possible lessons on the sourcing, framing and delivery of scientific

and technical advice

the OPCW experience

smallwood@unicri.it

“on tap but not on top”

POLICY-BASED

-BASED POLICY

delivering advice on S&Tthe multilateral context

Legitimisation

Politicisation

Scientisation

Mistrust

Polarisation

A permanent BWC review structure

Will be loosely structured or formal? How will membership be decided? What will its mandate be? What scope will it have (specific or wide)? Who will set/guard the agenda? Who will protect its independence? Will it be independent? How will it maintain its legitimacy/authority? Will there be any oversight? Who will it report to? Should it operate by consensus? What is scientific consensus? Is it compatible with political

consensus? Who is an expert? How regular will reviews be? How to avoid S&T fatigue….? Avoiding political capture?

$$$$$$$$$

Scientific Advisory BoardOrganisation for the

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

25 independent individuals

Appointed on the basis of their expertise but…

Frequency of meetings dependent on funding

OCPW budget provides for one meeting per year

Operates through SAB and Temporary Working Groups

Mandate of the CWC

Institutional support (CSP, EC, TS)

Technical Secretariat

500 staff

Scientific Advisory Boardcategories of advice on S&T

Developments in science and technology relevant to the CWC

Amendments to the schedules of chemicals and other technical amendments?

Technical interpretations of the Convention

Assess the merits of present or new technologies/equipment for use by the OPCW

Coordinate the TWGs

CWC Article VIII, paragraph 21(h)

“…direct the Director-General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him, in the performance of his functions, to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Convention, to the Conference, the Executive Council or

States Parties. The Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts appointed in accordance with terms of

reference adopted by the Conference”

Article VIII, paragraph 4

“The Director General shall, in consultation with States Parties, appoint members of the Scientific

Advisory Board…”

Terms of reference, p. 2

“when directed by the Conference acting in accordance with paragraph 22 of Article

VIII, provide advice and make recommendations taking into account any relevant scientific and technological

developments for the purpose of assisting the Conference in its review of the operation of the Convention”

SAB

Director-General

Conference of the States

Parties

Technical Secretariat

States PartiesCivil societyAssociations

Industry

Executive Council

getting the right people involved

engaging the life sciences What is relevant expertise?

Weapons? Regulatory science? Public health? biodefence? Pure science? Social scientists? A mix?

Limitations of a permanent membership Imbalances of info on Conventions

Peripheral expertise…

Semantics: “of concern”, “threats”…or… “of relevance to”, “potential consequences for”..

One off vs long-term interest (generational?)

straddling dividesscience and politics

Routes onto the agenda

Erosion in the credibility of advisory committees takes place when their recommendations become associated with political positions

Political expediency, the long grass

straddling dividesdissent versus consensus

Audience(s) (linked to purpose…are we trying to educate the BWC

policymakers? Scientists? Both?)

Scientific versus political consensus

Reporting dissent (write it out or acknowledge it?) and producing pluralistic and conditional advice (not popular)

Who shouts the loudest / unhappiness with process?

Delivery of reports to DG Note from the DG Opportunities….? Policy translations (BWC?)

Executive Council ==>CSP / Review Conferences

Managing expectations (the ivory tower)

straddling dividestalking science to policy

setting boundariesby framing questions to the

Board

“requested the SAB to study all relevant aspects of the applicable concentration limits for mixtures of chemicals

containing Schedule 2A and 2A* chemicals”

(Report of the Fourth Session of the Scientific Advisory Board, 2001)

policy/political debate (weapons significant quantities of PFIB..)

(Report of the Second Session of the Scientific Advisory Board, 1998)

“address, solely from a scientific and technical aspect, the qualitative and quantitative implications

of this issue in relation to their impact on declarations and inspections and, without making

any recommendations or in any way prejudging the nature of any future decision on the issue, to report

its findings to the Director-General.”

setting boundariesby maintaining independence of

science

Independence of experts Differing relationships with delegation Mistrust

Independence of the agenda Avoiding political capture (from any regional group)

‘government expert groups’ and government oversight (cf. second CWC RevCon)?

advisory boards are tasked with political issues presented as technical problems

states appropriate technical arguments to legitimise policy

states claim that issues have been ‘fudged’

advisory structures are asked to make technically complex decisions about threats and risk

divisions of labourTemporary Working Groups

Meet independently Chaired by a member of the SAB Enable the Board to tap into pools of expertise

Reports usually technical and forwarded to SAB for ‘policy translation’

An intro to the CWC Popular Ideal for focused, technical discussions Possibility for states to sponsor themes

Science advice is not diplomacy (at least not entirely…)

Preparation for meetingsBackground papers and documentsAvoiding repetition SAB not immune to memory loss

divisions of labourintersessional work

“political decisions are seldom purely

scientific. They involve ethics, economics

and social policies as well. And in domains

beyond their special expertise, scientists

speak just as citizens.”

- Lord Rees, May 2010 -

…some lessons

Set a clear mandate & reporting structure Insist on independence (private/state) from members A purely scientific approach to its tasks, incl. responsibility for

framing

Advisory structures must have a politically neutral ‘protector’ (cf.

DG/TS) Enable the flexibility to accommodate very different types of

expertise Communicating with different audiences Accept the limitations of science Ensure the commitment and motivation of members Develop a clear intersessional plan of work Structure meetings to maximise the use of time and money Establish a clear division of labour esp. if there are various

mandates

Synthetic Biology and Nanobiotechnology Risk and Response Assessment

Assessment of the biosecurity implications of advances in biotechnology

‘Horizon scanning’ for developments in the technology fields of synthetic biology and nanobiotechnology that may place dangerous capabilities at the disposal of groups or individuals that want to cause harm to society

Final report as a result of two expert workshops held in 2010

For more information or a copy of the final report, please contact Sergio Bonin, UNICRI Project Officer, bonin@unicri.it