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Sterbenz, et al.ITTCPostmodern Resilience and
International Collaboration in GpENI
09 July 2009
James P.G. Sterbenz*† 제임스스터벤츠David Hutchison†, Bernhard Plattner
Deep Medhi, Byrav Ramamurthy, Caterina ScoglioAbdul Jabbar*, Justin P. Rohrer*, Egemen Çetinkaya*
*Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer ScienceInformation Technology & Telecommunications Research Center
The University of Kansas†Computing Department, Infolab 21
Lancaster University
jpgs@{ittc.ku.edu,comp.lancs.ac.uk}http://www.ittc.ku.edu/~jpgs
http://wiki.ittc.ku.edu/resilinetshttp://www.gpeni.net
© 2009 Sterbenz
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Where is Kansas?Geography Lesson
Denver
Seattle
Portland
Salt Lake City
Las Vegas
Los Angeles
PhoenixSan Diego
St Louis
Minneapolis
Kansas City
Houston
Dallas
New Orleans
Cleveland
Boston
New York
Miami
DetroitChicago
Milwaukee
Philadelphia
Atlanta
San Francisco Washington DC
KANSASKU – Lawrence
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Resilience and HeterogeneityOutline
• Resilience and heterogeneity• Example realms
– WDTN– highly mobile airborne ad-hoc networking
• Evaluation methodology– simulation– experimentation
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Resilience and Heterogeneity Introduction and Motivation
• Network resilience increasingly important– as we increasingly rely on the Global Internet– increasingly a target of attack
• Heterogeneity– new application domains (mobility, sensors, etc.)– new network technologies (wireless, etc.)
• Internet architecture strained by both
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ResiliNets StrategyD2R2 + DR
• Real time control loop: D2R2
– defend• passive• active
– detect– remediate– recover
• Background loop: DR– diagnose– refine Refine
Diagnose
Remed
iate
Detect
Recover
Defen
d
Defend
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ResiliNets PrinciplesHigh Level Grouping
• Prerequisites: to understand and define resilience• Tradeoffs: recognise and organise complexity• Enablers: architecture and mechanisms for resilience• Behaviour: require significant complexity to operate
prerequisites tradeoffs enablers behaviour
servicerequirements
normal behaviour
threat and challenge models
metrics
heterogeneity
resourcetradeoffs
statemanagement
complexity
redundancy
diversity
context awareness
self-protection
translucency
multilevel
self-organisingand autonomic
adaptable
evolvable
connectivity
Resilience
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End-to-End Communication Redundancy and Diversity
• E2E transport over multiple diverse paths– that have minimal (if any) shared fate
• Diversity in– service provider: resilience to contract and peering disputes
(e.g. Cogent vs. Level3)– underlying technology: resilience to medium challenge
• e.g weather disruption of wireless mesh links
– path geography: resilience to natural disaster and attacks• e.g. Baltimore tunnel fire, Hinsdale central office fire• fault tolerance necessary but not sufficient for survivability
• Diversity at all layers
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End-to-End Communication Example Scenario
backboneprovider 2
backboneprovider 1 wireless
access net
opticalaccess net
opticalaccess net
wirelessaccess net
• Realm path choices explicitly available to end user– spreading (e.g. erasure coding) or hot standby– service tradeoffs: optical when available, fail-over to wireless– cheapest path under dynamic pricing
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End-to-End Communication Knobs and Dials
• Knobs and dials between upper layers and PoMo– support heterogeneous subnetworks
• e.g. lossy wireless vs. reliable wired
– explicit signalling of path diversity and multipath• geographic location of realms, nodes, channels
Knobs ↓ Dials ↑Layer
application
E2E transport
PoMo internetwork
network realm
HBH link
service characteristics
path char., geography
realm characteristics
link characteristics
service classreliability mode
PoMo knobs, FD, motiv.
realm oper. parameters
link type and codingerror control type/strength
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Resilience and HeterogeneityWeather Disruption-Tolerant Networking
• Resilience strategy and principles• Postmodern Internet Heterogeneity• Example realms
– WDTN– highly mobile airborne ad-hoc networking
• Evaluation Methodology– simulation– experimentation
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Millimeter-Wave Mesh Networks Architecture
• Mesh architecture– high degree of connectivity– alternate diverse paths
• severely attenuated mm wave• alternate mm links• alternate lower-freq. RF• fiber bypass (competitor)
• Approach– route around failures
• before they occur
– avoid high error links– P-WARP and XL-OSPF routing algorithms
802.163–4G
CO/POP
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SimulationsObserved Storm in Northeast Kansas
• Millimeter-wave grid location– 38.8621N, 95.3793W
• Storm observed at: – 20:39:26Z 30 Sep 2008
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Observed StormPerformance Analysis: Packet Loss
40s OSPF dead interval
node out
link out
40s OSPF dead interval
10s XL-OSPF HELLO interval
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Observed StormPerformance Analysis: Cumulative Loss
40s OSPF dead interval
10s OSPF HELLO interval
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Resilience and HeterogeneityHighly-Mobile Airborne Ad Hoc Networking
• Resilience strategy and principles• Postmodern Internet Heterogeneity• Example realms
– WDTN– highly-mobile airborne ad hoc networking
• Evaluation Methodology– simulation– experimentation
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Airborne Telemetry NetworkingScenario and Environment
• Very high relative velocity– Mach 7 ≈ 10 s contact– dynamic topology
• Communication channel– limited spectrum– asymmetric links
• data down omni• C&C up directional
• Multihop– among TAs– through relay nodes
GSGS
RN
TATA
TAs
Internet
GWGW
TA – test articleRN – relay node
GS – ground stationGW – gateway
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Airborne Telemetry NetworkingLink Stability and Contact Durations
ScenarioTransmit Range
[nmi]Relative Velocity Contact Duration
[sec]
Single-Hop Best Case
GS – TA 140 400 knots 2520
TA – TA 15 800 knots 135
Single-Hop Worst Case
GS – TA 100 Mach 3.5 300
TA – TA 10 Mach 7.0 15
• Multihop case significantly harder– probability of stable end-to-end path very low
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Airborne Network Protocol SuiteProtocol Stack and Interoperability
TmNS
GW TA
iNET MAC
iNET PHY
AeroTP
AeroNP
iNET MAC
iNET PHY
AeroN|RP
iNET MAC
iNET PHY
AeroTP
AeroNP
link/MAC
PHY
TCP
IP
link/MAC
PHY
TCP
IP
RN or TA
TA peripherals
HMI appsgNET
• AeroTP: TCP-friendly transport• AeroNP: IP-compatible forwarding• AeroRP: routing
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data segment
AeroTPConnection and Flow Management
• AeroTP is opportunistic : data overlaps control – final ACK of TCP 3WH at GW initiates AeroTP ASYN– data follows immediately without 3-way handshake in TmNS– optional AACK depending on mode; loss may retrigger ASYN
data segment
TA
ACK
SYNACK
GWGW gNET
SYN
data segment
ASYN
TmNS
SYN
ACKSYNACK
per
AACK
FIN
ACK
ACK AFIN
AACKFIN
FIN
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time [s]
pack
ets
rece
ived
[p
kt/s
]
50 150 250 350 450 550 650 750 850 950 0
400
800
1200
1600 AeroRP
DSDV
AODV
AeroRPPerformance Comparison (preliminary)
• 60-node ns-2 simulation in 150×150 km2 test range• TA tx range = 15 nmi; v = [200 knot, Mach 3.5]• CBR traffic = 200 kb/s per TA [MILCOM 2008]
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Resilience and HeterogeneityEvaluation Methodology: Simulation
• Resilience strategy and principles• Postmodern Internet Heterogeneity• Example realms
– WDTN– highly mobile airborne ad-hoc networking
• Evaluation methodology– simulation– experimentation
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Evaluation MethodologyFlexible and Realistic Topology Generation
• KU-LoCGen– evaluation of PoMo mechanisms– network engineering for resilience
• Level 1: backbone realms– nodes distributed based on location constraints– links generated using various models under cost constraints
• Level 2: access network realms– distributed around backbone nodes– access network connectivity: ring, star, mesh
• Level 3: subscribers– distributed around access network node
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Evaluation MethodologyChallenge Simulation Module
• Separate challenge from network simulation• Simulate challenges to any network over time interval
– natural disaster: polygon destroys network infrastructure– attack: {node|link} down, wireless link attenuated
××
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Evaluation MethodologyChallenge Simulation Module
• KU-CSM Challenge Simulation Module– challenge specification describes challenge scenario– network coordinates provide node geo-locations– adjacency matrix specifies link connectivity– input to conventional ns-3 simulation run– generates trace to plot results
adjacencymatrix.txt 0 0
1 0
simulation description.cc
challenge specification.txt
node coordinates.txt
ns-3 simulator
(C++)
plotted trace
KU-LoCGen
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Evaluation MethodologyExample: Resilience to Multiple Node Failures
• Example (and very preliminary results) – relationship of packet delivery ratio to multiple node failures– synthetic Sprint topologies generated by KU-LoCGen
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Resilience State SpaceOperational Resilience
NormalOperation
PartiallyDegraded
SeverelyDegraded
Operational State N
S
• Operationalresilience– minimal
degradation– in the face of
challenges
• Resilience state– remains in
normal operation
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Resilience State SpaceService Resilience
NormalOperation
PartiallyDegraded
SeverelyDegraded
Acceptable
Impaired
Unacceptable
Operational State N
Ser
vice
Par
amet
ers
P
S
• Serviceresilience– acceptable
service– in the face of
degraded operation
• Resilience state– remains in
acceptable service
S
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Resilience State SpaceResilience Trajectories
• Choose scenario– network– application
• Metrics– choose– aggregate
• Observe– under challenge
Unacceptable
Impaired
AcceptableP [d
elay
, pkt
del
iver
y ra
tio]
Normal operation
Partially degraded
Severely degraded
S5
S1
S4
p1 > 10 secp2 > 0.85
p1 < 10 secp2 > 0.50
p1 < 1 secp2 < 0.50
n1 ≤ 1.5ρ0n2 ≥ 3.0
n1 ≤ 3ρ0n2 ≥ 1.0
n1 > 3ρ0n2 < 1.0
N [load, node degree]
S3
S2
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Resilience and HeterogeneityEvaluation Methodology: Experimentation
• Resilience strategy and principles• Postmodern Internet Heterogeneity• Example realms
– WDTN– highly mobile airborne ad-hoc networking
• Evaluation methodology– simulation– experimentation
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GENIOverview
• GENI: Global Environments for Network Innovation– funded by the US NSF– managed by the GPO (GENI Project Office – BBN)
• Goal: new experimental network infrastructure• 1st solicitation: 29 projects funded
– grouped into 5 control framework clusters (PlanetLab, …)– including 2 regional testbeds (GpENI and MANFRED)
• 2nd solicitation closed and under final review– decisions hopefully by GEC5 (July in Seattle)– FIRE/GENI workshop in conjunction with GEC5
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GpENIOverview
• GpENI [dʒɛ’pi ni] Great Plains Environment for Network Innovation
• Regional network part of Cluster B in GENI Spiral 1– exploiting new fiber infrastructure in KS, MO, and NE
KSUKU
UMKC
UNL
MOREnetKanREN
GPN
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GpENIProject Goals
• Collaborative research infrastructure in Great Plains• Flexible infrastructure to support GENI program • Open environment for network research community• Outreach to grow GpENI infrastructure
– Great Plains region– internationally including EU FIRE
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GpENI Physical Topology and Network Infrastructure
KSU – KS KU – KS
UMKC – MO
UNL – NE
GpENI CienaCoreDirector
GpENI CienaCN4200
CCD FlarsheimHall
AveryHall
C-bandn λs
KU/Qwestfiber
NicholsHall
RathboneHall
GpENI nodecluster
WTC fiber
KU/Qwestfiber
SFBB fiberEllsworth
HallPowerPlant
QwestPOP
KC MO
KU/Qwestfiber
Internet2POP
KC MO
MOREnetfiber Newcomb
Hall
Ethernet
ScottCenter
UNL (L3)fiber
splicepatch
CC
to Smith Ctr. KS (eventual link to CO)
dark fiber
2 λs
4 λs
C-bandn λs
C42
GpENI
CCD
GpENI
C42
GpENI
C42
GpENI
C42
GpENI
• Physical topology– multiwavelength optical backbone
• current or imminent deployment
– 4 universities in 3 states• 1 switch/year with current funding
new nodes
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GpENINode Cluster
• GpENI cluster• 5–10 PCs
– GpENI mgt.– L4: PlanetLab– L3: prog. routers
• GbE switch– arbitrary interconnection– VLAN connectivity to GENI– SNMP cluster monitoring
• Ciena optical switch– L1 GpENI interconnection
Ciena optical
GpENImanagement& control
Campus net
GpENI optical backboneto Internet2 and KC SPPthen to Mid-Atlantic Net
Internet
GbEnetGENIVLANs
PlanetLab GENIwrap
control framework
prog. routersVINI,
XORP, click,…
� �site specificKUAR,
sensor, …
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KSUKU UMKC
UNL
GpENIGPN Proposed Expansion
DSU
USD
SDSMT
UMCIU
Europe
Asia
• Regional US GpENI partners– South Dakota: 3 universities– Missouri: 1 university– GMOC at Indiana University
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• European GpENI partners– 10 nations– 14 research institutions– 70 nodes– Lancaster, ETH coming up– more under discussion
Bucharest
Wien
Warszawa
ISCTE
Bern ETH
Zürich
KTH
SICS
HelsinkiSimula
Lancaster
Bilkent
GpENIEuropean Proposed Expansion
KSUKU UMKC
UNL
DSU
USD
SDSMT
UMC IUAsia
Internet2
GÉANT2
JANET
DANTE
NORDUnet
SWITCH
PassauMünchen
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GpENIAsian Proposed Expansion
KSUKU UMKC
UNL
DSU
USD
SDSMT
UMC IU
Europe
POSTECH
IIT Mumbai
IISc Bangalore
IIT Guwahati
Internet2
ERNET
APAN
• Asian GpENI partners– 2 nations– 4 research institutions– 20 nodes– more under discussion
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End