possibilities of planning for the twenty-first...

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Poor Countries’ Studentsin Rich Countries’ Universities:

Possibilities of Planning Educationfor the Twenty-first Century

Bishwapriya Sanyal

Abstract

Relevant planning education musttake into account that we live in oneworld comprised of rich and poornations who are now faced with acommon crisis of economy and ofideas. The central purpose of con-

temporary planning educationshould be to sensitize students to the

global dimension of this crisis and tobuild a consensus of ideas about

ways of transcending it. This re-quires that North American and in-ternational students be brought to-gether to learn to "think globally"and yet "act locally" in searching forsolutions to the crisis. Such a jointsearch requires an intellectual envi-ronment of mutual learning; andthat, in turn, requires a change inthe ethnocentric and tempocentricbiases of North American planningacademia.

Bishwapriya Sanyal is Ford International Associ-ate Professor of Urban Planning at MIT. Hispublications include Breaking the Boundaries:One World Approach to Planning Education,an edited volume to be published by Plenum in1989, and numerous articles on urban poverty,squatter housing, and self-employment in poorcountries.

E Introduction

The increasing influx of international students intoAmerican planning schools has added a new dimensionto the ongoing debate about planning education.’ Duringthe American Collegiate Schools of Planning (ACSP)conferences in Atlanta (1985), Milwaukee (1986), andLos Angeles (1987), a number of panel discussions weredevoted to international planning education. The issuewas further discussed during the ACSP meeting in Buf-falo (1988).The questions being raised about the increasing enroll-

ment of foreign students in planning schools are verysimilar to those raised during the 1960s about increasedforeign student enrollment in other professional schoolsin U.S. universities. For example: Are foreign studentsproperly selected and screened? Are they coming to theU.S. at the proper level of their educational develop-ment ? Is their command of the English language suffi-cient ? Are universities adjusting their academic standardsin evaluating the foreign students’ performance? Arethese students taking resources away from Americanstudents? Are the American taxpayers subsidizing theeducation of international students? (See IIE 1981; Scully1980; Spaulding and Flack 1976.) Though all of thesequestions deserve attention, they are not the focus ofthis paper.

I want to raise another question instead: Is the educa-tion offered in U.S. planning schools relevant for stu-dents from low-income countries? This is not a new

question. Charles Abrams first raised it in 1964; sincethen, others have raised the same question intermittently(Wheaton 1968; Friedmann 1973a; Fisher 1981; Hansen1985; Qadeer 1984). My purpose in reopening the ques-tion of relevance in planning education is, however, dif-ferent from those of my predecessors. I want to interjectsome fresh thinking on this issue based on a very differ-ent understanding of the world we inhabit, the times inwhich we live, and the future for which we are prepar-

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ing the students of today. Let me elaborate this point bya very brief summary of why the question of relevancewas raised in the past.Abrams’ (1964) intention in raising the question was

to mobilize funding for starting a university in Turkey.This was not because he felt U.S. education was irrele-vant for Turkish students, but because he wanted tointroduce the U.S. style of education in Turkey and alsocontribute to institution building, both of which he con-sidered essential for Turkey’s development. Wheaton(1968) raised the relevancy issue for a totally differentreason. He was worried that the education of studentsfrom poor countries was contributing to immigration,because these students, once exposed to Western afflu-ence, were reluctant to return to their countries. Tocounteract this, Wheaton proposed that these studentsbe provided monetary incentives to return to their coun-tries.’ Hansen’s (1985) more recent argument is similarto Wheaton’s in the sense that he too is concernedabout foreign students living in the U.S. after gradua-tion. Hansen argues that if foreign students are trainedin American planning practices, they are more likely tostay in the U.S. because of employment possibilities.Hence, he proposes that they be taught foreign planningpractices, which will make them unattractive to Ameri-can employers and thereby also stop the &dquo;brain drain&dquo;from poor to rich countries.

That foreign students should be trained in planningpractices more appropnate for their countries of originhas been stressed by others, though for different rea-sons. For example, Friedmann (1973a) and Fisher (1981)have argued that foreign students who return to theircountries after graduation often feel a deep sense offrustration at not being able to utilize their trainingabroad. Their education in the U.S. almost invariablycontributes to &dquo;trained incompetence,&dquo; wrote Friedmann(1986), because of the wide differences in the institu-tional contexts and in socioeconomic priorities betweenthe U.S. and the poor countries. This point of view hasbeen stressed lately by Third World planning academi-cians, including some who teach in Western planningschools (Qadeer 1984; Banerjee 1985).

International agencies which in the past funded thestudy of poor countries’ students in Western planningschools have also begun to take this view into accountin their funding policies. Hence, it is quite common tohear these days that planning education for the poorcountries’ students should be provided by the poorcountries’ universities, with some assistance from uni-versities abroad if required (Kunzmann 1985; Rodwin1986; The Center for Human Settlements 1984). Somehave even argued that there are already a number ofgood planning programs in the poor countries, but theirstudents continue to be admitted to U.S. planningschools to counteract the decline of American studentenrollment (Qadeer 1986).

In responding to these concerns and criticisms, Ameri-

can planning schools have pursued two approaches sofar. The first and more prevalent approach has been tocontinue with the same set of courses for both theAmerican and foreign students, with one or two new adhoc courses on Third World planning added to the cur-riculum. Usually, the small and medium-sized planningschools have followed this approach, partly becausethey lack the resources to offer any more courses, partlybecause they believe that the poor countries’ studentsshould be taking American planning courses becausethey come to the U.S to learn from the American experi-ence. Implicit in this approach is a rather traditional andsomewhat colonial notion: that the purpose of American

planning education for foreign students is to transferknow-how from the U.S., where there is plenty, to thepoor nations, where it is lacking. The vision of theworld that shapes this charitable notion of education isthat all countries are moving along the Rostowian &dquo;S&dquo;curve of development, and that the countries at the bot-tom of the curve should pattern themselves after theones at the top, if that is where they eventually want tobe.The second approach to planning education of poor

countries’ students is quite different in orientation. Orga-nized in terms of a specialized degree program, com-monly titled a Master of Planning in Developing Areas,this approach emerged during the mid-1970s in responseto the sort of criticisms referred to earlier. Lately it hasbeen incorporated in the curricula of some of the lead-ing American planning programs.3 The central assump-tion of this approach is that the planning problems andcontexts of the poor nations are so very different fromthose of the U.S. that the students from these countriesshould be trained in a very different way, with a differ-ent body of knowledge based on the institutional speci-ficities of these countries.The objective of this paper is to introduce yet another

alternative mode of thinking about the education ofpoor countries’ students in American planning schools.My purpose is not to deny the kinds of concerns thatled to the creation of special programs on poor coun-tries, but to interject a new approach to the issue basedon an even broader concern about the very purpose of

planning education in the late twentieth century. I beginwith the assumption, which I think is correct, that poorcountries’ students will continue to come to the Ameri-can planning schools for some time; and I propose thatinstead of thinking of it as a problem, American plan-ning schools should consider it an opportunity for en-hancing the relevancy of education for all planning stu-dents - foreign as well as domestic.Why so? I argue that to be relevant, planning educa-

tion, whether in the U.S. or elsewhere, must take intoaccount the current global reality. We must acknowledgethat in the late twentieth century we live in one world,not three or four separate worlds, as terms such asThird World or Fourth World imply; and that this world



141

comprises rich and poor nations that are increasinglylinked through ownership, commodity trade, technologi-cal and financial relationships, and transnational move-ments of students. Contemporary capitalism, which is acause as well as an effect of these linkages, poses amajor challenge now to both the rich and poor nationswho are faced with a &dquo;common crisis&dquo; (The BrandtCommission 1983). Our challenge is the following: Canwe transcend the crisis through progressive and demo-cratic reform of contemporary capitalism? I emphasizeprogressive and democratic because there are indicationsin both rich and poor countries of regressive responsesthat are parochial, undemocratic, and repressive, thatthreaten our collective survival in the long run insteadof strengthening its possibilities.The central purpose of contemporary planning educa-

tion should be to face this challenge boldly. And, in thisregard, American planning schools can play a significantrole precisely because they attract large numbers of in-ternational students. These students, if properly guided,can serve as a major resource both in the understandingof the global dimension of the current crisis and inbuilding a consensus of ideas about ways of transcend-ing it. This will require that the American and poorcountries’ students be brought together, instead of beingseparated into &dquo;special programs,&dquo; as is the currenttrend. Together, these students should be sensitized tothe common crisis and provided an intellectual frame-work to &dquo;think globally&dquo; and yet &dquo;act locally&dquo; in search-ing for solutions. To be effective, such a joint search willrequire an intellectual environment of mutual learningfor American and international students; and that, inturn, will require a change in the ethnocentric and tem-pocentric biases of American planning academia.

In proposing this alternative vision of planning educa-tion, I have organized this paper into five parts and anepilogue. The first two parts, which are historical, tracethe intellectual origins of the two approaches Americanplanning schools have pursued so far in addressing theeducational needs of poor countries’ students. This isfollowed by a review of the current intellectual turmoilwithin American planning academia and its need tocome to terms with the common crisis of economy andof ideas. The fourth part elaborates on an alternativevision of planning education for transcending the com-mon crisis. To support my proposal, I have providedevidence of mutual learning among planning academi-cians and of transfer of experience in problem solvingfrom poor to rich countries. The epilogue presents somekey operational issues which must be dealt with in mak-ing a transition to the new mode of planning education.

0 Those Were the DaysNot so long ago, students from Asia, Africa, and LatinAmerica were admitted to American planning schools tolearn things the Western way. Both the teachers and the

students were convinced that this was a good thing todo. The students wanted to learn about industrializationand urbanization from the American experience. TheAmerican universities felt that they had something indis-pensable to offer to those who had the misfortune to bebom into poor, agrarian countries that were striving todevelop. Development meant accelerated industrializa-tion, urbanization, and increasing consumption, muchlike what the Western countries had achieved. And to

develop, the poor countries had to traverse the samepath as the rich countries; that is what the substantivetheories in the field of economic development proposed(Rostow 1971). To aid in the process, Western nationswere regarded as providers of both financial and techni-cal assistance, including higher education, to the poornations.The then dominant sociological theories further rein-

forced the economists’ claim that the poor nations hadto transform themselves by shedding their traditionalvalues and developing an outlook similar to that of the&dquo;Western economic man.&dquo; Talcot Parsons’ (1951) writingson the role of individuals in modem, industrialized soci-eties provided the theoretical rationale in a definitiveway. The message was clear. To be part of a modern,industrial society, individuals could no longer be boundto the irrational, communal arrangements that had beenthe hallmark of traditional societies. Industrialization andmodernization require a new type of person: relativelyautonomous, dedicated to economic maximization andself-fulfillment, and comfortable with the contractual re-lationships required of efficient market operations. Edu-cation was to serve as the primary mechanism for initi-ating such changes in values. Once these culturalchanges were accomplished, economic developmentwould flourish, the sociologists claimed’ (Hoselitz 1952;McClelland 1961). Thus, the benefits of educating poorcountries’ students in Western universities were seen astwofold: the transfer of both technical knowledge and acultural ethos appropriate for initiating and fosteringmodernization.

This general consensus about socioeconomic transfor-mation embodied a consensus about the role of govern-ment in the process. The need for planning of nationaleconomies and cities was considered vital by develop-ment planners around the world. The legitimacy ofplanning was, in part, a result of four previously suc-cessful planning ventures in the industrialized countries;namely, postrevolution central planning in Russia; plan-ning during the Depression in Western countries; sectoralplanning during World War II; and the role of the Mar-shall Plan in the reconstruction of war-ravaged Europe(Meier 1984). The birth of the discipline of DevelopmentEconomics in the early 1950s had also strengthened theclaims for public planning (Hirschman 1981). The con-ventional wisdom then was that planning was requiredfor &dquo;rational&dquo; allocation of scarce resources among thevarious sectors of the economy. The planners would de-



142

cide on a growth rate of GNP, calculate the resourcesrequired for attaining this growth rate, show the gapbetween resources required and those available inter-nally, and finally make an &dquo;objective&dquo; plea for foreignaid. This process - at least on paper - seemed quitesimilar to what is known as the &dquo;rational planningmodel&dquo; in American procedural planning theory: it as-sumed a consensus of goals; it attempted to be compre-hensive, covering all sectors of the economy; and itstressed rationality and objectivity in decision making bythe use of &dquo;scientific&dquo; techniques, such as input/outputanalysis, dynamic programming and simulation ofgrowth models.At the level of city planning, the conventional wisdom

then was also to emulate the Western model. It wasbelieved that national development through industriali-zation required the emergence of a spatial system ofcities whose sizes would follow a log-normal distribu-tion, as in the already developed countries (Berry 1971;El-Shakhs 1972). This was to be achieved by depopulat-ing the rural areas, where more than 80 percent of thepeople lived (Lewis 1955). The aim was to transfer the&dquo;irrational and disguisedly unemployed peasants&dquo; to thecity, where they could then be turned into a rationalwork force for the emerging industries. To house theindustries, the workers, and the commercial activities,efficient and modem cities were required. That meant anefficient land use pattern with clearly demarcated areasfor each type of activity, connected by transportationarteries. Thus, the use of a master city plan, which wasthen popular in the Western countries, was thought tobe appropriate for the poor countries as well. The mas-ter plans provided a mechanism for the poor nations tovisually articulate their grandiose visions of develop-ment. Aided by foreign consultants, virtually all majorcities in these countries produced elaborate land usemaps. According to these maps, the existing land useswhich defied clear demarcation of activities had to be

drastically altered to achieve a rational organization ofspace. Major alterations were also recommended tomake way for the construction of massive highways -another feature that was borrowed from American cities.These highways were particularly appropriate elementsin fostering a &dquo;modem&dquo; image. As for the city centers,where traditional bazaars and all sorts of housing hadpreviously existed side by side, the master plans recom-mended the construction of luxury hotels and large-scalegovernment public buildings to house the national andinternational &dquo;agents of development :’ To facilitate sucha process of transformation, students from the poorcountries logically chose to come to the Western univer-sities for advanced degrees in architecture and urbanplanning (Banerjee 1985).The American planning schools responded to the aspi-

rations of foreign students rather well, despite offeringnot even a single course on the specialized problems ofpoor countries. It is interesting to note that during the

same time, the economics departments in some of theleading U.S. universities had begun to offer developmenteconomics as a specialization in the economic problemsof poor countries.’ Though the planning schools lackedany such specialization, they provided an intellectual en-vironment that may have been more conducive to the

foreign students’ aspirations - to develop through plan-ning - than anything offered by the economics depart-ments. One explanation for this apparent paradox is thatin American universities, planning departments have al-ways been relatively more receptive to the notion ofplanning than the economics departments, where theconcept of a &dquo;planned economy&dquo; is deeply disliked(Alonso 1986). This is very much a product of theAmerican tradition whereby public planning, to the ex-tent it is accepted, is confined to the local level (Dyck-man 1978). During the 1950s, American planningschools incorporated within this tradition the aspirationsof prospective planners from the poor countries. To-gether, the American and the international studentsdreamt of turning the world into a vast technologicallandscape, undeterred by either scarcity of resources orsocial conflicts. They both believed that rational plan-ning, based on scientific principles and aided by ad-vanced technology in problem solving, would help themachieve their objective. This consensus about the goalsof development as well as about planning procedurescontributed to the common understanding that therewas only one way - the Western way - to plan anddevelop. These were times when the three largest plan-ning schools in the U.S. - MIT, the University of NorthCarolina, and the University of California at Berkeley -had no course offerings in developing areas planning(Nocks 1974). There was no need to offer such courses.

m Paradise Lost

The consensus about what the international studentsshould be taught in U.S. planning schools began to col-lapse by the end of the 1960s. Two trends, one at theinternational level and the other within the U.S., con-tributed to its rapid erosion. At the international level,with the publication of Dudley Seers’ seminal 1969 arti-cle, &dquo;What Is Development?&dquo; a growing dissent beganamong development specialists about the appropriate-ness of the Western growth model for the poor countriesin Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This coincided withthe growing dissatisfaction among American plannerswith the rational planning model, which had been inef-fective in dealing with the problems of inner-city pov-erty and urban riots. Together, these two trends shat-tered the optimism of the previous decade. By thebeginning of the 1970s, American planning academiawas marked by major disagreements about what toteach not only the international students, but also thedomestic students.The disagreement about the training of international



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students was sparked by a new perception that theirneeds were quite different from those of the domesticstudents. This new awareness was largely a result of thedisillusionment with the development process of thepoor nations, who, it had been assumed until then,would generally follow the Western route to socioeco-nomic development. The disillusionment was on twofronts. In terms of economics, there was a growing pes-simism that the poor nations had been unable to createa broad base of prosperity despite significant increases intheir GNP growth rates (Prebisch 1979). As evidence,the critics pointed out the large and increasing urbanunemployment, squatter housing, and deepening incomeinequality in all but a few countries.’ The political trendsin these countries were even more disappointing. Con-trary to the expectation that capitalist developmentwould ease social tension and facilitate political democ-racy, the army had come to rule in many of the poornations, which were marked by socioeconomic and cul-tural polarization and accentuated conflict. These trendsdeeply troubled liberal Americans who had played aleading role after World War II in expanding Americanuniversity education for the international students (Pack-enham 1973). There emerged a growing sentiment thatperhaps the Western experience of development couldnot serve as a model for the poor countries and that the

training of planners for these countries must necessarilybe responsive to the very different socioeconomic andinstitutional characteristics of those countries (Zetter1981; Brine 1972).’The difference between the poor and the rich coun-

tries received the highest attention in neo-Marxist criti-cism, which by the early 1970s had emerged as a strongcontender to orthodox development theory. The principaltargets of the neo-Marxist criticism were the notions thatthe poor and the rich nations were tied by a mutuallybeneficial relationship, and that the poor nations wouldeventually industrialize in much the same way as therich nations. The neo-Marxists argued that, in reality, therich and poor nations were tied by a mechanism of&dquo;unequal exchange,&dquo; which created dependency of thepoor nations on the rich, &dquo;underdeveloped&dquo; the poornations’ economies, and transferred surplus to the richcountries (Amin 1977; Frank 1969). To retain this globalsystem of unequal exchange, a cadre of global managerswas required, the Marxists argued; and they criticizedthe universities in the rich countries for catering to thatneed (Gorg 1976). In other words, the neo-Marxists sawthe role of Western universities as harmful to the inter-ests of poor nations, whose best students, the Marxistsargued, were being co-opted to join the group of globalmanagers to protect the inherently unfair global capital-ist system.

N The &dquo;We Are Different&dquo; MentalityWhat emerged from this criticism and disillusionmentwas an image of the world very different from that

which characterized developmental thinking in the early1950s. In sharp contrast to the earlier view that rich andpoor nations traversed the same path of development,these nations were now perceived only in terms of theirmost acute differences. Such conceptual categories as&dquo;North/South,&dquo; the &dquo;core/periphery;’ and &dquo;the haves/have nots&dquo; implied a dichotomous world with conflictinginterests between the rich and the poor countries. Theinternal problems faced by these governments and theirrespective capacities to respond were also perceived tobe qualitatively different. Implicit in this new under-standing was the belief that the solutions to the poorcountries’ problems, both economic and political, wouldbe rather different from the historical experiences of therich countries in comparable stages of their develop-ment. Much of this type of observation was actuallymade by development experts and area specialists fromthe rich countries who had traveled, without much ex-perience, to the poor nations at the beginning of the1950s and were now returning to their own countriesafter years of field experience (Sutton 1982). The elite ofthe poor countries, who participated in numerous inter-national conferences and interacted closely with interna-tional aid agencies, also subscribed to this &dquo;we are dif-ferent&dquo; approach, though many of these elite had, bythen, been deeply influenced by their association, bothacademic and official, with the rich nations.One aspect that stands out in this reversal of attitude,

from &dquo;we are the same&dquo; to &dquo;we are different&dquo; was the

interpretation of the role of the culture in moderniza-tion. As mentioned earlier, at the beginning of the1950s, cultural change was considered a crucial prereq-uisite for initiating economic development in the poorcountries. Some may recall the disparaging remarksabout the &dquo;irrational small peasants&dquo; who were believedto defy any modernization attempts. It was believed thatmodernization would require a change of work ethic,more individualism, and less communal bonding amongthe emerging working class of the poor nations. Interest-ingly enough, by the late 1960s, the interpretation ofcultural differences had made a complete turnaround.Cultural norms of the poor nations were no longer con-sidered a hindrance to development. On the contrary, asSchumacher (1973) and others advocated, the local cul-ture was now to be considered an asset in fostering&dquo;self-sustaining development.&dquo; In the process, the &dquo;irra-tional peasant&dquo; of the 1950s became the &dquo;rational smallfarmer,&dquo; who was now believed to have a deep under-standing of the local constraints and possibilities in rela-tion to modernization. This made him look uniquely ap-propriate for locally based development. What is more,individualism of the Western kind, which only a decadeback was hailed as crucial in fostering modernizationand progress, was now deplored for social fragmentationof the advanced societies (Marcuse 1964; Hampden-Turner 1971). It became popular to argue that Westernindividualism did not lead to social progress but to an-



144

omie and alienation; and the poor nations were advisedto resist the penetration of this negative trait thatformed the core of cultural imperialism (von Lane 1987).

This new approach to development, more sympatheticto the particularities of the poor nations and less accept-ing of the general Western model, began to be incorpo-rated in the curriculum of U.S. planning schools by themid-1970s. Some planning schools began offering an adhoc course on &dquo;Third World planning.&dquo; Typically, such acourse focused on the problems of squatter housing oron urban informal sector employment, and catered tothe needs of international students, an increasing num-ber of whom then came from the oil-rich Middle East-ern countries. The larger planning schools began offeringmore than one course on Third World planning. A pop-ular course, I remember, was one entitled &dquo;AlternativeTheories of Development.&dquo; Under this broad and some-what ambiguous title, the course provided a variety ofcriticisms of the Western development paradigm. Thisranged from the Schumacherian &dquo;small is beautiful&dquo;

type of analysis to Streeten’s (1981) &dquo;basic needs&dquo; ap-proach to neo-Marxian structural criticisms of capitalistdevelopment. None of these different strands of criti-cism, however, could provide a really coherent alterna-tive model that could restore the lost consensus abouthow the poor nations were to develop They onlystrengthened the newly popular notion that the rich andthe poor nations were totally different in all aspects.

N The American Front

Let us leave aside for a moment the problems of lostconsensus about Third World development and focus in-stead on a simultaneous loss of consensus on anotherfront that had severely affected American planning aca-demia by the early 1970s. As is well recognized by now,the notions and principles that had shaped Americanurban planning doctrines since World War II began to beseriously questioned in the aftermath of the urban riotsin the mid-1960s (Friedmann 1973b; Rittel and Webber1973; Godchalk 1974). Prior to the riots, American ur-ban planners had been preoccupied with postwar afflu-ence. Many had defined their task mainly in terms ofconstruction of large-scale land use and transportationmodels which, they believed, helped in the &dquo;rationalallocation of resources.&dquo; These were times of growth andprosperity, of large-scale suburbanization and federalhighway construction (Krueckeberg 1983). Planning wasthen considered primarily a technical process: a processof resource optimization to achieve accepted social ob-jectives. Economic growth dominated all thinking; and itwas the common wisdom that the impact of growth wasbeneficial for all Americans. This, we may recall, wasvery similar to the developmental thinking of the time.While the development planners spent much of theirtime constructing national growth models, hoping thatgrowth once achieved would trickle down the social hi-

erarchy, American urban planners created elaboratemodels of urban land use and transportation with simi-lar convictions about their impact on social groups.The urban riots had challenged this technocratic and

optimistic vision of American urban planners and rudelyawakened planners to the depressing reality of povertyand social conflict in a country where increasing afflu-ence and social consensus were virtually taken forgranted. As Daniel Bell (1968, 168) wrote about thetimes, &dquo;when the poverty issue arose, nobody was reallyprepared, nobody had any data, nobody knew what todo.&dquo; In a way this is surprising, because the 1960s werenot the first time in the history of twentieth-centuryAmerica that issues of poverty and unemployment hadgripped the country. The Depression had significantlyaffected America’s social legislation and had inadvert-ently ushered in a decade of planning efforts (Skocpoland Finegold 1982). But in the post-World War II eu-phoria of growth and optimism, American planners hadbegun to believe that poverty would eventually simplywither away (Patterson 1981). To be sure, there were afew skeptics, like Galbraith (1958) and Michael Harring-ton (1962); but they were lone voices whose structuralcriticisms of the American economy were ignored untilthe American cities had burst into flames in the mid-1960s.The American urban planner’s response to the urban

riots, and later to the presidential call for &dquo;War on Pov-

erty;’ was ineffective - both the academic and practic-ing planners acknowledge that. What is more pertinent,however, is that there is no consensus as yet amongAmerican planners about how to be effective at suchtimes. This is true despite much discussion during thelast two decades about many planning approaches -ranging from advocacy to &dquo;guerillas within bureaucracy&dquo;to the &dquo;transactive style&dquo; - which were proposed as al-ternatives to the much discredited rational comprehen-sive model. At first, this lack of consensus was actuallyquite fruitful in generating a lively debate within theplanning profession. Nonetheless, as the debate contin-ued for years - and still continues - without any signof resolution, a sense of crisis has begun to pervade allthinking within the field (de Neufville 1986; Alexander1984).

0 What Now?

If there is no consensus either about how to develop thepoor nations, or how to plan American cities, can Amer-ican planning schools claim - as they did with suchself-assurance during the 1950s - that the purpose ofeducating international students is to transfer know-howfrom the U.S., which has plenty, to the poor nations,where it is lacking? When American urban plannersthemselves seem to be at a loss in the face of sluggisheconomic growth, plant closures, capital flight, increasinghomelessness, and decreasing concern at the federal



145

level about cities, what kind of accumulated knowledgeabout planning can they pass on to the prospectiveplanners from the poor countries? The American plan-ning schools need to formulate a coherent response tothese questions.One type of response I have heard in academic meet-

ings is that U.S. planning schools should no longer be inthe business of educating students from poor countries.This is more a principle-oriented position than a prag-matic one. International students are likely to continueto come to the U.S. for various reasons, not the least ofwhich may be to learn the &dquo;how to&dquo; of developmentplanning (Fisher 1981).9 This, some argue, is a goodreason to offer &dquo;special programs&dquo; in developing countryplanning, since neither the success nor the failure ofU.S. planning experience is relevant for the poor coun-tries. At first hearing, this line of argument may seemless arrogant and more convincing than the traditionalnotion that international students should learn thingsthe Western way. There is, however, an ethnocentric atti-tude implicit in this proposition too. Why? Because it isbased on the assumption that the poor countries’ stu-dents come to the U.S. planning schools to learn aboutthe &dquo;specificities&dquo; of the problems back home. This is awrong assumption (Dandekar 1984). Further, it alsowrongly assumes that the poor countries’ problems areinvariably different from the American problems: thatthey are more severe, are often structural (as opposed tocyclical), and must be responded to in an institutionalenvironment that is chronically unstable. Yet, there isalso an underlying belief that American planningschools can help the poor nations’ students to betterunderstand that very different social reality. Why thatmay be so, particularly when the U.S. planners do notseem to be able to comprehend their own problems,remains unanswered.

That, however, does not seem to bother Americanplanning academia. Staffed by faculty members, most ofwhom are the product of an arrogant era in develop-ment thinking - an era of Western experts, advisors,and modem techniques - American planning academiaseems to take it for granted that planning educationmust necessarily be a one-way street where knowledgeis to follow from the rich to the poor nations, where thevision of progress of humankind is to be unidirectional,always to be led by the world’s rich nations. There are,of course, some exceptional individuals in U.S. planningacademia who never contributed to this ethnocentric ap-proach ; this paper will refer to their work. Nevertheless,in general, this attitude is so prevalent that its concep-tual underpinnings are regarded virtually as commonsense. After all, what could American planners possiblylearn from Bangladesh’s or Zambia’s planning experi-ence ? Are not the contexts widely different, with Amer-ica far ahead in the development trajectory?The answers to these questions are not obvious - at

least not anymore. As we begin to enter the last decade

of the twentieth century, the rich and the poor nationsseem to be confronted by a common crisis, admittedlywith different response capacities (The Brandt Commis-sion 1983; Helleiner 1980). It is not within the scope ofthis paper to dwell at length on the nature of this com-mon crisis, which is widely recognized by now, thanksto the research efforts of many scholars from the rich aswell as poor countries (Fishlow et al. 1980; Green 1983;Cardoso 1980). For our purpose, it is important to recog-nize that the economies of both the rich and the poornations are in serious trouble and that this is not coinci-dental. Rather, the common problems have emergedfrom a growing connection between these nations in aglobal system of production and consumption based onownership, commodity trade, and technological and fi-nancial links (Bienefeld and Godfrey 1982).1° The com-mon economic problem has challenged the conventionalwisdom that while the poor nations must transcendstructural barriers to achieve economic growth, the richnations can ensure steady growth by neutralizing peri-odic cyclical fluctuations of the economy through Keynes-ian policies. The current crisis shows that both the richand poor nations are confronted with structural prob-lems of readjustment to a global economy over whichneither seems to have much control (Seers 1979). As aresult, the old discussion about &dquo;industrialization&dquo; of thepoor nations and the new concern for &dquo;reindustrializa-tion&dquo; of the rich nations have begun to sound similar.We now acknowledge that the most technologically ad-vanced nations can also be hurt by the strains of ab-sorbing modern technology. We have also come to ac-knowledge that there is no certainty that an accelerationof growth per se will be a solution to social problems,such as unemployment, either in the rich or poor na-tions (Seers 1979; Bluestone and Harrison 1982).The current economic problems have affected the po-

litical process in both the rich and poor nations. There issome similarity between them in that aspect, too. Inboth contexts, the state seems to be confronted by adeepening fiscal crisis which, in turn, has contributed toits growing legitimation crisis (O’Conner 1987; Castells1980; Harrison 1981). Again, it is beyond the scope ofthis paper to dwell at length on this issue. For now, wemust recognize this adverse trend, which has major im-plications for our thinking about the role of the state incapitalist societies. It was not that long ago when theWestern model of the welfare state was held up as the

symbol of political democracy to the rest of the world.Now the notion of the welfare state seems to be underattack even in the richest of the rich countries in theworld (Offe 1987; Gough 1979). The reality is that inboth the rich and poor countries, the state is confronted

by increasing claims on its rather limited and, in somecases, declining resources; and in both cases it lackscontrol over the fluctuations in the global economy, yetmust respond to the social problems that such fluctua-tions create.



146

The implications of these macro trends for urbanproblems in both the rich and poor nations came underdiscussion in planning literature only a few years back(Friedmann and Wolff 1982; Smith and Feagin 1987).From our limited understanding so far, the problemsfacing urban planners in the rich and poor countriesnow appear somewhat similar. Unemployment and un-deremployment are no longer perceived as structuralproblems in the poor nations and cyclical - and hencetemporary - problems in the rich nations. Now it seemsthat 8 to 10 percent of the urban labor force in even therich nations cannot be employed at any time (Summers1988; Offe 1985). Hawkers and peddlers are no longerthe problem of only poor countries’ cities. Now, themerchants of Fifth Avenue in Manhattan want thehawkers to be removed from the city’s streets&dquo; (NewYork Times, 19 December 1986 Bl). Squatter housing andhomeless people - the two virtually permanent featuresof poor countries’ cities - have begun to appear in therich countries too (Radbum and Buss 1986; Erickson andWilhelm 1986). Remember the demolition of squatterhousing in poor countries that was so forcefully arguedagainst by John Turner (1965) in the 1960s? In 1987, theLos Angeles Police Chief was involved in precisely thatin his city’s skid row area (Los Angeles Times, 3 March1987). One cannot dismiss these observations as isolatedincidents that occur occasionally only in Los Angeles orNew York. The recent reports of the National UrbanCoalition, as well as the National League of Cities, indi-cate a distinct trend in that direction nationwide (NewYork Times, 24 May 1987 18; 30 June 1987 A21).

0 The Planners’ ResponseWhat should be the role of planning under these newcircumstances - with growing problems and dwindlingstate resources? It is disheartening to realize that theplanners in neither the rich nor the poor nations havean adequate and coherent response to this fundamentalquestion.&dquo; In most cases, they have adopted policiesproposed by others (i.e., bankers, real estate interestgroups, or conservative politicians); in a few cases, theyhave resisted such policies, but without proposing analternative agenda of their own. This lack of initiativeson the part of planners is another sign of the currentcrisis. It is a crisis of ideas, of the irrelevancy of thedominant theories and conceptual framework throughwhich the social and political processes used to beunderstood during a very different time (Cooper 1983;Daves 1984). This is true for both the rich and poornations. In both contexts - in the countries where thesetheories and concepts were initially formulated and inthose to which they were exported - the old models ofdevelopment and planning have become dysfunctional.As a result, the planning profession all over the worldseems to be in disarray. What is even more disconcertingis that in the name of pragmatism, planners in increas-

ing numbers are abandoning their traditional resolve tobe normative in their outlook. They have ceased to bethe source of inspiration and ideas about what might beand what ought to be (Isserman 1985).

This loss of vision and confidence is a serious profes-sional deficiency, particularly now, when planning is un-der attack from both the right and left of the ideologicalspectrum (Dyckman 1987). The primary thrust of thesecriticisms has been about the nature of the state in capi-talist countries. Neither the right nor the left seems tobelieve - though for different reasons - that the statehas the relative autonomy to initiate major reforms incounteracting the current crisis. In other words, thestate’s ability to plan is being questioned. The left’s posi-tion on this issue is not new. Since the 1960s, it has

consistently argued that the state in capitalist countriesis controlled by the dominant classes and hence primar-ily serves their interests.13 Thus, the state is unable toinitiate major changes that will significantly alter thecontrol of these groups over either the economy or the

polity (Harvey 1978; Hirsch 1978). In contrast, theright’s position is relatively new. Couched in terms ofpublic choice theory, it argues that the current crisis isthe result of wrong state policies - policies that wereformulated by the state actors primarily to enhance theirown interests (Bates 1987; Coleman 1986). According tothis view, the state actors (planners and bureaucrats) usetheir privileged position in the policy-making processand seek &dquo;rents&dquo; from individuals who are then pro-vided access to influence the policy outcomes. Thus, thestate does not really have the autonomy to pursue &dquo;cor-rect policies&dquo; that would require less state involvementin the economy, because that would never be agreed toby the state actors.

Faced with this double criticism from the right andthe left, planners all over the world have been on thedefensive. So far, our responses to criticisms of the basicpremise of our profession have been fragmented andreactive. Lacking a coherent conceptual framework, weare increasingly incapable of formulating an argumentfor public planning in capitalist societies. We have nei-ther a clear understanding about our relative autonomyfor initiating progressive reforms nor a well-thought outagenda for determining what these reforms should be.As a result, common people in rich and poor countriesalike are becoming skeptical about whether public plan-ning can be useful in the current crisis.

N Large Commitments for Large ObjectivesWhat kind of planning education is relevant under thesecircumstances? How can we best prepare our students -both American and international - to function effec-

tively amidst the current crisis? What should we teachthem so they can shape the future in a democratic andprogressive way?To begin with, we need to sensitize all our students to



147

the common crisis that confronts us. That means not

only making them understand the nature of the currentproblems, but also sensitizing them to the current con-ceptual inadequacies for seeking solutions. One has tobe very careful, however, not to immobilize the studentswith a critical perspective based on the structural inevit-abilities of the crisis and of the conflicts that are boundto follow. Just the opposite is needed: we must help thestudents to identify what to hold onto amidst the confu-sion. This is a very difficult task. On one hand, to makethe students concerned about the current trends, wemust shatter their complacency. Yet, on the other hand,we must help them reconstruct a new meaning for theirrole as planners, drawing from the very past they mustnow transcend.One way this dual task can be performed is by bring-

ing American and international students together. Thenature of the current crisis is such that to understand its

origin, as well as its implications, a joint scrutiny byboth groups of students may be most illuminating. Asidefrom opening their minds to the linkages of the prob-lems, a joint scrutiny is likely to generate an interest inhistorical analysis, which is the only way to understandhow such linkages have developed over time. This willcounteract the now prevalent bias of tempocentrism inproblem definition among planning students.14 They maythen better appreciate that the world has changed overtime, that there are reasons why such change cameabout, and that in the late twentieth century, the richand poor nations have become linked as never before.

Sensitizing students to the common crisis, however, isnot sufficient. We in professional programs have to pro-vide our students with a set of tools for thinking aboutsolutions. This is not a simple task of teaching themvarious techniques and &dquo;hard skills.&dquo; Lacking a clearconception of what kind of knowledge is essential forthe students under the current circumstances, how arewe to know which techniques to teach (Schon and Nutt1974)? Perhaps the most appropriate thing we can do isto encourage students to critically evaluate some of thekey notions of &dquo;solutions&dquo; that have guided our think-ing in the past. At least one such notion comes to mindimmediately: that of modernization. Many of thepost-World War II development policies have beenguided by this key notion, which provided us a set ofvery specific goals related not only to economics but alsoto politics, social arrangements, and cultural practices.We are no longer sure about the relevance of these goalsfor either poor or rich nations, yet neither have we beenable to reconstruct a set of new goals. Our inability tothink afresh, even with all sorts of technological innova-tions, is in part due to our reluctance to let go of ourold methods of thinking, which were also shaped by aset of key notions such as rationality, positivism, andefficiency. The validity of these concepts must be ques-tioned as well in light of the current crisis confrontingthe poor and rich nations. It is through reinterpretation

of these key notions, I believe, that new approaches todevelopment and planning will eventually emerge.To be successful, reinterpretation of development ob-

jectives must be based on analysis of current problemsand discussion of reforms required to solve specificproblems. This, too, can be done better by bringing theAmerican and international students together. In fact,they must be brought together if we truly want to en-courage them to think about reforms in a pragmaticway. Why so? Because the nature of the current problemis such that the solutions require reform in both domes-tic and international contexts simultaneously. Felix Roha-tyn (1987) first explained this new requirement for prob-lem solving from the American side. Since then, moreand more planners and economists have come to thesame conclusion. What this implies for planning educa-tion is that from now on our students must be trainedto think about reform in a dialectical way, taking intoaccount both domestic and international contexts andhow reform in one cannot be successful without reformin the other.

Perhaps a brief remark about international reforms isappropriate here. We may recall that major internationalreforms about trade, monetary arrangements, and devel-opment assistance were made in 1944 as a result of theBretton Woods Conference. Then, most of the poorcountries were under colonial rule and were not repre-sented in the conference; and the nineteen poor coun-tries that did participate were merely observers, ratherthan active participants in the conference (Moggridge1980). They had signed an accord which for all pur-poses was really an Anglo-American deal (Gardner1969). John Maynard Keynes had objected to even thisminimalist participation by poor countries on thegrounds that they would turn the conference into &dquo;mon-

key-business&dquo; (Moggridge 1980, 42). He obviously hadno conception of the important role the poor countrieswould play in the global economy within the nexttwenty years. Now, as we approach the beginning of thetwenty-first century, these nations must be heard fromand their claims must be taken into account if globalcapitalism is to transcend the current crisis (Helleiner1984). This is not going to be an easy task. As Strange(1984) describes, the current relationship between richand poor countries is like that of two people in a HaroldPinter play, who sit facing each other but talk past oneanother, repeating to themselves for their own satisfac-tion the words they have already spoken to each othercountless times. The reconstruction of consensus at the

global level requires an end to this unproductive pro-cess. The rich and poor nations must now begin to talkwith one another, rather than at each other, as theytypically do in international forums.

0 Consensus BuildingThe road to consensus building through dialogue may aswell begin in the American planning schools. In fact, the



148

American planning schools may be the best place tobegin because they offer the most conducive intellectualenvironment for questioning basic conceptual categoriesthat shaped our thinking about development and plan-ning for most of the twentieth century. Unlike eco-nomics departments, where such notions as competition,growth, or modernization are accepted as &dquo;the truth,&dquo;the planning schools have a history of questioning suchsocial constructs. Also, planning schools are much morewilling to acknowledge conflicts of interest and goals aspart and parcel of social reality that must be respondedto for consensus building.&dquo; This is because plannersdeal with actual problems that usually involve conflicts,be they at the community, city, or regional levels; andthat makes them skeptical of the simplistic, conflict-freemodels of social reality with which economists usuallywork.

Thus, consensus building about new reforms mustnecessarily begin with explicit recognition of the currentconflicts of interest between communities, regions, andnations. Yet, at the same time, we must emphasize thecommonality of their interests in the late twentieth cen-tury. For the students of poor and rich nations, this willrequire a frank exchange of views about their countries’specific problems. A discussion of this sort, if properlyguided, will make the students understand the generalprocess of capitalist development, of which both typesof countries are part, the specific role played by eachtype of country in that process, and the particular out-come of this process in any given place, as conditionedby the institutional arrangements of that place. For ex-ample, a discussion about the problems of increasingurban unemployment in both the rich and poor coun-tries can help students understand the extent to whichwhat appear to be strictly local problems may be causednot only by the general slowing down of the globaleconomy or its restructuring, but also by local factors,such as over-valued exchange rates, wage rates, or fiscaldeficits. Such an exercise will help the students to tran-scend the rather crude conceptions of the world’s na-tions and their problems as either all the same or totallydifferent. It will cultivate their minds to appreciate themore complex reality of the extent to which their coun-tries may be similar to, and yet different from, othercountries. This view of the world will help the studentssort out the potential for conflict as well as cooperationamong the various countries in the world.Another way in which we can sensitize students to

the common crisis is to select some specific issues - thesort that Helleiner (1979) and Seers (1979) have called&dquo;interface&dquo; issues - and help the students understandthe domestic determinants of external economic relation-ships and the external determinants of domestic eco-nomic problems. For example, the students may beasked to discuss the impact of American budget deficitson the balance of payment of poor countries. Or, theymay discuss the implications of the debt problems of

poor nations for America’s banking regulations. If thesetypes of issues seem &dquo;too macro&dquo; for urban planners,we may need to probe other interface issues, such as theimpact of the large influx of foreign capital on real es-tate development in American cities. Specifically, wemay discuss the impact on land or housing prices andon housing rents. Or the students may discuss the im-pact of immigration from Central American countries onthe labor market in large American cities, such as NewYork or Los Angeles (Sassen 1985). Conversely, theycould analyze the impact of plant transfers from Ameri-can cities to developing countries (Bluestone and Harri-son 1982). Another issue that cuts across nationalboundaries is environmental problems of the type cre-ated by the Bhopal accident in India. Who is to be heldaccountable for such an incident? What are its implica-tions for future conflict or cooperation among the richand poor nations? Such questions will sensitize studentsto global linkages, help them to identify the potential forconflict and cooperation that emerges from such link-ages, and encourage them to think about the types ofreform that may be necessary to meet the challenge ofcontemporary capitalism.

m Words of Caution

In encouraging our students to think about reform, weneed to be particularly careful about two aspects. First,our objective is not to make the students think that allthat is required to transcend the crisis is global-levelplanning about which only a global elite should decide.We should clearly explain to the students the nature ofthe current linkages between global and local affairs,that reform at one level now requires reform at theother level, and that the implementation of such reformsrequires consensus building at both levels. Because mostplanning students will probably work at the locallevel - i.e., at the city or regional level - it is impor-tant that we provide them a conceptual framework to&dquo;think globally&dquo; and yet &dquo;act locally&dquo; in devising spe-cific reform measures. They must also be constantly re-minded that for any reform to be successfully imple-mented, broad-based local support is essential. Howsuch support can be generated is as important an issueas the type of reform the students may think of. Weneed to emphasize that all along. A discussion of theAmerican democratic process of decision making may beuseful in this matter. As students are asked to comparethe decision-making process in their countries with thatof the U.S., they may begin to question the nature ofthe state-society relationship in nondemocratic govern-ments. What will emerge from such discussions will be a

higher level of sensitivity among the students about thenormative aspects of state-society relationships - an is-sue that is at the heart of the planning profession.The second aspect we must be careful about is not to

encourage a statist mentality among the students. They



149

should not be led to think that government interventionis the panacea for the current crisis. Instead, they mustrealistically assess the limits of state involvement underthe current circumstances, and search for possibilities toinvolve market forces and the civil society in devisingsolutions. Again, an awareness of this nature of the lim-its and possibilities of state activity can be cultivatedquite well by highlighting the contrast of extensive pub-lic planning in most poor countries and the relative ab-sence of it in the U.S. Myrdal (1957) had noted thisapparent contrast when he studied poor nations in Asiaafter completing his research on the problems of Ameri-can blacks. He wrote about it as a paradox: there wastoo much planning in poor countries with too little insti-tutional capacity to plan and implement; and conversely,too little planning in countries such as the U.S., withmore than adequate resources and well-established pub-lic institutions. The discovery of such paradoxes can bea learning experience for both American and interna-tional students. They may then begin to be more criticalof their countries’ planning/nonplanning experience. Anindirect benefit of this critical inquiry will be a betterunderstanding of how historical circumstances haveshaped social decisions - to plan comprehensively inpoor nations, and not to plan in the U.S. This kind ofhistorical understanding will help the students appreci-ate that social decisions are time-bound. As a result,they may then be able to appreciate why there is a needto rethink the role of planning under the present cir-cumstances.

A critical discourse of this nature, involving studentsfrom all over the world, is likely to provide an addi-tional benefit: it can, if properly guided, contribute to amore definite and clearly articulated definition of aworldwide professional philosophy. The need for such aphilosophy, which would serve as the basis for a com-mon ethic, a core of shared ideology, a shared sense ofmission, and a common culture, has been noted byAmerican planners for many years (Perloff 1985c; Dyck-man 1978; Lim 1986; Susskind 1984). Perhaps a com-parison of domestic planning experiences within an in-ternational framework would provide that sense ofidentity for American planners as well as other plannersfrom around the globe.l6 The students may discoverwhat is generally valid and generally applicable in thefield of planning as they collectively search for answersto questions such as What is the scope of planning incapitalist societies? How is the state’s capacity to planshaped by internal and external forces? Are planningstyles a function of the planner’s relative autonomyfrom forces within and outside the bureaucracy? With-out such a collective understanding based on a reason-able degree of consensus, planning can hardly be calleda profession and will continue to lose credibility in arapidly changing world.

There is, of course, no certainty that a cross-nationalapproach to planning education will lead to the discov-

ery of a universal planning doctrine. Some have evenargued that such a search for general principles and aprofessional philosophy may be fruitless, considering thediversity of planning tasks and institutional arrange-ments within which planners operate (Mandelbaum1979). I disagree because the benefit of the process liesas much in understanding what Rodwin (1986) hascalled &dquo;the limits of truth&dquo; as in arriving at generalplanning principles. In a world where &dquo;the truth&dquo; ofhow to develop and plan (or not plan) has so far flowedunidirectionally from the rich to the poor nations, a con-sensus about the limits of such truth may be quite anappropriate way to begin collective rethinking abouthow to face the current problems.

It is appropriate, then, that American planning schoolsshould begin to reorient planning education to respondto the emerging global trends. If that sounds like anunrealistic and unprecedented demand, it is not so. Theevolutionary history of American planning education in-dicates a gradual expansion of intellectual focus, frompreoccupation with beautifying projects to community-level planning, followed by city planning, and eventu-ally to regional planning (Perloff 1985a). It is time toexpand the focus further by taking into account nationaland international factors that are likely to have a far-reaching influence on planning. This is not so much aquestion of looking into the future as it is a question ofnot overlooking fairly well-established trends on the ho-rizon. American planning schools must begin to ac-knowledge these trends and anticipate the need for newknowledge and methods. Otherwise, as in the past,planning education will only follow somewhat haltinglyafter the march of practical events (Perloff 1985b). Inother words, instead of shaping the future, whichshould be the objective of education, it will merely reactto the changing circumstances.

0 Mutual LearningThe search for new types of knowledge and thinking toshape the future requires that American and interna-tional students be brought together - not on unequalterms, as in the past, but as equal partners in a mutuallearning process. This position is unlikely to be con-tested on principle, because mutual learning is one ofthose ideals that cannot be argued against for diplomaticreasons. In practice, however, the changing of planningeducation to an explicitly mutual learning model mayface stiff resistance because of the long history of intel-lectually asymmetrical relationships between the richand poor nations. &dquo;What can American planners learnfrom the poor countries?&dquo; the skeptics are likely to ar-gue, pointing out the lack of research that may provideevidence to the contrary.That the poor nations’ planning problems and experi-

ences may not be of any use to America is not, how-ever, a correct notion. There are instances of knowledge



150

transfer, primarily about planning principles, from thepoor to rich nations. The agents of these transfers werethe professionals who served as Western advisors to thepoor countries during the 1950s and 1960s, but laterreturned to their home countries, often educated andhumbled by their field experiences abroad. Though someof these development agents returned with the notionthat planning in poor countries was &dquo;an entirely differ-ent ball game; ’ a few were able to see through theapparent differences and identified common planningprinciples, which they then used in thinking about prob-lems of their home countries.

Let me highlight some examples. Albert Hirschman(1981), in writing about the theory of unbalancedgrowth, mentioned how he formulated the underlyingconcepts first, during his professional work in Colombia,and later found the same principles applicable to theU.S. Reminiscing about this experience, Hirschmanwrote:

As the work of Herbert Simon on &dquo;satisficing&dquo;and that of Leibenstein on &dquo;x-efficiency&dquo; wereto show, the performance of advanced econ-omies also depends not so much on findingoptimal combinations for given resources as oncalling forth and enlisting resources and abilitiesthat are hidden, scattered or badly utilized -that was the way I had put it in The Strategy ofEconomic Development for the less developedcountries. A feature I had presented as beingspecific to the situation of one group of econ-omies was later found to prevail in others aswell.... This kind of dialectical movement firstcomes upon looking at outside groups, the as-tonished finding of otherness, and then followsthe even more startling discovery that our owngroup is not all that different. (1981, 9)

Hirschman goes on to provide other examples of suchstartling discoveries. He points out that the dynamics ofdevelopment with &dquo;unlimited supplies of labour;’ whichArthur Lewis had thought to be typical of less devel-oped countries, have in fact prevailed in many Northerneconomies during the postwar period of rapid growth,primarily due to massive migration from the South.Such similarities were also observed by Gunnar Myrdaland Paul Streeten, two of the most prominent develop-ment economists of our time. Streeten (1984, 339) men-tions how his work on the production function in col-laboration with Myrdal showed that many of thecriticisms originally developed in South Asia also applyto Western Europe and the U.S. Streeten also points outthat structural theories of inflation, developed originallyat the Economic Commission for Latin America by Pre-bisch, are now being used to analyze inflationary ten-dencies in the industrialized countries.There are other equally vivid examples of learning

from the poor countries, not only by economists but alsoby other professionals with varied backgrounds. Amongplanners, Friedmann’s work in planning theory as wellas regional development was influenced by his workexperience in Venezuela, South Korea, and Chile (Fried-mann 1973b). His recent work indicates that he remainsconvinced that &dquo;some Third World solutions apply alsoat home&dquo; (1986, 13). The same conviction is apparent inJohn Turner’s work. Turner, through his years of work inPeru, had come to understand the notion of autonomyof building users. Later, he applied the same principle inadvocating alternatives to American public housing poli-cies (1976). Recently, Habraken (1985) has expanded onthis theme. He has argued that incremental home build-ing in poor countries provides an alternative architec-tural tradition which should replace &dquo;the hopelessly ob-solete model&dquo; of Western European architecturaltradition. The architect can no longer be seen &dquo;as themaker of an exceptional product, for an exceptional oc-casion, and for exceptional use,&dquo; as in the Western tradi-tion, Habraken argues; and if architecture is to surviveas a profession, it must learn from the poor countries,where people are engaged in the cultivation of theeveryday environment, which is not static but changesand grows over time. The need to learn from the poorcountries has also been stressed by Burns (1987), whohas written extensively on housing problems in bothrich and poor countries. Referring to the problem ofgrowing numbers of homeless families in the U.S., Bumssuggested that much can be learned from the poorcountries’ recent efforts to provide serviced plots to thepoor, who gradually build their homes on those plots.Another area of research that is increasingly drawing

on the experience of the poor countries is the problemof the deformalization of labor in rich countries. In or-der to understand the increase in subcontracting and inlow-paying jobs in U.S. cities, researchers have turnedto the literature on the urban informal sector in the poorcountries (Sassen 1984). What is more, there is someindication that in order to alleviate poverty among sin-gle-parent households in American cities, planners arenow looking at successful cases of income generationamong the poor in countries as remote as Bangladesh(Gould and Lyman 1987). To be sure, the transfer ofpolicies, if it is to be successful, will require significantmodification to suit the American institutional context;but that does not negate the reality that the core con-cepts upon which such policies are based seem to holdtrue in both the rich and poor countries.&dquo;To sum up, I am proposing that if planning education

is to be relevant, we must acknowledge that the timesare changing and contemporary capitalism is at a cross-road ; that in order to move ahead, a new global consen-sus of ideas is required; and that American planningschools can play a significant role in the building ofsuch a consensus by bringing international and Ameri-can students together and by fostering an intellectual



151

environment of mutual learning - a practice that hasprecedence and is becoming more prevalent. That is cer-tainly a large objective, and will require an equally largecommitment from planning educators, particularly inleading planning schools.

0 EpilogueMy objective in writing this article was to make a pleafor a one-world approach to planning education. Inmaking my plea, I focused entirely on the rationale forsuch an approach, without addressing any of the logisti-cal questions of how to shift from the current mode ofplanning education to the new approach. I did not dis-cuss what kind of resources will be required to makesuch a transition or whether all planning schools canmuster such resources. Nor did I discuss what the for-mat should be for one-world-oriented planning pro-grams. Should they be based on the comparison ofproblem-solving experiences in rich and poor countries?And how likely are we to arrive at generalizationsthrough such comparisons when there are wide varia-tions among the rich and poor countries? Much has al-

ready been written about the conceptual problems ofcomparisons between acutely different contexts (Masser1986; Dogan and Pelassy 1984; Harloe 1981). Howshould we resolve these problems? One may argue thatunless such conceptual problems are resolved, it is un-likely that planning education will ever be reoriented toa one-world approach. In other words, there are criticalprerequisites which must be fulfilled before we canmake the transition.

My response to the prerequisite argument is the fol-lowing : Yes, I acknowledge that a readjustment in themode of planning education will not be an easy task,but the problems are likely to be resolved as we actuallytry to make the transition and not prior to it. The logicof this position is simple: it asserts that if a genuinecommitment to the transition is supported by sincereefforts, what we now consider as prerequisites will ac-tually be the outcome of the process. For example,methodological problems of comparative research arelikely to be resolved only after we try to conduct com-parative research. Similarly, the lack of planning facultywith a global perspective, which some may consider amajor problem, will be resolved only after the facultyare encouraged to develop a global outlook on planningproblems. To be sure, the outcome will not always bepositive, and there will be some friction during the tran-sition ; but these are normal parts of all transition pro-cesses, and can be utilized as a basis for learning bydoing.

Let me address another issue which follows from myplea for collapsing the First World/Third World dichot-omy. One may think that I am suggesting that special-ized developing areas programs which have been startedlately be eliminated. On the contrary, I do not think we

should begin the readjustment process by dissolvingsuch programs, though at a later stage that may beappropriate. It is likely that by discontinuing the devel-oping areas programs now, we may slip back to the oldmold of &dquo;all-American&dquo; thinking. In the absence of aninstitutional base to claim resources, the poor countries’

planning concerns are likely to be swept away by thecurrently dominant pattern of faculty and student inter-ests in American planning. We need to be sensitive tothis existing unequal relationship, otherwise our effort toequalize the intellectual discourse may be counter-productive. That is, it may undermine even the few

gains we have made so far in drawing the attention ofthe academic community toward the poor countries.Where should we begin, then? There is, of course, no

one correct answer, because each planning school’s re-sponse to this question will be conditioned by its uniqueconstraints and possibilities. Some schools, of the typewith emphasis solely on microlevel land-use issues, mayfind my proposition inappropriate for their purpose,though one can demonstrate conclusively that micro is-sues are rarely, if ever, independent of macro trends.Other schools, even if they agree with the rationale ofthis paper, may be unwilling to direct any resourcestowards that end in the near future. Medium-sizedschools with a significant percentage of international stu-dents may begin with a new course offering focused onthe local/global perspective. Still others, probably withrelatively more resources, may start with a collaborativeresearch project involving faculty and students with dif-ferent geographical interests.The shift may be more pronounced in larger schools

with high percentages of international students. It mayinclude summer programs of the type that the Univer-sity of Cincinnati has been conducting in Greece (Uni-versity of Cincinnati 1986), or MIT’s urban design stu-dios in China (Richardson 1987). Recently, ColumbiaUniversity’s planning program tried a different format ofthe same approach in Haiti, where American and inter-national students jointly analyzed planning problems(Downs and Voltaire 1987). It is possible that once suchsmall experiments prove to be useful, some planningschools may structure a set of courses leading toward aprofessional degree in comparative development plan-ning. Seers (1979) has argued that in the future thedemands for students with comparative backgrounds islikely to increase sharply, as both private firms and pub-lic institutions will require employees to function in theinherently volatile and competitive environments pro-duced by a global economy.One last reminder: whatever form a planning school

uses to encourage cross-national teaching and research,the basic objective should be to help build a globalconsensus about development and planning through amutual learning process. That, we must remember, re-quires a genuine and equitable exchange of ideas, notthe type of relationship that Helleiner (1979) has called



152

&dquo;the latest wrinkle on the old international division oflabor&dquo;: the flow of information, as the new raw mate-rial, from the South to the North, and its eventual re-turn to its origin as a manufactured product, analyzedand interpreted by the North. The way to break out ofthis division of labor is not to discourage the study ofpoor countries by citizens of rich countries but to en-courage the study of each by the other. Streeten (1974)proposed more than a decade ago that such research onAmerican domestic issues by foreign students and schol-ars be given top priority in research funding. ThoughStreeten’s advice has yet to influence mainstream think-ing, particularly among economists, there is indicationthat some planners have come to the same conclusion.For example, Kaufman’s (1985) comparative evaluationof American and Israeli planners reflects this new modeof thinking. Kaufman’s study points out that Israeliplanners have a broader conception than Americanplanners have of what constitutes ethical issues in plan-ning, and that Israeli planners have a stronger normativedrive than their counterparts in America. Such findingscan be very useful in generating the type of dialoguethat should serve as the basis for mutual learning. Inthe process, we will be able to transcend the current

relationship between knowledge producers and knowl-edge consumers and, instead, as Hudson (1976) sug-gested, create a knowledge network at the globallevel - a network which will play a leading role inshaping the future according to our collective needs atthe beginning of the twenty-first century.Author’s Note: I am grateful to Professors Paul Streeten, John Friedmann,Paul Niebanck, Don Krueckeberg, Judith deNeufville, William Goldsmith,Peter Marcuse, Ernest Alexander and many of my colleagues at MIT fortheir helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. None of them,however, should be held responsible for the content of this paper. 11

m Notes

1. According to Hansen (1985), the proportion of foreign studentshad increased from under 10 percent in 1975 to over 20 percentin the early 1980s. Between 1977 and 1982, in 59 planningschools, total enrollment dropped by 13 percent, while domesticstudent enrollment dropped by 22 percent and foreign studentenrollment increased by 61 percent (pp. 5-6). The rate of increasein foreign student enrollment has leveled off lately.

2. Wheaton wrote, "I have often wondered what would happen ifwe provided each of our returning graduates with $100,000 inequity capital and suggested that he go into the home buildingbusiness on the side. I can’t believe that we wouldn’t have todaya dozen millionaires in a dozen countries, each swinging a lot ofpolitical weight in his native country, each a powerful force forthe better organization of development activity" (1968, 128).

3. For example, MIT, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,University of Pennsylvania, University of Virginia, and Universityof Cincinnati.

4. The journal Economic Development and Cultural Change, first pro-duced in 1952 by B. F. Hoselitz, played a leading role in propagat-ing the view that cultural change was a prerequisite for economicdevelopment.

5. Even prior to Development Economics, there used to be a course,called "Colonial Economics;’ which focused on ways to "stabilize"(as opposed to "develop") the economies of poor countries (Seers1979).

6. One of the most influential studies with regard to this issue wasby Albert Fishlow (1972), who showed that income mequality inBrazil had increased despite unprecedented growth of the nationaleconomy.

7. Gunnar Myrdal had raised this issue with economists much earlierwhen he wrote, "In this epoch of great awakening, it would bepathetic if the young economists in the underdeveloped countriesgot caught in the predilections of the economic thinking in theadvanced countries.... I would, instead, wish them to have thecourage to throw away large structures of meaningless, irrelevant,and sometimes blatantly inadequate doctrine and theoretical ap-proaches and to start their thinking afresh from a study of theirown needs and problems" (1957, 103-104).

8. During this time, the World Bank produced a modified version ofthe earlier development theory in a book entitled RedistributionWith Growth (Chenery et al. 1974). This provided somewhat of arallying ground for a few, but it lacked the intellectual consistencyand popular optimism to recreate the lost consensus about devel-opment.

9. Fisher has identified the following six reasons why students frompoor nations come to the U.S.: (1) to attain technical expertise, (2)to gain opportunities for personal growth, (3) to achieve profes-sional certification and promotion when they return home, (4) toreceive higher income and status, (5) to enjoy temporary relieffrom burdensome responsibilities, and (6) to seek opportunities foremigration (1981, 294).

10. Who is to blame for the common problems? It used to be com-mon, until the recent stock market crash, to blame the poor coun-tries for creating a debt problem, which, the critics proposed,severely affected the global economy. It has also been rather pop-ular to trace the origin of the common crisis to the first oil pricehike by OPEC. However, as Abdalla (1980) and others haveshown, the origin of the common crisis can be traced back to1971 when the convertibility of the dollar — the international re-serve currency — to gold was suspended by President Nixon.Since then, many events have further deepened the vulnerabilityof the global system of finance, trade, and monetary arrange-ments, namely, the oil price hike; the change of the monetarysystem from fixed to floating exchange rates; the sharp drop in theinternational price of primary products that are the main exportsof poor nations; the rise of interest rates in the U.S. and theconcurrent rise in U.S. budget deficits, and so on (Helleiner 1983;Dell 1982).

11. On this issue, the New York Times had an editorial that began onthe following note: "The most contentious issue in New York Cityis probably not capital punishment or abortion but street vendors"(1 December 1986 A20).

12. One may disagree with this broad generalization by pointing outthe various attempts at "privatization" and other managerialmechanisms that are currently being used in the rich as well asthe poor countries to reduce state expenditures and generate newsources of revenue. These measures are based on a notion thatthe current crisis is primarily the result of bureaucratic misman-agement rather than a manisfestation of deeper structural prob-lems. Such measures are unlikely to improve the quality of citylife (Szelenyi 1984; Sanyal 1986).

13. There are indications that the "left" is modifying its position onthis issue (see Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985).

14. This can be explained by the fact that very few students withtraining in historical analysis apply for admission to planning pro-grams. And those who apply are not given priority in the admis-sion process over students trained in economics, architecture, orsociology. Historical analysis is also not stressed in planning curri-cula. It is regarded as a "soft" method compared to computer-



153

aided positivistic analysis that provides a scientific aura, andhence respectability, to what in many cases is rather useless foreffective practice.

15. Conflict resolution and negotiation is becoming increasingly cen-tral to the planning profession (see Susskind and Ozawa 1984).

16. Sternlieb made a similar observation in a recent article when hewrote, "The growing awareness of international change provides amirror to American planners, not so much for an increasinglysophisticated look at others, but rather for a compelling look atourselves" (1987, 23).

17. For example, that poor families are credit worthy, and often havea better loan repayment rate than the relatively better off, is truefor both rich and poor nations. Similarly, the positive impact of"solidarity groups" among poor families is also true in both con-texts.

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