power and lying - faculty photos | faculty directory...
TRANSCRIPT
Power Buffers Stress 1
Running head: POWER BUFFERS STRESS
Power Buffers Stress – For Better and For Worse
Dana R. Carney
University of California, Berkeley
Andy J. Yap
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Brian J. Lucas
Northwestern University
Pranjal H. Mehta
University of Oregon
James A. McGee
Columbia University
Caroline Wilmuth
Harvard University
Power Buffers Stress 2
Abstract
In 3 experiments, we offer evidence for the theoretical position that having power leads to a
reduction in the stress response—which can have both positive and negative consequences.
Experiment 1 tested the power-buffers-stress hypothesis in the context of a high-pressure mock
job interview. Experiment 2 extended further the power-buffers-stress hypothesis by testing the
effect on a physical stressor—an ice water submersion task. Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis
in the context of an interrogation about theft in a high-stakes mock crime. Across three
experiments, high-power individuals (vs. low-power) exhibited less of a stress response across
measures of emotion, cognition, physiology, and nonverbal behavior. We suggest some specific
biological trajectories through which power may buffer individuals from the stress response.
Power Buffers Stress 3
Power Buffers Stress – For Better and For Worse
Vladimir Putin lives an intense life. Decisions, which for him, are routine – carry great
local and international consequence and affect the social and economic livelihood of millions.
He, like many leaders, wakes early and retires late. He meets with other international luminaries
frequently and makes high-stakes public speeches which are broadcast to millions (sometimes
billions) of people. To meet the demands of his position, he necessarily pushes his mind and
body to the outer limits of mental and physical well-being. We might imagine that Vladimir
Putin’s daily life would be become overwhelmingly, chronically stressful. Yet, he persists and
even thrives. How does Putin – or any other powerful person—meet these overwhelming
psychological and physical challenges? Vladimir Putin possesses a great deal of power as he
resides in his current, third, non-consecutive term as president. Does Putin’s power help
him respond to and manage these stressors? In other words, instead of increasing
stress, could possessing power actually buffer us from the stress response? This question is the
focus of the current research.
Early research harvested from the animal literature in the 1950’s led to the idea that
power is associated with increases in the stress experience. These findings came to be known as
the "executive stress syndrome" (Brady, Porter, Conrad, & Mason, 1958). The conclusion drawn
from this work was that those at the top of a hierarchy (vs. those at the bottom) demonstrate
relatively higher chronic levels of the stress hormone cortisol. This animal research was applied
widely toward the understanding of both human and nonhuman primates. Although the
“executive stress syndrome” was certainly a provocative hypothesis, more recent research in
both nonhuman animals and humans has failed to provide strong empirical support for it. If
anything, it seems that the “executive stress syndrome” occurs only in a very narrow kind of
Power Buffers Stress 4
social structure: rigid societies in which hierarchies can be threatened or are unstable and power
can be lost. In these cases, power is maintained through continuous aggression and intimidation
(Hellhammer, Buchtal, Gutberlet, & Kirschbaum, 1997; Sapolsky, 1990; Sapolsky, 2005;
Sapolsky, 2011; Jordan, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2011). However, the findings on power and
stress continue to be mixed, and their precise association still remains a hot topic of debate.
While research converges on the suggestion that power increases the number and severity
of stressors in one’s life (Dansereau, Graen & Haga, 1975; Hogg, 2001), whether power
increases (or decreases) the stress response is largely an open question. There is some direct
evidence to suggest that power is linked to less—and not more—of a stress response. For
example, in nonhuman primates, power-holders show lower levels of basal cortisol, and cortisol
sometimes drops as power is acquired (Abbott, Keverne, Bercovitch, Shively, Mendoza,
Saltzman, Snowdon, Ziegler, Banjevic, Garland, & Sapolsky, 2003; Callaway, Marriott, & Esser,
1985; Coe, Mendoza, & Levine, 1979; Rejeski, Gagne, Parker, & Koritnik, 1989; Sapolsky,
Alberts, & Altmann, 1997; Winberg, Overli, Lepage, 2001). As such, powerful primates
(including humans) live longer, are more disease-resistant and recover more quickly from
psychological and physical stressors (Sapolsky, 1990; Sapolsky, 2005; Sapolsky, Alberts, &
Altmann, 1997). Research in public health and medicine also provides evidence for the
hypothesis that power may buffer the stress response. Individuals from high-ranking social
groups (e.g., whites; those with wealth and education) do not suffer from chronically elevated
cortisol and associated diseases as much as individuals from lower-ranking social groups (e.g.,
US-born African Americans; individuals without wealth or education; Adler, Boyce, Chesney,
Folkman, & Syme, 1993; Cohen, Schwartz, Epel, Kirschbaum, Sidney, & Seeman, 2006;
Gravlee, 2009; Krieger, Rowley, Herman, Avery, & Phillips, 1993; Williams & Collins, 1995).
Power Buffers Stress 5
If power does indeed buffer the stress response, the phenomenon would help to further
unite a large body of literature, which seems to be of two minds. On the one hand, many papers
have demonstrated all of the ways in which power leads to behavior with positive social
consequences. On the other hand, an equally large body of work has demonstrated how power
leads to behavior with negative social consequences. How can it be that power leads to behavior
with both good and bad social consequences? Based on previous research and theorizing, and the
simplicity afforded by the idea that power buffers stress, we predicted that possessing (versus
lacking) power would buffer individuals from the stress response—for better and for worse.
For Better: The Positive Consequences of Power. Power has been shown to
promote behaviors with many positive consequences. High- versus low-power leads to
successfully obtaining resources (de Waal, 1998; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). The
powerful (vs. the powerless) are more action-oriented and willing to approach a difficult task
(Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). They are more optimistic (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006),
reward-focused (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 2010; Ronay & von
Hippel, 2010), and they feel more agency and control over their own body and mind (Anderson
& Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky et al; Keltner et al.). The powerful are more pro-social (DeCremer &
Van Knippenberg, 2002; Griskevicius, Tybur, & Van den Bergh, 2010; Harbaugh, 1998), they
generally feel good (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) and
possessing power helps us express positive emotions (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006). The
powerful are more behaviorally consistent (a mark of psychological health; Chen, Lee-Chai, &
Bargh, 2001; Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, & Monarch, 1998) and enjoy higher self-esteem,
better physical health, and increased longevity (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000;
Barkow et al., 1975; Bugental & Cortez, 1988). The powerful think carefully about and find
Power Buffers Stress 6
unique value in individuals (Overbeck & Park, 2001) and are more likely to focus on
interpersonally rewarding aspects of social interaction (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). All of these
experiences enjoyed by the powerful reflect and support the idea that power may buffer the stress
response; but for every behavior with a positive social consequence, there seems to be a behavior
with an equally impactful negative consequence. News headlines are replete with examples of
people in positions of power – business (Madoff), academic (Stapel), and political leaders
(Nixon) - who fall from their position of power and grace because of societal, ethical or moral
transgressions, including stealing, cheating and lying.
For Worse: The Negative Consequences of Power. High- versus low-power
has been shown to increase behaviors with negative social consequences. Power leads to a
general reduction in empathy and empathic responses (Ronay & Carney, 2013; van Honk &
Schutter, 2007; van Kleef, Oveis, van der Löwe, LuoKogan, Goetz, & Keltner, 2008). Likely
stemming from a reduction in empathy, Kipnis (1972) demonstrated that people with power
objectified the powerless and treated them more poorly—a finding echoed in Gruenfeld, Inesi,
Magee, & Galinsky (2008). These findings are also consistent with the link between higher
testosterone (a dominance hormone) and increases in perceiving others as purely a means to an
end (Carney & Mason, 2010). In negotiation contexts, high-power negotiators were found to
bluff more and exchanged less information with their low-power counterparts (Boles, Croson, &
Murnighan, 2000; Crott, Kayser, & Lamm, 1980). The powerful (vs. the powerless) are more
likely to be moral hypocrites (Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010), engage in more adversarial
behaviors (Mazur & Booth, 1998; Dabbs & Morris, 1990), cheat (Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky,
2010; Yap, Wazlawek, Lucas, Cuddy, & Carney, 2013), engage in infidelity (Lammers, Stoker,
Jordan, Pollmann, & Stapel, 2011), steal (Yap et al.), stereotype (Fiske, 1993), and violate traffic
Power Buffers Stress 7
laws (Piff, Stancatoa, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012; Yap et al.). The powerful also
engage in more serious criminal behavior including sexual harassment (Pryor, LaVite, & Stoller,
1993), hate crimes (Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998), violent crimes (Dabbs, Carr, Frady, &
Riad, 1995) and child abuse (Bugental & Cortez, 1988). How is it possible that power can
simultaneously lead to behavior with both positive and negative social consequences?
Current Research: Power Buffers the Stress Response
We propose that a common stress-buffering mechanism may underlie the influence of
power on both pro- and anti-social behaviors. In three experiments, we test the hypothesis that
power buffers individuals from the stress response – for better and for worse. Experiment 1
tested the power-buffers-stress hypothesis using a stress-eliciting laboratory paradigm—the Trier
Social Stress Test in which participants must deliver a speech in front of an evaluative audience
(e.g., Foley & Kirschbaum, 2010). Experiment 2 used an ice water submersion task to test the
power-buffers-stress hypothesis in the domain of physical stress (Hines & Brown, 1932).
Experiment 3 tested the power-buffers-stress hypothesis in a domain with potentially negative
social consequences – lying. Borrowing a naturalistic theft paradigm from the criminal justice
literature, we tested whether power would buffer the stress response during a high-stakes
interrogation about a crime. All experiments tested the stress-buffering effects of power on
emotion, cognition, physiological stress response, and nonverbal displays of stress.
Operational Definitions of: (1) The Stress Response and (2) Power
The Stress Response. Hans Selye, in 1936, studying the endocrinological systems
of animals, borrowed the term “stress” from engineering to describe phenomena he was
observing in his lab. The term was used to describe the body’s nonspecific response to an
“insult.” An insult can be a real or imagined psychological or physical stressor which results in
Power Buffers Stress 8
the mobilization of physiological resources so that the organism can either “fight” or “flee.” One
of the primary stress pathways, the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) axis, is
activated in response to a stressor. This activation results in the secretion of the hormone cortisol,
which is detectable in saliva approximately 20-30 mins after the stressor occurs (Dickerson &
Kemeney, 2004). In the current research we define the stress response as cortisol reactivity to a
physical or psychological stressor. We also examined self-reported stress and nonverbal
indications of stress (specific nonverbal behaviors defined in the context of each experiment).
Power. In the current research we define power as the psychological experience and
sense of power, which is linked to the ability to control one’s own and others’ access to resources
(including people, information, and instrumentalities) without social interference (e.g., Anderson
& Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & McGee, 2003; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld,
2006; Keltner et al., 2003).
Experiment 1: Power Buffers the Stress Response During a Public Speech
To directly test the hypothesis that power buffers the stress response, Experiment 1 used
the Trier Social Stress Test (e.g., Foley & Kirschbaum, 2010). Participants prepared for and
delivered an employment-related speech to two judgmental evaluators and a video camera (in the
control condition only a camera was present). The stress response was measured by examining
nonverbal behaviors indicative of feeling stressed, self-reported stress, and cortisol activity at
three points in time: baseline, reactivity, and recovery. The third cortisol sample allowed for a
test of an alternative hypothesis – that power doesn’t buffer the stress response; it leads to a
faster recovery. We predicted that power would exert its effects through a buffering (not
recovery) mechanism rendering the powerful less stressed than the powerless as evidenced in
physiological, emotional, cognitive and nonverbal indicators of stress.
Power Buffers Stress 9
Method
Participants and Design
Fifty-five paid participants (37 female) from Columbia University were recruited and
randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (power: low vs. high) x 2 (stress: low-stress
vs. high-stress) factorial design.
Manipulation of Power
Following Carney et al. (2010; and also Bohns & Wiltermuth, 2012; Huang, Galinsky,
Gruenfeld, & Guillory, 2011; Yap et al., 2013), power was manipulated by inducing powerful
feelings and a physiological and nonverbal profile of power by configuring participant’s bodies
into either (a) expansive and open body postures or (b) contractive and closed body postures (i.e.,
so-called “power poses”). This particular power manipulation is relatively quicker to implement,
psychologically impactful, and comparable to lengthier role-assignment manipulations (Huang et
al., 2011). Following Carney et al., experimenters instructed participants to position his/her body
into two poses representative of either high or low power. To correct poses, verbal instructions
were accompanied by light touches of arms and legs to properly configure bodies into the poses.
A manipulation check administered an hour into the experiment (after the stress manipulation)
found support for a difference in sense of power between the high-power (M = 2.84; SD = .64)
and low-power condition (M = 2.46; SD = .76; F(1, 52) = 3.79, p < .06, effect size r = .27) on 8-
items: dominant, in control, in charge, high status, like a leader, powerful, and two additional
reverse-scored items: subordinate and submissive (α = .84).
The Trier Social Stress Test
Next, participants were either exposed to a high-stress or a low-stress condition. Stress
was manipulated with the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhemmer,
Power Buffers Stress 10
1993). The TSST produces a two to threefold rise in salivary cortisol levels in 70–85% of
participants (Dickerson & Kemeney, 2004; Kudielka, Bellingrath, & Hellhammer, 2007).In the
current version of the TSST participants prepared for and then gave a speech in front of 2
evaluators who were trained to express neutrality (which comes off as moderate negativity) in
facial expression.1 Evaluators were dressed in white lab coats holding clipboards with notepads.
The high-stress condition contained evaluators and a video camera; the low stress condition
contained only a video camera. After a 5 min preparation phase (during which power was
manipulated with expansive versus contractive postures), participants delivered a 5 min speech
about why s/he should be hired for their dream job.
Two manipulation checks confirmed that high-stress participants felt more stressed on a
5-point scale (see scale description in following paragraphs; M = 2.78; SD = .86) than low-stress
participants (M = 2.28; SD = .67), F(1, 52) = 6.60, p < .02; effect size r = .36. Participants’
nonverbal indications of stress were also coded on a 1-5 scale (variable descriptions below);
evaluated participants expressed more nonverbal stress (M = 3.81; SD = .32) than non-evaluated
participants (M = 2.26; SD = .32), F(1, 52) = 11.64, p < .01; effect size r = .47.
Hormone Sampling and Assays
Standard salivary hormone-collection procedures were used (Kirschbaum & Hellhammer,
1994; Schultheiss & Stanton, 2009). Before providing saliva samples, participants did not eat,
drink, or brush their teeth for at least one hour. Participants were tested in the afternoon (12:00-
5:00pm) to control for diurnal rhythms in hormones (e.g., Kudielka, et al., 2004). Each
participant first rinsed his/her mouth with water and provided approximately 1.5 mL of saliva
through a straw into a sterile polypropylene microtubule. Saliva samples were immediately
1 Typically, the TSST also includes a 5 min arithmetic phase. To keep the experiment under 2-hours, this phase was not included in the current research; however, variations in the TSST, such as the one used here, produce reliable and consistent stress responses (Foley & Kirschbaum, 2010).
Power Buffers Stress 11
frozen to avoid hormone degradation and to precipitate mucins. Two weeks after the end of the
study, frozen samples were packed in dry ice and shipped for analysis to Salimetrics in State
College, Pennsylvania. At Salimetrics, samples were assayed in duplicate for salivary cortisol,
using a highly sensitive enzyme immunoassay. Three saliva samples were taken (which brought
the total testing time to 1.5 hours). The first sample was taken approximately 10 mins after
arrival; the second was taken approximately 22 mins after the end of the TSST (M = 22.16; SD =
3.21; range was 17 to 33 mins). The purpose of the third sample was to test the degree of
recovery from stress; this was taken at the very end of the experiment, approximately 13 mins
after the second sample (M = 12.51; SD = 4.08; range was 4 to 26 mins).2 Across the three
points in time, the intra-assay coefficient of variation (CV; calculated on the 10% of the sample
that was assayed in duplicate) was 5.45 %. Cortisol levels at time 1 were in the normal range (M
= 0.17 µg/dL, SD = .10). To illustrate the change in cortisol over time, all three points in time
were plotted as a function of the stress and power variables. The amount of time that passed
between the TSST manipulation and the second saliva sample did not differ across conditions: a
one-way ANOVA across the 4 conditions revealed no significant variance from the grand mean
of 22.16 mins, F(3, 54) = 0.18, p > .90. The same was true for the difference in time between the
2nd and 3rd saliva sample (Mg = 12.51 mins), F(3, 54) = 0.53, p > .66.
Additional Measures of the Stress Response
Self-reported stress response. To assess participants’ level of self-reported stress
following the job interview with two discerning evaluators, we asked participants to indicate how
anxious, nervous, shaky, at ease, clam, and relaxed they felt (the latter 3 items were reverse-
2 Taking the first saliva sample after only 10 mins is not optimal. Readers wishing to replicate this research should ideally wait 20-30 mins after arrival prior to taking the first saliva sample as this is how long it takes for a person to reach a baseline state.
Power Buffers Stress 12
scored) on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). Items were averaged together to form
a composite variable of self-reported stress response (α = .86).
Measure of cognitive load. The Stroop was administered on the computer (Stroop,
1935). This task is an index of how cognitively taxed a person is (MacLeod, 1991; Swick &
Jovanovic, 2002). We will refer to performance on this measure as cognitive load. In the Stroop
task participants indicated “as quickly and accurately as possible” whether each of a series of
letter strings was written in red or blue (ignoring the meaning of the words; the key-press version
was taken from Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk, 2008). Trials began with a 1-s fixation
point located in the center of the computer screen. Fixation points were immediately followed by
a red or blue-colored letter string. Participants responded to the string by indicating if it was blue
or red by pressing a designated key on a computer keyboard. A 2-s blank screen appeared in
between trials. In total the Stroop task consisted of 120 trials (no feedback about whether
responses were correct or incorrect was offered). There were 40 congruent trials, 40 neutral
trials, and 40 incongruent trials presented randomly. Reaction times to the incongruent trials
were subtracted from reaction times to the congruent trials. As is typical, the distribution was
skewed and was therefore transformed using a reciprocal transformation; higher scores indicate
more cognitive load.
Nonverbal behavior. Three nonverbal behaviors known to be robustly associated
with the stress response were coded: self-touches (Harrigan, Lucic, Kay, McLaney, & Rosenthal,
1990; Harrigan, Wilson, & Rosenthal, 2004), anxious smiles (Hall, Carney, & Murphy, 2002;
Harrigan & Taing, 1997; Harrigan, Wilson, & Rosenthal, 2004) and lip bites (Ekman & Friesen,
1978; Ekman & Rosenberg, 1997). These variables were coded as frequency counts. All
variables were coded reliably by two coders who overlapped on a subset of 10% of the videos.
Power Buffers Stress 13
Only the first min of each 5 min speech was coded (Carney, Colvin, & Hall, 2007; Murphy,
2005). Inter-rater reliabilities for all variables were sufficient (self-touches were r = .95; anxious
smiles were r = .99; lip bites were r = 1.0).
Results
We predicted that power would buffer individuals from the stress response typical of
social evaluative situations. We tested this hypothesis by examining cortisol reactivity and
recovery, self-reported stress response, cognitive load, and nonverbal indications of the stress
response. The a priori analytical approach was to test the planned contrast sequence expecting
that when stressed, high-power individuals would appear as if they were not experiencing stress
—that they would “look” like unstressed individuals across all measures. As such, we specified a
contrast weight sequence of 3, -1, -1, -1 (low-power+stress = 3; high-power+stress = -1; low-
power+unstressed = -1; high-power+unstressed = -1). The only exception was with the cortisol
data, which included 3 points in time. Thus, to examine the stress-buffering effect of power on
cortisol reactivity to a social stressor, we conducted a 2 (power) x 2 (stress) x 3 (cortisol at 3
points in time: baseline, reactivity, recovery) mixed-model ANOVA.
Did Power Buffer Cortisol Reactivity after the Stressor?
As hypothesized, there was a small but statistically significant 3-way interaction, F(2, 48)
= 3.23, p < .05, η2 = .12. Figure 1 contains two panels in which the raw cortisol means are
displayed. Panel A displays the results for the low-stress condition in which no evaluators were
present. Cortisol at 3 points in time is graphed separately for the low-power and high-power
participants. Consistent with expectations, when not stressed, normal downward sloping of
cortisol across time is observed (due to typical diurnal variation in cortisol across the day;
Power Buffers Stress 14
Kudielka, et al., 2004).3 The means in the high-stress condition (Panel B) suggests a pattern in
which low-power individuals showed cortisol reactivity from Time 1 to Time 2 but then
recovered. The high-power individuals, on the other hand, did not show cortisol reactivity—the
means across the three points in time suggest they may have been buffered from the stress
response. No support was found for the alternative hypothesis that power leads to a faster return
to homeostasis after a stressor. No pair-wise comparisons were statistically significant (ps > .20).
Did Power Buffer Self-Reported Feelings of the Stress Response?
There was a significant effect of the planned contrast suggesting that the low-power
individuals in the high-stress condition reported feeling more stressed than other participants,
t(48) = 2.64, p < .02, effect size r = .38. Figure 2 displays the means for the low- and high-
power participants across both stress (low-stress and high-stress) conditions. While the means
and the overall effect was consistent with the hypothesis, pairwise analyses revealed some
complexities: low-power+high-stress individuals did not report significantly more stress than
those in the high-power+high-stress condition (p < .14) or those in the low-power+low-stress
condition. (p < .16) but did report more stress than those in the high-power+low-stress condition
(p < .001). High-power+high-stress individuals reported less overall stress than both low- and
high-power low-stress individuals (ps < .03). No other tests were significant (p > .94).
Did Power Impact Nonverbal Indications of the Stress Response?
Consistent with the hypothesis that power buffers stress, the high-power participants
exhibited fewer nonverbal indications of the stress response relative to the low-power
participants. Figure 3 displays the means for the effect of power (low vs. high) and degree of
3 There was one significant outlier (scores on cortisol were: 3.9 SDs above the mean at Time 1, 1.64 SDs at time 2, and 2.62 SDs at time 3). Scores across the 3 points in time were significantly higher than others’ scores and skewed the distribution considerably. Thus, this single participant’s cortisol data were removed from analysis. As is typical, temporal variability between the manipulation and cortisol measurement was statistically controlled for.
Power Buffers Stress 15
stress (low vs. high) on the nonverbal display of stress; higher scores meaning more stress
behavior, t(48) = 2.38, p < .03, effect size r = .34. Pairwise tests revealed that low-power
individuals in the high-stress condition were not more nonverbally stressed than high-power
individuals in the high-stress condition (p < .15), but they were more nonverbally stressed than
low-power individuals in the low-stress condition (p < .06) and high-power individuals in the
low-stress condition (p < .02); no other contrasts were statistically significant (ps > .30).
Did Power Impact Cognitive Load Following the Speech Task?
We predicted that cognitive performance would be debilitated after a stressor such as the
social-evaluative task. However, we did not find any effect of the stress manipulation on
cognitive performance nor did power influence variability across the 4 conditions—all were
essentially at zero (low-power stress: M = -.06, SD = .11; high-power stress: M = -.08; SD = .27;
low-power low-stress: M = -.01; SD = .03; high-power low-stress: M = -.05; SD = .16; p > .76).
None of the pairwise comparisons were statistically significant (all ps > .25).
Discussion
Experiment 1 suggests that power may buffer the stress response to social evaluative
stressors like giving a public speech. Results also suggest that power is indeed providing some
kind of buffer which is preventing stress reactivity. The lack of an effect on cognitive load in
Experiment 1 suggests the stress-buffering effect of power may be limited to more affective
systems (e.g., feelings, cortisol reactivity, and facial expressions). Experiment 1 demonstrated
that possessing power (vs. lacking it) reduces the stress response to a psychological stressor. In
Experiment 2 we predicted that this effect would generalize to physical stressors. We expected to
find evidence for our hypothesis across feelings, cognition, physiology, and nonverbal behavior.
Experiment 2: Power Buffers the Stress Response to a Physical Stressor
Power Buffers Stress 16
The primary goal of Experiment 2 was to test the prediction that high-power individuals
would be more buffered than low-power individuals from the stress response to a physical insult
(i.e., a physical stressor) which is the second half of the definition of stress (Selye, 1936).
Participants engaged in a 10 min role-play manipulation of power (high and low). Following the
power manipulation, participants were asked to submerge a hand and lower arm into a bucket of
ice water (i.e., the “Cold Pressor Task;” Hines & Brown, 1932). Participants were told they could
remove their hand as soon as was desired and all agreed to remove the hand as soon as they
wanted. The power-buffers-stress hypothesis predicted that power would lead participants to
experience less stress and pain and to leave their hand in the water longer. An alternative
prediction comes from the power-disinhibition idea (Keltner et al., 2003; Hirsh, Galinsky, &
Zhong, 2011). This perspective would predict that power should lead to action that is the least
inhibited and most self-interested; arguably the least inhibited and most self-interested act when
one’s hand is freezing in a bucket of ice water is to remove the hand as quickly as possible. In
addition to the primary dependent variable of “time in water,” we measured physiological stress
response, self-reported pain experience, cognitive impairment, and nonverbal indications of pain.
Method
Participants and Design
Seventy paid participants (53 women) were recruited from Columbia University (Mage =
22.54 yrs). Experiment 2 was a 2-group design examining the effects of power (low vs. high) on
the stress response during a physical stress test.
Manipulation of Legitimate Power
Standard power manipulation protocols used in both psychological science and
behavioral economics were merged to form one very impactful manipulation. Research suggests
Power Buffers Stress 17
that to appropriately and effectively manipulate power, that power must be perceived as
legitimate by all parties involved (e.g., Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn,
& Otten, 2008). Thus, Experiment 2 began with participants first completing a “Leadership
Questionnaire” (adapted from Anderson & Berdahl) which asked participants to describe their
leadership experiences through responding to a number of open-ended questions. After
completing the questionnaire, the experimenters then, ostensibly, assigned participants to the role
of leader (high-power) or subordinate (low-power) best suited for them based on the
questionnaire. In actuality, role was randomly assigned. The high- and low-power individuals
then formed a compensation committee that decided bonuses for three individuals by working
together in a pair. Final decisions were made by the high-power participant who also decided
how much (if any) of a $20 “paycheck” would be paid to the low-power participant in an
additional “dictator game” power manipulation (Sivanathan, Pillutla, & Murnighan, 2008). To
make the power manipulation even more impactful and ecologically valid, the high-power
participant was given duplicate copies of the three candidates’ resumes and was in a big office.
When the high-power participant was ready for the low-power participant, s/he hollered for the
low-power person who was across the hall in a very small office. The compensation committee
meeting was directed by the high-power participant and lasted approximately 10 mins. After the
meeting the high-power participant sent the low-power participant back to his/her office while
the high-power participant recorded final decisions and how much of the $20 to pay the low-
power participant. Additionally, during the ice water submersion task, high-power individuals
were instructed to rest their arms on the exterior edge of the arm rest and low-power rested on
the interior edge.
Power Buffers Stress 18
The same 8 items assessing self-reported power used in Experiment 1 were used in
Experiment 2: dominant, in control, in charge, high status, like a leader, and powerful plus two
reverse-scored items: subordinate and submissive (each rated on 5-point scales). Individuals in
the high-power condition felt more powerful (M = 3.34; SD = .71) than those in the low-power
condition (M = 3.00; SD = .64), F(1, 64) = 3.99, p < .05; effect size r = .25.
Physical Stressor: The Ice Water Submersion Test
An ice water submersion test is a physical stressor (first described by Hines & Brown,
1932; but also by Efran, Chorney, Ascher, & Lukens, 1989; Ferracuti, Seri, Mattia, & Cruccu,
1994; Kelly, Ashleigh, & Beversdorf, 2007; Lovallo, 1975). Prior to hand placement,
participants were told they could remove their hand/arm as soon as they wanted. Each
participant’s non-dominant hand and forearm was then placed into an ice water bath. The ice
water bath temperature was kept at approximately 47.97 degrees Fahrenheit (varying from 42 to
55).4 There was no significant difference in temperature between the low- (M = 47.56; SD =
2.72) and high-power (M = 47.94; SD = 2.77) conditions: F(1, 64) = 0.31, p > .58. As
recommended by previous research, the water tub contained a screen separating the ice from the
submerging pool. A circulating fan kept the water a uniform temperature, which a thermometer
continuously confirmed. Participants were videotaped during the ice water submersion task, and
duration of submersion was unobtrusively measured with a stopwatch. Room-temperature in the
lab and the weather outside were highly variable (both were measured and statistically
controlled-for).
4 This temperature was determined by the authors testing the water themselves and deciding that the initial cold temperature of 35 degrees Fahrenheit (used in previous research) was excruciatingly cold (and painful) and one author could only keep her hand in the water for less than 5 seconds. Thus, the temperature of the water was raised to a level that was still very cold and physically demanding but not excruciatingly painful.
Power Buffers Stress 19
Measures of Self-Reported Pain, Cognitive Load, and Nonverbal Expression of
Pain
Self-reported pain. To assess participants’ pain level during the ice water submersion
task pain ratings were made every 10 seconds on a 10-point scale from 0 (no pain at all) to 10
(excruciating pain). Most of the participants (95%) kept their hand in the ice water for at
least 10 seconds. By 40 seconds only 38% of the participants’ hands remained in the water.
Beyond 40 seconds the percentages were too low to derive reliable estimates (by 60 seconds
almost all participants had retracted). Thus, four points in time (10s, 20s, 30s, and 40s) were
modeled.
Cognitive load. Cognitive load was measured with the same key-press Stroop task
described in detail in the methods section of Experiment 1. Higher scores indicated more
cognitive load.
Nonverbal behavior. Nonverbal items from a medical index of pain were used to
code the nonverbal expression of pain (Nonverbal Pain Checklist; Feldt, 2000). The three
nonverbal indicators (two items from the checklist were verbal and were excluded) from this
checklist were reliably coded (a second coder coded 10% of the participants) for each subject for
the entire duration of the cold water submersion: bracing (r = 1.0), restless motion (r = .98), and
nonverbal lip bite/grimace (r = .72). A fourth variable was coded, rubbing the self, but not
observed in any participant. Consistent with Experiment 1, a principal component was
constructed (accounting for 49.18% of the variance). Higher numbers indicate more nonverbal
pain expression.
Hormone Measurement, Assays, and Calculation of Reactivity to Physical
Stress
Power Buffers Stress 20
We examined cortisol (as in Experiment 1); saliva collection and hormone assay
procedures were exactly the same as in Experiment 1. Approximately 10 mins after arrival,
participants provided the first sample and the second sample was taken approximately 17 mins
after the end of the ice water submersion task (SD = 38 secs; range = 14 to 19 mins with 91% of
the sample at exactly 17 mins). Cortisol was assayed once (10% in duplicate). The intra-assay
coefficient of variation (CV) across the two points in time was 2.53 %. Cortisol levels at baseline
were in the normal range (M = 0.18 µg/dL, SD = .12). Cortisol at Time 2 was regressed on Time
1 and the standardized residuals were used as the dependent measure (Thuma, Gilders, Verdum,
& Loucks, 1995). The amount of time that passed between the CPT manipulation and the second
saliva sample did not differ across conditions: a one-way ANOVA across the 2 conditions
revealed no significant variance from the grand mean of 17.02 mins, F(1, 63) = 0.14, p > .70.
Results
We predicted that high- versus low-power participants would be relatively more
impervious to a physical stressor. Specifically, it was predicted that high-power (vs. low) would
be buffered from the physical stress response allowing people to longer endure a physical
stressor. We also expected high-power participants to report feeling less physical pain, show less
cortisol reactivity, less cognitive load following physical insult, and exhibit fewer nonverbal
signs on pain. All tests used an ANOVA model comparing high-power to low-power
participants. Covariates are explicitly noted in the appropriate section.
Did Power Buffer the onset of Pain in the Physical Stress Test?
As predicted by the power-buffers-stress hypothesis, individuals in the high-power
condition left their hand and arm in the ice-cold water 45 seconds longer (M = 101.19 secs; SD =
96.74) than the low-power individuals (M = 56.57; SD = 59.40), F(1, 61) = 4.45, p < .04; effect
Power Buffers Stress 21
size r = .27. Room temperature and outside temperature have both been shown to significantly
impact responses to the ice water thus both temperatures were used as covariates in the analysis.
Did Power Mitigate Cortisol Reactivity?
Inconsistent with Experiment 1, there was no main effect of power on cortisol, F(1, 62)
= .0003, p > .92. effect size r = .28.
Did Power Buffer Self-Reported Pain in the Physical Stress Test?
There was no main effect of power on self-reported pain across the 4-points in time, F(1,
61) = .77, p > .39; however, there was an interaction between power and pain across the 4-points
in time, which was quadratic in shape. This interaction shows that low-power individuals have a
U-shaped distribution of pain experience across time whereas the high-power individuals have an
inverted U-shaped distribution of pain experience across time. Figure 4 illustrates the quadratic
interaction between power and the self-reported experience of pain: F(1, 61) = 7.32, p < .02;
effect size r = .35. Consistent with the theorizing, low-power individuals reported experiencing
more pain than the high-power individuals both at the beginning and the end of the 40-secs.
Did Power Buffer the Effects of the Physical Stress Test on Cognitive Load?
Consistent with Experiment 1, there was no main effect of power on cognitive load.
Three outliers that were more than 3 SDs above or below the mean were removed. High-power
individuals appeared equally as cognitively impaired (M = .01; SD = .22) as low-power
individuals (M = -.06; SD = .19); F(1, 60) = 1.70, p > .19.
Did Power Buffer the Nonverbal Expression of Pain During the Physical Stress
Test?
Controlling for time in the water, there was a main effect of power on the nonverbal
display of pain such that high-power individuals displayed significantly less (M = -.16; SD
Power Buffers Stress 22
= .74) than did low-power individuals (M = .16; SD = 1.20), F(1, 64) = 4.33, p < .05; effect size
r = .26.
Discussion
Experiment 2 found some evidence that power buffers the stress response to a physical
insult. The high-power individuals kept their hands in the ice water longer which supports the
stress-buffing account (and suggests no evidence for disinhibition). Like Experiment 1, this
experiment suggests that power can buffer stress, leading to arguably positive social
consequences. This finding on pain is also consistent with work by Bohns and Wiltermuth
(2012), which found that natural postural expansiveness (in response to another person’s
contractiveness; Tiedens & Fragale, 2003) increases how uncomfortable one perceives a blood
pressure cuff to be. In Experiment 2, the finding that cortisol did not react to the physical insult is
consistent with research found after this experiment was completed. Physical stressors such as
the ice water submersion task do not commonly elicit a strong or consistent cortisol response (al’
Absi et al., 2002; Duncko et al., 2007; Gluck et al., 2004; Lustyk, Olson, Gerrish, Holder, &
Widman, 2010; McRae et al., 2006; Schwabe & Wolf, 2010).
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that power buffers the stress response associated with
beneficial or acceptable acts. In Experiment 3, we were interested in whether power would buffer
the stress response associated with engaging in a dishonest act. Specifically, we were interested
in whether one of the pathways through which power leads to corruption is through the stress-
buffering mechanism observed in Experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment 3: Will Power Buffer the Stress Response to a High-Stakes
Deception?
Power Buffers Stress 23
Telling a lie is stressful. While humans lie for many different reasons, including to
protect feelings, claim undue resources, project a false self-image, manipulate, or coerce (e.g.,
DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996), telling a lie is emotionally, cognitively,
and physiologically costly. The liar must actively inhibit and suppress the truth and any behavior
indicative of it (in addition to their own moral compass, social norms, fear of consequence,
consideration of others’ interests, etc. This suppression leads to emotional distress (Ekman,
O’Sullivan, Friesen, & Scherer, 1991; Vrij, 2001; Vrij, Semin, & Bull, 1986), impaired cognitive
function (Spence, Farrow, Leung, Shah, Reilly, Rahman, & Herford, 2003; Spence, Hunter,
Farrow, Green, Leung, Hughes, & Ganesan, 2004; Vrij et al), and a physiological stress response
(Iacono, 2007, 2008; Vrij et al). The nonverbal indications of suppression are often referred to as
“nonverbal leakage” or “tells.” “Tells” are subtle and emitted from the face, voice and body
(Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Ekman & Friesen, 1974; Ekman & O’Sullivan, 2006; DePaulo et al.,
1996; DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003; Vrij, 2001).
We tested the hypothesis that power would buffer the emotional, cognitive and
physiological stress of telling a lie. Participants were assigned to either a high- or a low-power
condition using the same role manipulation+dictator game+physical space manipulation used in
Experiment 2. From the criminal justice and deception literatures we borrowed a “high-stakes
mock crime” paradigm (e.g., Kircher, Horowitz, & Raskin, 1988) in which participants stole or
did not steal a $100 bill and were interrogated about the alleged transgression, on videotape, by
an experimenter (50% were lying and 50% were telling the truth). If successful at convincing the
experimenter they did not steal the money, the participants were able to keep the $100. Multiple
methods were used to assess participants’ degree of emotional, cognitive, and physiological
stress. We predicted that the powerful would not report lying to be any less wrong than the
Power Buffers Stress 24
powerless as suggested by previous research (e.g., Lammers et al., 2008; Gruenfeld et al., 2008;
Kipnis, 1972; Kozak, Marsh, & Wegner, 2006; Sorokin & Lundin, 1959). And we predicted that
high-power (vs. low-power) would enhance the same emotional, cognitive and physiological
systems that stressors such as lying deplete. As in Experiments 1 and 2, we predicted that power
would buffer the stress response to telling a lie and this would be evident across measures of
self-reported emotion, cognitive load, cortisol reactivity, and fewer nonverbal “tells.”
Method
Participants and Design
Fifty paid participants (30 female) were recruited from Columbia University. The
experiment was a 2 (high power vs. low power) x 2 (lie-telling vs. truth-telling) between-subjects
design. Three participants were removed prior to analysis for not following study instructions
(one person stole the money when he was instructed not to and two people gave false confessions
to stealing the money when they did not).
Manipulation of Legitimate Power
The same experimental manipulation of legitimate power used in Experiment 2 was used
in Experiment 3 (i.e., the enhanced version of Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). By way of reminder,
this power manipulation included a “leadership questionnaire” to make participants feel that the
power assignment was legitimate when it was, in fact, randomly assigned. Participants were
assigned to be either the high-power or low-power person in a 10 min compensation committee
meeting. The high-power person had power over the social and economic outcomes of the low-
power person. In other words, the high-power person made all decisions and was responsible for
dividing up a $20 paycheck. A check of the power manipulation confirmed that those in the
high-power role felt more powerful (a composite variable comprised of: dominant, in control, in
Power Buffers Stress 25
charge, high status, like a leader, and powerful—each rated on 5-point scales; M = 2.89; SE
= .16) than those in a low-power role (M = 2.34; SE = .17), F(1, 46) = 5.76, p < .05; effect size r
= .35.5
The High-Stakes Mock Crime
A “high-stakes mock crime paradigm” was borrowed from the criminal justice literature
(for reviews see, Kircher et al., 1988; Frank & Ekman, 2004; DePaulo et al., 2003). In the current
experiment, immediately after the power manipulation, participants were brought into enclosed
rooms. A randomly assigned experimenter sat down with each participant separately and
explained that they would have an opportunity to earn an additional $100 by convincing the
experimenter that they did not steal a $100 bill hidden in the testing room.
Participants were told that after the experimenter left the room, the computer would
randomly decide and then instruct the participant whether or not to steal the money. All
participants were equally incentivized—all were instructed to do their very best to convince the
experimenter that they did not steal the money - whether or not they actually did. This
high-stakes mock crime paradigm creates 50% liars and 50% truth-tellers who have the ability to
earn the $100 if they succeed at convincing the experimenter of their innocence. If the participant
(whether or not s/he was lying) could convince the experimenter (who was blind to lie vs. truth
condition) they did not steal the money, the participant would keep the $100 prize and would be
entered into a lottery to win an additional $500. The experimenter informed the participant that
in about 5 mins, he would come back into the room and conduct a videotaped interrogation.
All participants reported that they believed the experimenter had no knowledge of
whether they actually stole the money. To further encourage participants to believe in the
5 Note that Experiment 3 used only 6 of the 8 self-report power terms used in Experiments 1 and 2. Experiment 3 was actually the first experiment we conducted and we improved the self-report power measure for what are now Experiments 1 and 2 by expanding it to 8 items by including 2 reverse-scored items.
Power Buffers Stress 26
experimenters’ blindness, both the experimenter and participant discussed and signed a contract
together stating that the experimenter had no knowledge of whether or not the participant would
be assigned to steal or not steal the money.
After the high-stakes mock crime instructions were given to participants, the
experimenter left the testing room the participant received instructions. In the steal condition
participants read:
STEAL THE MONEY OUT OF THE ENVELOPE!!! Be very quiet.
Put the envelope and books back exactly as you found them. Put
the money ON YOU somewhere – pocket, sock, wherever but
make sure the experimenter can’t see it (obviously). When you
are done STEALING the money come back to the computer and
click ‘continue’.
No-steal condition participants read:
DO NOT steal the money in the envelope!!! Leave the
money in the envelope and put it back where you found it. Be
very quiet. Put the envelope and books back exactly as you
found them. When you are done putting the money and envelope
back in the books, come back to the computer and click
‘continue’.
After the mock theft, the experimenter entered the testing room and turned on a video
camera and proceeded to interrogate the participant by asking a series of questions. Both
experimenters were trained to ask all questions in an affectively neutral, firm manner.
Experimenters did not stray from the script that contained 10 questions. We predicted that high-
Power Buffers Stress 27
power liars would have the ability (emotionally, physiologically and cognitively) to inhibit the
typical nonverbal “tells” associated with lying. We coded the videotapes for nonverbal behaviors
both during responses to “lie questions” (i.e., those questions pertaining to the mock theft about
which liars will lie) and “baseline questions” (i.e., neutral questions not pertaining to the mock
theft about which were verifiable; DePaulo et al., 2003; Karim, Schneider, Lotze1, Veit,
Sauseng, Braun, & Birbaumer, 2010; Kircher et al., 1988).
The baseline questions had verifiable answers and included: “what are you wearing
today?” and “what is the weather like outside?” The lie questions were adapted from Frank and
Ekman (2004) and included, “did you steal the money?” and “why should I believe you?” and
“are you lying to me now?” Immediately after the video recorded interrogation, participants
completed the manipulation check, measures of emotional distress, the Stroop task, and the
second saliva sample (the first one was taken after arrival to the laboratory).
Emotional Distress, Cognitive Load, Cortisol Reactivity, and Behavior
Emotional distress. Four emotion terms were rated on 7-point scales: bashful, guilty,
troubled, and scornful. The four emotion terms were submitted to a principal component analysis
to create a factor score (the factor accounted for 46.16% of the variance). Higher scores indicated
more distress.
Cognitive load. The same key-press Stroop task used in both Experiments 1 and 2 was
used in Experiment 3.
Hormone Sampling and Assays. Saliva samples were collected in exactly the
same basic manner as Experiments 1 and 2. A baseline saliva sample was taken from participants
approximately 10 mins after arrival. Approximately 27 mins after the beginning of the lie
manipulation, the second saliva sample was taken (SD = 5 mins; range = 17 to 37 mins). As was
Power Buffers Stress 28
the case in Experiments 1 and 2, variability in time between the lie manipulation and the second
saliva sample was controlled for. The intra-assay coefficient of variation (CV) was 5.6 %.
Cortisol levels were in the normal range (M = 0.13 µg/dL, SD = .10). Time 2 cortisol scores
were regressed on time 1 scores, and the standardized residuals were used in analysis (Thuma,
Gilders, Verdum, & Loucks, 1995). The amount of time that passed between the interrogation
and the second saliva sample did not differ across conditions, F(3, 42) = 0.99, p > .40.
Behavioral Coding. The interrogations were coded for the 8 best (i.e., most robust
across published reports) nonverbal correlates of deception. Six of the 8 cues were harvested
from a meta-analysis on nonverbal cues to deception by DePaulo et al. (2003). Two variables
were taken from work by Ekman (Ekman & Friesen, 1969, Ekman, Friesen, & Scherer, 1976)
and from Buller (2005). A rapid, one-sided (i.e., partial) shoulder shrug was one of the behaviors
coded. Four additional “molar” variables (i.e., more global variables rated by condition-blind
coders) have been shown repeatedly to indicate deception and are ratings of: cooperativeness,
immediacy (which is a word from the nonverbal literature, which indicates an amalgam of
warmth/intimacy/interest), nervousness, and vocal uncertainty. Three molecularly coded
variables (i.e., coded in seconds or by counts) were: accelerated prosody (calculated by taking
the number of syllables and dividing them by the number of seconds, which passed during the
utterances; Buller, 2005), lip presses (counts), and speaking time (in seconds).
Behaviors were coded separately during responses to each interrogation question. Inter-
rater reliability was determined by two coders who rated the same subset of videos (28%). After
inter-rater reliability was established, one of the coders went on to rate the remaining videos. A
total of 5 different coders coded the 8 behaviors (some coded more than one behavior). Table 1
lists the 8 behaviors, a brief description of each, the expected relation to deception for each, and
Power Buffers Stress 29
the inter-rater reliability for each. All statistical analyses examined behavior during the lie
questions minus behavior during the control questions (i.e., Δbehavior). Analyses were
conducted on each behavior separately and on an overall composite variable of “deception tells”
(the principal component accounted for 26% of the variance).
Results
We predicted that all participants (high and low-power alike) would believe that telling a
lie was generally wrong but that regardless, power would buffer individuals from the emotional,
cognitive, and physiological stress of lying. Again, the a priori contrast weight sequence of 3, -
1, -1, -1 was used for all outcome variables across low-power liars, high-power liars, low-power
truth-tellers, and high-power truth-tellers (respectively).
Did Power Influence the Sense that Lying Was Wrong?
Power did not shift participants’ sense of morality. All believed lying was wrong on a 1
(always wrong) to 6 (never wrong) scale and there were no differences among low-power
liars (M = 1.62; SD = 1.04), high-power liars (M = 1.75; SD = 1.60), low-power truth-tellers (M
= 1.67; SD = .89), and high-power truth-tellers (M = 1.80; SD = 1.03), F(3. 46) = 0.46, p > .98.
These results are inconsistent with previous research which found that high-power (vs. low-
power) individuals report their own indiscretions to be less wrong (e.g., Lammers et al., 2010).
Do High-Power Liars Experience Less Emotional Distress?
We first tested whether there was support for the power-buffers-stress hypothesis on a
self-report measure of emotional distress. Consistent with the general prediction that power
would provide a buffer from emotional distress resulting from lying, only low-power liars
reported emotional distress; in contrast, high-power liars—like the truth-tellers—reported no
emotional distress after the mock crime and lie, t(43) = 2.53, p < .02; effect size r = .39. Figure
Power Buffers Stress 30
5 shows the means across the four groups. Pairwise tests revealed that, as expected, low-power
liars were significantly more distressed than high-power liars (p < .05), low-power truth-tellers
(p < .08), and high-power truth-tellers (p < .03); no other contrasts were statistically significant
(ps > .57).
Do High-Power Liars Experience Less Evidence of Cognitive Load after Lying?
We next tested whether power buffers against cognitive load following a lie. Consistent
with the power-buffers-stress hypothesis, high-power liars and truth-tellers (as compared to low-
power liars) had significantly lower levels of cognitive load following the lie, t(43) = 2.57, p
< .02; r = .39. Figure 6 shows the means. Pairwise tests revealed that, as expected, low-power
liars were more cognitively loaded than high-power liars (p < .06), low-power truth-tellers (p
< .07), and high-power truth-tellers (p < .03); no other contrasts were statistically significant (ps
> .61). Research suggests that not all stressors are created equally (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996;
Dickerson & Kemeney, 2004) and as such can have different downstream effects. This result
suggests that something unique about the stress of telling a lie causes cognitive load; whereas the
kinds of stress experienced in Experiments 1 and 2 did not cause cognitive load.
Does Power Buffer against the Stress Response to Lie-Telling?
Consistent with the power-buffers-stress hypothesis and the results observed on measures
of emotion and cognitive load, again it was found that high-power liars—like truth-tellers—
demonstrated significantly less cortisol reactivity to the lie-telling stressor, t(46) = 2.10, p < .05;
r = 32. Figure 7 shows cortisol levels at time 2 controlling for time 1. Pairwise tests revealed that
while the means revealed a difference in the predicted direction, low-power liars were not
significantly more stressed than high-power liars (p < .34), but as expected were more stressed
Power Buffers Stress 31
than low-power truth-tellers (p < .06), and high-power truth-tellers (p < .05); no other contrasts
were statistically significant (ps > .25).
Do High-Power Liars Express Fewer Signs of Deception?
We predicted that high-power (vs. low) would not show nonverbal signs of deception.
Consistent with the power-buffers-stress hypothesis, Figure 8 illustrates the same pattern as was
observed across the other measures. High-power liars—like truth-tellers—evidence very few
nonverbal signs of deception on the composite nonverbal variable (a principal component
comprised of all 8 variables: accelerated prosody, cooperativeness, immediacy, lip presses,
nervousness, one-sided shoulder shrugs, speaking time, and vocal uncertainty). Only the low-
power liars relative to the other 3 groups expressed nonverbal distress in a manner similar to
previous research on the nonverbal cues associated with deception, t(43) = 2.58, p < .02; r = .39.
Pairwise tests revealed that, as expected, low-power liars were significantly more nonverbally
revealing than high-power liars (p < .03), low-power truth-tellers (p < .06), and high-power
truth-tellers (p < .07); no other contrasts were statistically significant (ps > .74).
To further investigate the stress-buffering impact of power on the leakage of nonverbal
indications of mental conflict and physiological stress, each of the eight nonverbal behaviors was
examined separately and all are depicted in Figure 9.
Panels A, B, C, and D show, again, that high-power liars—like truth-tellers—exhibit few
nonverbal tells of deception on accelerated prosody, lip presses, one-sided shoulder shrugs, and
vocal uncertainty. The planned contrast comparing low-power liars to the rest of the individuals
was statistically significant for each of these nonverbal behaviors (p < .05). Interestingly, panel
E shows that there may be one nonverbal tell that differentiates high-power liars from the others:
High-power liars expressed less immediacy (i.e., more coldness, less intimacy, and less interest)
Power Buffers Stress 32
when lying versus when telling the truth (p < .05). This is very interesting and may mean that
when lying, high-power liars are more emotionally cold and distant—an affective state entirely
consistent with the power-buffers-stress hypothesis—which gives rise to the appearance of less
warmth and engagement. Panel F shows that for cooperativeness, only a main effect of lie vs.
truth was observed. A post-hoc t-test revealed that truth-tellers were more cooperative than
liars (p < .05; no other contrasts, main effects, or interactions were statistically significant).
Panels G and H show no differences among the four groups on nervousness or speaking time.
Discussion
Experiment 3 provided support for the hypothesis that power can buffer the stress
response associated with stressors such as telling a lie—a behavior that is often accompanied by
negative social consequences. These data suggest that possessing power may render lie-telling
less emotionally, cognitively, and physiologically difficult. This stress-buffering pattern emerged
robustly across multiple indices of stress-reactivity – emotional distress, cognitive impairment,
cortisol reactivity, and nonverbal cues of deception. Power, it seems, enhances the very same
systems that lie-telling depletes.
General Discussion
Three experiments suggest that power may enhance our ability to endure stressors such
as: braving a public speech (Study 1) and surviving a physical insult (Study 2). Withstanding
stress in these contexts is generally considered desirable, adaptive, and can lead to positive social
consequences. But power may also bring with it the ability to endure the stress associated with
more nefarious activities such as lying about a theft under interrogation (Study 3). Prior research
indicates that power increases the tendency to be pro-social, optimistic, approach-oriented and
happy (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; DeCremer & Van Knippenberg, 2002; Galinsky et al.,
Power Buffers Stress 33
2003; Griskevicius et al., 2010; Harbaugh, 1998; Keltner et al., 2003). And at the same time
power increases the tendency to cheat, steal, lie, and engage in extramarital shenanigans (e.g.,
Boles et al., 2000; Lammers et al., 2010; Lammers et al., 2011; Yap et al., 2013). Together the
present findings point to the possibility that a common stress-buffering mechanism may explain
how power leads to these numerous pro- and anti-social behaviors reported in the scientific
literature. Below, we discuss the theoretical implications of the present findings, we propose
some physiological and neural pathways that may subserve the relation between power and
behavior, and we offer several new directions for future work.
The Link between Power and (Dis)Inhibition
The present results nudge us in the direction of thinking more about the expected relation
between power and inhibition. The results presented here hint at some circumstances under
which power may lead to more inhibition. Keltner et al.’s (2003) Approach-Inhibition theory of
power unifies the effects of power by demonstrating that power leads to a general state of
approach orientation: the powerful act. So far, research is supportive of the link between power
and approach. There are many results demonstrating this link but the most central ones show the
powerful (vs. the powerless) to be more likely to turn off an annoying fan in an experiment and
to choose to “hit” in a game of blackjack regardless of hand (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003;
Lammers et al., 2008). The link between power and approach is also consistent with the current
report. However, the current report did not find support for the idea that power leads to
disinhibition – in fact, we found some evidence for the opposite. Specifically, our results
revealed that high-power individuals (vs. low) are more likely and able to inhibit nonverbal tells
associated with deception (Experiment 3) and more likely to inhibit the automatic response of
recoiling from pain (Experiment 2). In light of the current results, it is noteworthy to point out
Power Buffers Stress 34
that there is not yet a great deal of evidence for the link between power and disinhibition. We
think it might be worthwhile to think about power-approach as a separate phenomenon from
power-disinhibition even though past research suggests they are opposite ends of the same
continuum (Carver & White, 1994). The reason is that – despite our theories and intuitions
strongly suggesting a link—there just isn’t much empirical support for the idea that more power
leads to less inhibition. The evidence that does exist includes: one unpublished paper (Ward &
Keltner, 1998), one self-report DV (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2008), and one
arguably opposite finding (DePaulo & Friedman, 1998) as compared to many published and
replicated findings demonstrating the link between power and approach. Hirsh and colleagues
(2011) put forth a theoretical piece about the link between power and disinhibition and
described a number of compelling studies which should be conducted and which could shed
some much-needed light on whether or not power really leads to disinhibition.
The Link between Power and Threat-Challenge
Another important theoretical framework to consider is challenge/threat (Blascovich &
Tomaka, 1996; Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & Jost, 2007). This theorizing differentiates
“good stress”, which leads to an approach motivation, from “bad stress,” which leads to an avoid
motivation. While both kinds of stress are, in fact, stress, the psychological state of challenge (vs.
threat) is caused by an individual appraising a situation as one in which available resources
outweigh demands. It is easy to imagine power leading to general appraisals that are more
challenge-oriented than threat-oriented , and, one recent paper showed a link between power and
challenge (vs. threat) (Scheepers, de Wit, Ellemers, & Sassenberg, 2011).
Possible Mechanisms for the Power-Buffers-Stress Hypothesis
Power Buffers Stress 35
There are a number of possible pathways that may explain the route(s) through which
power buffers individuals from the stress response. Here, we briefly suggest four pathways that
might be fruitful avenues to investigate: (1) power increases testosterone, which then suppresses
cortisol, (2) power increases testosterone, which then affects approach/avoid decisions in
vmPFC, (3) power and hemispheric lateralization, (4) power and reward pathway activation.
These pathways may also work simultaneously or interact with each other.
Power Increases Testosterone, Which Then Suppresses Cortisol. One
potential pathway involves increases in anabolic hormones and their suppressive effects on
catabolic hormones. In the animal kingdom, testosterone both determines and reflects power.
Alpha animals are significantly higher on androgen hormones, such as testosterone, than more
subordinate animals. This is seen in many different species from zebrafish, golden hamsters, and
prairie voles, to chimpanzees and humans (e.g., Larson, O’Malley, & Melloni, 2006; Mazur &
Booth, 1998; Melloni, Connor, Hang, Harrison, & Ferris, 1997; Sapolsky, 2005). Experimental
evidence demonstrates that various types of power acquisition in the lab (including physical
displays, vicarious acquisition of power, and first-hand acquisition) can boost testosterone levels
within 15 minutes (Bernhardt, Dabbs, Fielden, & Lutter, 1998; Booth, Shelley, Mazur, Tharp, &
Kittok, 1989; Carney et al., 2010). Testosterone has a complex relation with cortisol. However,
to oversimplify, testosterone can be a cortisol antagonist and when testosterone is high it can
work to keep cortisol levels down; likewise, higher levels of cortisol inhibit the secretion of
testosterone (Archer, 2006; Mazur & Booth, 1998; Sapolsky, 2005). Future work should test the
extent to which testosterone mediates the effects of power on stress.
Testosterone and Appraisal. A related mechanism for power’s role in stress
buffering is through interactions among neural systems previously implicated in stress and
Power Buffers Stress 36
affective processing such as ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and amygdala (e.g., Urry,
van Reekum, Johnstone, Kalin, Thurow, Schaefer, Jackson, Frye, Greischar, Alexander, &
Davidson, 2006). vmPFC is associated with the tagging of affective stimulus effects as those to
approach or avoid in a context-dependent manner, and this region interacts with the amygdala to
guide physiological reactivity (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Damasio, 1996;
Damasio, 1999) such as the stress response. Amygdala activation is linked to heightened stress
responses, including stimulation of the HPA axis via the hypothalamus that ultimately releases
cortisol. Although there is little neuroscience research on the neural systems implicated in power
per se, indirect evidence involving testosterone suggests that power may buffer stress by
blunting vmPFC activity or disrupting functional connectivity between vmPFC and amygdala
(Van Wingen, 2010; although see a review describing the lack of connectivity between
amygdalar and frontopolar regions; Amodio & Frith, 2010). Specifically, research has shown
that high levels of testosterone inhibit the vmPFC from doing its job—potentially preventing it
from coding a thought or act as “avoid” in the first place (Mehta & Beer, 2010) which would
then prevent any HPA activation that may have otherwise resulted.
Power and Lateralization. Another possible mechanism is that power may lateralize
cognitive and affective processing by shifting decision making responsibilities to the left frontal
cortical area. This area seems to be highly linked to approach motivation and approach-related
affective states such as enthusiasm and anger (Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Peterson, 2010). The
basic architecture of this idea was recently supported by work showing that when in a powerful
(vs. a powerless) state, there is more activity in the left frontal cortex (Boksem, Smolders, &
Cremer, 2012). If power shifts processing to the left hemisphere and the left hemisphere is linked
Power Buffers Stress 37
to more stress-free approach motivation, perhaps the link between power and approach has a
simple lateralization explanation.
Power and the Reward Pathway. Another viable pathway could be one that relies
on the activation of reward circuitry in the brain driven by the neurotransmitter dopamine
(Keltner et al., 2003; discussions with Adam Galinsky and Wil Cunningham). Dopamine is
primarily found in what has come to be known as the “reward pathway” and includes the ventral
tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain, the substantia nigra, and the arcuate nucleus of the
hypothalamus (the arcuate nucleus is also involved in a number of neuroendocrine functions;
Bouret, Draper, & Simerly, 2004). This pathway is activated in response to rewards (real,
imagined, or anticipated) and it is the magnitude of the reward—not its probability of occurring
—that stimulates the production and blocks reuptake of dopamine. As such, increases in
dopamine lead to increases in the reward-value of all things encountered (Schultz, 1998; Schultz,
Apicella, & Ljungberg, 1993; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Wise & Rompre, 1989)
regardless of the probability of occurrence (Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003; Hollerman &
Schultz, 1998; Satoh, Nakai, Sato, & Kimura, 2003) which leads to across-the-board
approach/action (Arias-Carrión & Pöppel, 2007; McClure, Daw, & Montague, 2003; Pessiglione
Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, Frith, & 2006).
Research suggests that increases in social power and higher social rank (both existing and
newly acquired power) are associated with increases in dopaminergic activity (Morgan, Grant,
Gage, Mach, Kaplan, Prioleau, Nader, Buchheimer, Ehrenkaufer, & Nader, 2002). Increases in
this activity results in increased resilience to physical stressors/pain tolerance (Jensen & Yaksh,
1984). Thus, another hypothesized biological pathway through which power may buffer stress is:
power leads to an increase in dopamine, dopamine acts on the reward pathway, all acts are coded
Power Buffers Stress 38
as potentially rewarding/should be approached which then leads to action with no aversive
biofeedback – thus no stress response occurs.
Future Directions
In addition to examining mechanisms in detail, three additional hypotheses emerge from
the power-buffers-stress hypothesis. Thinking beyond testing the basic generalizability of the
effect to other stressors, the power-buffers-stress hypothesis may affect basic perception, startle
and aversion learning, and have links to processes involved in psychopathology.
Perception. The power-buffers-stress hypothesis predicts that many actions – even
very difficult, psychologically and physically taxing ones - will be more likely to get a “green
light” by the brain. For example, research shows that experimentally induced happiness makes
hills seem less steep (Riener, Stefanucci, Proffitt, & Clore, 2003). We predict a similar effect
with power – one in which the perception of tasks and goals may be rendered more favorable.
For example, power may decrease estimates of difficulty and energy expended/required to
complete difficult and stressful tasks, such as the number of calories needed for a challenging
hike, the number of times one must go to the gym to lose weight, how easy it is to save money,
how steep a hill is, and even how far a lake is to the shore.
Startle and Aversion Learning. Power may mitigate the extent to which
stressful/threatening events will “prepare” the system for startle. This is not a prediction made by
approach-inhibition theory, but it is consistent with research showing that approach-related states
and traits, such as forward-leaning body postures and trait anger, lead to a reduced startle reflex
(e.g., Amodio, & Harmon-Jones, in press; Harmon-Jones, & Peterson, 2009). Related to the
possibility of an attenuated startle response, power may also slow down learning to anticipate
and/or avoid an aversive stimulus and lead to faster extinction of a learned aversion response.
Power Buffers Stress 39
Psychopathology. Some of the same phenomena observed in the current report and
predicted by the power-buffers-stress hypothesis are consistent with some of the consequences
and underlying mechanisms present in psychopathy. Psychopaths belong to a larger group of
individuals with antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). These individuals are characterized by
an inability to emotionally engage with others and by the repeated violation of others’ rights and
needs. Some mechanisms underlying these effects are shared with data and theorizing in the
current report. For example, psychopaths are unable to recognize threat, which significantly
reduces the stress response (Damasio, 2000; Ishikawa, Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, & Lacasse, 2001;
Motzkin, Newman, Kiehl, & Koenigs, 2011; Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, LaCasse, & Colletti, 2000).
This finding is also consistent with the effect of higher testosterone on lower empathy, slower
fear conditioning, and more antisocial behavior (Dabbs, Carr, Frady, & Riad, 1995; Dabbs &
Morris, 1990; Hermans, Putman, Baas, Gecks, Kenemans, & van Honk, 2007; Hermans, Putman,
Baas, Koppeschaar, & van Honk, 2006; Hermans, Putman, & Van Honk, 2006; Ronay &
Carney, 2013). Psychopaths also demonstrate an abnormally dampened fear conditioning
response (Birbaumer, Veit, Lotze, Erb, Hermann, Grodd, & Flor, 2005). It is also noteworthy to
mention that lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) lead to less emotional engagement,
dampened fear conditioning, and repeated norm violations – a condition referred to as “acquired
sociopathy” (Tranel, 1994).
Possible Moderators
A number of moderator variables may dampen or reverse the stress-buffering effect of
power. In unstable hierarchies, the powerful are the most stressed (Brady et al., 1958). It is easy
to imagine that in unstable hierarchies, the effect observed here could be reversed. Variables
such as challenges to power and illegitimate power are viable entry points for testing this
Power Buffers Stress 40
question. Other phenomena may dampen the effect. Resource scarcity has been shown to cause
the powerful to behave like the powerless (Carney, DuBois, Nitchiporuk, ten Brinke, Rucker, &
Galinsky, 2013). Likewise, scarcity may dampen the stress-buffering effect of power.
Limitations
There are a few important limitations to the current research. First, across the three
experiments, the power manipulations appeared weak. Because the self-reported power items
(i.e., the manipulation check) always came after the stress, pain, or lie manipulation—we are
surprised the power manipulations were as strong as they were. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy
that feelings of power were somewhat low overall. Self-reported feelings of stress (in all cases)
were also somewhat weak and likely for the same reason—all of the self-report measures were
administered many minutes after the stress manipulations, saliva tests, and the Stroop measures.
Another limitation is the sub-optimal timing for some of the hormone measurements.
Specifically, a baseline saliva sample should be taken approximately 30 mins after arrival to the
laboratory, after the participant has had sufficient time to relax and habituate to the environment.
The initial samples were taken only 10 mins after arrival. However, all such decisions are trade-
offs and we opted for this sub-optimal approach to keep the experimental sessions under 90
mins; however, it should be noted that having done so likely increased the error variance in the
time 1 measurement thereby leading to type II error.
A third limitation is that any conclusions about the link between power and disinhibition
based on the current report should consider that proponents of this theoretical position would not
likely see the Cold Pressor paradigm to be an adequate test of the hypothesis. While participants
were specifically instructed to take their hands out of the water as soon as they wanted, one could
Power Buffers Stress 41
argue that participants were equally incentivized by the implicit social norms surrounding
being strong and resilient (especially for the men).
Implications of the Current Research
We are suggesting here that power—even when minimally endowed through a laboratory
manipulation—ignites a physiological trajectory of some kind, which results in a reduction of the
stress response. Our data, alongside other results across disciplines, suggest that a mind and brain
today is not the same mind and brain it will be once it is on power. It might be useful to think
about the acquisition of power as a chemically altering process that renders the brain and its
decision making different than it was before. If we learn from the time we are young that power
and status will change our brains, perhaps we can learn to best leverage the benefits of power
while simultaneously learning to develop better psychological and structural strategies to
safeguard ourselves, our families, our educational institutions, and our organizations from
power’s sometimes pernicious effects.
Power Buffers Stress 42
References
Abbott, D., Keverene, E. B., Bercovitch, F. B., Shively, C. A., Mendoza, S. P., Saltzman, W., &
Sapolsky, R. M. (2003). Are subordinates always stressed? A comparative analysis of
rank differences in cortisol levels among primates. Hormones and Behavior, 1, 67-82.
Adler, N. E., Boyce, T., Chesney, M. A., Folkman, S. & Syme, S. L. (1993). Socioeconomic
inequalities in health: no easy solution. Journal of the American Medical Association,
269, 140-145.
Adler, N. E., Epel, E. S., Castellazzo, G., & Ickovics, J. R. (2000). Relationship of subjective and
objective social status with psychological and physiological functioning: Preliminary data
in healthy, white women. Health Psychology, 6, 586-592.
al'Absi, M., Petersen, K. L., & Wittmers, L. E. (2002). Adrenocortical and hemodynamic
predictors of pain perception in men and women. Pain, 1, 197-204.
Amodio, D. M. & Harmon-Jones, E. (in press). Trait emotions and affective modulation of the
startle eyeblink: On the unique relationship of trait anger. Emotion.
Amodio, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2010). The role of medial frontal cortex in social cognition:
Four years on. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11, 722.
Anderson, C., & Berdahl, J. L. (2002). The experience of power: Examining the effects of power
on approach and inhibition tendencies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6,
1362-1377.
Anderson, C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2006). Power, optimism, and risk‐taking. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 4, 511-536.
Archer, J. (2006). Testosterone and human aggression: an evaluation of the challenge hypothesis.
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 30, 319–345.
Power Buffers Stress 43
Arias-Carrión, Ó., & Pöppel, E. (2007). Dopamine, learning, and reward-seeking behavior. Acta
Neurobiologiae Experimentalis, 4, 481–488.
Barkow, J. H., Akiwowo, A. A., Barua, T. K., Chance, M., Chapple, E. D., Chattopadhyay, G.
P., & Isichei, P. (1975). Prestige and culture: A biosocial interpretation. Current
Anthropology, 4, 553-572.
Bechara, A., Damasio, A.R., Damasio, H. & Anderson, S.W. (1994). Insensitivity to future
consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex. Cognition, 50, 7–12.
Berdahl, J. L., & Martorana, P. (2006). Effects of power on emotion and expression during a
controversial group discussion. European Journal of Social Psychology, 4, 497-509.
Bernhardt, P. C., Dabbs, J. M., Fielden, J. A., & Lutter, C. D. (1998). Testosterone changes
during vicarious experiences of winning and losing among fans at sporting events.
Physiology and Behavior, 65, 59-62.
Birbaumer, N., Veit, R., Lotze, M. Erb, M., Hermann, C., Grodd, W., & Flor, H. (2005).
Deficient fear conditioning in psychopathy: A functional magnetic resonance imaging
study. Archives of General Psychiatry, 62, 799-805.
Blascovich, J., & Tomaka, J. (1996). The biopsychosocial model of arousal regulation. Advances
in Experimental Social Psychology, 28, 1-51.
Bohns, V. K., & Wiltermuth, S. S. (2011). It hurts when I do this (or you do that): Posture and
pain tolerance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1, 341-345.
Boksem, M. A. S., Smolders, R., & De Cremer, D. (2012). Social power and approach-related
neural activity. SCAN, 7, 516-520.
Power Buffers Stress 44
Boles, T. L., Croson, R. T. A., & Murnighan, J. K. (2000). Deception and retribution in repeated
ultimatum bargaining. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2, 235-
259.
Booth, A., Shelley, G., Mazur, A., Tharp, G., & Kittok, R. (1989). Testosterone, and winning
and losing in human competition. Hormones and Behavior, 23, 556-571.
Bouret, S. G., Draper, S. J., & Simerly, R. B. (2004). Formation of Projection Pathways from the
Arcuate Nucleus of the Hypothalamus to Hypothalamic Regions Implicated in the Neural
Control of Feeding Behavior in Mice. The Journal of Neuroscience, 24, 2797-2805.
Brady, J. V., Porter, R. W., Conrad, D. G., & Mason, J. W. (1958). Avoidance behavior and the
development of duodenal ulcers. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 1, 69-
73.
Bugental, D. B., & Cortez, V. L. (1988). Physiological reactivity to responsive and unresponsive
children as moderated by perceived control. Child Development, 3, 686-693.
Buller, D. B. (2005). Methods for measuring speech rate. In V. Manusov (Ed.), The sourcebook
of nonverbal measures: Going beyond words (pp. 317-324). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum.
Callaway, M. R., Marriott, R. G., & Esser, J. K. (1985). Effects of dominance on group decision
making: Toward a stress-reduction explanation of groupthink. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 4, 949-952.
Carney, D. R., & Mason, M. F. (2010). Decision making and testosterone: When the ends justify
the means. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4, 668-671.
Carney, D. R., Colvin, C. R., & Hall, J. A. (2007). A thin slice perspective on the accuracy of
first impressions. Journal of Research in Personality, 5, 1054-1072.
Power Buffers Stress 45
Carney, D. R., Cuddy, A. J. C., & Yap, A. J. (2010). Power posing. Psychological Science, 10,
1363-1368.
Carney, D. R., DuBois, D., Nitchiporuk, N., ten Brinke, L., Rucker, D., & Galinsky, A. D.
(2013). The deception equilibrium: The powerful are better liars but the powerless are
better lie-detectors. Unpublished manuscript.
Carver, C. S., & White, T. L. (1994). Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activation, and affective
responses to impending reward and punishment: The BIS/BAS scales. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 319-333.
Chen, S., Lee-Chai, A. Y., & Bargh, J. A. (2001). Relationship orientation as a moderator of the
effects of social power. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2, 173-187.
Coates, J. M., & Herbert, J. (2008). Endogenous steroids and financial risk taking on a London
trading floor. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 16, 6167-6172.
Coe, C. L., Mendoza, S. P., & Levine, S. (1979). Social status constrains the stress response in
the squirrel monkey. Physiology & Behavior, 4, 633-638.
Cohen, S. Schwartz, J. E., Epel, E., Kirschbaum, C., Sidney, S., & Seeman, T. (2006).
Socioeconomic status, race, and diurnal cortisol decline in the Coronary Artery Risk
Development in Young Adults (CARDIA) Study. Psychosomatic Medicine, 68, 41-50.
Crott, H., Kayser, E., & Lamm, H. (1980). The effects of information exchange and
communication in an asymmetrical negotiation situation. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 2, 149-163.
Dabbs, J. M., & Morris, R. (1990). Testosterone, social class, and antisocial behavior in a sample
of 4,462 men. Psychological Science, 3, 209-211.
Power Buffers Stress 46
Dabbs, J. M., Carr, T. S., Frady, R. L., & Riad, J. K. (1995). Testosterone, crime, and
misbehavior among 692 male prison inmates. Personality and Individual Differences, 5,
627-633.
Damasio, A. R. (2000). A neural basis for sociopathy. Archives of General Psychiatry, 57, 128-
129.
Damasio, A., Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. (1991). Somatic markers and the guidance of behavior.
In H. S. Levin, H. M. Eisenberg, & A. L. Benton (Eds.) Frontal lobe function and
dysfunction (pp. 217-228). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Damasio, A.R. (1996). The Somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the
prefrontal cortex. Royal Society of London B – Biological Sciences, 29, 1413-1420.
Damasio, A.R. (1999). The feeling of what happens. New York: Harcourt-Brace & Company.
Dansereau, F., Graen, G., & Haga, W. J. (1975). A vertical dyad linkage approach to leadership
within formal organizations: A longitudinal investigation of the role making process.
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1, 46-78.
de Waal, F. (1998). Chimpanzee politics: Power and sex among apes. Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins.
De Cremer, D. & van Knippenberg, D. (2002). How do leaders promote cooperation? The effects
of charisma and procedural fairness. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 858-866.
DePaulo, B. M., & Friedman, H. S. (1998). Nonverbal Communication. In D. Gilbert, S. Fiske,
& G. Lindzey (eds.) Handbook of Social Psychology, 4th edition. Boston: McGraw Hill,
vol. II, pp. 3-40.
DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkendol, S. E., Wyer, M. M., & Epstein, J. A. (1996). Lying in
everyday life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5, 979-995.
Power Buffers Stress 47
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K., & Cooper, H.
(2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 1, 74-118.
Dickerson, S. S., & Kemeny, M. E. (2004). Acute stressors and cortisol responses: A theoretical
integration and synthesis of laboratory research. Psychological Bulletin, 3, 355–391.
Duncko, R., Cornwell, B., Cui, L., Merikangas, K. R., & Grillon, C. (2007). Acute exposure to
stress improves performance in trace eyeblink conditioning and spatial learning tasks in
healthy men. Learning & Memory, 5, 329-335.
Efran, J. S., Chorney, R. L., Ascher, L. M., & Lukens, M. D. (1989). Coping styles, paradox, and
the cold pressor task. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 1, 91-103.
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1969). Nonverbal leakage and clues to deception. Psychiatry:
Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes, 1, 88-106.
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1974). Detecting deception from the body or face. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 3, 288-298.
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1978). Facial action coding system: A technique for the
measurement of facial movement. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Ekman, P., & O'Sullivan, M. (2006). From flawed self‐assessment to blatant whoppers: The
utility of voluntary and involuntary behavior in detecting deception. Behavioral Sciences
& the Law, 5, 673-686.
Ekman, P., & Rosenberg, E. L. (1997). What the face reveals: Basic and applied studies of
spontaneous expression using the facial action coding system (FACS). New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., & Scherer, K. R. (1976). Body movement and voice pitch in
deceptive interaction. Semiotica, 1, 23-27.
Power Buffers Stress 48
Ekman, P., O'Sullivan, M., Friesen, W. V., & Scherer, K. R. (1991). Invited article: Face, voice,
and body in detecting deceit. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 2, 125-135.
Feldt, K. S. (2000). The checklist of nonverbal pain indicators (CNPI). Pain Management
Nursing, 1, 13-21.
Ferracuti, S., Seri, S., Mattia, D., & Cruccu, G. (1994). Quantitative EEG modifications during
the cold water pressor test: Hemispheric and hand differences. International Journal of
Psychophysiology, 3, 261-268.
Fiorillo, C. D., Tobler, P. N., & Schultz, W. (2003). Discrete coding of reward probability and
uncertainty by dopamine neurons. Science, 5614, 1898-1902.
Fiske, S. T. (1993). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. American
Psychologist, 6, 621–628.
Foley, P., & Kirschbaum, C. (2010). Human hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal axis responses to
acute psychosocial stress in laboratory settings. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews,
1, 91-96.
Frank, M. G., & Ekman, P. (2004). Appearing truthful generalizes across different deception
situations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3, 486.
Galinsky, A. D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Magee, J. C. (2003). From power to action. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 3, 453-466.
Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Inesi, M. E., & Gruenfeld, D. H. (2006). Power and perspectives
not taken. Psychological Science, 12, 1068-1074.
Gravlee, C. C. (2009). How race becomes biology: embodiment of social inequality. American
Journal of Physical Anthropology, 139, 47-57.
Power Buffers Stress 49
Green, D. P., Strolovitch, D. Z., & Wong, J. S. (1998). Defended neighborhoods, integration, and
racially motivated crime. American Journal of Sociology, 2, 372-403.
Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., & Van den Bergh, B. (2010). Going green to be seen: Status,
reputation, and conspicuous conservation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
3, 392-404.
Gruenfeld, D. H., Inesi, M. E., Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Power and the
objectification of social targets. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1, 111-
127.
Harbaugh, W. T. (1998). The prestige motive for making charitable transfers. The American
Economic Review, 2, 277-282.
Harmon-Jones, E., & Peterson, C. K. (2009). Supine Body Position Reduces Neural Response to
Anger Evocation. Psychological Science, 20, 1209-1210.
Harmon-Jones, E., Gable, P. A., & Peterson, C. K. (2010). The role of asymmetric frontal
cortical activity in emotion-related phenomena: A review and update. Biological
Psychology, 84, 451–462.
Harrigan, J. A., & Taing, K. T. (1997). Fooled by a smile: Detecting anxiety in others. Journal of
Nonverbal Behavior, 3, 203-221.
Harrigan, J. A., Lucic, K. S., Kay, D., McLaney, A., & Rosenthal, R. (1991). Effect of expresser
role and type of self‐touching on observers' perceptions. Journal of Applied Social
Psychology, 7, 585-609.
Harrigan, J. A., Wilson, K., & Rosenthal, R. (2004). Detecting state and trait anxiety from
auditory and visual cues: A meta-analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1,
56-66.
Power Buffers Stress 50
Hellhammer, D. H., Buchtal, J., Gutberlet, I., & Kirschbaum, C. (1997). Social hierarchy and
adrenocortical stress reactivity in men. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 22, 643-650.
Hermans, E. J., Putman, P., & Van Honk, J. (2006). Testosterone administration reduces
empathetic behavior: A facial mimicry study. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 7, 859-866.
Hermans, E. J., Putman, P., Baas, J. M., Gecks, N. M., Kenemans, J. L., & van Honk, J. (2007).
Exogenous testosterone attenuates the integrated central stress response in healthy young
women. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 8, 1052-1061.
Hermans, E. J., Putman, P., Baas, J. M., Koppeschaar, H. P., & van Honk, J. (2006). A single
administration of testosterone reduces fear-potentiated startle in humans. Biological
Psychiatry, 9, 872-874.
Hines, E. A., & Brown, G. E. (1932). Cold pressor test for measuring the reactibility of blood
pressure. American Heart Journal, 11, 1-9.
Hirsh, J. B., Galinsky, A. D., & Zhong, C. B. (2011). Drunk, Powerful, and in the Dark: How
General Processes of Disinhibition Produce Both Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 415-427.
Hogg, M. A. (2001). A social identity theory of leadership. Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 3, 184-200.
Hollerman, J. R., & Schultz, W. (1998). Dopamine neurons report an error in the temporal
prediction of reward during learning. Nature Neuroscience, 4, 304-309.
Huang, L., Galinsky, A. D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Guillory, L. E. (2011). Powerful postures versus
powerful roles which is the proximate correlate of thought and behavior? Psychological
Science, 1, 95-102.
Power Buffers Stress 51
Iacono, W. G. (2008). Effective policing. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 10, 1295-1308.
Ishikawa, S. S., Raine, A., Lencz, T., Bihrle, S., & Lacasse, L. (2001). Autonomic stress
reactivity and executive functions in successful and unsuccessful criminal psychopaths
from the community. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 3, 423-432.
Jensen, T. S., & Yaksh, T. L. (1984). Effects of an intrathecal dopamine agonist, apomorphine,
on thermal and chemical evoked noxious responses in rats. Brain Research, 2, 285-293.
Jordan, J., Sivanathan, N., & Galinsky, A. (2011). Risk-taking by those who have something to
lose and nothing to gain: The role of power, stability, and stress. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 56, 530-558.
Karim, A. A., Schneider, M., Lotze, M., Veit, R., Sauseng, P., Braun, C., & Birbaumer, N.
(2010). The truth about lying: Inhibition of the anterior prefrontal cortex improves
deceptive behavior. Cerebral Cortex, 1, 205-213.
Kelly, I., Ashleigh, H., & Beversdorf, D. Q. (2007). Effect of the cold pressor test on memory
and cognitive flexibility. Neurocase, 13, 154–157.
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition.
Psychological Review, 2, 265-284.
Keltner, D., Young, R. C., Heerey, E. A., Oemig, C., & Monarch, N. D. (1998). Teasing in
hierarchical and intimate relations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5,
1231-1247.
Kipnis, D. (1972). Does power corrupt? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1, 33–41.
Kircher, J. C., Horowitz, S. W., & Raskin, D. C. (1988). Meta-analysis of mock crime studies of
the control question polygraph technique. Law and Human Behavior, 1, 79-90.
Power Buffers Stress 52
Kirschbaum, C., & Hellhammer, D. H. (1994). Salivary cortisol in psychoneuroendocrine
research: Recent developments and applications. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 4, 313-333.
Kirschbaum, C., Pirke, K. M., & Hellhammer, D. H. (1993). The “Trier Social Stress Test”—A
tool for investigating psychobiological stress responses in a laboratory setting.
Neuropsychobiology, 28, 76–81.
Kozak, M. N., Marsh, A. A., & Wegner, D. M. (2006). What do I think you're doing? Action
identification and mind attribution. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 543-
555.
Krieger, N., Rowley, D. L., Herman, A. A., Avery, B., & Phillips, M. T. (1993). Racism, sexism,
and social class: implications for studies of health, disease, and well-being. American
Journal of Preventative Medicine, 9, 82-122.
Kudielka, B. M., Bellingrath, S., & Hellhammer, D. H. (2007). Further support for higher
salivary cortisol levels in “morning” compared to “evening” persons. Journal of
Psychosomatic Research, 62, 595-596.
Lammers, J., Galinsky, A. D., Gordijn, E. H., & Otten, S. (2008). Illegitimacy moderates the
effects of power on approach. Psychological Science, 6, 558-564.
Lammers, J., Stapel, D. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2010). Power increases hypocrisy. Psychological
Science, 5, 737-744.
Lammers, J., Stoker, J. I., Jordan, J., Pollmann, M., & Stapel, D. A. (2011). Power increases
infidelity among men and women. Psychological Science, 22, 1191-1197.
Larson, E. T., O'Malley, D. M., & Melloni, R. H. Jr. (2006). Aggression and vasotocin are
associated with dominant-subordinate relationships in zebrafish. Behavioral Brain
Research, 15, 94-102.
Power Buffers Stress 53
Lovallo, W. (1975). The cold pressor test and autonomic function: A review and integration.
Psychophysiology, 3, 268-282.
Lustyk, M. K. B., Olson, K. C., Gerrish, W. G., Holder, A., & Widman, L. (2010).
Psychophysiological and neuroendocrine responses to laboratory stressors in women:
Implications of menstrual cycle phase and stressor type. Biological Psychology, 2, 84-92.
MacLeod, C. M. (1991). Half a century of research on the Stroop effect: An integrative review.
Psychological Bulletin, 2, 163-203.
Mazur, A., & Booth, A. (1998). Testosterone and dominance in men. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 3, 353-363.
McClure, S. M., Daw, N. D., & Read Montague, P. (2003). A computational substrate for
incentive salience. Trends in Neurosciences, 8, 423-428.
McRae, A. L., Saladin, M. E., Brady, K. T., Upadhyaya, H., Back, S. E., & Timmerman, M. A.
(2006). Stress reactivity: Biological and subjective responses to the cold pressor and trier
social stressors. Human Psychopharmacology: Clinical and Experimental, 6, 377-385.
Mehta, P. H., & Beer, J. (2010). Neural mechanisms of the testosterone–aggression relation: The
role of orbitofrontal cortex. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 2357-2368.
Melloni, R. H., Jr., Connor, D. F., Hang, P. X. T., Harrison, R. J., & Ferris, C. F. (1997).
Anabolicandrogenic steroid exposure during adolescence facilitates aggressive behavior
in golden hamsters. Physiology and Behavior, 61, 359-364.
Mendes, W. B., Blascovich, J., Hunter, S. B., Lickel, B, & Jost, J. (2007). Threatened by the
unexpected: Physiological responses during social interactions with expectancy-violating
partners. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 698–716.
Power Buffers Stress 54
Motzkin, J. C., Newman, J. P., Kiehl, K. A., & Koenigs, M. (2011). Reduced prefrontal
connectivity in psychopathy. The Journal of Neuroscience, 48, 17348-17357.
Murphy, N. A. (2005). Using thin slices for behavioral coding. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior,
4, 235-246.
Overbeck, J. R., & Park, B. (2001). When power does not corrupt: Superior individuation
processes among powerful perceivers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4,
549-565.
Pessiglione, M., Seymour, B., Flandin, G., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2006). Dopamine-
dependent prediction errors underpin reward-seeking behaviour in humans. Nature, 7106,
1042-1045.
Piff, P. K., Stancato, D. M., Cote, S., Mendoza-Denton, R., & Keltner, D. (2012). Higher social
class predicts increased unethical behavior. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America, 109, 4086-4091.
Pryor, J. B., LaVite, C. M., & Stoller, L. M. (1993). A social psychological analysis of sexual
harassment: The person/situation interaction. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 42, 68-83.
Raine, A., Lencz, T., Bihrle, S., LaCasse, L., & Colletti, P. (2000). Reduced prefrontal gray
matter volume and reduced autonomic activity in antisocial personality disorder. Archives
of General Psychiatry, 2, 119-127.
Rejeski, W. J., Gagne, M., Parker, P. E. & Koritnik, D. R. (1989). Acute stress reactivity from
contested dominance in dominant and submissive males. Behavioral Medicine, 3, 118-
124.
Riener, C. R., Stefanucci, J. K., Proffitt, D. R., & Clore, G. (2011). An effect of mood on the
perception of geographical slant. Cognition & emotion, 25, 174-182.
Power Buffers Stress 55
Ronay, R., & Carney, D. R. (2013). Testosterone’s negative relationship with empathic accuracy
and perceived leadership ability. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 0, 1-8.
Ronay, R., & von Hippel, W. (2010). Power, testosterone, and risk‐taking. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making, 5, 473-482.
Sapolsky, R. M. (1990). Adrenocortical function, social rank, and personality among wild
baboons. Biological Psychiatry, 10, 862-878.
Sapolsky, R. M. (2005). The influence of social hierarchy on primate health. Science, 5722, 648-
652.
Sapolsky, R. M. (2011). Sympathy for the CEO. Science, 6040, 293-294.
Sapolsky, R. M., Alberts, S. C., & Altmann, J. (1997). Hypercortisolism associated with social
subordinance or social isolation among wild baboons. Archives of General Psychiatry,
12, 1137-1143.
Satoh, T., Nakai, S., Sato, T., & Kimura, M. (2003). Correlated coding of motivation and
outcome of decision by dopamine neurons. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30, 9913-9923.
Scheepers, D., de Wit, F., Ellemers, N., & Sassenberg, K. (2011). Social power makes the heart
work more efficiently: Evidence from cardiovascular markers of challenge and threat.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1, 371-374.
Schultheiss, O. C. & Stanton, S. J. (2009). Assessment of salivary hormones. In E. Harmon-
Jones & J. Beer (Eds.), Methods in the neurobiology of social and personality psychology
(pp. 17-44). New York, NY: Guilford.
Schultz, W. (1998). Predictive reward signal of dopamine neurons. Journal of Neurophysiology,
1, 1-27.
Power Buffers Stress 56
Schultz, W., Apicella, P., & Ljungberg, T. (1993). Responses of monkey dopamine neurons to
reward and conditioned stimuli during successive steps of learning a delayed response
task. The Journal of Neuroscience, 3, 900-913.
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., & Montague, P. R. (1997). A neural substrate of prediction and reward.
Science, 5306, 1593-1599.
Schwabe, L., & Wolf, O. T. (2010). Socially evaluated cold pressor stress after instrumental
learning favors habits over goal-directed action. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 7, 977-986.
Selye, H. (1936). A syndrome produced by diverse nocuous agents. Nature, 138, 32-36.
Sivanathan, N., Pillutla, M. M., & Keith Murnighan, J. (2008). Power gained, power lost.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2, 135-146.
Smith, P. K., Jostmann, N. B., Galinsky, A. D., & van Dijk, W. W. (2008). Lacking power
impairs executive functions. Psychological Science, 5, 441-447.
Sorokin, P. A., & Lunden, W. A. (1959). Power and morality: Who shall guard the guardians?
Boston, MA: Sargent.
Spence, S. A., Farrow, T. F. D., Leung, D. H., Shah, S., Reilly, B., Rahman , A., & Herford, A.
(2003). Lying as an executive function. In P. W. Halligan, C. Bass, & D. A. Oakley
(Eds), Malingering and Illness Deception (pp. 255–266). New York, NY: Oxford.
Spence, S. A., Hunter, M. D., Farrow, T. F. D., Green, R. D., Leung, D. H., Hughes, C. J., &
Ganesan, V. (2004). A cognitive neurobiological account of deception: Evidence from
functional neuroimaging. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London:
Biological Sciences, 1451, 1755-1762.
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 18, 643-662.
Power Buffers Stress 57
Swick, D., & Jovanovic, J. (2002). Anterior cingulate cortex and the stroop task:
Neuropsychological evidence for topographic specificity. Neuropsychologia, 8, 1240-
1253.
Thuma, J. R., Gilders, R., Verdun, M., & Loucks, A. B. (1995). Circadian rhythm of cortisol
confounds cortisol responses to exercise: Implications for future research. Journal of
Applied Physiology, 5, 1657-1664.
Tiedens, L. Z., & Fragale, A. R. (2003). Power moves: Complementarity in dominant and
submissive nonverbal behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3, 558-
568.
Tranel, D. (1994). Acquired sociopathy: The development of sociopathic behaviour following
focal brain damage. Progress in Experimental Personality and Psychopathological
Research, 17, 258–311.
Urry, H. L., van Reekum, C. M., Johnstone, T., Kalin, N. H., Thurow, M. E., Schaefer, H. S.,
Jackson, C. A., Frye, C. J., Greischar, L. L., Alexander, A. L., & Davidson, R. J. (2006).
Amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex are inversely coupled during regulation of
negative affect and predict the diurnal pattern of cortisol secretion among older adults.
Journal of Neuroscience, 26, 4415-4425.
van Honk, J., & Schutter, D. J. L. G. (2007). Testosterone reduces conscious detection of signals
serving social correction implications for antisocial behavior. Psychological Science, 8,
663-667.
van Kleef, G. A., Oveis, C., van der Löwe, I., LuoKogan, A., Goetz, J., & Keltner, D. (2008).
Power, distress, and compassion: turning a blind eye to the suffering of others.
Psychological Science, 19, 1315-1322.
Power Buffers Stress 58
Vrij, A. (2001). Implicit lie detection. The Psychologist, 14, 58-60.
Vrij, A., Semin, G. R., & Bull, R. (1996), Insight into behavior displayed during deception.
Human Communication Research, 22, 544–562.
Ward, G., & Keltner, D. (1998). Power and the consumption of resources. Unpublished
manuscript.
Williams, D. R., & Collins, C. (1995). US socioeconomic and racial differences in health:
patterns and explanations. Annual Review of Sociology, 21, 349-386.
Wise, R. A., & Rompré, P. P. (1989). Brain dopamine and reward. Annual Review of
Psychology, 1, 191-225.
Yap, A. J., Wazlawek, A. S., Lucas, B., Cuddy, A. J., & Carney, D. R. (2013). The ergonomics
of dishonesty: The effect of incidental expansive posture on stealing, cheating and traffic
violations. Psychological Science.
Power Buffers Stress 59
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank many research assistants for their help conducting and coding
these studies including: Samantha Chu, Dean Duffy, Kyonne Isaac, Poruz Khambatta, Nikolai
Nitchiporuk, and Dayna Stimson. We would also like to thank many colleagues for the generous
help thinking about these ideas and providing useful feedback on earlier versions of this
manuscript: Daniel Ames, Cameron Anderson, Joel Brockner, Bertram Gawronski, Laura Kray,
Malia Mason, Michael Morris, James Palczynski, Barry Staw, and participants at the Duck
Conference on Social Cognition. We also thank Kerith Gardner, Chris Mayer, Gita Johar and
Columbia Business School more broadly for their generous and support for this research. All of
these studies were conducted while all authors were affiliated with Columbia University. This
research was supported by an NSF CAREER grant (1056194) to Dana R. Carney.
Power Buffers Stress 60
Table 1. Descriptions and Inter-Rater Reliabilities for the 8 Coded Nonverbal Behaviors
Indicative of the Internal Conflict/Stress State during Deception.
Nonverbal behavior Description and expected relation to deception Inter-rater
reliability (r)
Cooperativeness Cooperative/agreeable in body/voice (-) .96
Immediacy Warmth/intimacy/interest in body/voice (-) .69
Nervousness Nervous/tense in body/voice (+) .70
Vocal uncertainty Uncertain in body/voice (+) .89
Accelerated prosody # syllables/# sec utterance took (+) .97
Lip press # times lips press together (+) .96
One-sided shoulder shrug Rapid one-sided partial shrug (+) .74
Speaking time # sec spent speaking (-) .88
Power Buffers Stress 61
Figure Captions
Figure 1. The effect of power on stress in the Trier Social Stress Test. Panel A displays the re-
sults for the low-stress condition in which no evaluators were present. Panel B displays the re-
sults for the high-stress condition in which evaluators were present. Power buffers the stress of
an oral speech as can be seen in Panel B.
Figure 2. The effect of power on self-reported stress in the Trier Social Stress Test. Only low-
power individuals in the high-stress condition reported feeling stressed. Power buffers the expe-
rience and self-report of stress. Error bars are SEs.
Figure 3. The effect of power on nonverbal stress in the Trier Social Stress Test. Only low-
power individuals in the high-stress condition nonverbally expressed stress. Power buffers the
nonverbal display of stress. Higher scores mean more nonverbal stress. Error bars are SEs.
Figure 4. The effect of power on self-reported pain in the cold-water submersion task. At both
the beginning and at the end of the 40-secs, low-power participants reported experiencing more
pain than the high-power participants. Higher values mean more self-reported pain.
Figure 5. Like truth-tellers, high-power liars show no emotional distress following the mock
crime and lie; only low-power liars report feeling emotional distress (a composite of: bashful,
guilty, troubled, scornful). Higher scores indicate more emotional distress. Error bars are SEs.
Figure 6. Like truth-tellers, high-power liars show no evidence of cognitive load following the
mock crime and lie; only low-power liars show evidence of cognitive load. Higher scores indi-
cate more cognitive load. Error bars are SEs.
Figure 7. Like truth-tellers, high-power liars show no evidence of cortisol reactivity during the
mock crime and lie; only low-power liars show evidence of cortisol reactivity (Y-axis is cortisol
Power Buffers Stress 62
at time 2 controlling for baseline cortisol). Higher scores indicate more cortisol. Error bars are
SEs.
Figure 8. Like truth-tellers, high-power liars show no nonverbal tells of deception; only the
low-power liars reveal their lies through subtle nonverbal tells (composite of: accelerated
prosody, cooperativeness, immediacy, lip presses, nervousness, one-sided shoulder shrugs,
speaking time, and vocal uncertainty). Higher scores indicate more nonverbal deception. Error
bars are SEs.
Figure 9. The effects of power and lie-telling on each of the eight individual nonverbal behav-
iors are depicted in eight separate panels. Panels A, B, C, and D show the same pattern as was
found on emotion, cognition, and cortisol. Across accelerated prosody, lip presses, partial shoul-
der shrugs, and vocal uncertainty, high-power liars—like truth-tellers—show no signs of internal
conflict or stress. In panel E a post-hoc contrast revealed that the one behavior differentiating
high-power liars from the others is immediacy—high-power liars are more cold, less intimate,
and less interested when lying. Panel F shows that for cooperativeness, there was a main effect of
lie vs. truth such that truth-tellers were more cooperative than liars. Panels G and H show no dif-
ferences among the four groups on nervousness or speaking time. Higher scores indicate more of
the behavior. Error bars are SEs.
Power Buffers Stress 71
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
Low High Low High
Part
ial S
houl
der
Shru
gs
Lie-tellers Truth-tellers
12.00
13.00
14.00
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
Low power High power Low power High power
Acc
eler
ated
Pro
sody
Lie-tellers Truth-tellers
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
Low High Low High
Voc
al U
ncer
tain
ty
Lie-tellers Truth-tellers
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
Low High Low High
Lip
Pre
ss
Lie-tellers Truth-tellers
6.00
12.00
18.00
24.00
30.00
36.00
42.00
Low power High power Low power High power
Spea
king
Tim
e
Lie-tellers Truth-tellers
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
Low High Low High
Imm
edia
cy
Lie-tellers Truth-tellers
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
Low High Low High
Ner
vous
ness
Lie-tellers Truth-tellers
Note: Planned contrast sequence (3, -1, -1, -1) was statistically significant: t = 1.85, p < .07; r = .27
Note: Planned contrast sequence (3, -1, -1, -1) was statistically significant: t = 2.19, p < .05; r = .32
Note: Planned contrast sequence (3, -1, -1, -1) was statistically significant: t = 2.67, p < .01; r = .38
Note: Planned contrast sequence (3, -1, -1, -1) was statistically significant: t = 2.10, p < .05; r = .31
Note: No contrast sequences, main effects, or interactions were statistically significant
Note: No contrast sequences, main effects, or interactions were statistically significant
Note: Only the main effect of lie vs. truth was statistically significant: t = -2.36, p < .05; r = .34
Note: Only the post-hoc contrast sequence (1, -3, 1, 1) was statistically significant: t = 2.03, p < .05; r = .30
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
Low power High power Low power High power
Coo
pera
tiven
ess
Lie-tellers Truth-tellers
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H