, J. D. 2005. ‘Whatever happened to meaning? A morality tale Atlas, J. D. 2005. ‘Whatever happened to meaning? A morality tale of Cappelen’s and LePore’s insensitivity to lexical semantics of Cappelen’s and LePore’s insensitivity to lexical semantics and a defense of Kent Bach, sort of’.and a defense of Kent Bach, sort of’. Paper presented at thePaper presented at theInternational Pragmatics Association ConferenceInternational Pragmatics Association Conference, Riva del , Riva del Garda.Garda.

Atlas, J. D. 2006. ‘How insensitive can you be? Meanings, Atlas, J. D. 2006. ‘How insensitive can you be? Meanings, propositions, context, and semantical underdeterminacy’. propositions, context, and semantical underdeterminacy’. Paper Paper presented at presented at J. Atlas: Distinguished Scholar J. Atlas: Distinguished Scholar WorkshopWorkshop, University , University of Cambridge. of Cambridge.

Atlas, J. D. 2006. ‘Remarks on Emma Borg’s Atlas, J. D. 2006. ‘Remarks on Emma Borg’s Minimal SemanticsMinimal Semantics’. ’. Unpublished review.Unpublished review.

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Cappelen, H., Lepore, E. 2005b. ‘A tall tale: In defense of Semantic Cappelen, H., Lepore, E. 2005b. ‘A tall tale: In defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism’. In: G. Preyer & G. Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism’. In: G. Preyer & G. Peter (eds). Peter (eds). Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and TruthMeaning, and Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 197-219.. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 197-219.

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