POLITICALANDARMEDSTRUGGLE

THE PALESTINE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT FATEH

P O L I T I C A L S T R U G G L E

Upon the establishment of the Zionist settler-sta-te of Israel in May 1948, the Palestinian and otherArab masses pinned their hopes for liberation on theArab political regimes and the regular Arab armies.

Since the Arab states' dedication to the Palestinecause was always cyclical, these hopes used to centerat different intervals around this or that country tolead the rest of the Arab states in the battle forliberation. But inasmuch as the coups d'etat stagedin many of the Arab states after the creation ofIsrael in 1948 expressed the resentment of the Arabpeoples against their governments, they also confir-med the adherence of the Arab masses to the clas-sical solution of regime changes.

In turn, the Palestinian masses in the variousArab countries shared in effectuating these changes.The Palestinian struggle thus focused on the Arabcountries to create therein the regimes susceptibleto build strong regular armies and to import modernarmaments liable to inflict defeat on the enemy'sarmed forces.

TWO FACTS

This trend in the struggle for the liberation ofPalestine revealed two facts:

1) That the liberation battle against the Zionistinvasion is a battle against great forces allied toZionism and capable, under all conditions, to main-tain Israel's military supremacy. The Arab nation,and the Palestinian people included, cannot wage asuccessful regular battle against Israel and her alliesbecause this nation comprises a great number of un-derdeveloped countries which require a long timebefore they could industrialize themselves and unitetheir forces in such a way as to confront the enemyin a regular battle. Moreover, imperialism and itsallied Arab reactionaries have the potential to ob-struct the desired change in Arab society for a timesubstantial enough as to enable Israel to bolster itsexistence and realize its ambitions. In the course ofthe long struggle waged by the Arab nation, theneed to identify the respective roles of all hostileforces became apparent. Simultaneously, the Arabstruggle had to realize wh'ch of these hostile forceswas more damaging and restrainig ro as to concen-trate on the main enemy, isolate him and engagehim. That is why it became necessary to wage a batt-le with arms which the enemy could not oveicomeand to wipe out the hostile forces, one after the other,in the light of the people's ability.

2) That in his long struggle to achieve his ambi-tions in our homeland, the Zionist enemy was ableto recruit material and human forces which exceedby far his abil i ty to recruit regular armies. He wasable to mobilize the Jewish masses of the world towage a battle with diversified means. The role of hisregular troops was never more than that of a spearhead which he directed to achieve his aims.It becamedifficult for the Arab forces to achieve victory simp-

ly by preparing the efficient armies susceptible todefeat the enemy militarily although this was impos-sible for the reasons mentioned earlier.

EMERGENCE OF FATEH

These two facts, in addition to other less impor-tant ones, frustrated Arab aspirations for the libera-tion of Palestine. It became impedent on the Arabnation to benefit from the experience and to opt forthe genuine alternative which is compatible withreality and the conditions of the Palestinian peopleand other Arab peoples and which also expressestheir determination to achieve complete liberation.

Fateh's avant-garde embarked on this revolutio-nary path, believing in the masses as the only forcecapable of achieving victory and advocating a revo-lutionary war in which these masses would partici-pate to achieve their aims.

LIBERATION WAR

The revolutionary war which Fateh advocateshas clear political objectives and a well knownmeans of struggle.

The objectives of this war are to liberate the peop-le of Palestine, to restore their homeland to them andto establish a legitimate political authority in the li-berated country emanating from the will of the Pa-lestinian masses and fulfilling their aspirations. Themeans is a popular liberation war with full partici-pation of the masses.

Such liberation war entails a political struggle

and an armed struggle which go hand in hand with-the participation of these masses. It must be clearlyunderstood that the political struggle and the armedstruggle are two concomitant and complementarymeans to achieve the objectives of this revolutionarywar and that their separation or the renunciation ofeither one of them poses a threat to the success ofthis popular war.

If we were to take military struggle alone andproceeded to recruit the people in armed units, be-lieving that this alone is sufficient, our strugglewould be doomed to failure. All the military forceswe can recruit will remain, under all conditions,unfitted to confront a regular military force. And as

.long as they remain isolated from the masses, armedforces cannot be evaluated except in numbers, equi-pment and technological ability . This kind of revo-lutionary forces cannot under any condition face theexisting challenge.

If we were to take political struggle alone, mea-ning the mobilization, education, organization andleadership of the masses, we would also realize thatthe enemy cannot be possibly forced to retreat ex-cept by the annihilation of his military forces. Theorganized but unarmed masses cannot poss bly playthis role. The enemy will maintain his positions byarmed power and will remain capable of strikingagainst these defenseless masses. That is why politi-cal struggle without armed struggle will remain im-potent and incapable of achieving the aims of therevolution.

It is evident therefore that political and armedstruggle are concomitant and that the negligence of

one or the other is tantamount to turning our revolu-tionary war into an adventure.

NEED FOR POLITICAL STRUGGLE

With this always in mind, let us enumerate thereasons why political struggle is important in ourrevolutionary war:

1) The revolutionary we are engaged in impliesthat we do not believe that regular war is the meansliable .to achieve our aims. Revolutionary war is anegation of the bourgeois-understanding of war —namely the need to establish a power balance withthe enemy's military forces as a basic condition forvictory. Our understanding of revolutionary war isto wage a struggle simultaneously involving thearmed forces of the people and the wide masses hav-ing faith in the aims of this war. Participation of themasses in the struggle side by side with their armedforces renders many of the enemy weapons ineffec-tive, makes the enemy lose his ability to use themodern means of warfare and forces him to confrontall kinds of weapons — some of which are modernand some of which may be primitive. Such partici-pation also prevents the enemy from setting up fixedfront-lines where he could concentrate his militarytroops and organize them as suits him best.

2) By developing and educating the masses,political struggle becomes a safeguard for the lineof the revolution and prevents armed struggle fromdeviating from its aim. It also creates large forcescapable of directing the armed struggle in such away as to keep it in harmony with the tactics andstrategy of the revolutionary war and to prevent it

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from getting involved in a regular war which theenemy wilf continue to seek.

3) The impact of political struggle on thepeople is such that it enables them to supply thearmed forces with its needs in fighters who areaware of the aims of this struggle and are capableof enduring all the difficulties it might encounter.The elements who join the armed struggle enjoy ad-ded firmness, steadfastness, endurance and wil-lingness to sacrifice if they possess the revolutionaryawareness and struggle experience. Moreover, themobilized masses can offer to the armed forces sup-plies and arms as well as all their experiences andpotentials. The masses proved in many revolutionarywars in the world that they are capable of discover-ing and inventing ways and means as well as armswhich could be primitive at times but wh ch aregreatly effective in inflicting heavy losses on theenemy.

4) The revolutionary war we are waging fallson a vast territory which our armed forces cannotprotect. The enemy, on the other hand, can direct hisstrikes against far-fledged areas so that we cannotconsider having front-lines for confrontation. Theeriemy also occupies a vast territory and his troopssubdue a large part of our people. Through its strug-gle, this part of our people can prevent the enemyfrom setting-up secure front-lines. The absence ofsuch enemy front-lines is extremely important be-cause it affects his ability to launch military opera-tions compatible with the nature of his army andthe formation of his men.

5) Our enemy has been waging a political bat-

tle for a long time now along with his military bat-tles. He has political bases strongly entrenched allover the world, including the Arab World. He iscapable of activating these political bases with har-mony and effectiveness to support his military ag-gression. We cannot confront these political bases,set up by the enemy, militarily. We have to engagethem in a rough political struggle so as to isolatethem, cripple them and prevent them from support-ing aggression against us.

AIMS OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE

Now that we have demonstrated our need forpolitical struggle, let us turn to its objectives.

The main aims and objectives of the politicalstruggle are:

1) To mobilize the masses for their participa-tion in the revolution. This mobilization of the mas-ses has to pass through different stages although atno one point will the masses have the same standardof readiness and preparedness to participate in therevolution. The mass mobilization stages are as fol-lows:

a) Initiation of the masses to the aims of therevolution, to its basic line of thought and to its po-litical and social outlook. Such initiation does notnecessarily entail the adoption of a fixed dogma nordoes it imply that it is not exposed to development aswe proceed along the path of liberation. The masseswill be established by the revolution and to grasp,as much as possible, the motives which led to theemergence of the revolution and the need for themasses to sacrifice without limitation.

b) Political education of the masses throughclarification of the Revolution's precepts and iden-tification of the role of all internal and externalforces in the world which, by nature, are allied to theenemy and stand ready to join his aggression and toexert all their potentials in defending him. By thesame token, there are strong forces and many peopleswho stand by the side of the revolution and are pre-pared to share, in variant degrees, in supporting therevolution and in boistering the struggle of the mas-ses. Knowledge of the role of the liberation forcesin the world is an important factor in determiningthe fate of the revolution. The masses should knowtheir allies as well as those of their enemy. Inter-nally, Palestinian and Arab societies are torn by va-rious allegiances and comprise different classes. Butin each, there are revolutionary forces capable oftaking up arms and of sacrificing. There are forcesthat are less prepared to do so as well as neutralones which do not feel the need to make any sacri-fices. Simultaneously, there are counter-revolutiona-ry forces which either display their hostility outrightor try to conceal it for as long period as possible. Allthis should be known to the masses so that they canact accordingly in the interest of the revolution. Atthe present moment, for instance, the masses faceup to a number of projects and solutions which areaccompanied by intimidations and inducements. Themasses that are politically motivated cannot be luredby such suspicious schemes and submissive solutions.They are capable of unveiling plots against the re-volution and against our armed struggle for libera-tion.

c) Organization of the masses to become able,

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through their various organizations, to move at theright time in the right direction. Organized massesare alone capable of sacrificing and of adhering fullyto the line of the revolution. Support which does notcome from organized masses cannot be trusted orconsidered a reliable force in the ranks of the re-volution.

d) The organized masses cannot be led exceptthrough some kind of pyramidal organization whichrequires enlightened cadres on all levels. These ca-dres, in turn, need training and experience to es-tablish strong bonds between the masses and the lea-dership of the revolution.

2) To set-up a unified command which wouldassume leadership of the masses along with leader-ship of the armed struggle to ensure full coordina-tion among all forces in the interest of the revolu-tion.

3) To stage recurrent mass uprisings with theintention of:

a) Enlightening the masses and increasing theiradherence to the revolution.

b) Protecting the armed forces from crack-downs and plots attempted by some Arab regimes.The experiences undergone by the revolution inJordan and Lebanon provide evident proof of theability of the masses to protect the revolution withtheir bodies and voices rather than their arms —particularly that we are on Arab land and that the ar-mies entrusted with the task of nipping the revolu:

tion are Arab armies. Armed clashes with these

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armies will raise intricate obstacles for the revolu-tion. As far as the masses in occupied territory areconcerned.they are also capable of protecting armedstruggle and of crippling the enemy by strikingagainst his rear supply lines.

c) Protecting the legitimate rights granted bythe enemy to our Palestinian masses in occupiedterritory or by the Arab regimes in the respectivehost countries. These rights need alert masses toprotect them.

d) Securing new mass gains which, regardlesshow meager, boost the adherence and support of themasses to the revolution. The revolution cannotachieve all its aims at once. The masses should,through these uprisals, grab their one after the other.

4) To exploit contradictions in the enemyranks. The enemy army comprises men of the Jewishfaith who do not belong to one race and who do nothave the same motivations. By coming into contactwith the enemy forces, the masses mobilized throughpolitical struggle can discover their contr.aditions,capitalize on them and even win over elements towork on our side. The enemy army also comprisesnon-Jewish .forces, some of which are Arab, whichshould also be handled and won over to strengthenthe revolution. Ar for the Arab armies, they includenationalistic elements and it is the task of the mobi-lized masses to establish relations with them so as totransform them into a shield for the protection of therevolution and the masses against the schemes andplots of the regimes.

5) To select the qualified and efficient elem-

ents for the formation of the popular militia whosetask would be to protect the masses against reprisals,In their political struggle, the masses are exposed tocounter attacks by the enemies of the revolution.The steadfastness of the masses is greatly affectedby their ability to protect themselves. The militia isa defensive organization intended to protect the mas-ses. It is not part of the masses engaged in the poli-tical struggle.

6) To foil and counter the psychological warfarelaunched by the enemy.

7) To "foil espionage attempts and to unveilagents and saboteurs. The masses engaged in the po^litical struggle can simultaneously protect supplylines and the armed bases and report to the armedforces and the revolutionary command a lot of in-formation about the enemy troops, their movementsand armaments.

8) To secure the ability of the revolution tokeep-up the struggle. Our revolution cannot for ins-tance continue to depend on contributions from theArab masses, particularly that most of the Arabgovernments which now allow us to raise such con-tributions have political stand which do not conformwith those of the revolution and its long-term objec-tives. Contributions which are raised publicly todayare exposed to being cut-off with the slightest chan-ge in political conditions. The revolution needs alot of funds, supplies and equipment and its de-pendence on contributions liable to be cut off en-dangers the revolution. The aim of the politicalstruggle should be to mobilize the organized massesin such a way as to be able to reconcile between the

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need to maintain their fighting ability and theirability to work and produce so as to make resourcesavailable for the revolution. The ability of the mas-ses to secure these resources through their produc-tivity is a safeguard for the revolution 'against pres-sure from the Arab governments...

9) To muster the support and participation ofJhe liberation forces in the world, particularly in theArab countries, the Socialist camp and the ThirdWorld. To achieve victory the Palestinian massesneed to wage a political struggle on the Arab andinternational levels.

10) To create the feeling among the massesthat they must rely on themselves. All the forces ofthe world can play a role in supporting the revolu-tion but the Palestinian masses alone have enduredthe aggression and should be able to remain alwaysin the avant-garde of the struggle against the enemy.Support from aboard cannot be relied upon fully be-cause it is always liable to be cut off by a change inpolitical conditions... The launching of our revolutionin 1965 expressed, to a great extent, our indomitablefaith in this principle of self-reliance.

11) To boost the attachment of the masses totheir homeland through revivification of nationalculture and heritage, local customs and the historyof the struggle... etc.

12) To increase the ability and aptitude of themasses to use all possible means to defend the ho-meland.

MEANS OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE

After this exposition about the need for politicalstruggle and its aims and objectives, let us turn tosee through what means these aims can be attained.

The means of political struggle are:

1) The setting up of popular organizations.These actually constitute the basic means for achiev-ing the aims of political struggle. They can be ini-tiated as follows:

a) The broad popular organizations capable of«absorbing» most elements of the population becau-se, by nature, they do not reflect political or revolu-tionary inclinations in their structure. Good examp-les of such broad popular organizations are the fe-derations of workers, peasants, students and womenas well as the social and sports organizations.

b) Organizations with slight and specific poli-tical orientation such as the youth organizations, thepartisan committees, the fund raising committees,and the committees to care for the families of theFedayeen...

c) The revolutionary organizations or «cadres»which constitute the backbone of the revolution.Their absence or weakness disrupts the chain ofcommunications between the revolutionary com-mand and the masses and deprives political struggleof one of its most vital links. Cadres constitute thefront-line leadership of the masses. They must bedisciplined and should be highly qualified, matureand steadfast. The revolution can lead all kinds ofpopular organizations once it succeeds in buildingan efficient cadre.

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2) The use of legitimate means to undertakepolitical and revolutionary activity. Such activitythrough recognized legitimate rights facilitated thetask of the Resistance in many Arab countries incontacting the masses to enlighten them and involvethem in the work.

3) Foiling liquidation attempts and avertingplots to involve the revolution in side-battles.

4) The creation of the proper atmosphere forarmed struggle in supporting it and advocating it.This should feature:

a) The selection of qualified candidates for par-ticipation in the armed struggle. Political organiza-tions should be the only link between the massesand the armed struggle.

b) The transformation of political bases intobases for the accommodation and protection of ele-ments of the armed forces (such as in the Aghwar inJordan and in South Lebanon.)

c) The setting up of popular militia in the po-litical bases and centers of mass concentration.

5) The establishment of a wide national frontto encompass all the national forces that have faithin the phased aims of the revolution.

6) The continuous elucidation of the revolu-tion's policy and line of action. In fact, clarity in therevolution's political aims is basic factor in bolster-ing political struggle. It should be made clear, forinstance, that our aim to establish a unitary, demo-cratic, non-sectarian state in Palestine is not a poli-

tical project suggested to the Zionist usurpers but aprecept of struggle implying the liquidation of theZionist entity and all the institutions it built on ourland.

7) The gradual escalation of the masses' invol-vement in the struggle until their complete mergerin the revolution.

8) Encouragement of the masses to extend ser-vices to each others.

9) Exclusion from the revolution's ranks of allbad elements so that revolutionaries may continueto be, in the eyes of the masses, an example of pa-triotism, good character, modesty and discipline.

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ce:

A people's war (or a war of the revolutionarymasses) is the end result of a combination of twotypes of struggle — armed struggle and politicalstruggle. Should these be separated or should one bepracticed at the expense of the other, the people'swar would lose its meaning and be rendered inca-pable of achieving victory. An armed struggle whichfails to convince its executors of the validity of itspremises is bound to be short lived. And a politicalstruggle which limits itself to mobilizing, educatingand guiding the people is bound to come up againstthe simple truth that only the defeat of the enemy'smilitary forces can achieve the cessation of the ene-my's aggression.

To understand the strategy of a people's war, astudy of its three stages is imperative.

A study of all past people's wars which ended invictory reveals that a people's war, any people's war,invariably passes through three stages: strategicdefense stage, the strategic balance stage, and thestage of strategic counter-attack.

We feel, however, that it would be useful, con-sidering the current conditions of the PalestinianRevolution, to regard the people's war as a war oftwo stages, the first being the stage of avoiding de-cisive battles, the second the stage of decisive battles.

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The effects, positive or negative, of a decisivebattle, although not necessarily precipitous in na-ture, are usually longlasting and are felt in militarystrategy — perhaps in overall strategy. For thisreason, decisive battles can not be waged by guerillabands but must rely on a mobile strategic militaryforce, called Popular Army Units, whose strength orweakness is decided in the light of its victory ordefeat in a decisive battle, and hence in the war.

Taking this fact as a premise, we can confidentlysay that the function of strategy in a people's war isto search for ways and means which enable therevolutionary vanguard of a given people to build apopular army out of a people whose workers andfarmers have grown lean waiting for their live-lihood, have lost faith in the future and the possibi-lity of change, have turned for comfort to the pastand are being constantly subjected to the ruthless-ness of a colonial oppressor.

The factors involved in the mechanism of suchpopular war strategy are aptly summarised byGiap's statement that «our war, from the militaryviewpoint, has established that an illarmed populararmy fighting for a just cause can, through the useof the appropriate tactics and strategy, assemble thecircumstances necessary for victory over a modernarmy belonging to aggressive imperialism.))

STAGE OF AVOIDING DECISIVE BATTLES

The stage of avoiding decisive battles can be cal-led the stage of birth, growth and the sinking ofroots. Its success means that the defeat of the enemyhas become a matter of time only. This stage is

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launched with the understanding that «we are weakand the enemy is strong.» At its inception, the ba-lance between us and the enemy can be describedas maximum weakness against maximum strength.The objective of this stage, then, is self-developmentand expansion to allow a defeated people to changethe balance of power in its favor. Since the initiativeis taken by the weak, it is imperative that this stagebe conducted with intelligence as to result in tippingthe balance of power in our favor.

Waging war with intelligence means utiliz'ngthe strategy and tactics which would serve the de-sired purpose of carrying us from weakness tostrengh, from lack of arms to an abundance of arms,from land deprivation to land possession. What isrequired, then are the tactics which enable the weakto confront the strong, and these are beyond doubtthe tactics of the war of partisans which consists inusing the combined points of strength in the weakside against the strong side's points of weakness,avoid'ng a confrontation of forces, and taking advan-tage of the time element to sap the energy of theinvading forces through small operations (i.e. opera-tions of exhaustion and annihilation), while simul-taneously gathering the potentials of the people andcreat'ng the necessary political and military institu-tions. This process, in short, is aimed at exhaustingand wiping out the enemy while preserving and de-veloping oneself. These are the tactics of the war ofpartisans, or guerilla warfare, which must be appliedif the stage of balance of power with the enemy is tobe reached: a rising balance for us, a sinking balancefor him.

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The stage of avoiding decisive battles is charac-terized by:

1. A strategy of long-range defensive war oninternal fronts.

2. The tactics of a lightning offensive war onthe external fronts (guerilla warfare).

3. Its objective is self-development exhaustionof the enemy and creation of the pyramid of thepeople's army (partisan forces — local forces, cen-tralized mobile strategic forces).

4. Direction of the major strike: finding a safebase and ending the phase of dispersement and va-grancy.

5. Enemy's tactics: siege and annihilation ope-rations by land coupled with concentrated air raids.

A careful study of strategy and tactics revealthat what is required is long-term strategy and short-term tactics and that we must resort to swiftly-deci-ded battles within the framework of long-term stra-tegy. The purpose of the swift decision is to preventthe enemy from drawing in more of forces than oursthrough his ability to send reinforcements. The pur-pose of long-term strategy is to gain time to build upour forces, realize the aim of the first stage and ac-celerate changes in international postures. Revolu-tionary forces cannot attain adulthood at birth butmust be content to grow gradually.

Another point to be noted in the developmentof this military stage is that whereas its strategy isone of a defensive war, its tactics are those of an of-

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fensive one. This contradiction is necessary, however,for the realization of long-term strategy. For if wewere to adopt the tactics of a long-term defensivewar, we would be moving in the direction of catas-trophe and inevitable suffocation. While it is truethat defense and offense are two basic aspects offighting, it is also true that offense is the basis of therelationship between defense and offense. It is of-fense which achieves the ends of war, namely theannihilation of the enemy and self-preservation anddevelopment. The weak party which has musteredits forces, cannot but launch swiftly-decided or light-ning attacks taking into account the golden rules ofthe guerilla warfare stage — if the enemy advances,withdraw; if he tires, hit him: if he settles, harrasshim; and if he retreats chase him. All this should bedone in keeping with the numerical framework:strategically, we pit one against ten and, tactically,we pit ten -against one. All this must be done alsowithin the basic rules of safety — constant motion,constant digging and varying camouflage. The pur-pose of applying the two above said principles is todetermine the aim of this stage, which is the es-tablishment of the popular army in its three majorforces:

1. The partisans force, the major aim of whichis to wage a war of exhaustion through its scatteredelements and its decentralization andf.a war of par-tial annihilation through its lightning strikes.

2. Local forces, the aim of which would be toexhaust and immobilize large forces and to becomeable to strike at the enemy wherever he enters.These are forces of immobilization and strategicdefense (not negative defense).

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3. The mobile strategic force: the major force,with centralized leadership, capable of waging an-nihilating battles in one given direction in such away as to achieve major strategic victories.

The beginning of guerilla warfare marks thebeginning of the creation of the fighting forces, orself-development, and herein lies the basis of dif-ferentiation between effect ve and arbitrary guerillawarfare. Herein lies also the difference between thecommando squads attached to regular armies andguerilla units. The task of the former is to achieve aspecific, and purely military goal, and there the mis-sion ends. The activities of the latter (i.e. guerillaunits) are of revolutionary significance as seen intheir initial concentration on winning the peopleover and undertaking operations beamed more to-ward the people than against the enemy (armed pro-paganda). In fact, the recruitment of more guerillasand the increase of the number of guerilla units inall regions is one of the tasks of guerilla war leaders.

While it does not necessarily result in the cons-truction of a house, a cornerstone must be laid if ahouse is to be built

Similarly, guerilla warfare, although it repres-ents one step in a thousand-mile journey, is thebeginning of something big. It means that the revo-lution has moved from the drawing board to thejobsite.

We are bound, however, to miss the aim of thestage of avoiding decisive battles, which consists increating a popular military force capable of crip-.pling the enemy's military machine through the use

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of the strategy and tactics described above, if welose sight of the direction of the major strike —namely, the establishment of a secure base.

A secure base, as we see it is characterized bythe following:

1. ITS DEFINITION: A place in which the re-volutionaries have complete authority and control.

2. ITS SPECIFICATIONS:

a. It should be in contact with enemy groundsto enable the revolutionaries to undertake armedaction; to, so to speak, baptize them in fire; and toallow them to learn ab'nit war in an atmosphere ofwar.

b. It should be in the midst of the people di-rectly connected with the revolution.

c. It should be so located as to enable the re-volutionaries to resist the siege and annihilationoperations of the enemy. In other words, the securityfactor should be ensured for the secure base.

3. ITS AIM:

Shortening the war by speeding up the buildingof the popular armed forces' pyramid.

STAGE OF DECISIVE BATTLES

Evidently victory or defeat in war are the func-tion of two factors, the first being the basic objectivematerial factor or the military and topographicalconditions of the warring parties. The second factoris the subjective factor or the ability to keep the

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objective subordinate to the subjective in the con-duct of the war. This stage differs from its predeces-sor in the abundant presence of the organized ob-jectivity factor along with the development of thesubjective factor as a result of the experience gainedby leaders and soldiers through the practice of gue-rilla warfare and constant baptism by fire.Sincee waris no more than a contest of strength, this stage isidentical to its predecessor in its strategic principleswhich the weak party of the first stage is now ableto use in a better and more extensive way — par-ticularly those which relate to initiative, feasibility,and planning. Enemy conditions, in other words, havebecome infested with negatives which constitute po-sitives for us. Strategic balance is thus attained bymeans of the following achievements:

1. Forcing enemy forces into a defensive pos-ture, scattering them and pinning them to theirpositions.

2. Spreading the revolution in such a way asto enable it to strike at the enemy at any point itwishes.

3. Making it difficult for the enemy to com-pensate for his heavy losses in experienced humanfighting elements by striking at his fighting elite.

4. Rendering the enemy incapable of workingin accordance with rules and means which serve aneffective strategy.

5. Gradually destroying the morale of the ene-my forces, paralyzing their will to fight, breakingthe spirit of their military leaders and portrayingimpotence of the latter to the people.

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world public opinion and6. Winning over world public opinion andworking for an actual or potential revolt by the ene-my's people against the enemy's army and govern-ment.

All these developments will enable the people'sarmy to move on from the stage which focuses onexhausting the enemy to the enemy-annihilationstage, which stage is characterized by the following:

a. ITS STRATEGY.

A long-range defensive war on the internal lines.

b. ITS TACTICS:

A swiftly-decided offensive war on the externallines (guerilla war — regular popular war).

c. ITS AIM:

Destroying the enemy by annihilating his bestforces.

d. DIRECTION OF ITS MAJOR STRIKE:

Establishing control over strategic positions,holding same and striking the enemy's major forces.

Since the tactics are identical, it may seem atfirst glance that there is no difference between thetwo stages. Although it is true that we have kepttactics and strategy constant, it is also true that wehave intensified both, in degree and in form. Forwhereas in the first stage guerilla warfare charac-terized the war and the swiftly-decided battles alongthe external lines, guerilla warfare in the secondstage assumes a complementary role, acting as sup-port for the regular war — a war of motion and posi-

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tions — which constitutes the main characteristic ofattacks in the second stage.

Annihilation of the enemy requires guerilla war-fare of a higher standard — a regular popular war.But it is of the utmost importance during the transi-tion to the stage of decisive battles to constantlyintensify guerilla warfare and maintain and increa-se its pressure for swifter exhaustion of enemy forces.

Regular popular war consists in activating, insuccession and as circumstances require, the threeforces formed during the first stage. This underscoresthe importance of activating the centralized mobilestrategic force for a war of motion, and the necessityof achieving total centralization of leadership tomake possible the planning necessary for a mobilewar. With such centralization, the war acquires as-pects of a regular war. and without it the war wouldremain one of partisan (or guerilla) nature.

What makes the centralized forces ideal is thefact that they are of guerilla origin and can there-fore, depending on changes in the balance of power,either be centralized and driven in one direction orbe distributed into local forces and guerilla units.Since the classical army has no such close connectionwith the people, it has no such advantage. In ad-dition, the popular army can, due to its origin, fightwith or without modern weapons.

THEORY AND APPLICATION

Our revolution has over the past four years ar-rested attention through the victories it has beenable to achieve inspite of the adverse circumstances

which were described in a statement made in early1969 by one of our Cuban comrades, who said, «Fa-teh's Assifa fighter is the legendary guerilla fighter.He fights on a limited area, without forests, inadverse topographical surroundings and an extreme-ly intricate political environment.))

Our evaluation of our military achievementsmust be made on the basis that we are still in thestage of avoiding decisive battles. The yardstick fornegatives and positives should be the measure ofsuccess we have achieved in self-development and inthe fulfilment of the six conditions for strategic ba-lance.

For maximum clarity, let us review our phasedactivities from June 1967 todate.

A. The phase of undoing the political effect ofthe Israeli military victory from August 28, 1967, tillthe end of 1967:

Toward the end of June, while Dayan was stat-ing that every time there was a knock at his doorhe expected an Arab delegate to walk in and sign apeace treaty, an Arab official was telling a delegationrepresenting our movement: «If you do not act andat least start some fires, we cannot possibly go on.»

No one can ever rid us of the shame that theenemy was able to l if t the curfew on the West Bankonly a few weeks after the June defeat. Likewise,History will record that our movement was the onlyone which saw in the June defeat the beginning ofthe great victory.

On August 28, 1967. Fateh decided to start early

31

armed action on the West Bank with the intent ofundoing the effect of the Israeli victory.

A defeated people is at a disadvantage. For thevanquished to face up to his enemy politically andmilitarily, for him to exert pressure on internationaland hostile powers, he must without delay extricatehimself from his circumstances, which are disadvan-tageous to him and advantageous to the enemy, andcreate circumstances which suit him and are de-trimental to the enemy.

Early action was also aimed at preventing theenemy from pushing through a house-cleaning ope-ration to bring the entire nation to its knees. A start-off under unbalanced internal conditions to confrontan unprepared enemy is far better than a start-offto confront a prepared enemy with better preparedconditions.

We, in Fateh, believe that the core of revolutio-nary action is that we be constantly committed, re-gardless" of circumstances, difficulties and sacrifices.And to be committed to an idea, it is less importantfor that idea to ferment and develop within us thanit is for it to reveal itself and for us to embody itthrough our actions.

Despite all circumstances, our forces sprang intoaction under the leadership of Abu Ammar brandish-ing the slogans — «Do not be afraid:: wrap your fistsaround the burning coal» and «The homeland ordeath.» The aim was to make ourselves heard to theworld and to introduce the Palestinian elementthrough the practice of armed propaganda.

Action which is beamed more at the people and

32

the world than at the enemy must include action inthe cities, attacks on enemy patrols in the villages,and the public execution of agents, traitors and col-laborators.

Operations such as these are adventurous, suircidal in nature, and the results of the first fourmonths (after August 28, 1967) were cheering andpainful at the same time. At the cost of 46 men, halfof them belonging to the leadership cadres, wecarried out 79 operations inside Palestine, with thefollowing material effects:

1. Killing and woundingincluding nine officers.

about 318 Zionists,

2. Attacks on 13 kibbutzim.

3. Public execution of five traitors.

4. Blowing up of two military trains.

5. Destruction of 44 vehicles.

6. Exploding the large arms depot near Acreand the bazooka shelling of the suburbs of Jerusalemand Tel Aviv.

7. Downing of three helicopters.

8. Attacks on strategic installations (electricity,water, etc.)

B. The secure base:

We succeded during these last four months of1967 in recapturing the attention of the world, andour operations began to inject the feeling of victoryinto the Arab people.

33

The experience of those months convinced usthat we must content ourselves with our achievem-ents until that date and turn our attention to endingthe dispersement and vagrancy stage without furtherdelay. In fact, such method of fighting could neverbe of a long-range strategy nature. Self-developmentcould not be attained with the attrition which thedispersed and vagrant people were subjected to asa result of their .nability to swiftly regain theirbases. It thus became necessary to launch the strug-gle for a secure base.

Where should the secure base be? The questionled us to utilize the advantage which no other re-volution in the world enjoyed: that our war is a warof a people in a nation whose land has not beentotally occupied, making it possible to turn the unoc-cupied areas into a secure base.

Thus the Aghwar were chosen as the groundsfor overt action (secure base) and the West Bankas the battlefield.

Any man who has a work system can undertakestrategic work and map out the phased tasks and thedirection of the major strike. This explains why 1968was a year of debate over the revolution from withinand without. Many, at the time, made the seriousm'stake of linking the Palestinian nature of therevolution to the area which imperialism called Pa-lestine.

We, in Fateh, view Palestine in terms of na-tional, not geographic, dimensions. While we insistthat it would be a mistake to allow Arab nationalismto expropriate the Palestinian identity (and in so

34

doing freeze the largest mutinous section of theArab people), we also stress that it is clear that theplan to destroy Zionism, indeed the main lines of anystrategy of revolution, depends on the measure ofclarity with which we can answer the following ques-tion:

How can we exploit the demographic and topo-graphic status of the Arab people, at least those whofigure in the Zionist expansionist designs, to launcha popular war based on the enlightened, organizedand armed masses?

The above said premises reveal the ideologicalprinciples and the clarity of vision with which ourmovement entered the battle of al-Karameh — the,battle to acquire a secure base, the first decisivebattle ever waged by the Palestinian Revolution andthe second time that Fateh sacrificed all for the sakeof all.

By the sunset of Thursday, March 21, 1968, andby the dawn of Friday March 22, 1968, the PalestinianRevolution had embarked on the self-developmentand root-sinking stage — the stage in which Pa-lestinian feet were planted in the land for the f.rsttime in 20 years.

C. The Bitter Honey Factor:

The acquisition of a secure base can be consi-dered the theoretical, though not the chronological,half-way mark along the path of the armed popularrevolution.

A revolution which calls a halt in the middle ofthe road condemns itself to death. Dogged persistence

35

always conies at a high price. For there is a definitelink between the measure of sacrifice and theavailable potential, each being inversely proportiona-te to the other.

The potentials which were available to ourfighting forces early in 1968 were scarce indeed whenseen against the responsibilities which were laid onthe shoulders of the movement. The difficulties wereposed not so much by a dearth of finances and armsas by the problem of pulling together a large numberof alert and trained fighters and the problem ofextracting from them the cadre capable of creatingcircumstances which encourage the toleration of thetrials and tribulations, which the revolution wasbound to be subjected to. The emergence of suchcreative cadre takes time, and time is a rare com-modity in the history of modern revolutions.

Thus, 1968 was a year in which the ability of therevolution to maintain itself, reap the fruits of al-Karameh victory in terms of self-development andpreventing the enemy from achieving any strategicvictories was put to trial.

The year 1968 was marked mainly by the birthand development of the centralized strategic force,which is the cornerstone for building the popularPalestinian army.

The Aghwar all along the East Bank of theJordan River teemed with thousands of young menwhose only resemblance to a fighter had once beentheir khaki uniforms. The revolution was able inaddition to meet the requirements of such a centra-lized force — supply and transport units, a central

36

operations room, medical services, training units,wire and wireless communications units, etc. All thiswas achieved in the midst of napalm raids, while therevolutionaries were being baptized by fire andlearning about war through war itself.

Revolution is a creative thing. Those who studythe factors which enabled Fateh to remain the guid-ing and pace-setting movement in the area over thepast two years will note that the objective, materialfactors were equally available to many of the otherforces, and that the decisive factor which kept Fatehaf the helm of the Palestinian Revolution was thecreativity of its revolutionary vanguard, manifestedin the.r ability to make of themselves both the knifeand the victim, to enter the battle to create everyth-ing out of nothing. All these traits embodied in theability to struggle against impossible odds were thedecisive factor in maintaining Fateh's hold over lea-dership of the Palestinian Revolution.

The major guideline of military work during thestage of avoiding decisive battles is self developmentand enemy-annihilation. If we apply the six yards-ticks of strategic balance we note the followingachievements:

1. Forcing enemy forces out of the offensive andinto the defensive:

Stemming the initiative of the invading forceswas the first thing which had to be done and theresponsibility of doing it fell on the shoulders of therevolution and the Jordanian army. The revolutionsucceeded, through the battle of al-Karameh and theconsiderable losses it inflicted on the enemy, in

37

temporarily stemming the initiative of the enemy.The speed with which secure bases were establishedand a barrier of fighters set up all along the bordersforced Israel to replace its continued initiative withcontinued inertia along the West Bank of the JordanRiver.

2. Crippling enemy tactics:

The problem faced by Fateh strategists is that,contrary to what happens in classical war, the im-plementation tools in the popular revolution areborn, develop and crystallize in the course of the re-volution itself. This means that in a people's warthere is a slow escalation from tactics to strategy,whereas in classical war the movement is downward,from strategy to tactics.

The strategists of a people's war are thereforeforced during the stage of avoiding decisive battlesto tailor their strategic plans to fit the given tacticsand psychological enrivonmerit, leaving the initiativeto the enemy. The past two years can for this reasonbe considered years of the struggle of tactics.

The enemy's move from the offensive to the de-fensive had forced him to abandon work on the ex-ternal lines and concentrate on the internal lines —a negative position from which the enemy has tried toextricate himself through compensation for the prodi-gious cost of constant fixture along the entire lengthof the border by adopting a variety of tactics aimed atconfining his confrontation with us to the JordanRiver. This the enemy attempted to do for the pur-pose of securing internal peace and high morale onthe one hand and, on the other pulling the teeth ofthe popular army which he had failed to abort at al-

38

Karameh, shaking said army's faith inits effectiveness and making it feel asif it were kicking against the pricks. Thus,the enemy created a security belt along the length ofthe border. In the north, the belt took the form ofmine fields, mined barbed wire and electronic audio-visual devices. In the central area (i.e. that of theWest Bank) aware of the danger of contact betweenthe Arabs of the east and west banks, the enemysetup a human barrier. In the south, a combinationof both types of security measures was adopted. Togive his security belt a psychological impact, theenemy meanshile concentrated on air raids, bombinghumain concentrations with napalm.

The struggle over the past two years has beenone of defense-offense for Israel, with the accent onair raids in the offensive operations. For us, however,the struggle has been one of offense-defense. In fact,Fateh strategists applied the «circular saw» tacticsto overcome the enemy's security belt.

The circular saw tactics had two major objecti-ves, the first being to allow newly-recruited forcesto learn fighting by practicing it, the second being toneutralize the effect of the planes and provide ef-fective protection through constant motion of theforces.

Experience has taught us that one spy is enoughto destroy scores of security networks and thatconstant motion coupled with constant digging cons-titute the best possible security network.

Each of the two parties was and still is attempt-ing to force the other into a defensive position and

39

cripple his offensive operations.

Initially, the enemy tried to hold us to the EastBank by sending across small armed units to blowup houses and plant mines, in the hope that we wouldbusy ourselves with defensive operations scatteringour forces and abandoning the idea of crossing overto the west Bank. We foiled these tactics, however,by boosting our crossings and convincing the enemyof the fruitlessness of his tactics, which, indeed, wereabandoned soon after.

On our part, to make the naUing down moreburdensome for the enemy, we created protectionproblems for him. The aim, in other words, was toincrease the number of spots which the enemy hadto protect. Our fighters left no inlet unused, thusnailing down several enemy brigades along theborder. This helped correct the balance of powerbetween enemy and Arab forces.

When the enemy realized his failure to set upan impregnable barrier, he allocated forces for whathe called «hot pursuits. These were meant to foil ourtactics of «patpols in depth», which consisted insending guerilla units from the East Bank to strikeat strategic targets deep in enemy territory, reachingas far as Tel Aviv, Beersheba and Gaza.

«Hot pursuit)) relies on pulling together humanforces and an intensity of fire a hundred times thatof their prey, to surround and wipe out patrols whichsucceed in penetrating the security belt.

Intially, the enemy scored several successes. Ourfighters fought valiantly, but the balance was infavor of the enemy. We quickly grasped the enemy's

strategic intent and applied counter tactics, based onaccepting such confrontations when they occurredbut in spots of our fighters' own choosing — in spotswhere the topography is suitable for defense andpreservation and on condition that the strugglers beprovided with a doubled fire intensity.

This practice of ours is reminiscent of the mos-quito which killed the elephant. Consider ng theirsmall numbers, it was easy for our fighters to disap-pear in suitable topography, and the sheer size of theenemy made it inevitable that our fighters, with the'rconcentrated hail of fire, should inflict on him highlydisproportionate losses. The result of this type ofconfrontation was extremely sat sfactory — so sa-tisfactory, in fact, that it triggered a long debate inthe Israeli press in which Dayan was accused ofwalking nto a trap set up by Fateh, which was quiteprepared to sacrifice an ent-re patrol as long as theratio of losses was one to three or one to five inFateh's favor.

Revolutions whose fighters are politically moti-vated are left unscathed by defeats, whereas vic-tories affect them deeply. One victory is enough tomake the fighters of a popular revolut'on forget se-veral defeats. This Dayan knows, and it is for thisreason that he is trying to deprive the revolution ofthe slightest victory. That he has failed in this shownby the outcome of the following confrontations

41

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our path to South Lebanon. The Israelis forgot thatthe honor and dignity of a people have priority overhunger and pain and that there is no pain as into-lerable to a people as the pain emanating from anattack on their national existence and national feel-ings.

4. Armed revolutionary organization (the truedefense wall):

The strategic value of geographic depth is doubl-ed when the human element is introduced. Humanstrategic depth represents one of the biggest possiblestrategic advantages which we should exploit in ourwar.

In area, we have gained much since al-Karamehbattle. This is reflected in the emergence of armedpopular organization, which has allowed us to planand act in the knowledge that whereas the enemy cancross the river, ,t is no longer possible for him toleave the inhabited areas alive. The Israelis wouldbe doing us the greatest strategic favor if they decidedto meet us on our own grounds. An Arab fights hisbest battles on his land. Had the people of the WestBank been armed, the June War would have takena different turn.

In time, the thickness of the defensive .wall willincrease and the Israel's will begin to face the bigdilemma: their inability to coexist and their inability

44

to deter. This is one of the major justifications forthe major justifications for the minimization of theimportance of the lack of balance in material power.

By standing on its own feet, armed revolutionary,organization meant the birth of the local forces eastof the river, which forces should be the twin bro-ther of the local forces west of the river, so that bothcan flank the forces centralized in the Aghwar.

Combatting the Israeli war machinery and im-perial.sm can be achieved at the hands of the Arabnation's only power — namely, manpower. This canbe done by transforming this capacity into a revolu-tionary reservoir armed with political awareness todefeat imperialist technological superiority and foilthe blitzkrieg strategy and the strategy of long-termwars. That is the strategic aim behind revolutionaryorganization.

Spreading the revolution in all areas is one ofthe vital requirements of a people's war. The ex-plosions in Haifa, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Hebron, BeitSahour, etc. bear witness to the extent to whicharmed revolutionary organization has spread westof the river.

5. Steps toward the mobile war (the Green Belt,al-Himmah and the Good Earth operations):

Centralization of the centralized strategic forcesdoes not mean to gather them in one spot but toenable them to work together under centralized com-mand. This requires the ability to fight at the res-pective levels of a squadron, battalion, brigade, di-vision and army.

Securing the proper number of men and arms45

for a squadron does not mean the creation of one.A squadron is formed when it becomes certain that itcan fight as one unit to achieve varying ends. Someofficers, for instance, can lead one hundred fighterswell and accomplish the mission, but would lead five

hundred men straight to catastrophe on an identicalmission.

The development of the fighters' and leaders'personalities the raising of |heir standards to the le-vel of bigger responsibilities can only be achievedthrough practice.

The significance of the «Green Belts, «GoodEarth,» «Bayonets of Fateh,» «al-Himmah,» «FarhanAs-Saadi» and «Beit Sahour» operations lies in thefact they represent the birth of the platoons andsquadrons capable of carrying out the missions ofplatoons and squadrons. This represents the begin-ning of the formation of the popular tools requiredby the mobile war. When these tools are completed,the big achievement will start west of the river tocomplement the achievements on the East Bank.Then will the big leap come.

Events have proved that Fateh's takeoff in 1965was not an offspring of nervous tension and fruitlessmutiny. Events have also proved that all that we, ofFateh, needed to do was correct our steps withoutchanging our d'rection, and that our biggest militaryachievement was in convincing the people of thenecessity to struggle. Our people have left behindthem the idea of blitzkrieg war and are now organiz-

46

ing their popular leaderships and crystallz'ng theirintellectual and political conditions to confront theIsraelis and, behind them, the Americans, who infighting us are not after a guarantee of the Jews'right to I've but the exploitation of the entire Arab

region — which can never be achieved before theIsraelis bring the Arabs to their knees.

In the Aghwar, our Arab nation fought out noth-ing but victorious battles. It is the guns of the Agh-war that will bring the Israelis to their knees. Thecontrary will never happen.

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THE PALESTINE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT , FATE