political succession in eastern europe

CARL BECK, WILLIAM A. JARZABEK. AND PAUL H. ERNANDEZ

Political Succession in Eastern Europe

Of the many problems studied by analysts of Communist states, three are most prominent: the effect and influence of nationalism; the conflict between revolution and governance; and political succession. Nationalism and revolution have been and remain a question of identity, philosophy, and interpretation and the application of doctrine; succession is a fact of life that may present itself at any time. The succession problem in Communist states is resolved by a handful of individuals at the apex of the party structure in the country where succession takes place, often tmder the influence of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the succession process reflects a multiplicity of ongoing phenomena in the society itself and within the highest levels of leadership.

In Communist political systems, political succession is not institutionalized as it is in Western democracies. No constitutional rules govern the process, and even the party rules are mutable. The decision with respect to who succeeds is a personal rather than a constitutional one. Given the importance of the leader to the entire system in all Communist states, it is understandable why succession in such states has been of interest to observers. It is further understandable why succession has been interpreted as a moment of political crisis.’

1. Myron Rush, The Rise of Khrushchev (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958).

STUDIES IN COt.fPARATlVE COMMUNISM VOL. IX, Nos. 1 % 2. SPRING/SUMMER 1976. 3541

36 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

Three models have influenced much of what has been said about the nature of Communist politics: the totalitarian mode1,2 the conflict modeL3 and the administered or bureaucratic model.’ In the first two models the role of the individual leader is paramount in determining the nature of both public policy and political structures. The totalitarian model suggests that rule is personal and all-encompassing. The conflict model suggests that policy and political structures are shaped by the nature of the conflict between individuals jockeying for political power. The bureaucratic model places less emphasis upon the individual leader, suggesting that the way in which a system is governed is more a function of rules and norms within the political system and of the relationship of the political system to other subsystems within society.

The crisis impact of succession in totalitarian systems is abundantly clear. If the system is dependent upon one person’s rule and if that rule is assured by the destruction of competing struciures that might challenge his authority, then the question of replacing him and the individualized authority structure that he has created is a question affecting all parts of society. In the conflict model, the crisis nature of succession may be less dramatic, for such conflict is always present in the rules of the political game; but as open conflict for first position takes place, the conflict becomes all-encompassing.5 From the perspective of the bureaucratic model, succession is not so serious a question, for the system is more impersonal and presumably more routinized. Within bureaucratic systems structures exist which mili- tate against strictly personal rule. Conflict is neither total nor all- encompassing, but succession is still a difficult process.6

In a major study of succession in Communist political systems, Myron Rush analyzes the process, emphasizing the political-organizational base of the candidates who succeed. He finds that although succession is a significant phenomenon and often an idiosyncratic one,

2. Myron Rush, Political Succession in the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965).

3. Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Sovie: Leadership 1957-1964 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).

4. Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System (New York: Random House, 1965).

5. Carl Beck and James Malloy, Political Elites: A Mode of Analysis (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, 1971).

6. 0. Grusky, “The Effects of Succession: A Comparative Study of Military and Business Organization,” in M. Janowitz (ed.), The New Military : Chonging Patterns of Organizorion (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), and pp. 83-118.

POLITICAL SUCCESSION IN EASTERN EUROPE 37

there has been an important source of stability in Communist succession, at least when it has occurred in the past decade, which must rrot be lost sight of. It stems from the crucial advantage of the senior secretary over the other candidates in the succession contest, which has favored his efforts to con- solidate personal rule and thereby resolve the succession.’

We believe that a useful perspective from which to examine leadership succession. as well as other types of political behavior, incorporates a framework consisting of two fundamental dimensions: a network of motivational forces that underlie behavior, and the context in which actors operate. Motivational forces reflect the general- ized objectives pursued by actors in a social system. Such goals, political and otherwise, stem from the systemic value distribution and represent the system’s culture. Context refers to the normative complex in a given situation, as well as to the societal resources that may be used in actor interactions8

To develop a descriptive or explanatory picture of a system in terms of these dimensions requires relating each to a second pair of analytical devices: structure and process. Structure is defined as the array of system components in question, their nature, and their inter- relationships. Process is any systemic force tending to maintain or alter systemic elements or relationships, either within the system itself or between the system and its environment.”

Thus, an examination of the motivational dimension of succession might involve analyzing such components as the value perceptions and attitudes of segments of leadership as they relate to associated matters or to the succession issue itself, as well as the processes by which such elements are systemically distributed. Such processes might include various aspects of socialization, as well as forces pro-

7. Myron Rush, How Communist States Change Their Rulers (Ithaca. N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 285.

S. These dimensions are based on Durkheim’s thesis concerning the moral basis of social integration. Values represent long-range goals sought by societal actors. Because of their level of generality, however, sentiments do not specify interaction rules or resources to be used for interactional purposes. Norms perform the latter two tasks. See Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1947), translated by George Simoson.

9: For an elaboration of the value-norm complex as a fundamental dimension in a social system, see Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951); Structure and Process in Modern Societies (New York: Free Press, 1960).


moting sentiment or attitudinal change resulting from actor interaction.‘O

Research geared toward a description and explanation of the motivational structures and processes underlying leadership change in Communist states is critical. If we were able to measure these phenomena adequately, we would be taking a giant step toward answering the “ why ” of leadership change. Just as important, however, is the “ how ” of succession. A delineation of the structures and processes reflecting the context in which succession occurs is equally significant.

The three models outlined above reflect two major perspectives indicating the relationships between the top leadership, the political system, and the macroscopic social system. This pair of perspectives is typically used in analyzing succession in Communist states. All three models are conceptually rooted in an organizational framework. The totalitarian and conflict models reflect the first perspective in that they tend to depict all social systemic processes as occurring within the political system. Hence, the overriding variable in a description of succession is the distribution of organizational structure. The organizational aphorism (applied vertically in the totalitarian model and both vertically and horizontally in the conflict model) which says that “ where you stand depends [in or after a succession] on where you sit ” emerges as the major factor in explaining the nature of succession. The administered (bureaucratic) model, while also couched in organizational terms, is representative of the second perspective: actors located in non-political subsystems are viewed as having a potential impact on the political system through modernization and industrialization.

The totalitarian model is depicted in Fig. 1. “ Top leadership ” is defined as the First Secretary, along with the

Politburo and Secretariat. The influence vectors on the succession process extend “ from the top down.” The conflict model (Fig. 2) includes horizontal vectors in addition to the vertical ones, as well as vectors from other areas of the political system-such as the party and government sectors-which are used as resource bases by “ succession contestants.”

10. A general discussion of the significance of value and issue orientations as they relate to the study of Communist elites is contained in the Introduction of Carl Beck, Frederic Fleron, Milton Lodge, Derek Wailer, William Welsh, and M. George Zaninovich, Comparatt’ve Communist political Leaderdip mew York: David McKay, 1973). For an example of a piece of research that relates Soviet elite values and attitudes with socialization and interactional processes, see Milton Lodge, “ Attitudinal Cleavages Within the Soviet Political Leadership,” ibid.


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Fig. Z-Conflict Model

The bureaucratic model (Fig. 3) represents a still broader array of potential influence on succession owing to a crystallization of various interaction channels between non-political subsystems and political subsystems by way of organizational structures.

The framework used here comes closest to that depicted in Fig. 3. It differs from the bureaucratic model, however, in two important respects. First, we believe the bureaucratic model to be useful for


assessing structural alterations in the political system boundary HIJD. Such alterations reflect the formulation of access channels to actors representing non-political sectors for the purpose of developing a potential to influence policy formulation, deliberation, and resolution or implementation.” What we are looking for in the present analysis

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is an alteration in the “top leadership ” boundary EFGD; we are examining the career attributes, over time, of persons occupying these posts. Second, previous studies using data of the type employed here suggest evidence of a bureaucratization process in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which seems to be changing certain dimensions of elite-environment relationships. There seems to be a trend toward recruiting personnel increasingly on the basis of rational-technical

11. These actors are the specialist elites or interest groups that figure im- portantly in modes of analysis which concentrate on the functional necessity of expanding expertise throughout the social system as it modernizes and on its impact on the political system. See H. Gordon Skilling, “ Interest Groups and Communist Politics,” World Politics, XVIII, 3 (April 1966). This type of actor also approximates Apter’s “ representational elites “: David Apter, “Political Systems and Developmental Change,” in Robert Holt and John Turner (eds.), The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York: Free Press, 1970).


criteria, a decline in the significance of the ideological aspects of decisionmaking, and an increasing salience of technical and mana- gerial credentials in the political leaderships.la Nevertheless, a scheme that incorporates aspects of potential political development (such as succession) within a highly deterministic framework of bureaucratic development must be viewed with caution. Such a perspective often depicts political structure as a reflection of the overall social structure. Indeed, since one of our tasks in the present study is to determine the extent to which a developmental conceptualization of succession can be identified, we expect that a probable source of such a developmental theme is some aspect of bureaucratization. At the same time, the manner in which the theme holds up as an indication of the nature of leadership change, when compared with ad hoc political decisions and exogenous factors, must also be examined.

Thus, it can be seen that the totalitarian, conflict, and bureaucratic models all have an implicit organizational structure. The analytical relationship between process and structure dictates that, since the party apparatus represents the structural aspect of the context in which succession occurs, the process aspect is defined in formal organizational terms as well.

It is possible to conceptualize structure independent of process. One can, for instance, outline a structure of the party apparatus without any propositions regarding processes that might alter the various components. Usually, however, structure represents the main reference-base for examining and describing processes; it makes little sense to attempt to analyze process in the absence of structure. Given the dynamic nature of process conceptualization, such a strategy would entail a process existing in an analytical (not to mention operational) void.13

We are not playing down the significance of organizational structure in Communist systems. One of the defining characteristics of such societies is a high control capacity due to the politicization of virtually all aspects of life. In fact, one of the traditional criticisms of applying systemic models like that depicted in Fig. 3 to Communist societies is that the level of subsystem autonomy implied in such models simply does not exist. The marked lack of boundary maintenance between the political system and other social sectors renders

12. Carl Beck, ‘I Leadership Attributes in Eastern Europe: The Effect of Country and Time,” in Beck et al., op. cit.

13. Talcott Parsons, “Some Considerations on the Theory of Social Change,” in S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.), Readings in Social Evolution and Development (London: Pergamon Press, 1970).


inadequate the idea of non-political subsystems. The political system boundary (HIJD) and the macrosystem boundary (ABCD) are, it is argued, co-extensive.

Still, we believe that the issue of the often-assumed overriding significance of the political-organizational base of the “ circle of candidates ” in a succession, as a generalizable proposition across time and space in Communist societies, is an empirical question; we suspect that there may be other possibilities. We are not proposing that either of the two perspectives discussed in conjunction with Figs. l-3 is more “important” than the other. We are suggesting that a useful position is at least to view them both as potentially useful research strategies, either in conjunction with one another or with one predominant in a given situation.

In this article we are interested in the characteristics that a succeed- ing First Secretary brings with him and in the characteristics of persons whom he appoints. We explore these characteristics as a means of understanding the boundary relationships in the system, particularly the boundary relationship of the top political elites to the political sector (government and party), and of the political sector to other social sectors (economy, culture, and society).”

We are raising the question of whether a developmental theory is reflected in the data on political succession, or whether political succession (in the cases under study) is fully idiosyncratic. According to our developmental theory, there is a routinization over time in complex political systems; in the case of Communist systems, this routinization is reflected in the shift in priority from revolution to consolidation of power to system maintenance and improvement. In the latter stage we expect signs of developing subsystem autonomy.15

In viewing this process, we use indicators that we recognize to be only partial ones. They concern the careers of those persons who have succeeded and of the people that the successor brings with him. We use as indicators the experience of these people in ten sectors of society: the party bureaucracy (PBO), particularly in control and auditing functions; the party ideology (PI); the governmental bureaucracy (GBO); mass organizations, particularly trade unions

14. The current article is an abbreviated version of a longer work on the subject of political succession in Eastern Europe. The full paper includes an exoanded discussion of the First Secretaries in each of the four countries. as well as of the Politburo and Secretariat appointments and dismissals accompanying each new leader. See Carl Beck, William Jarzabek, and Paul Eman- dez, “ Political Succession in Eastern Europe: Fourteen Case Studies ” (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, forthcoming).

15. Andrzej Korbonski, “The Prospects for Change in Eastern Europe,” Shit Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 (June 1974). pp. 219-239.


(MASS); other political parties, particularly the Social Democrats (SPD); the military (MIL); industry (IND); educational institutions (ED); technical positions (TECH); and revolutionary experience (REV). In this respect the study parallels a study of the Central Committees undertaken earlier by one of the authors.ls

To relate the succession process more fully to structural changes within these sectors of society, we must know more than just the careers of the successors. We must have information on personal relationships among the leaders and between candidate leaders and the Soviet Union, on the motivations of individual successors and their entourage, and on the network linking various subsystems to each other and to the party. Despite the partial nature of our analysis, we believe that we can use career patterns effectively to evaluate significant political and social phenomena. Earlier studies using these data tend to reinforce the validity of this association.‘T

Our goal is a description of the succession process. The countries under study are Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, roughly over the period 19451971. lb: We compare the experience of the incoming leader with that of the outgoing leader; we study the changes in composition of the two leading groups-the Secretariat and the Politburo-brought in by the new leader both at the time of his coming into power and throughout his tenure; and we examine the context in which succession takes place. The last task entails searching for signs of a routinization of the succession processl” We

16. Carl Beck, “ Career Characteristics of East European Leadership,” in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Political Leadership in Easfern Europe and the Soviet Union (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), pp. 157-194.

17. Jerry F. Hough, “The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism? “, in Lenard J. Cohen and Jane P. Shapiro (eds.), Communist Systems in Compara- rive Perspective (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1974), pp. 449-486.

18. The beginning and end points of the time frame employed in both the present paper and the longer version are country-specific: Bulgaria (1949- 1971), Hungary (1948-1970), Poland (1948-1971), and Czechoslovakia (1945 1970).

19. We refer to identifiable recurring sectoral patterns as a potential indica- tor of a “ routinization ” of succession. We would interpret any such pat.tems as a preliminary indication that a normative structure of leadership change might be developing. Whether or not such patterns actually do develop begs the question of the extent to which leadership change is institutionalized. This question, as it applies to the countries under study, cannot be answered with the data we use here. Concepts of institutionalization typically specify a need to examine actor attitudinal and perceptual orientations toward the issue, the degree of commitment of existing institutional networks to systemic resource allocation, and the extent to which sanctions exist to deter or arrest deviant behavior regarding the ‘issue. See, for instance, the Introduction in


then characterize the process across each country and make inter- country comparisons. In conclusion, we look for indicators of an idiosyncratic succession process, indicators of a succession process influenced primarily by exogenous factors, and indicators of a developmental process.

Bulgaria In Bulgaria there have been three successions. Compared with the

process of succession in the other countries under study. the process in Bulgaria, like that of the development of socialism, has been relatively orderly. The turnover in personnel has been relatively high, and during the period of the development of a Stalinist system, there was an extensive purge. Bulgaria, however, escaped the drama of the New Course as reflected in the Polish October and the Hungarian Revolu- tion, and it has never undertaken anything equivalent to the experi- ment in socialist humanism of Czechoslovakia in 1968.‘”

The three First Secretaries in the period under study were Georgi Dimitrov, Valko Chervenkov, and Todor Zhivkov. In a sense, the careers of these three persons reflect the course of Bulgarian politics. Dimitrov was one of the international heroes of early Communist movements. He began his career as a trade unionist, joining the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1919. During the interwar period he spent most of his time as a revolutionary activist both in Bulgaria and in the Comintern. On the basis of his international reputation he was appointed First Secretary, March 1, 1945. He personifies the true revolutionary of this period. Chervenkov also joined the Party in 1919 and also was a revolutionary activist, but his career was associated with a greater array of Party institutions than Dimitrov’s. For example, he attended a Marx Lenin Institute and played an important organizational role in the development of Communist Party Youth organizations in Bulgaria. Much of Chervenkov’s career was associated directly with the Soviet apparatus. If Dimitrov was a disciple of St. Peter, then Chervenkov was a disciple of St. Paul.

Todor Zhivkov joined the Communist Party in 1932. He worked his way through the Party hierarchy in the 1930s and 1940s and became active in the Bulgarian partisan movement. At the end of World War II he held a number of lesser Party positions, as well as positions in Eisenstadt, op. cif.; Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Talcott Parsons, “The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change,” in his Essays in Sociological Theory mew York: Free Press, 1964).

20. J. F. Brown, Bulgaria Under Conmum Rule (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970).


the National Assembly and the National Front. In 1950 he was appointed a candidate member of the Politburo and Secretary in the Secretariat. In 1951 he became a full member of the Politburo and in 1954 he succeeded Chervenkov as First Secretary.

This process of succession is reflected in the succession patterns within the Politburo and Secretariat during the tenures of Chervenkov and Zhivkov. Beginning with the sixteen-month period following Dimitrov’s death, and extending through Chervenkov’s appointment as First Secretary in November 1950, to the end of his tenure in March 1954, nine persons were added to the leadership. The most salient aspect of this incoming group was a high incidence of Party and revolutionary credentials. There is also some indication of a trend toward sectoral differentiation between the Politburo and the Secre- tariat; some emphasis on administrative and ideological attributes was reflected in the membership of the latter body, with the Politburo continuing to be staffed largely with persons having Party and revolutionary credentials.

Standard Party and revolutionary credentials, together with in- creased experience in government and military sectors, characterized the group of four who accompanied Zhivkov upon his ascension to First, Secretary at the Sixth Party Congress in February-March 1954. During a two-year period prior to the Party Congress in 1958, Zhiv- kov made additional changes. Six persons were added, three to each of the two bodies. The credentials of this group indicate a continuation of the pattern of adding persons with revolutionary experience to the leadership.

Additional changes involving eighteen persons took place at suc- ceeding congresses in 1958, 1962, and 1966. These changes illustrate the maintenance of Party and revolutionary backgrounds as criteria for selection, linked with an expanded concern for governmental experience and some small concern for industrial and technical competence.

In summary, the Bulgarian succession pattern is one of expanding the sectoral representation in the top level of the Party leadership without neglecting the traditional emphasis upon Party and revolutionary credentials. Figure 4 illustrates the sectoral distribution of the incoming Politburo and Secretariat memberships for each of the Bulgarian First Secretaries. Some routinization of the succession process is reflected in these data. Two-thirds of the personnel changes are associated with Party congresses rather than with specific events.

The succession process in Bulgaria is thus incrementally expansive and non-event-oriented. In both of these characteristics it stands apart from the succession process in the other three countries under study.


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Hungary

There have been three First Secretaries of the Hungarian Com- munist Party since that Party came into power : Matyas Rakosi, Erno Gero. and Janos Kadar. The striking characteristic of Rakosi before he became First Secretary was his service to the revolutionary cause. He joined the Communist Party in 1918, served as Deputy Minister in Bela Kun’s short regime, and passed most of the years prior to the Communist seizure of power in activities designed to bring the Party to power. He spent approximately fifteen years in jail in that cause. During the Communist takeover, Rakosi drew extensive support from the Soviet Union. He was always associated with the Moscow- Stalinist wing of the Party. In 1948, he was appointed First Secretary.

From 1953 to 1956 Rakosi’s relationship with the Soviet Union was unsettled. The Soviet Union waffled between the hard-line posture of Rakosi, on the one hand, and the softer line associated with Imre


Nagy, on the other. In February 1955, Nagy was expelled from the Party and Rakosi was in complete command. That command was short-lived, however. In July 1956, Rakosi was deposed, presumably on orders from Khrushchev, and replaced by Erno Gero.

Gerii’s political career was distinct from that of Rakosi in a number of ways. He too joined the Communist Party in 1918 and spent most of the interwar years engaged in revolutionary activities. He participated in the Spanish Civil War,?’ held positions in the Cornintern, and spent time in prison. But after World War II, Gero spent much of his career in government ministries. In June 1949, he was appointed Prime Minister, a position he held until 1952. He also held positions in the Central Committee and was a member of the Politburo from 1948 on.

It would be an overstatement to classify Gerij as a government bureaucrat, but it is worth noting that he spent more time than Rakosi in governmental administration.

The third First Secretary, and the present one, is Janos Kadar. Kadar joined the %ommunist Party in 1932 at the age of twenty. He began his career as an official of youth organizations. He was active in the Hungarian underground from 1931 to 1939 and during World War II. After the war he held positions in both the Party and the government, but he was jailed in 1951 for anti-Party activities; he was not released until 1954. From 1954 until he became First Secretary, he held a number of positions in the Party hierarchy, pro- gressing from local offices, through regional office, to national office. He was probably selected as First Secretary on the basis of his experience in the Party, and because the selection of someone jailed by Rakosi would be an apt demonstration that the Rakosi wing of the Communist Party would not regain power after the Soviet invasion. Gero was not a likely candidate because of his close association with the policies of Rakosi.

Exogenous rather than domestic factors determined the selection of all three of these First Secretaries. We can find in the different careers of Rakosi and Gero some developmental postulates at work, but the selection of Kadar is understandable more from an analysis of the immediate context than from a developmental perspective. In recon- solidating power the Party turned to someone with proven Party and revolutionary credentials who was unsullied by involvement in the discredited regime.

21. Most Spanish Civil War veterans were purged during that period under Stalin.


When Rakosi became First Secretary in June 1948, nine persons were brought into the leadership. Taken collectively, they represented a much more diffuse and sectorally dispersed group than any in the Bulgarian case. The most prominent characteristic of this group is that two-thirds were Social Democrats at some time or other, while eight of the nine had extensive revolutionary experience. Somewhat less prominent was a background in the government bureaucracy; only a third of the group had any experience in the Party bureaucracy.

The group that entered the leadership with Rakosi represented a coalition possessing varied skill and experience as its major characteristic, with the qualification that the technical, educational, military, and industrial sectors were ignored.

During the 1951-1953 period, extensive changes took place in Rakosi’s Politburo and Secretariat. A group of eighteen persons was added who reflected extensive Party and trade union (but not Social Democrat) backgrounds. These changes can be seen as a probable attempt at consolidation by Rakosi. Only two persons were added to the leadership at the Sixth Party Congress in May-June 1954, but five more were added in the following year. Once again, the salient feature of the incoming group was Party bureaucratic experience.

In July 1956, during a period of unfolding crisis, Gero was appointed First Secretary. The group of five persons accompanying him into the leadership had two things in common: extensive revolutionary credentials, and the experience of having been dismissed from high Party offices by Rakosi.

The attempt by Gerij to rule by restoring a revolutionary tradition came too late to have any effect on the ability of the Hungarian Party to govern. By that time, it was doubtful that even profound structural change would have stemmed the course of the mass pattern of activism which shaped the revolution.22

Kadar was appointed First Secretary in October 1956, in the midst of the Hungarian Revolution. By the end of June 1957, he had appointed fourteen persons to the Politburo and Secretariat. Only about a third of this group had strong party credentials, but all were involved in revolutionary activities before 1956, and all were associated with trade unions. It seems that Kadar was attempting to build a new leadership out of a shared commitment to the original seizure of power, coupled with enough trade unionists to placate or control the trade unions.

22. Paul Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution (Stanford. Calif.: Stan- ford University Press, 1961).


The next significant change in Politburo and Secretariat personnel occurred at the Eighth Party Congress in November 1962, when seven persons were added to the leadership. The most salient feature of this group is the continuation of a strong trade union representation, along with governmental experience.

The remainder of the changes undertaken by Kadar from 1963 through the Tenth Party Congress in November 1970 were disparate in sectoral distribution and segmented in occurrence. With the exception of those in 1963 (when three persons were added to the leadership) and in 1970 (when four were added), only four persons entered the Politburo and Secretariat.

When we compare succession in Bulgaria with succession in Hungary since the seizure of power, we notice marked differences. In the case of Bulgaria we find indicators in the succession process of both development and routinization: development in terms of the expanded sectoral representation of Party leaders, and routinizution in terms of the non-crisis, non-event context of personnel changes. In

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Fig. 5-Sectoral Profile for Those Appointed to Politburo and Secretariat (Huwary)


the case of Hungary we cannot say that we have found a similar pattern through the 1956 upheaval. The sectoral representation of persons entering the leadership has not been marked by an incre- mental process. Succession has been determined by events and crises under the heavy impact of exogenous factors (Fig. 5).

Yet if we look at the succession stimulated by Kadar, we see indicators of both development and routinization. After his initial appointments in the post-revolutionary situation, he relied heavily on the governmental structure for his appointments-even more heavily, in fact, than he relied on the Party bureaucracy. He has brought into positions of Party leadership persons with industrial, technical, and educational careers; he has also routinized the process. Since the post-revolutionary appointments, personnel changes have been made at Party congresses rather than on an ad hoc basis.

Succession under the nineteen-year rule of Kadar approximates the Bulgarian succession pattern with the striking difference that the Bulgarians have maintained to a much greater extent the traditional pattern of Party and revolutionary attitudes.

Poland

One of the distinct advantages of the Bulgarian Communist Party after World War II was that the Party had a cohesive history and a following. The Communist Party of Poland was in disarray after World War II.?’ It had been discredited by the international Com- munist movement, and many of its leaders had been called to Moscow and executed. Those persons in positions of leadership who survived the purge were often those lucky enough to have been in Polish prisons at the time, or out of the country. This was true of all of the First Secretaries of the Party since the end of World War II: Wladys- law Gomulka. Boleslaw Bierut, Edward Ochab, and Edward Gierek.

Gomulka began his political career as a trade union organizer, first as a Social Democrat and then in 1927 as a member of the Com- munist Party. During the 1920s and the 1930s he spent most of his time organizing trade union groups. Like many of his colleagues he passed much of that time in jail. He was imprisoned in 1926, again from 1932 to 1934, and once again from 1936 to 1939. He joined the Polish underground during the war, organized regional Party groups, and wrote for Party newspapers. At the end of the war the reconsti- tuted Central Committee of the Party appointed him First Secretary.

23. M. K. Dziewanowski, The Communist Purry of Poland (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959).


Gomulka was a domestic& who strongly believed that a Polish road to socialism required the amendment of Soviet priorities. He strongly opposed expansion of the class struggle to the countryside and the formation of a new international Communist movement. He was dismissed from his position as First Secretary in 1948, and in July 1951 he was placed under house arrest.

He was replaced by Boleslaw Bierut. With two major exceptions the career of Bierut parallels that of Gomulka. He too was a union organizer. He too spent a number of years in Polish prisons. But in the interwar period he was associated with the international Com- munist movement, and after the war he had the opportunity to hold various Party positions. He became a member of the Central Com- mittee in 1943, head of state in 1947, member of the Politburo in 1948, and First Secretary in 1948, a position that he held until his death in 1956.

Neither Gomulka nor Bierut had much previous experience in administration. Edward Ochab, the third First Secretary, had a greater array of administrative experience. He too was a trade union activist, but he developed a career in the military as well. In 1929 he attended a military institute and during the war he was in a position of military command. After the war he achieved a number of high positions within the government, the Party, and the military-all associated with administrative, security, and control functions. His tenure as First Secretary was short-lived. During the Polish October he was replaced by Gomulka, who returned to power as a compro- mise candidate acceptable to enough of the factionalized Party leadership to bring him back. From 1956 to 1970 Gomulka was continually involved in trying to balance the many factions in the Polish Party, and the numerous conflicting demands of various sectors of Polish society. He was able to perform that balancing act until the strike of the shipworkers in December 1970. In the context of the strike Edward Gierek became First Secretary. Gierek spent much of his early life in France and Belgium. He was a miner and member of the Communist Party in both Belgium and France, holding positions in the trade unions and cultural associations of both countries. In 1934, he returned to Poland to serve in the army for two years. After his service he returned to Belgium, where he spent the war period as a member of Belgian paramilitary forces. After the war he returned to Poland as an employee of the Central Committee. He graduated from a polytechnic institute, became a regional officer of the Party, and was active in a number of Party and governmental industrial and mining commissions. He was appointed to the Secretariat by Ochab. In the post-1956 period he continued an active involvement in


governmental commissions, including ones in industry, mining, and economics. Although he has not neglected to develop experience and responsibility in Party control and administration, Gierek has had greater experience within the industrial sector of society than any of the First Secretaries under study.

We can search out underlying patterns or hints of patterns in the succession line of Poland, but the reality is that events, rather than orderly progression, determined who succeeded in Poland. Some of these events were of crisis proportions, particularly the Polish October. The Polish succession process is similar to that of Hungary in that exogenous factors determined both the time of succession and the successor. Forces external to Poland have had considerable influence on the process.

There are some developmental strands. Bierut was more the Party organizer than Gomulka, Ochab had more extensive administrative credentials than Bierut, and Gierek is a Party administrator with extensive experience in industry. But, generally, the succession in Poland seems neither developmental nor routinized when viewed through the lens of the careers of these individuals.

When Bierut assumed the post of First Secretary in September 1947, some of the most extensive changes accompanying the introduction of a new Party leader occurred. Nine persons entered the leadership, two-thirds of them with strong military backgrounds. Revolutionary credentials were also well represented, although not so strongly as military experience. In consolidating power, Bierut adopted a pattern substantially different from those observed in other succession incidents. Rather than being initially structured around persons with Party control and administrative careers, Bierut’s leadership base reflected from the beginning a heavy concentration of military experience coupled with revolutionary credentials. An increasingly Party-oriented base developed within a few years. Eight persons were added to the leadership by 1955, the group as a whole being characterized by extensive Party experience.

Bier&s successor, Ochab, became First Secretary in March 1956. The five persons added to the leadership during Ochab’s seven-month tenure represented a continuation of the Party-revolutionary trend that had become increasingly evident under Bierut after 1954. Government bureaucratic experience, typically among the most salient sectoral attributes over time in the other countries (along with Party and revolutionary experience), began to gain greater representation for the first time in Poland under Ochab.

Gomulka ascended to the post of First Secretary for the second time in October 1956. The four persons who entered the leadership


at this time represented a continuation of the pattern of strong military and revolutionary backgrounds begun under Bierut. Three of the four also possessed extensive Party bureaucratic experience, along with technical and educational credentials.

The military character of Gomulka’s appointments continued in 1957 and at the Third Party Congress in March 1959, with two persons with military backgrounds entering the leadership in each instance. An additional salient feature of these two groups was a background in the government bureaucracy.

The additions to the Politburo and Secretariat initiated by Gomulka during the period 1960-1967 represented a consistent build-up of persons having Party and government backgrounds who also possessed technical skills. During 1968, the year of the Fifth Party Congress, the most intensive change in the Polish Party’s leadership during Gomulka’s tenure since 1956 took place. A group of seven whose common denominator was extensive experience in the Party apparatus entered the leadership. By the end of 1968, the Gomulka leadership possessed considerable experience in the Party and the government and in the technical and educational sectors. These credentials were also, for the first time, dissociated from military experience.

Seven persons with strong Party bureaucratic credentials entered the leadership when Gierek replaced Gomulka as First Secretary in December 1970. The movement of this group into the Politburo and Secretariat weakened the trend started by Gomulka toward govem- mental expertise in the Party’s top bodies, while increasing the level of representation of the ideological sector and maintaining a high level of technical and educational skills. Representation of the military sector was substantially reduced, a trend that continued through the Sixth Party Congress in December 1971. The salient feature of the eight persons entering the leadership at the Sixth Party Congress was a continuation of a strong representation of the Party bureaucratic and educational sectors begun a year earlier. Also, by the end of 1971, a high level of ideological representation existed, although, unlike the case during the Gomulka tenure, ideological credentials were tied to non-military backgrounds. The comparatively small number of military personnel in the Gierek leadership through 1971 had, instead, considerable experience in the government bureaucracy.

When we display the relative weight of careers in the ten sectors under study, we find reinforcement for an earlier suggestion that succession in Poland has been idiosyncratic, crisis-oriented, and non- routinized (Fig. 6).


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Fig. 6-Sectoral Profile for Those Appointed to Politburo and Secretariat (Poland)

Not one career channel is linear across the four First Secretaries. Even more conclusive is the finding that there is no logical clustering of variables around any particular First Secretary, For example, our analysis of Gierek’s career indicates that he has had greater experience in the industrial sector than any other First Secretary, whether in Poland or in the three other countries. Yet Gierek brought into positions of top leadership more persons with ideological credentials than any previous First Secretary, and fewer technicians than Gomulka. This is not to suggest that the additions were random, but that other factors were much more powerful. If there is some mix of experience in a leadership group which promotes constancy in a Communist state, it is quite clear that the Poles have not found it.

Czechoslovakia

The Czechoslovak Communist Party was the most mass-based and institutionalized party in Eastern Europe in the interwar period.


Unlike the other Communist parties, it participated actively in the political process of the republic, It elected 41 deputies in 1925. 30 in 1929, and 30 in 1935. Internally, it behaved more like a political party than an underground revolutionary movement.

The Party was organized by a leftist group in the Social Demo- cratic Party. It came into being in 1921 when Bohumir Smeral led a group that demanded that the Social Democrats withdraw from the government. The original leaders of the Party agreed on this issue, but there was little agreement on other aspects of strategy and tactics. Disputes within the leadership were extensive and involved inter- ference in domestic Party affairs by the Comintem. Backed by the Comintem, Klement Gottwald-at that time the editor of a Com- munist paper in Slovakia-became the head of the Party. Gottwald was a spokesman for Comintern policies. In the 1930s he urged the dissolution of local Party organizations because of the belief that the democratic government was going to be overthrown by other forces in Czechoslovak politics, thereby forcing the Communist Party to go underground anyhow. In 1935, the Party adopted a policy of national front under the leadership of Sverma and Slansky. Gottwald was an employee of the Comintern at that time and was residing in Moscow. Upon his return to Czechoslovakia he rebuked both Slansky and Sverma for allowing reformist tendencies to dominate internal Party organization. When the Party was declared illegal after Munich, Gottwald returned to Moscow where he spent the war years.

Before becoming active in the Party, Gottwald had been an industrial worker and a soldier. But after the organization of the Party his career reflects more strongly that of a professional party politician than the careers of any of the other Eastern European leaders who came into power after World War II. At the time of his death (March 14, 1953) he was both head of state and chairman of the Party.2d

Antonin Novotny, who replaced Gottwald, had also joined the Communist Party in 1921. He too had been an industrial worker before joining the Party. Until 1935 he spent most of his Party career at the local level. From 1935 to 1937 he was a teacher in a Party school. He then became a regional official of the Party and an editor of a Party paper. During World War II he was active in the Com-

24. In terms of formal title, it must be argued that there is some question as to who meets the conventional criterion of First Secretary. Gottwald held the title of Chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and Slansky held the post of General Secretary simultaneously. We are interpreting Gottwald to he the leader in this case.


munist underground. He resumed the position of regional secretary after the war, was appointed to the Central Committee, and was elected to the National Assembly. He was appointed in 1951 to both the Secretariat and the Politburo, then in 1953 to the office of First Secretary. In 1957 he also became head of state. Novotny’s role was never that of the Party politician as was Gottwald’s; his was essentially that of the Party apparatchik who achieved power at a time when administrative and control experience was highly valued.

In January 1968, in the face of a number of challenges to the leadership structure of the Party, Novotny was replaced by Alexander Dubcek. It was during the short-lived reign of Dubcek that the most extensive changes in any Communist political system took place. With the exception that he was a Slovak and active in the Slovak apparatus, there is very little in Dubcek’s past that distinguishes his career from that of Novotny. Dubcek did not formally join the Slovak Communist Party until 1939. During the war he attended a polytechnic institute and was active in the Slovak underground. He progressed through the Slovak apparatus from regional secretary, to regional first secretary, to employee of the Central Committee, to member of the Slovak Central Committee. From 1955 to 1958 he attended a higher Party school. He was elected in 1958 to both the Slovak Central Committee and the Slovak Politburo, and in 1962 to the national Central Com- mittee. In 1960 he was elected to the Secretariat and in 1962 to the Politburo. In the period of debates regarding the state of Czechoslo- vak politics and economics, Dubcek became a strong spokesman for greater autonomy for Slovakia, but he was not consistently associated with the reformers.

In 1969, in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Gustav Husak became First Secretary of the Party. His career is much less routinized than that of Gottwald, Novotny, or Dubcek. Husak joined the Party in 1933. He was active in the Slovak Party apparatus until 1951, when he was found guilty of anti-Party activities and jailed from 1951 to 1960. At the time of his dismissal he held high positions in the Slovak Politburo, the Slovak National Council, the Slovak Board of Commissioners, and the Slovak Central Com- mittee. During the war he had been active in the Slovak underground. In 1937 he graduated with a degree in law.

After his rehabilitation, along with other Slovaks, in 1960, Husak was employed as a manager of heavy industry, and in the law section of the National Academy of Sciences. He began to rebuild his status in the Party. By 1968 he was a deputy prime minister; a member of the Slovak Central Committee, Secretariat, and Politburo;


and a member of the Central Committee commissions on science and administrative organization.

Given the idiosyncratic nature of changes in Czechoslovakia and the significance of exogenous factors, we would not necessarily expect the careers of the chosen leaders to reflect a developmental thrust. The shift from Gottwald to Novotny does reflect a consolidation of the power motif, but the careers of Dubcek and Husak do not con- tinue that motif. In neither case do the leader’s career and experience mirror his motivations or values. If we were using career data alone to predict motivations and behaviour, we would conclude that the two leaders should have behaved in opposite ways, for certainly Dubcek is much more the Party apparatchik than Husak. In short, succession in Czechoslovakia at the First Secretary level is neither routinized nor developmental.?” It is a function of exogenous and idiosyncratic forces.

After Gottwald assumed the post of First Secretary in April 1945, his leadership during its first year followed the pattern of the early days of the other regimes under study in reflecting the historical significance of Party service and revolutionary experience. Six of the seven persons entering the leadership had extensive backgrounds in these areas; four of the five added at the Eighth Party Congress in March 1946 possessed the same credentials.*” Ideological experience was also a major attribute of Gottwald’s Politburo and Secretariat, distinguish- ing it from the leaderships of the initial First Secretaries in the other cases examined.

Nine persons entered the leadership during the period between 1948 and the year of the Ninth Party Congress (1949); a second group of nine was added in 1951. The first group represented a continued expansion of the Party bureaucratic and revolutionary sectors in the Gottwald leadership, and reflected the absorption of the Social Demo- cratic Party in 1948. The salient feature of the 1951 group is a high incidence of governmental experience. This constituted the first phase of a virtual rebuilding of the Secretariat by Gottwald during the period 1952-1953. During these two years, a third group of nine was added to the Secretariat which had as its outstanding characteristic the attributes that characterized the Gottwald tenure as a whole: ex-

25. Carl Beck, “ Patterns and Problems of Governance ” in Carmelo Mesa- Lago and Carl Beck (eds.), Comparative Socialist Systems: Essays on Politics and Economics (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, 1975).

26. In discussing Czechoslovakia, when we speak of leadership attributes such as Party bureaucrat experience, we refer to such experience in connection with the national Communist Party and not in connection with the Slovak Communist Party.


tensive experience in the Party bureaucratic, revolutionary, and ideological sectors.

A high level of turnover in the Politburo and Secretariat occurred following Novotny’s ascension to First Secretary in September 1953, and at the Tenth Party Congress the following year. Five persons entered the leadership during these years, but they did not reflect any strong sectoral profile. Following the addition of six persons representing a fairly even mix of Party, revolutionary, and ideological ex- periences at the Eleventh Party Congress in June 1958, the sectoral nature of the Czechoslovak Party leadership was virtually unaltered to the end of Novotny’s tenure. A total of thirteen persons was sporadically added between 1962 and 1968, but sectorally the leadership continued to be one grounded firmly on Party administrative, revolutionary, and ideological attributes.

A strong base of Party skills was maintained by the addition of four persons possessing such attributes to the Politburo when Dubcek replaced Novotny as First Secretary in January 1968. The first of two massive turnovers took place in April when ten persons representing a mix of Party and governmental experience entered the leadership. Half of this group also possessed technical or industrial expertise. The second extensive change occurred four months later. The twelve who entered the leadership at this time, eleven of them elected to the Politburo at the one-day congress in August, reflected a massive concentration of educational and industrial credentials. Half had backgrounds representing the industrial sector, while five of the remaining six represented the educational sector. Furthermore, the two groups were independent; the persons with educational credentials were not the persons with strong industrial backgrounds. Also, there was an inverse relationship between this pair of attributes and Party bureaucratic experience, with a concomitant increase in govem- ment bureaucratic experience. The final changes during Dubcek’s tenure took place in November with the addition of four persons whose backgrounds reflected a continuation of the educational- industrial trend, plus the addition of technical representation.

This trend was continued by Husak following his ascension to the top Party post in April 1969; two of the three persons added to the leadership during his first year had broad industrial experience, while one had technical credentials as well. The seven persons who entered the leadership in 1970, and the two added at the Fourteenth Party Congress in May 1971, maintained this pattern; half of the 1970-1971 group possessed industrial experience coupled with strong Party credentials.


The pattern of succession under Husak through 1971 indicates his concern with dismissing those leaders associated with Dubcek but, at the same time, maintaining an expanded sectoral representation in the Party’s top leadership.

In the early years of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia, Party experience coupled with ideological and revolutionary experience marks the majority of those in the Politburo and Secretariat. Novotny brought no significant change to this mix. Dubcek, on the other hand. initiated the most extensive change in the career attributes of an East European leadership group. Among the most salient characteristics brought to the Party’s leadership were governmental experience and industrial expertise. Surprisingly, Husak did not change this priority except to bring in new persons to replace those who entered the leadership under Dubcek, and also to bolster the extent of ideological representation. A similar occurrence took place in Poland under Gierek-also after a time of crisis. The distribution of sectoral attributes of persons entering the leadership over time in Czechoslovakia is illustrated in Fig. 7.

PBOIPI

GBO

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GOTIWALD DUBCEK HusAK C-N-33) c?i=33j of- 12)

Fig. 7Sectoral Profile of Those Appointed to Politburo and Secretariat (Czechoslovakia)


Succession in Czechoslovakia shows some developmental characteristics despite the Soviet invasion, but sectoral representation has not been very even, nor has change been routinized around Party congresses. It has been instead centered around the person of the First Secretary.

Conclusions

We believe that two major orientations, or frameworks for analysis, exist for the study of leadership change: the organizational and the exogenous. The organizational framework, which is the model used in most studies of Communist succession, assumes that all of the major relevant factors are located within the political system- typically defined as the Party apparatus. Within this framework there is an implicit structure: the succession process follows formal organizational lines.

Within the organizational orientation, furthermore, there are two subthemes. The first suggests that the organization is a relatively static one. The second views the organization as amenable to alteration. This latter, dynamic process is related to shifts in systemic priorities from revolution to consolidation of power to governance. In the third stage, it becomes necessary for the organization to re- structure its relationships with other sectors of society. As it alters these relationships, the influence of societal subsystems on the organization increases, with a concomitant increase in subsystem concern in leadership succession.

The second orientation suggests that succession is a function of the environment in which it takes place. Three types of environment are reflected in the present study of succession : (1) revolution, (2) influence of the Soviet Union, and (3) functional failure on the part of the organization.

As we sift through the many cases of succession described in this article, we find that all five modes of succession are present. In only one of the countries under examination can we say that a particular type has been consistently present; the organizational model has been predominant in Bulgaria since Chervenkov’s ascension to power. Through time, in the other countries studied, although there have been cases in which the organizational model has dominated, there have also been cases in which the situational environment has been the determining factor in selecting both leader and leadership.

We have identified patterns of routinization, have provided ex- amples of development (as reflected in career data), and have cited


instances in which a drive toward reconsolidation has occurred with different types of political actors. But we must admit our perplexity in attempting to identify any social or political theory, or persistent trends, which adequately explain the cases we have analyzed. We have, to our satisfaction, cast extensive doubt on a perspective that attributes succession exclusively to the organizational orientation, or even to a dynamic organization model. But we have not been able to replace either with a summary statement or model. Rather, we emerge with the conclusion that, on the basis of the indicators used, political succession in Eastern Europe appears to be a stochastic process.” We hold with a premise that is slowly being accepted in the literature : that situational analysis, in which context is interpreted through the lenses of social theory, is a more powerful way of describing and analyzing Communist politics than is a monolithic framework. We are left with the view that these systems are more particularistic than universal.

27. This is the position taken in a recent article concerning Soviet succession in which leadership change since Khrushchev is seen as a contingency- oriented process. While recognizing the influence of certain common factors over time, the author suggests that it is also necessary to consider an array of situational variables and the multi-faceted nature of their associational and causal relationship to succession. We reach much the same conclusion for the Eastern European states examined here. The paradigm that emerges consists of a very complex multi-dimensional matrix based on both time and country. See Grey Hodnett, “Succession Contingencies in the Soviet Union,” Problems of Corwmrnism, XXIV, 2 (March-April 1975).

political succession in eastern europe

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