Ed Rooksby

Towards a Better Theory of the Capitalist State:

Combining Poulantzas’ and Block’s Approaches

In this paper1 I argue that much of Nicos Poulantzas’ theory of the capitalist state as

set out in his final work, State, Power, Socialism (SPS), may be fruitfully combined

with the ideas of Fred Block as put forward in two influential essays - ‘The Ruling

Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State’ and ‘Beyond Relative

Autonomy: State Managers as Historical Subjects’. I summarise, first, the theory of

the capitalist state which Poulantzas advances in SPS. I argue that much of this theory

provides a strong and convincing basis for an understanding of the way in which the

capitalist state functions. However, I go on to argue that SPS is seriously flawed in

that Poulantzas cannot adequately specify the structural mechanisms which ensure

that the state tends to operate in favour of the long-term interests of capital in general.

I then summarise Block’s work and argue that it provides us with the resources to

improve Poulantzas’ theory. Poulantzas’ theory can be modified to incorporate

Block’s framework – and with this combination there emerges, I argue, a fuller and

more cogent theory of the capitalist state2.

1 This is a shortened and revised version of a longer piece of work (a PhD thesis chapter). An earlier version of this paper was published by York University in the York Working Papers series.2 The Poulantzas-Block hybrid approach that emerges towards the end of this paper can be termed a ‘general theory’ of the bourgeois democratic capitalist state (as such it is not in keeping with the approach of Jessop (1982: 211-213) for whom the formulation of such a general theory is not a legitimate endeavour). That is, it is intended to be broadly applicable to all democratic capitalist states (it does not apply so easily in the case of military dictatorships for example in which, for instance, the possibility of open working class struggle – which plays a large role in Block’s approach – may not exist). As such, it is necessarily presented at a certain level of abstraction. This paper seeks to identify the structural mechanisms that tend to ensure that capitalist states serve the long-term interests of capital. There is no way that a ‘general theory’ of this kind could include some comprehensive exposition of the exact institutional and procedural specificities through which and by means of which these structural mechanisms are concretely brought to bear in particular capitalist states. What is offered here is a broad account of the way in which capitalist states function. Concrete, empirical studies of particular states in particular conjunctures would be needed in order to ‘fill in the details’ in relation to the precise institutional forms and channels in and through which, for example, state managers operate.

1

Ed Rooksby

Poulantzas - State, Power, Socialism

Poulantzas is most famous for his early, heavily Althusserean account of the ‘relative

autonomy’ of the state3. As many critics have pointed out4, however, this early work is

highly flawed. Firstly, it is severely functionalist - Poulantzas does not specify exactly

how the state fulfils its pre-given role as the ‘factor of cohesion’5. Secondly, he tends

to present the economic and political ‘regions’ as actually (rather than simply

analytically) distinct. Thirdly, Poulantzas’ emphasis on the determining role of the

structural matrix of the capitalist mode of production (CMP) is impossible to combine

with the idea of contingent class struggle. His later work is far superior – SPS, in

particular, represents a major advance in Poulantzas’ thinking. In SPS, Poulantzas

rejects the Althusserean underpinnings of his previous work and in so doing manages

to overcome many of the central problems of his early theory. In SPS Poulantzas’

analytical starting point for the theorisation of the capitalist state shifts from the

assumption of a determinant structural matrix composed of relatively autonomous

regions to an examination of the nature of the relations of production and social

division of labour in the CMP. This shift allows Poulantzas to develop a vastly

improved theory of the state and its relationship with the economy.

The nature of the polity and economy is, in every mode of production, he argues,

governed by the particular organisation of the relations of production and social

division of labour - and indeed these relations determine whether or not the economy

and polity actually exist as distinct entities. The relative separation of the state and the

economy is, Poulantzas argues, ‘a peculiar feature of capitalism’ (Poulantzas, 2000:

18). It arises out of the social relations of production in the CMP in that it is the

complete separation of the direct producers from the object and means of their labour

under capitalism which removes the need for direct ‘extra-economic’ coercion in the

3 See, for example, Political Power and Social Classes.4 Poulantzas came to recognise the faults in his early work too.5 This is not to suggest that analysis of the capitalist state in terms of the functional requirements of capitalism must be rejected. The problem is that this approach in itself (i.e. functionalism) cannot provide an adequate account of state power for the simple reason that it does not necessarily follow that some structure or system must exist simply because it is functional for something else. In his early work, Poulantzas fails to identify the institutional, structural or procedural mechanisms or processes by means of which the capitalist state actually secures the functional requirements of capital.

2

Ed Rooksby

process of production and therefore, allows political power to be (as it were) expelled

from the economy and established in a separate, specialised, institutional apparatus.

The relative separation of the economy and the polity in the CMP, however, is

precisely a relative separation. That is, the two instances are separate in the CMP

relative to their condition in pre-capitalist modes of production - they are not wholly

distinct even under capitalism. There is, Poulantzas stresses, profound interpenetration

between political and economic (and ideological) elements in the CMP.

Poulantzas goes on to say that the relative separation of the state and economy in the

CMP is ‘nothing other than the capitalist form of the presence of the political in the

constitution and reproduction of the relations of production’ (Poulantzas, 2000: 19).

That is, the relative separation of the state from the economy in the CMP forms the

particular mode by which the state is present in the capitalist economy. The state is

present in the economy in that it is engaged in various functions which are central to

the reproduction, accumulation and valorisation of capital6. The state and the

economy, then, thoroughly interpenetrate. However these functions cannot be

provided by anything other than an apparatus which is organisationally independent of

any particular capital - an apparatus which, to some extent, stands above the

economy. It is the institutional relative separation of the state from the economy, then,

which allows the state to perform its functions which are essential for the economy

and, therefore, inherently economic themselves.

Having theorised the relationship between the state and the economy, and having

identified the ‘space’ of the state within the CMP, Poulantzas is then free to

investigate further what exactly the capitalist state is and what it does. In SPS

Poulantzas argues that the state is ‘the specific material condensation of a relationship

of forces among classes and class fractions’ (Poulantzas, 2000: 129). The state is, in

effect, the ever-changing material reflection or expression of the balance of class

forces - it is the institutional accretion of the effects of past class struggles. The state’s

structure and internal organisation, that is, is constantly modified and re-shaped by

struggles between classes and between class fractions. It follows that the state is not a

monolithic, unified bloc - it is a fractured apparatus, riven with contradictions. Neither

6 It is, for example, responsible for the reproduction of labour power, the provision of transport networks, and the regulation of markets. All these things go to the heart of the productive process since without them the capitalist economy would not exist.

3

Ed Rooksby

is it an apparatus which is entirely controlled by, or which exclusively represents the

interests of, the bourgeoisie. The struggles of the working class shape the state’s

structure and, therefore, working class power (to a certain extent) is manifested and

embedded within the state and their interests are reflected in various aspects of state

policy.

Though its structure is shaped by class struggle, the state, however, is not a passive

entity. The state itself has a positive role to play in the process of class struggle. The

structures of the state – what Poulantzas terms the state’s ‘institutional materiality’ –

feed back into the class struggle helping to mould and channel its outcome.

Poulantzas argues that ‘[t]he capitalist state… plays an organic role in political

domination and struggle, by constituting the bourgeoisie as the politically dominant

class’ (Poulantzas, 2000: 125-126). So, although Poulantzas is careful to stress that

that certain interests of the dominated classes are reflected in state policy, he is clear

that the dominant class (fractions) are structurally privileged within the state’s

‘institutional materiality’. The structures and practices of the state create, organise and

help to reproduce the domination of the bourgeoisie.

How is the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie inscribed in the state’s ‘institutional

materiality’? One major way in which the state establishes and reproduces the

conditions necessary for the domination of the bourgeoisie is through the

‘individualisation’ of dominated classes. Poulantzas argues that institutions of the

capitalist state7 constitute the public as atomised subjects. People are identified and

addressed by the capitalist state in terms of isolated individuals - the bearers of

abstract individual rights - and subjects engage with the state in such a way that

reinforces this social atomisation. This process serves capitalist interests not only in

that it fragments the popular masses, preventing their political organisation against the

bourgeoisie, but in other ways too. This particular, atomised form of individual

identity is also functional for capitalism. Individual juridical-political subjects in

capitalism, engage in the ‘public sphere’ as abstract subjects - as formally free and

equal ‘citizens’. They do not engage in politics in a form that takes account of the real

material inequalities between them. Political struggle takes place in a narrow sphere -

class inequalities are excluded from the frame of reference of bourgeois democracy

7 Especially institutions of bourgeois democracy and bourgeois law.

4

Ed Rooksby

and are, then, obscured and hidden. Poulantzas goes on to argue that individualised,

formally free and equal subjects, purged of their class identity, are then unified (in an

abstract sense) by the capitalist state in the form of the ‘people-nation’. The capitalist

state, that is, presents itself as the classless public unity of subjects within its area of

territorial jurisdiction. Poulantzas also argues that while it acts to atomise the

dominated classes, the state, simultaneously, functions to organise and unify the

bourgeoisie – cancelling out the effect of individualisation on this class8.

There is a further way in which the ‘institutional materiality’ of the capitalist state

establishes and reproduces bourgeois hegemony. Poulantzas claims that the state

‘incarnates intellectual labour as separated from manual labour’ (Poulantzas, 2000:

56) – it embodies, therefore, an important aspect of the capitalist division of labour.

State officials tend to specialise in intellectual work, as opposed to the manual labour

performed by the direct producers. Moreover, the intellectual labour carried out by

state officials centres, of course, on the administration of political power and is

conducted in a specialist bureaucratic and/or juridical discourse which non-specialists

would find difficult to follow. The working class is, as a whole, then, effectively

excluded from the discourses of state power and, therefore, prevented from

participating in the exercise of this power. For Poulantzas the state is, therefore, in a

sense, the material embodiment of the working class’s exclusion from power.

There is another important reason why the capitalist state, for Poulantzas, ensures the

domination of the bourgeoisie. We have seen that the state is not the exclusive

representative of bourgeois interests but also expresses working class interests.

However, Poulantzas is clear that the dominant class (fractions) are able to manoeuvre

much more effectively on the ‘strategic terrain’ of the state than are others. This is

because while different branches or sectors of the state act as ‘power centres’ for

different fractions of the ruling class, the working class does not directly control any

part of the state apparatus - they have only ‘centres of resistance’ which they

influence indirectly. Whereas the power of ruling class fractions is manifested directly

in various branches of the state apparatus, the working class have no immediate

access to the state apparatus. Instead working class interests are interpreted and

mediated by state employees (who are not working class themselves) in certain

branches of the state that, to some extent, embody working class interests. The state

8 I say more about this later.

5

Ed Rooksby

personnel, Poulantzas argues, operate on the grounds of a particular ideology in which

‘a neutral State appears as the representative of the general will and interest, and the

arbiter among struggling classes’ (Poulantzas, 2000: 156). State employees who act

on behalf of the working class interpret their demands through the distorting lens of

this ideology. There is an element of self-interest at play here too, in that state

employees have an interest in the maintenance of the separation between manual and

intellectual labour – since their role is rooted in this division. The state personnel will

act on working class interests only insofar as these can be combined with their

attachment to the division between political managers and the passive majority.

Furthermore, Poulantzas argues that the bourgeoisie is able to remould the circuits and

hierarchies of power within the state to maintain its dominance. If, for instance, the

Left establish a ‘centre of resistance’ at a strategic point in the state, the bourgeoisie

will simply re-shape the structure of power so that this ‘centre of resistance’ is

isolated and neutralised9. Even when a Left government controls state branches and

‘manages to gain control of the hitherto dominant apparatus, the state institutional

structure enables the bourgeoisie to transpose the role of dominance from one

apparatus to another’ (Poulantzas, 2000: 138)10.

We have seen, then, a number of ways in which the ‘institutional materiality’ of the

state engenders and reproduces the subordination of the dominated classes. It remains

to be shown, however, how Poulantzas conceives of the way in which the bourgeoisie

is unified and how coherent policy, which serves the interests of the dominant class

fractions, emerges from the fractured ‘strategic terrain’ of the state.

As in his earlier work, Poulantzas claims that the state organises a unified alliance of

dominant class fractions (the power bloc) under the leadership of a hegemonic

fraction. The wider bourgeoisie is then unified under the leadership of this hegemonic

fraction. State policy favours the central interests of this fraction and incorporates, as

9 This can be carried out through methods such as establishing ‘parallel power networks’, ‘short-circuiting’ decision-making made elsewhere in the system, through selective filtering of information and through a process in which policies which emanate from the Left-controlled apparatus are not acted on elsewhere in the state. 10 He provides a couple of examples here. He points to the role that the House of Lords played in blocking a British Labour government’s nationalisation bills and the role that the Chilean law courts played in obstructing the Allende administration’s policies. In both cases ‘institutions-apparatuses that normally… [had] an altogether secondary role, or a purely decorative function… suddenly… [took] on a decisive role’ (Poulantzas, 2000: 138).

6

Ed Rooksby

far as possible, the interests of other bourgeois fractions, inasmuch as they are

compatible with those of the hegemonic fraction. In his early work Poulantzas is

vague about how state policy that allows for this hierarchical, unifying arrangement

emerges. In SPS, however, Poulantzas offers an intricate account of this process.

Poulantzas appears to believe that the unification of the dominant class fractions

comes as a direct corollary of (and is therefore synonymous with) the development of

coherent state policy11. We have already seen that different state apparatuses act as

power centres for different fractions of the dominant class (or as centres of resistance

for dominated classes). Each of these class fractions have different interests and

therefore the policies – Poulantzas terms them ‘micro-policies’ - that each apparatus

attempts to put into effect are often mutually contradictory. The state is, thus, the site

of conflict and competition between the various micro-policies developed by these

different power centres (or centres of resistance). However, Poulantzas argues that

from this seeming chaos of conflicting micro-policies, a coherent policy line emerges

– state policy consists in the outcome of the collision of these micro-policies within

the structural framework of the state, which acts to shape this outcome in certain

ways. As Jessop puts it, this:

line emerges in a complex fashion from the institutional matrix of the state and the clash of specific strategies and tactics. It is not reducible solely to the effects of an institutional system of ‘structural selectivity’…. Nor is it reducible to the… successful application of a coherent, global strategy established at the apex of the entire state system. Only the interaction of matrix and strategies account for the general line. (Jessop, 1985: 127)

What Jessop refers to as the ‘structural selectivity’ of the state in Poulantzas’ schema

consists of:

a complex set of institutional mechanisms and political practices which serve to advance (or obstruct) particular fractional or class interests. Included here are: selective filtering of information, systematic lack of action on certain issues, definition of mutually contradictory priorities and counter-priorities, [and] the uneven implementation of measures originating elsewhere in the state system…. (Jessop, 1985: 127)

These mechanisms and practices, then, select certain micro-policies (while blocking

and cancelling out others) and moulds them into an overall policy line which serves

the interests of the dominant class fractions. Poulantzas is clear that the ‘structural

selectivity’ of the state is always geared in favour of the dominant class fractions. The

11 The overall unity of the state apparatus, too, Poulantzas suggests, emerges as an effect of the generation of a general policy line amongst the various apparatuses of the state.

7

Ed Rooksby

hegemonic fraction, he argues, is able to shape the structure of the state in its favour

because they can both establish the dominance of their power centre within the state

system and can transform any apparatus which is already dominant into a power

centre under their control. This dominant power centre will then, as Jessop

summarises ‘penetrate the personnel of other apparatuses, short-circuit decision-

making elsewhere in the state… and switch the relays and circuits of power’ (Jessop,

1985: 128) in order to structure the state in ways that privilege the interests of the

dominant fractions.

However, Poulantzas insists that the structural matrix of the state does not pre-

determine the content of the policy line that emerges at the end of the process of

policy formulation and neither do the micro-policies first generated by the hegemonic

class fraction’s power centre(s) always conquer those of other power centres in the

conflict of strategies within the state matrix. As Jessop points out, for Poulantzas, the

most appropriate strategy to ensure the hegemony of the dominant class fractions

‘often emerges only ex post through the collision among mutually contradictory

micro-policies and political projects formulated in different parts of the state system’

(Jessop, 1985: 128) and that ‘no individual, group, or class subject can be said to have

chosen or decided the final outcome of conflicting micro-power plays’ (Jessop, 1985:

129). The final outcome embodies a series of compromises between the interests of

different bourgeois fractions and incorporates some of the interests of the dominated

classes. The nature of this compromise has the effect of uniting the bourgeoisie, as a

whole, around a policy programme which favours the essential interests of the

hegemonic class fraction and which also secures the dominated classes’ consent to

their continued subordination.

Evaluation and Criticism of SPS

Many aspects of Poulantzas’ theory of the state in SPS are impressive and convincing.

His theory is, however, plagued by serious problems. I shall draw out the inadequate

aspects of the conceptualisation of state power in SPS further on. First, however, I

point out those parts of SPS that seem successful.

8

Ed Rooksby

Poulantzas’ argument that the relative separation of the state from the economy in the

CMP is simply ‘the capitalist form of the presence of the political in the constitution

and reproduction of the relations of production’ (Poulantzas, 2000: 19) is far superior

to his earlier theory. This approach allows him to account, convincingly, for the

specificity of the institutional concentration of political power, relatively separated

from the economy, under capitalism while, at the same time, permitting him to

conceive of the profound interpenetration of the political and the economic.

Poulantzas’ central analytical focus on social relationships, rather than structure,

enables him to see that the structure of the state is, itself, generated and reproduced by

social relations and practices. In SPS structure and class struggle are shown to be part

of the same process – class struggle constitutes and shapes the structure of the state

and, in turn, the structure of the state feeds back into class struggle, shaping its

development and outcomes. His theorisation of the state as ‘the specific materialised

condensation’ of the balance of class forces is a highly valuable one. Furthermore, his

account of the ways in which working class subordination is inscribed within the

state’s institutional materiality is, in the main, convincing.

In regard to the problem of how the state manages to organise the bourgeoisie and

formulate coherent policy in the long-term interests of capital in general12, his

suggested solutions are much less impressive. As we have seen, Poulantzas indicates

that the unification of the bourgeoisie comes as a corollary of the formulation of state

policy to ensure long-term bourgeois hegemony. In itself, this seems a reasonable

explanation of how the effect of individualisation is overcome in the case of the ruling

class – the trouble is that Poulantzas’ account of how the state formulates policy in the

interests of bourgeois hegemony is deeply flawed. In what follows, then, my

explanation of why Poulantzas’ account of the emergence of policy which favours the

long-term interests of capital in general is unsuccessful should, simultaneously,

explain why his account of the unification of the bourgeoisie is also unsuccessful –

since for Poulantzas the latter comes as a corollary of the former.

12 When I refer to the formulation of policy in the ‘long-term interests of capital in general’ I do not mean to suggest that there is only one possible such formulation. The ‘long-term interests of capital in general’ should be understood in terms of the reproduction over the long-term of social, political and economic conditions allowing for successful capital accumulation in the context of a competitive international capitalist system. These conditions may be secured in a variety of ways.

9

Ed Rooksby

In his criticism of Poulantzas’ theory of the emergence of coherent state policy

serving the interests of capital in general from the clash of micro-policies, Jessop

raises two major objections. He argues that Poulantzas’ account here has, firstly,

awkward ‘instrumentalist’ and, secondly, problematic teleological and determinist

implications (Jessop, 1985: 142-144). What Jessop terms the ‘instrumentalist’

approach to state power is one that is often associated with the State Monopoly

Capitalism approach of post-war Communist parties and also (rather unfairly) with the

work of theorists such as Miliband (1969) and Domhoff (1967 and 1970). According

to its critics the ‘instrumentalist’ approach posits that the state operates in favour of

the bourgeoisie because members of the ruling class staff key positions within the

state bureaucracy or that the state, in some other way, is directly manipulated and

wholly controlled by the bourgeoisie13. The major problem for any theory that

suggests that the state is an instrument under the direct control of the bourgeoisie is

that it cannot account for the state’s necessary degree of autonomy14. The state must

be capable of transcending the short-term interests of particular fractions of capital

and of the capitalist class as a whole if it is to act in the interests of capital in general

in the long-term. Indeed, it is clear that capitalist states sometimes implement reforms

that are fiercely opposed by large sections of capital (even if these reforms ultimately

serve to rationalise capitalism and therefore help to secure the bourgeoisie’s long-term

domination)15. The ‘instrumentalist’ approach, its critics point out, cannot adequately

explain this since, as it posits that bourgeois forces are in direct command of state

power, it does not allow for the institutional ‘distance’ between state and capital that

would enable the former to function with some degree of autonomy from the latter.

As Jessop suggests, Poulantzas seems to lapse into an awkward ‘instrumentalism’ in

his explanation of why the state’s ‘structural selectivity’ always favours the 13 I should point out that in fact, as Barrow (2008) shows, the ‘instrumentalism’ attributed to certain theorists (such as Miliband in particular) is often a caricature and misrepresentation of those theorists’ work. As Barrow argues, Miliband never embraced the simplistic positions that are often associated with his state theory and, indeed, it is arguable that the version of ‘instrumentalism’ often described by critics of this approach bears little relation to any actually existing work on the capitalist state. For a recent, rigorous restatement of the ‘instrumentalist’ approach freed from the distorted positions usually attributed to it see Wetherly (2008). I go on to criticise Poulantzas for falling into the trap of a crude form of ‘instrumentalism’ himself – he suggests that a hegemonic fraction of the bourgeoisie directly and wholly controls the essential sites of state power. This is to say, then, that Poulantzas incorporates into his own theory the crude kind of ‘instrumentalism’ often unfairly attributed to others. This is highly ironic given that Poulantzas’ contributions to the Poulantzas-Miliband debate of the 1970s made him perhaps the most famous critic of ‘instrumentalism’. 14 For such criticism of ‘instrumentalism’ – albeit criticism Barrow (2008) singles out for censure – see, for example, Block (1987a: 52-53).15 Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ is a prime example.

10

Ed Rooksby

hegemonic class fraction. Poulantzas’s claim that the hegemonic class fraction can

shape the terrain of the state in its own favour implies that this fraction has direct

control of the state – or, at least, that it always controls the essential sites of power

within the state (which amounts, effectively, to command over the state as a whole).

Poulantzas’ theory, then, runs into the same difficulties commonly associated with the

‘instrumentalist’ approach. There is a similar problem in Poulantzas’ argument that

the dominant class fractions can re-shape the structure of state power to neutralise any

centres of resistance established at strategic points within the state.

Jessop detects an overarching functionalism-determinism too, in Poulantzas’ account

of the emergence of state policy. As we have seen, Poulantzas’ discussion of the play

of micro-policies within the state’s ‘institutional materiality’ suggests that the

formulation of state policy is a conjunctural, almost haphazard process. Yet, at the

same time, however, Poulantzas seems to insist that bourgeois hegemony must and

always does emerge out of the contingent interplay of micro-policies – as Jessop

remarks, Poulantzas ‘wanted to argue that the capitalist state can never in the long run

do anything but reproduce bourgeois class domination’ (Jessop, 1985: 134). There is,

then, a strong element of determinism here that makes the idea of contingency in the

generation of state policy rather redundant. Furthermore, as Jessop comments, in that

Poulantzas insisted ‘on the macro-necessity of class domination’, he ‘tended to see the

diversity of micro-policies as the cunning means whereby the predestined logic of this

domination is realised’ (Jessop, 1985: 144). That is, an underlying teleology seems to

guide and drive the process.

Why is it that Poulantzas, after having been at great pains to advance a theory based

on contingency – the unpredictable inter-play of micro-policies – lapses into

determinism and an ‘instrumentalism’ in which the hegemonic class fraction enjoys

complete control over the essential sites of state power? It seems to me that it was

only through incorporating a measure of such ‘instrumentalism’ and determinism that

Poulantzas could resolve the problem of how state policy in the long-term interests of

capital in general emerges out of the conflict of micro-policies – they constitute a kind

of deus ex machina which Poulantzas imports into his theory (by sleight of hand) in

order to get himself out of an impossible situation. It seems to me that Poulantzas’

theory of the play of micro-policies filtered through the institutional materiality of the

11

Ed Rooksby

state (itself the crystallisation of past struggles) could account for why it is that the

policies of the dominant fractions tend to emerge victorious from their clash with

those of other fractions, but it cannot account for the emergence of policy which

serves the long-term interest of capital in general. Some explanation is necessary

here. It seems possible to argue that the structure of the state gives dominant class

fractions an inherent advantage over other fractions and that this advantage is

constantly reproduced through the struggle of unequal class forces (unequal because

of the bias in structural selectivity). We could posit that, ever since the coming into

being of the capitalist state, dominant class fractions have enjoyed an inherent

advantage in the clash of micro-policies and that this advantage is continually

renewed, by the success of structurally advantaged micro-policies.

However, this structural tendency towards the reproduction of advantage for certain

class fractions cannot explain why certain interests of the dominated class fractions

are incorporated into state policy. Why is it that certain micro-policies (or elements

from them) emanating from centres of resistance are taken up by the state and

articulated with the central interests of the dominant fractions? It must be remembered

that, for Poulantzas, there are, effectively, no third parties involved in the process of

the formulation of state policy. There is no subject or apparatus which can stand apart

from the struggle between micro-policies and take account of the ‘bigger picture’, in

order to work out what political and economic strategies would best serve capital’s

long-term interests and to choose between the competing micro-policies accordingly.

State policy, as we have seen, must emerge organically from the contingent clash of

micro-policies. Poulantzas’ theory, however, does not provide us with any convincing

account of how this could possibly occur. It does not seem unreasonable to imagine

that Poulantzas was aware of this problem. He, perhaps, surreptitiously introduces

‘instrumentalist’ and determinist elements into his theory in order shore it up. The

‘instrumentalist’ elements suggest (without being explicit about it) that, perhaps, the

hegemonic fraction are fully cognisant of their long-term interests and those of the

wider bourgeoisie and act on this consciousness – pulling the strings of the state in

order to secure these interests. The determinist elements suggest that state policy in

the long-term interests of capital in general is an outcome pre-determined from the

start - somehow programmed into the process of the clash of micro-policies.

12

Ed Rooksby

Poulantzas’ theory, then, does not specify, convincingly, the mechanisms through

which the state ensures that policy is developed which favours the long-term interests

of capital. It seems to me that if we are to identify these mechanisms we must reject

much of what Poulantzas has to say and focus, instead, on the deliberate intervention

of human subjects (while avoiding the sort of class ‘instrumentalism’ that rests on the

idea that the bourgeoisie, or some fraction of it, are in direct command of the state). It

is my contention that Fred Block’s state theory can provide us with a convincing

account of the processes inherent within the functioning of the capitalist state which

ensure that it tends to operate in favour of the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie.

Furthermore, Block’s theory can be combined with those elements of Poulantzas’

theory which I have argued are most successful.

Fred Block’s Theory of the Capitalist State

Block starts from the assumption that capitalists are ‘conscious of their interests as

capitalists, but, [that] in general, they are not conscious of what is necessary to

reproduce the social order’ (Block, 1987a: 54). In order to illustrate this he points out

that the capitalist class often vehemently oppose state measures of reform, even

though these reforms may work in their long-term interests. Capitalism must rely,

then, for its long-term survival on an apparatus (relatively) independent of the

capitalist class and which is capable of identifying and safeguarding the long-term

interests of capital in general – this apparatus is the state. Unlike Poulantzas, however,

Block does not argue that this function emerges, somehow, unconsciously, through

the collision of various class (fraction) interests, filtered through the institutional

structures of the state. Instead, Block contends that this process occurs because of the

conscious and deliberate intervention of human beings within the state apparatus – the

state managers16. The structural position of state managers, Block argues, ‘forces

them to achieve some consciousness of what is necessary to maintain the viability of

the social order’ (Block, 1987a: 67) and forces them to act on this consciousness.

16 For Block ‘state managers’ are ‘those at the peak of the executive and legislative branches of the state apparatus’ (Block, 1987b: 201, fn.9) – this ‘includes the highest-ranking civil servants, as well as appointed and elected politicians’ (Block, 1987a: 197 fn.5). In the context of the British state, then, this term would cover, for example, the Prime Minister, senior and junior ministers, high-ranking civil service advisors and administrators in the various government departments and senior appointed political aides employed directly by the party in government.

13

Ed Rooksby

They are forced to ‘concern themselves… with the reproduction of the social order’

Block claims, ‘because their continued power rests on the maintenance of political

and economic order’ (Block, 1987a: 54).

Whereas Poulantzas tends to regard state personnel simply as the direct

representatives or agents of class fractions,17 Block claims that they must be seen as a

social category which is, to some extent, independent of class forces. Block argues

that we must acknowledge ‘that state power is sui generis, not reducible to class

power’ (Block, 1987b: 84). It is this independence from class forces which allows

state managers to function with a kind of relative autonomy. State managers are not

subject to the direct control of capitalist class fractions and so can formulate policy

proposals with a measure of objectivity, in order to run the state in the long-term

interests of capital accumulation.

For Block, state managers have their own particular interests – he suggests that it is

useful to conceive of state managers, collectively, as ‘self-interested maximizers,

interested in maximizing their own power, prestige, and wealth’ (Block, 1987b: 84).

Crucially, however, state managers operate ‘within particular class contexts, which

shape and limit the exercise of… [their] power’ (Block, 1987b: 84) – that is, they can

only maximise their own interests within a set of political and economic constraints. It

is the nature of these constraints which tends to ensure that state managers act in the

long-term interests of capital. So what is this class context in which the state

personnel must operate? Block argues that the state personnel must respond to

pressures from two main directions. Firstly, they are subject to strong pressure from

the capitalist class to act in certain ways and, secondly, from a lesser, but still highly

significant, set of pressures from the working class. Let us look at both of these in

turn.

In relation to the power the capitalist class holds over the activity of the state

personnel, Block differentiates between what he calls the ‘subsidiary structural

mechanisms’ through which the bourgeoisie exert pressure and ‘major structural

mechanisms’. Unfortunately, I do not have the space here to go into the subsidiary

mechanisms Block identifies and so I shall simply outline what he has to say about

17 With the partial exception of those state employees that re-interpret the interests of the working class in line with their own particular ideology.

14

Ed Rooksby

major structural mechanisms18. The major structural mechanism which tends to ensure

that state managers act in the interests of capitalists is rooted in the fact that state

managers are dependent on the existence of a healthy economy. This is true, Block

points out, for two reasons:

First, the capacity of the state to finance itself through taxation or borrowing depends on the state of the economy. If economic activity is in decline, the state will have difficulty maintaining its revenues at an adequate level. Second, public support for a regime will decline sharply if the regime presides over a serious drop in the level of economic activity, with a parallel rise in unemployment and shortages of key goods. Such a drop in support increases the likelihood that the state managers will be removed from power one way or another. And even if the drop is not that dramatic, it will increase the challenges to the regime and decrease the regime’s political ability to take effective actions. (Block, 1987a: 58)

Furthermore, as Block goes on to explain:

In a capitalist economy the level of economic activity is largely determined by the private investment decisions of capitalists. This means that capitalists, in their collective role as investors, have a veto over state policies in that their failure to invest at adequate levels can create major political problems for the state managers. This discourages state managers from taking actions that might seriously decrease the rate of investment. (Block, 1987a: 58)

Block is careful to point out, however, that although capitalists have a kind of

collective veto over state policy19, this does not necessarily mean that they hold or

exercise this power of veto as a class-conscious force. When capitalists respond to

state policy that they do not like by withholding investment or disinvesting, they do so

on the basis of a narrow self-interest in their own profits. Block calls the sum total of

all these evaluations by individual capitalists, the level of ‘business confidence’.

Capitalists, then, are able to exercise their veto over state policy ‘without any

members of the ruling class consciously deciding to act “politically” against the

regime in power’ (Block, 1987a: 62).

The fact that state managers are dependent on a healthy level of investment, however,

does not merely help to prevent state officials from enacting anti-capitalist policies. It

is also the key mechanism which helps to ensure that state managers tend to act in the

18 Block’s subsidiary mechanisms play only a very minor role in his theory – his theory of the state rests firmly upon the major mechanisms he identifies. It is not essential, therefore, that I cover them here. 19 Block argues that there have been certain ‘exceptional’ historical periods – periods of world war, depression and post-war reconstruction – that have allowed state managers more freedom of action in relation to capitalists than is normally the case (see Block, 1987b: 87-89 and Block, 1987a: 65-67). Since I am seeking to conceptualise capitalist state power under normal, rather than ‘exceptional’ (that is to say, very unusual) conditions, and since space is limited, I shall not cover this aspect of Block’s theory.

15

Ed Rooksby

long-term interests of capital in general. Block argues that the reliance of state

managers on a healthy capitalist economy means that they have a fundamental and

over-riding interest in making sure that the policies they formulate and put into

practice help to facilitate and encourage adequate levels of investment. ‘In doing so,’

Block writes, ‘the state managers address the problem of investment from a broader

perspective than that of the individual capitalist’ (Block, 1987a: 59). Their central

interest in maintaining healthy rates of capital accumulation means that state

managers are forced to concern themselves with the performance of the national

economy as a whole and to produce policy that serves the interests of capital

considered collectively. In other words state managers must act in the long-term

interests of capital in general.

This, however, is still only a partial account – Block’s analysis of the pressures that

emanate from the bourgeoisie does not fully explain why state managers tend to

introduce reforms that improve the rationality of capitalism. We must ask, in

particular, why they introduce changes which may induce a decrease in business

confidence in the short-term. To answer this question, Block suggests, we must turn to

the pressures exerted by the working class on state managers. Block argues that

working class struggle against social injustice forces state managers to reform

capitalism in order to improve workers’ living and working conditions20. State

managers must respond to workers’ struggle if they are to avoid social disorder and a

decline in the level of economic performance. Block also argues that the working

class’ interest in the amelioration of their living and working conditions through

increased state involvement in the economy dovetails with state managers’ self-

interest in expanding the powers of the state.

How, exactly, does the response of state managers to the pressures exerted on them by

working class struggle tend to contribute towards the rationalising of capitalism?

Block argues that ‘[o]nce working-class pressures succeed in extending the state’s

role, another dynamic begins to work’ (Block, 1987a: 64). As we saw above, state

managers have a fundamental interest in facilitating adequate rates of capitalist

investment. ‘There will’, then, Block argues, ‘be a tendency to use the state’s

20 In this respect Block’s views are similar to those expressed by Marx in Capital Volume 1, Chapter 10 (see Marx, 1961: 231-302) and by Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto (see Marx and Engels, 1965: 22), in relation to the passing of the Ten Hours Act. The passing of this legislation is regarded in these texts as the result, largely, of working class struggle.

16

Ed Rooksby

extended role for the same ends’ (Block, 1987a: 64). State managers will attempt to

ensure that the reforms they provide are, at least, compatible with capital

accumulation or, better than that, that they improve conditions for accumulation.

Block suggests, for example, that state managers will, in response to working class

demands for better education, try to ensure that the content of expanded education

services is geared towards ‘the production of a docile work force at an appropriate

level of skill’ (Block, 1987a: 64). Block is clear that this process should not be

understood as one in which demands emanating from the working class are simply

and directly translated into state legislation – he points out that ‘working-class

demands are rarely granted in their original form’ (Block, 1987a: 65). Furthermore, he

is careful to point out, too, that the working class has not been the only force behind

the historical expansion of state provision of things like welfare and education.

Nevertheless, the major impetus behind the extension of such reforms, he argues, has

come from the working class and the way in which this working class pressure has

intersected with the fundamental concern of state managers – the safeguarding,

encouragement and expansion of capital accumulation.

Block does not offer many specific examples of the sort of reforms he discusses21.

Nevertheless, his arguments here are quite compatible with that of another theorist

who does specify particular historical reforms that should be regarded as the result (at

least in great part) of ‘pressure from below’ on the part of the working class. Gough

(1979) argues, along lines very similar to Block’s approach, that the development of

the welfare state in Britain and elsewhere came about as a result of the interplay of

certain pressures impinging upon the state - ‘pressure from below’ on the part of the

working class and other allied subordinate groups on the one hand, and pressure to

provide for the requirements of capital accumulation on the other. Gough identifies

several specific welfare measures that came about as a response to pressure from the

working class and allied groups – Bismarck’s social insurance scheme of the 1880s,

Lloyd George’s unemployment insurance scheme of 1911, the NHS, and the

introduction of comprehensive education in Britain for example (see Gough, 1979:

58)22. Gough’s specification of particular welfare measures in the genesis of which 21 He mentions the expansion of education provision as noted above and also ‘welfare’ (in very broad terms), state legislation to end child labour and to improve standards of public health and housing, and measures to produce higher levels of employment. However these are all mentioned rather fleetingly and discussed at a very general and abstract level.22 Similar arguments are advanced by Piven and Cloward (1972 and 1979) who point to the key role that the struggle of the working class and other dominated groups played in the introduction of specific

17

Ed Rooksby

working class struggle has played a key role seems wholly compatible with Block’s

approach.

Furthermore, Gough makes clear something which I think is implicit in Block’s

argument and which should be mentioned here in order to help clarify the latter’s

approach. Gough points out that ‘the modes through which class pressure generates

welfare reforms are many and various’ (Gough, 1979: 58) – class pressure might be

exerted directly, for example through extra-parliamentary mass action, or,

alternatively, reforms might be devised by state personnel in order to ‘forestall the

dangerous growth of an independent class movement, and may even be opposed by

the subordinate classes’ (Gough, 1979: 59). Even in the latter case, however, where

welfare reforms are imposed against the wishes of the working class, these reforms

can still be regarded as, in large part, responses to pressures emanating from the

working class and impinging on the capitalist state. This, of course, would help us to

account for historical occasions on which particular welfare reforms have met with

working class opposition.

It seems to me that what Gough articulates here is also implicit in Block’s argument.

As we have seen, Block does not argue that state reforms should be regarded as the

direct translation of working class demands into state policy. Rather, these reforms

represent the response to pressures emanating from the working class of state

managers operating within certain constraints that force them to focus on the

provision of an economic and political environment conducive to healthy levels of

investment. Implied within Block’s approach is the idea that these ‘pressures from

below’ may or may not take the form of direct working class demands on the state for

particular reforms, but may also, for example, manifest themselves in terms of the

danger of social unrest (both actual social disorder and the threat of future social

disorder) or in terms of the danger that capital may not be supplied with a sufficient

quantity or quality of workers as a result of ill-health or inadequate education. As the

guardians of capitalism, forced to achieve some consciousness of what is needed to

maintain the viability of the social order, state managers must try to head-off and

neutralise such dangers and this might involve the implementation of reforms

designed to dampen down class struggle or improve healthcare and education

welfare reforms in the US. See also Ginsburgh (1979) and Manley (2008) for similar analyses.

18

Ed Rooksby

provision, even if these particular reforms have not specifically been demanded by the

working class23. In this way, then, Block’s approach certainly allows for the

introduction by the state of measures such as welfare reforms which have not been

called for by the working class and which might even go against their wishes24.

Block is clear that the process of reform does not occur smoothly or without the

possibility of the implementation of reforms which cannot easily be integrated into the

capital accumulation process. He argues that sometimes politically conscious

elements of the working class exert strong pressure on the state for reforms that are

not wholly compatible with the expanded reproduction of capitalism. Sometimes,

also, there is a ‘serious time lag between granting concessions to the working class

and discovering ways that the extension of the state’s power can be used to aid the

accumulation process’ (Block, 1987a: 65). Block goes on to say that:

some concessions to working-class pressure might have no potential benefits for accumulation and might simply place strains on the private economy…. If the strains occur over the long term, then capitalism faces severe problems because it becomes increasingly difficult to roll back concessions that have stood for some time. (Block, 1987a: 65)

However, despite the ‘friction’ and ‘continuous possibility of other outcomes’ (Block,

1987a: 65) inherent in the process of state reform, Block asserts that it has a very

strong tendency to work in favour of the interests of capital. This is because, as we

have seen, it is fundamentally in the interests of those who formulate and execute

these reforms that they ultimately guarantee the smooth operation of the accumulation

process.

It should be pointed out that – although he does not make this aspect of his theory

very explicit - Block’s theory allows for multiplicity in terms of the particular policy

strategies that may be chosen by state managers in order to secure capital’s long-term

interests. That is, state managers in Block’s schema may seek to secure bourgeois

hegemony in many different ways. The political and ideological disposition of

23 This is most strongly suggested in Block (1987b: 85-86) although he does not make the point directly.24 I should point out, too, that Block’s approach is quite compatible with the empirical observation that it is often the middle class that particularly benefits from the welfare state (on this see, for example, Ginsburgh, 1992: 4). The fact that the middle class is often the main beneficiary of welfare provisions does not in itself invalidate Block’s argument that the working class has been the major driving force behind the introduction of such measures. Furthermore, it should not come as any surprise that the relatively privileged sections of society are often the most proficient in making sure that they benefit from welfare provision.

19

Ed Rooksby

particular state managers, of course, will often have some effect on the specific policy

choices they make (clearly, different policy choices will be made by different parties

in government)25. Some policy strategies, furthermore, may be more successful than

others. It is not just that, as we have seen, state managers may enact policies that

badly impair capital accumulation – Block’s approach also suggests that some

strategies formulated by state managers may not encourage as much capital

accumulation as other possible strategies (without necessarily inducing a serious

deterioration in ‘business confidence’).

It is also worth making clear that Block’s theory is not incompatible with the view

that it is not only state managers who engage in day-to-day ‘big picture’ strategic

thinking about the long-term requirements of the capitalist economy. Block does not

incorporate such an idea into his theory26, but it seems obvious that other groups and

individuals such as ‘think-tanks’, business journalists and academics engage in serious

and well-informed strategic political-economic thinking too. Nevertheless, it is quite

easy to adapt Block’s approach slightly in this regard. These intellectuals, we may

say, formulate a number of different and competing ‘accumulation strategies’27 for

capital upon which state managers may draw for ideas – they may adopt one of these

accumulation strategies more or less in its entirety or they may selectively pick and

choose between them. However, it is always the state managers who are ‘at the sharp

end’ of the process of economic management. They will usually have more to lose

than business journalists or ‘think-tanks’ from the implementation of policies that do

not adequately serve capital’s long-term interests and will also feel the pressures that

build up from a decline in ‘business confidence’ more directly and more sharply than

those intellectuals. For these reasons, then, state managers will tend to have a clearer

view of what is necessary for the reproduction of bourgeois hegemony than any other

social group, even though they are not the only people who engage in strategic

thinking about the requirements of capital accumulation.

25 It is surprising that Block has little to say about the specific effects of party politics on state policy (he tends to treat state managers as an undifferentiated mass), but - as I hope I have shown – it is quite possible to integrate into Block’s overall approach some recognition of the fact that different state managers may have different political views and that these will have some effect on their activities as state managers.26 Although his discussion of Marx’s distinction in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte between the ‘political and literary representatives’ (Marx, in Block, 1987a: 55) of capital on the one hand, and capitalists themselves, on the other, implies something like this (see Block, 1987a: 54-56).27 I am borrowing Jessop’s term here. See, for example, Jessop (2002 and 2008) for his use of the term.

20

Ed Rooksby

Combining Block and Poulantzas

Block provides a convincing account of the structural mechanisms which ensure that

the state tends to act in the long-term interests of capital in general - those structural

mechanisms which Poulantzas fails to identify. For Block, state managers are,

effectively, the custodians of the interests of capital in general – their structural

position forces them to seek to identify the long-term interests of capital and it is

through their agency that these interests tend to be provided for. This is vastly

superior to Poulantzas’ incoherent account of how state policy is formulated in

capital’s long-term interests. In addition, Block’s theory is free of those

‘instrumentalist’ and functionalist-determinist problems that were identified above in

Poulantzas’ approach. Unlike Poulantzas, who, as we saw, seems to fall back on the

problematic idea that a hegemonic fraction of the bourgeoisie enjoys direct control

over the essential sites of state power, Block is careful to resist the temptation to

attribute to the bourgeoisie any direct control over the state. Neither does Block’s

theory, unlike Poulantzas’, suggest that the state must inevitably function in the

interests of capital in general. As we have seen, state managers may sometimes

introduce policy which is disadvantageous or damaging for capital28. His theory, then,

provides us with the resources to explain how crises of bourgeois hegemony may

sometimes emerge. The tendency for the state to act in the interests of capital in

general is, precisely, a tendency – and no more than that.

It is my contention that Block’s ideas can be combined with the best elements of

Poulantzas’ theory. If we reject Poulantzas’ theory of the emergence of state policy

from the clash of micro-policies and replace this with Block’s account of the

constrained autonomy of state managers, we arrive at a full and convincing theory of

the capitalist state. It appears to me that, after we have rejected the micro-policies

theory, the remaining central ideas of SPS are thoroughly compatible with Block’s

theory. Let us now look at these remaining ideas in SPS, and understand how they are

compatible with those of Block.

28 They may do this under pressure from a strong working class, or, alternatively, they may simply fail to identify policies adequate to the task of securing capital’s long-term interests – that is, they may badly misjudge the particular needs of the capitalist class as a whole.

21

Ed Rooksby

Nothing about Block’s theory seems incompatible with what Poulantzas has to say

about the fundamental interpenetration of the polity and the economy. Neither does

there seem to be any difficulty in reconciling the notion that the capitalist state is

founded on capitalist social relations of production with Block’s framework. There

seems to me little problem in combining the idea of individualisation with Block’s

theory. Block’s framework allows for the idea that state institutions tend to atomise

and fragment the working class. With our adoption of Block’s framework the

individualisation process becomes, perhaps, less central to our schema than it is for

Poulantzas, but we can certainly say that it plays an important role in helping to

support the process through which capitalism is reproduced. An individualised

working class are less likely to organise politically to make radical demands on the

state which managers will find difficult to reconcile with capital accumulation and are

more likely to regard the state as class-neutral and to accept the concessions that state

managers provide for them. Poulantzas’ idea of the state as the institutional

embodiment of intellectual labour as separated from manual labour also seems

compatible with Block.

What about Poulantzas’ ideas about the state’s organisation of bourgeois unity – and,

in particular, its organisation under the domination of a power bloc? As pointed out

above, Poulantzas’ account of this process is highly problematic. He appears to argue

that bourgeois unification occurs as a corollary of the process of the state’s

organisation of policy in the long-term interests of capital in general. However, the

process by which the state organises this policy in capital’s long-term interest is

precisely what Poulantzas fails to account for. Block however, as I have argued, does

manage to explain this process – and there is no reason why we cannot, then, take up

Poulantzas’ suggestion that the class organisation of the bourgeoisie stems from the

successful formulation of policy in the interests of capital in general. The idea of a

power bloc and hegemonic fraction capture something about the nature of capitalist

class organisation – that the bourgeoisie is not a homogenous bloc and that certain

fractions tend to be dominant over others29 – and I argue these should and can be

incorporated into our hybrid Poulantzas-Block theory of the capitalist state. How do 29 For example, it is often argued that financial fractions of the British bourgeoisie have, historically, been dominant over industrial fractions and that this domination has been reflected in preferential treatment for the City of London rather than for, say, manufacturing interests, on the part of successive government administrations. For arguments of this type see Hobsbawm (1990), Nairn (1979) and Anderson (1987). For broadly similar arguments from non-Marxist perspectives see Pollard (1982) and Hutton (1995).

22

Ed Rooksby

we square the idea of a hegemonic class fraction and a power bloc with Block’s

schema? We can say that when state managers formulate policy in order to safeguard

and reproduce healthy levels of economic activity, they tend to organise it in line with

the central interests of those bourgeois fractions which seem to state managers the

most crucial to the national economy. Therefore, state policy will tend to privilege the

interests of certain fractions – it is a small step from here to call these privileged

fractions a ‘power bloc’ and to consider that state policy unfolds under the hegemony

of particular fractions.

It is also possible to integrate Block’s framework with the central idea of SPS – that

the state is a social relation between classes. Like Poulantzas, Block argues that the

particular balance of class forces has an effect on the content of state policy – a strong

working class will force the state to act on some (or all) of their demands, for

example, and they must also respond to the needs of various capitalist fractions in

order to reproduce the conditions for adequate levels of economic activity. Like

Poulantzas, also, Block claims that the state is not a passive entity which simply

responds to the particular class pressures it is subjected to. The interests of dominant

class fractions are structurally advantaged and privileged within the state apparatus,

for Block as for Poulantzas, and, therefore, the state tends, systematically, to

reproduce the class domination of the bourgeoisie. For both theorists, though the state

is the concentrated site of class struggle, the dominant class fractions are accorded an

inherent structural advantage in this conflict. Furthermore, for both Block and

Poulantzas, the state apparatus organises the general interests of the bourgeoisie and,

in so doing, unifies the class – it does not simply reinforce some pre-existing

domination of the ruling class, but actually establishes its ascendancy.

However, while there seems to be clear compatibility in general terms between the

two theorists’ frameworks, Poulantzas’ account of the state as a social relation

between classes must be modified slightly to incorporate Block’s insistence on the

central importance of state managers. Poulantzas suggests that dominant class forces

are manifested directly in various ‘power centres’ within the state’s institutional

materiality and that their physical presence within the state helps to determine the

content of state policy. Except for Poulantzas’ discussion of the role the state

personnel play in (mis)representing the interests of the working class, state managers

23

Ed Rooksby

do not seem to be very important in Poulantzas’ schema. However, for Block, of

course, an awareness of the actions and decisions of state managers is crucial to an

understanding of the way in which the capitalist state functions. If we are to

incorporate Block’s ideas into Poulantzas’ general framework we must abandon

Poulantzas’ suggestion that class forces are manifested directly within the state

apparatus – we must acknowledge that the balance of class forces is reflected in the

processes and policy of the state only indirectly, through the mediation of state

managers. The balance of class forces is not, somehow, directly inscribed into the

structures of the state and the specific content of state policy is not determined by the

relative weight of class fraction interests actually existing within the state. Instead the

structure of the state, and the content of policy, is generated (in effect) in relation to

state managers’ interpretation of the balance of class forces and the relative

importance to national economic success of the needs and interests of each class

fraction.

This formulation still preserves the idea that structure and struggle are not distinct, but

part of the same process. The structure of the state becomes, perhaps, rather more

solid with our incorporation of Block’s ideas, but Poulantzas’ idea of a dialectical

interaction between two not wholly distinct entities (class struggle and state structure),

I think, remains intact – class struggle shapes the institutional structure of the state

and guides policy via state managers and, in turn, the structure of the state and state

policy via state managers, feeds back into the class struggle.

To some extent the Poulantzas-Block hybrid theory of the state must abandon

Poulantzas’ notion of ‘power centres’ – we have seen that Block’s ideas are not

consistent with the idea that class forces physically manifest themselves within the

institutional materiality of the state. However, we need not reject the idea that certain

state apparatuses may tend to represent the interests of certain class fractions. It is

clear that the state apparatus is not a homogenous bloc and that state managers do not

always act in unison. The state is not fractured into ‘power centres’ because

competing class fractions actually penetrate into certain apparatuses, but because state

managers in different branches of the state may, for various reasons, tend to favour

the interests of certain class fractions. For example, certain apparatuses may tend to

favour the interests of particular fractions because of the occupational background of

24

Ed Rooksby

key state managers within those apparatuses, or because of historical links between

those apparatuses and specific class fractions which tend to be reproduced, or because

the nature of the remit of a particular branch tends to bring it into contact with

members of a particular class fraction30.

The idea of a ‘centre of resistance’ also retains some force. Just as there are state

apparatuses that will tend to favour the interests of particular dominant class fractions,

certain apparatuses may tend to take particular account of the interests of the

dominated classes. Some state employees in areas such as social security or

healthcare, for example, may be particularly sympathetic to working class needs and

demands. However, as Poulantzas points out, those state employees who sympathise

with the working class interpret their demands and interests in terms of a particular

ideology – that of the ‘neutral state’. They act on working class demands only insofar

as these are compatible with their view of the state’s neutrality and in as far as they

are compatible with the continued division between state employees and the mass of

people. This seems compatible with Block’s view of state managers. For Block, like

Poulantzas, state managers’ self-interest in the maintenance of their own power is an

important factor in their behaviour. Also, for Block as for Poulantzas, state managers

will tend to act on working class demands only insofar as they are compatible with the

reproduction of the capitalist order.

There is a difference of emphasis in that while Poulantzas suggests that state

employees in certain apparatuses may consciously sympathise with the working class,

Block seems to indicate that state managers will act on working class demands only

because they feel it is necessary in order to safeguard capitalism. However, this is not

a major problem. We could say that the vast majority of state managers will act in the

way that Block describes and that only a minority will actively sympathise with the

working class – and that this minority will tend to be concentrated in certain areas of

the state such as those administering welfare. This minority can easily be sidelined by

the majority and, in addition, the pro-working class minority will, as discussed above,

30 For an interesting account of how relationships between various ‘interest groups’ (i.e. class fractions) and state apparatuses tend to be reproduced and reinforced over time, though with room for constant, dynamic alteration see Marsh and Smith (2000). Marsh and Smith focus on the ‘policy network’ surrounding the British Ministry of Agriculture in the post-war period, but, as they point out, the findings of this case study can be extended more widely. Furthermore, this essay emphasises a dialectical inter-relationship between members of a ‘policy network’ (including state managers) and between state policy and ‘policy network’. It seems broadly compatible with the theory I set out here.

25

Ed Rooksby

(mis)interpret working class interests via a particular ideology which will tend to

‘filter out’ the most radical of working class demands. We should also, here,

differentiate between state managers and state employees. Those most ready to listen

to the demands of the working class will tend to be those lower in the state hierarchy

and state managers (i.e. those with real influence and decision-making power) will

tend to behave in accordance with Block’s account, since radicals are unlikely to be

promoted to positions of influence.

It is important to retain Poulantzas’ idea that should a left-wing government be elected

(and therefore penetrate key state apparatuses) the circuits of power within the state

are likely to be remoulded so that these centres of resistance are neutralised. I

indicated in my criticism of Poulantzas that his description of this process has

problematic implications. However, though we should reject the idea that the

bourgeoisie remould the structure of the state in such circumstances, we could still

argue (drawing on Block’s schema) that the circuits of power are reordered by state

managers31. It is likely that should a radical government be elected, state managers’

self-interest would drive them to seek to ‘limit the damage’ that it could do32. Block,

then, provides us with the resources to explain how the circuits of state power can be

deliberately transformed to neutralise the threat from internal socialist forces – a

reality Poulantzas correctly identifies, but fails to account for convincingly.

Block’s schema is highly compatible with many of the central arguments of

Poulantzas in SPS once we have rejected the latter’s theory of micro-policies. Block’s

ideas, then, allow us to correct the major flaw in SPS. With the combination of the

two theories, I argue, we produce a cogent, detailed and coherent theory of the

capitalist state.

31 Of course, in Block’s terms, radical government ministers would, themselves, be state managers. However, in the event of the election of a left-wing government these ministers would find themselves outnumbered by other more experienced state managers in the civil service, for example, who would tend to oppose radical policies. It should be pointed, too, that radical government ministers would find the economic and political constraints presented by the level of ‘business confidence’ amongst the bourgeoisie just as constraining as any other group of state managers – it is likely, then, that radical government ministers would soon abandon radical policies. The political trajectory of the left-wing French government under Mitterrand’s presidency from 1981 exemplifies this process.32 Coates details some of the complaints of relatively radical Labour ministers, such as Barbara Castle and Richard Crossman about the opposition or ‘administrative inertia’ they faced when dealing with the civil service (see Coates, 1975: 148-151) – providing us with examples of civil service obstruction and a glimpse of what is likely to happen should a left-wing government come to power.

26

Ed Rooksby

Conclusion

I have argued that much of Poulantzas’ theory of the state in SPS is highly

convincing. It sets out an extraordinarily rich and sophisticated account of the

capitalist state – its origins, its foundations, its dialectical relationship with class

forces and its role in the establishment and reproduction of bourgeois domination and

in the reproduction of the CMP. SPS, however, does not provide an adequate account

of the way in which the structures and workings of the state tend to ensure that the

state operates in the long-term interests of capital in general. I have argued that for

such an account we should turn to the work of Block. I argued that Block’s theory of

the way in which the structural position of state managers forces them to develop an

understanding of what is necessary to safeguard the social order and to act on this

understanding is very convincing. Furthermore, I argued, Block’s schema can be

incorporated into Poulantzas’ theory – and with the amalgamation of these two

theories there emerges a more thorough and persuasive theory of the capitalist state.

References

Anderson, P (1987) ‘The Figures of Descent’, New Left Review 161 (1st Series),

January/February 1987.

Barrow, C W (2008) ‘Ralph Miliband and the Instrumentalist Theory of the State: The

(Mis)Construction of an Analytic Concept’ in Wetherly, P, Barrow, C W, and

Burnham, P (eds.) Class, Power and the State in Capitalist Society: Essays on Ralph

Miliband (Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan).

Block, F (1987a) ‘The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of

the State’, in Block, F Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics and Postindustrialism

(Philadelphia, Temple University Press).

27

Ed Rooksby

Block, F (1987b) ‘Beyond Relative Autonomy: State Managers as Historical

Subjects’, in Block, F Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics and Postindustrialism

(Philadelphia, Temple University Press).

Coates, D (1975) The Labour Party and the Struggle for Socialism (Cambridge,

Cambridge University Press).

Domhoff, G W (1967) Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall).

Domhoff, G W (1970) The Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America (New

York, Random House).

Ginsburgh, N (1979) Class, Capital and Social Policy (London, Macmillan).

Ginsburgh, N (1992) Divisions of Welfare: a Critical Introduction to Comparative

Social Policy (London, Sage).

Gough, I (1979) The Political Economy of the Welfare State (Houndmills,

Macmillan).

Hobsbawm, E J (1990) Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day (London,

Penguin).

Hutton, W (1995) The State We’re In (London, Jonathan Cape).

Jessop, B (1982) The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods (Oxford, Martin

Robertson).

Jessop, B (1985) Nicos Poulantzas: Marxist Theory and Political Strategy

(Houndmills, Macmillan).

Jessop, B (2002) The Future of the Capitalist State (Cambridge, Polity).

Jessop, B (2008) State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach (Cambridge, Polity).

28

Ed Rooksby

Manley, J F (2008) ‘Theorizing the Unexceptional US Welfare State’ in Wetherly, P,

Barrow, C W, and Burnham, P (eds.) Class, Power and the State in Capitalist Society:

Essays on Ralph Miliband (Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan).

Marsh, D and Smith, M (2000) ‘Understanding Policy Networks: Towards a

Dialectical Approach’, Political Studies 48.

Marx, K (1961) Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production, Vol. 1

(Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House).

Marx, K and Engels, F (1965) The Communist Manifesto in Mendel, A P (ed.)

Essential Works of Marxism (New York, Bantam Books).

Miliband, R (1969) The State in Capitalist Society (New York, Basic Books).

Nairn, T (1979) ‘The Future of Britain’s Crisis’, New Left Review 113-4 (1st Series),

January/April 1979.

Piven, F F and Cloward, R A (1972) Regulating the Poor: the Functions of Public

Welfare (London, Tavistock).

Piven, F F and Cloward, R A (1979) Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed,

How They Fail (New York, Vintage).

Pollard, S (1982) The Wasting of the British Economy: British Economic Policy 1945

to the Present (London, Croom Helm).

Poulantzas, N (1975) Political Power and Social Classes (London, NLB).

Poulantzas, N (2000) State, Power, Socialism (London, Verso).

29

Ed Rooksby

Wetherly, P (2008) ‘Can Capitalists Use the State to Serve Their General Interests?’

in Wetherly, P, Barrow, C W, and Burnham, P (eds.) Class, Power and the State in

Capitalist Society: Essays on Ralph Miliband (Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan).

30