populism and the rise of the reform party in alberta

Populism and the Rise of the Reform Party in Alberta*

TREVOR HARRISON and HARVEY KRAHN University of Alberta

L'augmentation rapide du soutien populaire accorde au Reform Party of Canada est abordee du point de vue de deux theories deja anciennes de mobilisation populiste-la premiere axee sur la position de classe et la seconde privilegiant le nativisme. Les donnees issues d'une enqu6te effectuee dans toute la province en 1991 revelent que les agriculteurs, un segment particulier de la petite bourgeoisie, ont tendance plus que tout autre groupe a accorder leur vote au Reform Party au cours d'une election federale. Les Albertains qui se decrivent comme CCanadiensn plutijt qu'appartenant a un groupe ethnique ou racial particulier et, a un degre moindre, les repondants d'origine anglo-saxonne ou celtique, semblent un peu plus enclins a soutenir le Reform Party. De plus, les Albertains qui ont de fortes convictions sur certains dossiers sociaux et politiques (multicultu- ralisme, egalite des sexes, statut distinct du Quebec, indulgence envers les criminels) sont egalement attires par le Reform Party, ainsi que les personnes qui se sentent generalement alienees sur le plan politique.

The early rise in popular support for the Reform Party of Canada is discussed from the vantage point of two long-standing theories of populist mobilization, the first focussing on class position and the second emphasizing nativism. Data from a province-wide survey of Alberta residents conducted in 1991 reveal that farmers, a particular segment of the petite bourgeoisie, were more likely than any other class group to state that they would vote Reform in a federal election. Albertans who identified themselves as Canadians rather than identifying with a particular ethnic or racial group, and to a lesser extent those of Anglo-SaxodCeltic origin, were somewhat more likely to support the Reform Party. In addition, Albertans with strong feelings on a number of specific social and political issues (multiculturalism, gender equality, distinct status for Quebec, lenient treatment of criminals) were also attracted to the Reform Party, as were those who felt generally politically alienated.

THE 1993 FEDERAL ELECTION was one of the most remarkable in Canada's history. The Progressive Conservatives, the ruling party entering

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1992 Annual Meetings of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. Doug Baer's helpful comments are gratefully acknowledged, as are those provided by several anonymous reviewers. The manuscript of this article was received in January 1994 and accepted in June 1994.

128 CRSNRCSA, 32.2 1995

the campaign, were reduced to a mere two seats, while another traditional party, the left-wing New Democratic Party, fell from 43 to nine seats. And while Canada’s remaining old-line party, the Liberals, won the election, taking 177 seats, the real story was the rise to prominence of two “regional” parties, the Bloc Quebecois in Quebec (54 seats) and the Reform Party, centred mainly in Western Canada (52 seats). This paper examines the social origins of the latter.

The Reform Party was founded only a few years ago, in 1987, but has already left its mark on Canada’s political landscape. Despite the party’s evident success, however, we know little about the characteristics and attitudes of its supporters. Nor do we have an adequate understanding of why particular groups of Canadians have come to support the Reform Party, since previous accounts of the party have been largely descriptive (Dobbin, 1991; Sharpe and Braid, 1992; Manning, 1992). In this paper, we attempt a more theoretical examination of Reform’s beginnings.

Although it is beyond our scope and intention to test alternative explanations of populist mobilization, we examine Macpherson’s (1953) theory of the petite bourgeoisie and Hofstadter’s (1955) theory of nativism (see also Conway, 1978; Richards, 1981) to see whether they can help explain the phenomenon of Reform support in the province of Alberta. We then broaden our analysis to examine the more complex relationship between background characteristics and attitudinal configurations that underlies Reform support, reasoning that structural variables alone can- not explain political behaviour.

Theories of Populist Third Parties

Broadly speaking, theories of populism have tended to focus upon four issues: economics (including versions based on some notion of relative deprivation-see Graham and Gurr, 1969), nativism, class and/or, more recently, resource mobilization. Early historical accounts of populist third parties in the United States and Canada typically invoked economic explanations, describing populism as an attempt to thwart the trajectory of “big capital” (for the United States, see Hicks, 1955 [19311 and Buck, 1920; 1965 [19131; for Canada see Morton, 1978 [19511; and Lipset, 1968 [19501; more recently, see Pinard, 1975). In particular, these texts ex- plained the rise of populist parties as resulting from the uncertainties of hinterland or rural economies.

This generally sympathetic view of populism, however, changed with the publication of Hofstadter’s The Age of Reform in 1955. Hofstadter’s work, supported by later historians (e.g., Crapol, 1973), linked populism with “nativism.” Nativism is a belief system combining nationalism with prejudicial attitudes based on ethnicity, religion andor race (Palmer, 1982). Nativist attitudes are most oRen found among social groups that hold the same status characteristics, but not the economic or political

Populism and the Rise of the Reform Party in Alberta 129

power, of the dominant class. Nativism emerges most frequently during periods of social, political and/or economic crisis, reflecting the feelings of said groups that they must defend the country against internal threats posed by various minority groups (Leonard and Parmet, 1971).

Few attempts have been made to apply the concept of nativism to Canadian history. Notable exceptions are Berger’s (1976) examination of Canadian imperialism in the late 19th century, Robin’s (1991) study of extreme right-wing groups in Canada between the two World Wars, and Palmer’s (1982) study of nativism in Alberta’s history. Since Alberta was the Reform Party’s birthplace and remains its major area of support, Palmer’s work suggests that it may be useful to examine the rise of the Reform Party from a nativist perspective. If Reform support is a reflection of traditional nativism in Alberta, we would expect to find the party receiving a disproportionate amount of support from Anglo-SaxonKeltic and/or Protestant voters.

A few years before Hofstadter’s (1955) work appeared, Macpherson (1953) had combined ideas of regional economic exploitation with class concepts, derived from Marx and Engels (1977 [1848]) and Lenin (1960 [18941; 1970 [18981), to explain the rise of Social Credit in Alberta. Macpherson contended that Alberta had a relatively homogenous class structure made up almost entirely of a petite bourgeoisie. In his view, the latter’s contradictory class location, exacerbated by its quasi-colonial position within the North American economy, made it prone to political discontent but simultaneously unable to challenge the basic tenets of the capitalist system as a whole-hence the rise ofthe right-wing Social Credit party. Macpherson’s specific arguments about Alberta’s homogeneity and Social Credit’s petite-bourgeoisie support have been successfully countered in recent years (see especially Bell, 1989; 1990). Nonetheless, the applica- tion of his class hypothesis to the case of Reform Party support in Alberta may be appropriate, given that petite-bourgeoisie support continues to be a significant factor in the rise of populist parties (Pinard, 1975).

The fourth type of populist-movement theory, resource mobilization theory, holds that economic and/or other discontent is an insufficient cause for the rise of populist parties. Rather, such discontent must be mobilized. Thus, researchers within this tradition emphasize the role of leadership and organization in the mobilization process (see Tilly, 1978; McCarthy and Zald, 1987).

Ideally, we would like to consider the relative utility of all four types of theories in explaining the emergence of the Reform Party in Alberta. Unfortunately, we do not have the individual or group-level data needed to focus explicitly on economic explanations of populism. Nor do we have access to the organization-level information required for a careful assess- ment ofresource mobilization theory. We are, however, able to operationalize nativist and class theories, the potential usefulness of which is suggested by anecdotal accounts and survey findings about Reform Party supporters.

130 CRSNRCSA, 32.2 1995

In addition, we can examine the relationships among a variety of attitude/ belief measures, our class and nativist measures, and party preference, in an attempt to improve our understanding ofwhy certain groups ofAlbertans might have been more attracted to the Reform Party.

Existing Descriptions of Reform Party Supporters

Descriptions of the Reform Party have tended to focus on its leadership and membership. Such accounts have described the party as consisting largely of white, middle-aged or elderly males (Alberta Report, 1987; 1990; Stew- ard, 1990; Edmonton Journal, 1990), of upper-class or upper-middle class (professionals and businessmen) or agrarian background (Alberta Report, 1990; Edmonton Journal, 1990). Reports have also suggested that members were largely discontented former supporters of the Progressive Con- servative party, although significant connections to both the Social Credit party (especially in Alberta and British Columbia) and more extreme right- wing fringe parties (e.g., Western Canada Concept, the Confederation of Regions Party) are also noted (Edmonton Journal, 1990; Sharpe and Braid, 1992; Dobbin, 1991). Unfortunately, these descriptions have seldom been based on systematic observations. Instead, they tend to assume that the characteristics of certain of the party’s higher-profile members can be inferred to apply to the membership as a whole.

The Reform Party itself made three attempts to describe its own membership. In 1989, the party surveyed 5,000 members (reported in McCormick, 1991; Pearson, 1990). The same year, the party circulated a questionnaire to 2000 delegates to its Edmonton convention (Reform Party of Canada, 1989). In 1991, the party again surveyed its general membership, collecting information from a sample numbering 1,784 (Reform Party of Canada, 1991). In general, the results of these internal surveys supported the generalization that the typical Reform Party member was an older, fairly well educated male, retired or nearing retirement, living in a rural area. He was well-off, but not rich, and had formerly voted for (and often been a member of) the Progressive Conservatives.

Two questions arise from these observations. First, how closely did the Reform Party’s membership resemble the profile of supporters at large? Second, how different were Reform Party supporters from supporters of other parties? An Environics poll (n = 19521, conducted in the summer of 1991, provided some answers. Compared to other party supporters, Reform supporters tended to be disproportionately male, older (over 601, retired, home-owning, English-speaking, Protestant, and of European origin. The 1991 Environics data also suggested that, in comparison with the Liberals, Conservatives and NDP, Reform was then drawing somewhat more of its support from people in technical, professional, administrative, and skilled (or semi-skilled) occupations, from those with higher incomes ($50,000 or more), and from among the better educated (Environics, 1991). ADunvegan poll of 576 prairie farmers conducted at the height of the referendum


campaign in October, 1992 showed Reform Party support to be particularly high within this group. This poll revealed that 64% of decided Alberta farmers, and 49% of decided farmers in all three prairie provinces combined, planned to vote Reform (Edmonton Journal, 1992).

Using the same 1991 data examined in this paper, a recent study of Reform Party supporters in Alberta (Harrison and Krahn, 1993) obtained results similar to the Environics findings, but also examined a series of attitude measures dealing with such issues as Senate reform, “distinct society” status for Quebec, and support for multiculturalism. Different responses to these attitude statements by supporters of the four main federal parties (PC, Liberal, NDP, and Reform) suggested the possible importance of specific attitudes and beliefs in populist mobilization. Spe- cifically, they might help explain the effects of structural variables (e.g., class, nativism) or ascribed characteristics (e.g., gender, age) or might also exhibit a completely independent effect on party preference.

There is both anecdotal and research support for the idea that specific beliefs and attitudes are related to Reform Party support. As did our own preliminary findings, Reform’s 1989 convention survey found adamant beliefs within its membership on such specific topics as government intervention in the economy, the Goods and Services Tax (GST), language policies, and multiculturalism (Reform Party of Canada, 1989). Simpson (1991) argued that Reformers were motivated by neo-conservative attitudes and values endorsing less government, less taxes and less special treatment for minority groups. Sharpe and Braid took the issue of attitudinal variables even further, suggesting that the Reform Party drew together supporters less motivated by a coherent set of ideological principles than by a combination of generalized political discontent and the saliency of special issues. “Many people are so disillusioned with the old parties that they find one thing they like about Reform policy and hang on for dear life” (Sharpe and Braid, 1992: 33).

Research Design and Sampling

Data for this study were obtained from the 1991 Alberta Survey, the fifth in an annual series of province-wide public opinion surveys conducted by the Population Research Laboratory (PRL) at the University of Alberta. A total of 1345 randomly selected residents of the province, 18 years of age or older, were interviewed by telephone in February and March of 1991.

Random-digit dialling was used to generate the sample ofhouseholds. Aquota system was used to obtain an equal distribution of female and male respondents. Repeated call-backs to difficult-to-contact households pro- duced a final response rate of 74%. Because Edmonton was over-sampled relative to its share of the provincial population, the final sample was weighted to reflect the proportion of the population living in Edmonton, Calgary, and the rest of the province.

132 CRSNRCSA, 32.2 1995

Measurement and Index Construction

The highest social status in Canada has traditionally been attributed to Protestants of British heritage (Porter, 1965; Forcese and Richer, 1988; Curtis et al., 1988). Presumably, also, persons born within a country have both a higher socially ascribed status and a greater tendency to place the blame for perceived negative changes upon outsiders. On this basis, we chose three variables to index nativism: ethnic identity, religious affiliation and place of birth.

Place ofbirth was coded as a binaryvariable (native-born; other) while religious affiliation was collapsed into three categories (Protestant; Catho- lic; Other/None). Ethnic identitywas more difficult to categorize, given that survey respondents frequently report multiple ethnic origins (e.g., British and Dutch) or simply state that they are “Canadian.” For this study, we placed everyone who reported Anglo-Saxon or Celtic origins (i.e., British, English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh or multiple ethnic origins including one of these) into one group. Other European origins formed a second category. A large proportion of the respondents (28%) identified themselves as “Cana- dian,” thus forming a third category. Amore detailed analysis revealed that virtually none of these individuals were recent immigrants and suggests that very few were from visible minority groups. Instead, it would appear that most were of Anglo-Saxon/Celtic or European origin.’ A much smaller number (2%) stated that they were French-Canadian. Those of “other” e t h i c origins formed a fif3h group.2

Social class was initially defined using neo-Marxist categories suggested by Wright (1976; see also Johnston and Ornstein, 1985; 1988; and Baer et al., 1987), but modified in the courseof our research to reflect a significant difference found in party support between agrarian and non- agrarian segments of the petite bourgeoisie. Interestingly, a subsequent rereading of Macpherson’s (1953: 227) original text provided some justifi- cation for this modification-a point to which we return in our concluding discussion. Thus, farmers (the agrarian petite bourgeoisie) were distinguished from self-employed professionals or small business owners (the non-agrarian petite bourgeoisie). Likewise, owners of large businesses were distinguished from senior and middle-level managers. Foremen/ women and supervisors were coded as foremen. Technicians, semi-professionals and employed professionals-individuals who possess some degree of control over the work process but not over other employees-were classified as semi-autonomous workers. Farm labourers, along with un-

1. Ninety-six percent of those self-identifying as “Canadian” were born in Canada. Seven out of ten (72%) stated that their father had been born in Canada, 12% said the United Kingdom or Ireland, 5% said the United States, while most of the rest mentioned a Third World country. Almost identical results were reported for mother’s place of birth. Nine out of ten (91%) stated that their fust language was English.

2. Forty percent of the 122 individuals in this residual group reported East or South Asian ethnic origins. 28% were members of aboriginal groups, and 14% identified African, Central or Latin American, or Middle Eastern origins. Thus, most would be considered members of avisible minority group. Forty-eight percent had been born in Canada, and about one-third reported parents born in Canada. Less than half (43%) stated that English was their first language.


skilled, semi-skilled and skilled manual, clerical and service workers, were classified as worker^.^

Correlational and factor analyses were initially used to identify seven distinct attitudinal “clusters” (i.e., involving multiple items) and eight single items that we retained because of high factor loadings andor theoretical importance.* Ultimately, only two of the single measures (“Quebec should be officially recognized as a ‘distinct society’ in Canada” and “Society has become too lenient with criminals”) and three of the multiple-item indices (political alienation, multiculturalism and gender equality) figured in our multivariate analysis (see Table 4 be lo^).^

Three statements were used to create the political alienation index (a= 0.76): “I don’t think the federal government cares much about what people like me think”; “I don’t think the Alberta government cares much about what people like me th ink and “The government is too powerful in Canada.”

The multiculturalism index (a = 0.78) dealing with respondents’ views on ethnic diversity (i.e., assimilation versus retention of diversity) was constructed from responses to six items: “Canada would be a better place if members of different ethnic groups would keep their own way of life alive”; “It would be good to see ethnic groups in Canada preserve the use of their heritage languages”; “It is best for Canada if all immigrants forget their cultural backgrounds as soon as possible”; “People who come to Canada should change their ways to be more like everyone else”; “The presence of a variety of ethnic groups in Canada is a valuable resource in the shaping of our future” and “Having many cultural groups in Canada makes it difficult to develop a sense of unity among Canadians.”

Four items were used in the index of (traditional versus progressive) beliefs about gender equality (a = 0.69): “Men should take more responsi- bility for taking care of children”; “More should be done by governments to promote equality for women in Canada”; “The government of Alberta

3. Class categories were initially determined using occupational information coded according to Pineo (1984). However, the 16-category Pineo scale does not directly measure ownership status or the degree of control over the work process possessed by individuals within occupational categories. While we had no additional information about control over the work process, we could address the issue of ownership by cross-tabulating the Pineo categories with responses to two questions: “Are you mainly an employee working for someone else, or self-employed?” and (if self-employed) “Do you have any paid employees?” Logical discrepancies in the designation of class categories (e.g., individuals classified as managers who said they were self-employed) were then reassigned on the basis of other occupation and industry information in the data set.

4. The special topic of the 1991 Alberta Survey was Political Culture in Alberta. Over fifty opinion statements, measured on a seven-point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree), addressed a wide range of political, economic, and social issues. Since the questionnaire included only single or a limited number of items for some issues (e.g., the power of unions; leniency with criminals), multiple-item indices could not be created for each of these concerns. When indices were created, responses to the component items were averaged (with the values of negatively phrased items reversed).

5 . Indices measuring left-right distributive beliefs (two items), sympathies to aboriginal concerns (seven items), attitudes toward abortion (two items) and toward the military (four items) were examined and then dropped from the exploratory multivariate analyses, along with single items asking about the GST, the power of unions, an acceptable level of immigration, an elected Senate, and labour force participation by mothers of small children.

134 CRSNRCSA, 32.2 1995

should legislate a pay equity policy, that is, equal pay for work of equal value” and “It is time Alberta had a woman premier.”

Finally, several additional control variables were included in our analyses. These were age, gender, education, residential location (Edmon- ton, Calgary, other city, towdrural), household income, home ownership and union membership. The profiles of Reform Party membership and support reviewed earlier suggest that these may be important variables.

Descriptive Results

The survey results indicated that, had a federal election been held in early 1991, the Reform Party would have received the largest share of electoral support. Among decided voters (n = 815), Reform would have received 30% of the vote, compared to 25% for the Liberals, 24% for the NDP, 20% for the Tories and 1% for other parties.

What were the factors underlying Reform’s electoral support? Table 1 cross-tabulates federal voting preference in 1991 with the class variable and the nativist measures described above. Undecided voters, those who said they would not vote, and the handful who would support other fringe parties are included in the “other” category (40% in total).

Table 1 reveals that Macpherson’s (1953) petite bourgeoisie theory only partially describes the Reform phenomenon. As expected, workers were somewhat more likely to support the NDP. But almost equivalent levels of NDP support were observed among semi-autonomous workers and the non-agrarian petite bourgeoisie. However, support for the Reform Party from the non-agrarian petite bourgeoisie was not all that much higher than the average for the total sample. Instead, the most pronounced class support for Reform came from farmers. More than four out of ten (41%) said they would vote Reform if an election were called. The extent of this agrarian support is even more apparent if only decided voters are considered. In this case, 62% of farmers said they would support the Reform Party.

The pattern of Reform support is also only somewhat similar to what a nativist explanation of populism would predict (Table 1). While Albertans of Anglo-SaxodCeltic ethnic origin were slightly more likely than the sample as a whole to state that they would vote Reform (19.3%), 22.3% of those individuals who were self-identified as “Canadian” were Reform Party supporters. However, French Canadians and, particularly, those of “other” ethnic origin were less likely to indicate that they would vote for the Reform Party. The relationship between religious affiliation and federal voting preference was also statistically significant, but primarily because Catholics were much less likely to support the Reform Party (11.6%). Protestant Albertans were only marginally more likely to express preference for Reform (21.1%). As for immigrant status, native-born Canadians were a little more likely to be Reform supporters, but the relationship was not significant.

Tab

le 1

Fed

eral

Vot

ing

Pre

fere

nce

by

Cla

ss, E

thni

c Id

enti

ty,

Rel

igio

n a

nd Im

mig

rant

Sta

tus,

Alberta, 1

991

Reform

Lib

eral

N

DP

PC

T

otal

(N

) O

ther

*

Tot

al S

ampl

e

Cla

ss P

osit

ion

t Fa

rmer

s O

wne

rs

Petit

e B

ourg

eois

ie

Sed

mid

. Mgr

s Se

mi-a

ut. w

orke

rs

Fore

men

W

orke

rs

18.4

14.9

41.3

3.0

27.2

27.2

20.6

10.8

21.7

19.7

20.2

16.4

15.7

14.8

13.9

15.6

14.6

7.8

7.5

16.5

7.9

14.9

7.5

17.9

12.0

14.8

12.3

13.3

18.2

15.8

1.3

9.1

40.1

33.1

25.8

38.8

32.5

32.7

50.9

43.5

100.0%

(1345)

100.0%

(78)

100.0%

(21)

100.0%

(102)

(108)

100.0%

100.0%

(229)

100.0%

(126)

100.0%

(659)

Eth

nic

iden

tity

t A

nglo

-Sax

odC

eltic

19.3

12.3

14.7

11.6

42.0

100.0%

(373)

Eur

opea

n 17.0

14.4

13.5

13.7

41.5

100.0%

(440)

Fren

ch-C

anad

ian

14.4

22.1

24.5

11.3

27.7

100.0%

(27)

“Can

adia

n”

22.3

14.2

16.2

12.7

34.7

100.0%

(382)

Oth

er

9.0

24.9

11.2

5.2

49.7

100.0%

(122)

Rel

igio

nt

Prot

esta

nt

Cat

holic

O

ther

Non

e

21.1

12.3

12.3

13.6

40.7

100.0%

(739)

11.6

20.9

14.7

13.6

39.2

100.0%

(318)

18.9

14.7

20.5

6.1

39.8

100.0%

(289)

Imm

igra

nt S

tatu

s B

orn in

Can

ada

18.8

14.0

15.2

12.6

39.5

100.0%

(1124)

Bor

n ou

tsid

e Can

ada

16.2

19.3

11.8

8.9

43.8

100.0%

(221)

* O

ther

incl

udes

“do

n’t k

now

,” “w

ould

not

vot

e,” “

inel

igib

le to

vot

e” a

nd “

othe

r par

ty.”

t

DiiT

eren

ces b

etw

een

grou

ps a

re st

atis

tical

ly si

gnifi

cant

(p c

.01; c

hi-s

quar

e tes

t).

3

ID E ln ID 2 a -c W

v1

136 CRSNRCSA, 32.2 1995

Our review of several previous studies profiling the characteristics of Reform Party members and supporters suggested that additional variables might be significantly correlated with Reform support. Table 2 displays the cross-tabulation of voting preference with a number of these sociodemographic variables. First, we observe more support for the Reform Party in rural areas (including small towns) and in Calgary, as compared to Edmonton. The level of Reform support in the other urban areas within the province lay in between these two extremes. NDP support was highest in Edmonton, (at the time) a stronghold of the provincial party and the only Alberta community with a sitting New Democrat MP in Ottawa. While support for the Conservatives was low across the province, somewhat more of the Calgary respondents in this survey stated that they would vote PC in a federal election.

As other surveys of Reform Party members and supporters have revealed, men were significantly more likely than women (21% compared to 15% in our study) to indicate their support for this new party in the federal arena. However, male respondents were also somewhat more likely than female sample members to indicate support for each of the other three main parties, since women were much more inclined to say they were undecided (46% versus 34% of males in the “other” category).

Reform Party support was fairly stable (around 20%) for those over 30 years of age, with a slight tendency toward greater acceptability among those 65 and older (23%). By contrast, only 12% of those younger than 30 said they would vote for the Reform Party. On the other hand, Liberal and NDP support declined with age, while roughly similar proportions of each of the four age cohorts said they would vote for the Conservative party.

The relationship between educational attainment and party preference was statistically significant, in part due to the much smaller proportion of undecided voters among better-educated sample members. How- ever, it is also clear that the Reform Party attracted a larger share of better- educated voters (as did the Liberal party). The lowest household-income group (less than $20,000 in 1990) was least likely to support the Reform Party, but the differences in Reform support across the other four income categories were negligible.6

Home owners (who tend to be older and more affluent) were significantly more likely to support the Reform Party (22% compared to 12% of renters). The pattern was reversed for the Liberals and New Democrats. As for union membership, as expected, union members were much more likely to support the NDP and much less likely to indicate support for the Reform Party or the Conservatives.

6. AB in most other surveys, a substantial minority (almost 20%) of respondents did not report their household income. Inclusion of this variable in subsequent data analyses substantially reduced the sample size, but did not lead to important changes in our results. Consequently, income was omitted from the multivariate analyses.

Table

2

Fed

eral

Vot

ing

Pre

fere

nce

by

Soci

odem

ogra

phic

Ch

arac

teri

stic

s, A

lber

ta, 1

991

Ref

orm

L

iber

al

NDP

PC

Oth

er'

Tot

al

(N)

Tot

al S

ampl

e

Lo

cati

on

t Edmonton

Cal

gary

O

ther

city

T

odru

ral

Gen

der?

Fe

mal

e M

ale

22

9

30-4

4 45

-59

60 +

Ed

uca

tio

nt

< 1

2 ye

ars

12 ye

ars

13-1

5 ye

ars

16 +

year

s

HH

Inco

me

(S)

< 20

,Ooo

20

,000

39,9

99

40,0

00-5

9,99

9 60

,000

-79.

999

80,0

00 +

Hom

e O

nn

ersh

ipt

YeS

No

Un

ion

Mem

berr

hipt

Ye

S N

O

18.4

11.8

20

.6

16.7

22

.6

15.4

21

.5

12.2

20

.7

19.6

22

.6

16.2

13

.6

20.3

22

.4

11.1

20.0

21

.6

19.6

21

.8

21.9

12

.2

13.2

19

.3

14.9

20.0

16

.1

18.1

7.

8

13.9

15

.8

18.6

15

.3

12.3

9.

0

9.7

14.6

15

.0

20.5

16.7

14

.6

16.1

10

.9

21.3

12.9

18

.4

17.3

14

.4

14.6

20.0

12

.1

14.5

12

.6

13.6

15

.7

15.3

17

.1

13.5

8.

1

10.4

19

.1

14.5

15

.2

16.4

14

.9

19.1

16

.2

12.5

12.2

19

.0

24.0

12

.9

12.0

8.6

15.5

10

.9

12.2

11.2

12

.8

12.7

10

.7

13.5

12

.8

10.7

10

.4

14.1

11

.9

10.8

11

.5

15.1

13

.4

12.3

13.3

9.

7

6.5

13.0

40.1

39.6

35

.7

39.8

44

.8

45.9

34

.2

41.2

36

.2

41.1

47

.5

53.0

42

.3

36.1

30

.0

45.0

39

.0

28.1

39

.9

32.1

39.7

40

.7

39.0

40

.4

100.

0%

(134

5)

100.

0%

(343

) 10

0.0%

(3

77)

100.

0%

(211

) 10

0.0%

(4

14)

100.04

(683

) 10

0.0%

(6

62)

100.

0%

(389

) 10

0.0%

(5

51)

100.

0%

(193

) 10

0.0%

(2

11)

100.

0%

(314

) 10

0.0%

(2

85)

100.

0%

(445

) 10

0.0%

(2

98)

100.

0%

(167

) 10

0.0%

(3

01)

100.

0%

(284

) 10

0.0%

(1

76)

100.

0%

(162

)

100.

0%

(858

) 10

0.0%

(4

82)

100.

0%

(211

) 10

0.0%

(1

134)

other

mdu

ded

'don

't h

ow,"

'wou

ld n

ot vo

te,"

'meL

pble

to v

ote'

and

'oth

er p

arly

" t

DIfI

eren

eea W

en p

up

s ar

e S

tah8

+aca

lly aw

u6ca

nt (p

c 01, &

-qua

re test)

3

ID 3

ID

-0 e r"

-. 3 E 4 G U

A

w u

138 CRSNRCSA, 32.2 1995

Multivariate Results

Our primary goal in this analysis was to determine whether class and nativist explanations of populism can help account for Reform Party support in Alberta. Table 1 revealed that predictions derived from Macpherson’s class theory only partially matched the relationships observed in the data (i.e., only one segment of the petite bourgeoisie, farmers, shows,a substantially higher-than-average level of Reform support). Simi- larly, hypotheses based on the nativist explanation were only partially supported. But even these weak bivariate relationships between party preference and both class and nativism need to be questioned. It may simply be that better-educated, more affluent, older, rural Albertans are more likely to prefer Reform policies (Table 2), but not necessarily because of their class or nativist status. Similarly, it is possible that Albertans in certain class, nativist, or sociodemographic groups are attracted to the Reform Party, but more so because of specific attitudes and beliefs, which tend to be more common in these different groups.

Hence, a second goal in this paper was to explore the relationships among class, nativism and such background variables as education, afflu- ence, age and location (Table 2), as well as attitudes and beliefs. Since our dependent variable was a binary measure (18.4% supporting the Reform Party; 81.6% other), we used logistic regression techniques to test the alternative theoretical explanations. We set out to explicitly compare the relative effects of class and the nativism measures, but proceeded in a much more exploratory manner with the other sociodemographic variables and the attitude variables.

We began by constructing binary measures from the class variable, combining owners and managers (because of the small number of owners) and omitting workers as the reference category (since they were least likely to support the Reform Party). The first panel of results in Table 3 displays the effects of these five binary variables on federal voting preference (a pattern already observed in the bivariate results in Table 1). The first ofthe two columns contains the regression coefficients for each predictor, while the second includes the ratios of these coefficients to their respective standard errors. As in ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression, a ratio larger than 2 indicates a statistically significant (p < .05)net effect. Owners/ managers, the non-agrarian petite bourgeoisie, semi-autonomous workers and especially farmers were significantly more likely to support the Reform Party than workers were.

Four binary measures were constructed from the ethnicity variable; the “other” category was omitted. In addition, two binary variables (Prot- estant; Catholic) were created from the religious affiliation measure, and one from the immigrant status variable (native-born). Table 3 (panel 2) shows the net effects of these seven variables on Reform Party preference, controlling on the five binary class variables. Compared to Albertans of “other” ethnic origin, those from an Anglo-Saxon background or of other

Tab

le 3

Ref

orm

Par

ty P

refe

renc

e by

Cla

ss, N

ativ

ism

Mea

sure

s, a

nd S

ocio

dem

ogra

phic

Cha

ract

eris

tics

, A

lber

ta, 1

991:

Log

isti

c R

egre

ssio

n A

naly

ses

~

(Sam

ple

size

) (1

345)

(1

345)

(1

339)

(G

.-0.-f

. Ch

i-sq

uar

e)

1345

.0

1339

.0

1329

.2

(PI

.449

.4

41

.409

Ind

epen

den

t var

iab

le

Farm

ers

.729

4.

89

*.70

4 4.

61

.465

2.

68

Ow

nerd

man

ager

s .2

64

2.23

.2

41

2.02

-.0

05

-0.4

1 Pe

tite

Bou

rgeo

isie

.2

65

2.01

.2

69

1.99

.0

72

0.50

Sem

i-Aut

onom

ous

.234

2.

39

.224

2.

25

.065

0.

58

Fore

men

.0

16

0.12

.0

26

0.19

-.0

36

-0.2

5

Ang

lo-S

axod

Cel

tic

Eur

opea

n Fr

ench

Can

adia

n "C

anad

ian"

Pr

otes

tant

C

atho

lic

Nat

ive-

Bor

n

.477

2.

54

.402

2.

09

.411

2.

21

.375

1.

98

518

1.57

.5

30

1.59

.5

89

3.12

.5

54

2.89

.0

19

0.21

-.0

09

-0.1

0 -.3

12

-2.5

6 -.3

14

-2.5

4 -.0

33

-0.3

1 .0

81

0.69

Mal

e .2

40

3.01

A

ge (

year

s)

.007

2.

65

Edu

catio

n (y

ears

) .0

34

2.45

H

ome

owne

r .1

96

2.25

U

nion

mem

ber

-.110

-0

.99

Cak

ary

.262

2.

74

Oth

er c

ity (n

ot E

dmon

ton)

.1

38

0.99

R

Wdt

own

.248

2.

14

* In

eac

h ce

ll, th

e fv

st en

try is

the

logi

stic

regr

essi

on c

oeff

icie

nt. T

he se

cond

entr

y is

the

ratio

of th

e co

effic

ient

to it

s st

anda

rd e

rror

.

W 3 P

c J

(D

W

W ;I

-c 3 -. e 2 U

W c

140 CRSNRCSA, 32.2 1995

European origin, and individuals who called themselves “Canadian,” were significantly more likely to support the Reform Party. In addition, Catho- lics were significantly less likely to indicate that they would vote Reform.’ The addition of the nativist measures to the logistic regression equation had little impact on the effects of the class measures, indicating that the effects on voting preference of class and nativism are largely independent.

Sociodemographic control variables were added to our analysis with a set of three binary measures of residential location (Calgary; other city; rural/town), binary variables for gender (male = 11, home ownership (owner = l), and union membership (member = 1). The effects of age and education, both measured in years, were also examined. When these eight additional variables were added to the logistic regression equation (Table 3, panel 3), the effects of four of the class measures were drastically reduced, indicating the correlations among these two sets of measures (e.g., owners/managers tend to be men; semi-autonomous workers are typically well educated). Only farmers continued to stand out as a group significantly more likely to vote Reform, controlling on this set of sociodemographic variables. The impact of the nativist measures on voting preference was also reduced by the inclusion of the sociodemographic measures but Anglo-SaxodCeltic and “Canadian” Albertans were still significantly more likely to favour Reform while Catholics were less likely to do so.

As a data-reduction strategy, the variables with non-significant net effects in this last analysis were dropped from subsequent analyses. Table 4 (panel 1) displays a trimmed logistic regression equation including only the eleven independent variables with significant net effects.* As the previous results in Table 3 already demonstrated, we found some support for both the nativist and the class expldnations of populist party support. Farmers were significantly more likely to favour the Reform Party, as were Albertans of Anglo-SaxodCeltic origins and those who identified themselves as “Canadians.” But Table 4 also reveals that males (compared to females), home owners (versus renters), Calgary residents and those living in rural areas or small towns (compared to residents of Edmonton and other cities) were more likely to say that they would vote Reform in a federal election. In addition, age and education were both significantly positively associated with Reform support. Thus, while class and nativist explanations can help us to understand the origins of Reform Party support in Alberta, other sociodemographic variables also play an important part.

As noted earlier, specific attitudes and beliefs may be part of the explanation. For example, older Albertans may have supported the Reform Party because of their more traditional attitudes toward the family and the role of women in society. Similarly, Albertans who have ethno-cultural 7. We report the significant coefficients for Catholic religious affiliation and other European ethnic origins,

recognizing that they do not constitute support for the nativist hypothesis, which predicts greater support for Reform from Protestants and those with Anglo-Saxon origins.

8. A comparison of the coefficients in this equation with their equivalents in the last panel ofTable 3 reveals that the trimming of non-significant independent variables had little impact on the overall pattern of results.

2 T

able

4

Ref

orm

Par

ty P

refe

renc

e by

Cla

ss, N

ativ

ism

Mea

sure

s,

U c 3 -. WY

Soci

o-D

emog

raph

ic C

hara

cter

isti

cs, a

nd A

ttit

uded

Opi

nion

s, A

lber

ta, 1

991:

W

Q-

J

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isti

c R

egre

ssio

n A

naly

ses

3

(Sam

ple

size

) (1

339)

(1

294)

(2

279)

(1

179)

(1

158)

(1

155)

(D

(G.-

0.-f

. Chi

-squ

are)

13

28.2

13

01.1

12

41.7

11

86.3

11

51.4

11

41.3

E

(P)

.485

.3

42

.277

,3

18

.417

.4

67

Zi 0,

3

Inde

pend

ent v

aria

ble

Farm

ers

.461

2.

75*

58

2

3.34

.5

90

3.22

.5

31

2.68

.5

19

2.63

,5

09

2.57

g

A

nglo

-Sax

onK

elti

c .3

42

2.14

.3

31 2.05

.275

1.

69

.239

1.

46

.249

1.

51

.269

1.

62

3

Eur

opea

n .2

95

1.85

.3

12

1.93

.2

66

1.63

,2

09

1.27

.2

18

1.32

.2

25

1.36

$

“Can

adia

n”

.491

3.

14

.460

2.

90

.392

2.

44

.363

2.

26

,366

2.

26

.374

2.

30

T

Cat

holi

c -.2

94

-2.8

8 -.3

18

3.05

-.3

13

2.94

-.3

24

2.95

-.3

19

-2.8

9 -.3

13

-2.8

3 2

Age

(ye

ars)

.0

07

2.76

.0

07

2.44

.0

06

2.30

.005

1.68

.0

05

1.77

.0

05

1.62

2

Edu

cati

on (

year

s)

.036

2.

91

.047

3.

65

.041

3.

05

.034

2.

42

.032

2.

24

.034

2.

41

g H

ome

owne

r .1

96

2.28

.2

05

2.33

.2

21

2.48

.1

96

2.15

.1

95

2.13

.1

88

2.04

5

Cal

gary

.2

32

2.69

.2

14

2.43

.2

16

2.41

.1

99

2.17

.1

94

2.10

.1

92

2.07

R

uraV

tow

n .2

30

2.14

.2

13

1.96

.1

94

1.72

.1

66

1.44

.1

55

1.34

.1

66

1.43

P

olit

ical

alie

natio

n in

dex

.177

5.

38

.160

4.

80

.170

4.

91

.166

4.

79

.152

4.

32

CI

(D

Mal

e .2

29

2.98

.2

11

2.70

.2

07

2.57

.1

34

1.59

.1

27

1.50

.1

40

1.64

5‘

Mul

ticu

ltur

alis

m in

dex

-.081

-2

.59

-.056

-1

.73

-.046

-1

.39

-.041

-1

.24

Gen

der e

qual

ity in

dex

-.133

-3

.56

-.117

-3

.11

-.117

-3

.10

Dis

tinct

sta

tus f

or Q

uebe

c -.0

46

-2.0

9 -.0

45

-2.0

3 C

rim

inal

s tr

eate

d to

o le

nien

tly

.061

2.

07

* In ea

ch c

ell,

the

firs

t ent

ry is

the

logi

stic

regr

essi

on co

effic

ient

. The

seco

nd e

ntry

is th

e ra

tio o

f the

coe

ffic

ient

to it

s st

anda

rd e

rror

. A 5

142 CRSAJRCSA, 32.2 1995

backgrounds congruent with nativist orientations might have favoured the Reform Party because of its more open opposition to federal government multiculturalism initiatives. If so, the inclusion of measures of such attitudes in the analysis would be expected to reduce the relative effects of age and the variables measuring nativism.

However, we might also find independent effects of various attitudes and beliefs on Reform Party support. According to some observers at the time this survey was completed, Reform was attracting many supporters because of their strong feelings on one or several issues (Sharpe and Braid, 1992: 33). If this were the case, we should see significant net effects for attitude measures, with the effects of class, ethnicity, religion, and other sociodemographic predictors remaining relatively unchanged.

In our exploratory analysis of the effects of various attitudes on Reform Party support we added one index or item (see Measurement, above) at a time to the first equation in Table 4. We began with measures of attitudesheliefs that, in our opinion, were most congruent with the social, economic, and political issues that figured prominently in Reform Party policies in 1991:If the additional predictor did not have a significant net effect, it was removed from subsequent analyses. This procedure was continued until the effects of all of the attitude indices and items had been examined.

Feelings of political alienation (i.e., big government doesn’t care) had an independent net effect on Reform Party support (Table 4; second equation). Albertans more alienated from government were more likely to identify with the Reform Party. Comparisons of the regression coefficients for the other predictor variables, with and without the inclusion of this attitudinal index, revealed few changes. The one exception was the binary measure identifying farmers. When the political alienation index was added to the logit equation, the coefficient for this variable increased from .461 to .582, indicating a suppressed effect. Taking feelings of political alienation into account, farmers were even more likely to support the Reform Party.

This suppressed effect does not indicate that politically-alienated farmers were particularly likely to support the Reform Party since, when included in the logit equation, an interaction term (farmer x the alienation scale) did not have a significant effect (results not shown). However, an additional analysis including an interaction term for age and political alienation (results not shown) did reveal a positive significant effect for the interaction term. Thus, older, politically alienated Albertans (possibly former Social Credit voters) were particularly inclined to support the Reform Party.s

9. An additional interaction term measuring the joint effect of age and being a farmer did not have a significant effect in this equation.


The third equation in Table 4 reveals that individuals less supportive of the principles of multiculturalism were more likely to support the Reform Party. Looking for changes in the effects of variables already in the equation, we observe that the regression coefficients for Anglo-Saxon/ Celtic origin and European origin, as well as “Canadian” self-identification, were all reduced. Only the “Canadian” coefficient remained statistically significant. These changes suggest that at least some of the “nativist” support for the Reform Party was due to concerns about the increasingly multicultural nature of Canadian society.

Equation four in Table 4 adds the gender-equality index to the list of 13 predictors already included in the analysis. The significant negative effect of this measure indicates that Albertans less in agreement with statements about gender equality were more likely to vote Reform. Com- paring the coefficients for other predictor variables in equations 3 and 4, we see that the effects of many of these independent variables were somewhat reduced. In particular, the effects of gender and age, which were previously statistically significant, were now considerably weaker and non-significant. Thus, some of the appeal of the Reform Party to older males may have been due to their perception that, compared to other parties, the Reform Party did not promote gender-equality policies and programmes.

The fourth opinion variable added to the logistic regression equations in Table 4 was a single measure asking about support for “distinct society” status for Quebec. Albertans who agreed with this political proposition were less likely to indicate support for the Reform Party, and vice versa. Opinions about Quebec as a “distinct society” appeared to have a largely independent effect on political party preference since, with only two exceptions, the coefficients for the other predictor variables changed little when this variable was added to the logit equation. However, the effects of both the multiculturalism and the gender-equality indices were reduced somewhat. I t may be that all three of these subjective measures tap an underlying attitudinal reluctance to grant special privileges to, or provide unique programmes for, population sub-groups (e.g., different ethnic groups, women, Quebec).

Equation six in Table 4 adds one last opinion statement, about too- lenient treatment of criminals, to the multivariate analysis. Albertans who agreed with this sentiment were significantly more likely to state that they would vote for the Reform Party. The addition of this variable to the regression equation had almost no effect on the size of the coefficients of variables already included in previous equations. In other words, independent of class, nativism, other sociodemographic characteristics and a number of other attitudes, some people may have been attracted to the

144 CRSNRCSA, 32.2 1995

Reform Party because of their belief that it was more concerned about “law and order.”1°

Conclusion

Our main goal in this study was to examine the roots of Reform Party support in Alberta prior to the party’s substantial increase in popular support (in several of the Western provinces) in the 1993 federal election. Predictions derived from two specific theories of populism, Hofstadter’s (1955) nativist theory and Macpherson’s (1953) theory of the petite bourgeoisie, helped guide our analysis.

Beginning with the former, in the context of Canadian, specifically Albertan, history (see Palmer, 19821, a nativist movement could be expected to attract greater support from Anglo-SaxonKeltic ethnic and Protestant religious groups. However, our data only partially matched this theory‘s predictions, since Protestant religious affiliation was not related to Reform Party support. But taking into account age, gender, education and other control variables, Albertans of Anglo-SaxonKeltic origin were significantly more likely to favour the Reform Party. The reduction in the predictive strength of this variable when attitudes toward multiculturalism were added to the analysis suggests that some of the ”nativist” effect on Reform preference may result from concerns about the increasingly multicultural nature of Canadian society.

A serendipitous finding that does fit with the nativist thesis is the greater preference for Reform (with control and attitudinal variables taken into account) from Albertans self-identified as “Canadians.” Far from being an amorphous group, these individuals are typically from the dominant ethno-cultural group (almost all reported English as their first language; three out of four were at least third-generation Canadians). As such, their self-identification appeared to constitute a kind of political statement equating their culture with being “Canadian”-a particularly nativist sentiment. While the Reform Party’s official position on multiculturalism and immigration did not stress explicit nativist sentiments, such opinions

10. The inclusion of additional attitude indices or items in the logit equation did not add to its explanatory power. Most of these additional predictors had small and non-significant effects on voting preference. However, when the”e1ected Senate” measure and the militarism indexwere added tothe logit equation, both revealed statistically significant effects, even though the goodness-of-fit Chi-square statistic for the total equation was now also statistically signficant,indicating a poor fit between the model and the data. These two measures were also omitted from the fmal model for theoretical reasons. We believe that few Reform supporters were attracted to the party because of its position on the Senate. Rather, they may have adopted this position after shifiing their support to the party for other reasons. The inclusion of the militarism index in the equation reduced the effects of gender, the nativism measures, and the multiculturalism index, since men, those classified as nativist or semi-nativist, and respondents concerned about multiculturalism were also more likely to exhibit pro-military attitudes. Since military concerns have not figured that prominently in Reform Party policies, we did not pursue this analysis further.


from individuals connected with the party have, no doubt, attracted some supporters. l1

The utility of Macpherson’s theory of the petite bourgeoisie for explaining Reform Party support in Alberta in 1991 was also limited. On the one hand, our data did not match the descriptions of Alberta class structure in Macpherson’s (1953) grand theory of the petite bourgeoisie. Clearly, Alberta is even less homogenous today than it was in the time of which Macpherson wrote. Only 13.4% of our sample could be classified as petit-bourgeois (both agrarian and non-agrarian). Regarding the proposition that, in any case, Reform should garner the majority of its support from this class, the evidence is not convincing. Reform did obtain 22% of its support from the petite bourgeoisie, but it clearly also obtained sizeable support from the other classes.

On the other hand, our results do fit with an insufficiently explored aspect of Macpherson’s theory, namely, that a fundamental segmentation of political consciousness exists within the petite bourgeoisie class between agrarians and non-agrarians:

[Tlhe western farmers, being more homogenous than the petite bourgeoisie as a whole, have been able to organize both politically and economically to promote their immediate interests, and in the course of this organization they have developed a vigorous consciousness of common interests (Macpherson, 1953: 227).

In our study, support for Reform among farmers was twice as high (41%) as among non-agrarian members of the petite bourgeoisie (21%)’ suggesting that the former still continue to share many more common interests than do non-agrarian members of the petite bourgeoisie.

As we have noted earlier, it is not our intent to test Macpherson’s original theory of class-based populism. Instead, we are interested in the social origins ofthe Reform Party and, to this end, Macpherson’s (1953: 227) observations about the more distinct political orientations of farmers are helpful. Unfortunately, this distinction disappears from the remainder of Macpherson’s analysis. As Bell (1989: 50) notes, “[mluch of Macpherson’s discussion of class is couched in terms of the Western farmer.”

So how do we explain these findings? We speculate, following Macpherson’s lead, that some aspects of the occupation of farming, and/or perhaps the organization of rural life in Alberta, have made the agrarian segment of the petite bourgeoisie relatively more open to “third party” mobilization. Such aspects may include more involvement in primary, as

11. Prominent author and Reform supporter William Gairdner devoted an entire chapter of The Trouble With Canada to the “silent destruction” of Canada’s core culture and heritage, which he defined an “Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman, and Anglo-European” (1991: 410). In the 1993 federal election, John Beck, Reform’s candidate for York Centre, commented regarding immigration: “I feel if an immigrant comes into Canada and gets a job for $150,000, he is taking jobs away from us, the Gentile people.” (Edmonton Journal, Oct. 14,1993: A4).

146 CRSNRCSA, 32.2 1995

compared to secondary, relationships, than is typically observed in urban society. More generally, a greater degree of Gemeinschuft in the organization of rural communities may lead agrarians, as compared to their non- agrarian counterparts, to seek out radical and collective solutions to their problems and grievances. In any case, we believe that an explanation of the strong Reform support from farmers requires insights from both class and resource mobilization (“illy, 1978; McCarthy and Zald, 1987) theories of populism. In fact, a more complete understanding of the effect of nativism on Reform support may also be obtained in this manner.

Populist and nativist movements and parties arise during periods of crisis (Leonard and Parmet, 1971; Palmer, 1982) in defence of a people “historically, culturally, and geographically” constituted (Boyle, 1986: 3) that feels threatened. In the years immediately preceding our survey in 1991, Canada faced a number of such “crises,” many of them instigated by what had become increasingly viewed as a hostile, “foreign” government in Ottawa. The crisis over the Meech Lake Accord and its aftermath, including a prolonged recession, provided merely the most striking examples.

For those social groups most likely to support the Reform Party, however, we speculate that the real crisis began much earlier. Since World War 11, and especially since the 1960s, Canada has experienced significant changes in its social, economic and ideological structures. These changes have affected people in certain social locations more than in others, sometimes with negative results. Among occupations and classes, for example, Western farmers have frequently come to see themselves as victims of big government, big business and big city interests. Among ethnic groups, those ofAnglo-SaxonKeltic origin (including those who self- identify as “Canadian”) have seen their traditionally high status within Canadian society challenged by other minority groups, including immigrants from non-traditional source countries as well as French Canadians (see Ogmundson and McLaughlin, 1992).

It is not surprising that groups that have lost power and privilege should hold strong opinions on issues that they perceive t o have led to the loss.12 It is also not surprising that they might be more likely to align with a new populist party taking a strong traditional position on many of these issues. Looking back to our multivariate analysis of Reform support, we note how the effects of measures of support for multiculturalism, special status for Quebec, and gender equality pointed to an underlying attitudinal reluctance on the part of Reform supporters to grant special privileges to specific population sub-groups. In addition, we observed evidence of a greater “law and order” orientation among Reform supporters.

Recognizing how these “special interest group” and “law and order” sentiments have been incorporated into Reform Party policy and rhetoric helps us to understand better the party’s remarkable success in attracting voters. Widespread concerns and grievances about a changing society were 12. Archer and Ellis (1994) reach a similar conclusion.

populism and the rise of the reform party in alberta

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