popularity blowback - the 22nd amendment

American Military University

Popularity Blowback

FDR’s Success and the Coming of the 22nd Amendment

By

Nathanael Miller

HIST 556

U.S. Constitutional History

Dr. Douglas A. Dribben

The ability of a president to serve more than the two terms (a limit informally set by

Washington) was in contention for more than 150 years. Some feared Washington to be a man

bent on becoming an “elective monarch” for life…until he dashed that fear by actually retiring.

No president served more than two terms for nearly 150 years until Franklin Roosevelt broke the

precedent. Two very popular men, U.S. Grant and Theodore Roosevelt, sought non-consecutive

third terms, but failed to achieve them. Grover Cleveland proved it was possible to win a non-

consecutive second term in 1893. Yet, from 1789 until 1951 no concrete mechanism existed to

prevent a president serving more than two terms. This paper will argue that FDR’s success in

winning a fourth term was a fatal political miscalculation which was the catalyst providing the

nascent term-limit movement with enough momentum to achieve ratification of the Twenty-

Second Amendment, codifying the two-term limit into the United States Constitution.

The Constitutional Convention convened to develop a truly stable national government.

The nation had “watched in horror as Massachusetts, the cradle of American liberty, the most

patriotic of all the colonies, dissolved into civil war in 1786.”1 The lack of state cooperation

putting down Shay’s Rebellion “revealed the need for a more energetic national government.”2

Shay’s Rebellion was only the most glaring and public example of the embarrassing

inadequacies of the Articles government. The national debt had not been paid off, British troops

remained on U.S. soil, the Spanish were slowly expanding in the southwest region, and the states

themselves were enacting duties and penalties against each other.

Never before had a people set out to design a government structure. Working out details

for the national Congress and the federal judiciary were hard enough, but “the design of the

1 H. W. Brands, The First American: The Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin. (New York, Anchor Books, 2000),

671. 2 Ibid.

executive was one of the most vexing problems of the Constitutional convention, and solving it

was the convention’s most creative act.”3 Madison’s Virginia Plan called for a one-man

President serving a seven-year term. William Patterson presented a New Jersey Plan proposing

an executive council whose members could be removed by the state governors. Benjamin

Franklin of Pennsylvania also advocated an executive council as a hedge against the tyranny so

recently cast off from Britain’s crown.4 New York’s Alexander Hamilton proposed a single

President who would serve for life based upon good behavior, but could be impeached and

removed. Massachusetts’s Elbridge Gerry suggested a three-man executive council representing

each major section of the country.

The convention settled on an office that would be occupied by a single President, but the

selection and tenure of the office remained contentious. The Framers finally referred the matter

to a Committee on Postponed Matters to craft additional ideas. Emerging from the committee

was an Electoral College that would elect the president to a four-year term, with no restrictions

on eligibility for reelection.5 This last was a stunning development in a nation that had just

fought a revolution against a monarch who possessed his throne for life. Although legislative

offices were not given term limits either, a single legislator did not have the opportunity for

tyranny that an executive did. Lifetime eligibility, coupled with the loosely defined executive

power in Article II of the Constitution, potentially gave the proposed President an incredible

amount of authority.

3 Sydney M. Milkis and Michael Nelson, The American Presidency: Origins and Development (Washington, D.C.,

CQ Press, 2012), 27. 4 Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton. (New York, The Penguin Press, 2004), 234. 5 Sydney M. Milkis and Michael Nelson, The American Presidency: Origins and Development (Washington, D.C.,

CQ Press, 2012), 36.

Many of the ideas used to craft the office of President of the United States were

apparently shaped by the character and reputation of George Washington himself. Washington

was widely expected to be the first President if the Constitution was ratified.6 The former

general carefully cultivated the image of the legendary Roman general Cincinatus (who had

retired to his farm after winning a war for the Roman Empire), crafting for himself the historical

legacy of a reluctant hero eager to return home (in fairness, there was much truth in

Washington’s desire to go home as his personal letters demonstrate). Resigning from military

command at the height of his power following victory in the Revolution cemented the bona fides

of Washington’s commitment to republican ideals. Washington (perhaps inadvertently) turned

himself into a personal bulwark of reassurance against fears this new political office would be a

springboard to despotism.7

Writing to Thomas Jefferson near the close of the Constitution Convention, James

Madison was confident the American people were at a point of frustration that would assure

ratification of the new governing structure. Madison explained the convention had worked out a

Senate to be chosen by the states; a house to be chosen by the people, a judicial establishment,

and “a President cloathed (sic) with executive power.”8 Foreseeing the opposition to the new

national government, Madison was still confident the Constitution would carry the day. He

6 James Thomas Flexner, Washington: The Indispensable Man. (New York, Little, Brown, and Company, 1974),

209. 7 Sydney M. Milkis and Michael Nelson, The American Presidency: Origins and Development (Washington, D.C.,

CQ Press, 2012), 72. 8 James Madison, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, Sept. 6, 1787. Madison: Writings. (New York: The Library of

America, 1999), 135.

wrote, “My own idea is that the public mind will now or in a very little time receive any thing

that promises stability to the public Councils (sic) & security to private rights.”9

Transmitting the proposed Constitution to the states marked on the beginning of a deeply

personal national debate that presaged the later two-party system dominating American politics.

Proponents of the Constitution took on the name “Federalists,” while the opposition became

known by the obvious moniker “Anti-Federalists.” The two sides presented “competing

nightmares of what would happen if the other side prevailed.”10 The vicious political hyperbole

rocking the national fabric resulted from the polity grappling with a question that could no longer

be postponed: what sort of society was the United States to be? Was the U.S. to be a loosely

confederated social order or a homogenous political entity under a government that bore some

frightening similarities to the imperial government so recently thrown off? The vaguely defined

Presidency became a critical flashpoint of debate, and each state convention would specifically

take up the office during their debates (the legislature and judiciary were usually debated in more

general terms).11

Pennsylvania’s ratification of the Constitution did not silence dissent. The defeated

minority published a powerful screed against the new government. This pamphlet, clearly

intended to sway debates in other states, sounded the alarm on the dangerous mixing of power

between the branches of government. The “Pennsylvania Minority” caustically suggested the

odd interlacing of legislative prerogative (treaty ratification) with executive activism (negotiating

the treaty) rendered the President susceptible to bribery by foreign governments desiring him to

9 James Madison, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, Sept. 6, 1787. Madison: Writings. (New York: The Library of

America, 1999), 136. 10 Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton. (New York, The Penguin Press, 2004), 243. 11 Sydney M. Milkis and Michael Nelson, The American Presidency: Origins and Development (Washington, D.C.,

CQ Press, 2012), 59.

sway the Senate in favor of a particular treaty.12 The Pennsylvania Minority argued the President

ought to be hemmed in by a small executive council. This council should be entirely independent

of the Senate and that “without the concurrence of the majority of the quorum of this council, the

President should not be capable of taking any step.”13 Significantly, the Pennsylvania Minority

did not mention the theoretical lifetime eligibility of a President for reelection. This would be

addressed by an icon of the American Revolution as Virginia debated ratification.

Patrick Henry came out swinging hard against the Presidency. Taking the floor of the

Virginia Ratifying Convention, Henry focused his razor-sharp mind on similarities between the

proposed President and the British monarch.14 Henry thundered against the proposed “great and

mighty President with very extensive powers; the powers of a King.”15 He complained the

President was to be maintained in “extravagance”16 and was free to pursue whatever agenda he

wanted because there were no truly defined limits on executive power and startlingly few

legislative mechanisms to thwart a President who did not engage in overtly illegal behavior (an

oblique, if significant, reference to the lack of executive term limits in the original Constitution).

Henry mocked the President as a “Federal Sheriff” in reference to the sheriffs in England and

their near-despotic powers over those in their fiefdoms.17

12 “The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents,”

Dec. 18, 1787. Ketcham, Ralph, ed. The Anti-Federalist Papers. (New York, Signet Classics, 1986), 260. 13 “The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents,”

Dec. 18, 1787. Ketcham, Ralph, ed. The Anti-Federalist Papers. (New York, Signet Classics, 1986), 261. 14 Patrick Henry, speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 5, 1788. Ketcham, Ralph, ed. The Anti-

Federalist Papers. (New York, Signet Classics, 1986), 200. 15 Patrick Henry, speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 7, 1788. Ketcham, Ralph, ed. The Anti-



Federalist Papers. (New York, Signet Classics, 1986), 217.

The Federalists did not suffer these attacks in silence. They designed the Presidency to

protect the nation from the very monarchial tyranny Henry so eloquently described. By making

a civilian President commander in chief of the armed forces, but vesting the power to declare a

state of war in the Congress, the “Founders doubtless hoped to spare America tribulations of the

sort” visited upon European nations subject to the whims of a king possessing the concurrent

powers to declare a state of war and command the military structure.18 This kept Europe forever

embroiled in a game of empire building and military brinksmanship. Further to the protection of

American liberty, this civilian President could be recalled by the Electoral College every four

years in a general election, or else be impeached by the House of Representatives and removed

by the Senate for overtly illegal behavior.

James Madison described the proposed President’s true power base—and

accountability—in another 1787 letter to Thomas Jefferson. The President derived “his

appointment from the States, and is periodically accountable to them.”19 This accountability,

reviewed at four-year intervals, “seems effectually to guard [the states] against any dangerous

encroachments.”20 Madison argued the Presidency, indeed, the entire federal government, was in

more danger of having its power eroded by the states than the other way around because of the

checks on various federal powers written into the Constitution. Madison addressed the issues of

the President’s tenure, but only by describing the various ideas that had been referred to the

Committee on Postponed Matters. Madison did not address the possibility of a President being

reelected repeatedly under the proposed system.

18 Athur M. Schlesinger, Jr. The Imperial Presidency. (Toronto, Canada; Popular Library, 1974), 17. 19 James Madison, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787. Madison: Writings. (New York: The Library of

America, 1999), 147-148. 20 James Madison, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787. Madison: Writings. (New York: The Library of

America, 1999), 147-148

George Washington, perhaps the most prominent Federalist of them all, expressed hope

to Alexander Hamilton that the new government “may be put in motion, without much effort or

hazard of miscarrying.”21 Clearly Washington cast his impressive reputation and personal clout

behind the successful launch of the new government and its ill-defined chief executive, but even

he did not see a need to tackle the issue of a President’s potentially perpetual re-electability

(perhaps he already envisioned a fixed retirement date if called to serve?).

Federalist #69 finally addressed the issue of lifetime eligibility for the President head-on.

Written by Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #69 succinctly stated the President “is to be elected

for four years; and is to be re-eligible as often as the people of the United States shall think him

worthy of their confidence.”22 Hamilton forcefully argued the requirement of the four-year

election cycle, coupled with Congressional oversight through impeachment, made the proposed

President unlike the British King. Once impeached and removed from office the former

President would still be subject to criminal law as any ordinary citizen. Hamilton argued this

quasi-form of double jeopardy (humiliation by removal from office and then criminal

prosecution) would ensure only men of virtue occupied the office. “The person of the King of

Great Britain is sacred and inviolable,” Hamilton stated, but an American President would

occupy no legal ground higher than “a governor of New York.”23

Washington reluctantly assumed the Presidency April 30, 1789. His “awe-inspiring

personality and popularity made him an indispensable source of unity and legitimacy” for this

21 George Washington, Letter to the Alexander Hamilton, Aug. 28, 1788. Washington: Writings. (New York, The

Library of America, 1997), 692. 22 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist #69: The Real Character of the Executive,” The Federalist Papers. Ed. By

Clinton Rossiter, (New York, Signet Classics, 1961), 414. 23 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist #69: The Real Character of the Executive,” The Federalist Papers. Ed. By

Clinton Rossiter, (New York, Signet Classics, 1961), 415.

revolutionary new republican government.24 President Washington was painfully aware that

every action he took set social and political precedents that would echo down the American

government for generations. Eager to both create a strong, stable executive, but also strictly

observe Constitutional limitations, Washington walked a fine line. For example, though he

would energetically enforce any bill passed, he refused to lobby Congress for measures or

programs he favored. Considering his annual message to Congress his only Constitutional

means to address that body, Washington did not involved himself in legislative matters.25 Even

so, political opponents saw nefarious designs in Washington’s attempt to build a vigorous

Executive Department and his formidable reputation began to suffer.

Washington was ready to retire by the expiration of his first term. The bitter political

attacks and his increasingly frail health (he began to complain of hearing and memory loss)

drove him to desire retirement so much he asked Madison to draft a farewell address for him.26

However, forces beyond his control combined to bring unendurable pressure on him to

reconsider his wish. Both sides of the growing political divide implored him to stand for

reelection because the young nation could not yet conceive of any other unifying figure.

Washington acceded and was unanimously reelected by the Electoral College. Taking the oath

of office March 4, 1793, he became the first multiple-term President, and finally activated the

question of possible lifetime tenure for a perpetually re-electable Chief Executive.

This was a question Washington had no intention of exacerbating. Embarking as

reluctantly on his second term as he did his first, the President harbored no desire to continue in

24 Sydney M. Milkis and Michael Nelson, The American Presidency: Origins and Development (Washington, D.C.,

CQ Press, 2012), 73. 25 Thomas Flexner, Washington: The Indispensable Man. (New York; Little, Brown, and Company, 1974), 221. 26 John Ferling, A Leap in the Dark: The Struggle to Create the American Republic. (New York, Oxford University

Press, 2003), 351.

office past the 1796 election. Washington’s decision was “momentous” because “many

Americans expected him to serve for life.”27 Washington’s retirement was an event even more

unprecedented that his departure from the Army following the Revolution. Asking Hamilton to

update the original Farewell Address drafted by Madison, Washington did not seek to create a

two-term precedent; instead he wished to show the country the federal government could

function without him. Writing to his fellow citizens, Washington held forth his hope that the

“free constitution (sic), which is the work of your hands, may be sacredly maintained,” but

maintained with another Chief Executive at the helm.28 Passing the baton to incoming President

John Adams, Washington unintentionally created a final political precedent: the two-term limit

on a President of the United States.

John Adams was fated to be in the Executive Office only one term. The contentious

election of 1800 elevated Thomas Jefferson to the newly completed White House, and

Jefferson’s successful first administration naturally led to a second term. Unlike Washington,

who never appeared to develop a belief in the need for term limits, “Jefferson was long a believer

in term limits or rotation for the Presidency, even before he held the office.”29 Jefferson strongly

believed that not only should new blood be allowed for the sake of bringing new ideas, but also

to prevent old age from impeding the public good. “The danger is that the indulgence and

attachments of the people will keep a man in the chair after he becomes a dotard, that reelection

through life shall become habitual, and election through life follow that,” Jefferson wrote in

27 Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton. (New York, The Penguin Press, 2004), 505. 28 George Washington, Farewell Address, Sept. 19, 1796. Washington: Writings. (New York, The Library of

America, 1997), 963. 29 Michael J. Korzi, Presidential Term Limits in American History: Power, Principles, and Politics. (College

Station, Texas; Texas A&M University Press, 2011), 47.

1805, explaining his own decision to retire when his second term ended in 1808.30 With the

second two-term President stepping down after only eight years in office, the two-term precedent

inadvertently set by Washington became so engrained in the American political psyche that it

carried all but the force of Constitutional power behind it.

The question of a third term President simmered quietly for much of the 19th century.

Ulysses Grant, the 18th President of the United States, was the first sitting Chief Executive to

openly consider a third term run and even initiated an mild attempt to win the 1876 Republican

nomination. The issue never made it past party politics. Although Grant was still popular with

the American people, the numerous scandals that had plagued his two administrations resulted in

the party nominating Rutherford B. Hayes.31

Grant went abroad for a celebratory world tour during Hayes’ single term in office.

Returning to the U.S., Grant made the decision to try for a non-consecutive third term. Grant’s

international journey largely erased memories of scandals past, and his reception upon his return

to the U.S. demonstrated that he was “still the most famous living American.”32 Adhering to the

political mores of the time, Grant did not openly seek the 1880 Republican nomination, but he

allowed political friends to organize for him. Grant’s popularity carried him far, but his

campaign mangers proved inept. “The Chicago meeting opened strongly for Grant, with 306

votes in his supporters’ pockets,” but deadlocked as the Grant men ineffectually tried to sway

more Republicans into Grant’s camp. The nomination went to James Garfield.

30 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to John Taylor, Jan. 6, 1805. Jefferson: Writings. (New York, The Library of America,

1984), 1153. 31 Alan Brinkley and Davis Dyer, ed. The American Presidency: The Authoritative Reference. (New York,

Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 213. 32 Joan Waugh, U.S. Grant: American Hero, American Myth. (Chapel Hill, North Carolina; University of North

Carolina Press, 2009) 162.

The question of whether a President could, or even should, serve a third term became

temporarily overshadowed by the question of whether a defeated President could recover and

retake the White House. Grover Cleveland answered this when he became the 22nd and 24th

Presidents. Intent on redeeming his defeated bid for reelection in 1888, Cleveland spent his four

years as a private citizen carefully cultivating Democratic Party machinery. His efforts were

aided by the economic turmoil of the national debate over a gold standard or free silver. “He

maneuvered skillfully to placate the warring factions within the [Democratic] party” and secured

nomination on the first ballot in 1892, casting him back to the national scene.33 The opposition

to Cleveland was split between a lackluster Republican campaign and the insurgent People’s

Party. Cleveland won a decisive victory, taking 277 Electoral votes.

Cleveland “owed his political comeback to the failure of pro-business Republicans to

assuage rising public concerns about the economic dislocations caused by corporate

industrialization.”34 However, the very economic dislocations that swept Cleveland back to

power proved his undoing. Cleveland was far more conservative than the rest of the Democratic

Party. His tough handling of strikes and his adherence to the gold standard against “free silver”

created a fault lines between Cleveland and his own party. Seeking a third term, Cleveland was

“surprised and angered” by his loss of the 1896 nomination to William Jennings Bryan.35 Like

Grant, Cleveland’s bid for a third term was thwarted by a lack of party support.

Flushed with success in 1904, Theodore Roosevelt rashly pledged that he would not seek

a third term in 1908. This was a pledge made in the heat of the moment as Roosevelt felt the

33 Alan Brinkley and Davis Dyer, ed., The American Presidency: The Authoritative Reference. (New York,

Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 245. 34 Sydney M. Milkis and Michael Nelson, The American Presidency: Origins and Development (Washington, D.C.,

CQ Press, 2012), 209. 35 Ibid., 210.

weight of Washington’s two-term tradition, but it was a pledge he would regret.36 True to his

word, “TR” worked hard to secure the nomination of William Howard Taft in 1908, and his

immense popularity ensured Taft’s election. Like Grant before him, Roosevelt embarked on an

international odyssey during his years out of office, only to return to the U.S. dismayed at the

state of affairs. Roosevelt plunged back into Republican Party politics, declaring his intention to

repeat Cleveland’s come-from-retirement win to retake the White House.

1912 was the first time “Presidential primaries contributed significantly to the selection

of delegates to the national party conventions.”37 Casting his hopes on his popularity with the

American people, Roosevelt challenged Taft in every state primary, resulting in TR’s

accumulating 276 delegates to Taft’s 46 (a third Republican contender, Robert LaFollette, won

36 delegates in the primaries). Roosevelt roared into the Republican convention on a wave of

popular support, but he had alienated the party machinery in the process. Despite Roosevelt’s

showing the primaries, “the outcome was settled” before the convention balloting began.

Roosevelt lost the Republican nomination because Taft controlled the party machinery.

Taft was not only hurt that his former mentor was openly challenging his party leadership, but

was afraid that TR’s attempt to break the two-term limit represented a serious threat to

constitutional government.38 Recalling TR’s earlier pledge to observe Washington’s precedent,

Taft found Roosevelt’s change of heart chilling evidence of an ego run amuck. Roosevelt

explained his 1904 pledge as meaning he would not seek consecutive terms, but this was

disingenuous; TR had stated uncategorically in 1904 that he would not seek a third term at all.

36 Peter Collier with David Horowitz, The Roosevelts: An American Saga. (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994),

130. 37 Alan Brinkley and Davis Dyer, ed. The American Presidency: The Authoritative Reference. (New York,

Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 240. 38 Michael J. Korzi, Presidential Term Limits in American History: Power, Principles, and Politics. (College


The general populace did not see a threat to the constitutional system since TR had left office

and was, like Grant before him, seeking a non-consecutive third term. However, Taft and the

Republican bosses were as insulted by this threat to Washington’s precedent as they were by

TR’s attempting to unseat his own hand-picked successor. Taft defeated Roosevelt at the

convention because he believed “Roosevelt’s violation of the two-term tradition indicative of an

overly ambitious individual.”39

Roosevelt was not to be denied so easily. Leading a walk-out, Roosevelt split the

Republican Party and created the Progressive Party. Although third parties had existed before,

the Progressive Party was the first true threat to the political status quo. Roosevelt still stood a

very real chance of success despite the split Republican vote because he was strongly and

personally associated with the widely popular social reform movement sweeping the country. It

would be a shrewd maneuver by the Democratic Party that delivered Roosevelt’s political coup

de grace.40 Abandoning their conservative front runner and nominating Woodrow Wilson, a

governor boasting impeccable progressive credentials of his own, the Democrats seized the

reform movement’s leadership. With a united Democratic Party behind Wilson and the

Republican vote split, Roosevelt could not win.

The bitter Republican civil war of 1912 highlights the important role personalities and

emotions play in national politics. The 1912 election was “as cruel an experience” as any in

American history.41 Had either Roosevelt or Taft been solely focused on party politics, each

would have supported the other’s candidacy for opposite reasons. If Roosevelt had not believed

39 Michael J. Korzi, Presidential Term Limits in American History: Power, Principles, and Politics. (College

Station, Texas; Texas A&M University Press, 2011), 70. 40 Peter Collier with David Horowitz, The Roosevelts: An American Saga. (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994),

166. 41 Alan Brinkley and Davis Dyer, ed. The American Presidency: The Authoritative Reference. (New York,

Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 294.

himself to be the indispensable leader of the growing reform movement, he would have loyally

supported Taft as his party’s nominee, and TR’s magic touch would likely have secured Taft’s

reelection. For his part, if Taft had been able to forgive the personal affront he suffered by

Roosevelt’s challenge, he would have backed Roosevelt because of TR’s obvious electability.

Thus personality, ego, and emotion blocked what had been, to date, the closest a former

American President came to achieving a third term.42

The third-term issue lay dormant for only 28 more years before an epic combination of

domestic and world events thrust it squarely onto Franklin D. Roosevelt’s desk. Approaching

the end of his second term, FDR faced the twin crisis of the lingering Great Depression and the

eruption of war in Europe by 1939. This second Roosevelt faced a difficult choice. He could

easily win repeal of an arms embargo to aid Britain he strongly favored by announcing

unequivocally his intention to retire after eight years, or he could attempt to stay in office to fight

the European war he was certain would engulf the United States.43

Roosevelt seemed genuinely torn between the desire to follow tradition and retire, and his

fear that no successor, Democrat or Republican, would fight to protect his “New Deal” programs

or effectively prepare the U.S. for its (in his opinion) inevitable involvement in World War II.

Although later generations would criticize FDR’s bold use of power, he was “a cautious man,

deeply sensitive to the ebb and flow of public opinion, and deeply aware that democratic

government was a process of consent and accountability.”44


Station, Texas; Texas A&M University Press, 2011), 71. 43 Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny. (New York, Little, Brown, and Company,

1990), 322. 44 M. Schlesinger, Jr. The Imperial Presidency. (Toronto, Canada; Popular Library, 1974), 115.

Hitler’s blitzkrieg warfare blasted across Europe and into American politics as 1940 went

on. Both the Republicans and Democrats sought to build party platforms that pledged defense

while promising to stay out of war. The Republicans nominated Wendell Willkie in June, but

still the Democrats had no clear frontrunner, although FDR was maneuvering behind the scenes.

As the July Democratic convention neared, party leadership realized that, despite many private

misgivings about challenging the third-term taboo, they needed FDR in order to win again in

1940.45 Roosevelt finally signaled his willingness (and wish) to attempt a third term win at the

Democratic convention itself in July. Waiting until the convention to announce his candidacy,

Roosevelt arguably diffused much potential opposition by appearing to be the same sort of

reluctant leader Washington himself was. Though he finally won the long-coveted third term,

his margin of victory was far narrower than his previous two victories had been. Even so, this

“first successful challenge to the two-term tradition” made the 1940 election the most significant

event in Presidential history since Washington voluntarily retired in 1796.46

Shattering Washington’s long-revered precedent obviously opened the door to a potential

fourth term, but that possibility seemed remote as FDR took the oath of office for a third time in

January 1941. FDR’s success in challenging a nearly 150-year-old precedent was influenced as

much by world events as it was by the same personality, emotional, and party-centered political

factors that derailed Grant, Cleveland, and Theodore Roosevelt. Previous to this unique

confluence of events, “no other previous third-term candidate had his party’s support,” and this

support can largely be laid at the doorstep of World War II.47 With the Pacific basin growing

45 Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny. (New York, Little, Brown, and Company,

1990), 343. 46 Michael J. Korzi, Presidential Term Limits in American History: Power, Principles, and Politics. (College

Station, Texas; Texas A&M University Press, 2011), 79. 47 Ibid., 80.

unsettled and open warfare threatening the U.S. from Europe, Roosevelt was the man in the

White House at a very unique time in American history. His third term was largely built on the

desire for continuity of executive leadership during the twin crisis of the on-going Depression

and incipient world war.

The Republicans based much of their 1940 campaign on the threat to constitutional

tradition presented by Roosevelt’s third term run. Willkie continually demanded FDR answer

the charge of trying to subvert a sacred American tradition. He “made the typical conservative

argument that Roosevelt was not respectful of the traditions of U.S. government,” but this line of

attack did not gain traction. Roosevelt specifically avoided any public acknowledgement of the

two-term tradition.48 FDR countered the younger Willkie’s challenge by staying in the White

House and making a point to be seen calmly addressing the escalating world crisis. Despite his

lower margin of victory in 1940 as opposed to his earlier elections, Roosevelt’s strategy was

obviously the right one for the time. The sense of crisis piling atop crisis inclined the American

electorate to be less concerned with Constitutional tradition and more concerned with a desire for

continuity of leadership.49

The war came, but “not in the theatre where Roosevelt had wished it, and not in the

fashion he would have chosen” by the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.50

Instantly Roosevelt was a war leader during a war that, at first, went badly in both east and west.

Despite this, FDR maintained a cool, consistent leadership style. His combined mastery of the

press and “a series of important military decisions” such as the bold Doolittle Raid on Tokyo in


Station, Texas; Texas A&M University Press, 2011), 93. 49 Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny. (New York, Little, Brown, and Company,

1990), 347. 50 Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny. (New York, Little, Brown, and Company,

1990), 405.

1942 and his success in having American General Dwight Eisenhower named Supreme Allied

Commander built his credibility as a war leader.51 As such, a possible fourth term largely

became based on whether the war would be won before or after the 1944 election. If the Allies

were victorious before 1944, FDR could retire. However, if the war continued into 1945, the

odds of Roosevelt seeking a fourth term on the same basis of his third term run (continuity of

experience leadership) were great.

Common thought points to FDR’s third term as the catalyst for the surging momentum

leading to the Twenty-Second Amendment. However, a closer look at the events and thinking

leading to FDR’s fourth term strongly suggests the 1944 election and its consequences were the

real triggers leading to Presidential term limits.52

Felled by polio in 1921, FDR worked hard to maintain his health, but the war years took

a fearsome toll on the President’s body and mind.53 In 1943 Roosevelt contracted a flu that took

him months to shake. As 1943 rolled into 1944, Roosevelt “changed, becoming ashen-faced, his

skin discolored by liver spots and purple smudges beneath his eyes.”54 Roosevelt lost so much

weight that his clothes no longer fit, and congestive heart failure was setting in. What is more

damning about FDR’s fourth term decision and its constitutional ramifications is the reality that

Roosevelt and his doctors were fully cognizant of his condition. They knew it likely meant he

would not survive another term in office, but by 1944 Roosevelt saw himself as the indispensable

51 Alan Brinkley and Davis Dyer, ed. The American Presidency: The Authoritative Reference. (New York,

Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 364. 52 Michael J. Korzi, Presidential Term Limits in American History: Power, Principles, and Politics. (College

Station, Texas; Texas A&M University Press, 2011), 101. 53 Peter Collier with David Horowitz, The Roosevelts: An American Saga. (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994),

425. 54 Ibid.

man.55 It appears that FDR, his doctors, and Democratic Party leaders blinded themselves to the

truth in the hope FDR’s health would recover as Allied war fortunes continued to improve.

Roosevelt easily carried the 1944 Democratic nomination, but he and other the party

leaders sought a Vice Presidential candidate calculated more for placating party factions than for

a possible Presidential succession. Senator Harry Truman was not selected because he was seen

as a strong leader in the event of FDR’s death. In fact most people regarded Truman as rather

ordinary. His own contemporaries referred to him snidely as a “little man” from Missouri.56

Truman was selected because he fit a number of demographic bills within the Democratic Party.

Labor unions liked him, and, though he was a Southerner from a Civil War Border State, Truman

carefully cultivated the Southern black vote. He was an energetic and strong campaigner, and

his insider status in the Senate would aid Roosevelt’s legislative agenda. Here again personality,

ego, and emotions impacted American Constitutional history as much as world events. Despite

all the medical evidence staring him in the face, FDR apparently did not seriously consider his

failing health important. He merely sought a running mate “who would not cost him votes.”57

This haphazard (even egocentric) thinking in 1944, and not FDR’s well-thought out third

term run in 1940, was the critical miscalculation that triggered the sequence of events leading to

the Twenty-Second Amendment. Roosevelt’s sudden death barely three months into his fourth

term and the ascent of the relatively unknown Harry Truman shocked the nation. “There was no

sinister motivation to perpetuate a president in office in an act of sheer power consolidation,” nor

was there any question of Roosevelt’s patriotism and commitment to constitutional


Station, Texas; Texas A&M University Press, 2011),102. 56 Alan Brinkley and Davis Dyer, ed. The American Presidency: The Authoritative Reference. (New York,

Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 307. 57 Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny. (New York, Little, Brown, and Company,

1990), 534.

government.58 Rather, misplaced hope in Roosevelt’s health, the human desire to avoid

confrontation with unpleasant truths, and an egocentric belief in FDR’s indispensability played

into this critical mistake.

Calvin Coolidge’s 1933 obituary quoted the late President’s explanation why he did not

seek a third term. Coolidge feared the effects of declining health if he stayed in office too long.

Echoing Jefferson, Coolidge’s statement defines the trap ensnaring Roosevelt in 1944: “It is

difficult for men in high office to avoid the malady of self-delusion. They are always surrounded

by worshipers. They are constantly and for the most part sincerely assured of their greatness.

They live in an artificial atmosphere of adulation and exaltation which, sooner or later, impairs

their judgment. They are in grave danger of becoming careless and arrogant.”59

Roosevelt’s third and fourth terms provide contradictory evidence in the debate over

Presidential term limits. FDR’s strong command of the crisis of 1940 augured well for the idea

of unlimited eligibility, while his “fourth term suggests the problems associated with long tenure

in office.”60 This latter event led the Eightieth Congress to start the constitutional machinery

moving for Presidential term limits in 1947. Although there are strong elements of a partisan

slap at FDR in the resulting Twenty-Second Amendment, evidence dating back to the ratification

of the Constitution suggests larger concerns provided the impetus for Constitutional action than

merely rebuking the Democratic Party. From 1789 to 1947, Congress had proposed 270


Station, Texas; Texas A&M University Press, 2011), 121. 59 “Unusual Political Career of Calvin Coolidge, Never Defeated for an Office,” The New York Times, Jan. 6, 1933.

The New York Times on the Web Learning Network (accessed March 18, 2015).

http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0704.html 60 Michael J. Korzi, Presidential Term Limits in American History: Power, Principles, and Politics. (College


resolutions to limit Presidential tenure.61 That’s an average of 1.5 resolutions introduced per year

for the 158 years between the founding of the Presidency and the ratification of the Twenty-

Second Amendment. Clearly, Washington’s precedent only quieted the tenure question, but did

not eliminate it. Nearly four years would be required before the national debate finally decided

in favor of terms limits. The Twenty-Second Amendment was ratified Feb. 27, 1951, enshrining

Presidential term limits into the Constitution itself.

The debate is far from over, however. A brief “Reagan 88” movement took shape as

Ronald Reagan prepared to retire following his second term. This movement had no chance of

changing the political landscape in time to offer Reagan a third term, but it did kick off a new

round of debate.62 Reagan himself commented in 1988 that the Twenty-Second Amendment

infringed on the constitutional rights of the American people.63 However, while Reagan’s

endorsement of a possible repeal of the amendment provided support for a repeal movement, his

health raised the opposite point. Reagan was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease in 1994. The

progression of Alzheimer’s means Reagan began to suffer from it years earlier; had he been

reelected in 1988, he likely would have experienced its onset while still in office.

Conversely, Bill Clinton could also have been a third term contender, and was clearly

young enough and healthy to serve another four years successfully. However, Clinton himself,

though admitting to a personal wish for a third term, conceded his belief the Twenty-Second

Amendment provided a valuable service to American democracy. Speaking in 2012, twelve

years and two Presidents following his own service, Clinton echoed Jefferson and Coolidge by

61 Alan Brinkley and Davis Dyer, ed. The American Presidency: The Authoritative Reference. (New York,

Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 319. 62 Stephen W. Stathis, “The Twenty-Second Amendment: A Practical Remedy or Partisan Maneuver?” University

of Minnesota Constitutional Commentary, Vol 7:61, page 61. Accessed Feb. 7, 2015.

https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/165281/07_01_Strathis.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 63 Ibid., 86.

explaining that “political scleroisis” sets in if people are in power too long.64 However, during

the same interview, the former President admitted he could be persuaded to support an effort to

modify the amendment by prohibiting three consecutive terms, but allowing a former President

to attempt a comeback in the model of Grover Cleveland.65 This debate is not the foremost

question facing the American electorate, but it clearly has not ended after two hundred years.

Franklin Roosevelt’s unprecedented fourth term success, coupled with the Democrats’

miscalculation in nominating a candidate they knew would not survive a full term, finally created

a political storm strong enough to overcome American ambivalence to executive term limits.

Although FDR’s patriotism was never in question, his lack of wisdom (ignoring clear signs of

declining health) and sudden death in office during a war, provided the momentum ensuring

ratification of the Twenty-Second Amendment, limiting all future Presidents to the tradition of

two terms set by George Washington.

64 Thomas Cronin, “Resolved, the Twenty-Second Amendment Should be Repealed.” Colorado College Bulletin,

Dec. 2014. Accessed Feb. 7, 2015. http://sites.coloradocollege.edu/bulletin/2013/10/why-we-have-the-twenty-

second-amendment/ 65 Ibid.

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