politics insurgent union political action builds ties between labor and the community

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54 LABOR STUDIES JOURNAL/FALL 1999

Coalition Politics:

Insurgent Union Political A ctionBuilds Ties Between

Labor and the Community

David Reynolds

Discussions for revitalizing the labor movemen t include a frequent call for build-ing labor-community coalitions as well as reactivating a more activist brand ofelectoral politics. This paper illustrates how unions have used aggressive politicalaction to establish lasting coalitions with the community. Our examples draw fromthe work of the fledgling New Party, Connecticut's Legislative and Electoral Ac-tion Program, and the mushrooming living wage movement. Through these newforms of political action unions have begun to redefine their agenda, build bridg esto the community, mobilize their membership, and lay the foundation of a broad-

based movement for economic democracy.

Index Terms: Community mobilization/Political activity.

As the labor mov em ent rethitiks its strategies, two goals top the list. Un ions

need to build coalitions with their communities and other progressive organiza-

tions (Brecher and Costello 1990, Fisher and Kling 1993, Simmons 1994, 1997,

1998). And, labor must reactivate aggressive political activity (Labor Research

Review 1994). Across the country unions have found ways to combin e these two

dimension. In doing so they have not only shaken up politics as usual, but also

built broad progressive political movements that mobilize working people and

offer positive agendas for the future.

Unions in Connecticut and Wisconsin have developed model electoral

projects that have not simply placed progressives into office, but produce d labor-

community coalitions that extend well beyond the ballot box. In addition, across

the country a growing movement of Living Wage campaigns has brought to-

gether similarly broad coalitions to fight for basic economic justice . As respon ses

to the political and economic changes of the past three decades, these examples



COALITION POLITICS 55

Con necticut's Legislative Electoral Action P rogram

By the early 1980s, many progressive activists in Connecticut were fed-up

with "politics as usual". More and more of the candidates they were asked to

endorse w ere often no t strong enough to win, or even wo rse, if elected d id not act

much different than their conservative opponents. This problem was especially

true in the halls of the state legislature. "Progressive groups were sick of being

ignored by legislators," remembers LEAP Director Lynne Ide. "The attitude of

those in power w as like: If you do n't support me, what else are you going to d o? "

With the key support of the UAW's region 9 and the Connecticut Citizen

Action G roup, organizers decided to build an altemative. They went to the major

progressive groups with state-level political action comm ittees and asked them to

pool their resources. By forming the Legislative E lectoral Action Program (LEA P)

in 1980 these organizations created a formal coalition that actively recruits pro-

gressive candidates from among the ranks of member organizations to run in

Dem ocratic Pa rty primaries for state, and some local, offices. F or those willing to

becom e candidates, the LEA P provides campaign training while the mem ber or-

ganizations pool their fimdraising and volunteer power.

The end result has been the most successful state-level labor-com m unity in

the country. Its mem ber organizations include the United Auto W orkers, Health

Care Workers District 1199, several city labor councils, several state employees

unions, Lesbian and Gay Right Coalition, the W om en's Issues Netw ork, B ridge-

port Acorn, Congress of Connecticut Comm unity C olleges, Cormecticut C itizen

Action Group, Environmentalists to Elect Legislators in Connecticut, National

Organization for W omen, and National Abortion Rights Action L eague. D uring

the 1990s, roughly a third of all the Dem ocrats in the Connecticut legislature are

LEA P candidates. W inning over three-quarters of the races it backs, LEA P'S suc-

cess stories include people such as State Senator Tom Colapietro, a former

autoworker and UAW mem ber. Before getting involved in LEAP C olapietro had

considered running for office as "a quick way to leave you high and dry and

broke." Union organizer Chris Donavan has gone to the State House. Through

LEAP door-to-door style grassroots campaigns Donavan developed a personal

rapport with his constituency. "While the political establishment might consider

my politics way out, I know that I am not considered that way in my district,"

explains Donavan. "People really welcomed and appreciated my efforts. I can




In 1994, the year of the so-called Republican Revolution, LEAP defied the

pundits. Twenty-five out of thirty-five of their candidates for state office won.

These victories included Miles Rappenport, former Connecticut Citizen Action

Group director who became the Secretary of State running on a platform of fun-

damental cam paign finance reform. Although LEAP activist William Curry lost

in the general election, the coalition nevertheless scored a major upset earlier that

year when h e defeated the party establishm ent's candidate in the Democ rat pri-

mary for Governor.

W ith the aid of the Northeast Action Resou rces Center, an um brella office

for state citizen action groups in the northeast, LEAP'S model has now spread

throughout New England and to other parts of the country. In 1996, LEA P and its

spin off coalitions helped elect New Hampshire's first woman Governor, oust

five incumbent Republican hiembers of Congress, and swing four state legisla-

tures to Democratic control. Progressive candidates with activist support have

proven that they are more effective than the Democratic Leadership Council's

"centrist" Democrats.

Most important, LEAP'S purpose and operation has extended well beyond

its original task to recruit and run specific c andid ates. Today, L EA P is as much a

lobby ing arm as an electoral tool. Within the halls of the state legislature, the law-

making process can seem like loose collections of fi-agmented individuals and

dom inant political figures rather than clear party agen das. In order to push pro -

gressive change, LEAP found that it had to build coherence among the candi-

dates it helped to elect. Until objections from the mainstream of the Democratic

Party forced LEAP to redefme its efforts, this work took the form of an official

progressive caucus. Today , LEAP sponsors routine meetings among its endorsed

state officeholders as well as meetings between these people and representatives

of progressive organizations.

Over time, LEAP extended its coalition campaigns into the actual law -mak-

ing process. Before LEA P, progressive lobbying m eant groups individually w ent

to the state house and advocated their specific con cem s. Now , thanks to LE AP ,

they often go as a coalition. Thus, for example, when the legislature debated a

global warming bill the assigned subcommittee found itself sitting across from

not only the "usual suspe cts" among environmental organizations, but also group s

like the UAW as well. This coalition lobbying has included "street heat" as wellwhen, for example, the UAW marched in a demonstration for gay and lesbian




which proved instrumental in winning a state income tax. The new system re-

placed a series of more regressive taxes. LEA P has also helped pass several land -

mark pieces of legislation that began to establish greater commu nity influence

over corporate decisions. One such act required comp anies seeking public m oney

to make a specific com mitm ent on the numb er of job s they w ill create as a result.

Companies that had misused the fiind had to repay the assistance. The LEAP

spin-off in Maine, the Dirigo A lliance, won a pioneering victory throu gh coali-

tion work in 1996 when voters approved a referendum establishing public fi-

nancing of the state's elections. Under the Clean Elections system candidates for

state office can opt to forego private campaign contributions. In its place, they

have their election supported out of state funds at the levels established by past

elections. Two years later M assachusetts and Arizona voters passed similar laws.

The greatest benefits to LEAP'S activities, however, are often the most in-

tangible. Eighteen years of electoral and legislative coalition building has trans-

formed the progressive community in Connecticut. Groups used to operating in

their own separate sphere have come into contact and worked w ith other progres-

sive groups quite unlike them selves. Union leaders have interacted with en viron-

mentalists who m et welfare rights groups who joined with wo m en 's organizations

wh o worked with memb ers of the Puerto Rican comm unity. They have leam ed to

appreciate each o ther's issues as well as their comm on g oals. At times such coa-

lition building has not been easy as LEA P balances organizations with qu ite dif-

ferent resources and ways of doing things. Key to its success, LEAP has had to

develop a decision-making process and intemal culture in which the coalition

pursues an agenda based on common ground while individual member groups

agree to disagree on specific issues.

The informal benefits of ongoing interaction have shown them selves q uite

concretely at critical times. When 1,000 mem bers of UAW Local 376 struck C olt

Firearms, they faced an uphill battle against a hostile, concession-demanding

emp loyer. How ever, through the coalition experiences of LEA P and related ef-

forts the un ion was able to pull together effective com m unity support that prov ed

critical to winning the strike.

Because of its success LEAP has reached a turning point. To continue to

grow it mu st evolve beyo nd its current activities. Three aspects stand out in par-

ticular.Until now LEAP has been a coalition of organizations, not a membership



58 LABOR STUDIES JOURNALyFALL 1999

grassroots base, LEAP m ust rely upon its coalition groups to m obilize their own

membership behind progressive campaigtis. Within such campaigns the experi-

ences of many volunteers can retnain within their own group . An d LE AP h as nodirect mechanism of its own to involve the vast ranks of people not conn ected to

any progressive organization. Facing these considerations, some of LEA P'S spin-

offs groups have considered developing a grassroots structure of their own. In

M aine , for exam ple, the Dirigo Alliance used the clean elections referendtim cam -

paign to build a grassroots leadership network through out the state.

LEA P'S coalition is also incomp lete. Reflecting the experience of p rogres-

sive organizations that start white and then remain largely white, Gonnecticut's

African-American commimity remains largely outside the electoral coalition. A

political network more tied to the mainstream of the Democratic Party had al-

ready developed within this community that made the entrance of an instirgent

coalition more difficult. By contrast, for the less politically developed Puerto

Rican community, LEAP built a solid partnership by providing itself as a key

channel for developing leadership and electoral success within the community.

To cross the racial divide, LEA P activists have fostered new issue coalitions that

reach well beyond LE AP'S memb er groups. The Northeast Action Resource G enter

has also established a New England-wide training and internship program that

helps develop the skills of activists within the African-American comm unity and

build ties across the barrier of race.

Finally, LEAP 'S very success in getting progressive group s to support each

others issues has led it to rethink its ultimate agenda. Like many progressive

groups across the country, LEAP and its member organizations see a need to

mov e beyond traditional interest group politics in which each gro up specializes

in its particular issue. Interest-group-style coalitions run the risk of producing

platforms that are simply "laundry-lists" which add together each group's spe-

cific issue con cem s. Such agendas are no longer adequate, howev er. Gonserva-

t ive momentum dominates today 's pol i t ics as a comprehens ive agenda.

Progressives can only hope to fully cotuiter the Right through a comprehensive

altemative of their own. To this end, LEAP and its spin-offs have begun to find

ways to transcend specific issue work and the perspectives of individual me mb er

groups.

This process is seen quite clearly in the job s and econom ic justice coalitions

that have grown out of LEAP-style organizing in Gonnecticut and Massachu-




ofthe state's work force holding part-time, temporary, or other forms of contin-

gent jobs, the campaign has developed legislation aimed at stripping away the

tmfair elements of contingent work by requiring: equal pay for workers regard-

less of employment status, pro-rated benefits for all workers in part-time jobs,

and matemity leave and strengthened unemployment insurance for part-time

wo rkers. The cam paign has also established a modest contingent W orkers G enter

in the Boston area to foster direct grassroots organizing among workers. Tack-

ling contingent work offers a concrete project that transcends separate groups'

issue concems to address the broad questions of fostering a community-driven

economy.

In Gonnecticut, Gitizens for Economic Opportunity (GEO) are organizing

to bring together unions, as well as comm unity and religious groups to prom ote

'corporate accountability' through the development of state laws that would, for

example: deny tax breaks to irresponsible corporations; provide financial assis-

tance only to those that can dem onstrate a record of living wages and decent jobs;

and require the sam e hotu-ly pay and benefits for tem porary and part-tim e w ork-

ers as are paid to regular employees.

Reflecting LEAP'S trajectory, labor and community organizers in Minne-

sota launched two sister coalitions aimed at redirecting economic policy debates

in their state (Duncan 1990, Howe and Vallianatos 1998). The Minnesota Alli-

ance for Progressive Action (MA PA) w as formed in 1988 to promote a progre s-

sive legislative agenda. Its companion organization. Pro-Vote, organizes to get

progressive candidates in public office along LEAP lines. In the early 1990s,

MAPA developed corporate accountability legislation requiring firms receiving

state financial assistance to mee t specific wag e and jo b creation go als within tw o

years. Through a hard fought and very public series of efforts, the coalition gotmost ofth e legislation enacted, minus the wage requirement vetoed by the gover-

nor. With a reputation for serious grassroots organizing, MAPA is now continu-

ing the struggle for corporate accountability, undertaking detailed research on

the impact of money in politics, and developing a strategy for prom oting "com -

mun ity wealth creation." This last concept redefines economic developm ent as a

process driven by community participation, vision, and resotirces.

Unions and the New Party




As with LEAP, dissatisfaction with conventional politics convinced Wis-

consin prog ressives, including several key officers within the state and local AFL -

CIO un ions such as the Transit W orkers, to try something different. Initially the

group focused on the modest task of running people from within the prog ressive

community for selective local offices. In contrast to LEAP, however, Wisconsin

activists placed themselves on the third-party route by affiliating with the fledg-

ling national New Party.

Formed in 1991, the W isconsin New P arty movem ent is mu ch you nger than

LEAP. Nevertheless, it has already established a record of electoral success. In

W isconsin 's capital, Madison, the New Party has established itself as the largest

group on the city council. By the end of 1996 the local New Party had elected

nine members to the county board, twelve on the city council, and two to the

school board. At the same time, in Milwaukee, three New Party members won

seats on the county board, while an incum bent mem ber of the city council sw itched

his affiliation to the New Party chapter. The M ilwaukee New Party also provide d

the electoral structure by which progressives successfully fought back conserva-

tive and business efforts to transform the city's school board. All of these con-

tests were in non partisan races for which the cand ida te's party affiliation has not

been a factor. In electing three state legislators. New Party organizers made the

tactical decision to use the Dem ocratic ballot line by entering activists in succes s-

ful primary campaigns.

Just as with LEA P, New Party organizing quickly grew beyon d the task of

electing progressive cand idates. From the beginning, founders of the local chap-

ters conceived of their efforts in terms of building the p olitical arm of a broader

progressive mov ement, no t just contesting a few election. The New Party nation-

ally sees its task as one of building serious grassroots organizations that allow

ordinary citizens to participate in politics. Through their Precinct Leadership A ction

Network (PLAN ) mode l organizers aim to recruit effective leadership at a block-

by-block level that will sustain ongoing and active neighborhoo d organizations.

The New party has used electoral bids, house parties, and targeted issue work to

develop their PLA N. For example, in Milwaukee the first Living W age camp aign

(described below) began by targeting one city neighborho od, ch osen for its racial

and economic diversity. Volunteers went door-to-door systematically through-

out the area. In speak ing with residen ts, the activists both bu ilt suppo rt for a local

living wage ordinance while also identifying people willing to volunteer in the




their com munity. The New Party volunteers found that they did not so much have

to convince people ofthe limitations ofthe current policies as offer a believable

altemative course of action. The first living wage campaign during the summerof 1995 grew well beyon d the initial neighbo rhood. By the end oft he summ er,

Milwaukee organizers had developed a base of 86 Precinct Leaders and several

hundred voltmteers who signed "activist con tracts" pledging to participate neigh-

borhood activism.

Through models such as PLAN the New Party aims to constmct genuine

political o rganizations that allow people to participate in politics directly in their

neighborho ods. W hile in theory all political parties should organize at a grassroots

level, in the U.S . the Republicans and Dem ocrats largely abandoned serious local

structures almost a century ago. Even the stirviving big city machines tod ay com -

mand but vestiges of their former grassroots armies. Much ofthe scholarship on

American electoral politics mistakenly assumes that this evolution of the two

major parties represents the natural transformation and modemization of party

organizations (Reynolds 1997 chapter four). Yet, as the New Party's success in

grassroots activism across the coimtry demonstrates, the mainstream vote-get-

ting, candidate-centered netw orks do not represent the only possible form of elec-

toral politics in the 1990s.

New Party grassroots organizing coincided with the launching of what is

arguably one ofthe premiere efforts at metropolitan-wide community plarming:

the Gampaign for a Sustainable Milwatikee. Since local New Party founders saw

their tasks in broad m ovem ent-building terms , an econom ic coalition w as a natu-

rally partner to their political efforts. Sustainable M ilwaukee began w ith key leaders

who had enough credibility among a diverse mixttire of groups, such as Bruce

Golbtim — then secretary-treasurer o fthe M ilwaukee AFL -GIO, to convince other

labor and commtinity activists that a year and a half spent in a planning process

would yield valuable results. Through separate task forces and general meetings

a coalition of activists from a broad m ixttire of groups developed a peop le-based

econo mic plan for the fiiture of Milw aukee. Estimating that the city need s 50,000

new jobs to employ everyone who wants work, the group proposed concrete w ays

for local and state govemment to use their spending and regulatory powers for

encotiraging companies to establish family and cotnmtmity supporting jobs. At

the same time the group proposed ways to discotirage and penalize employers

who seek only to provide low-wages, temporary work, or neighborhood pollu-




• Establishing comm unity- and worker-nm companies.

• Several new mech anisms to provide credit-starved neighbo rhood s basic

resources for m ortgages and sm all businesses.• Fostering greater use and availability of buses and trains.

• Prom oting clustered suburban developmen t and farmland preservation.

• Improv ing the public schools by, for example: linking classroom mate

rial to work experiences in the real world; giving parents leave from

work to volunteer at their schools; and tuming school buildings into

community centers or "lighted schoolhouses", which would be open

from moming until evening with programs available to be enjoyed by

residents of all ages (Sustainable Milwaukee, 1994).

The Sustainable Milwaukee plan has becom e an ongoing organizing project.

Today, it is a formal, non-profit organization with a growing staff. Through

grassroots organizing the coalition has won several living w age cam paigns. Th ese

victories have put in place ordinances requiring com panies contracting w ith the

city, county, and school board to pay a minimal wage level of up to $7.70 per

hour. Tod ay, the coalition has begun to use the living wage concep t to pressure

emp loyers not connected to public mon ey to pay a decent wag e. During the sum -

mer of 1998 volunteers began leafleting local fast food franchises found to be

paying poverty wages noticeably lower than their suburban counterparts.

Sustainable Milwaukee's Job Access task force has teamed up two groups

that previously warred with each other: the building trade unions and civil rights

organization s. Today, they lead grassroots efforts to pressure large pubHcly funded

construction projects to pay prevailing wages and conduct significant minority

and female hiring. The coalition has also waged an ongoing battle to steer mil-

lions of Federal transportation dollars into a light rail system and expanded bus

services. Transportation has proven a broad concem touching issues of job ac-

cess, community development, and suburban sprawl. Sustainable Milwaukee is

part of the M ilwaukee Jobs Initiative — a project that recruits and prepares inner

residents for high paying jobs in construction, manufacturing, and printing. In-

deed, it provided the initial conduit through which a multi-million dollar grant

fTom the Casey Fo undation supporting the project came to M ilwaukee. Sustain-

able M ilwaukee d irectly administers the Central City Workers C enter com ponent

of the Jobs Initiative. The Center prepares loca l residents for the jo b training and




ral allies. The same imion and community activists who helped found the local

New Party, also provided much of the core leadership for Sustainable Milwau-

kee. Alon g w ith several other local groups , the local New Party had also provide dsignificant grassroots organizing behind such victories as the living wage cam-

paign s. An d the New Party provides an imp ortant political context for mak ing the

prospects of changing local economic policies believable. Local politicians who

do not take Sustainable Milwaukee seriously faced the prospects of a well-orga-

nized New Party challenge to a future reelection bid. The New Party had equally

benefited from the econo mic coalition. Sustainable Milwauk ee provide s the local

chapter w ith the grassroots non-electoral activities key to sustaining and expan d-

ing neighborhood organizing year round. Milwa uke e's exam ple reflects the NewParty's general strategy that sees issue work as an equal component to electoral

organizing.

Wisconsin is only one example of New Party work. In states such as Mary-

land, Ark ansas , and New Y ork, New Party groups have directly confronted Chris-

tian Coalition-style school agendas which aim to restrict funding to public

education while steering greater public resources into elite charter schools and

private educational institutions. New Party candidates and supporters have c oun-

tered with a public-education-cen tered approach to school reform. In Little R ock,Arkansas, the New Party won a police accountability ordinance after a controve r-

sial killing of three African-American men. The victory came in a context of

several years of New Party issue organizing and electoral campaigns wh ich placed

eighteen New Party candidates into local and state offices by the end of 1997.

New Party chapters have also fought to pass campaign finance reform, change

the priorities of local government budgets, and promote local public transporta-

tion. In the last national elections, No vem ber 1998, thirty-two of the New Pa rty 's

thirty-nine candidates won election including Chicago New Party mem ber D annyDavis who returned to Congress, legislative seats in Arkansas, Illinois, Mary-

land, Montana and M innesota, and twen ty-nine local city council, court, and coun ty

board positions.

W herever they have been active, local New Party groups have opened new

ways for union activism within their communities. Some local unions have out-

right affiliated with the New Party chapters. These include the NE A and U FC W

in Montgomery County, MD, Teamster Local 705 and SEIU Local 800 in Chi-

cago, and AFSC ME Local 994 and SEIU Local 100 in Little Rock. In H ouston,



64 LABOR STUDIES JOURNAL /FALL 1999

Portland, O regon a similar group includes leaders from the Rainbow Co alitions,

Jobs With Justice, the Oregon Public Employees Union, and the Sierra Club.

Many other unions have joined New Party-sponsored electoral and issue coali-tions. Roug hly two out of five New Party mem bers are either in unions or in som e

way connected to the labor movement. "Local leaders from my union in several

cities have been quite involved in New P arty activity," explains SEIU President

Andy Stem. "The most important and impressive aspect of the New Party is its

successful dedication to independent, class-based, multi-racial electoral activ-

ity." {New Party News vol. VI No.2 p. 12)

Politics without Elections: Living Wage Campaigns

In December 1994, Baltimore's mayor signed into law Council Bill 716

requ iring city contractors to pay service worke rs at least $6.10 per hou r. The first

of its kind in the nation, the new law followed a year long broad -base d grassro ots

cam paign organized by the Am erican Federation of State, Coun ty and M unicipal

Employees (AFSC ME) and a group of fifty mu lti-denom inational churches called

Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development (BUILD).

The impact of this victory spread far and wide. Before the win, Charles

Riggs, a thirty-two-year-old who cleaned Oriole Park at Camden Yards, would

check in at the local hom eless shelter every night because his $4.25 p er hou r full-

time pay check cou ldn 't support a rented room . Thanks to the new law Riggs saw

his wages increase by almost 50 percent itnmed iately. An estimated 1,500-3,000

workers gained from the ordinance. Local church soup kitchens and homeless

shelters no longer had to feed an d shelter workers such as Riggs. The A FS CM E/

BU ILD coalition persuaded the mayor to take back, as state jobs paying a living-

wag e, custodial services for thirty-six schools that had been previously been con-

tracted out. As a centerpiece of the campaign, activists founded the Solidarity

Sponsoring Committee (SSC) as an organization of low-wage workers covered

by the living wage. The SSC offers workers immediate membership benefits

through a package of low-cost health and insurance discounts. At the sam e time,

it mo bilizes its growing m emb ership to fight for enforcement of the living w age,

the right to remain on the job even if their employer loses the public contract,

pro-w orker w elfare reform, and basic worker rights.

Most important, Baltimore's example sparked a grassroots movement for




Portland (OR), Jersey City, Boston, Oakland, Chicago, Detroit, San Jose, and

Madison. Hard fought campaigns lost their initial efforts in Denver, Albuquer-

que, New Orleans, and St. Lou is, but continue to organize. The St. Paul cam paign

lost an initiative vote, but went on to win a living wage law passed by the city

council. By early 1998, new living wage efforts had taken root in almost three

dozen communities, including Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Albany, Spokane, Mi-

ami, Cleveland, San Francisco, A lexandria, A ustin (TX), W ashtenaw C ounty (M I),

and Kalamazoo (MI). The momentum continues to grow.

The basic concept behind the living wage campaigns is simple: tax payer

money should go to companies that support the community, not those that force

Workers to live in poverty. Local govemment contracts and economic develop-

ment assistance have provided the legal mechanisms. Some cam paigns, such as

Baltimore and M ilwaukee , have focused just on contracts. Other ordinan ces, such

as in St. Paul, apply just to economic development money above a certain dollar

amo unt. Some of the more recent living wage laws, such as Los Angeles, O ak-

land, and Detroit, include both contracts and economic assistance.

While the exact dollar amount defmition of a living wage varies by cam-

paign, generally orga:ilizers have set the amount around 100-125 percent ofthe

Federal poverty line for a family of four (by the end of 1998 this line worked out

to $8.35 per hour). More and more commonly, activists have also placed other

requirements in their ordinances. The Los Angles law requires $7.25 with health

care or $8.50 without. In Boston and St. Paul the ordinances mandate hiring among

residents. The Minneapolis and St. Paul laws contain provisions which m ake union

organizing a much fairer undertaking. Th ese include voluntary card checks, ma n-

datory arbitration for a first contract, and special preferences given to com panies

with good labor relations.Different cam paigns have tried different routes toward winning living wage

laws. In St. Paul originally activists tried a ballot referendum. How ever, w ith an

incomplete coalition the canipaign was not able to fend off the money spent by

the business com munity to oppose the living wage. After a 59 to 41 percent loss,

the campaign pursued a joint legislative route with neighboring Minneapolis. In

the end, this well organized effort saw resolutions pass their city coun cils unani-

mously in both cities. The central labor council in Detroit built into the labor-

comm unity m obilization already planned for the Novem ber 1998 elections a livingwage ballot initiative that won with an impressive 81 percent ofthe vote. The




Mo st living w age efforts, h owev er, have chosen a legislative route. W hile

such a strategy risks negotiation and compromise, it requires fewer resources

than a ballot campaign and lessens the impact of the business community's big

money . While not organizing to get out the vote, legislative camp aigns hav e hardly

been "behind the scenes" deals. Indeed, most successful efforts require signifi-

cant mobilization among coalition partners and at the grassroots. For example,

the final seven to one vote in favor of Bos ton 's living wage law cam e from a hard

fought campaign. The support of many city councilors expressed early on in the

campaign threatened to evaporate when the mayor announced his opposition to

the proposed law. The final negotiations kept most of the campaign's demands

intact, including the application of the law to employ ers of we lfare-to-wo rk indi-

viduals, only because of a strong grassroots campaign — complete with lawn

signs, petitioning, rush hour picketing, and large turnouts at city council hear-

ings. The law was also passed during an election year in which man y incum bents

looked to lab or's endorsement. Even then, a year later the living wage coalition

had to rely upon the credibility it had established in order to save most of the

ordinance from legal and political counterattacks by the Cham ber of C om me rce

and its allies.

The process of living w age organizing has proven to be a major coalition

builder and a great opportunity for labor and com mun ity mobilization. Ch icag o's

Living W age cam paign w ell illustrates these dimen sions. In Chicago politics, the

will of Mayor Richard Daley typically holds sway. With his likely opposition,

Chicago activists knew fighting an uphill battle. Indeed, some o rganizers did n ot

originally believe that they could even pass a living wage law, but saw the cam-

paign as an oppo rtunity to stir up local politics and build a lliances. The cam paign

did indeed bring together a broad coalition. Mass mobilizations, including sev-eral dem onstrations and a "Tour of Sham e" bus trip of Dem ocratic Party Na tional

Conven tion delegates to low-wage em ployers, gave the campaign significant v is-

ibility. In the end, six living wage o rganizers were arrests as they tried to e xercise

their legal right to attend the open council meeting voting on the living wage.

At that 1997 vote, however. Mayor Daley did prevail. Although the bill

originally had more co-signers than aldermen needed to pass it, in the end only

seventeen out of fifty, defied Daley to voting in favor of the living wage. Daley

claimed, as is often done, that he was not opposed to the general concept of theliving wage, but that the city could simply not afford it. He carted out a study,




living w age law sug gests that not only do con tractors not pass such costs on to the

public, but that gains in worker productivity and lower employee turnover actu-

ally offset the costs of wage increases. The Chicago estimates, however, could

simply be rejected even at their face value. Twenty to thirty-six million dollars

may seem like a large sum of money , but relative to the city 's ov erall $4.5 billion

annual bu dget this amount is trivial.

Despite their loss, living wage organizers had much to celebrate. They had

made local economic development policies the subject of public debate and se-

verely beaten up D aley's political machine. Grow ing from the initial initiative of

ACO RN and SEIU Local 880, the Chicago Living Wage Cam paign had grown to

nearly eighty labor, community and religious organizations. Indeed, by voting

against the living wage in the face of this strong coalition, many aldermen had

placed themselves in a position vulnerable to electoral challenge by New Party

and other pro-living wage candidates. This vulnerability came into the open a

year after the 1997 vote when, after rejecting the living wage on fiscal grounds,

the Board of Aldermen wanted to raise their own salaries! The living wage

coa lition's e lectoral threat was sufficiently severe to convince D aley to nego tiate

a com promise living wage bill covering city contracts. The bill was passe d by the

Board of Alderman in the summer of 1998. Soon thereafter Cook County passed

a comparable law.

As the Chicago example suggests, win or lose, serious living wage cam-

paigns deliver key gains for unions and community groups quite aside from the

impact of any ordinance. The Chicago campaign cem ented new alliances among

local unions, community groups, and religious leaders, injected progressive is-

sues into public debate, and exposed vulnerability in status quo politics. Similar

gains are true elsewhere. In addition to Chicago, the New Party has used living

wage organizing in M irmeapolis, St. Paul, Milwau kee, M adison, Little Rock, and

Montgomery Coimty, Maryland to build active local chapters. Living wage cam-

paigns have opened new opportunities for unions to organize among low-wage

wo rkers. Indeed, the Los An geles cam paign grew d irectly out of struggles to save

unionized jobs at the city's main airport (Khalil and Hinson, 1998). Today, the

campaign works with SEIU, HERE, and other unions to use the living wage to

organize among the airport 's 30,000 non-union workers. In both LA and Oak-

land, HERE has used provisions of the living wage law and the support of coali-

tion partners to gain organizing leverage in the hotel industry. And the Los A ngeles




up living wage victories with organizing among local residents to gain access to

decent-paying jobs . Living wage organizing has also helped labor and the com -

munity to fight privatization and outsourcing by raising the wage floor and unit-

ing coalitions dedicated to blocking low-wage jobs . In Little Rock, for example,

the living wage is providing one of the initial campaigns for a new formal alli-

ance of ACOR N and the local central labor council. W ith four New Party cand i-

dates elected to the city council on a living wage platform, the campaign is now

in a position to pass a local ordinance.

Most generally. Living Wage organizing raises a fundamental debate over

the purpose and vision of local economic developmen t. It challenges the w idely

held assumption that local governments can only purse the kinds of job-at-any-

cost strategies of passive tax breaks and corporate welfare that randomly lure

companies to within the city limits. The debate becomes all the more intense

because the o pposition almost universally attacks the living wag e as a job killer.

"This proposal is just another death wish," editorialized Crain 's Detroit Busi-

ness. "It delivers to busine ss a simply m essage : This is Detroit; it costs you m ore

to do business here than anywhere else in Michigan. If you do n't like it, leave ."

Living Wage organizers are faced with two major variations on this theme: that

wage increases lead to reduced employment levels and that business will not

locate in a city which passes such an "anti-business" law. Recent studies of both

increases in the minimu m w age and the living wage in Baltimore and L os An ge-

les suggest that none o f this is true (Card and Kn ieger, E PI, W eisbrot and Sforza-

Roderick, PoUin and Luce). Employers do not automatically reduce their work

force or future hiring simp ly because of wages increase s. A research team head ed

by Robert PoUin estimated that the maximum total increased wage costs for 616

out of 668 firms likely covered by the living wage am ounted to less than one half

of one percent of their armual operating budgets. Only six firms would face sig-

nificant increases of over twenty percent (PoUin and Luce, 1998).

In addition to countering the opposition's factual errors, living wage cam-

paigns must also counter the basic philosophy behind them. The issue is not a

question of job s or n o jobs , but what kind of job s a comm unity w ants to establish.

The concept of a living wage forces a com mu nity to distinguish be tween differ-

ent types of em ployers. Those pursuing "low road " strategies that com pete with

low prices from slashed labor costs are not the kinds of firms that a communitywants. Low road em ployers simp ly strip the tax base while forcing poverty -wage




ing "high road " look for public investments in educa tion, training, infrastructure,

and a overall quality of life (Preamble, 1997). They compete on the basis of the

quality and efficiency that come from a motivated and skilled work force and

from partnerships with other local businesses, governments, unions, and com mu-

nity groups. By challenging u nrestricted corporate welfare, living w age cam paigns

raise the central question for a community to chose between passive acceptance

of the low road or active pursuit of the high road.

This broader perspective is important to keep in mind because the actual

physical impact of living wage laws remains modest. Pollin and Luce estimated

that 7,500 workers would likely receive direct wage increases from LA's living

wage law with another 10,000 workers seeing wage gains as a result of upward

pressure on wages above the living wage. By contrast they estimated that over

870,000 workers would be effected by an increase in the local across-the-board

minim um w age to just $6.50 per hour (Pollin and Luce, 1998). Living wa ge cam -

paign s are not an end in of them selves, but a first start along a longer path . Th ey

pull together the broad coalition of groups and raise the fundamental issues needed

to develop a long-term movement around economic justice and democracy. In-

deed, the best campaigns, such as those in Los Angeles, Baltimore, San Jose,

Oakland, Boston, Milwaukee, and the Twin Cities, are those which cany their

living w age organizing into ongoing w ork to build an altemative to the ec onom ic

status quo (Reynolds and Kern, 1999).

Providing Political Bridges

W hile LE AP , the New Party, and Living Wage cam paigns differ in many

ways, their experience also points to several comm on lessons. All have succeededbecau se they establish a workable bridge between most unio ns ' frustrations with

the Demo cratic Party on the one side and new, more independ ent political action

on the other.

While the benefits of having a genuine working-class political party are

clear, the most direct route toward independent politics, third party organizing,

had traditionally seemed a risky and ultimately futile affair. In part, this reflects

the distinct U.S. electoral system with its wiimer-take-all elections that require

individual candidates to win electoral pluralities. The U.S. is only one of threecountries to not use some form of propo rtional representation that allows greater




However, this "common sense" wisdom also reflects no small degree of

propagan da by the two major parties and their supporters. A con vincing case can

be made that third party building is far more viable than "common sense" as-

sum es. For exam ple, the conven iently forgotten history of the great Popu list and

Socialist revolts at the last turn of the century reveal political mo vem ents which

mo bilized literally millions of w orking peop le. Indeed, this third party organiz-

ing delivered many reforms that we now take for granted. Merely achieving to-

day the same level of activism of these historical predecessors would have an

enorm ously positive impact on the progressive comm unity and reshape the terms

of our nation 's political debates. How ever, progressives can go even further. The

Pop ulists' and S ocialists' ultimate demise was by no means preordained, but re-

sulted from the rather undemocratic and blatantly authoritarian methods resorted

to by the two major parties and their allies (Reynolds, 1997). Furthermore,

Ca nad a's New D emocratic Party demonstrates that a lasting political altema tive

can be built in political soil quite similar to ours. Indeed , the United States is one

of the few liberal dem ocracies that do not have a healthy m ulti-party system . The

public sees the contradiction. For years now poll data has consistently revealed

peo ple 's alienation from the two-party system and their support for new altema-

tives.

However, while a strong case can be made for bold independent politics,

most unions are understandably not willing to leap into the unknown of third

party o rgan izing. Th is is especially true if such a project requires them to jettiso n

or jeopa rdize their ongoing p olitical action working with the Dem ocrats. No la-

bor leader w ants to politically isolate him or herself while giving opp ortunities to

Republicans. Fledgling new political projects m ust avoid throwing dow n a gauntlet

that asks unions to chose between the Democratic Party and an uncertain altema-

tive. While legal-financial issues are also involved, the Labor Party's decision at

its 1996 founding convention to not engage in electoral work illustrates a desire

not to confront unions with a choice between their traditional Democratic work

and Labor Party cand idacies seen as hopeless and prem ature.

LEAP solved this problem b y forgoing third party politics to build an inde -

pendent force within the Democratic party at the state level. As one LEAP state

legislator commented "Inside the Democratic Party is an empty shell. There is

ample opportunity for progressive influence and even a take over." Independent

political organizing even within the Dem ocratic Party went too far for some people.




The New Party avoids throwing down a gauntlet by carefully targeting its

electoral bids. The New Party prioritizes local offices (Cantor and R athke, 1997).

Most of these are nonpartisan. Thus, the party label and potential for being seen

as a spoiler becomes irrelevant. However, roughly one-fifth of New Party elec-

tion campaigns has been in higher-level, partisan races. In such situations local

New Party groups have been open to running candidates in Democratic prima-

ries. Such practices represent tactical decisions in which the benefits of building

a coalition, winning the election campaign, and placing a comm itted N ew Party

supporter in office are seen to out way the cost of blurring po litical d istinctions.

The New Party has drawn criticism from other third party supporters for this

decision and its related attempt to knock dow n legal prohibition s on fusion (two

parties endorsing the same candidate). However, through its electoral fiexibility

the New Party h as been able to go to local unions and ask them to support specific

winnable can didacies, rather than a wholesale break w ith their traditional D em o-

cratic political action work. As local New Party chapters gain success after suc-

cess they build stronger ties and credibility with local unions — becoming

increasing relevant vehicles for union political work.

The New Party's electoral flexibility has also helped build a genuine multi-

racial organization. At least a third ofthe New Party's candidates and member-

ship are people of color. This achievement came from deliberate and co ntinuous

effort. New Party organizers targeted issues, candidates, and geographical areas

that would produce multi-racial organizing. The New Party's overall strategy

aims to build a majority-seeking political coalition by uniting the nation's cities

with their inner-ring suburbs. Electoral fiexibility has clearly helped multi-racial

organizing. A significant number ofthe New Party candidates elected as Demo-

crats are people of color. They include Danny Davis — elected as the first NewParty member of Congress. While Davis joined the New Party and agreed to

promote it, he ran as a Democrat. In the one-party system of Chicago, challeng-

ing the machine-endorsed candidate in a Dem ocratic primary was in itself a bold

undertaking. R unning independently at this current stage would have b een alto-

gether political suicide . By having the fiexibility to go with the logic of the local

situation, the New Party won a major upset in Chicago politics and furthered its

grassroots organizing within the black community.

Both LEAP and the New Party have also gained credibility with unionsbecause their activities extend well beyond elections. Living wage campaigns



72 LABOR STUDIES JOURN AIVFALL1999

In an age in which the status quo tries to keep corporate power one of the best

kept secrets within official politics, these campaigns thrust this issue into the

open. The broad coalitions behind living wage cam paigns articulate the very eco-

nomic interests that unite the vast majority of the population. This is why D etro it's

ordinance passed by a margin of four to one and why the Econo mic Policy Insti-

tute found a majority of Am ericans ag reeing with a call for governm ent to estab -

lish greater corporate accountability (EPI). When transferred into electoral politics

this economic coahtion promises to offer the voting base by which progressive

governments both locally and nationally could form a governing majority for a

very long time.

The Impact on Unions

While electing candidates and winning issue campaigns represent visible

successes, unions have also secured less imm ediately tangible, but no less impor-

tant gains from innovative political activity. Clearly, their participation in the

coalitions surrounding LEAP, the New Party, and living wage campaigns has

opened new channels for unions to build lasting ties with other groups in their

communities. When they are part of living wage efforts, civil rights lobbying,

campaign finance reform initiatives, or progressive election coalitions, unions

place themse lves at the forefront of com mu nity battles and em erge as progressiv e

leaders. Political organizing provides a key channel for imions' transformation

from organizations representing simply their membership to a social movement

of working people.

LEAP, New Party, and living wage organizing has also helped to raise the

political horizons of the unions and other groups involved. The defensive nature

of many of current progressive battles reflects a weakness within U.S. activism.

Simply defending people against right-wing assaults lets corporate America and

conservatives set the agenda and the public debate. Progressive can no longer

afford to fight in terms of what they are against. They have to be for so me thing

concrete and pos itive. For exam ple, unions fight from a weak position wh en they

are simply resisting union-busting em ployers. The compan ies have set the agen da

and the union message is a negative one: "these corporations are bad". Yet, through

innovative political organizing, activists have been able to look toward the fu-

ture. The job coalitions in New England, econoniic plans such as Sustainable




corporate accountability, job training, defense conversion, effective school-to-

work programs, etc.

As poli t ical organizing grows, this potential becomes even greater .

Progressives can move from unsuccessfully fighting off right-wing welfare re-

form to leading battles for national health-care, family-supporting wa ges , public

low-cost child care, and long-term paid parental leave. Union activists can move

from management's concession agenda to pushing corporate codes of conduct,

public industrial planning, lower work hours, strong collective bargaining rights,

and worker-centered codetermination within the workplace. In today 's context,

progressive change means not simply redistributing the economic pie, but also

dem ocratizing how that pie is m ade (Swinney, 1998). All of these reforms repre -

sent comm onplace elements of the social contract in Europe. Both the moral and

economic evidence clearly point to the need to have a related and even bolder

contract here. Political organizing provides the path toward this future.

Participating in projects like LEAP, the New Party, and living wage cam-

paigns has also allowed unions to mobilize their own m emb ership. While it has

an impo rtant place, the task of servicing the contract is no longer adequ ate to the

needs of a twenty-first century labor movement. Unions have to develop ways to

organize their mem bership to fight on their own behalf both in the workp lace and

beyond. The com munity and electoral campaigns provide new , positive charmels

for activating union m em bers. For example, in Milwaukee the United Electrical

workers quite deliberately used the living wage to build a network of member

volunteers willing to serve as ongoing leaders and organizers within their neigh-

borhoods.

Progressive Opportunities

The examples of LEAP, the New Party, and living wage efforts point to

new progressive opportunities. The pain and suffering caused by the economic

restructuring of the past two decades is real. And these changes have rendered

many traditional interest-group-based progressive strategies obsolete. However,

change has also opened up new possibilities.

For the first time in our nation's history, the political mainstream does not

offer the promise of a better future. More and more of the generations enteringtoda y's labor market w ill not live better than their parents. M any already estab-




ally votes. And for these people the predominant messages promise to let people

hold on to what they have, not to build a better society. However, progressives

know that a far better future is possible. In organizing for that altem ative, activ-

ists are filling a tremendous vacu um in Am erican politics. Ac tivists connected to

the projects we have studied have not gone out into their communities and had

their message rejected. Indeed, they have found people quite willing to support

wha t official "political wis dom " would label as quite radical ideas. The task has

been m ore to find the resources to get the message out, than to conv ince peo ple of

the need for change.

Progressive activists may be frustrated by the growing ineffectiveness of

many of their traditional strategies. How ever, the process of innovation prom ises

to produce a much stronger Left. During the height of the post-war boom, pro-

gressive groups w ere able to play the interest-group game . Liberal politics m eant

focusing on on e's specific issues and then pushing these conce m s through a com-

bination of lobbying, protests, and funding Democratic candidates. While such

strategies delivered significant ga ins, they also fragmented p rogressiv es, isolated

them from many working people, and left them politically dependent on main-

stream politics. Today, interest-group activism is no longer enough. As progres-

sive groups rethink their strategies, more and more move toward seeking greater

com mo n ground and coalitions with each other, reconsidering insurgent electoral

politics, and realizing the need for more ambitious and more comprehensive so-

lutions. The end result promises to produce a progressive community far more

unified, pro-active, and majority seeking than before (Rogers, 1993; Reynolds,

1994).

The task is not easy. Activists must take a long-term view. "It has taken

progressives a long time to get to the weak position we are in today," argues N ew

Party organizer Daniel Cantor. "It is going to take progressives a long time to

build an altem ative." How ever, as LE AP, the New Party, and living wage cam-

paigns demonstrate, a new kind of politics is possible.

When SEIU member Richard Berghofer hit the streets of Milwaukee one

summer evening for the new living wage campaign, he did not know the kind of

reception h e would ge t. After all, he would be standing at the doors o f people he

had never met. However, by the end of the evening Berghofer was ecstatic. Not

only did he have a stack of signed living wag e cards and the names and addre ss of

several new volun teers, but he had also had a good time. As one woman told him



CO AL rnON POLITICS 75

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