popular ethics in the world of thucydides

Popular Ethics in the World of ThucydidesAuthor(s): Lionel PearsonSource: Classical Philology, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Oct., 1957), pp. 228-244Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/265689 .

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POPULAR ETHICS IN THE WORLD OF THUCYDIDES

LIONEL PEARSON

IT is hardly to be expected that Thucydides should offer us a complete system of ethics. Nor is

there any reason why he should con- sciously represent historical events within the framework of a fixed moral code or show them as illustrating some ethical or theological conception of history. Indeed, though he describes in well-known passages the deterioration of moral standards during the Pelopon- nesian War, neither in the course of his narrative nor in his digressions does he attempt to explain what the moral standards were which prevailed in the years previous to the outbreak of war.

Nevertheless he must believe that there were recognizable moral standards in the prewar world, since he believed that the deterioration was noticeable; and though he does not offer moral judgments of his own, it does not follow that he would have refused to give them if he had been asked.1 Though he hopes that his work may stand as a "possession for ever," he is nonetheless writing for his own contemporaries. He does not spend time explaining what he expects them to take for granted.2 Hence he leaves it to them to supply their own moral judgments, just as he leaves it to them to decide whether the speeches which he puts in the mouths of public men are typical of their time or not. No doubt he expects his readers to remember, as he does, the ethical code of their elders in which they were brought up, and he leaves them to judge how healthy or satisfactory it was. With the world, as he knew it, falling apart be-

fore his eyes, he does not care to discuss whether there may be some gain or progress despite the disasters; he does not even invite us to consider whether the sophists have taught the Athenians anything.

The silence of Thucydides on such matters is certainly to be regretted; for example, a word or two from him might have thrown light on some passages in Attic tragedy and helped us to decide how an Athenian audience would have felt about moral issues in Sophocles and Euripides.3 Even so, unless his silence is a deliberate attempt at concealment, he cannot write without making some assumptions; and it should be worth while to examine his text in the hope of finding out what moral standards and what definition of justice he assumed to be current in Athens and elsewhere in the Greek world before the outbreak of the war.

It would be rash to attempt any answers to these questions if we could not check the results by comparison with the answers suggested in the Attic drama and the picture of the world of Socrates drawn for us by Plato and Xenophon. We cannot always trust the descriptions of pre-sophistic Athens in Aristophanes; like Thucydides he knows that his audience will remember their young days and will recognize how much exaggeration and parody is contained in sketches of bygone days (like the sketch of an old-fashioned boyhood which the Just Argument presents in the Clouds).4 A blend of genuine nostalgia with humorous exaggeration is the special gift of Aristoph-

[CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY, LII, October, 1967 J 228



POPULAR ETHICS IN THE WORLD OF THUCYDIDES 229

anes in his earlier plays; his artistic skill must not be mistaken for historical realism. We should be equally cautious in accepting the young men of Plato's dialogues as strictly accurate portraits from the fifth century, however cleverly they may be drawn; and it is notori- ously difficult to know when Euripides is indulging in exaggeration or exces- sive simplification. Nonetheless if we find these authors reinforcing the im- pressions created by Sophocles and Xenophon, as well as by Herodotus and Thucydides, we can hardly refuse to accept them as witnesses.

Herodotus leads us to believe that his readers were willing to accept the story of the Persian Wars and the tyrants in terms of hybris and nemesis; Croesus, Cambyses, Xerxes, and Pe- riander are all guilty of attempting too much or of flouting the will of the gods.5 But this particular form of political crime is associated with autocratic or oligarchic rule and generally with bygone days before Greek states had adopted democratic or quasi-democratic constitutions. Otanes in his speech urging the Persians to adopt democracy stresses the fact that hybris is elimi- nated when the majority rules and arbi- trary irresponsible behavior is checked (3. 80). Megabyzus, it is true, in his plea for oligarchy, denies this advantage, but his assertion that hybris is prevalent in democracies is vitiated by his oligarchic notion that the demos is a "useless mob" (3. 81. 1). It is left for Darius to bring out the special charac- teristic of democracy with its tendency for good or evil: "powerful friendships" (3. 82. 4).6 It is the making of friends that leads to political power and success in democracies; and friendships between states are the greatest force for good or evil in international affairs. The history of Herodotus illustrates

this point over and over again; he interprets the relations between states in terms of benefaction and requital; the failure to return a favor is unfor- givable, and one ill turn deserves another.

This Herodotean point of view is well known and requires no further argument. And the prevalence of this political attitude in Athens, even as late as the fourth century, is abundantly il- lustrated in other authors. There is no need to cite passages; it is sufficient to recall the attitude of defendants in the law courts, who expect special consideration because they have done more for the state than is strictly required of them. In the Funeral Oration of Peri- cles, where we find a more highly refined description of democratic ideals than anywhere else, there is a section on the Athenian attitude toward friendship. Various current accusations against democratic Athens are refuted in this speech, but no attempt is made to deny that Athenian power is based on skilful "making of friends"; the only quali- fication is that the Athenian ethical attitude toward friendship is supposed to be different from and superior to the attitude of other states: "Our ethical attitude is different from the usual one (xt& aI &?apst7v 6vczv ('0t toGq 7o?- xoz<); it is not by receiving benefits but by conferring them that we acquire our friends; and the party which con- fers the benefit is the surer partner in a friendship, with his determination to preserve the recipient's sense of obligation by showing good will; whereas the partner who remains under an obligation has the edge of his feeling blunted, knowing that his return of the benefit will not be from pure kindness but from obligation" (etc8(o oux '5 X&ptv oCX' eq 0ye(pk%x rv &peT7v Wr08o6a&V, 2. 40. 4). Not only is it taken for granted



230 LIoNEL PEARSON

that making friends is an important part of arete; it is actually assumed that arete is summed up in the attitude of a man or a state toward friendship.7

This simple conception of arete does not necessarily represent the views of Thucydides himself; he is not concerned to expound his own philosophy on the matter; but when he speaks of moral disintegration he must mean that prevailing ethical standards ceased to be observed and that no satisfactory substitutes took their place. In fact, in the first passage where he discusses the moral disintegration brought about by the war it is precisely this sense of obligation toward friends which he shows is being forgotten; in describing the effects of the plague at Athens he says that people no longer thought of their obligations toward their neigh- bors or even of conventional honor and decency, but only of their immediate self-satisfaction and profit (2. 53).8 In other passages-notably in the discussion of 8ta8i8, in the speeches at Athens when the fate of Mytilene is debated, and in the Melian Dialogue- he shows how the search for profit removes any sense of obligation in men's minds; but moral responsibility begins to break down during the plague, when men neglect their obligations toward their friends.9

Before turning to the first book in search of evidence about public morality in the days before the war, it is worth while to look elsewhere for some hints of what we might expect to find in Thucydides. In the first book of Plato's Republic we are presented with various popular codes, all of which Socrates finds unsatisfactory. There is the code of Cephalus, a wealthy businessman conscious of his obligations, who is concerned to keep his word and pay his debts to god and man-the code of

the honorable businessman. Polemar- chus tries to define a man's obligations more exactly by saying that he should help his friends and harm his enemies. And in due time we are introduced to the cynical or sophistic outlook of Thrasymachus that justice is only self- interest and the legalistic or policeman's notion of justice that it consists in obeying the laws. Socrates shows that there are weaknesses and inconsisten- cies in all these definitions, but we cannot doubt that many plain men believed in them; otherwise the first book would be pointless as an intro- duction to the more constructive discussion of the books which follow.

If we turn from the Republic to Xenophon's Cyropaedia, we find Cyrus characterized precisely in terms of these old-fashioned codes which Socra- tes finds so unsatisfactory. He is presented as a perfect example of kaloka- gathia: handsome, a lover of his fellow men (yLpvOpw7roq), a lover of learning, a lover of honor, a lover of beauty.10 The virtue of obedience (so necessary in the soldiers under his command) does not arise in a ruler, but philanthropia is all important. This virtue does not count as one of the ordinary soldierly virtues, since soldiers are more concerned with killing the enemy than with making and preserving friendships,11 but every officer must have it ;12

and the moral virtues of Cyrus are entirely summed up in his philanthropia. Astyages is confident that the boy will grow up "able to help his friends and harm his enemies" (1. 4. 25); his edu- cation, however, does not teach him how to harm his enemies (1. 6. 31-34) or how to deceive, but only how to behave toward friends; the Persian system of teaching justice to the boys is supposed to stress above everything the importance of gratitude (1. 2. 7)



POPIULAR ETHICS IN THE WORLD OF TH-uCYDIDES 231

and telling the truth; they learn how to deceive their enemies only by the indirect method of learning how to trick wild animals in the hunt (1. 6. 29).

It is only on the battlefield that Cy- rus is concerned with deceiving his enemies; elsewhere he is notable for his power of making friends, and making friends by giving rather than by receiving. He promises not only to make the Armenian king show the obedience that he has neglected to show toward Cyaxares, but to make him a firmer friend (2. 4. 14); and he succeeds in this, following the advice of the king's son, Tigranes. Tigranes asks him: "From whom could you win greater friendship than is in your power to win from us now ? Could you find anyone on whom you could confer such great favors as you can at the present moment on my father'?" (3. 1. 28-29). It is by his generosity in not punishing the Armenian king severely that he wins his friendship, and his character brings him rich rewards in the form of gifts (3. 3. 5). The insistence on making friends continues in the later books of the Cyropaedia, and Cyrus' final ad- monition in his deathbed speech is: "Do good to your friends, and you will be able to punish your enemies."'13

In the Anabasis when Clearchus, an old-fashioned Spartan officer, appeals to the feelings of the mercenary soldiers under his command, he presents the obligation of friendship as the guiding principle of his conduct; the tragedy for him is that he must apparently choose between the friendship of Cyrus and the friendship of his soldiers; he has no principle to help him choose, and when he chooses to stand by his soldiers he says he does not know if he is doing the right thing.14 It would be hard to find a better illustration of this simple code, which interprets ethics in

terms of friendship and its obligations but leaves a man helpless when he has to decide between conflicting loyalties.

If we find that speakers in the first book of Thucydides, before the stress of the war has corrupted the old peacetime morality, interpret ethics in terms of friendship, gratitude, and philanthropia, we are justified in concluding that Thucydides (like Xenophon) is recalling the old-fashioned code of behavior which he was taught as a boy. We may not find that the cities which the speakers represent always behave according to the high standards of Cyrus and the Funeral Oration; and we shall not find the Athenians themselves following the dictates of peacetime morality when they take the steps that lead to war; but we may well expect to find other states appealing to the current moral code before the war breaks out, and in later books it is quite proper that Thucydides should show the old morality still prevailing in parts of the Greek world where the impact of the war has not yet been felt.

With these considerations in mind it is worth while to notice how Thucydides presents the story of Epidamnus, Cor- cyra, and Corinth which begins in 1. 24. The democratic party in power at Epidamnus needs help in making peace with its oligarchic opponents. It appeals first to the proper quarter, to its own mother city Corcyra; and when Cor- cyra refuses to interfere, it goes above the head of its mother city and appeals to Corinth, the metropolis of Corcyra, only after the Delphic oracle has sanc- tioned the step. This seems like a good example of proper diplomatic procedure. The Corinthians agree to help for two reasons-on the grounds of justice (xocro T' 'Xtzov), because they recognize their obligation to help Epi- damnus, "considering that Epidamnus



232 LIONEL PEARSON

is their colony no less than a colony of the Corcyreans"; and also "out of enmity toward the Corcyreans," an enmity which is justified because the Corcyreans, their colonists, have not shown them proper respect and have forfeited any claim to their good will (1. 25. 3-4). The Corinthians might claim to be "helping their friends and harming their enemies"; but it is only so far as they are helping their friends that they claim to be acting according to justice.15

The Corcyreans deny that Corinth has any right to interfere in the affairs of Epidamnus and are prepared to submit their claim to Delphi for arbitration; only if the Corinthians force war upon them will they in their turn be compelled, reluctantly, to seek friendship elsewhere "in their own self- interest" ((?eLoac tvexo, 1. 28. 1-3). They wish to preserve the standards of peacetime diplomacy; they are unwilling to abandon their friendly relations with Corinth and so to fail in their obligations (as the Corinthians say they have already done); but they recognize that self-interest may be in conflict with justice.

Thus the issue is presented as though it were a matter of meeting obligations. The tale might be told quite differently, in terms of political parties, of ambition and fear, of Corcyrean hybris or Co- rinthian polypragmosyne. But these factors are all played down, and the story is told in terms of T'O 8&X(V, as each side claims to see it. It is signifi- cant that Thucydides should present the story in this manner, because it shows his belief that Greece still thought of international relations in terms of justice and friendship, not exclusively in terms of self-interest.

Accordingly when the Corcyreans carry out their threat to seek friends

elsewhere (in their self-interest), their plea for Athenian aid begiins with an appeal to justice; the first word of their speech is 8txocov (1. 32. 1). They cannot claim assistance from Athens as their right, because they are not yet recognized as friends of Athens; it is "just," therefore, if they want the Athenians to help them, to make an offer themselves first, to show that the Athenians will not be hurting themselves by accepting Corcyrean friendship and that Corcyra will recognize and fulfil its obligation of gratitude. They have broken off their friendship with Corinth and recognize no further obligation in that quarter; Corinth has become their enemy. Hence Athenian action in supporting Corcyra will not violate justice: "If the Corinthians say that it is not just for you to accept their colonists as friends, let them recognize that every colony respects its metropolis when it is well treated, but that when it is wronged it is alien- ated" (1. 34. 1).

The Corcyreans argue that the behavior of the Corinthians has broken the tie of friendship between them and there is therefore no reason why they should not make friends of Corinth's enemies and incur new obligations which will be in conflict with the old; and the Corinthians justify their aid to Epidamnus in similar terms, only insisting that they already have obligations to Epidamnus. If the Corcy- reans could claim that they had pre- viously sought the friendship of Athens, their moral position would be precisely similar to that of the Corinthians. As it is, however, they cannot make this claim; on the contrary, they have to defend themselves against the charge of avoiding alliances in the past; they attempt, despite the Corinthian protest (1. 37. '2-5), to show that this policy




was not the result of bad character or moral weakness, but was intended to avoid the possible necessity of supporting an ally in an unjust action; nonetheless, they admit that their aloofness was really a mistake, an error of judgment (1. 32. 3-5).

In actual fact all this ethical argument seems to be wasted on the Athe- nians. Thucydides shows them making their decision on the basis of pure expediency (1. 44. 1-3), and as we read the later speeches in the first book we see something more like a wartime morality in force. The Corinthians, it is true, try to convince the Spartans of the bad character of the Athenians (1. 68-71), just as they tried to blacken Corcyrean character in their speech at Athens; and the blunt ephor Sthene- laidas denounces the Athenians roundly as xoxoL (1. 86. 1). But Thucydides is quite definite that it was fear of Athens, not righteous indignation or the wish to help their allies and friends, that made Sparta go to war (1. 23. 6; 1. 88). And at the second Spartan congress the Corinthians explain that most of Greece will help in the war against Athens, "partly from fear, partly from self-interest" (1. 123. 1).16 Ethical considerations begin to disappear as a wartime atmosphere comes to prevail; and when ethical values are mentioned, it is the warlike virtues which are emphasized-bravery and loyalty, rather than the peacetime virtues of friendship, because in war an alliance is held together not by mere good will, but by "fear and self-interest."

It is only when a state is invited to change sides or offers to do so of its own free will that the familiar arguments have to be revived; and conflicting claims cause difficulty. When the Thebans make their sudden attack on Plataea, they refrain from open

violence in the hope of bringing the city "into an agreement and into friendship" (C' iVtmatLV xocL ptM?v, 2. 2. 4), in order to establish the Plataeans as their "friends" before the formal outbreak of war. The attempt fails, and the Plataeans render any repetition of it unlikely by killing the Theban prisoners, whom they may or may not have sworn not to harm (2. 5. 5-6). But when the Spartans attack Plataea two years later, each side claims the justice of its cause; after the Plataeans protest the injustice of the Spartan attack "with our worst enemies, the Thebans," Archidamus replies that what they say is just if their actions will conform to their words-if they will recognize the obligation to help Sparta in the liber- ation of Greece (2. 71-72). It is strictly true that Plataea has obligations both to Sparta and to Athens; indeed it is only by recognizing her obligation to Sparta in return for the benefits conferred on the city by Pausanias (2. 71. 2-3), that she can protest the present action of the Spartans; but the Plataean spokesmen say that "fear of Athens" makes it impossible for them to carry out the Spartan request. Then Archi- damus makes them an offer: they can go away to some safe place, and hand over their city and their farms to the Spartans to be held in trust until the end of the war (2. 72. 3). The Plataeans are evidently old-fashioned enough to consider that the return of a deposit is a sacred duty (which cannot be af- fected by the result of the war) and the offer is sufficiently tempting to them that they actually go to Athens to ask permission to accept it; when the Athenians, naturally, refuse permission, Archidamus puts on a tremendous show of self-righteousness calling on the gods to witness the justice of his attack.



234 LIONEL PEARSON

Archidamus does not even insist that the Plataeans deny their friendship with the Athenians; if they will not join the Peloponnesians in the liber- ation of Greece, he is content that they remain neutral, regarding both Spar- tans and Athenians as their friends (2. 72. 1). Thus he claims to recognize their obligation to both sides as they do; and he speaks to them as though it were peacetime and they were not finally and definitely committed to support of the Athenians.

The fate of the Plataeans is closely linked with the fate of the Mytilen- aeans in the third book, and the Mytilenaeans try to justify their revolt from Athens in their speech at Sparta, hoping to convince the Spartans that they are not "betrayers of their former friends" (3. 9. 1); they say that their friendship with Athens is really not a true obligation, because it rested entirely on fear, not on good will (3. 12. 1). Unlike the Plataeans, the Mytilenaeans are not so naive as to ask Athenian permission for failing in their obligations. And after the failure of the revolt the speakers at Athens do not waste time in discussing the justice of their cause. But after the fall of Plataea the Spartan commander still maintains the attitude that the Plataeans owed the Spartans support in the war "in accordance with the ancient treaty of Pausanias" (3. 52. 4; 68. 1) and the Spartan judges solemnly ask each individual whether he has conitributed anything to the Spartan cause in the war before he is put to death. The trial, as the Plataeans know, is an empty mockery; but they recognize the techni- cal point of the charge made against them: "We say that if you ask the question regarding us as enemies (X5 -no?,et4ouq), you have suffered no injustice in not being helped by us; and

that if you consider us as friends, it is you, who attacked our city, who are more in the wrong yourselves" (3. 54. 2). It was the Plataeans who first reminded the Spartans of the old relation of friendship between them, and they are not allowed to forget it; they are treated accordingly not as brave and stubborn enemies, but as false friends who fail in an important obligation. This is the justification for their terrible punishment.

Thucydides witholds comment. It is left for the reader to consider if the old code of behavior is a sound guide when it leads to this brutal treatment of a defeated enemy, whereas the Athenians, on grounds of pure expediency, refrained from inflicting similar punishment on the rebellious Mytilen- aeans, though their guilt was beyond question if the same code was applied. Cleon, in the speech in which he urges the most rigorous punishment of Myti- lene, bases his decision on another old-fashioned guide to behavior; he argues that obedience to the laws, even if they are imperfect, is the most important thing;17 Diodotus counters him only by appealing to euboulia, and reminds the Athenians how unwise it is to regard themselves as "'severe judges" of the case (note esp. 3. 46. 4).

From this point in the narrative it is principally the enemies of Athens who raise moral issues. The Spartan peace mission of 425, in its speech in Athens, is careful to begin by using the sort of language which the Athenians might be expected to understand. Terms of peace, they indicate, will have to be based on the common interests of both sides and bring them both credit and honor (4. 17. 1-4).18 But when they ask for the release of the men blockaded on Sphacteria without any substantial offer in return, they present a variation



POPIULAR ETHICS IN THE WORLD OF THIUCYDIDES 235

of the theory of friendship which Pericles had elaborated in the Funeral Oration; friendship, they say, can best be renewed after a quarrel if the party which has the upper hand surprises the underdog by a generous concession, putting him under an obligation to return the favor, and so shaming him into keeping whatever agreement he makes (4. 19. 2-3). The argument has no appeal for the Athenians, who intend to exploit the advantages they have gained to the full (4. 21. 2); Cleon's influence prevails and, as before, he insists on the letter of the law being observed; when the Spartans suggest negotiation with a committee, he jumps on them for suggesting non- democratic methods, accusing them of underhand "unjust" intentions if they are unwilling to deal openly with the demos (4. 22. 2).

Certainly the Spartan attempt to win over the Athenians by appealing to a theory of friendship does seem a little naive. The best commentary on the situation comes later in the same book. The speech of Hermocrates at Gela shows that the old ideas about friendship and quarrels are still current in the cities of Sicily, but he warns the congress that they must understand the Athenian point of view if they want to avoid becoming victims of Athenian aggression. His speech is full of violent protest against a prevalent attitude; he insists that they must realize the true situation: that the Athenians are trying to dominate Sicily and that offers of alliance to one of the factions in Sicily are not made out of good will or friendship, because all cities of Sicily are really the enemies of Athens; any alliance offered by the Athenians is nothing but a conventional fraud (gvvo- t?ov Ovo?Lx EutLyLoc c) to make their natural enemies (-o yu'cr 7To?e4?Lov) work for

them;19 they are quite capable of attacking a country without any invitation; if any Sicilian city accepts Athenian aid against its neighbor, it is simply making the task of the Athe- nians easier; the only hope is to put up a united front against the invader and not weaken themselves by internal quarrels.

Such is the argument of 4. 60. In the following chapter, after some repetition, Hermocrates offers proof of the Athenians' insincerity; it is not true, he says, that they are unfriendly to the Dorians and friendly to the Chalcidians as Jonians; the Chalcidians never helped them in the past and so they are not returning a favor by offering assistance now; on the contrary, in their reply to the appeal for help made by the Chalcidian colonies, they made no offer to help their kinsmen but were very ready to take the initiative themselves in claiming an obligation to which they were entitled under the treaty-an obligation which the Chal- cidians had not honored in the past. The Greek is difficult and has generally been interpreted differently ;20 but a correct interpretation must support the argument of Hermocrates. He means that the Athenians were expecting to receive more assistance than they would ever give and that a hint of this was to be found in their eager insistence on To 8Lxct.ov -rx iuvxc, "the justice of the treaty" or, in concrete terms, "what they were entitled to expect under the treaty."

Hermocrates goes on to warn his listeners against undue confidence in their strength or faith in their cause because it is just; he wants them to think in terms of fear, not in terms of punishing injustice-in the terms which really motivate the enemies of Athens, as Thucydides believes, not in the terms



236 LIONEL PEARSON

of the old peacetime morality and prewar diplomacy. The congress was convinced by his arguments and the Athenian hopes of a diplomatic victory in Sicily were shattered. The Athenian fleet sailed home, and the commanders were held responsible for the failure of their mission; Thucydides evidently thinks they should never have expected to succeed (4. 65. 4).

The Athenian failure in offering "justice" to her allies in Sicily stands in sharp contrast with the success of Brasidas in Thrace, who persuades former allies of Athens to change sides by showing himself "just and reasonable" to the various cities (4. 81. 2). His references to "justice" in his speeches are frequent, but his idea of justice has nothing to do with the obligations of allies; if the cities refuse his offer of freedom, he will consider himself justified in ravaging their land; he cannot accept their claim that they are entitled to accept or refuse freedom as they choose; he regards a refusal as damag- ing to the Spartans; he cannot allow them to prevent other Greeks from recovering their freedom and he reminds them of the good name they will win by helping the cause of freedom (4. 87. 2-5). He is successful at Acan- thus not because he is thought to have justice on his side, but because his offer is attractive and the Acanthians fear the results of refusing (4. 88. 1); fear and self-interest are the dominat- ing motives, as so often. Later at Torone he tries a higher moral tone; he argues that the people of Torone will not be guilty of any injustice in betraying the Athenians, because their motive in abandoning their obligations is to win prosperity and freedom for their city; but so as not to antagonize those who have refused to submit and have joined the Athenian forces at Lecythus, he

remarks that he does not think the worse of them for their loyalty; on the contrary, "when they have had some experience of the Spartans, they will be so much the more loyal to them in that their present action is more just, though for the moment they are frightened because of their lack of experience" (4. 114. 3-4). In other words, he respects their character and believes that, because of their loyalty to Athens now, they will be in the future particularly staunch allies of Sparta-once they understand the true facts.

At Amphipolis Thucydides says that Brasidas offered "reasonable terms"; but he adds that the majority in Am- phipolis convinced themselves, in their frightened state, that his offer was actually "just" (4. 105. 2-106. 1). In general he condemns the fuzzy thinking in the cities which went over to Brasidas, and their readiness to accept what was immediately attractive without any real thought for the future (4. 108. 4-6). This is similar language to that which he used in describing the moral breakdown in Athens caused by the plague. The faithlessness of the Thracian cities is certainly intended by Thucydides to illustrate how insensitive about loyalties the allies of Athens have become; these people are very different from the stubbornly faithful Plataeans.

Thrasymachus in the Republic takes the cynical view that justice is less advantageous than injustice; if he had wanted instances to prove his point, he might have cited the fate of the Plataeans and other incidents of the Archidamian War. The plague itself, indeed, seemed to suggest how dis- astrous it was to be faithful to a friend; only by neglecting him when he fell sick could one hope to escape the dreaded infection! Thucydides points




out how "those who made somc claim to arete and were unsparing of themselves" in tending others were the surest victims (2. 51. 5). But he makes the point about weakened loyalties more forcibly in his discussion of stasis. Revolutions occurred, he says, when a faction in a city wanted to make the city change sides in the war. "In peace they would have had no prophasis" (3. 82. 1); in peace time they could not have defended21 disloyalty to an existing allegiance with arguments of self-interest and fear nor claimed (like Brasidas) that it would aid the cause of Greek freedom. But war corrupted the character of the average man and allowed circumstances to dominate his decision. The neglect of family ties in favor of some reckless outsider who had something to offer; the disregard for existing rules governing agree- ments; the feeling that loyalty was secured not by fear of divine anger but by the hope of sharing in the rewards of crime; the ignoble motives with which the offers of former enemies were accepted-these were the signs of the times (3. 82. 6-7); simple good faith was laughed out of existence (3. 83. 1).

When traditional standards collapsed in this manner, there could be little hope that the obligations of any agreement would be observed. There was no justice, no basis of good will in the Peace of Nicias; it was motivated by fear and suspicion on both sides; they feared further defections on the part of their allies (5. 14). Sparta's allies considered that she had failed in her obligations to them by accepting the terms; they demanded that a more just treaty be made; and the Spartans replied to their protests not by any attempt to recover their good will, but by making a separate alliance with the

Athenians (5. 22. 1-2). Then, when it became clear that the terms of the treaty could not be carried out, the Spartans and Athenians became more and more suspicious of one another.

Thucydides, therefore, refuses to regard the Peace of Nicias as a true peace. The diplomatic skirmishes described in Book 5 do not follow the rules of behavior or show respect for conventional notions of justice like the negotiations described in Book 1; and the hopeful references to friendship have almost disappeared (though Ni- cias does on one occasion invite the Spartans to behave like friends, 5. 46. 1). Finally in the Melian Dialogue the Athenians scoff openly at any idea of justifying their actions; there is to be no pretense of allowing the Melians to plead that they never harmed Athens; questions of justice are not relevant when one party is strong and the other weak (5. 89). There is no repetition of the self-righteous Spartan appeal to the Plataeans; the Spartans had offered the Plataeans the alternative of remaining neutral, friendly to both sides; the Athenians refuse the Melians this alternative, because "your friendship will be an indication to our sub- jects of our weakness, your hatred of our strength"; mere friendship, they mean, will be useless to Athens; they insist on submission. Since they cannot demand submission by any appeal to justice, they simply advise the Melians to save their own lives; fear and self- interest are the only motives worthy of their consideration; it does not matter to Athens whether the Melians think it honorable or shameful to surrender (5. loo; 101).22

The Athenians can hardly sink to any greater depths than this; and there are some reflections of their attitude in the preliminaries to the Sicilian expe-



23S LIONEL PEARSON

dition as Thucydides describes them. The invitation from Segesta is the formal justification for their interference in Sicily; but while the embassy from Segesta "reminds the Athenians of their alliance," it appeals more directly to the motives of fear and self-interest (the Dorians in Sicily may come to the aid of their kinsmen in Greece) and adds that it would be prudent (a6ypov, 6. 6. 2) not to delay, just as the Athenians had appealed to the Melians to make a prudent decision ("v ye awcpOpvwq Poue6v]AO, 5. 101). The speech of Nicias, opposing the expedition, also recalls the language of the Melian Dialogue. Though he recognizes that the expedition will bring him honor and he has always been considered a brave man, when he opposes it he has to risk being branded as an unambitious coward (6. 9. 2), as was expected of the Melians. He warns his hearers not to put their trust in the existing treaty (6. 10. 2), as the Melians were warned not to trust the Spartan alliance (5. 113). The prospect of Athens neglecting its obligations toward Segesta does not disturb him; he warns older men not to be shamed into thinking they will be considered cowards if they vote against the expedition (6. 13. 1), thus implying that shame and the fear of public opinion are no longer sure guides to conduct; finally he advises the president of the assembly to put the vote and not to be frightened of breaking the law (6. 14. 1); thus even the legalistic notion of justice, which Cleon had upheld as a trustworthy moral re- straint,23 is disregarded.

Honorable man though Nicias is, his speech is in many ways on a less high moral plane than that of Alcibiades. Alcibiades, in urging the Athenians to keep their word to Segesta, is careful

to point out that expediency is the strongest reason for doing so (6. 18. 1-2); but, like Pericles, he appeals to the past traditions of Athens and he concludes with an important ethical idea-both men and cities must be true to their traditional character and their laws, even if they are imperfect (6. 18. 7). It is a clever and an effective reply to Nicias; but in the opinion of Thucydides what really silenced the opposition was fear-fear that they would be considered unpatriotic if they voted against the expedition (6. 24. 4). Thus considerations of justice appear to have little weight; Alcibiades never stresses the ethical importance of their obligation to Segesta nor the need of honoring it if the good name of Athens is to be upheld; and Nicias, while scoffing at the worthless character of the Segestans, never suggests that the alliance with Sparta has any claim on the Athenians.

The speeches of Hermocrates and Athenagoras at Syracuse are confined almost entirely to practical matters; it is only with the speech of Hermocrates at Camarina that ethical issues are raised again. He does not ask the Camarinaeans to repudiate their alliance with Athens, but to remember that this alliance was not directed against their friends, since it bound them only to help Athens if Athens was attacked (6. 79. 1). Their real friends, he means, are the Syracusans and the Sicilian cities who should be forming a united front against the Athenians; to help their natural enemies, using the respectable excuse of an alliance, will be weak and cowardly "and it will not be just" (6. 79. 2-3). Nor can they remain neutral; they must help their Dorian kinsmen in Sicily who are being attacked and they will be doing a favor to their good friends the Athenians by




forcing them to keep to the right path; in any case they would gain little by supporting the Athenians, whichever side is victorious in the end (6. 80. 1-5).

Hermocrates had opened his speech by attacking the Athenian claim to be helping their kinsmen in Leontini and to be champions of liberty (6. 76. 1-4). The Athenian speaker, Euphemus, takes up this challenge; he declares openly that the Athenians, as Ionians, are hostile to the Dorians; and he defends the justice of subjecting to Athenian rule the Ionians who had joined the Persian king in his attack on Greece (6. 82-83). This looks like an argument fit only for Sicilian consumption; but when he goes on to say that the Athe- nians have always acted with their own safety in mind, in Sicily as in the Ae- gean (6. 83. 2-4), we recognize the new vocabulary, particularly when the speaker tells us of what is fitting and reasonable (7rpoaixov, eUsoyov) and finally identifies the reasonable with the expedient (85. 1). Athens chooses her friends and enemies according to circumstances; but in Sicily it is to her advantage that her friends should help to weaken her enemies. It is Syracuse, not Athens, that threatens to enslave Camarina; to deny the danger from Syracuse, which was the reason for wanting Athenian help in the first place, is "not just" (85. 1; 86. 1-2). It soon appears that by "just" Euphemus means "reasonable" or "intelligent" ;24 he asks the Camarinaeans not to set themselves up as "judges" or "cor- rectors" of Athenian policy, but to take advantage of the aggressive Athenian character when their interests coincide; and to seize their opportunity of "counterplotting" (&ve7tP oouXA)axL) against Syracuse (87. 3-5). So also Diodotus, when he urged the Athenians to show "wisdom in council" in deciding the

fate of Mytilene, advised them not to set themselves up as "stern judges" (3. 46. 4); and the suggestion that plot- ting or counterplotting is safer than inaction recalls the discussion of sta,8is

(3. 82. 4, 7). The Camarinaeans decide to remain

neutral and defend their decision as in accordance with their oath (?OpXOM, 6. 88. 2); but Thucydides says their feelings were mixed; and, apart from the suspicion that the Athenians might be planning to conquer all Sicily, their sympathies were pro-Athenian and anti-Syracusan (6. 88. 1). One may wonder whether a more precise definition by the Athenian speaker of what he considered to be their obligations as an ally might have been useful; here is an occasion where one would really like to know how accurately the speeches of Thucydides represent what was actually said and (if he really knew) how well chosen he thought their arguments were.

We should also like to know exactly what Alcibiades said at Sparta when he abandoned his allegiance to Athens, and whether his apologia was sympa- thetically received. Thucydides describes the effect of his speech only insofar as he says the Spartans were greatly impressed by his advice to establish a fort at Deceleia (6. 93.1-2). But the extraordinary mixture of naive argument and sophistry which Thu- cydides attributes to him is historically credible only if Alcibiades imagined the Spartans to be extremely old-fashioned in their interpretation of friendship and its obligations. He says they can hardly blame him for renouncing his friendly attitude to Sparta and undertaking the Mantinean and Argive scheme, since they had negotiated the Peace of Nicias through his political opponents instead of through him (6. 89. 2-3); and he



240 LIONEL PEARSON

feels it necessary to explain why he had not attempted to overthrow the Athe- nian democratic constitution (89. 3-5). This is to explain why he has failed them in the past; at the end of his speech he tries to explain that, despite his apparent treachery to Athens, he is still a true "lover of his city" (92. 2-4). The speech gives the impression that he is trying to follow the old ethical code, but has no real understanding for it. His speeches that are outlined in Book 8 are completely devoid of ethical content.

It is likely, however, that Alcibiades did in fact credit the Spartans with old-fashioned ethical views. Thucydides himself certainly makes his own opinion quite clear. He believes that the Spartans were extremely sensitive about war guilt and inclined to think that an "unjust war" could not succeed; he says that they were enthusi- astic about the fortification of Deceleia partly because they thought the war on two fronts would make the Atheni- ans more vulnerable and also because "they considered the Athenians had been the first to break the truce; in the previous war, on the other hand, the guilt had been more on the other side, as the Thebans attacked Plataea when the peace treaty was still in force and, though it had been laid down in the earlier treaty that hostilities should not start if they were willing to submit to arbitration, they had not themselves accepted the Athenian offer of arbitration; because of this they felt that their lack of success was not unreason- able" (8C& rouTo ex6ow aruzPuv evo- [urov, 7. 18. 2).

No such self-righteousness is attrib- uted to any other belligerent; the Syracusans are influenced by "love of honor" and think how high their repu- tation will stand in the Greek world if they are largely held responsible for

the fall of Athens (7. 56. 1); and when the list is given, in 7. 57, of the various cities now taking part in the war, with an occasional note on their attitude, the wish to gratify an old enmity and the hope of advantage are the over- riding motives. Nonetheless a Spartan, Gylippus, does point out to his men that it is not only pleasant but also entirely proper to vent one's fury on punishing an aggressor, and indeed that the justice of their cause makes cow- ardice particularly inexcusable (7. 68. 1-2).

As the Sicilian expedition nears its end Thucydides shows more interest in the moral feelings of the fighting men than in those of politically responsible persons. Nicias is unhappily aware that his efforts to keep up the morale of his men are not very successful (7. 69. 3). Even when the last retreat begins and the men reproach themselves bitterly because they must leave their sick and wounded comrades behind them (7. 75. 3-5), as though they no longer had the power to behave like honorable men, still Nicias tries to encourage them; he says that they must not blame themselves for what has happened "contrary to their deserts" (7. 77. 1); he has suffered worse than anyone, yet he has always been pious and just in his dealings with men (77. 2). This last pathetic plea is certainly intended as a reply to the self-righteousness of the Spartans who think the gods are on their side; but in urging them to be good soldiers to the end he can only tell them that they have no other choice, since there is no place of refuge for the coward (77. 7). The historian's famous verdict on Nicias, that he least of all men deserved such a fate because of his constant care to live an upright life (7. 86. 5), has not always been rightly appreciated; the point must be that,




despite his weaknesses as politician and commander, he held to his personal ethical values to the very end.

Since Book 8 contains no speeches, it is difficult to know what changes in moral attitude Thucydides wished to describe in the last years of the war. But when it became apparent that Persia would come into the war, both Athenians and Spartans must have wondered whether an old-fashioned attitude still prevailed among Persian officials. Alcibiades, we find, is convinced that Tissaphernes will support whichever side offers him the greater advantage. But Phrynichus, who has no faith in Alcibiades, is not so sure; he thinks that the Persian king will remember all the harm that the Persians suffered from the Athenian league and will prefer to support Sparta "from whom he has suffered no damage" (8. 48. 4). This is the last glimpse in Thu- cydides of the old style of diplomatic thinking; and it comes from a man whom Thucydides admired (8. 27. 5).

The Philoctetes of Sophocles was pro- duced in 409 B.c. To many an Athenian in the audience the opening scene must have brought to mind the foremost political problem of the day-the difficulty of winning the support of the Persians in view of the treatment they had received from Athens in the past. Odysseus explains to Neoptolemus that there is no hope of persuading Philoc- tetes to come to their aid with his invincible arrows, and that he must be tricked into becoming their ally. The practical problem, however, is soon overshadowed by the ethical issue: Will Neoptolemus accept the argument of Odysseus that deceit brings no shame if it leads to self-preservation and victory ? Neoptolemus is an upright young man, highly sensitive to the old traditions, and loyal to the memory of his

father Achilles; but Odysseus tells him that the prospect should force him to relax his moral standards; he can re- deem himself later on and recover his good name for justice which he prizes; for the moment he must recognize his patriotic duty and cast all shame aside (79-85). Odysseus always stresses the need of obedience to a commander, which Neoptolemus as a soldier cannot disregard; Odysseus himself had per- formed the unwelcome task demanded of him by his superiors, the abandon- ment of Philoctetes on Lemnos (3-6); in contrast with this distasteful duty, the present task will bring the highest glory to Neoptolemus, since the bow after all is to be wielded by him, not by Philoctetes. Thus the apparent obligation of obedience and the prospect of future honor seem to override the claim of human good faith; despite his own nature and his father's example, Neoptolemus cannot bear to be called a traitor to the cause of the Greeks (88-94).25 His conventional moral up- bringing does not supply him with a convincing answer to the arguments of Odysseus; at first he says he prefers to fail honorably than to succed basely (95-96); but once he understands the gain and the rewards that obedience will bring, he has no further hesitation: "I will obey, and put all shame aside" (120). The turning point seems to come in line 108, when he begins to realize that Odysseus can justify deceit "if it brings safety" and that compunction is out of place when there is "gain" in prospect (111); it is the same language that Thucydides uses in his discussion of stasis.

The conversion of Neoptolemus is not permanent. But the rival claims of different obligations, to Odysseus and to Philoctetes, alternate in their command of him; and once he has



242 LIONEL PEARSON

befriended Philoctetes, he cannot decide one way or the other without being branded a traitor. No wonder, then, that a deus ex machina is needed to solve the moral predicament of Neoptolemus and to satisfy the demand of the oracle that Philoctetes shall go willingly to Troy. In fact, however, Heracles, though he satisfies the wounded feelings of Philoctetes, has no word of moral advice for Neoptolemus or of reproof for Odysseus. He offers no moral code to replace the old one; there is no counterpart to the speech of Athena in the Eumenides; the old- fashioned code of Neoptolemus has not completely broken down when faced with the "rational self-interest" of Odysseus, but has left him helpless in his indecision.

The parallel with the story which Thucydides tells need not be pressed further. The Athenians responsible for

the brutal treatment of Melos are like Odysseus26 insofar as they are governed by rational self-interest and have abandoned the old-fashioned regard for the obligations of friendship and alliances. Nonetheless, both Thucydides and Soph- ocles must be well aware that men still survived who believed in the old standards and tried to live their lives in accordance with them. A popular ethical code is not permanently dis- carded simply because it fails in a time of national crisis. Like Socrates in the first book of the Republic, Thucydides shows that it was not capable of meeting a severe test. He does not draw the further conclusion that some higher sanction, whether religious or philo- sophical, is needed if true human arete is to be realized and preserved by intelligent men.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

NOTES

1. Cf. D. Grene, Man in his Pride (Chicago, 1950), pp. 16-19, 24-27, 54. I cannot agree with Grene, however, when he says that "the idea of justice or injustice in international procedure resolved itself into the issue of freedom or slav- ery," and this is the issue which "for Thucydides and many of his most penetrating contemporaries" is "old-fashioned and insignificant" (pp. 52-53).

2. Cf. A. W. Gomme, A Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford, 1945), Intro. ? 1, "What Thucydides takes for granted."

3. A good example would be the exact meaning of "unwritten laws." Cf. V. Ehrenberg, Sophocles and Pericles (Oxford, 1954), chap. ii.

4. Aristoph. Nub. 961-83. Sketches of boyhood days in ancient literature are not distinguished by their realism. Cf. E. M. Blaiklock, "Schoolboys of the Ancient World," Greece and Rome XI (1942), 97-102.

5. Cf. L. Pearson, "Real and Conventional Personalities in Greek History," Journ. Hist. Id., XV (1954), 136-45.

6. By contrast he considers that "enmities" are charac- teristic of oligarchies (3. 82. 3) and that they lead to stasis. The danger of "friendships" is likewise emphasized by Creon in Soph. Ant. 182-83: xoca Lieov' 6Oa-Lq &wVl -T

oc&Voi -Trpoc; / CpXOV VOLteL, rouTOv 68o0CaLou Xiyc.

7. The meaning of arete in Thucydides should be under- stood clearly. There are a few passages where it appears to denote a quality of moral character (2. 42. 2; 45. 2), excel- lence in a general sense (cf. 1. 2. 4 V' dpvTAV yt5), or even something like "high standing," which is earned by such a quality (1. 33. 2), but for the most part it has the concrete meaning of "good works," and there is little to distinguish it from Xcpt or 6zpyzato (note 4. 19. 3 awr7ro8ro&)va dcpzrv, as in 2. 40. 4, quoted in the text). E. Schwartz, Ethik der Griechen (Stuttgart, 1951), pp. 24-25 is quite

right to define it as &v8po ciyoc%v yevia6mL, in the meaning that is implied by this phrase in honorific citations; it is for "services to the city" that men are given gold crowns, whether these services are rendered by bravery in battle or by contributions of money. When Thucydides says that the Peisistratids ?J:e to8euaov ipeiAv xoct t6v?Lv (6. 54. 5), he means that they conferred benefits on Athens, not that their moral character was admirable; by way of illustration he points to their very moderate taxation, their adornment of the city, their successful wars, and their regular sacrificial offerings. Cf. also 4. 81. 2 t t6te Bpocai8ou &penr xoL t6vemC, which is explained in 81. 3 by 8ocM

?tvocL xoT& VTrvo dyaos, "helpful and useful" to all with whom he came in contact, as well as "capable at whatever he did." Thucydides says of Nicias that his whole life was directed toward arete (7. 86. 5); there is no mention of t6v?aLq this time, because Nicias made many errors of judgment. In two speeches Nicias shows what his conception of arete was; he did indeed strive to be a "good man," not only an -example of courage to the army (this was a matter of record and he has no false modesty about it, 6. 9. 2), but consistent in giving the gods their due and doing many "just deeds" ungrudgingly to men (7. 77. 2). The element of generosity in his justice is important (cf. the meaning of yevvocloc); there is no clear distinction between a just man, a good man, and a benefactor.

The Socrates of Xenophon uses the word in precisely the same way; he is astonished that self-styled teachers of arete should take fees, as though they were afraid that a pupil, yev6i,uvoq xaMq x&yo6ct, should not be grateful to his benefactor; he has confidence enough in his own teaching to know that his pupils will remain his friends for life (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 7-8. Cf. 1. 2. 48 and 64).

In the Funeral Oration Thucydides makes Pericles say



POPULAR ETHICS IN THE WORLD o?E THUCYDIDES 243

of the individual Athenian that he wins honor and respect not in proportion to his social position but in proportion to his arete; and he goes on at once to qualify this remark by insisting that poverty is no bar to distinction-that a lowly position does not hold a man back "if he can do something good for the state" (2. 37. 1). A plutocratic society might believe that only a wealthy man, with the power of conferring numerous benefits, was really capable of great arete; Pericles is concerned to show that this opinion did not prevail in democratic Athens.

A more archaic ("aristocratic" or "oligarchic") use of the word can be found in Herodotus. Megabyzus in praising oligarchy says ipLatov t &v8pCv oE6p f opLctN aouX5Loato yLveaoCct (3. 81. 3), and Darius in rebuttal argues that pursuit of arete by a large number of persons will cause violent quarrels (3. 82. 3). Arete here means "distinction" as in Homer: octv ipapLoreetv.

8. Popular feeling was evidently greatly shocked by this failure to help sick and dying relatives. Thucydides was certainly not alone in regarding it as a symptom of moral degeneracy. Apparently it was one of the evils of the age for which Socrates was subsequently blamed because of his statement that "when people are sick or involved in a lawsuit, it is not their relatives who help them, but phy- sicians and skilled advocates" (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 51). He was charged with diverting the respect of young people away from their parents and attaching them to himself (1. 2. 52).

9. If we turn to the opening scene of Euripides' Medea we can see how Thucydides has indeed reproduced the languiage of the flrst years of the war. The English phrase "breakdown of friendship" is far too weak to describe the quarrel between Medea and Jason; but the Nurse intends no anticlimax when she cries out: 6XoLro itv r? , 8ean&r-T yip ?a-T L>0q,/i-r&p xocx6q y' &v ?5 cptXou5 &xvroct (83-84). She takes no notice of the cynical reply of the Paidagogos, who claims that everyone loves himself more than his neighbor.

10. 1. 2. 1; 1. 3. 3. 11. A private soldier's duty is set forth in 2. 1. 22:

obedience, willingness to work, love of danger (within the limits of discipline), knowledge of military matters, love of beauty in his weapons and armor, and love of honor. There seems to be an echo of the Funeral Oration in cptoxNv8uvov >?T' e&TocNto and pLXO6xaov 7repL 67rXo, as though even the ordinary soldier, like the average Athenian of the Funeral Oration, is supposed to have something of the artist and the scholar about him.

12. Cf. esp. 2. 2. 10. 13. 8. 7. 28. If a literary figure from the Periclean age

is sought who will be a complete contrast to Cyrus, Creon in Sophocles' Antigone supplies a perfect example. His prime concern is to punish and he shows none of the generosity that makes friends; after a long denunciation of Polyneices and and all traitors he can only add lamely: &xx Oa-rtq e9vou5 t8e -r Tn6?Lt, Oov&v/ xoc 4X9v 6goLc

4 o0U TtgLavroct (209-10). He shows no regard for the feelings of the elderly chorus (note esp. 280-81) and thinks of the obligations of sons to a father without ever noticing a father's obligations to his children (641-44). This is in marked contrast with the Socrates of Xenophon, who insists that, in order to be respected by a relative, one must strive to be useful to him (Mem. 1. 2. 55).

There is no trace of philanthropia in Creon, and perhaps not even any arete in the Thucydidean sense (see n. 7 above), since he has not apparently conferred great benefits on the city either on the field of battle or elsewhere (V. Ehrenberg, op. cit., pp. 107-9, points out that despite the title of stra- tegos given to him by Antigone [8] he is never presented as the commander-in-chief of the Theban army which put the invaders to flight). The contrast with Antigone needs no description.

14. Xen. Anab. 1. 3. 3-6. 15. Aristotle, who discusses the ethical implications of

"friendship between unequals" (Eth. Nic. 8, 1160b-61a), might have taken the relation of a metropolis toward a colony as an example of this kind of friendship; he might hold that the metropolis has no obligations if the colony fails in respect and obedience. It might perhaps also be argued that the plea of helping a friend is only an excuse on the part of Corinth to justify gratifying its self-interest; but in a world where helping a friend is the prime duty of a just man, the justice of the act is not diminished merely because it happens to be advantageous.

16. J. de Romilly, Thucydide et l'imp&rialisme athenien (Paris, 1947), p. 26, concludes that the speeches as well as the account of the decision were written by Thucydides after he had decided that Spartan fear of Athens was the &0?oTiTn 7rp6cpNot5 of the war. This is certainly correct; but she has not brought out clearly enough the difference between the ethical nature of the arguments in the speeches and the nonethical grounds for the decision to go to war.

17. This argument was to gain strength in the counter- revolutions following the collapse of the Four Hundred and the Thirty (as it naturally would). It was used with effect in the prosecution of Socrates (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 9).

18. The language recalls the words used by the Athenians in their speech at Sparta before the outbreak of war, esp. 1. 75. 3; 76. 2.

19. F. Heinimann, Nomos und Physis (Basle, 1945), p. 108, shows how 6v%9o as well as v690o can be used as the reverse of Cp6mLq, but he does not discuss this passage or the use of the adjective ?vvogoc.

20. 4. 61. 3-4: o5 y6cp rolq 16vem, rTt 8&Xx TcpuXe, r6o ?TtPOU )XOet L7rLOCOLV, C ))& TcV ?V Tv r LXeXL &yOCOC9 LpL?eL>?o, & XOLV9 XeXrtgeeo?. 8tXWa9V 8V5V tv -9T -coo Xc&x0SLxo0 yiVoUq CpCXAXtae- TOIC y&p O08ErnoTe aCpLOL XOM TO6 LU9CXLX6V 7POta5C9 OC6)VOL T6 8&XOLOV iax&ov -Vq UvOtxiq Np066 q 7r=poxov00o.

Editors and translators have adopted (with slight varia- tions) one or the other of the following interpretations: (1) The Athenians fulfilled their obligations over and above the requirements of the treaty (see, e.g., Kruger and G. P. Landmann, Eine Rede de8 Thukydideg: Die Friedengmah- nung de8 Hermokrate8 [Kiel, 1932], pp. 46-47). (2) The Athenians on their own account rather took the initiative in carrying out their legal obligations as set down in the treaty (see, e.g., Classen-Steup and 0. Regenbogen, Thu- kydides: Politische Reden [Leipzig, 1949]).

Both interpretations are at fault in taking -T6 8txoLov as though it were -rO 8txcLcL. r6 8&XoLov in Thucydides is always abstract, "justice" or "the principle of justice," sometimes opposed to Tr6 tucpkpov, "the principle of expediency." Cf. the language of Hermocrates himself in 4. 62. 3 and 6. 79.1; also 1.25.3,3.47.5 and 56.3,5.90. The first interpretation contains a grosser grammatical error: TO

8LXoLov g6&?6v ti5 iuvOtnXc might mean "justice rather than the treaty," but this makes no sense; but it cannot be taken as equivalent to r6 8tXoLOV TN0v i XO-rd -rAT v T Uvotwnv or 8mcLL6-repoc m dg iuv9kOaoxv. &U?ov must, therefore, be taken parenthetically.

Even for those who will not grant the grammatical dif- ficulties it should be enough to look at the context. Hermoc- rates says the Athenians are not really supporting one racial group in Sicily against the other, but intend to conquer the whole island; proof of this can be seen in the manner in which they responded to the Chalcidic appeal for help. When Leontini and her Chalcidic allies asked for Athenian help in 427, they appealed to the old alliance and to the tie of kinship (3. 86. 3); there is nothing specially suspicious or sinister in the Athenians responding to this appeal, even if Leontini has not helped them iD the past; it is hardly enough to say (as Landmann does, op. cit., p. 47) that Hermocrates is accusing the Athenians of polypragmosyne. But if, in agreeing to send help, the Athenians ignore the reason of kinship suggested by their allies, it looks as though the Athenians do not wish to be



244 LIONEL PEARSON

restricted by the pretense that they are helping their kinsmen. In any case, the argument of kinship is in- convenient for Athens, which has treated so many lonians with scant respect for the tie of blood. The only other principle on which to justify interference in Sicily-since the Chalcidians have never helped them and they are not returning a favor-is the legal bond of the treaty, r6 &txotov

tri iuvOtxyn. And if the Athenians invoke the bond of the treaty, it means they are agreeing to help only if the Chalcidians agree to help Athens, because the obligation lies more heavily on the party that has rendered no service in the past; it means that the Athenians are deliberately putting the Chalcidians under an obligation to help Athens in the future. This proves what Hermocrates is trying to show, that the Athenians expect the Chalcidians to further purely Athenian interests in Sicily.

Earlier interpreters have taken TrocpioXovo as though it meant "they provided assistance" (as it frequently does). But the verb can equally well mean "provide arguments," "offer alternatives," "appeal to principles" (not unlike 7rpokxeaOccL). Cf. 3. 54. 1 TraspeX6gvoL & &Xo,Pev 8txoctoc and 1. 39. 2. 67rp r? q &w 8Lxn TroxpkaXovro. What Hermoc- rates means is: "To their allies who never gave them help in the past the Athenians replied by making a counter- claim themselves instead of offering help, and were only too ready to offer as an argument 'the principle of the treaty,' in preference to 'the principle of kinship."' The 7roapdx?noa is the Athenian appeal to the Chalcidians as well as the original Chalcidian appeal; oc6rot means that the Athenians made a claim on their own account. This is the forethought (7rpovoe-E&xL) of the Athenians mentioned in the following sentence; and the Chalcidians will be foolish if they are ready to comply (67rocxoet9v -roLgo-rpoLq), because it will lead to their complete subjection along with the rest of the island.

The argument of Hermocrates becomes clearer if we look at his later speech at Camarina and the reply to it by the Athenian Euphemus. Hermocrates protests against any claim to be observing r6 8&Xctov, which is only a trap that the Athenians have laid for their allies; he says that such regard for "justice" is not "just" at all (6. 79. 1-3); and he

warns the Chalcidians that the Athenians have no respect for the tie of kinship (76. 3-77. 1). Euphemus begins by saying that his embassy has come to renew an existing alliance; but since Hermocrates has attacked Athenian policy, he defends the Athenian harsh treatment of the Tonians; he says they were "justly" conquered even though they were kinsmen (6. 82. 3), thus continuing the practice of emphasizing -r6 &XoLov rather than r6 iuyyevk. This is surely the kind of language against which Hermocrates is protesting. But Euphemus goes further than this in his blunt revelation of Athenian methods. He admits that the principle of kinship and the principle of justice must both give way to the principle of expediency; he says there is nothing illogical in enslaving the Chalcidians of Euboea and liberating the Chalcidians of Sicily, since it is expedient for Athens that the former should be disarmed and tributary and the latter have the greatest possible autonomy (6. 84. 3); it is circumstances, he says, not sentiment that dictate the Athenian choice of friends and enemies (6. 85. 1).

21. For 7rp69poatq in the meaning of "defense" see L. Pearson, "Aitia and Prophasis," TAPA, LXXXIII (1952), 205-33.

22. This is in sharp contrast with Xenophon's Cyrus, who helps the Egyptians to preserve their self-respect if they prefer surrender to death (Cyrop. 7. 1. 41-44).

23. 3. 37. 3-4. 24. As in the Old Oligarch. Cf. H. Frankel, "Note on the

Closing Section of Ps. Xen. Const. Ath.," AJP, LXVIII (1947), 309-12.

25. Some members of the audience might be reminded here of the arguments presented to the Athenian demos, when not so long before it was invited to obtain the help of Persian "archers"-the invincible gold darics-by renouncing its democratic traditions and accepting an oligarchic form of government: "and the general public, though its first reaction to the proposals was hostile, was influenced by the agreeable prospect of receiving pay from the King, and therefore raised no objection" (Thuc. 8. 48. 3).

26. For Odysseus as a typical figure of the wartime period see W. B. Stanford, The Ulysses Theme (Oxford, 1954), pp. 101, 108-11.



popular ethics in the world of thucydides

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