Book 2

Political Report and Discussion Documents

COSATU 13th National Congress

“Deepen the Back to Basic Campaign, Consolidate the Struggle for the NDR and Advance the Struggle for Socialism”.

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Contents

1. Political Report........................................................................................................................................... 3

1.1. The International Balance of class Forces........................................................................3

1.2. Assessing the Domestic Balance of class Forces.........................................................21

1.3. The Socio – Economic Context and Radical Socio – Economic transformation............................................................................................................................................................ 48

1.4. Building COSATU for the challenges lying ahead........................................................82

2. COSATU Strategy towards the 2019 Elections........................................................................120

3. Discussion Papers................................................................................................................................ 128

3.1. An inescapable need for a reconfigured Alliance An inescapable need for a reconfigured Alliance..........................................................................................................................128

3.2. Preliminary Assessment of the ANC 2014 Manifesto.............................................139

3.3. COSATU’s Analysis of the 2016 Local Government Elections.............................161

3.4. COSATU’s 2015 Plan..............................................................................................................176

3.5. Constitutional review committee....................................................................................189

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Political Report

1. The International Balance of class Forces

1.1. Introduction

“The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.....” Marx and Engels, 1848, the Communist Manifesto.

Since its inception, capitalism has been about generalised commodity production on a world scale, for narrow private profiteering. This explains the world economy becoming more and more a unit structured by and in the interest of the most developed imperialist countries, the dominant global centres of capital accumulation. The export market largely shape the type, quality, specialty and overall and purposed design of what is produced and in what quantities.

The deeper the level of internationalisation of capital and the productive forces, the more intense the class struggle itself, both in its organisational and internationalist forms. History has proven that the internationalisation of revolutions and counter-revolutions, exploitation and resistance, oppression and struggle, constitutes the essence or foundation for a revolutionary international of workers. In one word, the class struggle has no boundaries.

The working class is increasingly faced with a profound reality, the urgent need for even more sophisticated forms of solidarity, organisation and tighter coordination as a class, on a global scale. The global system of capitalism is ever facing deeper crisis, but without an advanced form of working class organisation on an international scale, the crisis won’t be turned to workers victory.

Writing in the International Marxist Review, Spring 1982, Ernest Mandel had this to say on this crucial subject, “Each national revolutionary organisation has to learn through its own experience how to develop a cadre and leadership capable of encompassing, besides all the lessons of the international class struggle, the national specificities of its own country, of its working class, of its labour movement, and working out correct tactics there. The International as a whole, and other sections, can advise and urge but they have no right to decide anything on these fields”. He went on to say, “Just as much as there is no strictly national revolution, no purely national economy, there is no bourgeoisie which confines its action to purely national terrain. We are living in the epoch of imperialism”.

The stakes are so high; foreign policy is an assemblage of powerful military and economic interests intertwined with political power. To illustrate this point vividly, “By 1949, the United States had liens on some 400 military bases, while the expansion of direct overseas investments was taking place at a phenomenal rate. Thus, while between 1929 and 1946 US foreign investments had actually declined from $7.9 to $7.2 bilion, between 1946 and 1967 they increased eight-fold to more than $60 billion. It is

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this global stake in the wealth and resources of the external frontier that forms the basis of the US to the worldwide status quo”.

For the USA led imperialism , war and bussiness are just two sides of the same coin, each reinforcing the other continuously . Currently the imperialist economic objective of expansion and getting unlimited access to natural resources is being desperately pursued by all means including through forcing governments in various countries to impose political and economic policies to open up.

Where this approach has failed , more brazen , more open and destructive military means are applied against properly targeted countries, many of whom are those with natural resources.

The socio –economic and politico-electoral platform and agenda of the right wing is continuously being consolidated in various part of the world and the working class is being hoodwinked to play a supportive role in the process through deceptive demagoguery politics. This was epitomized by the ascendency of Donald Trump in the USA and today it has been extended to France, Germany and Italy including in Iraq.

The rise of China the largest importer of oil has shaken the foundation of the US imperialist domination which is based on overthrowing sovereign countries and stealing of natural resources. This shift in the strategic location of China explains the continued aggression of the oil and mineral rich countries by the USA. The decline of the US power has occasioned a deadly geopolitical competition for hegemony between the US and China which will have negative results for exports and jobs in developing countries including South Africa as these countries try to close their markets for imports and engage in a trade war when in the main the whole world is depended on their markets.

The USA is on a panic mode and this has been openly displayed and crystallised by USA’s open role in supporting the overthrow of progressive governments in Latin America particularly in Venezuela and Brazil.

The USA led imperialist military approach has taken a central stage over the political approach an is becoming more open, brazen, overt and unapologetic in its intensity. This is a continuation of what became intensified 25 years ago when USA relentlessly subdued, exploited and essentially re-colonized the resource-rich and geo-strategically important regions .

In this context countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Syria, and many other countries have been destroyed, and millions have been killed or turned into refugees.

The recent merciless attacks by Israel directed against the Palestinian people attests to this growing right wing offensive which is openly being backed up by the USA.

Maintaining the oppression of the working class plays a central role in the calculations of the imperialist powers. Seven years ago, when the revolutionary masses in Tunisia and Egypt brought down two brutal lackeys of imperialism, Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, the imperialist powers intervened in Libya and Egypt to install pro-Western puppet regimes and divided the working class along religious and ethnic lines.

Five years later, despite the counter-revolution and war, the Middle East and North Africa are experiencing a revival of the class struggle. At the beginning of the year, mass protests took place in Iran, Tunisia and Morocco. In Turkey, the employers’ organization MESS was forced to increase the wages of 130,000 metalworkers by 24 percent, in order to prevent

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the renewed outbreak of wildcat strikes. In Israel, a one-day general strike had already paralyzed the country at the end of last year.

The political institutions and agreements such as the United Nations meant to create world peaceful coexistence are seen as an obstacle to the imperialist economic objective of expansion and unlimited access to natural resources. They are being turned upside down. This has seen open undermining of multilateral institutions by the USA led imperialist offensive. This was seen with the undermining of the UN resolution on Lybia and very recently it has been Palestine.

In the process , the US has started 13 wars over a period of 30 years , spent over 14 trillion dollars in the process and hundreds of thousands of innocent people have perished.

This heightening military offensive was also seen in the recent summit of NATO countries where they agreed on a plan to expand the number of high-readiness military forces ready to attack Russia, or any other country, at a moment’s notice. The summit resolution declared that “Allies will offer an additional 30 major naval combatants, 30 heavy or medium manoeuvre battalions, and 30 kinetic air squadrons, with enabling forces, at 30 days’ readiness or less.”

The resolution reaffirmed NATO’s moves to deploy “four multinational combat-ready battalion-sized battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland,” including “over 4,500 troops from across the Alliance, able to operate alongside national home defence forces,” all within hundreds of miles of Russia’s second-largest city, St. Petersburg.

Very recently we have also seen a huge escalation of the war against Yemen being waged by a coalition of forces that includes the United States, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, the UK and France.  These forces have waged a relentless war against Yemen, the poorest Arab country.  There has been continuous bombing of the country by Saudi Arabia, including hospitals, schools, food supplies, neighborhoods, infrastructure and other civilian targets.  More than 14,600 civilians have been killed and injured and over three million people have been internally displaced.  The devastation has been so bad that the country is now entirely dependent on outside aid as eight million Yemenis face famine.  The worst cholera epidemic ever has caused over 1 million cases and resulted in more than 2,200 deaths.

Without US military and diplomatic backing, the war on Yemen could not take place.   It rightfully should be called the US/Saudi Arabian war on Yemen.This may be calling for a closer interrogation of South Africa’s foreign and trade policy with Saudi Arabia.

This policy of gravitating towards war aggression has been a trend for the Bush Administration , the Clinton Administration , under Obama and now under Donald Trump where it comes coupled with open racism and attacks directed against the African continent. The supremacy of war in politics is not just about who is the president in the USA but it is in the political “DNA” of USA political system.

It is a system influenced by military, industrial security, money and media etc, It is a an abhorrent system perpetuated under the guise of just wars justified under the America flag.

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It is a system which has over the years has given the USA an unquestionable mandate to invade over hundred countries, for regime change , causing economic chaos, implementing camouflaged terrorism for interests of the USA business in particular which always benefits in their alliance with the USA administration whether under democrats or republicans. After every war imposed by the USA in various countries, a call is made for a reconstruction and developments process and it is at this state that the bussiness component in the unholy alliance reaps the benefits of having invested in USA government led wars.

This is what gives the USA government a licence to forever look for wars .They have been recently looking for a war against North Korea , they are inviting war with Russia and in the process imposed sanctions against the Russians. A similar trend is seen in how the USA is dealing with CUBA, Venezuela and China on trade wars.

1.1.1. USA led Imperialist military offensive have also been pursued through economic policy expressed in the right wing economic agenda which is gradually gaining confidence in the context where is less coherent challenge from the left forces

a) The rising confidence of the Right wing in Europe

For an example the right wing continues to gain electoral confidence in various parts of the world . As we speak , in Italy, the collapse of the official “left”the Democratic Party (PD) and the left parties , has led to an electoral victory for the far right, including the Five Star Movement (M5S), led by comedian Beppe Grillo, and the extreme-right Lega, formerly the Lega Nord.

This is a country whose working class has a long and militant anti-fascist traditions, and the recent electoral results testify to the utter bankruptcy of the official “left.” The racist and fascist policies pursued by the right-wing parties are not supported by the broad mass of workers in Italy.

In Europe, social democratic parties have lost the support of the working class due to their pursuit of neo-liberal policies.

In France, the National Front came in second place in last year’s election; in Germany, the far-right ultra-nationalist Alternative for Germany entered parliament for the first time, and in Austria, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) shares government power.

In every case, it is the far-right that has benefited. The growth of the right wing due to the anti-working class policies of the nominal “left” parties is especially pronounced in Italy. Since the 1990s, the successor organisations to the Italian Communist Party have repeatedly enforced the interests of the financial markets and the European Union’s austerity dictates against bitter opposition from the working class.

b) The Right Wing in Latin America

In Latin America the new crop of right-wing governments with Macri in Argentina, Temer in Brazil, Piñera in Chile are no longer able to resolve the crisis gripping the capitalist system in the region . Like their erstwhile predecessor whom they accused of corruption,

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they are also mired in filthy corruption scandals; their only answer is to shift the burden onto the backs of the working class.

The public sector particularly teachers have taken the lead in this renewed upsurge of the class struggle, going on strike and taking to the streets from Sao Paulo to Buenos Aires, and from Santiago, Chile to Mexico City to San Juan, Puerto Rico to fight the decimation of public education and defend their living standards and basic rights. In many instances, these struggles have been met with naked police repression.

I. In Brazil

For an example Current President, Michel Temer, elected in 2014 as Rousseff’s running-mate, is the most despised head of state of any democratic period in Brazilian history, with only a 3 percent approval rating. Temer has ruled out running to keep his post, even though he faces imminent criminal persecution on corruption charges as soon as he steps out of the presidential palace on January.

In the Datafolha poll’s so-called “induced scenario,” where voters are asked to choose from a list of candidates, those still saying that they would cast blank or spoiled ballots oscillated between 21 and 34 percent, depending on whether former PT president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was in the running, an increasingly unlikely scenario. When Lula is included in the candidates’ list, he leads the polls with 30 percent, followed by 21 percent casting blank or spoiled ballots and 17 percent for the fascist Jair Bolsonaro. Given Lula’s exclusion, 34 percent said they would spoil ballots, with a small contingent migrating to Bolsonaro, giving him 19 percent.

Lula, who is currently serving a 12-year sentence on charges of money laundering and passive corruption related to the Lava-jato (Carwash) probe into a massive bribes and kickbacks scandal at the country’s state-run oil giant Petrobras, is barred from running due to an anti-corruption law that he himself signed into law in 2010. There is considerable expectation, however, that the country’s Supreme Court may at any moment order his release from jail as he appeals the country’s (civil) High Court’s ruling against him.

There is also speculation that a favorable Supreme Court ruling before the elections might put pressure on the Electoral Court to grant him a stay on the suspension of his political rights pending his definite conviction by the High Court. This would allow him to run for president and, if elected, secure immunity so long as he stays in office.

The most striking feature of the polls has consistently been the hemorrhaging of support for both the Workers Party and the PSDB, the two parties that have dominated the country’s longest, if still brief, democratic period since 1985.

II. In Venezuela

Nicolás Maduro won a second term as president, taking nearly 68 percent of votes cast, with 5.8 million, versus the 1.8 million for opposition candidate Henri Falcón, the former governor of Lara State and a former supporter of ex-president Hugo Chavez.

Research shows that despite Maduro’s large margin of victory, the election saw mass disaffection from the political system on the part of Venezuelan workers, reflected in the record low turnout. According to CNE President Tibisay Lucena, 8.6 million

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Venezuelans cast a vote out of 20.5 million, a turnout of just 46 percent, the lowest since elections resumed in 1958 following the end of the dictatorship.

Indeed, turnout has dropped substantially since even the last presidential election in 2013, when it stood at 80 percent. Maduro himself received 1.5 million fewer votes than in 2013, when he barely eked out a victory against Henrique Capríles.

While a boycott of the election by a majority of the right-wing Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) coalition no doubt contributed to the fall in turnout, the more significant change is the fall in support among former United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) voters.

It is no surprise that support for Maduro and the ruling chavísta PSUV has tumbled. The IMF expects inflation this year to reach 13,000 percent, an astronomical figure so high it is barely comprehensible. Despite an increase to the minimum wage, which now stands at 1 million bolívars per month, this figure is worth less than $2 according to the black market exchange rate. One kilogram of meat already costs more than 2 million bolívars, while a pair of shoes can easily exceed 10 million bolivars and the medical system is in shambles.

A major driver of the Venezuelan crisis has been the fall in both oil prices and oil production. Because oil accounts for over 95 percent of Venezuela’s export earnings, the fall in oil prices that began in 2014 led to a fall in imports. This resulted in widespread shortages of food, medicine, consumer goods and machinery and parts.

Oil production at state oil company PDVSA has hit a 33-year low, falling 28 percent over the past year to 1.4 million barrels per day (bpd). By comparison, Venezuela was producing 2.3 million bpd in January 2016 and 3 million bpd in 2009. Refineries are reportedly operating at only one-third of their capacity, while the number of operating oil rigs has been cut in half.

The developments in Brazil and Venezuella are not happening in a vacuum. Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay and even more intensely in Venezuela and Cuba, epitomise the systematic attacks on progressive forces and peoples’ struggles is a sustained war against humanity, sovereign economic resources and the gains of poor people in their struggles.

III. Colombia

Recently Colombia’s far-right Democratic Center candidate, Iván Duque, won the presidency with 54 percent of the vote against the 42 percent for Gustavo Petro of the Progressive Movement in a second-round election on June 17.

The political vacuum generated by the alignment of the official “left,” led by Petro, with the militaristic and austerity-driven policies of the outgoing Juan Manuel Santos administration has been exploited by the extreme right.

The largest parties in the Senate are now the Democratic Center and Radical Change, both closely tied with far-right paramilitary groups used by the landed and financial aristocracies to terrorize the peasantry. The coming to power of Duque parallels the rise of far-right forces in Europe and the United States, posing a stark warning for workers

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in Colombia and internationally about the continued shift of bourgeois rule toward increasingly dictatorial and militaristic governments.

Colombia is the closest military ally of the United States in the region, and it was announced last month that it will not only become a “global partner” of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but will also join the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which has continued to demand further corporate tax cuts and austerity from Bogotá.

The Colombian economy already suffered a sharp deceleration as oil and other commodity prices fell when the Chinese economy slowed down in 2014, and now the increase in interest rates in the capitalist centers and a trade war between the US, China and the European Union are on their way to upset previous forecasts with inflation and an economic downturn.

The 2017 tax reform cut corporate taxes from 40 percent to 33 percent. Meanwhile, a jump in the regressive value-added tax (VAT) from 16 to 19 percent is already hurting retail consumption—i.e., has measurably impoverished the masses.

The growing land and income inequality, devaluation and an addiction to profits from mineral and oil extraction are “destroying industrial and agricultural production.

Research shows that 71 percent of agricultural workers and peasants own 3 percent of registered land, while 0.2 percent of landowners, whose predatory interests Uribismo and Duque most directly represent, control 60 percent of the land.

Colombia is the second most unequal country in Latin America, a region where the top 10 percent own 68 percent of wealth, while the bottom 50 percent control just 3.5 percent, according to a recent Oxfam study.

The policies pursued by the political establishment to carve out a larger share of wealth for the ruling elites meant that 95 percent of all new wealth generated during 2017 in the region, that is, excluding the profits siphoned off by the imperialist financiers in New York and London, was hoarded by the top 10 percent.

The more than 300 million Latin Americans of the bottom half, according to the same Oxfam report, lost more than $22 billion in assets

1.1.2. The global Political economy of inherent parasitism and extremely unequal class realities

Writing in his book, “Treasure Islands. Tax Havens and the men who stole the world”, Nicholas Shaxson, outlined the following revelations :

Billionaire Warren Buffet, currently the third wealthiest man in the world, paid the lowest rate of tax among his staff, including his receptionist

In 2006 the world’s three biggest banana Companies did nearly 400 million Pounds Sterling worth of business in Britain but paid just 128 000 Pounds Sterling in tax between them.

In January 2009, US Law enforcement fined Lloyds TSB $350 million after it admitted secretly channelling Iranian and Sudanese money into the US banking system.

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He then concludes by saying that, “Tax havens are the most important single reason why poor people and poor countries stay poor. They lie at the very heart of the global economy, with over half the world trade processed through them. They have been instrumental in nearly every major economic event, in every big financial scandal, and in every financial crisis since the 1970s, including the latest global economic downturn.

A report by Oxfam showed that nearly all global wealth growth in 2017, 82 percent, went to the top one percent, while the bottom half of the world’s population, some 3.8 billion people, saw nothing at all. Last year saw the largest increase in the number of billionaire’s worldwide in history. The number of dollar billionaires currently stands at 2,043, with a new billionaire created every two days.

Over the course of the past year, the world’s billionaires saw their wealth increased by $762 billion, enough to eliminate extreme poverty from the face of the planet seven times over. From 2006 to 2015, the typical worker saw their average income rise by just two percent a year. This was dwarfed by a 13 percent annual increase in billionaire wealth.

Rather than being the result of hard work on the part of the world’s billionaires, the report found that two-thirds of billionaire wealth is the product to inheritance, monopoly, and cronyism. The 500 richest people in the world are expected to hand down $2.4 trillion to their heirs over the next two decades, an amount larger than the GDP of India.

Oxfam notes that the world’s billionaires utilize their extreme wealth and connections to manipulate public policy, take advantage of privatization deals, procure natural resource giveaways, and benefit from tax exemptions and loopholes to further enrich themselves at the public expense.

The super-rich can dodge taxes by hiding their money in an international network of offshore tax havens. Accord to data contained in the leaked Panama and Paradise Papers, some $7.6 trillion is being shielded from taxation. An analysis of the data by economist Gabriel Zucman found that the super-rich are avoiding $200 billion in taxes through the use of tax havens.

The report found that the richest man in Nigeria, Aliko Dangote, earns enough just in interest on his $13 billion in wealth to pull two million out of extreme poverty. At the same time that Dangote has become one of the richest people in history, poverty has risen in Nigeria.

The four richest men in Indonesia owned more wealth in 2017 than the bottom 100 million people in the world’s largest island country. Nearly half of the country’s population, approximately 133 million people, continues to languish in poverty.

Meanwhile, in Brazil a worker earning the minimum wage must work 19 years to make the same amount that someone in that country’s top 0.1 percent makes in a single month.

When it comes to social inequality within so-called developed countries, the United States is in a league of its own. In little more than a day, a typical CEO in the US earns as much as the average worker will make in a year. The three richest people in the US owned as much wealth as the bottom half of the population, approximately 160 million people.

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Jeff Bezos, CEO of Seattle-based Amazon, recently became the richest person in world history with a net worth of $105.1 billion, which he acquired off the backs of a highly exploited international workforce of some 300,000 employees. Amazon workers in India make as little as $233 per month, while workers in the US average less than $13 an hour.

Microsoft founder Bill Gates follows closely behind Bezos with $92.3 billion, while Warren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, claims a net worth of $87 billion. The implementation of tax cuts signed into law by President Donald Trump late last year will only accelerate the growth of the gap between the top and the bottom.

Meanwhile a recent survey by the International Labour Organization (ILO) found that nearly one in three workers in emerging and developing countries live in poverty, and that this figure is only increasing. Even more exploited are the 40 million who were enslaved in 2016, forced to work for nothing as modern slaves in a host of industries including harvesting shrimp, sewing garments and cleaning buildings. The ILO estimates that 25 million of the enslaved worldwide are forced labor.

1.1.3. Linked to this , is the reality of the world governments who continue to adopt policies which favors the rich and leave the poor in worse conditions

The policies adopted by government in the aftermath of the world economic crisis continues to create possibilities for the rich to become richer whilst the poor sinks deeper into conditions of squalor and abject poverty.

The 2018 World Wealth report shows that the concentration of the planet’s wealth in the hands of narrow financial elite is growing by leaps and bounds. The reports revealed that the wealth of the world’s 18.1 million “high net worth individuals”—those having investable assets of $1 million or more—shot up by 10.6 percent last year to top $70 trillion for the first time ever. The United States, Japan, Germany and China are the four largest markets for millionaires, accounting for 61 percent of the world’s High Net Wealth Individuals . The US tops the list with 5.3 million High Net Weath Individuals , a 10 percent increase from 2016.

The main factor driving the rapid enrichment of the financial aristocracy is the record rise in stock prices. The stock market has served as the primary mechanism for central banks and governments around the world to increase the wealth of the financial oligarchy, which dominates the world economy and all of the official institutions of society and dictates the policies of governments. For decades, the central banks, led by the US Federal Reserve, working in tandem with governments of the nominal “left” no less than the right, have deliberately engineered a vast transfer of wealth from the working class to the ruling elite by pursuing policies designed to pump up the financial markets.

These polices have been intensified since the 2008 financial crash. The Fed and the US government, first under Bush and then Obama, responded to the Wall Street meltdown by enacting measures to ensure that the oligarchs recouped all of their losses and were able to exploit the crisis to further enrich themselves. In addition to bailing out the banks and hedge funds with trillions of dollars in tax-payer money, they provided virtually free credit to Wall Street by means of near-zero interest rates and used “quantitative easing”.

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1.1.4. This is also coupled with a race for the implementation of Austerity measures by governments all over the world

All over the world governments are racing to implement policies aimed at eliminating whatever is left of the social safety nets: the cuts to the National Health Service and public housing as it happened in Britain, the passage of punitive labor laws and the attacks on rail workers in France, new austerity measures in Germany, and the EU-dictated austerity regimes in Spain, Italy and Greece.

In the decade following the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the capitalist class has delivered powerful blows to the social position of the working class. As a result, the working class in the US, the world’s “richest country,” faces levels of economic hardship not seen since the 1930s.

While corporate profits climb to new heights, the reality of life for tens of millions of workers is defined by increases in the indices of social misery: growing opioid abuse, increasing maternal death rates, exhausting and dangerous workplace conditions, declining life expectancy, crumbling infrastructure and mountains of student loan debt. This is an international phenomenon.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recently published its 2018 Global Employment Outlook Report, which noted: “At the end of 2017, nominal wage growth in the OECD area was only half of what it was just before the Great Recession for comparable levels of unemployment.” As a result, “poverty has grown among the working-age population.”

Not only have wages failed to keep up with rising corporate earnings, they have also fallen behind increases in productivity. The OECD report notes, “If real median wages had perfectly tracked productivity growth over 1995-2014, they would have been 13 percent higher at the end of the period.”

The ruling classes of the US and Europe took advantage of the financial crisis and resulting mass unemployment to suppress wages, boost corporate profits and intensify exploitation. This has continued in the most recent period despite nominally lower unemployment rates.

From 1995 to 2013, aggregate labor’s share of gross domestic product across the OECD fell 3.5 percentage points—a figure that represents a wealth transfer equal to roughly $1.89 trillion per year by the end of this period.

From all these, we hope to be able to adequately and appropriately, respond to the basic question on; what is the substance, form and future of working class internationalism and the role of COSATU?

What Organisational model, capacity and resources are required to advance our aims in the most concrete and effective way possible, given the concrete realities, we face and shall still face?

To further illustrate the gravity of the crises, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that more than 61 million jobs have been lost since the start of the

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global economic crisis in 2008. This means, an estimated more than 200 million people are currently unemployed, globally.

Further estimates indicate that about 500 million new jobs will need to be created by 2020 to provide opportunities to those currently unemployed and to the young people who are projected to join the workforce over the next few years.

The World of Work is changing so rapidly that what is or was regarded as work a while ago, is now unavailable on the job-shelf. What we regard as work or otherwise translated into job, depends on the structure of the political economy that defines what, how and why is work regarded as work and by who?

These changes are impacted upon and impact on the whole of society, because this is linked to the profound structure of production and consumption and the relations arising from it. The 4th Industrial revolution is a game changer in this regard. It has introduced a series of IT tools, applications (called apps), gadgets, and other means of artificial intelligence that have radically changed society, work and ways of doing things, including organising itself, in the case of the trade union movement.

1.1.5. However, this has not changed the substance of the matter; the unequal, unjust, exploitative and miserable conditions facing the millions of working people and their families all over the world! Instead, it has deepened further!

This has not altered the fundamental question about the future and dignity of human beings; in the workplace and in society. It has not answered the core issues about the abundance of resources for a few and the grinding desperation faced by the suffering majority, on the other hand.

Therein lies our interest, our focus and our struggle; the future of humanity, the environment and a totally different society built on the foundations of justice, equality and dignity for all. It means, our struggle is for the dismantling of all relations that produce and reproduce injustice and oppression, anywhere and everywhere.

It is further affirmed by the ILO that, “The first Industrial Revolution, driven by steam, created new manufacturing processes. The second was driven by electricity which led to many new inventions and witnessed the expansion of steel and petroleum. The third is the one we are living through now - when IT and electronics have transformed our lives and manufacturing has gone digital”. Therefore, begging the question, what is the future of work, workers and the workplace as we know it?

Writing in the future of jobs: What will survive by 2020 and what won't and what it means for Africa, Samantha Spooner had this to say, “65% of children entering primary school today will ultimately end up working in completely new job types that don’t yet exist”

1.1.6. Developments in Africa

The first annual economic report by the African Union Commission since its creation in 1963, shows that there is a growing trend of various African country’s positive economic growth showing on amongst others progress in the pursuit of macroeconomic policies and strategies to diversify national economies. The report shows that the decision by certain countries to increase investment in infrastructure

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and the growing number of commercial partnerships - with China, India and other emerging countries - have also proved judicious.

The report also reveals the mixed performances of different African regions in terms of growth, jobs and inequalities. These include the following :

a) East Africa has enjoyed stronger and more resilient economic growth than the other regions, at over 4% per year since 1990, on the back of a more diversified economy.

b) In addition to the underemployment and vulnerable employment that characterise most of the African labour markets, some countries in North and Southern Africa face high structural employment.

c) In Central Africa, the number of jobs in the formal economy has been falling since 2015.

d) East Africa and West Africa managed to reduce extreme poverty by 23 and 12 percentage points respectively between 1990 and 2013.

e) Inequality in Africa is most prevalent in Southern Africa, which, in terms of income, contains six out of the ten most unequal countries in the worl

Whilst there is pocket of improvement in various parts of the African continent but the continent is still engulfed by challenges of dictatorship, financial mismanagement , looting of resources , and financial illicit outflows . For an example research shows that Illicit financial outflows from Sub-Saharan Africa ranged from 5.3 percent to 9.9 percent of total trade in 2014, a ratio higher than any other geographic region studie . A report by the head of African Union’s Panel on illicit Financial outflows showed estimated that over the last 50 years, Africa lost in excess of US$1-trillion in illicit financial outflows.

1.1.6.1. The recent admission of Morocco in the AU,

a) Without meeting the requirements of the African Union Constitutive Act poses a challenge.

b) Morocco not only has an agenda of suppressing Western Sahara within the AU, but also

c) Poses an internal threat to progress within the AU itself because of its links with France and that of some Arab League countries that have vested interests in Africa and her development.

d) Since its admission in the AU, Morocco has been a stumbling block to many key decisions in the African Union, particularly in the Peace and Security Council.

1.1.6.2. AU Free Trade Resolution – Rwanda

a) The role of African trade unions in this regard would be to ensure that free trade benefits the workers and contribute to job creation and development of industry. Considering the colonial political economy, which was characterized by the exports of raw minerals and imports of finished goods, which continues to reproduce itself, continues to pose a challenge for the development of the manufacturing sector in Africa.

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b) Seen as a way to implement regional integration

1.1.6.3. Assessing the work of the AU

a) The observation is that the African Union has made strides in the promotion of peace, and conflict resolution in the continent. This needs to be accompanied with Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development, which is sustainable to allow for the development of industry. The conflict in Somalia, DRC, Central Africa Republic, South Sudan, Mali are receiving the necessary attention from the AU, notwithstanding the continuous agendas of the West in seeking Africa’s mineral resources to serve the national interests of these countries.

1.1.6.4. The Horn of Africa

a) We are witnessing the winds of change in the Horn of Africa. b) Dr. Abiy Ahmed the Ethiopian Prime Minister has normalized the relations with

Eritrea witnessing the recent visits of both leaders to each other’s countries and the acceptance by Ethiopia to handover the territory that was contested as per the recommendation of the Commission more than 10 decades ago.

c) The ‘no war, no peace’ policy that had characterized the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea has come to an end.

d) Dr. Ahmed has called for reforms that would stimulate the economy of Ethiopia. His appointment has brought an end to months of protests that have engulfed the Oromo region and thus destabilizing the country. The new Prime Minister has also been a catalyst to the progress of peacemaking between the warring parties within the SPLM, largely led by Salva Kier and Riek Machar that had led to a deadly conflict since December 2013 in the new country of South Sudan particularly amongst the ethnic groups of Dinkas and the Nuers. There is now hope for progress in South Sudan.

e) With these winds of change in Ethiopia, prospects of a stable Horn of Africa are developing.

f) Djibouti, the smallest country in the Horn of Africa in both size and population has become strategic in terms of geopolitics due to its proximity to the trade route by the Red Sea and strained relations between the West and Eritrea. This has seen a country of less than a million people hosting huge contingencies of Chinese military bases, Unites States of America military base, French military base and Italian military base. The normalization of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea can have an opportunity to change some of these developments of geopolitics.

g) Somalia continues to strive to create a strong state, however the Peace Support Operation in the form of AMISOM continues to face challenges in capacitating the security forces of Somalia to maintain peace by themselves. This is evidenced by the continued insurgencies by Alshabaab.

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1.1.6.5. Transnational Terrorism

a) The threat of transnational terrorism can no longer be seen as remote to the east of Africa as these threats have now come closer to South Africa, with the insurgency of the Jihadist in North Mozambique. Development in Mozambique historically had focused in the South parts of the country, with the exclusion of the North. This has created discontent, also leading to FRELIMO loosing elections in some districts to RENAMO. In addition to the recent tensions between Frelimo and Renamo, this has created a fertile ground for these insurgencies.

b) With Mozambique going to elections in 2019, developments will have to be watched closely. FRELIMO remains a key ally of the African National Congress and progressive forces and therefore should be advised accordingly by her neighbors and allies as an alternative would change the political landscape of SADC in a less desirable scenario.

1.1.6.6. The Great Lakes

a) Continues to be a theatre of conflict, with the Democratic Republic of Congo as the center of conflict. DRC boasts huge mineral deposits that are of interest to its neighboring countries and the West in particular. DRC has the longest presence of a United Nations Peace Operation in the form of MINUSCO in Africa, which seems to be a permanent feature in the DRC, having less prospects of fulfilling its mandate.

b) The presence of any UN mission in Africa is also not without its politics as national interest of the partners to the Peace Operations is always at play and the DRC is not immune. The leadership vacuum that DRC is experiencing is not helping the situation as there is a widespread discontent with regards to President Kabila remaining in power post his term of office.

c) South Africa has recently been admitted to the United Security Council to serve a two-year term. This gives South Africa an opportunity to provide direction and influence the UNSC with regards to Peace and Security in Africa.

d) It is therefore incumbent upon COSATU, as one of the largest Trade Union Federations in Africa, to influence government positions in the UNSC in a manner that seeks to create peace and development in the African continent for laying foundations for the industrial revolution that Africa desperately needs. DRC remains strategic, as a source of energy through the INGA hydro energy project that supplies energy to South Africa and other surrounding areas. This project has prospects of electrifying the whole of Africa. Peace and security in DRC is thus ever crucial. Countries in Europe like Turkey are also pinning their hopes in getting energy from the DRC. An Expanded INGA projects provides opportunities to stimulate unprecedented growth for African industry and her population if strategically managed with the goal of contributing to lasting Peace in the DRC.

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e) COSATU therefore needs to find ways of strengthening and building the trade union movement of the DRC in order to share perspectives as a united force to take advantage of the development prospects in the DRC.

1.1.6.7. Francophone

a) The trade union movements of Francophone Africa, like the many political parties in the West African region, have a culture of proliferation of organizations and leadership, where you find several unions established in one operation and a plethora of federations operating in one country. These are the challenges that COSATU will come across in this endeavor and beyond the DRC but that COSATU should be ready to transform.

1.1.6.8. What should concern COSATU

a) COSATU needs to encourage the South African Communist Party to resuscitate the Africa Left network, which should also have a trade union component to help unite the left voices in the African continent.

b) South Africa continues to be expected to lead in the continent and this does not exclude the leadership of COSATU in the African trade Union movement.

c) COSATU must be seized with the challenges that face workers and the trade unions in Africa starting from the Southern Region of SADC. SATUCC should be seen as a strategic space for COSATU to influence the workers struggles and left politics of trade unions in SADC. Any vacuum in this regard will lay fertile ground for a continued onslaught on workers considering the liberal transnational market economy that we find ourselves in.

d) The work of COSATU affiliates in the African region should link with and have synergies with the posture that COSATU seeks to have in the African continent.

1.1.6.9. International Solidarity – Focus cases and Recommendations to Congress:

a) Swaziland – Develop a Comprehensive Solidarity Programme to strengthen organisations, develop cadres and capacity, mobilise resources and raise profile of the Swazi struggle. In this regard, Special focus on supporting the research work done on the Royal land grabs as case study and strengthen it, towards an active, sustainable movement throughout the SADC region and internationally. Do an audit on the economic interest on what South African have in there.

b) Palestine – Concrete update on the COSATU Comprehensive BDS Programme and identify specific and targeted priority action areas, given the latest developments including the US-Israeli arrogant appropriation of Jerusalem as

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Israel’s capital against international law and human rights. Build trade union relations with the Palestinian federations.

c) Venezuela – A Concrete assessment of the development based on the latest developments regarding Venezuela peoples struggle against imperialism and how these are linked to the broader Latin America developments and the global working class struggle to fight to fight imperialism and defend working class alternatives against capitalism

d) Zimbabwe – Concrete assessment of the developments and the extent to which they address the aspirations of the working class and people of Zimbabwe. In this regards, what is the actual meaning of the oncoming elections and concrete way forward for a regional solidarity movement with the people of Zimbabwe.

e) Cuba – Following the US intensification of aggression against the people of Cuba, as COSATU, we must develop a special angle to bring back to the centre of focus, the struggle to defend the sovereign right to self-determination and human dignity that the Cuban revolution represent and advance values of justice. Further, need for a special exchange programme for Cadre development and experiential learning for our leaders on such matters as health, dignity and education for the poor and society as a whole with minimal resources. Strengthen the relationship between COSATU and CTC and prioritise a special session with them.

f) Western Sahara – Concrete possibility of a BDS format against Morocco, guided by the people of Western Sahara and their premier liberation movement, POLISARIO/UGTSARIO, basing ourselves on the need to build a broader continental detachment, united in support of the Saharawi people and their right to self-determination, freedom from colonialism and human dignity. 1

g) Africa Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA)

COSATU must properly discuss the meaning and implications of the ACFTA to workers and the whole continental development agenda. In this regard, a workshop is being proposed, as a matter of urgency to ascertain what it means and how does it enhance or contribute to the much needed development of the people of our continent. In this regard, it must be guided by certain basic principles;

1 Footnotes: implications of actively balancing our Boycott campaigns, Jobs-enhancing economic development and human dignity require separate evaluation and strategic discussions to avoid tensions with our international solidarity work.

Further attention is drawn to the fact that the SADC region requires special focus in context of the crisis in Lesotho, DRC and growing inequalities, poverty and unemployment generally. In this regard, the campaign for justice, democracy and human dignity must always be central

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i. It must be developmental and based on the urgency of industrialisation and job-creation and infrastructure investment in the African people and sustainable development

ii. It must integrate the economies, people and resources of the continent and not allow further fragmentation based on either external or internal elites and their narrow self-serving interests, to bring together and unite Africa

iii. It must protect, build and support local industries, content and capacity to source, develop and export by our own producers. In this regard, it must build the productive capacity of Africa.

h. 7th BRICS Trade Union Forum, Durban –COSATU with fellow sister federations, is proud to host for the second time, the BRICS Trade Union Forum (BTUF) IN THE City of Ethekwini this month. We affirm the fundamentals set out in the Draft Declaration, but demand more concrete outcomes towards a stronger, more effective and comprehensive Join Action Plan by BRICS countries. And the centrality of the trade union movement in that regard. We further call for urgent steps towards the idea of a BRICS Labour Research and Policy Institute, as previously agreed to by BRICS trade unions.

i. Eritrea – Ethiopia and South Sudan Peace processes and their concrete meaning for the whole continent and progress in general – we are inspired and proud of this great African moment, the moment marked by the historical advance made by fellow brothers and sisters, the people of Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as South Sudan in signing and taking concrete steps towards peace, normalisation of relations and prospects for sustainable development in the Horn of Africa region., the broader East African community and the whole continent. We are called upon to do more on our continent as workers and people, to demand that our leaders prioritise the dignity of our people and their conditions of life, at all times.

1.1.6.8. Proposed Congress directives for COSATU international work

The need for the urgent development of a New COSATU International Programme which concretely base itself on the balance of forces and the following concrete task, amongst others:

1. Develop an international solidarity programme which will focus special international cases and capacity building.

2. SADC as a priority region for developmental alternatives and the building of a strong progressive movement anchored in the regional trade union movement as a critical force for that momentum.

This must primarily affirm the importance and centrality of advanced regional integration of the people, their historical cultural and linguistic development, to avoid regional integration being reduced to mere market integration and not human development

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3. The international trade union movement and our approach towards future of working class internationalism in the context of deepening our struggle against imperialism and developing alternatives to capitalism

4. Changing the global balance of power and developing concrete alternatives on the policy front for industrialisation; job creation; income distribution and sustainable human development. In this regard, the balance of forces is a critical tool to concretely ascertain what is possible and what practically must we do. Clearly outline our tasks as trade unionist, revolutionaries and activist

5. The concrete essence and form of alliance/relationship that BRICS signifies for us as workers as a country and as a people on the African continent

a) What should we expect or hope to gain

b) What concessions are implied by the relationship

c) What are our interests and strategy

6. The substance and the meaning of the trade unions and freedom of association from global comparative experiences and how they relate to justice, development and quality of life for the poor. It must not be a token; but affirm human development, true freedom and concrete progress for the working class

7. Development of a bold trade union development infrastructure on research, policy and education for workers

8. Affirm South-South relations as key anchors of our progressive agenda with special emphasis on Africa in building progressive working class forces for struggle

9. Promote South-South economic investment and developmental agenda. This must include the infrastructure development which will link the people and promote regional integration.

10. Establish a Special CEC Commission on the Future of Work, its meaning and concrete impact on South Africa and workers

11. Call for an alliance international solidarity conference for political leader to advance a joint strategic solidarity programme.

12. The final medium term plan must be based on the organisational renewal model of COSATU as a whole and its prerequisites for constant monitoring, evaluation and rejuvenation at specified regular intervals; preferably every Congress.

13. This must also take into cognisance the following important instruments and watershed moments in Africa and global developments;

a) 2063 Africa Industrialisation Plan of the AU

b) SADC Industrialisation Strategy

c) 2030 UN Sustainable Development Goals

d) ILO Centenary and its significance to international workers standard and the global class struggle

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2. Assessing the Domestic Balance of class Forces

2.1. INTRODUCTION

A proper assessment of the South African political situation must proceed on the basis of an understanding of the state of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) at a given conjuncture as a framework.

Such an understanding of the NDR at a particular conjunctural moment must keep in perspective that like other revolutions elsewhere, the NDR is a protracted revolutionary struggle, necessarily spanning decades and generations, passing through different phases and taking different forms as determined by objective conditions, subjectivity and identified objectives.

Equally, account must be taken of the fact that as the NDR unfolds in different phases, internal contestation within the broad front of the people’s camp also takes place. Indeed, it is in the nature of such fronts of different class forces that under certain objective conditions, combined with the relative subjective strengths of a specific class that the correlation of class forces would change in its favour and in turn there would be a corresponding shift in ideological hegemony.

Hence, since the 1990s – in a new phase of governance - the decisive influence that the working class exerted in the ANC’s ideological and political perspectives especially since the 1960s receded as other class forces with their own narrow elitist agendas became hegemonic. The domination of the 1996 Class Project was in part aided by the fact that its ideas appeared as if they were pragmatic under difficult objective circumstances, whilst in fact they represented a serious deviation that has since locked the course of the NDR.

Hence, in the present conjuncture, at least since 2012, all formations of the Alliance have been unevenly seized with how best to forge “a radical second phase of the transition” with a view to restore the revolutionary content of the NDR.

Vladimir Lenin implored revolutionaries that “in order really to know an object [reality] we must embrace, study, all its sides, all connections and "mediations".2 So in trying to understand the present conjuncture, we first begin with a brief theoretical outline of the NDR in which we reassert its revolutionary roots and content, contrasting it to the narrow nationalist and right-wing version that has been used to justify the current deviant trajectory of the NDR.

Then we deal with the notion of the radical second phase adopted at the ANC’s Mangaung conference in 2012 with a view to evaluate its practical translation to date. With the ANC-led Alliance being the revolutionary subject charged with prosecuting this radical second phase, we make an assessment of the state of the Alliance and as part of this the historic resolution adopted at the SACP’s 14th National Congress held last year is discussed as it potentially has implications for the Alliance. Then the post-NASREC situation is discussed after which follows the balance of class and political forces in this conjuncture to bring the overall assessment to its totality.

2 V. I. Lenin, "Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Present Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin", Selected Works, Eng. ed., International Publishers, New York, 1943, Vol. IX, p. 66.

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2.2. THE NDR PERSPECTIVE

It is often opportunistically forgotten that the NDR is a revolutionary perspective that is drawn from the international communist movement (the 2nd Congress of the Communist International) in the 1920s - recognising the intertwined and indivisible nature of the anti-colonial and anti-capitalist struggles in the global-south, and placing the working class in alliance with the peasantry at the head of such revolutions.

Thus, the NDR posited a distinctly radical strategy that is different from the bourgeois-democratic and nationalist struggles that were often dominated by elites characterising much of the independence struggles in Africa and other parts of the global-south. In its development in the course of the 20th century, the ANC itself evolved from a nationalist liberation perspective that was spearheaded by the upper strata of the oppressed black majority to the NDR in the 1960s.

This of course was also a conjuncture when internationally there was a world-wide tendency of transitions to people’s democracies and socialism, whilst domestically the confrontation with the Apartheid regime was intensifying as communist and broader working class activism was rising and exerting a more revolutionary content to the ANC’s strategy and tactics, and liberation perspective.

In brief, in the peculiar conditions of colonialism of a special type characterising South Africa, the translation of the NDR meant that it would have as its content the resolution of the three interrelated and mutually reinforcing antagonistic contradictions of national oppression, class exploitation and the three dimensions of gender oppression.

Therefore, with its growing social weight and economic location where class exploitation and national oppression are expressed in their extremity, the working class was required to develop into the primary motive force if the NDR was to be thoroughgoing and successfully prosecuted. Indeed, the working class and other popular strata constitute this primary motive force of the NDR as they have most to gain and nothing to lose.

This was the strategic path that sought to integrate the raging national, gender and class struggles into a common front to overcome these mutually reinforcing exploitative and oppressive aspects of capitalism that are rooted in colonial-Apartheid relations.

This perspective of the NDR was already espoused by the SACP in terms of its 1962 programme, The Road to South African Freedom. This rising working class influence within the ANC found expression at the 1969 Morogoro Conference and at which ANC also concluded that:

‘In our country ‐ more than in any other part of the oppressed world ‐ it is inconceivable for liberation to have meaning without a return of the wealth of the land to the people as a whole . It is therefore a fundamental feature of our strategy that victory must embrace more than formal political democracy”.

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This aspiration of “a return of the wealth of the land” to the people as a whole encapsulates public, collective or social forms of ownership of the national wealth, which is an antithesis of the perpetuation of capitalist social relations, “deracialised” or otherwise.

However, it was always apparent that the leading role of the working class and the radical content of the NDR were not preordained and iron-cast. That under different international and domestic circumstances intra-class contestations could change the correlation of class forces in this broad front and therefore marginalise the working class and dilute the content of the NDR.

In part, this is because alongside this radical Morogoro content of the NDR there always existed a more narrow nationalist conception within the ANC which reduced the content of the NDR to a national question, i.e. “liberation of Africans in particular and blacks in general”.

Accordingly, the fundamental question in our situation and facing the movement was said to be the struggle to merely overcome the legacy of hundreds of years of national oppression and racial economic discrimination. Of course national oppression and discrimination should not be understated, especially because they have a lingering effect on the identity and consciousness of the oppressed. But this nationalist conception is in contrast to the NDR that is premised on the systemic and mutually reinforcing nature of colonial-Apartheid and capitalist relations, whose resolution are inseparable.

Indeed, at the height of the domination of the 1996 Class Project the 50 th Mafikeng conference of the ANC (taking place as it did a year after the adoption of GEAR) emphasised this narrow nationalist content, which in turn was used at the policy level to legitimise the notion of the “deracialisation” of South African capitalism through the elite Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme.

Obviously, this was a far cry from the Morogoro’s aspiration or a call for “a return of the wealth of the land to the people as a whole”, a call which is in fact derived from one of the key demands and ideals of the Freedom Charter.

However, at the 2007 52nd Polokwane Conference where the 1996 Class Project was dislodged from the helm, the ANC reverted back to the Morogoro perspective. And subsequently, the 2012 53rd Mangaung Conference reaffirmed the Strategy and Tactics adopted at the Polokwane conference, stating that:

“[The] Strategy and Tactics 2007 affirms the strategic goal of the NDR as the resolution of the three basic and inter-related contradictions of Colonialism of a Special Type in South Africa: racial oppression, class super-exploitation and patriarchal relations of power. These antagonisms found expression in national oppression based on race, class super-exploitation directed against Black workers, and the triple oppression of the mass of women based on their race, their class and their gender”.

But from our perspective in the light of the post-1994 developments, it is justifiable to pose a question as to whether the NDR as a strategy towards socialism is still relevant.

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It is a perspective that must be continuously debated even as we are clear and confident that the NDR remains a correct strategic perspective and relevant so long as the basic triple contradictions characterising its content remain unresolved.

We must use the implementation of manifestos and the Freedom Charter as our minimum benchmark of the advances of the NDR.

If the NDR remains relevant as we correctly argue, we must still ask ourselves a question as to whether the current organisational form or vehicle of driving the NDR in terms of the ANC-led Alliance is still appropriate and relevant in the current conjuncture. What about the correlation of class forces in the NDR or the broad front led by the ANC.

If the primary adversary or enemy of the NDR is monopoly capital (white), how do we relate to the related question of the black capitalists who are unavoidably involved giving legitimacy to one of the contradictions of the NDR - class contradictions – in terms of their involvement in class-exploitation for private accumulation?

The foregoing discussion on the NDR perspective should compel us to ask and provide answers on basic questions that we have up to now taken for granted, such as whether there is a common and shared understanding on the 1994 democratic breakthrough - on what it represented as it is clear that different class and ideological forces in the Alliance have in practice different perspective.

For others, e.g. the primary aim of the old generation (pre-Freedom Charter/Morogoro) meant the slogan and strategic goal of “Freedom in our life-time” and that this has been achieved in 1994.

Whereas from the NDR perspective it represents a breakthrough, what the SACP also calls a “bridgehead” to advance and deepen the revolution further - using mass and state power to shift the balance of forces and deepen our transition socioeconomically.

It can also be argued that the ANC and other Alliance formations have made a mistake of unconsciously abandoning the progressive narrative around the national constitution in our post-Apartheid epoch – being its custodians having finalised it in the process that was dominated by us in 1996 and leaving it to be appropriated by the DA and other forces – when this was a constitution drafted basically by the Constituent Assembly (1994-1996). We must defend its progressive content, including socioeconomic rights and ensure that its institutions are hegemonised to advance transformation.

2.3. THE RADICAL SECOND PHASE

So far, the discussion on the NDR has been largely at the theoretical level. We now turn to an assessment of what practically became of the Mangaung’s call for the radical second phase. But in order to do so, let’s briefly trace the context leading to Mangaung.

Our 1994 democratic-breakthrough occurred against the background of the collapse of the soviet bloc (1989-1991), the height of Neoliberalism (the 1990s) and on the back of the domestic terrain of a negotiated settlement, government of national unity and

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therefore a symmetrical balance of forces that enabled a shift in the correlation of class forces within the ANC.

Hence, the decline of the influence of the working class and a departure from the radical content of the NDR ensued. This allowed for the imposition of Neoliberal macroeconomic policy regime facilitated by an elite consensus with the domestic oligarchy, international finance monopoly capital and the dictates of institutions such as the IMF.

Resultantly, leading to Mangaung there was a widely shared view in the ANC-led Alliance that in the overall the radical political transformation that marked the first phase of our transition was at the socioeconomic level largely characterised by redistributive measures extending socioeconomic entitlements that the overwhelming majority of our people were deprived of under Apartheid and colonialism. Indeed, significant progress was made in improving the lot of our people even though the inherited colonial structure of the economy, characterised by highly racialised and gendered concentration of wealth and control, remained virtually unchanged.

Actually, the impact of these redistributive measures was limited by the Neoliberal macroeconomic policy framework inaugurated under GEAR as measures such as privatisation, trade liberalisation, casualization, retrenchments and the corresponding weakening of the trade union movement maintained and reproduced the inherited crisis-levels of unemployment, poverty and inequalities.

Even more so because at the community level the working class was subjected to a Neoliberal service delivery regime of user-pay and cost-plus measures causing deprivation of meaningful access to basic municipal services.

Therefore, in addition to the rolling militant mass resistance waged by COSATU in response, the crisis-level of youth unemployment, these Neoliberal local government policies generate persistent outbreaks of the so-called service delivery protests in working class communities. On the basis of such right-wing policies that perpetuated the inherited structural and spatial features of the South African economy, the welfare of the masses of our people were bound not to change fundamentally. Of course, the conditions of freedom and extensions of some basic services made a difference, but not in a substantial way as was the case for those who became part of a growing black petty-bourgeois stratum and a tiny class of black capitalists. Therefore, leading to Mangaung it was broadly recognised that keeping the structure of the economy untransformed whilst merely relying on the fiscus to pacify the masses of our people through measures such as the extension of social grants, portions of free-basic access to water and electricity, housing, indigent policies, etc. was not enough nor sustainable.

But instead, the Neoliberal macroeconomic policy regime became entrenched and untouchable as it successfully survived subsequent ANC administrations including the first Zuma administration (2009-2014) despite its watershed Polokwane mandate. However, we must also take into account of the fact that objectively the advent of this administration coincided with onset of the global capitalist crisis (2008-09) which led to a domestic recession in 2009 in which more than a million jobs were lost.

This was a huge blow to COSATU and the working class in general as these jobs have still not been recovered despite the NEDLAC agreement that helped to pull the economy out of the recession. This generalised global capitalist crisis which also afflicted South

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Africa’s major trading partners such as the European Union and China meant that the slowdown of their productive sectors negatively impacted on the demand and prices of the mineral exports which are key for the country’s foreign earnings and investment in mining and related secondary sectors.

It was therefore against this background that leading to the 2012 Mangaung Conference there was a widely shared recognition that what has practically transpired since the 1994 democratic breakthrough was little more than what Morogoro called an empty “formal political democracy”. It had become clear to all in the movement that if the existing policy trajectory was allowed to continue, the socioeconomic conditions of the working class would be worsened and this would liquidate the movement out of political power, hence a clamouring call for a radical second phase emerged strongly.

This call for radical economic transformation became a platform upon which the ANC went into the 2014 elections and secured a 62% of the votes. In an attempt to counter the slow rate in which the economy was growing, amidst stubborn crisis-levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality, the ANC government had taken a counter-cyclical posture geared at increasing social and infrastructure spending with the hope that this would stimulate private sector investment and improve the economic growth rate.

This amounted to trillion rands of expenditure on building roads, dams, rail infrastructure, public transport infrastructure, energy generation, etc. which combined with extensions of social municipal infrastructure to working class and rural communities.

After the 2014 elections it became clear that the growing public debt and budget deficit would not be sustainable in an environment in which private sector investment remained low.

Hence, from then onwards the counter-cyclical posture was abandoned in favour of the deceleration of spending in order to reduce public debt and budget deficit. In the meantime, economic growth consecutively declined year after year since the 2014 elections without any policy change or comprehensive response as government became preoccupied with reducing the public debt and budget deficit.

These economic policy developments paralleled the failure to implement progressive Mangaung resolutions on organisational renewal and cadre development that sought to arrest what were already clear signs of organisational degeneration in the movement which had become acute in the period leading to Polokwane.

The combined effect of these factors engendered an unprecedented and dramatically poor performance on the part of the ANC’s in the 2016 municipal elections - whereby its total electoral support collapsed to 53,9%. Thus, the ANC lost some of its rural stronghold municipalities and even some of the key metropolitan centres such as Tshwane and Johannesburg where the working class is concentrated.

Therefore, in brief, we can say that the Mangaung agenda of radical second phase suffered from the lack of political will and commitment at the time when the Alliance remained dysfunctional, let alone operating as a strategic political centre. Factions in the ANC became institutionalised, as the allegation of the use of money to influence leadership outcomes and allegations of corruption and state capture deepened.

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2.4. THE ALLIANCE, SACP AND STATE POWER

From the standpoint of the state of the Alliance3 the post-NASREC situation does not necessarily represent a qualitative positive change although there have been indications of such a potential given improved interactions.

One of the important lessons about the ANC-led Alliance since the “strategic rupture” caused by GEAR and subsequent years of the implementation of the divisive Neoliberal macroeconomic policies is that whilst personalities of leaders play a crucial role in how the Alliance functions, ultimately the absence of strategic cohesion amongst Alliance components on such crucial matters as macroeconomic policies is an objective reality that has a decisive influence on the functioning and nature of the Alliance relations.

In other words, the political attitude is not merely determined by subjective traits of individual leaders, but it is also determined by the objective and unresolved strategic differences which makes the warmth that any new particular leader of the ANC may have towards COSATU and SACP to very quickly disappear (especially after national elections) as there are bound to be episodes of acute polarisation.

But this cannot be treated as an inherent and normal feature of the Alliance relations as the magnitude of divergences on macroeconomic policies actually amount to more than differences, they can be characterised as representing mutually exclusive contradictions. Whilst it is correct that the Alliance relations are supposed to be at an organisational level (both nationally and subnationally) rather than merely amongst leading individuals as office-bearers, we emphasise the element of the top leadership, especially the ANC president, because there may be a recurrence of a mistaken tendency in COSATU and SACP whereby their posture become unduly influenced by the personality or attitude of an ANC leader at a particular point in time.

However, falling for this temptation may be understandable since the ANC itself tends to be dominated by the force of personalities of its presidents around which its structures cohere and rally (if not divided) at the expense of the authority of its democratically elected leadership structures.

It is worth taking into account that in the history and ongoing collaboration of the Alliance formations, despite the often flawed pattern of their interactions, ultimately they have played their distinct but somewhat complementary roles in the struggle as a common front in the NDR.

And as the Alliance evolved factors such dual or multiple membership and leadership caps, the shared political culture and cherished historic ideals such as the Freedom Charter have somewhat generated a collective identity and unity constituting the Alliance an organic whole, of which each component is a part.

This is not the same thing as saying that the Alliance is a single organisational entity but it is to say that it is a movement that has become an interconnected whole in which its parts dialectically interact and influence each other.

3 It is recognised that the ANC-led Alliance includes SANCO and that in fact the broader movement goes beyond the Alliance; however, for the purpose of this discussion at the moment the focus is on the three components of the Alliance.

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This means that each would be qualitatively different if it deserted the Alliance, hence sections that have broken away or split from the Alliance have somewhat taken a different quality. And since the whole permeates its parts, as it is present in each of its parts, each is not immune or insulated from some of the negative tendencies that may be there in others, and this includes the SACP as reflected at its 14 th National Congress were there was some manifestation of ill-discipline regarding the leadership nomination process.

COSATU has also not escaped these challenges perhaps due to its necessarily mass and less tight organisational and ideological character such that many of the destructive tendencies in our movement have engulfed it and its affiliates.

These include the phenomena of business unionism, the growing distance from the rank and file, the creation of networks of patronage and these becoming decisive in determining leadership outcomes at congresses – drawn from the corrosive malaise that is afflicting our broad movement, especially the ANC as a leading component and the most exposed to power and financial resources.

This is not to mean that the organisational challenges and corrupt tendencies that have afflicted our federation can be attributed to the ANC. The point here is to highlight the fact that these are the prevalent tendencies of the time within a movement that is operating in a capitalist reality, and a revolution that has deviated its course and thus enabling and spawning ideological and moral decay. It is a degenerate ideological, political and moral climate in which it is no longer out of place for cadres that have assimilated selfish capitalist culture to claim revolutionary mantle whilst simultaneously they brazenly use the organisation and the masses of our people to exclusively pursue their own personal capitalist interests.

These degenerate capitalist tendencies are not happening in isolation from the already entrenched negative factional organisational culture that is prevalent across our movement. And whilst this malaise may be uneven in its manifestation, it has to be recognised that there is still an ongoing dynamic of cross-pollination that is occurring so long as the degeneration persists and deepens.

On the question of the current configuration of the Alliance, whilst in principle it is correct to argue that if the ANC was broadly and properly representative of its different strands and constituencies, and in particular the working class as the primary motive force in the NDR, the strategic rupture and dysfunctionality in the Alliance would never have occurred or developed to the extent that we have seen since the mid-1990s, if at all.

In fact, even the call for the reconfiguration of the Alliance, which tends to be more pronounced when tensions between the ANC and other Alliance components become acute, would never have arisen if indeed the Alliance operated as a strategic political centre in which the ANC was but one of the equal partners. Whilst there is some improvement in the interactions of the Alliance formations at the moment, especially at the national level, it would be an exaggeration to say that the Alliance is operating optimally, i.e. as the strategic political centre.

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Arguably, this improvement in the interactions amongst the Alliance formations is still in the same superficial and ad hoc mode of the past in which the ANC engaged other Alliance components as a superior partner – presumably in this post-1994 situation this is mainly due to its access to power and control of patronage by deployment. In this mode, and in the best of circumstances, the ANC would as a formality invite other components of the Alliance to its own meetings in which crucially strategic issues are on the tabled for discussion - but whereby the framework of such discussions are solely predetermined and shaped by the ANC.

The currently unfolding process of the formulation of the 2019 election manifesto is but one case in point reflecting the perpetuation of this mode, in which effectively the ANC relates to other components of the Alliance as if they were its leagues or even worse some civil society lobby groups. Whilst in fact, the development of the manifesto is an important exercise as it shapes expectations, reflects key commitments and policy parameters over the next term - for which all Alliance formations are expected to mobilise resources to support in the elections campaign.

Another form in which this superficial and ad hoc mode of Alliance engagement manifests pertains to the Alliance Summits. Even when these summits are jointly convened, the ANC tends to treat the outcomes of these summits as external, with no obligations to internalise and to implement them especially on matters that require policy action from government. A number of such summits have emerged with sound policy positions, especially those calling for change in the macroeconomic policy regime. But these would either end up being ignored, sometimes openly rejected by the ANC government or subjected to an Alliance task team as a form of a managed process of stifling and ultimately dissipating the issues or terminating the engagements.

Whereas the modus operandi of the Alliance as a “strategic political centre” would be markedly different. To begin with it would require regularly scheduled meetings characterised by jointly determined agendas and content of discussions - driven by the Alliance Political Council as a central coordinative and leadership organ that also takes as its duty to ensure that collaboration and jointly determined discussions are cascaded to the subnational level and vice versa, and where necessary they are translated into government’s policy action.

Actually, COSATU’s call for the reconfiguration of the Alliance (as do the SACP now) effectively envisages an Alliance that operates along these lines as a strategic political centre. Hence, we must insist on the conclusions of the 2008 Alliance Summit - on the Alliance as the strategic political centre.

As such when it comes to key and strategic policy decisions that have major implications for the jointly developed manifesto, the NDR or our shared pursuit of the ideals of the Freedom Charter deliberations would be subjected to a collectively driven process of determination and in forums that are binding. Similarly, in the context of this modus operandi the Alliance would have a jointly developed programme of action geared at collectively mobilising and taking up international, socioeconomic and political campaigns and issues, rather than the current mode of occasional and poorly coordinated mobilisation for anniversaries and commemorative events, if not for elections.

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It is rather strange indeed that for election campaigns each Alliance formation deploys its leadership, activist personnel and resources whilst after the elections there is no such a collective and shared responsibility in the deployment of leadership personnel into strategic government, legislative and other public sector bodies.

Clearly, this hardly substantial but superficial and ad hoc operational mode of the Alliance is unsustainable amidst the changing political landscape in the medium to long-term. The Alliance relations cannot be sustained on the terms and whims of the ANC leadership as the bearer of arbitrarily dispensed patronage and in which the ANC exclusively sees itself as the custodian of key policy determinations.

We must develop a more elaborate view on what we have termed the reconfiguration of the Alliance and the principle of the strategic political centre as there are no easy answers as to its implications, appreciating the imperative that this reconfiguration must also be informed by a bottom-up process rather than exclusively by national experiences.

Similarly, we must elaborate as to what the SACP’s idea of the popular left front means in relations to what we have termed the “Left Axis” and what these means in practice, as well as have a discussion on the building a mass and active youth and student movements. As COSATU we must acknowledge that we are still suffering from the residual effects of the previous period of paralysis and exit of two of our affiliates, weak financial position and weak and sometimes non-existence of some of our key organisational engines that are supposed to drive its strategic programmes.

On the other hand, the other organisation of the working class in the Alliance, SANCO, sometimes appear to have been reduced to a deployment conveyor belt or lobby group. We need to engage in discussion with the view to understand what SANCO and its role are in the present conjuncture should be – given its virtual absence amidst service delivery protests (which also includes the absence of the ANC and SACP in those community struggles).

The fact that all components of the Alliance have prioritised organisational renewal and going back to the basics – a task that is very necessary for the restoration of their strengths and crucial for the prosecution of the radical second phase – provides an opportunity for COSATU to place the reconfiguration of the Alliance, i.e. the principle of the Alliance as a strategic political centre, back on the table.

This would also require the federation to develop its own programme of organisational renewal to recover the lost ground, to formulate its perspective on the radical second phase and its concrete proposals on the reconfiguration of the Alliance.

Actually, in the first place, the question of the swelling-of-the-ranks arouse after our endeavours to engage the ANC in particular on the reconfiguration was to no avail. During this first initiative we were even placing the issue of the Alliance Pact on the table. Therefore, we then resorted to use the swelling-the-ranks to win hegemony organically within the ANC as an innovative tactical move.

Clearly, we are now back to the same position of calling for the reconfiguration as we did in the past. The reconfiguration of the Alliance would never happen out of cap-in-hand appeals, as ultimately it is a function of organisational strength and the concrete projection of working class power in the broader balance of forces inside and outside the movement.

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Notwithstanding the heated debates and outcomes of other previous SACP congresses, the resolution on “state and popular power” that was adopted at the SACP’s 14 th

National Congress is historic in as far as it somewhat reflects a shift in the assumptions and line of march of its 13th Congress political programme, The South African Road to Socialism. In terms of this political programme of the 13 th Congress, participation in multi-party elections was not ruled out, but broached as subject to important conjunctural considerations.

Accordingly, the SACP maintained that its approach to state power was not narrowly party political but one in which it would campaign on the basis of single ANC electoral lists and in which it actively sought to shape the ANC election manifesto - keeping in perspective the strategic objective of building working class hegemony over the state and other loci of power.

So, arising from the 14th National Congress the SACP is saying that subject to a broad consultations process especially with formations of the working class, it would consider actively contesting elections and that the modality through which such participation in elections would take place may or may not be within the umbrella of the Alliance.

The congress also directed the SACP to build a popular left front and called for the reconfiguration of the Alliance. For its part the SACP’s Central Committee held in February this year reaffirmed this resolution and concluded that “the SACP is forging ahead with implementation.

To this end the SACP will be deepening consultation and engagements with our allies, worker and other progressive formations.” However, at this stage it is unclear as to how this consultation process is unfolding and how extensive it is meant to be. Nonetheless, it is important to underscore the point that the SACP is not rigid on this resolution, but seeks to be guided by material conditions and the consultation process that would presumably culminate at its special national congress.

The SACP set out to approach this conjuncture and the related matters about “state power” guided by the sub-theme of the 14th congress: strategic consistency, analytical alertness and tactical flexibility. Accordingly, this is to ensure that it does not fall into “free-floating opportunism and short-termism”, that it is informed by concrete analysis of the concrete situation, it avoids being caught flat-footed and that it continues to be guided by its revolutionary strategic consistency.

It is fair to say that within both the ranks of COSATU and SACP there is a certain amount of scepticism about the idea of the SACP participating in the elections at this conjuncture and the fact that there is no guaranteed support of the SACP vis-à-vis the ANC amongst COSATU’s rank and file adds weight to this scepticism.

The current COSATU’s policy on elections is articulated in 2015 plan which says that “Our general approach to elections entails the following:

1. For each elections we will have a balance sheet based on our vision of what was achieved, what still needs to be done and setbacks. On that basis we will develop a framework for what should constitute an electoral platform. This analysis will be used to contribute towards the development of Election Manifestos.

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2. Establishing election teams for mobilisation of voters during the entire election campaign.

3. Mobilising financial resources to implement our election plan.

This constitutes part of the elements of what will inform the discussions regarding the 2019 elections at congress.

COSATU’s approach on this matter is also informed by the reality of the membership base whose political members and allegiance are both to the ANC and the SACP.

Discussions must also consider the fact that the COSATU workers’ Survey conducted in 2012 pointed out that 70 percent of workers said COSATU should stay in the Alliance and 2 percent of those who said COSATU should leave the alliance said COSATU should ally with the SACP.

There is also a reality that workers participation in the SACP constitute about 17,1 percent of the total membership and currently as this debate unfolds the current organisational capacity of both the SACP and COSATU is at its weakest .

Currently , the COSATU membership cannot be subjected into making a choice between the ANC and the SACP , at best such an approach is bound to deepen divisions in the federation and at worst may even lead to a split.

On the other hand, to take part in the elections for the first time in the post-1994 era was always going to be a challenging undertaking for the SACP and one on which there could not be certainty unless circumstances drastically changed where the ANC irredeemably degenerates and its support base significantly plummets.

A consideration of all these factors will be important as part of being guided by the concrete conditions obtaining on the ground in our country and the concrete state of our organizations.

As Congress discussed this matter , there should be a clear understanding that there could never be perfect circumstances for such an undertaking under capitalist conditions, as at any given moment that the SACP would choose to do so it would necessarily have to be a matter of plunging into unchartered waters. Indeed, we must assert the proposition that one could never learn to swim in the mind (theoretically) first to the exclusion of practice. In simple terms , the SACP will have to take the decision to contest elections whether in the context of the alliance or outside such a setting with all the risks it contains.

Even such an approach should be guided by the party’s 14th Congress consideration , that the party was to ensure (a) Strategic Consistency, not free-floating opportunism or short-term emotional responses; (b) Analytical Alertness, what Lenin described as the capacity to provide a “concrete analysis of the concrete situation” (and not be locked into mouthing timeless platitudes about the class struggle in general); and (c) Tactical Flexibility (the ability not to be caught flat-footed while still being guided by strategic consistency).

The SACP would have to make a firm determination that takes into account all the objective challenges that are inherent in the nature of our liberal democratic terrain - understanding that it would only learn to swim through praxis (combined theory and

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practice) from which it would be in a position to develop a sense of its electoral capacity, its weaknesses and strengths in this terrain.

Anyway, for a revolutionary party, participation in multi-party elections should ultimately be regarded as a tactical rather than strategic consideration in so far as it can be useful in helping to build its independent profile, organisational resources and capacity. It can be a significant avenue to advance its battle for working class hegemony, critique of capitalism and to enhance its reach in the dissemination of its message on socialist solutions to the working class and the broader masses of the people. Indeed, it should by no means be an isolated tactic that is prioritised above other forms of activism, mass mobilisation and the broader strategic orientation of the party, nor should the party find itself gradually and blindly drifting along the lines of a narrow Kautskyite parliamentary path to socialism in which all other forms of struggle are subordinated.

Nonetheless, for us, the question of the SACP and state and popular power is already answered inherently in its and COSATU’s commitment to socialism and is part of the basic strategic question as raised in the Communist Manifesto and Lenin’s State and Revolution, as a necessary strategic question for transition to socialism.

But still the SACP’s resolution in so far as it raises the modalities and prospects of contesting elections, should also answer some fundamental theoretical and practical questions on how this parliamentary site relates to our shared socialist goals.

Comrade Lenin in his writing “Left-Wing” Communism: an Infantile Disorder – in answering the question “Should We Participate in Bourgeois Parliaments?”. Amongst the responses he provided are the following:

1. “We Bolsheviks participated in the most counterrevolutionary parliaments, and experience has shown that this participation was not only useful but indispensable to the party of the revolutionary proletariat, after the first bourgeois revolution in Russia (1905), so as to pave the way for the second bourgeois revolution (February 1917), and then for the socialist revolution (October 1917)”. 

2. “Certainly, without a revolutionary mood among the masses, and without conditions facilitating the growth of this mood, revolutionary tactics will never develop into action. In Russia, however, lengthy, painful and sanguinary experience has taught us the truth that revolutionary tactics cannot be built on a revolutionary mood alone. Tactics must be based on a sober and strictly objective appraisal of all the class forces in a particular state (and of the states that surround it, and of all states the world over) as well as of the experience of revolutionary movements. It is very easy to show one’s “revolutionary” temper merely by hurling abuse at parliamentary opportunism, or merely by repudiating participation in parliaments; it’s very ease, however, cannot turn this into a solution of a difficult, a very difficult, problem”.

3. “You want to create a new society, yet you fear the difficulties involved in forming a good parliamentary group made up of convinced, devoted and heroic Communists, in a reactionary parliament! Is that not childish?”

Comrade Lenin was raising issues on the general principles but also of the existing material conditions and the peculiarities of Russia as a country. This is also what must guide COSATU in its approach on this matter.

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This should include drawing lessons from other struggles that combined the anti-colonial and anti-capitalist struggles that drove the NDR in their own specific conditions such Cuba, Vietnam, China, etc. In this vein, we must learn from the teachings of revolutionaries such as Chairman Mao, who warned against adventurism - in taking strategic and tactical decisions. He also warned against commandism in relation to the masses (failing to listen and taking into account the level of class consciousness of the working class).

We must always take the mass-line, root and ground our decisions within the class and popular strata. We must avoid tailism where the working class and its formations would find themselves helplessly following behind the agenda of other class forces in the coalition of class forces.

2.5. NASREC AND THE NEW DAWN

After the NASREC Conference, following a series of ANC NEC meetings and consultations, the ANC president comrade Jacob Zuma resigned on the 14 th February 2018 and comrade Cyril Ramaphosa assumed the position of state president and made his first state of the Nation Address. The theme of the inaugural SONA of President Cyril Ramaphosa was “the new dawn”, which purports that we have now entered a new conjuncture even though its policy content and practical meaning still remains unclear.

We by no means can say that we have now entered the radical second phase. It is also unclear as to whether this is the same thing as the new dawn. Whilst we took a principled decision calling for the Deputy ANC President to succeed as per historical precedent, we need to develop a grasp of the ideological politics underlying the “new dawn” and vigilantly analyse the discussions of the ANC leading executive structures given the diminished presence of the working class, but always observing practice rather than just rhetoric. However, all of these questions should not suggest that nothing has so far changed at all, since NASREC. In fact, many of the political demands and objectives of COSATU’s general strike of the 27 th September 2017 have been met or realised.

We have seen a cabinet reshuffle that removed some of the worst ministers (even though others still remain); the board of Eskom being dissolved and the irregular appointment of its CEO being reversed; more departments and SOEs being subjected to critical cabinet and parliamentary scrutiny; a judicial commission of inquiry on state capture being established; the Guptas becoming outlaws on the run from the law; those who have been associated with the alleged GUPTA corruption being pursued. Obviously, there are numerous other investigations, prosecutions, disciplinary processes that are underway and probably still more to be uncovered.

But all of this reflects the scale and depth of the scourge of corruption and maladministration that has engulfed the democratic state, ANC and society at large. This indicates that next to the strategic adversaries of the NDR in the counter-revolutionary camp, is the comprador bourgeoisie which is made up of two segments: a) that segment of the bourgeoisie which is allied to monopoly capital and imperialism and b) that segment which accumulates on the basis of “corruption”.

For the first segment, its mode of accumulation is based on dealings that ensure that the interests of monopoly capital are protected and extended. Inter-imperialist rivalries over the

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spoils of the country are bound to find expression in the bickering, discord and cat-fights within the comprador bourgeoisie.

It is in this context that, if the movement is to maintain its unity and clarity of purpose and policy, this element of the bourgeoisie must be carefully isolated from the ranks of the movement. The effect of the comprador element is also to mask the true nature of the enemy. Since it has dealings with monopoly capital and imperialism, its approach is to blunt our movement’s understanding of the enemy, and to divert attention to issues that are either peripheral, or issues that are “effects” of the underlying class relations.

The comprador bourgeoisie seeks to replace the domestic white capitalist class, or to squeeze itself in the alliance of white-monopoly capital and imperialism, and thereby become part of the exploiters. In this way, it will consistently attempt to undermine the NDR and measures geared at tackling property relations in a revolutionary way.

The second segment of the comprador bourgeoisie is those that accumulate on the basis of what is ordinarily called corruption, which is nothing but capital accumulation outside the parameters of bourgeois legality. This segment is not necessarily linked to white-monopoly capital and imperialism. Elements of this consistently seek accommodation in the monopoly capital alliance, and they consistently fail to find a place on the dinner-table of monopoly capital.

At one point, it adopts the positions of the non-compradorial bourgeoisie, in another instance, it positions itself against imperialism. In this segment too, internal bickering, discord, and rivalries over the spoils that are left by monopoly-capitalism, particularly the spoils arising from the fiscus, including exploiting loopholes in the regulatory framework of SOEs, in order to loot.

There are contradictions within these segments and between them. The main cause of the contradictions between the “corrupt” comprador and the “non-corrupt” comprador lies in the struggle for space in the dinner-table of the ruling class and imperialism. This inter-comprador contradiction inevitably spills over into the movement and in the process work to hollow out the NDR.

It is in this context that our fight against the GUPTA phenomenon and similar parasitic elements must not be allowed to make us lose sight of our primary fight against monopoly capital and white monopoly capital in particular. Yesterday it was the 1996 class project which had the GUPTA like elements that enjoyed proximity with the state and today it is the GUPTA with a similar behaviour.

We should reflect on our omissions regarding how we fought against the manifestation of the compradorial element leading to the 2007 Polokwane conference and yet the outcomes of those battles allowed space for the survival and emergence of new parasitic elements, with monopoly capital being left to go away with murder.

Whilst our fight against corruption must be based on high revolutionary morality, we must never commit a mistake of assuming that corruption can be fought and defeated

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by simply focusing on what is taking place in the state without recognising that there is no corruption taking place in the state without its link to the private sector.

The Deputy General Secretary of the SACP comrade Jeremy Cronin in 2012 wrote an article titled “The unholy trinity – the roots of corruption in our society”, amongst others he said that “the idea that politicians and the state are, more or less by definition, corrupt is liable to undermine our determination to use state power (along with social activism) to deal decisively with corruption. It also helps to obscure the fact that where corruption occurs in the public sector there is, invariably, a private sector corrupter, a Glenn Agliotti or a Brett Kebble.

For every black property tycoon working in collusion with senior public servants to lease buildings at hugely inflated prices to government there is typically a big bank. The bank might well not literally be breaking the law, but its own senior staff involved in the lease will know exactly what is going on. They will quietly earn inflated bonuses for bringing in business, while the bank chairman publicly condemns the corruption of the new “extraordinary breed of politicians.” He continued and argued that ...there is a failure to recognize that the established white bourgeoisie did not stand idly by in the face of the new, post-1994 political reality. They continued to pursue the agenda of late-apartheid, namely to build a relatively substantial “buffer” black middle strata. This was already the agenda of big capital in the early 1990s negotiations period, for instance.

By the mid-1990s, a key strategy for engineering “social distance” and for consolidating a buffer black elite stratum was the policy of “black economic empowerment”. This amounted to a social pact between elements within the new political elite and established big capital. From the side of established big capital it represented in many respects a re-run of how mining and banking capital had once accommodated itself to the 1948 Afrikaner nationalist political victory. The first wave of BEE advancements were not necessarily all corrupt (although many questions still surround key early BEE-related moves – notably the arms deal). But the canonization of “BEE” as a central programme of government brought into play a dangerous nexus between political office, personal enrichment, and established capital. He then concluded that “... unless we grasp the triadic nexus, this unholy trinity, we will not begin to understand the systemic roots of corruption in our society. Nor will we be able to develop an effective multi-pronged counter-strategy”.

The struggle against corruption and the material conditions that foster it has, therefore, to be a struggle for social emancipation. We have literally to abolish, amongst many things, the social distance engraved in our persisting apartheid spatial patterns through the accelerated planning and implementation of mixed-used, mixed-income settlement patterns. But this means taking head-on the vested interests of the established capitalist class (the value of their residential properties, for instance), and the venal interests of a comprador elite that has been promoted as a buffer against serious transformation. Therefore, there must be recognition of the fact that in our country corruption is marked by a dynamic cross-pollination between public-sector led development which relies on the skills and capacity from the private sector. Evidence of corruption in the public sector mirrors the corresponding levels of corruption in the private sector. The two are just different sides of the same coin and both must be fought with equal vigour!

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In trying to understand and make sense of the emerging reality in the aftermath of NASREC, perhaps we would be best guided by Antonio Gramsci’s dictum of the “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.”4 Thus, putting aside considerations of the broader balance of class and political forces for a moment, on the surface we can claim that the NASREC outcomes are pregnant with a potential to help forge a radical second phase of our transition. The ANC adopted resolutions that underscore this potential:

Free education for the poor and working class

Nationalisation of the SARB

Expropriation of land without compensation subject to food security concerns

Support for mining subject to further discussions and free carry shares for the state instead of tenderpreneurs.

Full implementation of the NHI

Subsequently, this was followed up with the January 8 th Statement which reaffirmed these key NASREC policy positions, including:

The need to reduce concentration of ownership and control in the economy and breaking up monopolies

Implementation of the National Minimum Wage The Job Summit

These policy outcomes and pronouncements must be appropriated by the working class as an inspiration to infuse the “optimism of our will” to mobilise and exert pressure on the ANC government for their implementation. However, in the camp of our movement, the post-NASREC reality has come with concerning implications and it raises fundamental questions. As mentioned in the foregoing, in the leading organ of the ANC, the NEC, our leading working class cadres from COSATU and SACP have all but been removed - there are only three elected into the ANC NEC, two of whom are from COSATU. Compared to the previous NEC that was elected in Mangaung, this is a complete rout if ever there was a consciously organised ideological or class contestations riding on the NEC elections.

Whilst it is not a matter of quantity of representation, there is a measure or point at which quantity take on some quality. This devastatingly diminished influence of the working class somewhat discloses the class-orientations of both of the main factions that contested the top leadership positions at NASREC.

Hence it would be foolhardy to argue that this was merely a product of an unadulterated democratic process, especially given the fact that there were openly organised slates under the control of gate-keepers. Of course, from province to province there would be variations determined by particular dynamics of the Alliance relations.

4 Gramsci, A: Prison Notebooks, trans. Joseph A. Buttigieg and Antonio Callari, ed. Buttigieg, 5 vols., New York, 1992, Volume 1, p211.

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But in the overall we can say that in the unfolding ANC regional and provincial conferences the forces exerting the greatest influence are the rival elite factions formed around provincial and national figureheads and these are to some extent still shaped by the factional line-ups formed in the period leading to NASREC.

It would be naïve for COSATU and SACP to be oblivious to the fact that this raises the spectre of potential hostility towards the interests of the working class in the medium to long-term.

Therefore, despite our principled support for the election of Cde Cyril Ramaphosa at NASREC, it would be a huge mistake for COSATU to be carried away by the sweep of “ramaphoria” and the seeming relatively improved Alliance relations at the national level without considering the implications and potential dangers of this post-NASREC reality on the Alliance and working class interests.

Again, it is fair to ponder as to the reliability and conviction of such ANC leadership on the central question of forging a radical second phase. Or put differently, taking into consideration the broader balance of class and political forces in society, it has to be asked as to what potential is there for even the radical resolutions of NASREC to be implemented?

These are not idle questions charged with nothing but cynicism or sour grapes, but some of the many questions that a necessary healthy dose of the Gramscian “pessimism of the intellect” calls for. To illustrate the point, whilst some in the movement may choose to treat it as an isolated instance and justifiable on some grounds known to the leadership, but the quick retreat that was made by the ANC when the issue of the nationalisation of the SARB was raised in Parliament is indeed an ominous signal.

Clearly we are in an unprecedented situation marking the lowest point in the influence of the class-conscious working class leadership at the top executive organ of the ANC at least since Morogoro. Worst still, given what appears to be a major alteration and potentially irreversible change in the correlation of class forces within the ANC, this outcome also raises a fundamental question as to the viability of the NDR spearheaded by the ANC that is increasingly dominated by other ideological outlooks and class interests. But from our standpoint as COSATU this development unfortunately once again underscores the dismal failure of our 2015 Plan with regard to the “swelling-the-ranks” of the ANC. Perhaps this also raises questions as to whether we have done enough with what was possible, in the period leading to NASREC to safeguard our class interests in terms of the machinations of the ANC NEC elections.

All of these emerging questions on the back of NASREC must be considered as part of our discussions of the historic resolution adopted at the 14 th Congress of the SACP on state power, the call for the reconfiguration of the Alliance and the leadership role of the SACP in the NDR. As we formulate our medium-term strategic perspective as COSATU, these are the key questions to which answers must be provided. We cannot fall back on the tired, default and formulaic theoretical mantras that are no longer immersed in and reflective of the conjunctural reality. The fact that the SACP is already placing front and centre its leadership role in the NDR and it seeks to build a popular left front underscores two theses on the NDR in this conjuncture:

The fundamental contradiction in our society, the class contradiction, is ascending as the principal contradiction in this conjuncture and phase of the NDR.

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Correspondingly, there is a major realignment of class and ideological forces within the broad front of our movement and in the wider society.

This then brings discussions to the question of the balance of class and political forces.

2.6. THE BALANCE OF CLASS AND POLITICAL FORCES

A discussion on the balance of class and political forces must take the political economy as its point of departure, as ultimately politics is nothing but a concentrated expression of social and economic interests. It is now a full decade since the onset of the global capitalist crisis precipitated by the collapse of the US bank, Lehman Brothers, in 2008.

Since the 2009 global recession, capitalism has been trapped in a state of persistent stagnation, which is a significant feature of the international context that has a direct bearing on the broader South African economic and political reality.

Whilst the external contradictions of capitalism have an impact domestically only through the internal contradictions, the influence of the international context and its driving factors on the domestic front has become even stronger as the South African economy is now significantly internationalised in terms of ownership and investment patterns.

Some of the key sectors have now fallen under the control of international monopolies and in fact amongst these there are those that owe their origins to South Africa under colonialism and Apartheid, having accumulated their vast capital on the back of massive subsidisation by the regime and the super-exploitation of black labour over the years.

On the other hand, there are still others that remain domiciled in South Africa whilst actively investing the capital accumulated locally outside the country, becoming multinationals in their own right. South Africa is relatively small and it is inserted into global capitalist circuits as a semi-peripheral economy which means that it is at the mercy of imperialism.

Yet its oligarchic ruling class and massive capital stock exhibit features that are commonly typical in economies of the developed global-north. In this regard, we point to the twin features of high internationalisation and concentration in the structure of the economy.

Hence, NASREC (following Mangaung) adopted a resolution on “the need to reduce concentration of ownership and control in the economy and breaking up monopolies.”

The relevant question is whether the Competition Amendment Bill (published last year) which accordingly is meant expand the mandate and powers of the competition authorities to address high levels of economic concentration would indeed arm the state to carry out this intervention, if there is political conviction and will. This is an immense but critical undertaking for the radical second phase which if implemented is bound to provoke resistance not only from domestic but also international monopoly capital. Ironically, the motivation behind this resolution is an attempt to break down barriers of entry for the fledgling black capitalist class. Thus, in terms of the NDR version of the “deracialisation” of capitalism, this is the only extent to which within the ANC monopoly

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capital (white) is regarded as an adversary of the NDR rather than on the basis of its class exploitation.

Therefore, as the working class we must always be aware that there is a limit in the extent to which other class forces within the ANC are committed to the fight against monopoly capital, as the current ANC’s strategy and tactics only seek the “resolution” of “super-exploitation” and not capitalist exploitation as such. Of course the ANC is not socialist, but it is unclear as to what the “resolution” of “super-exploitation” means when global capitalism is actually intensifying exploitation everywhere by raising productivity whilst suppressing wage levels and destroying the social wage. This underscores the argument that the working class as the primary motive force of the NDR is indeed alone with the potential capacity, commitment and orientation of overcoming all the contradictions of the NDR.

As part of the phenomena of internationalisation and concentration, one of the recent examples in the South African economy which simultaneously consolidated concentration is in the hotel industry – where the largest hotel group in Africa, Protea Hospitality Holdings, merged with US based Marriot International. Similarly we have seen others such as between SAB and AB InBev and of course the takeover of Massmart by Walmart - highlighting the scale of this unfolding pattern of the deepening presence of foreign monopoly capital. Indeed, across several other sectors these twin features of internationalisation and concentration occurred including in banking, manufacturing (petro-chemicals and basic iron and steel), heavy machinery and equipment, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, etc. Some in the ANC and right-wing pundits would regard this as a positive sign of foreign investment, oblivious to the underlying effect of under-development caused by the repatriation of increasing proportions of profits.

Thus, having merged and established networks particularly with western monopoly capital, the colonial-Apartheid oligarchy now feels more confident in its engagement with the South Africa political terrain - a factor that has a significant influence on the domestic balance of class and political forces. This western orientation also manifests itself in the political terrain where the main political opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), and other right-wing forces regularly invoke western imperialist powers and institutions on sovereign domestic matters, the land question being a case in point. This underscores the heightening of the anti-imperialist content of the NDR, which necessarily has to take a new form since South Africa is now fully reintegrated internationally. Equally, it underscores the fact that our combined national and class struggles and anti-imperialist resistance are two sides of the same coin. Hence, the importance of our struggle, including trade union struggle, to taken a consistent proletarian internationalist outlook. The increasing influence exerted by this external dimension on the domestic balance of class and political forces is also underscored by the role that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the three Manhattan-based sovereign rating agencies have now arrogated to themselves in providing oversight on government’s policies, as they regularly summon it to explain its positions.

In fact, lately they have even been going public in issuing their prescriptions to government on public policy, especially on the fiscal policy, despite their dismal failure and discredit that they incurred as a result of their role in the 2008 financial meltdown.

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But on the other hand we can argue that this is facilitated and enabled by the fact that for its part the South African government still harbours illusions of growing the economy through foreign direct investments, something that has never substantially materialised despite the Neoliberal macroeconomic policies that have been imposed since 1996 - at the cost of aggravating the inherited crises of unemployment, inequalities and poverty. If not in the stock exchange, foreign investments have largely been in the form of mergers and takeovers and rarely has it been in the form of greenfield direct investments. We can already see the logic of this illusion at play as President Ramaphosa puts his administration under pressure with his appointment of a group of “investment envoys” to raise 100 billion dollars over the next five years. This well-meaning initiative is likely to be a soft spot to be used by imperialists and international monopoly capital to dictate policy preconditions before they would make any offers of investments. In addition, the extremely deregulated South African financial markets and the vulnerable external value of the Rand (which has been gradually falling this year) have made the domestic policy agenda to be open to mediation and moderation by international finance monopoly capital which regularly threatens capital flight.

This deepening and intensified internationalisation and concentration, are but two of the symptomatic features of what Lenin characterised as moribund capitalism (imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism), which when combined with the particular objective domestic dynamics the consequences are devastating on the working class and organised labour. Hence, putting aside the subjective weaknesses for a moment, COSATU as the primary class-oriented trade union movement on the opposite side of the balance of class forces in South Africa, has suffered massive blows from these objective tendencies in the recent while, that have been accompanied by the restructuring of the workplace, intensified mechanisation of work, casualisation and retrenchments. Despite the fact that the ANC proclaims to be working class biased, we have witnessed a precipitous decline in the social position of the working class and the ANC government has been incapable of defending its core social base in the face of the onslaught by capital. The current perilous socio-economic conditions for the working class will persist for as long as the working class does not take a direct and unapologetic lead in the struggle to free itself from these bondages. The working class needs to remember that no class has ever led the revolution on behalf of the other classes; each class act in its own self-interest first and foremost before it thinks of its class allies.

In the overall landscape of organised labour, since the 2009 recession we have seen further fragmentation with the formation of more trade unions. As at March 2018 there are about 190 unions registered with the Department of Labour. Obviously, there are dire implications of this fragmentation on the future of the trade union movement and working class power in general. This is exacerbated by the fact that in this fragmentation there is a tendency amongst unions to cannibalise each other – preoccupied with mainly recruiting members from each other and preferring sectors that are least affected by precarious terms of employment. Ironically, it is as if they are copying the predatory methods of their bosses or monopoly capital in staging takeovers as such unions tend to target workers that have already joined other unions instead of

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prioritising the unorganised and vulnerable sections of the workforce. The more pronounced manifestation of this phenomenon of fragmentation has been the formation of SAFTU, following the dismissal of NUMSA from the federation in 2014. Worst still, this fragmentation is taking place against the backdrop of a generally shrinking membership base, as the South Africa labour landscape seems to be now following the general international trend of declining unionisation. For instance, in the global-north (OECD countries) about 17% of workers are members of a union (falling from 30% in 1985)5, whilst in South Africa unionisation has now fallen below 30%. Our federation is still reeling but gradually on steady recovery trajectory having suffered from this combined effect of shrinking unionisation and fragmentation (as well as the offensive escalated by monopoly capital especially since the 2009 recession) from its height of 2.2 million strong membership.

These continuous objective changes are also manifested socioeconomically with the widening wage gap and declining workers’ share in the national economy, which are further polarising society. To illustrate the point, in the retail industry which is one of the worst affected by precarious working conditions, the average annual income for an entry-level worker is around R63 917, whilst at the Executive Director level it averages around R17, 467, 403.6 There is also another underlying objective secular or long-term transformation that is taking place in the labour force, and perhaps more so within the membership of organised labour. Thus, based on a series of surveys conducted amongst COSATU membership,7 already by 2014 around 60% of the respondents classified themselves as either skilled or professional, whilst actually in 1994 60% of COSATU membership were unskilled and semi-skilled, a seismic inversion indeed. The majority of these skilled or professional workers are located in the public sector and accordingly the sample also reveals that 40% have some tertiary qualifications in the form of diplomas or degrees. This reinforces the observation that the proportion of unskilled manual workers are increasingly dropping or leaking out of the federation at the time when they require protection given the expanding precarious forms of employment (casualisation, informalisation, etc.).

These developments mean that the capitalist class has an upper-hand and it is succeeding in reshaping the labour market on its own terms to extract supper-profits or to further weaken the trade union movement. Improvement in the skilling and education profile of our base is of course a positive development that must be welcomed and promoted, but we must ensure that it is accompanied by rising income levels and not just productivity that benefits the bosses alone.

But together with the increasing youthfulness of the labour force, the receding memories of anti-apartheid struggles, declining sentimental loyalties to COSATU and the broader democratic movement, as well as the depolitisation that is taking place in our society, the continuation of these objective labour market changes pose serious dangers for the federation.

5 OECD (2017) Employment Outlook 2017, OECD Publishing, Paris.6 Labour Research Service, 2017. Bargaining Indicators 2017. Cape Town. 7 Bezuidenhout, A. and Tshoaedi, M. (2017). Labour beyond COSATU: Mapping the Ruptures in South Africa’s Labour Landscape. Wits University Press: Johannesburg.

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COSATU is called upon to make some major adjustments and to creatively adapt to these labour market realities and trade union landscape if it is to regain its strength in order to fight back and shift the balance of class forces in the political economy. This includes continuously using innovative methods in learning how to improve strategies of recruiting and organising precarious workers who are also used by capital to suppress the average wage levels. There is no question that the history of the South African trade union movement for nearly half a century, has basically been that of COSATU and its predecessors. In terms of the future, this can no longer be taken for granted as our subjective weaknesses have enabled and embolden numerous opportunist individuals to establish their own union fiefdoms, hence the mushrooming of unions that are dominated by figureheads and cultists who do not allow accountability, worker control and democratic practice. Our gallant history, radical and militant traditions must be cherished and safeguarded but on their own without proper service to members, transparency and accountability they are no longer adequate nor sustainable in the face of the changing landscape. Our current generation bears the responsibility of retaining the revolutionary mantle of our federation in concrete class struggles, to challenge the upper-hand enjoyed by the bosses. To do so we have to take seriously the task of overcoming many of the subjective weaknesses that have dragged us down and enabled the bosses to have a free-hand in changing the labour market and thus further shifting the balance of class forces in their favour.

Unless the working class and other popular strata assert themselves, our movement will continuously suffer from incoherence and discord, and will lose sight of who the strategic enemy of the revolution is. We must acknowledge that despite some weaknesses and setbacks in terms of the political programme of the 2015 Plan, we were still able to make an impact such as on leadership successions in Polokwane, Mangaung and NASREC, as well as on the policy resolutions of these conferences, including creating pressure for the perspective of the second radical phase to emerged in the ANC at Mangaung. Once again, we helped open the door but are weak and lack confidence to walk in – to capitalise on our gains and opportunities. But it can be argued that the swelling-of-the-ranks have on the whole led to the “swallowing” of worker leaders by ANC, even at the branch and regional levels, many of our comrades find themselves captives of the rival factions of the ANC. In some instances, COSATU deployees or members would be amongst those who are hostile to the federation. On the other hand, for those amongst us who are active in the ANC and consistent, we have found it difficult to articulate COSATU positions within the ANC structures even when we know that they are correct.

Despite the foregoing regarding the balance of class forces and weaknesses exhibited by our organised class-oriented trade union movement, we are proud to say that since our last congress COSATU has led successful May Day celebrations all over the country and in the process defeated attempts by our detractors and the bourgeois media to question and undermine our victories, including on the National Minimum Wage. Many COSATU unions have been and continue to be on the streets demanding a living wage in their sectors. COSATU’s interventions on corruption and state capture, on leadership questions in the ANC and on various policy struggles have earned it both respect and

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more enemies. For example, since 2015 it has become clear that the media is hell-bent to promote and elevate the new federation whose declared aim is to liquidate COSATU. Even though these attempts continue to fail but the project of liquidating COSATU has not been aborted. More space continues to be given to those who oppose COSATU, including black and white right-wing commentators. However, as the federation we have not been aggressive in defending ourselves from this onslaught. We have to rearm ourselves to respond without losing focus on our eternal duty of disseminating a positive and confident message to inspire workers and the working class in general in the face of these immense challenges.

At the level of the broader national political terrain we can say that the post-NASREC reality has produced new and difficult conditions for the political opposition camp to contend with. Thus, despite the necessary and healthy scepticism that we must bear - informed by previous experiences of being disappointed - it is a significant development that some of the radical policy outcomes of NASREC are already finding expression in the corridors of power as they are debated in Parliament. This is forcing some shifts and realignment of forces in the political opposition camp in which the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) is now gradually trying to distance itself and finds itself at loggerheads with its coalition partner, DA, and slightly less so with the ANC as compared to previous years. The EFF is now opportunistically piggybacking on the radical NASREC policy outcomes, deluding itself into believing that it can determine the national agenda and run the country from the opposition benches.

The DA itself is facing internal contradictions that have been simmering for a long period of time and that even its federal congress only suppressed but never resolved. Hence, the recent reigning in of its purported leader, Mmusi Maimane, by the core white leadership cabal over his comments on white-privilege have further fuelled rumours of a potential split. Its high-handed handling of the De Lille matter is back-firing and has further deepened the internally simmering tensions, especially in the Western Cape and thus raising good prospects for the ANC in future elections only if it becomes properly and effectively organised. As the main opposition party, in its aspiration to maintain the momentum of attracting more African people and to appear as the main parliamentary voice speaking against some of the broadly unpopular policies of the ANC government such as the etolls, the DA has opportunistically slid into populism. This has planted seeds of contradictions within as the Apartheid-liberalism espoused by its white rear-guard leadership and core constituency that clash with some of the opportunist manoeuvres and populist issues that Maimane is using to attract African votes. In this post-NASREC situation the Zuma electoral windfall that the opposition enjoyed in the last local government election has somewhat disappeared.

The movement stands a better chance to secure electoral advances in the Western Cape under these conditions however the continued infightings in the ANC will not allow it to make such advances. One things has become clear and it is that the DA is more and more getting exposed for a racist organisation that it is but observing that on its own is not enough unless it is turned into a political opportunity to exploited for electoral and ideological objectives. Now, we have a situation where some of the fundamental demands of the NDR such as universal health coverage, free post-schooling and the expropriation of land without compensation have become the main topical issues, and

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this is making the DA to finds itself caught up in a dilemma of protecting the narrow privileges and interests of its core white constituency whilst trying to appear not opposed to the aspirations and needs of the historically oppressed majority. Indeed, the DA’s mythical narrative that has been constantly peddled by right-wing pundits and commentariat that the results of the 2016 municipal elections point to a future in national politics that is characterised by coalition governments, is now looking like a pipedream. The fact of the matter is that the general trend in the on-going by-elections run counter to this narrative because the ANC has been reclaiming some of its lost ground and consolidating its strongholds.

2.7. CONCLUSION

So, we can conclude by saying that whilst the ANC-led Alliance remains the dominant political force, ultimately the extent to which the movement has been able to use this popular support to advance the radical agenda of its mandate in the formal political processes has been limited by the fact that the balance of class forces remain decisively in favour of monopoly capital. And whilst we acknowledged that NASREC has generated some hope as that conference retained the radical thrust that goes back to Polokwane in as far as some of the resolutions adopted are concern, we are also flagging the dire sign of dangers that are lurking in the present conjuncture in so far as at NASREC the working class leadership has all but been liquidated from the leading organ of the ANC, the NEC. The increasing involvement of western imperialist institutions on sovereign matters and the heavy presence of international monopoly capital in our economy has placed the project of the second radical phase in doubt, especially given the overall outlook of the new ANC national leadership. But, if the ANC remained consistent in its fight against corruption in government and all formations of the Alliance seriously embark on their organisational renewal and going back to the basics, then the second radical phase and ultimately the NDR have a fighting chance.

3. The Socio – Economic Context and Radical Socio – Economic Transformation

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, the financial crisis has plunged global capitalism into a prolonged state of fluctuation between low-growth and stagnation, and in turn this economic crisis created a credibility crisis for Neoliberalism8 which even the mainstream international commentators have conceded. Hence, in 2008 the editorial of the London based “world’s leading global business publication”, Financial Times, said: “Remember Friday

8 “Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit” (Harvey 2005:2).

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March 14th: it was the day the dream of global free-market capitalism died.” Yet, the global ruling class has not produced a new economic policy orthodoxy or regime of accumulation as they previously have done after such major crises – in response to the great depression of the 1930s (Keynesianism) and the economic crisis of the 1970s (Neoliberalism).

Reactions to this crisis often blamed it on the greed of the bankers, the corruption by politicians, incompetence of governments or Neoliberalism. Certainly, all of these factors and still more others have contributed to the outbreak of this crisis but for us ultimately all capitalist crises are bound to occur at some point because they are systemic or results of the inherent contradictory logic of the capitalist system. And it is not as if we expect solutions to capitalist crises from the ruling class. So, Neoliberal policies still remain the order of the day in international economic institutions and forums, even as some moderation is entertained in the numerous exclusive gatherings of the global oligarchy.

Through BREXIT the British people thought they were freeing themselves from the dictates of European Union’s “Brussels bureaucrats” that is scapegoated by domestic politicians for their own Neoliberal failures. Whilst, in addition to his opportunistic and extremely reactionary politics, Trump has struck a chord with some of his economic policies that are messing up the entrenched North Atlantic Neoliberal consensus to which the American political elites have been committed. Yet, in the domestic policies of many countries Neoliberal policies are still followed by the ruling centrist parties despite the fact that politically they have reawakened right-wing demagogy on the one hand and the resurgence left movements on the other, including more interest in Karl Marx’s Das Kapital. However, some breathing space has been created in part by the lack of solutions from Neoliberalism and the odious reputations that the IMF, finance monopoly capital and the domestic Neoliberal centrist parties have incurred. This means that the current conjuncture that is ridden with economic, social, political and ecological crises provides an opportunity for the left at least to override Neoliberal policies if not to challenge capitalism itself. However, the left as a group has failed to take an opportunity of pushing for alternatives on the back of nationalisation of debt by western governments in order to save their businesses. But in the overall, at best the ruling classes have only accommodated marginal stopgap measures or moderations to sweeten the pain of their unending austerity measures and to pacify the masses whilst the Neoliberal economic policies basically remain in place. Ironically, such stopgap measures include regulatory interventions and the temporary nationalisation of collapsed businesses, to socialise the debts and other costs.

In part because of the persistent low-growth trap into which the South African economy has fallen since the 2009 financial crisis, economic policy is in a state of flux in the current conjuncture, ironically this also reflects that there has bee a systemic and conscious opening up of a breathing space for the Neoliberal and this reality underscores that there are constraints on the balance of forces in breaking free from Neoliberal dictates.

On the basis of the experiences of other countries such as Libya and Venuezela any attempt to move out of the neo liberal economic policy framework will result in the fall in the economy especially when we are so dependent on foreign capital and technology.

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However we take resolutions and elect leaders not to be celebrated by the imperialists institutions and the media but to advance an agenda that confronts imperialism and neo-liberalism. There is an urgent need on the country’s leadership to localise control, ownership and investment in the economy through active state intervention and ownership of the commanding heights of the economy.

It should be noted that moving towards the ANC policy conference and later the 54 th

National Conference there had been a clear articulated agenda to push back against neo liberalism, in particular addressing the ownership and control of the economy. The call for radical transformation of the ownership patterns and control of the economy has been met with a serious pushback by the neo liberal exponents which was camouflaged as a fight against corruption and the protection of state owned enterprises when in reality as it is gradually being exposed by unilaterally imposed policies against the working class such as VAT increase, and privatisation of energy.

Economic policy action now seems to be informed by a cocktail of the juxtaposed prescripts of the National Growth Path (NGP)9 which was meant to be some kind of a shift from GEAR, the infamous chapter 3 of the National Development Plan (NDP) which essentially is a framework of continuity with GEAR, the Nine Point Plan announced during the 2015 SONA in response to the 2014 downward turn in the economic growth rate, which in turn was followed by the 14 Point Plan adopted after a dramatic Cabinet reshuffle and in the face of a technical recession in 2017. In parallel to these policies are a host of economic resolutions adopted at Mangaung and NASREC that resonate with the perspective of a radical second phase and they too occasionally find expression in parliamentary debates and speeches of government leaders.

Therefore, this flux is characterised by a mixture of sometimes contradictory economic policies piled on top of each other, which suggest that the NDP through which the Treasury reclaimed its authority and continuity with GEAR’s Neoliberal framework is already failing even on its own unambitious targets.

Neo liberal policy framework in South Africa is located in the GEAR policy and now the NDP. The targets of the NDP are not likely to be achieved. In the absence of an interventionist state and an expansionary fiscal policy which must prioritise reduction in taxes on the poor and working class and an increase in government spending, we are unlikely to achieve the NDP targets of reducing unemployment to 14% by 2020 and 6% by 2030.

And so, the current transitional period of the Ramaphosa-led government that includes the process of the development of the ANC’s manifesto leading to the 2019 elections, provides an opportunity for a break with the deep-seated Neoliberal discourse and practice in government, not only in terms of macroeconomic policies but also in terms of the orientation of the state itself.

All the rhetorical talk of building a capable Developmental State has now subsided because what transpired has been nothing but further embarrassing hallowing of the state - with outsourcing and agentisation continuing unabated, behind which often are parasitic networks of tenderpreneurs.

9 Actually, the NGP replaced the ill-fated Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), which amongst others sought to introduce greater labour market flexibility through a review of the labour laws.

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From this year’s Budget Speech we have even heard the privatisation of the state’s assets being brought back to the table. In fact, already Eskom seems to have been lined up as deliberations around the dismemberment of its vertically integrated structure are advancing.

Usually this is the first stage along the path of the creation of separate markets of generation and distribution, of course inclusive of private sector “players”. Already Eskom has committed to privatisation through selling off Eskom’s market share for generation of renewable energy to the private sector.

In what follows we shall not deal with the confusing zigzags, complexities and nuanced differences of the government’s economic policy response to the persisting economic crisis. In conjunction with the Department of Trade and Industry’s Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), the NGP and NDP are currently used as the official reference documents in the government’s economic policy discourse. And so, to give the discussions a background and historical perspective we shall begin with an outline of a summarised version of key elements of the NGP – as this was the first major policy initiative that tried to go beyond the GEAR framework.

Then the NDP’s economic prescriptions are critically outlined in summary. For many years even after GEAR, the federation has consistently critiqued the Neoliberal macroeconomic policy regime that is administered by Treasury and the South African Reserve Bank.

Thus, to underscore the argument that this framework is basically still in place and overarching all the economic policies, we provide a brief outline of its evolution up to the present.

This would be followed by highlights of the key resolutions of Mangaung and NASREC, which arguably must be the basis and framework for the 2019 manifesto and thus a guide towards the second radical phase. Finally, we isolate specific key policy matters that require clear positions by the federation from discussions.

3.2. ECONOMIC POLICY CONTEXT

3.2.1. The New Growth Path

On the back of the watershed Polokwane conference and the 2009 recession, the ANC government’s response in this emerging breathing space was in a form of the NGP, which was released in November 2010. In the first instance, it is important to appreciate that as part the spin offs of the dislodgement of the 1996 Class Project, it appeared as if economic policy making was shifting from the bastion of Neoliberalism, Treasury, (which through GEAR it was positioned as a super-ministry) as the NGP was developed for government under the new Ministry of Economic Development. In many respects, the NGP departed from GEAR’s Neoliberal straightjacket, though not entirely as its “macroeconomic package” sought a balance between “looser monetary policy” and “more restrictive fiscal policy” and it was also too preoccupied with inflation targeting though tougher measures by the competition authorities and other microeconomic interventions. But in brief NGP set out to do the following:

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a) It placed emphasis on job-creation and reduction of inequalities rather narrowly focusing on the growth rate target. Thus, it aimed to create 5 million jobs and reduce unemployment from 25% to 15% in the next ten years (from 2010).

b) It redefined the role of the state in the economy, proposing the creation of a state-owned bank, the reorientation of the SOEs and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) in terms of the planned investment targets and development objectives.

c) It sought an alignment of the macroeconomic policies, in particular the monetary policy with the industrial policy and other objectives.

d) It sought to develop capacity for a state-led coordination between the productive economy, education and skills training, infrastructure development and environmental sustainability.

e) It sought to direct government to increase employment using activities in the social economy, especially cooperatives and other activities in the not-for-profit sector.

f) It sought to build-on the Industrial Policy Action Plan II for industrialisation, as developed by the Department of Trade and Industry.

3.2.2. The National Development Plan (NDP)

We are now in the 6th year and towards the end of the second term since the ANC government adopted the NDP. It can be said that in general the NDP sets out noble objectives, including eliminating poverty, reducing inequality and unemployment and it identifies the crisis-level of our triple socioeconomic challenges as its core focus. The NDP claims to integrate the Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) IPAP and NGP. The NDP’s focus on the triple crises of unemployment, poverty and inequality was in principle welcomed but as COSATU we correctly rejected the lack of ambition in its targets and its related economic policy instruments. In the light of such policy objectives, one would be forgiven for believing that the NDP was a departure from the entrenched Neoliberal macroeconomic policies, as it even recognises the dire implications of failure in its garbled echo of the popular Morogoro quotation:

“No political democracy can survive and flourish if the mass of our people remain in poverty, without land, without tangible prospects for a better life. Attacking poverty and deprivation must be the first priority of a democratic government”.

But COSATU and SACP warned that it was wishful thinking to pursue such transformatory objectives whilst persisting with the Neoliberal macroeconomic straightjacket and with no clear interventions to structurally transform the economic base. Thus, in brief, the federation rejected10 the NDP on the following basis:

a) On jobs, the NDP envisages creating mostly low-quality, precarious jobs outside the core productive sectors - relying mainly on SMMEs and service sector jobs. Furthermore, we noted that SMMEs (in contrast to large enterprises) have actually

10 This apt summary is drawn from the 2013 SACP discussion document on the NDP.

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shown net job losses over the past period in SA. This made the NDP’s expectation of 9, 9 million new jobs highly unrealistic.

b) On worker rights - and related to the above - the NDP sought to erode worker rights through its emphasis on job creation in low-skill, low-paid work in the SMME and service sectors, and through proposed legislative measures to make dismissals easier.

c) At the heart of these problems is the fact that the NDP is extremely weak on the critical dimension of placing the economy onto a new growth path - namely through re-industrialisation.

d) The NDP envisages shrinkage of the manufacturing sector from 12% of GDP in 2010 to 9, 6% in 2030. Of the 11 million new jobs envisaged in the NDP, nearly two-thirds will come from services, domestic work and the informal sector.

3.2.3. The Neoliberal Macroeconomic policy regime

Despite all the different economic plans or strategies that have been introduced since 1996, macroeconomic policies basically remain within Neoliberal framework that has been ushered in by GEAR.

The parameters and philosophy of economic policy in government is still informed by Neoliberalism, and this is also reflected in the nature of the state. Changes that took place in the mid-2000s to the 2008 economic crisis was only because there was an international commodity boom which increased revenue, increased outsourcing and privatisation and thus encourage government to spend more.

Again, the countercyclical budgetary stance that was taken from around 2008-2009 until after the 2014 elections did not constitute a departure from the Neoliberal framework. In fact, it was part of the adjustments that have been encouraged internationally by bodies such as the IMF including loose monetary policy and quantitative easing. Of course, the SARB did not shift away from its conservative stance to a loose monetary policy, despite claims by government that the NDP is aligned with the NGP, which proposed a loose monetary policy alongside a strict fiscal policy.

Thus, the combination of this strict monetary policy and the tightening fiscal policy plunged the economy into the current low-growth trap accompanied by growing public debt. Arguably, in addition to its commitment to Neoliberalism, the persistence of the SARB with its inflation-targeting and conservative interest rates policy reflects the influence of the narrow interests of its private shareholders, who benefit from an environment of high repo rates.

The argument that we are making is that the government’s macroeconomic policies basically remains in the clutches of GEAR’s Neoliberal framework and this is underpinned by the government’s role in the market – given the ever and still widening scale of the outsourcing of public service functions, agencification, public-private-partnerships, including in major and expensive projects such as the e-tolls and others.

Nonetheless, since 1996 we can say that the fiscal policy in particular evolved over what can be characterised as four phases which were in part influenced by the state of the economy. Thus, we outline a brief description of its trajectory as a background to discussions on the present conjuncture.

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Obviously, in the first phase GEAR was inaugurated in 1996 officially lasting up to the early 2000s when the economic growth began to pick up. It was a period characterised by draconian Neoliberal measures – such as government expenditure cuts, reduction of the size of the public service to cut the public service wage bill, inflation targeting with high interest rates, privatisation, etc. The second phase began from 2003 up to 2008, during which there was an international commodity (minerals) boom, and the domestic economic was accelerated by debt-financed consumer spending and property market bubble – this significantly improved the economic growth rates and the budget balance as revenue exceeded expenditure leading to budget surplus in 2006 and 2007. During this phase government increased infrastructure and social spending, and it also gave away some revenue through tax cuts claiming that this would further accelerate growth when people and companies had more in their accounts to spend.

The third phase was heralded by the global capitalist crisis in 2008 which led to a domestic recession in 2009, and basically spanning until the new government was elected in 2014. In brief, the budget policy stance in these years can be characterised as counter-cyclical, but still maintaining the old monetary policy framework of inflation-targeting by the SARB. Thus, during this period the Treasury took a stance of using the relatively strong budget balance and to even borrow more to increase spending in order to counter the recession and low growth rates that were occurring year after year. Of course, this was in part informed by Mangaung call for a radical second phase. However, by around 2014-2015 this approach was exhausted as the budget deficit and public debt were growing as a result of increased spending but without much impact in stimulating private sector investment to achieve higher levels of growth. Thus, when Minister Nhlanhla Nene took over, he announced during his Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (2014) that Treasury was moving away from the counter-cyclical posture, and that henceforth it was going to reduce the rate of the spending growth in order to bring back the budget deficit below 3% (a GEAR target). After he was fired, in the following year Pravin Gordhan presented (2015 Budget Speech) a budget that had even more draconian cuts in expenditure and since then up to the present, the government’s macroeconomic policy stance has just been conservative. In an environment where there is low private sector investment, this meant that the economy is now in a vicious cycle of a low growth trap. As government incrementally reduced the growth of its spending rate from 2014, the economic growth rate in turn consecutively fell, leading to the 2017 technical recession (see Figure 1).

4. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT

4.1. Macroeconomic overview

In principle, we must welcome the fact that in 2017 the economy avoided recession as it registered 1.3% growth rate, and that this year it is poised to grow by 1.9% according to the Treasury, although the World Bank’s Annual Global Economic Outlook (2018) forecasts a 1.1% growth rate, which is little more than a stagnation and signals potential recessionary conditions if the consecutive downward spiral reflected in Figure 1 below

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persists. Unfortunately we also have to welcome the fact that the ratings agency Moody’s has affirmed SA’s investment-grade credit rating and revised its credit outlook to stable from negative. We also need to appreciate that rating agencies are an instrument of imperialism to ensure that economic policies are always dictated by the mother colonial country and that they exist to protect the interests of the bankers and not the poor, workers and consumers.

Source: Statistics South Africa, Q1, 2018

The largest negative contributors to economic performance in GDP in the first quarter were agriculture, mining and manufacturing industries. The manufacturing industry decreased by 6, 4% and contributed -0, 8 of a percentage point, which has been a protracted trend since the 2009 recession. The main positive contributions came from finance, real estate and business services and government, although on the basis of the current government’s plan to reduce spending over the next three years to reduce public debt its contribution is likely to correspondingly decline, which is a dire prospect in the current environment of low private sector investment.

The underlying structural fault-lines and constraints, which amongst others include the domination of the now significantly foreign-owned monopolies in key sectors, deepening racialised and gendered wealth and income inequalities, the untransformed Apartheid geography that keeps the black masses in the periphery, mean that our economy shall continue to languish in the current low-growth trap with persisting socioeconomic crises. In addition, the public sector is now burdened by a massive debt-overhang which before the global capitalist crisis in 2008 stood at a record low of 27.8% of GDP. In the intervening period, especially in the second term of President Zuma in which proper governance and management in some departments and SOEs collapsed, amidst the prevalent scourge of corruption and state-capture, public sector debt ballooned to an all-time high (since 1994) of 53% of GDP in 2017. However, a big proportion of this debt has been accrued from large scale infrastructure projects by SOEs for which the terms of financing have deteriorated.

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Source: StatsSA. Q1, 2018

We are now confronted by a farce of the ascendance of President Ramaphosa being accompanied by pronouncements of privatisation and increase of VAT as a way to address the public sector debt-burden and the of SOEs. At least CPI Inflation is still currently within the SARB’s conservative target bounds, despite the 1% VAT increase, which hopefully means that there may not be any repo rate hike. As a federation, through our affiliates that organise in SOEs we have to be vigilantly and actively monitoring and engaged with developments in the governance and management of the SOEs; our affiliates must spearhead campaigns against corruption, as this pervasive mismanagement of SOEs has enhanced calls for privatisation and agencification. This year the Treasury has reported that the combined assets of SOEs continue to exceed liabilities, where profitability measured by return on equity, fell from 0.8% in 2015-2016 to 0.3% in 2016-2017. Disturbingly, it further reports that “over the past year, the majority of these entities’ bond auctions have either been cancelled or undersubscribed. In several cases, this has led to severe liquidity shortfalls, and calls on government to extend assistance through guarantees or recapitalisation.” This is a drain on the national revenue and thus it directly affects even the bargaining interests of our members in the public sector.

4.2. The crisis-levels of unemployment, inequality and poverty

According to the latest Labour Force Survey released by Statistics South Africa, unemployment rate in the first quarter of 2018 stood at 27.2%. In gender terms, women suffer the worst brunt of unemployment, which is recorded at 28.8%. Whereas youth unemployment remains extreme – for the youth of the age of 15-24 years it is 52.4 %, which is a slight increase compared to the fourth quarter of 2017, where it was 51.1%. This means many of our matriculants are unable to proceed to post-schooling education or to find jobs. Youth unemployment from the age of 25-34 years is currently at 33.0%, it has also increased by 0.04% relative to youth unemployment in the fourth quarter of 2017 which was 33.4%.

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Since the integration of the SA economy in 1994 through GEAR into the economies of the West imperialist economies the capacity of the economy to absorb workers has been declining. Close to 58% of the economically active population is unable to find jobs in the economy. Despite the growth rate pre 2008 financial crisis the economy has not been able to create many jobs. We need new economic policies that must prioritise decent jobs and elimination of inequalities and wealth. policies that promote profits or economic have failed the working class and the poor.

According to the World Inequality Report 2018, “income inequality has increased in nearly all world regions in recent decades”. This report states that “South Africa stands out as one of the most unequal countries in the world”, where “the top 10% receive 2/3 of national income, whilst the 1% receive 20% of national income”.

On the other hand, the recent report11 of the World Bank on behalf of the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, which assessed poverty and inequality from 1994 to 2015 found that ours is the most unequal society in the world, in which about 40% of South Africans lived below the lower bound poverty line and where high wealth inequality and low intergeneration mobility inherited from apartheid saw the disparities being passed down from generation to generation, with signs showing that the situation was worsening.

4.2.1. Victories for workers

COSATU and its affiliates have achieved various material benefits for members and workers in Nedlac and courts including the following;

a) National Minimum Wage

Through our living wage campaign the President of the country has been instrumental in leading the conclusion of the National Minimum Wage per hour at Nedlac. This agreement will see 6 million workers salaries being increased to at least R3500. This is a victory for vulnerable workers in the security, cleaning, retail, farming domestic workers. The agreement will also result in enhanced enforcement powers by the CCMA regarding non payment of wages.

b) Abolishing labour broking

Whilst COSATU campaign is to ban labour brokers the government has opted for regulation of labour brokers. Whilst this is not adequate it has increased protection for workers who are employed by labour brokers by limiting the contracts of placed workers to 3 months. After a period of three months the placed workers are deemed to be employed permanently by the client of the labour broker. Whilst this is a victory it is being frustrated by tenderpreneurs who use outsourcing contracts to illegally avoid the 3 months requirement. This is a victory for vulnerable workers who are abused by labour brokers. However, the challenge is to organise to fight off this parasitic and corrupt behaviour by business. The campaign must continue to ensure total abolishment of labouring as an industry and not only the practice. The CCMA and the courts have agreed without our views in interpreting the 3 months requirement to convert temporary workers into permanent workers.

11 World Bank (2018). Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. Washington.

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In the constitutional case involving Assign Services (Pty) Limited vs National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa the court agreed without view that after a period of 3 months workers placed by a labour broker with a client remain permanent workers employed by the the client. This case was taken up by the labour broker Assign Services to mislead the court into believing the lie that labour brokers are useful and paly a role in the employment of workers. The courts have rejected this lie by stating that labour brokers contribute nothing to the employment relationship. Therefore, labour brokers are bloodsuckers who steal hard earned money from the workers and their aim is to destroy unions.

In a CCMA award involving MTN and CWU12 the CCMA found that after a period of 3 months workers are regarded as being employed by client. MTN's lawyers indicated after the arbitration award was issued in the case as indicated above that their next step would be informed by the constitutional court's  judgment in the case of Assign Services (Pty) Limited vs National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa.  This case was decided on the 26th July 2018 and we have not yet heard from MTN.  MTN and other employers who are hell bent on evading the law must comply with the constitutional court's judgment. 

Community health care workers are no entitled to be treated as workers with all benefits that are available for permanent employees. 13

c) Unemployment insurance victory for workers

COSATU has been a key supporter of the amended act and helped champion and negotiate its way through Nedlac and Parliament, including the many delays it encountered. Key progressive aspects in it that will benefit thousands of retrenched workers, mothers and their dependents include:

d) Unemployment cover:

The act will increase UIF benefits from 238 to 365 days, in other from 8 to 12 months.

It will include public servants under the UIF and thus be covered in the event of dismissal. It will significantly expand workers’ access to the UIF by reducing the credit cycle workers need to build to claim UIF. Reduced and short time workers will be included who went from full-time to part-time work due to their companies’ financial distress will be covered at their previous full time income levels if retrenched or dismissed or on maternity leave.

e) Maternity leave:

The act will not exclude workers from UIF and maternity leave benefits if they are members of the Government Employees Pension Fund. Maternity leave benefits will be separate from UIF benefits, eg a woman who was on maternity leave last year will be entitled to UIF benefits this year if she loses her job. This will remove unfair discrimination against women simply for being mothers. Women, who had miscarriages in their third trimester or still-born births, will be entitled to maternity leave to allow them time and space to heal physically and emotionally. Domestic workers will be targeted to ensure that they receive maternity leave benefits.

12 CWU obo Madela and 39 Others vs MTN. 13 Mokoena and Others v MEC Gauteng Department of Health.

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Maternity leave benefits will be increased from 54percent to 66percent of salaries within the salary limit caps.

5. THE RADICAL SECOND PHASE

Clearly, the current trajectory of low growth trap amidst the crisis-levels of unemployment, poverty and inequalities has to be turned around if the radical second phase has any positive prospects. The current economic conditions of declining investment and production in mining and manufacturing and high household debt are part of the constraints, in addition to the combination of a relatively tight monetary and contractionary fiscal policy. These are part of the structural fault-lines of the semi-peripheral economy that is still tied to a condition of dependency to the European Union and China for its mineral exports, with no substantial beneficiation for industrialisation taking place.

It is absolutely necessary to go back to the important radical economic resolutions of Mangaung conference so that the consideration of the economic resolutions of the recent NASREC conference is not in isolation from this broad thrust of the second radical phase inaugurated in Mangaung. Anyway, NASREC reaffirmed some of the Mangaung resolutions. This is important as these resolutions actually capture and echo our own policies as COSATU in our A Growth Path towards Full Employment. But it is not only what is in our policy package, even some of our campaigns issues are captured in these resolutions. In 2012, our expectation was that the immediate task before the ANC government after the Mangaung conference was to integrate the economic resolutions resonating with the radical second phase into the NGP, which had already been adopted as official economic policy. This was not to be as the NGP itself was somewhat displaced by the NDP when government adopted it in 2012. Nonetheless, Mangaung itself said that the NDP is “a living and dynamic document” and that the “ANC will continue to engage with the plan”. Whilst, on the other hand, Mangaung resolved that the NGP and other policy instruments and initiatives would be located within the vision of the NDP, whereby the NGP would remain as “the economic strategy designed to shift the trajectory of economic development”. Furthermore, Mangaung resolved that:

a) The industrial policy action plan guides the reindustrialization of the South African economy.

b) That decent work is the primary focus of economic policy.

c) The state mining company must be strengthened in order to capture a share of mineral resource rents and equity.

d) In addition, Mangaung built on some of the Polokwane economic policy gains as it called for:  

e) Financial regulation and control, including through a state owned bank.

f) The transformation of the structures of production and ownership.

g) Expansion of the social wage.

h) Macroeconomic policies and particularly flexible monetary policy regime, aligned with the objectives of the second phase of transition, without

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sacrificing price stability and taking into account other objectives such as employment creation and economic growth.

i) Increased state ownership in strategic sectors.

j) Elimination of over-reliance on tenders.

On social policy, for an example on health, Mangaung made some new and important interventions:

a) It says “critical services such as cleaning services, security services, food services and laundry services and linen supply must be provided in-house and not be outsourced”.

b) “All nursing colleges must be immediately transferred to the National Department of Health”.

c) “The establishment of a National Pricing Commission to regulate the health care in the private sector”.

d) “All public Colleges, specifically Agricultural and Nursing Colleges currently under provincial authority must be moved to a national competence in line with the constitution”.

For its part, NASREC adopted its own economic resolutions that are also within the broad thrust of Mangaung and therefore part of a package of resolutions creating a policy framework for radical second phase. Thus, amongst others, NASREC called for:

a) Free education for the poor and working class

b) Nationalisation of the South African Reserve Bank

c) Expropriation of land without compensation subject to food security concerns

d) Support for mining subject to further discussions and free carry shares for the state instead of tenderpreneurs.

e) Full implementation of the NHI

Whilst some of these Mangaung resolutions have been taken on board in government, at the moment there are a host of other resolutions that exist in parallel to official government policy and that are in a state of limbo. Similarly, whist government has already taken up some of the economic resolutions of NASREC, notably the resolution on land; other resolutions may also suffer the same fate as those of Mangaung.

The broad thrust of the resolutions of these ANC conferences, from Polokwane to NASREC already provide a good framework for the radical second phase. What is required is the translation of these resolutions into a comprehensive, coherently integrated economic strategy for the radical second phase rather the current pattern where there seems to be the picking and choosing of certain resolutions - thrown into an incoherent economic policy framework.

6. KEY ISSUES

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The foregoing sections sought to provide the policy background and context, a brief portrayal of the state of the economy at this moment and in the process we raised long-standing critiques of the federation on these matters. In this section there are several key issues that we have identified for discussions to clarify our position on them as the federation. They are by no means exhaustive, in fact in other sections in this document there are also issues arising for consideration and debates.

6.1. Land Reform

Land is a common property which should belong to all. Therefore, land should be accessible only through leases and not a full freehold title. A conversion of freehold titles to leaseholds does not require compensation. Ideally this should be our approach in addressing private land ownership by white people which is estimated to be more than 70%. Africans own 4% of the farm and agricultural land.

In traditional African culture land is owned under the custodian ship of a king or queen. In this system evictions are very rare. The problem with this system is that it tends to discriminate against women and this must stop as women have now equal rights. Whilst kings and queens are part of the elite and not the working class this system cannot be abolished as more than half of the population live under this system. However the control and management of the land must be democratised without opening up the space for banks to steal communal land. Anyway we are in Africa and we do not have to follow a European system of property relations. We should develop a property system which is suitable to our social and economic conditions. Therefore we should be considering title deeds that can accrue to a family than an individual.

Contrary to the above the current property system is based on Roma Dutch and English laws of private ownership of land and production of title deeds. Africans have been denied the right to own land and had their livestock taken away at gunpoint. Poll and hut taxes were introduced to force Africans off their land and to force them to search for work on farms and mines. Chiefs were also bought to enforce these taxes in return for certain privileges and this practice firmly established corruption in the African society. Africans have no title deeds to prove that they were owners of particular properties. Because of the passage of time it may also be difficult to assemble convincing oral evidence to prove that Africans were dispossessed of a particular property. Hence the constitutional requirement that only land dispossession claims after 1913 are eligible to be treated as valid claims. The closing period of 1998 for lodgement of land claims was with hindsight unfair on land claimants. There should not be an opening and closing of claims periods as dispossessions started a long time ago provided there is proof of dispossession.

For those that have been given land back most of the land has remained unused because of lack of support from the state and from the private agricultural sector. This has robbed African communities of an opportunity to use land to produce food and to create jobs.

The constitution requires that farm owners must be given a just and equitable compensation taking into account the market value of the property. The courts have interpreted section 25 to refer mainly to market value which is incorrect and prejudices the state and makes land restitution expensive and slow.

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Most foreigners have bought farms, property along the coast and prime land in metropolitan areas. There is no credible data on the extent of foreign ownership of land. Foreigners should only use land through leases and this can be changed without attracting compensation.

Neo liberal economic policies and SA’s membership of the WTO and various other trade agreements have opened up SA’s agricultural sector to subsidised cheap imports from Europe and the USA. These imports have killed any potential of developing small and African farmers to produce food and create jobs. It is unacceptable that we have to import milk, potatoes, beef and chicken feet when these can be produced locally.

There is lot of squatter camps mushrooming around cities mainly because many people do not have work and those who have work earn very little and are unable to afford exorbitant rentals. There is lot of vacant land around cities which is subject of speculation. It is these land parcels that must be expropriated without compensation in order to house the poor and the working class. It also unacceptable that government has promoted gated security villages where most if not all politicians are staying and “hiding from the poor”. During colonialism and apartheid times certain areas where declared no go areas for Africans because of their colour of skin but today income is being used to exclude Africans from staying in areas such as Sandton. Our government has failed the poor and the working class by failing to promote mixed residential areas.

A law on redistribution of land is needed urgently to ensure redistribution of land by taking land from those with excess land to those with little or no land at all. Such a law should also put caps on ownership of land and prohibit foreigners from owning certain land such as farm land and game reserves.

Clarity is required of whether or not the requirement of just and equitable compensation can be satisfied by an award of no compensation. It is in this context that expropriation of land without compensation must be addressed and section 25 reviewed. Reviewing section 25 must be followed by an expropriation law which must be broader and which must provide for broad expropriation powers than what the current laws allow. This must also include compensation for those who lost their land through dispossession.

Farm workers and their families who are staying on farms are subject to abuse by farm owners and whilst there are laws to protect them against eviction these laws have not been implemented. Farm workers must be given secured titles for their plots including areas to farm, livestock grazing and for burial purposes. Expropriation without compensation can be used to implement this protection. Those who work and stay on farms are subject of abuse and evictions by farmers and receive little or no support from the state. They are called derogatory words such as occupiers.

Those who occupy rural properties do not have secured title and this must be improved and guaranteed without inviting banks and loan sharks to take over these properties. Expropriation must also be used to provide decent housing for those staying in shacks. Whilst communal ownership of land must be promoted it must not be used to enrich kings or queens and to entrench patriarchy.

No politicians should be allowed to benefit from expropriation without compensation.

The land question must include a fund built from compensation levies from colonial beneficiaries – where those “whose” land is not expropriated can still be made to

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contribute to the fund so that the beneficiaries can be supported technically and financial for productive use of the land. Land and hut taxes were imposed on our people exclusively who lived off their land without needing insertion to the colonial capitalist economy – to forcibly proletarianise them. These African farmers were able to produce even cash crops competing in the market in the last third of the 19 th century.  South African government must start demanding compensation from among others the British government and all companies that benefitted under colonialism and apartheid.

There are different opinions on whether or not expropriation without compensation should be awarded to beneficiaries of land dispossession. Whilst no compensation claims are directed against white property owners Africans need compensation.  The discussion on the land question tends to exclude other aspects of immovable and movable properties that were lost by the dispossessed. Land dispossession went hand in hand with the destruction of homesteads, expropriation of livestock and produce. This adds to the argument on compensation. For example, whites did not buy livestock abroad or they did not come with it. Maybe horses because apparently they are not indigenous; but which group is in possession of most of the “nguni” cattle? Whether or not there is compensation section 25 should be reviewed in its entirety. In addition to this there is pain and suffering that has been suffered by Africans most importantly breakdown of families and loss of culture.

Land that has been converted into game parks mainly for the pleasure of the rich and tourists. These game parks must pay higher taxes to the state and surrounding communities.

Section 25 must be reviewed in its entirety for the following reasons;

a) It represents the 1994 class compromise between the political elite and business to guarantee property for the white minority even if it was stolen and to guarantee non-voting shares for the black middle class in monopoly companies owned and controlled by whites which has developed into a form of rent seeking for individuals who are politically connected. This compromise is a source of corruption and corporate capture of the state institutions. With hindsight there should been asset redistribution through nationalisation of all companies owned by white businesses especially the commading heights before section 25 was put into the constitution.

b) The protection against expropriation of assets or property which includes minerals rights, water and intellectual property is a Washington consensus condition and its main purpose is to protect capital.

c) There is no basis under international law to protect property in the constitution.

d) Section 25 entrenches wealth and income inequalities by guaranteeing property which is owned and controlled by a few and in our context it protect property what was stolen under British colonialism by overseas and British multinationals of which Britain has not apologised and paid compensation.

e) This debate is an opportunity for COSATU to call for the total review of section 25 and not only to amend it to address land issues.

f) It is anti-developmental because the state must always pay compensation to acquire private property when property should be a common good.

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g) The protection against property is absolute even though it can be limited under section 36. Contrarily socioeconomic rights such as health, education and social grants are conditional on government resources yet government must pay compensation to get back stolen land whether or not it has resources.

h) The current property system is based on capitalist principle of private ownership and proof of ownership by a titled deed when African ownership of property is more communal. It would be difficult to introduce a new property system with the current section 25 in place.

i) The amendment of the constitution must protect communal property under the chiefs as this is an institution of governance similar to the state. We must not be tempted by title deeds certificate as this might result in large dispossession of the land belonging to the poor. Commodifying rural land will benefit banks than the poor. However titles on rural land must be improved to ensure clear tenure rights for those staying on tribal land. Furthermore the must be specific levies paid by companies operating on tribal land to distribute the proceeds to the relevant communities.

j) Amending section 25 of the constitution beyond the limits of the parliamentary motion to expropriate land without compensation will assist in taking back profitable mining and banking companies as land includes minerals and other rights.

7. National Health Insurance

7.1. Background and Context

The World health Organisation (WHO) recommends that countries should spend 5% of the national income (GDP) on health in order to effectively address a county’s disease burden. The range in per capita health spending across countries is larger than 100 to 1, this result in spending ranging between 1 and 10 percent of national income14. Each country in their quest to determine the optimum level of health expenditure often grapple with the following factors: the current health challenges, the health status aspirations, current national health activities and policies as well as the price of inputs. Having considered the above according to the Department of Health (DOH) South Africa spends 8.5% of GDP on health which by far surpasses the 5% target stipulated by the WHO. Unfortunately the over expenditure on health has not translated into health achieved health objectives.

Health expenditure as a percentage of GDP in South Africa is highest as compared to the rest of the BRICS partners (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)15. However South Africa on key health care objectives performs worse as compared to its BRICS counterparts. Health expectance is lowest in South Africa at 62.9 with China performing the best at 76.1. Under 5 and maternal mortality have decreased in each BRICS country with India having the highest rate of under 5 and maternal mortality closely followed by South Africa. In South Africa a quarter of the deaths are caused by non-communicable diseases, while HIV/AIDS account for a further quarter of deaths.

14 Savedoff, W.D. and World Health Organization, 2003. How much should countries spend on health?15 World Health Organization, 2017. BRICS health and WHO country presence profile.

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The inverse relationship between health expenditure and health outcomes lies squarely on the uneven distribution of health care.

The private sector spends 4.4% of GDP on 16% of the population while the public sector spends 4.1% of GDP on the remaining 84% of the population.

This disparity in health expenditure also has a racial and class dimensions. The 4.4% of GDP is primarily spent on the rich white population of the country while the poor and large portion of the population that is largely black relies on 4.1%.

According to data published by the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) the majority of South Africans covered by a medical aid are white, with 72.7% white people covered on a private medical aid while only 10.5% of black-African people enjoy similar coverage. This study shows that a large majority of African people are dependent on the public sector with a limited number of health care personnel and health care equipment. The distribution of doctors and specialists between the public and private sector exacerbates the inequality. According to the Human Science Research Centre (HSRC) only 41% of medical doctors are working in the public sector while the remaining 59% ply their trade in the private sector and servicing the needs of only 16% of the population. South Africa’s high HIV/AIDS prevalence and associated high rates of TB requires additional human resources and therefore impacts on the need for more Doctors and nurses within the public sector.

7.2. Financing the NHI

Conservative and Neoliberal economists have argued that the country does not have adequate financial resources to implement NHI. They also argue that the introduction of this policy will increase health expenditure in the long-run. These arguments have all been challenged by various studies and the primary costing estimates. The graph below illustrates that this policy (NHI) will decrease overall health expenditure from the current 8.5% percent to just above 6% by its full implementation in 2025.

Moreover, the current health expenditure in the country exceeds the amount required to introduce the NHI. The cost estimates in 2011 amounted to R255 billion by 2025. It should be noted that these are calculated over the following implementation range: 125 billion by 2012; 214 billion by 2020 and 255 billion by 2025. The overall health expenditure amounted to over R227 billion in 2010.16 Neoliberal supporters within and outside government have also suggested methods of financing that defeat the logic of introducing NHI. These include co-payments, financing through Value Added Tax (VAT) and multi-payer systems.

All the above-mentioned payments will place an extra financial burden on citizens when accessing healthcare. The primary aim of the NHI is to entrench free health care at the point of service.

According to the Green Paper (2011), there will be co-payments17 and investigations on the possibility of introducing multi-payer systems. It is silent on the question of using

16 Department of Health 2011.National Health Insurance in South Africa .Policy Paper. This figure takes into account the following : 2010/11 health MTEF budget is R101 billion and increases to R110 billion in 2012/13 (2010 prices). This does not include spending by other departments (such as health spending by Defence and Correctional Services). In addition, a similar amount is being spent on medical scheme contributions= R92 billion in 201017 Under specific circumstances

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VAT. Treasury is primarily responsible for making the final decision on financing the NHI.

Informal reports suggest that it wants to use the above-mentioned methods of financing. COSATU should defend the following resolutions adopted at the 11th national congress18:

a) NHI must be funded via general revenue, taxes on high-earning self-employed individuals, payroll linked progressive contribution tax, tax on high earning individual taxpayers and contribution by employers.

b) There must be no additional levies through VAT.c) There must be no co-payments as those who can afford to pay will have paid

through employee taxes.d) Tax subsidies to the private sector must be ended.e) The NHI Fund must be publicly-funded and administered with no outsourcing of

administration.f) There must be no investigation into multi-payer systems.

7.3. Human Resource and Healthcare

COSATU has always pointed out that the human resource challenges in the sector are primarily caused by the skewed public/private divide. This was captured in the federation’s position paper which argued that: “More than 60% of professional human resources in health are in the private sector and also as a result of agentization. As of 2006, 29% of the public health sector posts were vacant”. It further noted that: “

There is also a common understanding that the push factors associated with migration and retention problems, especially in the public sector, include poor human resource management and weak support for staff, work overload and emotional burnout, training that does not adequately address human resource requirements of the country or equip staff to work in rural and under resourced areas, problems of working conditions, including concern about staff safety and remuneration levels 19

The development of a legitimate and efficient national strategy on human resource is integral for the successful implementation of NHI. This strategy must be supported by the following actions:

a) Firstly, it must prioritize the right to social equity and universal access to health care. It must not be narrowly driven only by budgetary costs considerations on human resources.

b) Secondly, it must be based on the ILO definition of decent work. This specifically applies to the status of Community Health Care workers, and

18 COSATU 2012: Socio-economic Section Resolutions adopted at the 11th National Congress.

19 COSATU (2008) NHI Position Paper.

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other “mid-level” care workers. The formalization of their work and creation of clear guidelines for scope work is important.

c) Thirdly, all vacancies in the public sector must be filled. And outsourcing of services in public health facilities should be halted immediately.

d) Fourth, the refurbishment and expansion of the nursing training colleges must be a national priority. It is also important to regulate and exercise oversight over the function of private health professional colleges.

e) Lastly, the government must improve the status of health faculties in historically black/disadvantaged universities. 20

7.4. Threats to Review the NHI Policy

The release of the NHI bill has been met with a scathing attack by neoliberal economists and political parties. The NHI policy represents a policy shift that necessitates a mass reorganisation of the current health system. This mass reorganisation affects both the public and private sector in order to redress the entrenched inequalities that exist in the health care sector. It is not surprising that any policy that seeks to address equitable distribution is threatening to the private sector. The profitability of the current private sector thrives on the current inefficiencies of the public sector and the failures of the Department of Health. What is clear is that neoliberal economists and political parties as well as players in the private health care sector have no interest in policies that seek to decisively address South Africa’s inequality crises through the fulfilment of section 27 of the constitution as well as article 12 of the United Nations Covenant on Economic, social and cultural Rights of 1966 which provides for the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest possible attainment standard of physical and mental.

The NHI policy is facing a threat of a review from within the ranks of the ruling party. Those with vested interests in the current unequal distribution of the health care in South Africa are agitated by the release on the NHI bill and view the policy as a means to an end to their various business interests within the health care sector. COSATU must continue to safeguard the NHI policy and reject any attempt to review the NHI policy and campaign for the implementation of the NHI.

7.5. Public Investment Corporation

In principle, as COSATU we must support active investment by the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) in the public sector, including lending to the Treasury through bonds to meet budgetary deficit-financing and to support investment by SOEs in infrastructure development and job-creating productive activities.

The recent scandal surrounding Steinhoff in which the PIC made some investment calls for greater vigilance on the part of labour representatives in the GEPF as the PIC holds R1.9 trillion in assets under management (88% of which belongs to public employees) and therefore any deterioration in its governance and management could have far reaching destructive systemic consequences in the economy.

20 COSATU 2012: Socio-economic Section Resolutions adopted at the 11th National Congress.

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We must welcome the fact that there is now a move towards transparency as the PIC has begun to disclose its private equity investment and the previous Minister of Finance has asked the PIC board and management to make its investments and beneficiaries public, and to undertake a forensic investigation into alleged irregularities at the corporation.

The 2018 Budget Review states that “consideration is being given to improving stakeholder representation on the PIC board.” This is in line with the deliberations around the amendment legislation on the PIC that is currently before Parliament. However, we must underscore the point that representation on its own is neither a solution nor adequate. What is required is labour activism in providing oversight through GEPF and developing a clear shareholder compact guiding the PIC’s investments as currently it has about R71.5 billion in the speculative money markets and R58.7 billion in property which are risky. The mandate must be clear that they PIC cannot be used to prop up a developed economy manufacturing sector when SA is greater needs of these resources.

7.6. Public service

Despite the NDP rhetoric from ANC and government leaders around building a capable developmental state, in reality our state continues with the Neoliberal trajectory of outsourcing and agencification, which especially at the provincial level has severely weakened service delivery.

There is also reduction in personnel head-count in the public service as vacancies are closed and attritional retrenchments are effected. Hence, according to the report of the Public Service Commission assessing the state of the public service as at the end of 2017, there are over 11% (about 148 775) vacant posts out of a public service establishment of about 1.3 million posts.

At the national level the vacancy rate stands at 7.6% and the Eastern Cape has the highest vacancy rate of 23%. This massive vacancy rate is predominantly concentrated in administrative or operational level at 52%, followed by junior and middle management level at 47%.

According to the 2014-2019 DPSA’s medium-term strategic framework and its 2018/19 budget-vote, the department is working on establishing a uniform job-grading system that would be linked to a jobs competency framework, which shall cover the accounting officers of individual departments. COSATU unions must be proactive to ensure that this matter is dealt with at the PSCBC.

The DPSA also reported to Parliament that the Government Employees Housing Scheme was established in 2015/16 as part of resolutions adopted by government and labour representatives at the PSCBC. That the scheme, which the department plans to operationalize over the MTEF period (meaning by 2020/21), is intended to assist public service officials on salary levels 1 to 10 with collateral for access to home loans and home ownership. To facilitate the scheme’s operationalization, Cabinet has approved budget increases of R24.2 million in 2018/19, R16.3 million in 2019/20 and R18.9 million in 2020/21 for the scheme’s project.

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7.7. The workplace Tuberculosis Crisis

In March 2018, in Cape Town our country hosted the 17 th World Conference on tobacco or health. Beyond our usual collective bargaining demands and campaigns against outsourcing and agencification, as COSATU unions we have not systematically campaigned around workplace issues related to occupational injuries and diseases to enforce the rights and protections of COIDA and other legislations. The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that healthcare workers have a four-to-eight times higher risk of contracting TB than the general public. WHO statistics revealed that South Africa accounted for 21% of the reported incidents, and there were fears that the situation could be worse because many cases were not reported. The same applies to the unreported HIV infections by health workers in the health institutions. South Africa has the second-highest incidence of healthcare worker infections of TB in the world, according to the WHO. The drug-resistant type of TB in the patient population that is treated in SA is very prevalent due to the fact that patients do not comply with prescriptions on their medication. Hence, the TB strains that exist today are more and more resistant to the normal treatment. The federation and affiliates must work with progressive ngos working in the area of occupational injuries and diseases and engage the Department of Labour to develop programmes addressing workplace health and safety, compliance with COIDA and overall improvement of working conditions.

7.8. Health safety

When workers sell their labour they do not sell their life’s. However, often the risk of non-compliance with health and safety is on the employee. Employers still regard health and safety measures as costs on the employer which have to be paid for by the workers and their families. This practice and attitude of burdening families to take care of their breadwinners who are injured and who perish in the course of their work due to employers’ lack of health and safety measures must stop. When workers are killed during mining accidents fellow workers usually take a day off to mourn the life’s of their perished comrades. This practise must be extended to all worker places and sectors. Whilst some mining companies tolerate this practice some have dismissed and given written warnings to workers for mourning their departed comrades. This is unacceptable and a violation of the right to fair labour practice, the right to dignity and to practice one’s culture.

As a result, employers are more interested in protecting their product and profits than the health and safety of their employees. When employers fail to comply with the law they usually resist compliance by appealing the fines. The compensation claiming process is cumbersome, very long and most workers are denied their right to compensation. The compensation fund has R500 million of unclaimed monies which belongs to the injured workers, at the same time workers are living in poverty, and some workers resort to SASSA for some income.

We demand commission of Inquiry into the status of Occupational Health and Safety in the country to investigate the compliance on the Mine Health and Safety Act, Occupational Health and Safety Act, Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act and Occupational Diseases in the Mines Act.The commission should among others investigate causes and solutions to rock burst and rock fall incidents, including seismic events.

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7.9. Government Interest payments

Imperialism is manifesting itself in different ways and in this case in the form of financial imperialism which involves private foreign banks financing local companies and state owned enterprises. Foreign funding is being brought into SA under the pretext of closing the so called savings gap which more of a lie than a fact. It is strange that SA companies have been allowed to move much needed foreign capital to overseas jurisdiction whilst these savings can be used to fund socioeconomic demands. Instead debt and low taxes are used as mechanisms to liquidate the government coffers.

Government is paying more than R163 billion rand on interest payment. In 1998, South Africa was reducing the debt load built up by the apartheid government. In that year, government spent 21.2 per cent of revenue on interest payments and only 0.5 per cent on transfers to local government. Since 2011/12, interest payments have grown faster than allocations to national, provincial or local government, crowding out space for increasing productive expenditure. It is projected that on current trends, by 2020/21, government is expected to spend 12.2 per cent of available revenue on servicing debt. On average, 13.8 per cent of revenue will be used for debt service over the next three years.21 The government‘s payment of the apartheid debt was unwarranted and legally indefensible. It is unfair to allocate more than 10% of revenue towards interest payment to creditors when many communities lack basic social services including clean drinkable water and sanitation. The government should consider restructuring debt so that it can reduce interest payment to less than 3% per annum. The money that was used to pay the apartheid debt must be paid back to the government as there was no legal basis to pay the apartheid debt. Prescribed asset requirement must be reintroduced to ensure that state companies have necessary local funding without stringent conditions.

7.10. Financialisation

Financialisation has affected the economy badly and has resulted in bankers dictating economic policy beyond the finance sector in order to ensure high income in the form of high fee income. The financialisation of the economy has turned the South African freedom which Nelson Mandela and other unsung heroes and heroines fought for so much into a misery and a nightmare. Few workers salaries can last for 30 days and most workers are indebted and unable to afford repayment of loans. The poor spent 30% of the salaries on food and at least 40% on transport. At least 40% of those who have bank finance for instance a car loan, bond on house and credit card are unable to repay their capital and interest. As a result a large proportion of the working people have been unable to get bank finance to finance new firms and to create new jobs as their names are blacklisted.

Close to 10 million people are unemployed and a quarter of the labour force is employed in the informal economy which are characterised by nonexistent social security measures and survivalist enterprises. Even those who do not work are not

21 Budget Review 2018.

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safe from the negative impact of financialisation. The poor who rely on social grants are forced to rely on debt to provide for their social security in the form of funeral policies even if they do not need these policies.

Government has done little to direct the financial sector to finance the manufacturing sector and primary sector. More finance has been dedicated towards building of malls and private hospitals. Furthermore, the reserve bank has been slow to license the post Bank. The public protector’s attempt to have the mandate of the reserve bank amended to include economic growth should be supported. The focus on inflation has failed to reduce unemployment instead it has made the cost of capital expensive. The private banks borrow from the SARB at 6.50 and lend to the public at 10.00. It is not clear why the reserve bank is subsidising private banks shareholders and not the poor. It is a scandal that at least 70% of wages is used to pay for debt leaving little money to buy goods and service and drive demand in the economy. This is the fault of the South Africa Reserve Bank which continues to cater for the interests of finance monopoly capital and not the public interest. Nationalisation of the private shareholders’ shares without compensation is urgently needed to bring back the reserve bank into the hands of the public and to ensure that government has interest free debt to fund infrastructure projects.

7.11. We need a progressive Tax policy with a redistributive objective

Tax revenue more than doubled over the past decade, growing from R572.8 billion in 2007/08 to more than R 1 144.1 billion in 2016/17. Personal income tax contributed 37.2% of the tax revenue, VAT 25.3% and company income tax 18.1% from 19.8% in 2012/13. The tax system is increasingly relying on wage income and indirect taxes on consumption than on the rich and big companies. For example the increase in the fuel levy which is paid out of every litre of petrol or diesel accounts for R5.00 of the levy. This makes petrol and diesel very expensive. More than 60% of the commuters who use public transport make use of taxis and have to pay high transport costs. The burden of VAT, therefore, rests on the final consumer.

The indirect taxes have increased the prices of fuel is basic input in all industries and any increase in fuel price is likely to hit the poor and workers. These taxes are further evidence that the tax burden is on the poor and workers than on the rich. It is unacceptable that the government has imposed a further tax through e-toll user fees. The e-toll must be abolished and paid through general fuel taxes. The projected income from the fuel taxes amounts to R118, 7 billion rand.

The standard rate of VAT in South Africa has remained at 14% since 1993. It is applicable to most goods and services supplied in the economy and it is intended to tax all consumption of goods and services except those that are exempt or zero-rated. VAT is levied at each stage of the production and distribution chain as value is added. There are a small number of goods and services that are supplied at either zero-rate or are exempt from VAT. These consumption concessions are intended to provide relief to consumers. Some basic food items, for example, are zero-rated to assist low income groups. The government cannot increase tax unilaterally and set a zero treated panel to justify this looting from the poor’s pockets. The 1% increase must be reversed or at least the zero rated goods and services must be expanded.

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As a result of the power of the rich and big business on the political class the tax burden has shifted towards the poor and working class consumers’ including those reliant on social grants. The tax to GDP ratio has remained around 26% which is an indication that government is not doing enough to take money from the rich to the poor. The tax system has shifted towards more regressive tax basis than progressive taxes which must tax the rich and reduce taxes on the poor. Whilst pay as you earn tax has some elements of progressiveness the overall tax system is characterised by regressive taxes than progressive taxes. Regressive taxes are flat taxes that apply to all poor and rich but have devastating impact on those who rely on social grants and low wages including cleaners, teachers and nurses and policies. Because of tax credits and various subsidies business do not pay the standard 28% tax rate but end up paying a few cents out of every rand that they make.

The indirect taxes have increased the prices of fuel is basic input in all industries and any increase in fuel price is likely to hit the poor and workers. We should be paying cents per litre of fuel and not more than a dollar. These taxes are further evidence that the tax burden is on the poor and workers and than on the rich. It is unacceptable that the government has imposed a further tax through e-toll user fees. The e-toll must be abolished and paid through general fuel taxes5.10. Tax subsidies to big business

Business has become powerful lobby and has received rents from government. This is concerning as business is not part of the ruling ANC alliance yet it can extract benefits more than those who are in the alliance. Our calls to government to ban labour broking have resulted in regulation than total ban. Whilst labour brokers are regulated government has refused to comply with 3 months deeming requirement. Government introduced the employment tax incentive on 1 January 2014 to contribute to reducing Youth unemployment. It reduces an employer’s cost of hiring young people through a cost-sharing mechanism with government, while leaving the salary the employee receives unaffected. The employer can claim the ETI and reduce the amount of Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) tax payable by the amount of the total ETI calculated in respect of all qualifying employees. Total claims for the Employment Tax Incentive amounted to R11.2 billion for the period 1 January 2014 to 31 March 2017.

The incentive was claimed by 50 977 unique employers. Employers in sectors represented by the Wholesale & Retail SETA claimed the highest amount of ETI followed by the Services SETA. Business is being paid for creating job which they would have created anyway. The negative impact of these subsidies will be felt in the medium to long term through low stagnant wages, low levels of unionisation and little collective bargaining and move towards plant bargaining. The tax subsidies must be conditional.

7.12. Investments and savings

Every government has to encourage investment and savings. However, in most countries including South Africa the focus is on households than firms. Firms are allowed to take money of the country at will and are not forced to reinvest their profits into the country. Household do not have the capacity to save because of high interest payment on their debt which can be as high as a minimum of 28%. In 2015, there were just over 16 million members of retirement funds in South Africa, including both

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occupational funds (where membership is a condition of the terms of employment) and individual retirement annuity funds. The high unemployment rate and dependency ratio makes savings unattainable and unaffordable coupled with high management fees.

Corporate such as such as Billiton (1997), Anglo American, Old Mutual and South African Breweries (1999), and Dimension Data (2000) including Investec were allowed to moved their company registration and domicile to the UK together with their tax base and savings. This scandalous illegal act which was done as part of Gear targets was not consulted upon and has increased dependency of South African economy on portfolio investment or hot money which can come into the country and leave the country with huge profits on the stock market and without paying taxes.

Some of the large local companies which should be owned and controlled by South Africans but are owned by foreign companies include Anglo American Platinum, ArcelorMittal South Africa, Massmart, Nedbank, Standard Bank and Vodacom. The foreign ownership has implication for development of the local economy in particular in respect of local employment, transfer of technology as foreigners will always be biased towards countries of origin.

SASOL has invested US$8.1 billion in the USA. Sasol's transformational GTL and chemicals technologies will help unlock the potential of abundant natural gas resources, provide the U.S. with world-class, cleaner-burning fuel, contribute to the country's energy security and support expanded domestic manufacturing. It is not clear why SASOL has been allowed to move to the US when we need this investment locally. This is disappoint considering that the government is supposed to be having an influence through PIC and IDC shares in SASOL.

The largest source of foreign ownership of South African companies is through foreign direct investment (FDI) - amounting to R1 970 billion in value at the end of 2015, equivalent to 49% of GDP.

Foreign ownership through portfolio equity investment contributes a further substantial portion of South Africa’s foreign capital needs - amounting to R1 770 billion in value at the end of 2015, equivalent to 44% of GDP. The high level of foreign ownership of JSE-listed companies has continued to rise in recent years: from 28 percent of the market (by value) in 2008 to 38 percent in 2016.

Foreign portfolio investment makes our economy vulnerable to external changes in economic conditions of western countries and has entrenched the re-colonisation of the SA economy.

It is reported that big JSE companies have hidden more than 1.4 trillion in the bank accounts and that this money is not being reinvested into the economy. Self regulation has failed. We need legislative compulsion to force big business to re-invest their profits into SA.

Calls for increased investment into SOE’s has revealed intentions of government to divest and not invest and to sell state owned enterprises to private individuals who are only interested in turning viable SOE’s into profits making ventures. Any sale of minority shares to private companies or foreign investors is privatisation which must be rejected outright. Privatisation of state assets has never and will never benefit

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workers and the poor. Instead it creates African elite which must protect interests of monopoly capital and increases income inequality. Privatisation has resulted in loss of jobs, increase in prices, destruction and weakening of trade unions. It is unacceptable that we are now paying DSTV exorbitant amounts when should not be paying a cent to see news. Therefore, privatisation must be characterised as a form of corruption, state capture and an act of war against the poor and the working class.

7.13. Corruption

Corruption is foreign to Africans and was introduced through Arab and later the European slave traders. In South Africa it was made part of our culture through the hut and poll taxes and the use of local chiefs to extract these taxes from Africans in return for a privileged lifestyle. These taxes were meant to force African off their land to work to work in the mines and farms.

If the big business sector was honest in campaigning against corruption they would not be involved in illicit financial flows.22 There are several components of illicit financial flows, but all of them make use of the same facilities provided by the tax haven and offshore secrecy system. They include:

the concealment of the proceeds of crime or corruption; tax evasion; tax avoidance and tax planning; hiding wealth from public agencies, business associates, or family members.

South Africa mining companies use tax haven to hide money which should be paid as taxes. For example Anglo American group structure includes 43 subsidiaries in tax havens (Bermuda,British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Isle of Man, Luxembourg, Mauritius and theNetherlands. Petra Diamonds is itself incorporated in Bermuda and has subsidiaries in the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Jersey and the Netherlands. Petra diamonds is involved in the mining, processing, sorting and sale of rough diamonds.

The question is why our law enforcement officers including the SARB are not asking the following questions to multinationals; how many employees these subsidiaries employ, what tax advantages the company receives by having subsidiaries in these tax havens and whether the company is willing to report its key financial figures on a country-by-country basis in all countries where it operates.23

According to UNCTAD report on Trade misinvoicing – when export and import data between two countries do not align – is thought to be "one of the largest drivers of illicit financial flows from developing countries, so that the countries lose precious foreign exchange earnings, tax, and income that might otherwise be spent on development.

Mining companies has used various methods to avoid paying taxes. The Chamber of Mines now the Council of minerals has refuted this allegation as being misinformed. It is

22 Tax Justice Network. 23 Southern African Catholics Bishops Conference (SACBC)https://www.taxjustice.net/2017/12/04/dear-mining-companies-use-tax-havens/

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very sad that Statistics South Africa was used to justify Glencor’s fraudulent conduct. The law enforcement institutions have not taken Glencor to task. The banks including the SARB have not excluded mining companies from accessing financial facilities. This raises the question of whether or not South African business and media is interested only in combating corruption when it done by certain politicians. This also puts doubts to campaigns of business organisation such as BUSA and Business Leadership South African who during the GUPTA expose became overnight anti-corruption busters clearly for selfish reasons. Even the courts were quicker to condemn the GUPTA capture of politicians by developing a rule called reputational risk as a reason to close their banking accounts. They must be congratulated but they must extend the same hatred of corruption to mining companies who are illegally evading taxes.

Lonmin has used its subsidiary to evade taxes by selling platinum at low prices in order to attract lower taxes. This conduct has been treated by financial institutions and the mainstream media as a non-issue. According to recent estimates from Global Financial Integrity, SA has lost more than 100.7 billion dollars over for the period 2002- 2011. This money could have been used to increase salaries of teachers, nurses and police and to fund social grants and NHI but because of the collusion between law enforcers’ institutions and business the money is exported to tax havens through complicated funding transactions. In 2015, the former South African president Thabo Mbeki presented a report on the money siphoned from Africa by illicit means by multinational corporations. He pegged the figure at $50 billion.

In July 2016 UNCTAD released a report entitled Trade Misinvoicing in Primary Commodities in Developing Countries: The cases of Chile, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia. The report points towards a systematic practice of mis- and underinvoicing among mining companies in these countries. For South Africa, cumulative under invoicing over the period 2000-2014 is reported in the UNCTAD study (in 2014 constant US dollars) for silver and platinum to have amounted to USD 24 billion, iron ore to USD 600 million, and gold to USD 78.2 billion. In total, under invoicing for South Africa over the nearly 15 year period is stated by the UNCTAD study to have amounted to USD 102.8 billion (2014 US dollars).

We have seen KPMG using fraudulent financial statement to mislead investors and workers. As a result of their actions workers are in danger of being being retrenched in Steinhoff companies. KPMG has set up an internal inquiry to self prosecute itself. No bank has taken away their bank account and the SARB has not intervened. The quest to end corruption will have a limited role as long it is limited to certain politicians and companies and not all those who are corrupt or perceived to be corrupt. In saying that the law must follow those who are corrupt we are not saying the GUPTA are not guilty but merely that the law must be applied objectively without fear, favour or prejudice. This is not happening as the private sector has remained immune from the long hand of the law. Even the chief justice Mogoeng Mogoeng has expressed similar concerns that there are few cases that involve private sector thieves.

Illicit financial flows have resulted in loss of funding or revenue for the state and have increased dependency of countries, the poor and the working class on the financial sector. South Africa should use national tax laws, the sourth African reserve bank and

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her membership of the UN and regional bodies to criminalise illicit financial flows. Capital controls must be reintroduced and the state must control imports and exports.

We must campaign for an African Criminal court which must focus on prosecuting leaders and business elite for violating human rights including labour laws e.g. health and safety laws and tax laws. Glencor‘s human rights violation has gone unpunished because there is no enforceable law against multinationals. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, workers’ complaints against Glencor copper and cobalt mining subsidiaries concern inadequate amounts of drinking water in some Glencor operations, with low quality food and lack of a designated eating area, obliging mine workers to eat where they work, sometimes around chemicals. Above all, these complaints highlight the extremely limited and inadequate healthcare provided by Glencor to workers and their families. These workers also complain about unfairly low wages, which in the DRC stand in particular contrast to the extreme profitability of Glencore’s operations. Nonetheless, Glencore categorically refuses to enter into negotiations over long standing grievances. There is therefore a need for an international agreement to regulate and prosecute multinationals.

7.14. Decline in multilateralism and lack of an African voice

Since the Second World War II the US and the UK have been the champions of free trade and led the talks on the conclusion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later the WTO. The US and the UK appears to be turning against free trade principles for the selfish reason. However, protectionism is not new in the developed world. It is at the core of western countries' economic policies. Since the 2001 Doha development round developed countries led by the G7 have been refusing to accept the developmental mandate and have instead demanded that China turns its economy into free market in the same way they have done with developing economies especially those on the African continent.

The question is what is Africa including South Africa’s response. As early as 1960’s Kwame Nkrumah warned that without unity and economic integration at continental level it would be impossible to free the poor and workers from economic imperialism and what he termed neo colonialism. SA has dismally failed to integrate the SACU and SADC countries. The conclusion of the EU-SADC economic partnership agreement outside SADC where SA signed with SACU and Mozambique is a testimony of a failed integration agenda. South Africa has just signed a continental free trade agreement which will further accelerate exploitation of labour and natural resources and benefit local and foreign monopoly capital which is mainly controlled and owned by white people.

Currently Africans are excluded from managing multinationals on the continent and participating in their economies. Most countries on the continent trade with former colonisers than with fellow neighbouring countries. It is premature to liberalise trade without developing domestic and regional productive capacities specifically in controlling natural resources. Therefore, the free trade will benefit foreign monopolies and entrench the dependence of Africans on their former European colonisers. Free trade agreements are only appropriate for countries that are at an advanced stage of development.

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South Africa’s trade policy are not guiding the continent towards self sufficiency but will entrench neo colonialism through strengthening colonial trade relations of exporting raw minerals whose prices are set up in London among others and importing expensive manufactured goods including second hand goods and second hand clothing. In order to enhance bargaining power SADC countries must speak in one voice on foreign economic issues and adopt common policies in order to avoid a race to bottom. And enhance the protection of social and labour rights.

7.15. International labour relations

There is little international working class solidarity when coming to bread and butter issues of development and raising the living standards of the poor and workers in the south or developing countries. Whilst there are strong working class relations at ILO there is little solidarity on non labour issues. This includes the question of why must Africa continue to export raw materials at prices that are determined in London and Chigago and produce natural products at cheaper prices for western markets. Even on labour issue the relations are weak as labour law continues to be territorial whilst capital can move freely from one country to the other without notice and with damaging results on host economies. There is no equalisation of wages between workers in rich and poor countries. Where there are global agreements to equalise working conditions these are merely best intention agreements and are not enforceable. In this way capital has succeeded in creating tension and a division between workers in the poor countries and those in rich countries.

On domestic labour relations there is dark spot of Marikina which is an indication of desperation of workers and low wages and high cost of living and the ruthlessness and mercilessness by capital. Marikana also shows that unless we radically change the control of our minerals workers will always remain at the mercy of mining companies due to the state’s failure to control prices of mineral commodities and to restrain the objective of profit making.

There is high degree of labour flexibility that has been incorporated into the Labour Relations Act. Trade unions have to go through a lengthy process to get permission to strike and employers are allowed to reduce wages of strikers. Employers are allowed use scab labour to defeat strikes. Further they are allowed to retrench workers in order to make more profits under section 189 of the labour relations act. There is a need for a total overhaul of the neo liberal basis of LRA which seeks to promote labour flexibility over job security.

7.16. Developmental state

South Africa needs a developmental state that is capable of intervening, competing with the private sector in the provision of economic and social infrastructure and production of goods and services. We cannot accept that the state has no cash and therefore the state must cut spending. A state can never be insolvent. A developmental state has access to a wide variety of capital: fiscal capital (taxation), state capital (state owned enterprises), social capital (pension funds), and allocative capital (the regulation of the allocation of capital). So far the state has used capital to benefit politicians and politically connected individuals and not the masses. The inability of the state to use its

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developmental powers has resulted in the economy being owned by foreigners and making all prices in the economy high and wages low.

Whilst the President’s efforts to attract investment should be commended this cannot be a sustainable long term solution in the absence of a strong domestic investment. There are few countries that have succeeded using FDI only and where this has happened it has resulted in recessions in host countries because of unregulated inflows and outflows of capital. The state also has the power to increase investment through licensing, procurement and prescribed assets.24 Therefore the state has a role to play in expediting radical socio economic transformation and is not helpless as alleged by credit rating agencies. The reality is that we cannot rely on the private sector to change the ownership patterns and control and structure of the economy.

We reject the use of public private partnerships to fund state owned enterprises. Amongst others measures to fund state owned companies we need to reintroduce prescribed asset requirement for private pension funds to hold at least 50% of their total assets in government bonds. It is disappointing that we have allowed the workers savings to go into malls and offices and not factories. 25

7.17. Education

The Rhodes must fall at Rhodes University and ultimately the nationwide fees must fall protests have highlighted the plight of African students in institutions of higher learning. After 24 years of democracy and many efforts to transform institutions of higher education remains exclusive due to high barriers to entry such as; high upfront registration fees, exclusionary language policies, limited access to funding opportunities such as NSFAS.

Whilst we welcome the phased-in introduction of free education which will go a long way towards addressing unequal access to economic opportunities. However we take note that the entire education system is still based on the notion that black people must be restricted to manual unskilled labour and that we need to decolonise the education system.

Free fee higher education will go a long way in easing the financial burden on students who have acquired loans from the NSFAS scheme to further their studies and graduate with a significant debt accumulated from their years of study. A lot of previously disadvantaged black students who upon graduating struggle to find jobs post graduate and more often than not settle for employment as interns and earn a meagre stipend that does not sufficiently cover the cost of transportation For these students we must demand that there should be no interest running on these loans as a relief to all students.

The institutional autonomy that most universities enjoy poses a serious challenge for national growth and development as many university principals prioritise curriculum development and skills programs in favour of the requirements of university funders and university ranking specifications. This has contributed to the mismatch in terms of the skills that the university provides and the skills required by the broader economy.

24 Joel Netshitenzhe Umrabulo Nov 2009. 25 This is despite the warning from former Finance Minister that we cannot allow the nation’s saving to into malls and offices.

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The Department of higher education must be able to have greater say in the running/academic development of institutions of higher learning to ensure that each university produces skills in accordance to the skills needs of the country.

7.18. Impact of the fourth industrial revolution

We must challenge the conceptual basis of the 4th industrial revolution. African revolutions have preceded the British industrial revolution. Therefore it cannot be correct to refer to the age of robots and digitalisation as the fourth industrial revolution when there were other revolutions prior to the imperial British revolution which was driven by slavery and colonisation.

One of the reasons for job losses is increased mechanisation of the workplace. The source of this mechanisation is capital‘s objective to make profits at all costs. However, the root problem lies with liberalisation policies. The causes of the use of machines can be attributed to trade liberalisation which has exposed domestic firms to foreign competition, imports, dumping of goods. This liberalisation has shifted production in favour of capital intensive sectors and away from labour intensive sectors. This shift has weakened labour’s bargaining power in South Africa and has resulted in a declining share of labour in total national income which is estimated to be around 47%. As result even if there is growth such a growth is accompanied by joblessness because of foreign competition and mechanisation and computerisation.

Consequently it is widely acknowledged that the South African economy has experienced a jobless growth for most of the post apartheid era. Jobless growth refers to a situation where the overall economy is growing but the absolute level of employment is stagnant or falling resulting in a near zero or negative employment. 26 The impact of the fourth industrialisation must be understood within the context of trade liberalisation, the removal of the state from the economy and the current law which promote labour flexibility including retrenching and changing working conditions in order to promote the use of technology. One of the measures to address the negative impact of the use of machines and robots is to impose trade measures that will ensure that there is import substitution of technological products and that South Africa should not import technological products but must copy existing technologies to produce technologies that are appropriate for SA conditions and needs. Therefore, the solution lies in more regulation and removal of labour flexibility. The definition of retrenchment must be review to ensure that employers do not retrench workers to increase profits and must not allow retrenchment just for introducing technology in the workplace.

7.19. Conclusion

Given the above the alliance’s clarion calls for a radical phase of our transition will require clarity on the following; a strong organisation to lead the motive forces on the ground, bold and decisive leadership that must not pander to the interests and demands of capital in particular credit rating agencies. Most importantly it would require a strong militant and campaigning COSATU that is clear on its demands and has the strengthened capacity to articulate and defends those demands at all times. A reconfigured alliance must ensure that alliance partners have the capacity to influence government policy

26 Dr Jabulile Mkhize. Job summit 2018 a review of the NDP and suggestions for improved inclusive growth 2018.

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jointly and state institutions including the Treasury, Public Enterprises and the Reserve Bank must implement government policies as articulated by the ANC alliance and must stop taking advice from imperialist organisations such as the World Bank and IMF.

8. Building COSATU for the challenges lying ahead

8.1. Introduction

In the 33 years of her existence COSATU has learnt the truthfulness of the profound scientific statement made by Albert Einstein when said that “No problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it”.

In the process COSATU has developed the capacity to self -introspect, to purge herself and to self-correct. Such capacity was demonstrated in the 1997 September Commission’s report which defined COSATU’s role in the post 1994 democratic breakthrough.

This extra ordinary capacity was also seen in the 2003 at the 8 th National Congress which adopted the COSATU’s medium term Vision (2015 Plan).

This similar and rare capacity was again demonstrated both at the 2015 Special National Congress and the 12th National Congress which adopted a back to basic programme based on rebuilding COSATU Engines and leading workplace struggles.

The September Commission’s report was more telling, more direct and remains a relevant starting point when it said the following:

“COSATU’s goals are to defend worker rights, improve working conditions and wages, and contribute to the transformation of society. ..But to achieve these goals, COSATU needs to build effective, democratic and dynamic organisation. In doing this it can draw on its history.

Over the years COSATU has been extremely effective as an organisation. It grew in the face of vicious repression from employers and government. It won trade union and worker rights, it improved wages and conditions. Politically, it challenged the apartheid regime and eventually, together with other forces, compelled it to capitulate.

From their beginnings COSATU and its affiliates have operated according to the democratic principle of workers’ control. This was central to its effectiveness - to its survival, its ability to build unity among workers, to protect its leaders and mobilise its members.

COSATU’s affiliates have always been extraordinarily dynamic. They have continuously invented new ways of organising, new tactics and campaigns. They have managed to make creative use of institutions established by their opponents - the law, industrial councils, for example - and turned them to their own advantage. They created new structures, such as shop steward committees and shop steward locals, which became centres of worker creativity. Their history is a history of dynamic energy, of innovation, of empowering workers to take initiatives. They would never have survived and grown without this.

Are COSATU and its affiliates still effective, democratic and creative? In many ways, yes they are. Membership is still growing. They have great

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influence in South African society. They have been highly effective in negotiations over the LRA, and the struggle against the lockout clause, for example.

However, we believe COSATU’s organisations are much less effective, democratic and creative than they could or should be. Some of the reasons for this are:

a) the end of apartheid has led to a weakening of the vision and shared ideology in the unions

b) the establishment of democracy has forced the unions to engage with a tremendous range of issues, many of them more complex than in the past

c) conditions of struggle have changed: during the 1980s unions were driven by mass militancy and creativity from below, whereas now the emphasis has shifted to national negotiations with government and employers

d) they have lost experienced staff and worker leaders to government and business

e) the unions have grown into very big organisations in which it is more difficult to sustain democracy, effectiveness and creativity

f) the rapid growth of a black middle class in society, and the culture of self-enrichment that has accompanied this, is undermining the traditional culture of solidarity of the trade unions

g) there are worrying organisational trends - lack of service, lack of skills, lack of discipline, lack of commitment - that could generate a crisis if not addressed.

As a result of these changing conditions, COSATU and its affiliates run the danger of losing strategic capacity and vision. They often operate in an ad hoc way, reacting to initiatives of others rather than taking initiatives themselves. This kind of ad hoc, reactive and inefficient unionism can be called Zigzag unionism (see Chapter 2, Options).

But COSATU cannot allow its unions to become victims of the transition which they fought for. There are many steps they can take to overcome organisational problems and increase their effectiveness, democracy and creativity”.

Could it be that a similar ground-breaking moment has arrived for this generation of leaders and members of COSATU to conduct an honest organisational self-evaluation if the federation is to remain relevant?

It is now 21 years since the seminal September commission’s report was adopted by the congress and yet we can still raise similar issues and can still ask that historical question “Is COSATU and her affiliates still effective, democratic and creative?”

The answer to this question is clearly found in the actual record of work by the federation and her affilliates over the years particulalry since the 12th National Congress.

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We can assert without any ambiguity that COSATU remains a principled, consistent and non-compromising voice of the workers and continues to occupy the front ranks in fighting against exploitation of workers.

The federation of Barayi remains a bulwark that is grounded on the traditions of strong shop floor organization and militant struggles for worker rights.

The strength of COSATU remains in democratic organization controlled by workers and based on campaigns and mobilization; incorporation of broader social issues and interests into her programmes.

In line with the instructions and mandate of the 12th National Congress, COSATU remains closer to the workers and our unions continue lead workplace struggles and the record of our activities since the last congress speaks for itself.

In 2016 COSATU intervened in Mpumalanga uMbhaba to defend the dismissed farm workers.

Through force of argument and struggles waged over the years in the streets we have made the entire movement and many in society to agree on a need for a radical policy shift towards the realisation of radical economic transformation.

In this context we saved NHI from being undermined by the private sector and the exponents of Neo-liberalism and today NHI is in a process of being translated into reality. We do not only point out what is wrong but we put forward our proposals and made our presentation on the NHI white paper in parliament.

Currently the country is in a process of developing policy towards the comprehensive social security despite attempts by the neo liberal ideologues to vulgarise, delay and undermine this process.

The federation has led marches all over the country against job losses and for accessible, reliable, affordable and integrated public transport including demanding the scrapping of E-tolls

We took Free Market Foundation head on when these ideologues of capital attempted to steal workers right to collective bargaining.

We confronted the ANN7 and ENCA about undermining workers’ rights. We raised alarm bells about SABC problematic editorial policy which was being rammed through without consulting with all stakeholders.

We challenged and exposed the dangers of the SAB-InBEV merger.

We went to the Human Rights Commission and made a presentation regarding the plight of farm workers and as we speak the Human Right Commissioned is ceased with issues relating to the plight of farm workers, preparing to report back to COSATU and society.

We led from the front on ensuring transition from the informal to the formal economy at local level through organising meetings of the Vulnerable Workers Task Team (VWTT). We coordinated workshops with Social Partners that led to the 2015 International Labour Conference (ILC) in Geneva adopting Recommendation 204 on transitioning from the informal to the formal economy.

After 2015 COSATU ensured that the Decent Work Steering Committee at NEDLAC prioritised the formalisation of the informal economy in the Decent Work Agenda.

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As part of implementing the new ILO Recommendation 204, COSATU coordinated a follow up workshop on 20 to 22 April 2016 for the Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy which brought together informal workers, their representative organizations, civil society partners, federations and trade unions organising informal workers. This was the beginning of a process to ensure a holistic and inclusive participation of all relevant stakeholders in ensuring the transition to formality in South Africa within the framework of Recommendation 204.

We participated and coordinated with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) Tripartite Constituents a workshop convened a to discuss the implementation of Recommendation 204 (R204). R204 is focused on the transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy in South Africa. There was approximately ninety representatives from Labour, Community and Government (National, Provincial & Local), gathered at Birchwood Conference Centre in Boksburg – Johannesburg, South Africa.

The purpose of the workshop was to share knowledge and experiences on the implementation of R204 and build consensus on the roadmap towards integrated programmes needed for the facilitation of transitioning to formality. In addition, the workshop set the tone for the development of a National Strategy on Formalisation for South Africa.

The federation coordinated preparations for the Dialogue on the ILO Recommendation 204 held in Durban, KZN on 26 to 28 March 2018. The federation was represented by 25 delegates from the affiliates, KZN Province and 4 Head Office participated under the theme “The Future of the Informal Economy: Towards a Roadmap to facilitate Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy”

Major Achievements for Vulnerable workers include the following;

a) The recommendation includes all units of economic activities such as cooperatives, social and solidarity organisations, and also all workers including own account workers, wage workers, domestic workers and workers in subcontracting and supply chains.

b) R204 is a tool to be used by the informal workers to claim their rights, as well as for trade unions and other organisations organising in the informal economy to support the formalisation of the informal economy as part of the Decent Work Campaign.

c) R204 seeks to prevent the informalisation of formal economy jobs.d) R204 seeks to help low-income households, disadvantaged persons to escape

poverty and access work, and put in place labour migration policies that protect the rights of migrant workers.

e) Adequate and appropriate system of inspection extended to the informal economy in order to protect workers.

Our Unions have been on the streets since the 2015 National Congress and as we prepare towards the 13th congress, they were giving employers sleepless nights on workers’ demands.

Our unions have raised the stakes on the Living Wage campaign. The Communications workers Union took the MTN employer wage increases and other fundamental working conditions such as housing subsidy, equal pay for work of equal value.

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In the same period POPCRU was on a march to hand over memorandums of demands to Ministers Bheki Cele, Dr Blade Nzimande, Michael Masutha and Aaron Motsoaledi respectively. Their demands included the full implementation of all signed agreements and resolutions, the restructuring of the South African Police Service, nationalisation of traffic, proper tools of trade, an end to police killings, the finalisation of grading of PSA Appointees levels, the finalisation of shift patterns, payments of outstanding Occupation Specific Dispensation (OSD) in Correctional services and promotion policy.

We confronted and resolved many of the challenges the federation was facing leading to the 2015 Special National Congress and the 12th National Congress. Some of these included confusing roles between affiliates and the federation; Abuse of the concept of autonomy of affiliates; Obsession about being big by all means and at all costs; Labelling, mistrust and suspicions; Use of the tactic of boycotting meeting as a leverage to subvert democratic outcomes and undermining the democratic processes and decisions of the organisation; Usage of media to attack the decisions of constitutional structures, including the leaking of documents as part of undermining and attacking the organisation; Creation of factions; Constitutional breaches in the federation and breaches on the Alliance Protocols; Emergence of King Maker mentality; The King Maker mentality came with the emergence of a personality cult; Disrespect for COSTU founding principles, its Constitution and the founding principles; The Cancer of Corruption; Business Unionism; Lack of exit strategy for leaders; Undermining of the Founding Principles of the Federation Independence of COSATU and its character being contested.

Despite this progress there are persisting organisational challenges which have limited the federation from unleashing her maximum organisational arsenal against our class enemies.

As Amicar Cabral said “tell no lies. Expose lies whenever they are told. Mask no difficulties, mistakes, failures. Claim no easy victories”. Notwithstanding the consistent fight which our unions have directed against the employers but we continue to be confronted by challenges, some of which have compounded into crisis levels because of our failure to address the challenges we have identified. These include the following:

a) The COSATU’s 2015 Plan – A Brief Assessment of the organisational Section

The 2015 plan was anchored on the two interrelated central pillars which include building working class power and ensuring quality jobs which reinforced each other. It said that engagement on policy issues must support organisational development, rather than overshadowing it. The plan asserted that our longer- term approach included (a) Strategies to build the power of the organised working class in South Africa, in our region and continent as well as internationally (b) Strategies to make our relationship with the Alliance work (c) The priority areas for intervening on socio economic policy in the short term to stem the job-loss bloodbath and fight for quality jobs.

It then forecasted the following Scenarios:

b) A rapid decline in membership to below 1 million by the 30th Anniversary of COSATU in 2015.

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We have neither been able to achieve the 4 million mark by the 30 th Anniversary nor has the membership declined below 1 million marks.

c) The persistence of financial challenges, ultimately forcing a cutback in our roles in the range of issues.

Since the 12th National Congress , some of our unions have not been paying their subscription fees and the federation has operated on a tight budget causing a cut and reprioritisation of programmes . As we go to the 13th National Congress 4 of our unions were not in good standing owing COSATU more than R20 million.

d) The coherence and unity of COSATU being undermined leading to splits.

Since the 2015 Special Congress and the 12th National Congress in which COSATU members stood up and firmly confronted the turbulences which threatened to split the federation, we can say with certainty that as at this 13 th National Congress the federation has become more stable and the leadership collective of the National Office Bearers and the CEC is more coherent. However the 2015 turbulences saw the congress adopting a resolution to dismiss NUMSA and that was followed by three unions disaffiliating from the federation as an expression of their dissatisfaction with the dismissal of NUMSA despite. These included FAWU, SASAWU, and SAFPU.

Some of our unions such CEPPWAWU, SATAWU and SAMWU are facing internal organisational challenges. SATAWU has had two splits s and SAMWU has had three splits as a result of internal organisational turmoil. CEPPWAWU has many factions which developed a life of their own and the change the form towards congresses and develop new forms after the congress.

The common factors leading to splits include financial mismanagement, fight for leadership positions centred around fights about access to union investment resources, court cases, unconstitutional dismissals and suspensions .

e) The collapse of the Alliance and in that context the ANC and the SACP also facing splits.

The Alliance continues to function albeit in its weaker state.

Since the 8th Congress, the federation has intensified calls for the alliance to be a strategic centre of power and the 2010 ANC NGC took a decision that the ANC is a strategic centre of power.

The alliance has not been functioning as a driver of the National Democratic Revolution. After every election, the SACP and COSATU got sidelined and undermined in the processes of policy implementation. The ANC itself is in many occasions undermined by its own cadres deployed in government. More recently the SACP took a resolution to contest elections as part of a reconfigured alliance or if that fails contest elections on its own.

Both COSATU and the SACP has called for the reconfiguration of the Alliance . At the time of writing this report , the discussions were still at the level of the Alliance Political Council.

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f) A full- blown "skorokoro" scenario as painted by the September Commission Report.

The federation has not deteriorated to the level of “Skorokoro”. There is a reality of objective and subjective challenges confronting the industrial unions in the main. These stem from the state of the economy internationally which impact negatively on the South African economy resulting to job loses which has a ripple effect on the union membership base. These also include the changing nature of work, casualization, outsourcing etc. On the other hand it has been subjective weaknesses from union to develop new ways of organising and responses to these new challenges.

The public sector unions are growing and remain relatively stable but are also facing threats from the neo liberal policy agenda which is being pursued by government, which include a possibility of retrenchments in the public sector.

Based on these scenarios, an organisation Building programme was developed which focused on the following strategic focus areas;

1. Organisational Programme Building COSATU Engines2.

Benchmarks specific to the Organisation Building Programme

a) Build a strong trade union movement that excels on workplace issues and defence of members in the face of attacks by employers.

b) We must continue to engage on priority policy issues, above all to ensure employment creation and strengthen social protection.

c) Our organisational strategies need to address the changing realities, and be specifically geared towards meeting the needs and addressing the consciousness of specific layers and strata of workers. Some of the sectors and strata that we need to consciously target with creative organisational approaches include:

i. Youth.

ii. Women.

iii. Migrant workers.

iv. Casualised and part- time workers.

v. Unorganised sectors of the working class. The obvious sectors in this regard are about 2 million unorganised farm and domestic workers.

Progress Report

A recruitment drive campaign with the aim of increasing our membership by 10% every year, working towards the overall target of 2.6 million by 2006 4 million in 2009.

COSATU did not the recruitment target because of a number of reasons such as :

a) The objective challenges in the economy and these include :

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The global economic crisis which led to job loses particularly in the private sector

The changing nature of work which include outsourcing and casualization

b) The subjective challenges facing the unions which include the following :

Lack of innovative organising strategies in line with the changing nature of work

Lack of capacity by organisers Lack of service to members Infightings in unions Corruption

All these and other subjective factors conspired to liquidate COSATU unions when workers began to lose confidence in the union and splinter unions got formed

As a response the following work was undertaken:

a) We developed the Organising and Recruitment Turnaround Strategy adopted by the CEC in November 2017 and busy rolling out in Provinces.

b) Recruitment programmes are on-going by all unions. Specific and notable recruitment by POPCRU, SASBO (Capitec), SACTWU (Farms) and LIMUSA.

c) We have planned for a Membership Data collection workshop to take place after May in order to share the union experience and find the best way of reporting.

d) With the 2018 May Day we have been involved in Workplace visits. The problem is however getting the Affiliates in the provinces to cooperate with the workplaces

1. Ensuring greater support for Shop Stewards, both in terms of organisational service and education.

We have engaged on the matter extensively. We are however mindful of the issues of the social distance of members and shopstewards. To that extend we have now started Company based Lunch Hour engagements as opposed to institutionalised methods of education delivery. This is to also alleviate the costs and access issues that are related to the other forms of education delivery. The Eastern Cape was the beginning of such efforts on the 2018 May Day Mobilisation

2. Institutionalising capacity building for both effective organisation and ideological cohesion. The core task is to build the education capacity of affiliates and the Federation, as well as other institutions such as DITSELA and the Chris Hani Institute.

COSATU is actively involved with CHI and DITSELA. We are in both their Boards through direct representatives. We are also involved in both their programme conception and delivery. We have since the last Congress trained in excess of 2000 shopstewards and organisers through DITSELA alone. Some of the programmes are short term while some are long term leading to credits on the NQF

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3. Ensuring better financial and personnel management in each affiliate.

This is the key problem that have a severe effect on Education. With the Affiliates in dire financial positions the tendency is to compromise and uncoordinated education programmes. We still have very low adherence to the 10% budget agreed budget threshold and in many Affiliates we have no Provincial and/or Regional Educators who support the National Coordinator or Secretary. Also the many shopstewards we engage in have never gone through Affiliate based programmes on basic issues like Union Constitution, Recognition Agreements, Rights and Duties of a Shopsteward, the LRA provisions, OHSA and many sector specific basic programmes. Also we find many shopstewards who have no minimum understanding of their workplaces, the number of employees, the production process and many other basic company based issues.

We however are equally dealing with a very high number of new Young shopstewards who don’t have the necessary struggle experiences and traditions and therefore not tolerant of the organisational processes and even discipines. This means that Trade union cultural orientations are also very fundamental for all

4. Unifying the three Federations so that by 2009 we realise our vision of one-country-one-Federation, one-industry-one-union.

The fragmentation is getting worse with now 5 Federations representing a total of 89% of all union membership. However what needs to be our primary concern is the 12 million workers who are unorganised, untrained and very vulnerable workers who don’t belong to a trade union. Surely many of these are being daily victimised and don’t enjoy even the basic provisions of the Labour legislation protections. The Unity of the Three Federations happens mostly on joint programmes of education through our Labour Service Organisations.

COSATU Departments continue to hold Joint Workshops with FEDUSA and NACTU.- Organising Vulnerable Workers- Future of Work- Gender Programmes and Activities- International Relations

5. Promoting women leadership, taking up gender struggles much more effectively, and monitoring progress consistently. Congress has adopted the quota for women representation in leadership structures and by 2006 we must see visible improvements in representivity.

COSATU has not achieved the quota for women but we have improved in the gender struggles and programmes.

- Capacity building workshops for women leaders and shop stewards.- Education and workshops for young women workers.- Trained Male Gender Champions- Campaigns against GBV, Women and Children abuse and LGBTIs.

6. Ensuring measures to manage the deployment process.

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In this regard, we should ensure even development amongst leaders and affiliates and further consolidate the depth in our leadership. We need an exit strategy for leadership that retains experience and expertise within the trade union movement.

7. Implementing gains we have achieved at the level of legislative advances into coherent organisational strategies.

The implementation of COSATU Organisational strategy includes;

- Labour Law Amendments (S198 as a focus area)

- Unemployment Insurance Act (UIF)

- National Minimum Wage (NMW)

8. Providing quality benefits to workers, improving their and their families` lives; and creating the reputation of COSATU as a movement, which really cares for and is home for all workers. This includes looking at best practice across the affiliates and international experience around issues such as bursaries for children of workers, insurance, health and other benefits, workers` holidays, workers saving schemes, etc.

Most of COSATU unions have bursary schemes for members and children

2. Building the SACP

To remain relevant, the SACP must strengthen its capacity for independent analysis and policy development from a working class perspective. In the medium term:

1. The Socialist Commission should discuss the two medium term strategy documents developed by COSATU and SACP and develop a minimum platform of work. Further the Commission should re-open discussion on a Conference of the Left and agree on a common programme for the Socialist Forums.

The Political Workshop processes with the SACP have failed on numerous occasions. The problem is largely the synchronisation of our activities and even diaries to ensure that the Leadership that has to engage is available

2. COSATU will provide financial and material support to the SACP as a concrete contribution toward the Party becoming financially stable and ultimately self-reliant. In that vain, we will encourage our members and leaders to support the debit order campaign and to join the SACP. The Central Executive Committee will determine the actual contribution by affiliates.

A political fund whose name has been changed into a solidarity was created and all unions agreed to pay a levy towards this fund . But some unions have not kept to their commitment in the same way that some have not been paying their subscription fees. The federation has consistently made transferes to the SACP

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and in some instances could not keep to this commitment because of financial limitation caused by unions which have not been paying their levy.

Some unions have continuously provided financial support to the SACP , this has come in different forms including funding the SACP programmes and meetings. The most visible of these has been the buying of SACP offices buy POPCRU.

3. COSATU will support the Red October and other campaigns run by the SACP.

We have started in 2016 and 2017 Seminars with the SACP and CHI focusing on areas like Land, International Criminal Court. We have a pending Seminar on the question of Nuclear energy. The challenge with these seminars is that they are still Johannesburg based and have not reached out to the other Provinces, Districts and Locals of the SACP and COSATU. We need a further resource allocation to achieve this objective

4. COSATU will ensure that the Chris Hani Institute is up and running in order to deepen political education and a working class perspective on development questions.

We have commenced on the Chris Hani Brigade albeit largely sustained in Limpopo due to the funding constraints. This is a Eight Blocks Course which has had a National Political School. The Limpopo school has produced Two cohorts of Brigaders and are ready to roll the training in other Districts of their province. Whilst this was not with the CHI, the SACP and ZCTU were directly involved. This is largely to the credit and resilience of the Team in Limpopo who have sustained the School even under such heavy financial constraints. They were also supported from a Facilitation by the SACP in the form of Cde Rudolph Phala who has not failed them in the years of delivery

5. COSATU will ensure young workers join the Young Communist League.

Whilst statistical information cannot be provided, but anecdotal evidence has shown that many young workers which are active in COSATU and union structures are members of the Young Communist League . The recently launched COSATU Young Workers Fourum is led by comrades who alse serve in the structures of the Young Communist League.

3. Building the ANC

3.1. To swell the ranks of the ANC by calling on its members, shop stewards and leaders to join the ANC en masse.

COSATU has successfully swelled the ranks at branch, Provincial and National levels.

COSATU members are participating in the ANC branches, Shop stewards are leading in the BECs and BETs, COSATU Provincial leaders sit in the PECs and we have two COSATU NOBs sitting in the NEC.

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3.2. To develop a joint programme with the ANC on campaigns, education, and others matters.

We have not been successful to implement joint campaigns programmes developed. Only the Elections and some May Day mobilisation programmes are implemented.

We have developed a Joint programme for the Centenary Celebrations of the birth of Comrades Nelson Mandela and Albertina Sisulu.

3.3. To continue building programmatic relations with the leagues of the ANC

COSATU Gender Committees at National and Provincial have worked with the ANC Women’s League on different programmes.

We will be formalising the work for programmes between the ANC Youth League and the COSATU Young Workers Committee since they are now launched.

4. Building the Mass Democratic movement

4.1. Working with the traditional mass democratic movements.

a) Work with the student movement has been sporadic . It included our close work with SAUS and SASCO on the struggle for free education which led to a COSATU led march and the section 77 notice at NEDLAC.

b) Our work with COSAS has only been at the level of supporting them financially but we have not had visible programmes and campaigns

c) Our work with the People`s Budget Coalition, the Basic Income Grant Coalition, the TAC/ Section 27 has since stopped after the 2015 Special National Congress and the 12th National Congress given the dynamics which emerged at the time. It was discovered at that point that the relationship had developed into an emotional relationship with certain leaders and had ceased to be organisational and there were certain activities undertaken by some of our allies in the social movements which were viewed as an attack to the federation . But there is a healthy relationship at a provincial level between COSATU and many social movements as seen in the fight against e-tolls , increase in fuel prices etc. A process has however been put in place to revive the relations as we prepare for many socio economic struggles.

5. Ideological Contestation and Political Education: Responsibility is with the Education Department

5.1. Ideological Contestations and Political Education

a) In the medium term, we must build the Chris Hani Institute into a strong engine for ideological grounding and political education as well as the

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development of alternatives on a range of issues but primarily to ensure that serves as an intellectual asset of the working class.

Our engagement with the Chris Hani Institute has just started. This was due to the transitional stages of the Institute and the lack of funding. The new Director and his Team are now part of NEDCOMM and we cooperate with them on numerous engagements. We have this far engaged with them on the following key areas:-

The International Worker Education Study Tour of Latin America, Asia and European countries. This was under the Worker Education programme funded by the DHET. In that Tour we had the Workers College and DITSELA as part of the Study to view the best practice around Worker Education. These Tours were conducted in 2017 and 2018 and a Complete Report has been provided.

The CHI also engaged our views on the Worker Education through a Colloquim where we shared our views on the areas of Worker Education, Skills Development and general Political Education. This was important so that COSATU and CHI share their views on these areas and not contradict one another once engaged in other forums

We are now in discussions around the re-conceptulisation of the Chris Hani Brigade and the work will be finalised very soon. We also have agreed that the next CHB roll-outs will be done in joint collaboration of the two organisations

b) Set aside a portion of our income for the design and delivery of political education programmes across the Federation. To that end prioritise the strengthening of our locals and regions.

We have trained over 100 COSATU Locals through the Local Training programmes in all provinces in 2016 and 2017. Some of the provinces were even visited more than Two times. These provinces are Mpumalanga, Limpopo and KwaZulu Natal. This was largely due to the funding needs of increasing the number of participants in our contact sessions and only those Three provinces provided us with the necessary figures to comply with such funding requirements

c) Invest in developing a pool of political educators,

We have invested and in the programme but have been limited through the availability of the needed resources as explained in the CHB rollout that was conducted in Limpopo

d) Collaborate with the progressive intelligentsia to contest the intellectual and ideological space in society through public debates, use of media, and influencing centres of knowledge production such as universities, policy institutes, etc. To that end COSATU should be at the centre of shaping on- going development of curriculum that promotes working class and progressive values in the public education system.

a. We have focused on the Minimum Norms and Standards in Education. We are still stuck in that area and have not yet moved largely into the ideological space.

b. An opportunity now presents itself through the re-introduction of the compulsory History in the Basic Education stream. We need to be involved in

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the content of the Labour and Economic history so that the misery and plight of the working class is properly told and appreciated by learners coming from that stream. We also have another opportunity in the indigenous languages teachings in Universities which will ensure that many of the high end education programmes are easily consumed and comprehended by our members

e) Focus on young workers and develop ways to attract them to trade union organisation.

We have assisted in the Launch of the Young Workers Desk and have been very instrumental in the shaping up of that structure.

f) Be at the centre of alternative cultural productions that highlight the experience of our people and which instil values based on the objectives of non- racial and working class traditions

No work was undertaken in this regard.

6. Elections

6.1. For each election we will have a balance sheet based on our vision of what was achieved, what still needs to be done and setbacks. On that basis we will develop a framework for what should constitute an electoral platform. This analysis will be used to contribute towards the development of Election Manifestos.

Various COSATU Congresses have provided a mandate for the workers to vote ANC. The Federation has continued to do an assessment on outcomes of each election and renew the mandate of the ANC.

7. With the 2015 Plan not being fully implemented ,old challenges have developed into new complex problems conspiring to weaken and liquidate the Federation

As a result of not fully implementing the 2015 plan , over a period of time more problems have built on top of old challenges. For an example as a result of non -attendance to the challenges identified at the 6th Congress , by the 9th National Congress there were remaining challenges and some developed and took a new and more complex form which on amongst others included failure of the recruitment campaign; Lack of progress on trade union unity; Failure to organize atypical workers; , failure to implement decisions; Inadequate progress on the position of women workers; Retreat from the workplace; Softness in engaging capital; Lack of control over union investment companies; Involvement in divisions in the liberation movement and Careerism.

We are now overwhelmed by what appears to be new challenges when in fact we are confronted by old problems which have developed into something more complex, also compounded by the new political and socio- economic context.

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For an example in our 2015 Special National Congress and in the 12 th National Congress new challenges emerged which appeared as new and yet they were a concentrated expression of old challenges which remained unresolved .

Instead of addressing the weaknesses we have identified, we allow them to develop into more complex and overwhelming challenges. When a new generation of leaders takes over the responsibility of leadership they inherit an organisation with complex challenges which have developed a life of their own and in the process new and more complex challenges emerge resulting to the organisation reaching a state of decline.

If we were to juxtapose the human body and the organisation we can conclude that over time the federation like a human body has developed an organizational immune system. An organization’s immune system, like the human immune system, protects against change (intrusions) by erecting a powerful barrier. The organizational immune system is comprised of the people, policies, procedures, processes, and culture it creates to prevent change, regardless of the consequences (Gilley, Godek, & Gilley, 2009). People, become the gatekeepers of the status quo, fearful of change and the potential consequences of behaving in a different manner.

Leaders and others within the organization view policies, procedures, processes, and culture as providing control, continuity, and security, resulting in a comfortable status quo that seems preferable to the uncertainty of risk. Change threatens all of this. Few people possess the desire or ability to deal with uncertainty, choosing instead the known (even if painful) over the unknown. The organizational immune system’s protective, survival mode response may ultimately harm the body. The immune system attacks all intruders, with little attention to the overall implications - similar to the rejection of new ideas in an organizational setting. Often the individual’s response (like the cell’s response) is an intuitive and visceral defensive move with no consideration of the overall well - being of the system (the organization).

If we can consider a patient fighting for his life as his body rejects a critical organ implant, the organisation struggles to survive amidst a rapidly changing, highly competitive political and socio-economic landscape. What do these two have in common? Each has an immune system vigorously defending against change.

Our failure to aggressively address our own weaknesses has over the years developed into an organizational immune system with imposed powerful barriers, an anti organisation building culture.

This has crept in and produced arrogant gate-keepers which act against anything that is new regardless of the consequences. This has shown itself when for an example affiliates refuse to have the CEC discuss openly the state of each of the affiliates and call things by their right names, when union leaders continue to use the COSATU constitution on union autonomy to stop COSATU NOBs from intervening decisively to correct the obvious wrongs in the union, this has been seen when some of the union leaders refuse to attend meetings convened by COSATU to discuss the state of their unions, there have even been instances where COSATU NOBs have been refused entry to address union’s constitutional meeting or in some instances being allowed to do so but being set up against the structures and more worryingly is that where this has happened the results are that the union deteriorates and at that point everyone turns his or her eyes towards COSATU for solutions.

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This organizational immune system has been seen when union leaders take each other to court on procedural issues in order to disarm one another as a way of stopping uncomfortable change from happening. This is the capacity which is barely used against our strategic class enemies such as employers and monopoly capital.

As a result of this we now have leaders, organizers and shop stewards who do not know the organizational standard of a COSATU union which distinguishes a COSATU union from the rest because they were introduced to the organisation during a period of decline, defiance and chaos.

No union task ever gets accomplished, recruitment, organizing and accountability no longer take place, unions resources get wasted on other activities other than the core activities and no one intervene to correct. In instances where corrections are made, that is sometimes done factional. Those who do intervene get humiliated and removed unceremoniously.

The non-implementation of decisions and non-service to members has become a norm rather than an exception. Over the years those cadres and activists who live by the belief of being the honest servants to the people have disappeared and have been replaced by self-serving leaders and personnel, who come to the office in the morning and leave to go home in the afternoon, and nothing more.

Today unions have personnel who do not know the difference between the right and the wrong based on the standards of a progressive trade union movement and the required corresponding revolutionary discipline because they have in many occasions seen the wrong celebrating triumphantly.

In some instances members cannot even wear the affiliate’s colors because they cannot be associated with the leadership scandals. Our organisations are suffering from credibility crisis and many are refusing to see this truth instead they continue to arrogantly get involved into activities which have a proven history of destroying the union.

All these are the weaknesses which are known by our detractors and class enemies. The biggest danger we face today is that we have exposed our acute weaknesses to our class adversaries and detractors in the name of being open and transparent but we did so without addressing our them adequately and later these weaknesses got used to liquidate the federation as it is happening today.

If we do not act now, we may allow the chronic and cancerous illness which has corroded the federation to reach its fatal state and the federation will die in our hands.

8. The Biggest Strategic Challenges facing the Federation

The biggest strategic challenges facing our the federation today include the subjective weaknesses and the objective reality which constitute the environment within which the federation is operating following factor which;

8.1. The Objective Reality : The Factors which are outside Union and Federation’s control ,mainly imposed by the state of the economy globally and the changing nature of work

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8.1.1. International trends

Research shows that trade unions' membership numbers all over the world have dropped dramatically in the rich world over the last three decades. From a peak of 20m members in 1979 they fell to 14.5m in 2013 in America and from 12m to 6.5m in Britain, according to the report on OECD countries , mostly rich countries. European countries, including Germany and France, have also seen huge drops in membership.

The decline is largely due to structural changes in advanced economies. Total manufacturing employment in America has fallen from nearly 20m in 1979 to 12m today. The kind of workers who have lost out—in particular, unskilled men—were precisely those most likely to be in a union in the first place. And what has sprung up to replace them, crimps unions further. If you went to a factory in the 1970s, you would have seen assembly lines of people. Such workers were much more amenable to the idea of "class consciousness". 

The impact of globalisation has been an increased in the use of technology and mechanisation and this has made it harder for unions to regulate work, the rise of a more flexible service sector, and government policies (such as those imposed by a Conservative-led government in Britain in the 1980s under Margaret Thatcher) and the loss of union clout seems inevitable.

Faced with declining membership figures, some unions have tried to modernise. In Britain, for example, UNISON, the second-largest union, now allows people to join online and has created an app which is popular with younger people. It has also changed the way it markets itself to potential members: highlighting services such as free legal advice rather than just its ability to strike. Instead of relying on “stewards” to recruit new members, it advertises in newspapers and on the television.

But the pace of change in trade unions has often been slow. Several high-profile unions are still run by leaders who prefer staging industrial action as a means of recruiting new members.

This means that membership in the private sector, particularly in America and Britain, has seen a larger drop than that in the public-sector (although the numbers of private-sector union members has increased slightly more recently in Britain). As the public sector contracts, particularly in Britain, that may make the unions even more vulnerable.

This trend is not universal. In some countries trade union membership has grown: Spain, Ireland and Luxembourg have all seen an uptick in members over the past three decades. Meanwhile there is scope for even more growth in emerging markets. Since 1981, when records for Chile began, the number of people who are members of a trade union there has more than doubled. Between 1992 and 2013 the number of union members in Mexico increased by 25%.

Workers at China’s manufacturing plants may also increasingly start to organise themselves. And despite the declining number of members, unions in places such as France still hold sway in other parts of the market, determining wages or preventing businesses from expanding. But unless western unions start to widen their appeal, events such as this week's in Paris will become increasingly sombre.

This reality is also seen in COSATU unions. In 1991, COSATU’s membership constituted 93% private sector workers and only 7% public sector employees. By 2012, private sector membership had dropped to 61% while that of the public sector had risen to 39%.

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This constitute a significant shift as it means that COSATU has succeeded in attracting public sector workers but at the same time, it has lost or is not attracting private sector workers in substantial numbers.

We also note that in 1991, COSATU had 1, 2 million members. This number rose to about 1,9 million in 2000 and about 12 years later in 2012, the number stood at just under 2,2 million members. Currently, COSATU’s membership stands at around 1, 9 million which should make the federation and its affiliates to pose and reflect because it means that COSATU has about the same membership as it did 15 years ago.

We also note with concern that although COSATU is the largest federation in the country with about 1, 9 million members, it needs to be remembered that almost 10 million workers are unorganised. About 2, 8 million workers belong to non-COSATU affiliated unions but overall, the fact that about 73% of all workers in South Africa are unorganised is gravely worrying.

Over the years the COSATU membership base has been eroded by the impact of the global economic crisis which affected all the economies of the world but worsened the economic conditions of developing countries such as South Africa.

The colonial and apartheid legacy of South Africa has always imposed severe limitations in the South African Economy resulting to persistent poverty, unemployment and inequalities. With the stubborn global economic crisis, the triple crisis of poverty, unemployment and inequality have worsened in South African.

The direct implications of this, is loss of membership base in the unions which are organising in the affected sectors and these are unions in the private sector.

It also means that under these conditions we could not achieve the objective of the 2015 Plan which was adopted at the 8th National Congress in 2003 setting out a target for increasing membership by 10% every year, so as to achieve a total of 4 million members by 2009.

It is a fact that workers who were in temporal casual and seasonal positions or who worked of smaller employers were less likely to be in a union.

This has been complicated by the rampage existence of labour brokers who have made it difficult to organise workers in the sectors where they exist. When a union visited the workplace of the client- which is the place where workers are based- the client simply told the union that it cannot organise there because those are not its (client) workers. The union had to go to the offices of the labour broker if it wanted to recruit those workers.

These are not the only factors which explains decline in union. Many companies have been declared insolvent as a result of the global economic crisis and the opening of the South African economy to global competition. The trade policy choices made by our government in the early 90s which on amongst others included decisions to lower trade tariffs meant that local industries were no longer protected from competing with the subsidised companies from other countries. This period saw the clothing and textile industries, including farming sector being severely affected leading to job losses in those industries.

This period also saw the intensification of a call for a lesser role of the state in the economy. The withdrawal of the state from the provision of basic goods which to a large extent explains the persistence of unemployment, the rise of structural unemployment and the increase in the Lazarus-layers of the working class in South Africa. The privatisation of infrastructure provision and the supply of other basic goods meant that labour-intensity was subordinated to the dictates of profit-making. The removal of exchange controls also facilitated the outflow

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of capital in the form of delisting of South African conglomerates from JSE to the London Stock Exchange. Many of these companies had been employing thousands of South African workers.

All this put together contributed to the shrinking of the union’s membership base particularly in the private sector.

All these also raise a collolary question which is whether we have been able to respond aggressively to address the loss of jobs in our country. In our fight against the neo liberal policy trajectory as agreed at the 12th National Congress, there is a need to link and elevate job losses. Workers are expecting that COSATU and their unions should aggressively lead a campaign to stop the job losses.

Our unions have tried as individual unions to lead sector based campaigns to ward off retrenchments. But there is a broad strategic and collective task that we need to undertake in a systematic way and that is to make nd aggressive national call that job losses must stop now. This action on its own has a potential to increase levels of confidence to workers and the society as a whole but it will at the same touch at the central nerve of the critical challenge of unemployment and poverty afflicting our society. Part of our organisation building programme and the programme to build unions should include a systematic approach to this particular strategic task. Trade unions and COSATU unions in particular must be built on the basis of campaign for job security and increasing the levels of employment in the country.

8.2. The Subjective Factors : These are factors which are within the control of the Unions and the entire federation

8.2.1. Non Implementation of COSATU Programmes , Policies and Resolutions

The tendency is that COSATU affiliates treat COSATU as another organisation and the implementation of its programmes are not seen as being the primary responsibility of affiliates. The existing policy perspective on this matter is that the Federation’s role is to build unity, to co-ordinate affiliates’ activities, and to create an environment that is favourable to the affiliates’ sectoral structures.

Out of these three key tasks flow COSATU’s functions to ensure a unified voice for progressive labour, and ensure mutual protection and support between sectors. To develop policy positions for the entire working class, going beyond the sectoral needs of individual affiliates, and engage on them, including through national campaigns. Examples include economic policy, labour law and welfare policies. To deal with demarcation issues. To provide strategic support for affiliates by supplying materials and helping them share experiences in dealing with common problems. To give targeted assistance to weaker sectors, such as farm and domestic workers.

The affiliates’ functions are to ensure workers in the sector speak with a single voice, and provide support for workers in more vulnerable areas within the industry.

To assist workers with grievances in the workplace. To negotiate wages and other conditions of service. To develop policies for their sectors, working with the Federation and affiliates in related sectors where necessary. To co-ordinate workplace organisation to avoid conflicts and ensure greater efficiency, including leading campaigns around sectoral issues ,for

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instance on restructuring or AIDS,....To ensure the implementation within the sector of gains won by the Federation on a policy level, such as the new labour or pension laws (1997September Commission )

This is the challenge which lies at the centre of the weakness confronting the federation and its affiliates. This is one area which always threatens to expose the federation as a whole to our class enemies. The campaign which is being run by the right wing and our detractors about the so called crisis in COSATU and that COSATU is weak will continue to be given credibility if unions continue on the path of double talk – take militant resolutions but fail to show up for implementation.

Actually this conduct is evidenced of the worst forms of liberalism and reactionary tendencies which have come to be harboured in the federation in the recent years.

In fact it must be said that for one to make a commitment to show up in a class war and then decide to renege on the commitment is tantamount to selling out the revolution. Those who do so must fall on their sword in shame!

8.2.2. Deepening international organisational Challenges within Unions

The failure of many unions to strategically respond to changes in the workplace which have been occasioned by the economic changes has further diminished their power. Few manage to appeal to younger workers or those who are self-employed or work part-time. Whilst unions themselves have failed to come up with new and innovative ways of organising workers in what is clearly a radically changed labour market, objectively, the vulnerability of many workers has simply made it that much more difficult to organise in the private sector.

COSATU’s affiliates experience many challenges and it is disturbing to note that many of our unions are not genuinely accepting their own weaknesses.

There are too many weaknesses in COSATU Affiliates which are not being confronted and addressed and these have accumulated into a platform which is used by our class enemies and detractors as defining a permanent state of COSATU. These include the following amongst others

There is an existing trust deficiency between members and too many of our union leaders.

Too many of our unions are going through internal organisational turmoil leading to divisions and splits. Some of our unions have split more than twice in their life time without the union evaluating and addressing the reasons which led to the first split. In Some cases it has become normal that an elected leadership does not finish its term of office and by the end of a term about 85 percent of the leadership is new.

It has become too easy and frequent in unions to have leaders being expelled even for offences which are not grievous but which could be resolved through other effective means .In many instances these expulsions do not follow the union constitution. It has become normal to find a union leader on his or her own simply deciding to expel other leaders at a go.

At the centre of these organisational divisions is money , it is corruption and leadership style which when properly analysed it is found that it is not just undemocratic leadership style for its own sake , but it is about a leader giving himself or herself a right and a space to loot union resources.

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Corruption in our unions does not happen in a vacuum but it is driven by service providers and is based on a desire by some to exclusively access and control union investment resources.

Service Providers have found our unions to be a captured market. Many of our unions are being captured by service providers who want perpetual access to unions funds. This is done by the legal firms we use, the pension administrators, the printing companies, computer companies, property management companies, medical Aids companies etc.

What has become even more of a problem is that unions do not appreciate and accept COSATU’s intervention and this comes with political dishonesty and lack of understanding of COSATU policies or in some instances it comes from direct and deliberate undermining of the standing of the federation.

The worst version of this is when each faction in the union position itself as being on the favourable side of the COSATU NOBs or create a false impression that COSATU NOBs were taking sides.

The existing policy of COSATU with regard to the intervention of COSATU say that COSATU may intervene in affiliates when they:

a) experience deep political conflict that creates a crisis in the union

b) experience serious administrative or organisational crisis

c) adopt or implement policies that contradict Federation policy

d) Are unable to grow or reach large pockets of workers in their sector because of a lack of resources or inability to develop and implement focused strategies.

Each of the situations noted above requires different kinds of interventions and different capacities from the Federation. They could be distinguished as follows:

a) Deep political conflict: the intervention of the senior leadership of the Federation is required - including COSATU NOBs and affiliate NOBs.

b) Serious administrative or organisational crisis:  This kind of issue is dealt with by delegating a relevant staff member, and NOB and an Organisational Development specialist.

c) Adopt or implement policies that contradict Federation policy: This is dealt with in the CEC once the COSATU NOBs have alerted the CEC about the said policy breach. Experience has shown that this kind of a challenge is best dealt with through continuous dialogue and the application of the constitution in terms of discipline becomes the last option.

d) A weak or stagnating affiliate: This is the real terrain of the organising department, and it must have the capacity to consistently help affiliates deal with such problems.

8.2.3. Inability to support or intervene in affiliates,

Despite the intervention by the 12th National Congress and later the 6th Central Committee which gave the federation more authority to intervene in unions without being hindered by unions who wrongly assert their autonomy. In the actual process of intervention it became clear that authority without resources to exercise such authority in the face of resistance renders such authority meaningless. In many cases where the

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federation has been intervening in union, it was limited by unavailability of resources particularly in relations to addressing the membership directly.

Because of its lack of capacity, and the weak link between affiliates and centre, COSATU as a federation is unable to support, in a consistent way, an affiliate which is weak or is experiencing internal problems.

These problems weaken and undermine the Federation as a whole, and make it difficult to act in a unified way. It is obvious that COSATU will be unable to implement its ambitious programmes unless it is able to act as a powerful and unified force. It is also clear that every affiliate is weakened if there are sectors or affiliates that are weakly organised or have internal problems. The strength of each affiliate in its own sector depends not only on its own strength, but on the strength of the trade union movement as a whole.

8.2.4. Weak Provincial Structures

COSATU provincial structures are not adequately resourced to engage effectively with provincial governments and provincial development forums. Yet these are likely to become increasingly important arenas for public service delivery and economic and industrial development.

Provincial structures are weak because, like national structures, they lack powerful engines, and they do not receive adequate strategic or policy support from the national level. Not only do the Provincial structures of many affiliates fail to implement decisions of the PECs, but often affiliates fail to even attend meetings of the Federation in the provinces.

8.2.5. Weak locals

Locals used to be real centres of innovation and activism in the movement. In the early 1980s the locals took on many of the tasks of organisers - organising new factories and training new shop stewards. In the middle and late 1980s the locals became political centres, building local alliances, driving local struggles and campaigns, mobilising solidarity, as well as implementing national campaigns.

But as the unions became more centralised (head offices became the centres of innovation, rather than the locals or shopsteward committees) and as the nature of the political struggle changed - also becoming more centralised - the locals degenerated into administrative centres, their agendas packed with complex documents from head office. As a result COSATU locals have become very weak, stagnating between major COSATU campaigns. As in the provinces, there is lack of clarity about the role of locals and their relation to affiliates.

8.2.6. Business Unionism

The paucity of size of Leaders in Unions devoted to Trade Union activities, and the inherent contradiction between the principles of struggle and the emerging commercial interests, e.g. rising number of Union based business people vis-à-vis a declining number of dedicated Trade Union Activists

8.2.7. A cluster of strategic weaknesses which requires urgent attention

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Over and above the subjective weaknesses identified above there is a cluster of strategic weaknesses which exist side by side to each , which if left unattended will have a potential to ultimately change the character of the federation and our unions. These include the following;

a) Lack of solidarity amongst unions

b) Poaching of COSATU affiliated unions members by other COSATU unions and other unions

c) Unions which do not prioritise political education and capacity building and where union strategies and resources do not equip stewards to build in ways to be able to exert control over their union as well as to deal with the employer’s strategy of control over the workplace.

d) Inter union rivalry and fierce inability to aggressively confront competition from emerging independent unions and non-union staff associations

What is to be done?

“Experience has taught, however, that a lot more requires to be known about organising if the product of our efforts and activities, i.e. organisation, is to be effective. And if the oppressed and exploited are to achieve their end, viz to take over power, they must build effective organisational machinery. And to have such organizational machinery there is no room for haphazard and half-hearted measures. The task has to be tackled seriously and systematically.” Govan Mbeki –Learning from Robben Island

It must be properly understood that COSATU is not just any other organisation but a federation of trade unions operating within a terrain of class struggle based on three organising focal areas which include: (a) trade union work (fighting for the improvement of working conditions and salaries, job security); (b) policy work (labour market transformation and working related policies) and (c) political struggle (The ANC led National Democratic Revolution and the SACP led struggle for socialism).

Therefore, the starting point in any of the interventions should be the following interrelated focus areas: the pre-requisite to all the activities is ensuring the financial sustainability of COSATU and then prioritise the following:(a) undivided strategic focus on a member (b) strategic focus on the structure, capacity and authority of the federation and its relation to unions (c) targeted Priority campaigns which have a multiplier impact on other integral organising focal areas stated above.

These include developing effective communication strategies and link Communication to activities of the federation and unions.

1. Ensure Financial Sustainability of the federation as a Pre-requisite to all the activities

The principle of paid up membership is based on an understanding that the federation should be self-sustainable and not rely on donations because that has a potential of compromising the independence of COSATU. Besides this being a constitutional principle

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to which all affiliates must adhere but it is also a political consideration to protect the federation’s ability to speak its mind without fear or favor.

Some affiliates receive subscription fees from the membership and a portion of this money is supposed to be paid to COSATU. But these affiliates do not pay it and instead they prioritise international affiliation and other priorities at the expense of the federation.

This has literally collapsed the federation’s capacity to implement its programme, has destroyed the staff moral as they are always not sure if they will get paid at the end of the month and has also destroyed the political and organizational credibility of the federation.

The federation no longer has the capacity to coordinate the activities of its affiliates nor can it conduct provincial visits and interact with membership. These are the core activities which can no longer be undertaken because there is no financial capacity to roll them out.

Our class enemies and detractors have exploited this weak state of the federation because we cannot respond against the systemic attacks directed at the workers and our organisation. We can no longer mount any sustainable campaign to defend the federation nor conduct any study which will allow us to remain a step ahead of our class enemies and detractors.

What is even more disturbing is that affiliates which owe the federation do not even take the initiative to approach the federation instead it is the COSATU NOBs who write to them and take the initiative to explain their situation to the CEC.

In reality the nonpayment of affiliates fees when affiliates are receiving membership subscription fees is tantamount to declaring a vote of no confidence to the federation itself and at worst it is equal to an act of sabotage aimed at systematically destroying the federation.

Almost in every CEC a decision gets taken that all affiliates in arrears should pay with immediate effect but this has never happened without NOBs making phone calls to each and every affiliates wasting the very little and remaining resources.

What are the practical steps to be undertaken?

a) Allow COSATU NOBs to communicate directly with members and publish the names of all affiliates which are in arrears so that the leadership can explain the reasons to members who pay on a monthly basis on the knowledge that the federation is also being paid the affiliation fees.

b) Affiliates must pay their fees in respect of each month on or before the 7th day of the following month.

c) Apply clause 2.2.8 and 2.2.9 of COSATU constitution on a case by case basis.

d) Almost all affiliates hold an average of three/four national meetings per year in which conferencing facilities are paid for from subscriptions. This includes conference venues, regalia, printing and accommodation. This runs into huge expenses amounting into millions which can be estimated at an average of a minimum of R5 million in a year. If all these financial resources can be put together into a single pool toward a project of building COSATU wide in-house conference

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facilities a lot of money can be saved and the federation as a whole can have assets that address its core business. At the same time this can generate sustainable income. The congress must consider commissioning a study towards the possibility of having in-house COSATU wide conference facilities.

e) All affiliates must send capable personnel who will help to take forward the federation’s fundraising drive which will include the following elements :

I. Convene the union’s investment council to develop fundraising strategies for the federation including how union’s investment arms can fund the initial capital towards COSATU new investment vehicle.

II. Generate enough capital towards the establishment of a new COSATU’s investment entity. Identify friendly business people in the country who can help raise enough capital towards COSATU’s new investment entity.

III. All COSATU deployees to parliament must be part of the fundraising drive for the federation

IV. Follow up to legally recoup monies allegedly embezzled from Kopano Ke Matla

V. Develop practical measures towards COSATU’s new funding model

VI. Approach strategic ministers to have various partnerships with their departments which may assist in funding specific strategic programs

VII. Approach COSATU‘s international friends prioritizing those who help to build COSATU in its formative years to assist in specifically defined projects such as COSATU Radio , leadership training programmes etc.

2. Analyse the enemy and our detractors and develop appropriate and effective responses

The federation should spend time to answer and develop a sense of clarity on the following strategic question :

Currently there are following developments which need to be confronted:

The EFF has started to move into the workplaces and creating trade unions which are now eating into the members of the Federation and that it is a very negative impact

The DA has taken up a role of talking for the workers like in JHB metro at the back of weakness in SAMWU and now taking steps to protect the local production against the illegal and cheap imports and that would also allow him to creep into other areas like the industrial unions

a) Who is the principal enemy?

b) Who are the enemy’s principal allies?

c) Which is the principal social force of our revolution?

d) Who are the main allies of the working people?

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e) Who are the main external allies of our struggle?

f) What are the key elements of the enemy’s political strategy?

g) What is our principal immediate strategic line of struggle?

h) What is the character and shape of our broad front of struggle?

3. Strategic Focus on trade union work with a special attention on a member

Practical Work to be undertaken should include the following:

3.1. Recruit new members

All unions must works towards achieving the target of 4 million members by 2030 for the federation as a whole and in this regard the following work must be undertaken:

a) All affiliates must conduct an assessment of potential membership in the sectors based on the current report by NALEDI showing that there is a total of 16, 7 million workers which remain unorganized.

b) The recruitment strategy of all affiliates must also focus on targeting the race, age and gender demographics. In this regard the COSATU organizing department will develop a common recruitment strategy for each working with identified strategic unions.

c) Once this is done, the federation shall impose annual recruitment targets per union which can further be broken into manageable quarterly targets.

d) All affiliates must develop a corresponding recruitment and organizing programme which must be integrated into a federation led programme.

e) Such a programme shall be funded from a common fund managed by the federation whilst also allowing unions to have individual budgets. Each Affiliate shall have a responsibility to pay towards this common fund.

f) The coordinating work of the federation shall include central management of the recruitment form and processing of such with corresponding unions and employers

g) In this regard it must be mandatory that the federation should have membership data for all its affiliates. This shall also include the authority of the federation to meet and address members should it deem it necessary to do so.

h) Redefine the role of COSATU substructure called COCC.

i) Redefine the listening campaign.

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3.2. Organise the unorganised

Within the wavelength of recruiting new members have a special focus on organizing the unorganized and increase trade union membership and density. Practical work to be undertaken must include the following;

a) Heighten the recruitment drive which will be linked to the listening campaign to reach out to small and big workplaces ensuring that we aim to be 100% representative instead of just gunning for a 50+1% representation.

b) The main focus of this recruitment drive shall be the most vulnerable workers, and workers in rural areas and small towns. Vulnerable workers are particularly those in low-paid sectors, with few benefits, unorganised, young, female and rural.

c) Target professional workers who are barely protected in law, and it is our duty to extend our organisational reach to them.

d) Also target white workers, women, youth and foreign nationals to ensure that our movement strengthens our broader political goal of building a united, democratic non-racial, non-sexist, egalitarian and prosperous South Africa.

e) Specifically in relation to Domestic Workers, pledge practical support to SADSAWU.

f) Our support and engagement with the organisation of street vendors must take place at every level of the Federation.

g) All affiliates of the federation should desist from recycling members amongst themselves. Poaching members from another COSATU union is not registering progress.

h) The Federation must work harder to enforce the founding principles of the Federation, including the one union one industry principle, and ensure that mergers and integration take place between unions that are currently competing for the same membership.

i) Research obstacles towards Merger of unions.

3.3. Retain membership through quality service and deepening worker control

a) It must be made compulsory through proper verification that no unions present positions in the constitutional structure or anywhere on behalf of members without soliciting a mandate from workers.

b) Unions must report back to members from all meetings attended

c) Communication with membership must not rely on the use of the bourgeoisie media but the internal communication systems of unions including the use of fast official communication technology.

d) Whiles we embrace social media; it should be used to the Federation and union’s advantage especially in reaching out to members.

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e) The federation must develop monitoring systems on the consistent work to be done by unions in servicing members and this will be including in the reports that will be sent to the GS on quarterly intervals – please see the template provided.

f) The federation must conduct surveys on the different needs of various membership groups such young workers , other racial groups , women and have this knowledge used in developing new recruitment strategies and service

g) COSATU should establish a specialized unit to deal with representation of members

h) The CEC and or Congress should discuss the possibility of ensuring that workplace agreements include giving COSATU access to the workplace and institutions of representation such as CCMA, bargaining councils etc.

3.4. Build workplace Organisation

Affiliates are important for engaging at an industrial level in collective bargaining and sectoral policy issues, for organising and servicing workers, and for building workplace organisation capable of engaging employers at that level. On the other side COSATU also needs to strengthen its capacity to co-ordinate the activities of affiliates both in relation to industrial and sectoral policy and in relation to collective bargaining.

Co-ordination could focus on solidarity struggles, and joint recruiting campaigns for vulnerable sectors. It is also important for affiliates to begin sharing experiences of, and strategies for, responding to work place restructuring and democratisation in both the private and public sectors.

In building workplace organisation we need to consciously strive towards reaching a point where workers can shout without fear that “In COSATU We Trust” and to wear our colours as a badge of pride. We need to build the COSATU brand name based on how union leaders conduct themselves in public. This includes building the leader’s ability to inspire membership when they speak and inspire young future leaders to emulate them.

Members must see and feel that they are a priority in all COSATU unions.

More specifically all affiliates should undertake the following practical activities aimed at building workplace organisation:

Heighten the Listening Campaign - Specific Tasks to be undertaken

a) COSATU Provinces working with a team of General Secretaries will lead Bi-monthly visits to workplaces especially those adversely affected by rivalry, apathy and competition.

b) All PEC and CECs shall receive consolidated report backs on the issues raised by the membership and how affiliates and COSATU provinces have responded to the issues raised.

c) The Listening Campaign is to be integrated into all the programmes of affiliates and provinces as part of service to members. Provinces will develop programmes to ensure that Affiliate leadership and members of the CEC hit the ground to engage members on the demands emanating from the membership and those articulated in our 2013 Organizing and campaigns conference.

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d) Keep Records of grievances compiled and collated. Close monitoring of processes and successive follow ups on redressing of grievances.

e) Organizers/Educators to organize tea time, lunch hour and after work meetings in a drive to enlist new members in plants/industries not yet unionized, and consolidate membership where unionism is properly established.

f) Develop a data on the numbers of new members recruited and report on members turned into paid up membership with service and training provided.

g) All workers demands directed at employers and the state shall be popularized and written in all workers' languages. Pamphlets, posters, banners will be produced to popularise these demands

h) Provide training for organizers who negotiate the Recognition and Collective agreements, including union guidelines as to the most important right or what NOT to compromise, how to improve on what already exists as a right under the LRA or bottom lines or formula to help and guide the settlement agreement in respect of particular rights.

i) Develop model union agreements reflecting the diversity of situations, sectors, and employment status etc – what we need as guidelines and principles allowing emphasis to develop different kinds of organisation rights agreements.

j) Build space for workers to share views as a basis to explore their unity and to facilitate the practice of rank and file involvement including the kind of organisation they want to build.

k) Allocate time, financial and human resources to address, specifically, workplace challenges e.g. a provision be made in the Recognition or Collective Agreements for the allocation of at least 2 hours per month for a workers’ general meeting and shop stewards to utilize the time allocated for that purpose optimally.

l) Shopstewards, Organizers & Educators must be given time to attend to organizational matters rather than be overloaded with CCMA cases. Most Organisers spend time doing dispute resolution instead of organizing, recruiting new members and servicing old members.

m) Training and education - The 15-21 paid time-off to be allocated for Shopsteward Training by Trade Unions and not Employers or Department of Labour Training. Shop stewards and workers are experts on their own workplaces therefore must be provided a platform through local general meetings and shop steward meetings in the workplaces the chance/space to share this knowledge.

n) Every worker joining a company where Cosatu affiliated union is an established majority and/or is sufficiently representative should be provided with a copy of plant level Recognition Agreement as an education tool/instrument to teach current and prospective workers about the terms and conditions of the agreement prevailing between the Employer and Employees in that workplace.

o) Our current Shop steward education and training programme appears inadequate and somewhat irrelevant in assisting the Federation to overcome challenges of pervasive ignorance among our Shop steward cohort. We need to revisit the content of our training manuals and customize them to meet the demands of the current challenges. We must identify all the challenges and problems affecting the workers in the new labour dispensation and make appropriate interventions.

p) Develop a new Shop Steward manual guide based on examples of how to exercise or apply Organizational rights, conduct procedure for grievances and undertake processes of dispute resolution include the new labour legislation.

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q) Conducting quarterly Training and Education made compulsory for Shop-stewards with time-off for shop stewards.

3.5. Ideological training and Capacity Building for members / Shop Stewards

a) Capacity building and training programmes must proceed from an understanding that all members of the union / federation have a potential to become leaders at various levels of the organization and that they must be social activist who can represent and defend workers right at all material times including participating in community struggles .

b) The federation must provide a common training manual for the induction of new members including developing a common expected training standards for trainers

c) In this regard all COSATU provinces will revive the Chris Hani brigade as a platform for building and inculcating activism in the federation as a whole.

d) The training programmes must be linked to set criteria for the election of members into positions of leadership in unions and in the federation.

e) COSATU shall coordinate with the SACP to facilitate the CUBAN and Chinese ideological training programme through worker to worker contact.

f) All elected leaders and shop stewards should attend economic school

g) The Federation should build internal research capacity.

h) Training of shop stewards on labor laws should incorporate the country constitution.

3.6. There is an urgent to redesign assess the limitations imposed by the structure, capacity and constitutional authority of the federation and its relation to unions

The current structure of the federation has a limiting effect on the expected coordinating work to be executed by the federation. This includes the fact that the federation has a binary structure, in that has a federal relationship to unions and has unitary orientation to provinces. This orientation decapitates the federation’s authority from ensuring decisive intervention and support where required in unions. In this regard the following is recommended:

a) COSATU NOB’s should mandatorily attend the Affiliates structural meetings to understand developments in any of its affiliates including gauging timeous need for support or any form of intervention . The observation made by the federation may further be subject of discussion in the constitutional meetings of the federation

b) The CEC must assert its authority and reinforce the work of the NOBs , this included asking unions to frequently submit organisational reports for discussion by the CEC

c) The federation must have constitutional powers to discipline a union leader who engages in deliberately demeaning activities in the Federation and affiliates will be bound to take corresponding action to reinforce the disciplinary action by the federation.

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d) The Commission re affirmed the 6th Central Committee Resolution and it must now be in the constitution, that the federation has a right to intervene in unions as it deems necessary.

e) No union should use courts without first exhausting internal processes which should be outlined in the constitution

4. Build COSATU Local and Provincial Structures

We move from the premise that the Locals are the most basic structures and remain the backbone of the Federation because they are the delivery point of the Federation’s campaigns”.

The local’s survival is reliant on using facilities of affiliates (meeting places, telephones etc) and do not have their own budgets or staff. They are administratively supported by local offices of affiliates and the COSATU Provincial offices.

To build a sustainable organisation we need to build organisation in the workplace and amongst workplaces through strong branch/local and provincial structures.

The Local meetings can be used to build space for workers to share views as a basis to explore their unity and to facilitate the practice of rank and file involvement including the kind of organisation they want to build.

Challenges continuously faced by Locals and proposals;

a) No available offices where there are no affiliates having an office - especially in small rural towns and on farming areas.

(Affiliates with membership in these areas must open offices and avail the space and resources for local meetings)

b) Poor attendance at Local meetings of shop stewards by some affiliates.

(Therefore all affiliates must monitor and ensure their officials and shopstewards attendance to locals is improved to correct this)

c) Failure of Local office bearers to visit affiliates and reflection by the LOBs on the content of the Local meetings with a view to making them more interesting/relevant.

(There is a need for capacity building in the Locals and Provinces)

d) Failure by the Local office bearers to meet in order to plan, and failure to convene shop stewards councils and general meetings.

(Allocate funds to Locals and negotiate time-offs LOBs to attend to COSATU work)

e) Poor attendance by most affiliate officials (organisers) and lack of assistance from the PEC leadership

(Fulltime officials to attend Locals, report to the union structures and follow up decisions)

Provinces are the engine of the Federation therefore the Organising programme must include building our local and provincial structures as guided by Congress Resolutions

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on Building COSATU Engines and the decisions of the CEC held on 23 to 24 November, who endorsed the COSATU priorities for 2017 to building the fighting capacity of COSATU Engines.

We have identified a challenge of inexperience in the elected POBs and have proposed the need for Induction and Training to be provided for all Provincial Office Bearers. This includes Provincial sub-structures, including Locals, to be audited for functionality on a regular basis.

The auditing process of Locals and Provinces to include content of issues should be taken up. Where it is observed that there are common issues being taken up, a strategy to be developed to support and co-ordinate visits by identified leadership to assist and support.

The constitution of the federation renders provinces as unthinking implementation machines in that their voice in national constitutional meetings have no constitutional authority. They are not even actively participating in congress debates. Actually there have been signs from some in the CEC and in other constitutional meetings to frown against arguments and reports being tabled by provinces about the state of affiliates. The reason for this is that provinces are located as strategic levers for implementation and they know the weaknesses of affiliates from firsthand experience.

Provinces must be empowered to have authority in constitutional structures and to whip over the affiliates in provinces.

5. Identify Strategic Priority campaigns with a Multiplier effect

The federation has over the years adopted many resolutions and campaigns which in many occasions do not get implemented.

In this regard Congress must consider the following recommendations :

a) The coming congress should avoid adopting new resolutions instead it should develop tighter programmes for implementation based on the existing relevant resolutions

b) The federation should consider prioritising the following few campaigns which have a multiplier impact

i. The Living Wage Campaign/job creation

ii. Recruitment Campaign

iii. Advancing gender struggles.

c) Pay special attention to Building Unions in Small Towns where the majority of our organizing presence exists (not in overall membership numbers but in numbers of locations). The vast majority of our 236 Locals are based in small towns.

d) Ensure establishment of mobile offices and centers of service in small towns and in rural areas to cut across sectors.

e) A summit of shop stewards from these areas must be convened to develop a more focused programme of Action.

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f) Put pressure on the Department of Labor to ensure enforcement of legislation in these areas

g) Our recruitment and organizing in small towns and rural areas will be linked to a campaign for rural development. The hostile and brutal working conditions experienced by workers in these areas cannot be separated from the general environment, inclusive of high levels of illiteracy.

h) Ensure that there is shop steward election in every workplace following union constitution. In the NALEDI survey 35% of our members have told us that there has not been a shop stewards election in their workplace in the past four years (compared to 50% of non-COSATU unions).

i) Address the Fragmentation of the unions as a source of weakness not strength

j) Develop a checklist for all activities across the Federation. The components of the checklist should include the following :: -

Is the activity being conducted on lines that promote Internal Democracy? Does the activity promote Solidarity? Is Activism present? Is the activity steeped in Dialogue - that is not just a one-way street of

communication from the top down?

6. Assert the role of the CEC

The purpose, powers and duties of the CEC are captured in clause 5 of the COSATU constitution which says that “the Central Executive Committee ("CEC") manages the affairs of the Federation between meetings of the NC and CC and has such powers and duties which customarily vest in an executive body, which includes in relation to - policy , membership , employment , property , finances and annual report, structures , provinces , leadership , legal matters and other miscellaneous issues such as assisting the General Secretary in the exercise of his/her duties; dealing with matters specially delegated to it by the CC; and referring decisions having major policy implications to the CC or NC.

This is the responsibility which resides with the CEC working with the National Office Bearers. Proceeding from this understanding, at no stage is the CEC expected to fold its arms and not act on matters affecting the federation.

The CEC must act on the following matters and not leave them to the NOBs:

a) Affiliates which stand in breach of the constitution including those who owes affiliation fees to the federation.

b) Affiliates which are poaching. The CEC needs to find a way of decisively deal with poaching and this include a process of returning membership to the original union and addressing the reasons which made it easier for members to leave the union in the first place.

c) Unions which faces internal organisational challenges

d) Building and supporting newly affiliated unions. It should not be the burden of the leaders of a new union to build the organisation but this must be the

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responsibility of the CEC which must adopt such a union as a special project for support. That is how historically COSATU unions were built.

e) Admission of unions which applied for membership to COSATU and provide answers to difficult questions such as what should be done about people who leave unions to form other unions and later come back to apply for affiliation in COSATU. This question should be answered in the context of the principle that COSATU is a home for all workers and that workers are better organized under COSATU.

f) The CEC must give guidance on what COSATU should do in the case of a union which is being accused of anything including non compliance with statutory requirements from the Department of Labor. This must be dealt with in the context of asserting COSATU as an effective, democratic and dynamic organisation whose credibility has also been built based on striking a balance between tactical defiance, militancy and responsible trade unionism.

g) The CEC must confront the question as to whether union members are not COSATU members at the same time. The reality is that members join a union on the basis of its affiliation to COSATU and linked to this the CEC must therefore discuss how COSATU should interface with union membership including how affiliates can benefits directly from COSATU from programmes such as bursaries and funeral policies etc.

The NOBs must be assisted to carry out the work of the federation and should not have their work of coordinating the implementation of resolutions hampered by lack of resources or non -compliance by affiliates.

7. Developing effective communication strategies and link Communication to activities of the federation and unions.

The starting point should be that the federation and its affiliates must be clear that the objective of communication should primarily be directed to members Communication systems should therefore be developed to serve this purpose. This include developing federation wide membership contact details and data base which must reside with the federation .

The test of the federation’s communication should be on the activities by unions which corresponds with the message

All unions and the entire federation should remain alert that employers are using underhand tactics and also conniving with our rivals to weaken us and therefore effective communication with the membership base should be prioritise , to undermine the enemy’s offensive.

In this regard, the recommendations contained in book three from the Communications Department is relevant and these include the following;

On the communications front, there is a need to establish a systematic budgeting and planning process for federation wide communications planning. We need to develop our internal communications platforms and tools and this requires a clear criteria for

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measuring communications budgets, common benchmarking standards in order to be able to provide support to affiliates in their communications work.

The IT Unit has been grossly underfunded and this has resulted in the federation struggling to keep up with the developments. We need to avail more resources for the IT Unit to be able to keep with the ever-changing technological advancement.

a) Training and Capacity building

There is a need for national programmes to upgrade communication skills for all levels of the federation and also with affiliates. This will need the affiliates to harness the available resources and also source for more sponsorship.

b) Plain Language

COSATU’s duty is to inform the public and membership and this includes the obligation to communicate effectively. Information about policies, programs, services and initiatives must be clear, relevant, objective, easy to understand and useful. To ensure clarity and consistency of information, plain language and vernacular languages must be used in all communication with the public. This principle also applies to affiliates and internal communications, as well as to information whether delivered in writing or in speech.

c) Provincial

Co-ordination between head office, Provincial and COSATU Local operations in communication matters is essential. Provincial communications staff and affiliates must be included from the outset in planning and developing strategies to achieve communication objectives at the local or provincial level. We need to ensure an appropriate distribution of resources between head office and provinces in all communications planning, management and delivery. To ensure that staff at all levels carry out their unique role in, and shared responsibilities for, delivering and managing the federation’s communications; Examine ways to increase efficiency in responding to communication issues, and adjust and simplify approval processes as necessary; Ensure the coherence and consistency of information and messages across all channels of communication, from in-person service, telephone and mail, to facsimile, Internet and electronic transmission;

Collaborate with other organisations that promote common messages and themes Ensure communication plans and strategies for policies, programs and initiatives are developed collaboratively with input from responsible heads of departments in both head office and provincial

Affiliates must ensure that their provincial structures have the resources needed to effectively manage the communications function.

d) Internal Communications

Engaging employees in a conversation for action allows institutions to tap into a vast pool of intelligence and expertise. Properly engaged in the life of an organization, employees can be valuable allies in external communications – helping to inform the public, professional colleagues and prospective employees about the federation.

Managers and supervisors must communicate with employees openly, frequently, and before or at the same time as information is communicated to the public. Training in

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communications must be available to them to help ensure they are effective communicators.

To foster employee knowledge, awareness and understanding, internal communication includes a mix of published materials (in multiple formats), oral presentations, staff meetings and learning events. COSATU has often deployed its employees in pickets and marches and there is a need to engage managers and employees in a dialogue for action.

e) Technological Innovation and New Media

COSATU must maintain a capacity for innovation and stay current with developments in communications practice and technology. While adopting new means of communication, COSATU must also continue to reach, in a timely manner, members and citizens whose access to technology may be limited or who prefer to receive information through more traditional means.

f) Internet and Electronic Communication

The Internet, social media tools and other means of electronic communication are powerful enablers for building and sustaining effective communication within affiliates and with their members across the country.

An important tool for providing information and services to the public and membership, the Internet facilitates interactive, two-way communication and feedback. It provides opportunities to reach and connect with members wherever they reside, and to deliver personalized services. COSATU must maintain an active presence on the Internet to enable 24-hour electronic access to services and information.

COSATU must advance on-line initiatives aimed at expanding the reach and quality of internal and external communications, improving service delivery, connecting and interacting with members, enhancing public access and fostering public dialogue. Ensure that Internet-published information on policies, programs, services and initiatives is regularly updated, accurate, easy to understand, and accessible in multiple formats for persons with disabilities.

g) Media Liaison

Journalists and other media representatives play an important role in providing the public with news and information about the federation and reporting on the public's views and opinions of government. COSATU and her affiliates must continue to cultivate proactive relations with the media to promote public awareness and understanding of COSATU policies, programs, services and initiatives.

COSATU must operate and respond effectively in a 24-hour media environment. The federation must be able, on short notice, to reach and inform the media on issues of importance. We must continue to engage the media using a variety of communication tools, including news conferences, briefings, news releases, and audio-video presentations.

COSATU must respect the authority and responsibility of affiliates t, whose members are entitled to learn about planned legislative initiatives before information about them is released to the media.

Work collaboratively with other federations to develop joint communication plans and strategies in areas of mutual interest. Share communication plans and evaluation

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findings with affiliates and strengthen the media forum. Track the performance of communication products and measure results achieved against objectives set in communication plans. Evaluate the effectiveness, including cost-effectiveness, of communication programs and campaigns developed in support of policy or campaigns and make improvements or adjustments as needed to ensure the efficacy of plans, strategies and activities.

8. Conclusion

“No problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it”.

This congress is being called to think anew and provide a ground breaking way forward. It is now or never!

4. COSATU Strategy towards the 2019 Elections

4.1. Introduction

a) We reaffirm the 2015 plan on general elections, which states that; we will have a balance sheet based on our vision of what was achieved, what still needs to be done and setbacks. On that basis we will develop a framework for what should constitute an electoral platform. This analysis will be used to contribute towards the development of Election Manifestos.

b) We further reaffirm our resolution to support the ANC during this forth upcoming general election. We support state power contestation however it will not be feasible for the upcoming 2019 election.

c) The manifesto for the 2014 General Elections committed to priorities which included:

i. Creation of more decent and sustainable jobs. Decent work and sustainable livelihoods for inclusive growth.

ii. Rural development, land reform and food securityiii. Education iv. Health and v. (e)Fighting crime and corruption.

Observations

a) Our observation is that the working class resolutions always get postponed because of the so called economic growth problem.

b) In 1997 COSATU warned the ANC that by adopting policies of trade and financial liberalisation under GEAR policy the government was increasing the vulnerability of the South African economy to global forces and trends.

c) GEAR policy emphasised the role of the market and "business confidence" in generating private sector investment as the engine of economic growth and not the state.

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d) The 2007 radical Polokwane policies had to be postponed because of the western capitalist crisis and liberal economic policies which had negatively affected the South African workers in 2008 and 2009.

e) The general neo liberal argument is that we need economic growth first whilst we have argued for growth through redistribution and development.

f) Redistribution must be the fundamental goal of economic policy, and as an instrument for generating economic growth. Collective bargaining, Land reform and state led investment in the economy are critical elements of redistribution including through using the state’s power to impose taxation on the rich.

Progress Made

We note the progress that the ANC has made in implementing policy which include:

a) National Minimum Wage of R20 per hour.

b) Labour relations amendment laws have improves the job security of millions of workers including restricting labour broking contracts with placed workers to 3 months.

c) Black industrialist programme.

d) Local procurement and local content regulations.

e) Addressing job insecurity among vulnerable workers.

f) The attempt to restructure the treasury in order to align it with out radical second phase of our transition.

g) Amendments to the Competition Act to address high levels of monopolisation in the economy.

h) Pilot projects on the NHI

i) Land reform particularly commitment to amend the constitution to provide for expropriation without compensation.

j) Free basic and tertiary education

k) The release of the discussion document on comprehensive social security

However what remains clear is that at the heart of the weaknesses in the implementation of progressive policies by the movement is the demobilisation of the working class

4.2. Assessment of the 2014 and 2016 ANC Manifestos

There are mixed results on how and the extent to which the priorities have been implemented.

4.2.1. Building a Developmental State

• The previous administration has derailed the development state agenda.

• The national development plan (NDP) is a neo liberal document which will not be able to pursue a developmental state mandate and deliver the majority from poverty and unemployment and wealth and income inequalities.

• The state has been weakened through increased outsourcing.

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4.2.2. Decent jobs

• The ANC government has failed to ensure that workers at municipal and provincial level are in sourced, totally defeating the decent work agenda. Promises to in sources workers have not been implemented.

• The campaign against the total ban of labour broking has yet to be realised. An attempt was made to ban labour brokers. This bill was withdrawn and this resulted in regulation of labour brokers and not banning.

• Job losses continue to paralyse the economy with employers abusing section 189 of the labour relations act to roll out mass mechanisation and automation retrenchments. In order to increase their profits.

4.2.3. Health and safety

• Workers continue to work under hazardous conditions. The recent deaths in the mining sector are a cause for concern.

• Health and safety is a challenge across all sectors from mining, manufacturing and even health care.

• The compensation claiming process is cumbersome, very long and most workers are denied their right to compensation.

4.2.4. Health and Comprehensive Social security

• The policy on the NHI and the establishment of the NHI fund bring us a step closer to the realisation of Universal Health Care.

• However provincial health remains in a state of collapse as reported by the health ombudsman.

• The benefits of a free universal quality health care are not reaching the poor. The Life Esidimeni bloodbath which is evidence of lack care in the health system is a case in point which shows that private and whether for profit or not profit cannot deliver public services.

• The system of comprehensive social security that will ensure that informal sector workers receive social security benefits remains to be realised.

4.2.5. Public transport

• Public transport remains unreliable, costly and unsafe for the poor and working class. Public transport networks and infrastructure for the working class remain under resourced and poor.

• There should be free public transportation for the poor and the working class.

• Road carnages remain a serious problem on the country’s highways due to the slow implementation of the road to rail policy.

• The integration of public transport has yet to be achieved and

• E-tolls are yet to be scrapped

4.2.6. Crime and Corruption

• Crime continues to increase

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• National intelligence has declined

• NPA leadership is deeply compromised

• SAPS personnel need to be deployed from administrative positions to visible policing in communities, detective and intelligence work

4.2.7. Energy

• The introduction of renewable energy IPP’s poses a threat to jobs and sustainability of Eskom and it amounts to privatisation and privatisation means the death of trade unions in the form of short time, retrenchments, low wages, little or absence of collective bargaining, corruption, state capture and enrichment of an elite in the governing party and in the business sector.

• The signing of the IPP contracts has been done without adequate consultation with stakeholders.

• It is not clear whether the renewable energy products have been manufactured locally.

• Liberalising the energy sector will increase prices of electricity and will increase prices across all sectors in the economy and employers will use tariff increases as excuse to retrench workers.

4.3. Priorities for the 2019 manifesto

4.3.1. Decent jobs

Total banning of labour brokers. Reduce the 3 months labour broking contract to zero months.

Total banning of outsourcing. Legislate in sourcing of jobs by both the private companies and the government.

Amend s197 to prohibit outsourcing Strengthen the right to strike by prohibiting the use of scab labour in response to

strikes. Amend section 76 to prohibit the supply of scab labour by labour brokers. Amend s189 to prevent retrenchments based on profits and technology. Increase severance packages to 6 weeks without conditions and to be payable

upon all types of termination of work. Impose procurement targets of 75% in respect of the volume and value of all

contracts by the private sector and the state must procure 100% of its goods and services from local producers.

Convert and in source EPWP/CWP into full time municipal jobs. Amend the competition act to prohibit mergers that result in job losses and

takeover of South Africa companies by foreign companies. Limit the repatriation of profits by foreign companies to three years. Impose a tax on export of capital. Introduce a dual mandate inflation and employment on the SARB and amend the

constitution to take away the independence of the SARB. Implement a state bank to give free interest loans to job creating projects in the

townships and for women and co-operatives.

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Implement a 100% owned and controlled state construction company in order to create skills for graduates in TVET colleges.

Implement a 100% owned and controlled state property company that must manage and maintain and lease state properties for the state. The state must not lease property from the private sector.

At least 50% of all private retirement funds must invest be invested in job creating projects and in SOE’s.

4.3.2. Comprehensive social security

Social wage(Affordable housing, Universal Health Coverage, Free quality education, affordable transport, affordable access to energy and water)

Expand and increase the Free basic electricity to a minimum of 350 kw/h for those earning low wages and the poor.

Introduce a basic income grant for adults between ages 18 and 60. This can be financed through higher taxes on the rich and on natural resources.

4.3.3. Anti-Privatisation

COSATU rejects privatisation in state owned enterprises including through selling minority shares to private individuals. The PIC must not be used to finance selling off of state companies.

Reverse all forms of privatisation including public private partnerships and terminate all renewable independent power producers.

Privatisation has resulted in loss of jobs and increase in prices of goods and services.

4.3.4. Safe, reliable and affordable Public transport

Scrapping of E-tolls, integration of public transport, implementation of road to rail policy.

Free transport for the poor and working class.

4.3.5. On VAT

The increase on VAT should be countered by progressive taxation which will be used be used ease the financial burden on the poor.

Introduce a special rebate for the poor and those earning low wages in respect of transport, accommodation and food expenses.

Increase corporate income tax to 50% and make hidden tax subsidies conditional on creation of decent jobs.

Increase estate duty to 50% and remove all exceptions and exemptions. Introduce an 50% inheritance tax on estate worth than R 1.5 million.

U Demand

4.3.6. Crime and Corruption

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• Zero tolerance towards private and public sector corruption• Human and financial resources must be increased in security and policing. • Regulate and criminalise professional crime by auditors and lawyers.• Criminalise tax havens. • State control on imports and exports to prevent illicit financial flows. • Prohibit the use of private security companies in national key points.

4.3.7. On Health and safety issues

• Universal health coverage and the full implementation of the NHI. State driven NHI than market driven.

• Abolish the licensing of private hospitals. • Ensure strict compliance to the Health and safety Act by employers. • Overhaul health and safety laws including compensation institutions that ensure

protection workers rights. • Implement a moratorium on licensing of private health care facilities. • Implement a true state pharmaceutical companies.

4.3.8. Non trading holidays

• Amend the Public Holidays Act to provide for non-trading holidays on workers 'day, human rights day and elections day. Employers must not be allowed to open their businesses on these days.

4.3.9. On Free and quality education for all

• Decrease the Teacher/learner ratio and remove pit toilets in all schools• Scrap interests on student loans. • Guarantee jobs for TVET students.

4.3.10. Land

• Secure and guaranteed land tenure for all farm workers and farm dwellers through expropriation of land without compensation & state subsidies.

• Introduce state trading to guarantee prices and markets to small and emerging farmers.

• Prohibit the sale of state land. State land must only be leased. • Convert all foreign freehold titles to leasehold of 10 years renewable leases with

retrospective effect. • Enact a land redistribution law that must caps on ownership of farms and prime

land.

4.3.11. Economy

• Review and replace the neoliberal basis of the NDP with a developmental basis. • Increase the level of state participation in the production of goods and services.

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• Implement a sovereign wealth fund in order to close the budget deficit and to increase social security spending on the poor and working class though special levies on imports of luxury goods, on JSE companies, on the mines and the financial sector assets.

• Nationalise the SARB shares without compensation. • Implement a developmental state which is free from business interests. • Increase the role of SOE’s in the economy.

4.4. Alliance election campaign

• Election structures of COSATU must be established in order to effectively participate in the election processes.

• Election day should be a non-trading public holiday.

• Workers issues must find expression in the thuma mina document.

• COSATU must prioritise participation in the following structures and task teams at National, Provincial and Local levels:

• National Election Teams (NET, PET)

• Mobilization and Training task team

• Sectoral Engagement team

• Media and Communication task team

• Manifesto team

• COSATU must develop a message relevant to the workers

• Red Fridays must be incorporated in the mobilisation strategy, particularly in the industrial and farming areas.

• COSATU must find a way to mobilize financial and human resources in order to ensure that all workers are registered.

• There must be special focus in KZN, Western Cape, NW, EC, Gauteng provinces.

• We should devise strategies to monitor the progress in each province on issues that have a negative impact on elections, such as:

Demarcation processes.

Ethnicity and tribalism.

• pact on elections, such as:

Demarcation processes.

Ethnicity and tribalism.

4.5. COSATU International Inputs to the ANC Manifesto

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4.5.1. SADC as our Priority region for the building of democracy, regional integration and industrial development to improve the quality of life, create jobs and ensure dignity of the people. This includes actively promoting solidarity, supporting people’s initiatives and building a culture of participatory public policy making and capacity of the state to drive inclusive development.

4.5.2. Africa Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA) – the ANC must properly discuss the meaning and implications of the ACFTA to workers and the whole continental development agenda. In this regard, we propose a Public Outreach programme, as a matter of urgency, to evaluate what it means and how does it enhance or contribute to the much needed development of the people of our continent. It must be guided by certain basic principles;

4.5.3. It must be developmental and based on the urgency of industrialisation, job-creation and infrastructural investment in the African people and sustainable development;

4.5.4. It must integrate the economies, people and resources of the continent and not allow further fragmentation based on either external or internal elites narrow and self-serving interests, to bring together and unite Africa.

4.5.5. It must protect local producers and industries and develop local content and capacity to source, develop and export by our own economies. In this regard, it must build the productive capacity of Africa

4.5.6. Regarding specific country cases;

a) Swaziland – Develop a Comprehensive Solidarity Programme to strengthen organisations, mobilise resources and raise profile of the Swazi struggle. In this regard, Special focus on supporting the research work done on the Royal land grabs as case study and strengthen it, towards an active, sustainable movement throughout the SADC region and internationally. Finally, an audit of South Africans’ financial and economic interests involved in propping up the Mswati regime, including the role of SACU.

b) Palestine – Concrete Update on the COSATU Comprehensive BDS Programme and identify specific and targeted priority action areas, given the latest developments, including the US-Israeli arrogant appropriation of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital against international law and human rights.

c) Venezuela – A concrete assessment based on the latest developments regarding the Venezuelan peoples struggle against imperialism and how these are linked to the broader Latin American developments and the global working class struggle to fight imperialism and defend working class alternatives against capitalism

d) Zimbabwe – Concrete assessment of the developments and the extent to which they address the aspirations of the working class and people of Zimbabwe. In this regard, what is the actual meaning of the on-coming elections and concrete way forward for a regional solidarity movement with the people of Zimbabwe.

e) Cuba – Following the US intensification of aggression against the people of Cuba, as COSATU, we must develop a Special angle to bring back to the centre of focus, the struggle to defend the sovereign right to self-determination and human dignity that the Cuban revolution represent. Further, need for a Special exchange Programme for Cadre development and experiential learning for our leaders on

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such matters as health, dignity and education for the poor and society as a whole, with minimal resources.

f) Western Sahara – Concrete possibility of a BDS format against Morocco, guided by the people of Western Sahara and their premier liberation movement, POLISARIO/UGTSARIO, basing ourselves on the need to build a broader continental detachment, united in support of the Saharawi people and their right to self-determination, freedom from colonialism and human dignity.

Discussion Papers

5. An inescapable need for a reconfigured Alliance An inescapable need for a reconfigured Alliance

4th Draft

An inescapable need for a reconfigured Alliance

“The Alliance must truly become the vehicle and political centre under the ANC leadership. To that end it must drive policy formulation and implementation; direct deployment and hold cadres accountable; and mobilise our people as their own liberators. The alliance machinery must be reinforced to ensure that it discharges this responsibility and a Protocol governing alliance relations must be developed. In addition, an Alliance Pact or Programme for transformation should be developed to reach agreement on policies required for achieving the goals of social transformation, employment creation and eradication of poverty”- COSATU 4th Central Committee Declaration.

5.1. Introduction

The Alliance is a complex relationship between the ANC, COSATU and the SACP and it is a mutual relationship shaped by deep historical links and common struggles, but is not without its tensions and contradictions. These tensions and contradictions have also emerged within the context of a diminished strength of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM).

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The Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) was the organised expression of the popular bloc as led by the ANC during the 1980s. These mass organisations have declined, with some collapsing and others no longer as politically active as they were. One of the reasons for this has been the shift of their leadership into other political positions, deployment to the state institutions including into government and others have gone to business. This has been a phenomenon which has seen class transition and the consequent change in the consciousness of many cadres whose ideological perspective have organically emerged and shaped by their working class background.

These tensions and contradictions have also emerged in the context characterised by the shift away from grass-roots activity in the Alliance, the widening gap between the ANC and those of its leadership in government, the continued side-lining and the consequent declining influence of the Alliance in relation to policy-making, the intensification of a culture of self-enrichment and display of opulence. In totality these have represented a shift away from the politics of mass driven struggles for transformation upon which the alliance organically emerged.

The change in political conditions and lack of direction from the Alliance is the main reason for the decline in the MDM as we knew it and in the process similar new organisations emerged outside the fold of the congress movement. The role of mass formations is no longer as clear as it was and leadership is not being given around this issue. The Alliance has not been able to take up the responsibility to meet with the civics, as well as other mass formations, which formed the core of the MDM, to discuss how to move forward under new conditions.

Where such meetings have taken place it has been un-strategic meetings coordinated by individual alliance partners (as COSATU did in 2010, convening the civil society conference and excluded other alliance partners) and has in itself deepened the tensions and contradictions within the alliance rather than strengthening the alliance. Both the ANC and the SACP individually have also on different occasions convened some of the social movements and flirted with the idea of building new alliances outside the strategic Alliance discussion as was seen in the SACP 2013 National Congress and with the ANC’s working with other federation and unions outside the congress movement without that flowing from a strategic discussions in the alliance.

These un-strategic activities have proceeded based on a correct but problematic and un-strategic understanding that there are a number of formations other than the COSATU led progressive labour movement which are organised and capable of mobilising. In addition to a wide range of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) , the civics are still functioning in some areas but remain weak , the students movement is still existing but have been weakened by the its own internal challenges but also by a cross pollination of problems from the alliance in particular from the ANC , the churches still have massive constituencies but their relationship with the movement is no longer as coherent as it was pre 1994 and their agenda remains contested by various forces in society. The cultural and collective economic organisations, such as stokvels and burial societies, have also flourished and remain disconnected from being directly influenced by the alliance except on occasions where some of them work with the SACP in the financial sector campaign.

The challenge to COSATU and the Alliance is to play a key role in mobilising these forces, rebuilding organisations and helping to give direction to the Mass Democratic Movement.

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The role of the ANC as government has added to the natural class and organisational tensions within the ANC and between the ANC, COSATU and the SACP. Managing these tensions is made more difficult when policies are adopted without proper or adequate consultation. The politics of opposition, resistance and struggle made it easier to create a common platform between Alliance partners than current circumstances do. This raises the question of how the Alliance manages the natural differences that will emerge when the ANC has to exercise its role as government and how to ensure this is done broadly within a framework which is acceptable to all parties.

These tensions are also made difficult by the failure of the Alliance to meet regularly, if at all, by the unilateral way of deciding policy in some instances, and by the lack of joint campaigns and activities.

The complexity of the Alliance makes it difficult to evaluate it as a whole. For an example COSATU may have a powerful impact in one place, and be ignored in another. However, it is quite clear that in general the Alliance is not working.

In most cases Alliance structures do not meet, and when they do meet it is formalistic. There is little or no joint formulation of policy or strategy.

The Alliance partners are not operating as partners: they do not, in general, confront common problems together and work out joint solutions. This is the case at national level (Cabinet, the executives), at sectoral level (health, education or transport ministries, for example) and provincial and local levels.

All this is also happening in the context of sharpened contestations regarding the direction and content of transition. This contest is between the neo liberal forces inside and outside the movement and the pro working class proponents also inside and outside the movement. This very configuration imposes its own challenges in shaping the strategies and tactics to strengthen the Alliance and it is a matter which cannot be treated lightly.

The most recent experiences on the debate regarding the policy of land expropriation without compensation and on the nationalisation of the reserve bank attest to the lack of a coherent tactical response from the movement in cases where there is an intersection and diversion of interest by forces inside and outside the movement. The most worrying observation has been lack of urgency to have the alliance develop a common perspective on these strategic questions of the National Democratic Revolution. In the process the alliance formations have been reduced to being just another NGO who is subjected to respond from the periphery and it has been clear that the neo liberal forces have been elevated to the privileged position to assert their ideological influence on the content and direction of the NDR.

This reality was best captured by the 2015 Alliance Summit which observed a growing social distance between leadership and our mass constituency, including

a) A disconnect between the focus of branch activities and the social and economic realities of communities

b) Crass displays of wealth and arrogance.

The Summit further argued that these problems reinforce and are connected to the deliberate manipulation and subversion of internal democratic processes through the manipulation of membership through gatekeeping and the use of money to advance

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individual ambitions and factions based on patronage and nepotism. This behaviour is also the entry-point for state and corporate capture and private business interests outside of our formations to undermine organisational processes.

The Summit resolved that these deviations must be dealt with firmly and without fear or favour. Those guilty of funding factions and those guilty of accepting money for these purposes must be exposed.

a) Internal disciplinary processes must be pursued speedily and consistently b) Where money intended for our organisations is diverted into private pockets, civil

and criminal cases must be preferredc) Those found guilty in court must be placed on the Registry of National Treasury

which makes them ineligible for being awarded public tenders.

The Summit was clear that leadership of society must be earned through exemplary conduct and adhering to revolutionary morality.

The Summit agreed that each alliance partner, having identified the challenges, will work out its specific responsibilities and that these will be reported to the Political Council. The Political Council will monitor implementation and execution of responsibilities.

The alliance directed that the initiatives from this Summit be taken forward in a series of national alliance-led provincial and regional meetings with organisational structures.

All these challenges were never addressed up to this day with the rampant incidences of patronage, mismanagement and corruption being normalized within the social and moral fibre of the movement, instead Alliance political Council providing much needed leadership the meetings were stopped from being convened.

Secondly the ANC’s indecision to use access to state power to drive progressive policy which decisively transfers economic power to the working class and the poor has exposed complexity in the chain of policy-making; the link between policy formulation and implementation is not straightforward.  It is not obvious that consensus policy positions that emerge from Alliance deliberations find expression in ANC policy directives, and neither is it obvious that ANC policy directives will find expression in government policy, and neither is it obvious that government policy will be implemented by the state bureaucracy.  Furthermore complications arise because in each of the links in the policy-making chain, there are various layers through which power shifts.

In the process the working class gets managed through unending internal engagements, whilst reactionary policies continue to be imposed by the state. It was in this context that both COSATU and the SACP had adopted a more combative approach and to sharpen the contradictions on matters of the alliance as could be seen in the outcomes of bilateral meeting between the SACP and the COSATU, including the outcomes of the subsequent alliance political council. It is now clear that without COSATU, the SACP and progressive sections inside the ANC standing up to confront issues, the NDR will remain moribund.

5.2. COSATU’s understanding regarding a reconfigured Alliance

Our starting point is that “the Alliance must truly become the vehicle and political centre under the ANC leadership. To that end it must drive policy formulation and implementation; direct deployment and hold cadres accountable; and mobilise our people as their own liberators. The alliance machinery must be reinforced to ensure that it discharges this responsibility and a Protocol governing alliance relations must be

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developed. In addition, an Alliance Pact or Alliance Programme for transformation should be developed to reach agreement on policies required for achieving the goals of social transformation, employment creation and eradication of poverty”- COSATU 4th Central Committee Declaration.

The Alliance remains the most powerful vehicle to advance the NDR. Its role needs to be clearly articulated because in our view, it represents the most concentrated expression of the unity of the disparate motive forces of our revolution. There is no debate that the ANC should play a leading role in the Alliance.

However, the question is how the ANC derives this leadership and how it exercises it. One thing that any revolutionary will not contest is that being a leader of a revolution is not something that is divinely ordained, but it is something that is consistently cultivated in the field of struggle.

The leadership role of the ANC derives from the tasks of the NDR, which are in essence, to destroy the power of monopoly capitalism and imperialism in our country and not to destroy capitalism in general. In that sense the class character of the ANC makes it the best organisation through which the motive forces of the revolution can be brought together. In fact the ANC is itself an embodiment of the revolutionary class alliance. Precisely because of this, the ANC occupies a leading role in the Alliance.

But then, among the motive forces, the working class is the primary and leading motive force. To us, the working class leads in all aspects of the revolution, including the ideological orientation of the entire movement. This is important, because as a multi-class organisation, the ANC has to articulate the national-democratic aspirations of the majority of the people as expressed by that class which stands in opposition to monopoly capital in the relations of production. If the ANC pre-dominantly expresses the national-democratic aspirations of any other class, it will fail to completely destroy Colonialism of a Special Type. Consequently it will gradually lose the leadership position it occupies in the struggle for national liberation. China is a perfect example of where a national liberation movement lost leadership of the NDR. Consequently it fell upon the Chinese Communist Party to advance the NDR and to effect socialist transformation. Vietnam is another instance where a Marxist-Leninist Worker’s Party led a successful NDR.

These examples demonstrate the importance of revolutionary ideology in the national liberation movement, and how a national liberation movement can lose its leadership position once it begins to subsume the national-democratic aspirations of the working class under those of other classes.

The Alliance must not be reduced into election machinery. COSATU has long argued that its usefulness and activities must not be limited to delivering and working together only during elections, while being excluded from governance. To that end, it must exercise effective oversight and collectively define a deployment strategy.

5.3. An inescapable need for a reconfigured Alliance

Given all the developments since 1994, one thing is certain and it is the fact that the process of having the Alliance reconfigured will happen with or without the views by either COSATU or the SACP, the existing objective conditions will ultimately compel the reconfiguration process even if may be called by other name.

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In the post 1994 period many organisations have been borne out of the ANC that bear the policies of the ANC and continue to advance the mission of the ANC. A similar phenomenon has existed within the SACP where many new organisations have been formed out of the party and stood in opposition to the SACP whilst also still advancing the struggle for Socialism who has not discarded the Marxist and Marxist teachings. Many trade unions have been established outside COSATU but have continued to advance almost all the COSATU’s founding principles and agenda.

Over time these organisations have not ceased to exit instead they have grown leaps and bound and are in contest with the ANC led movement, but as the contradiction of imperialism deepens there is a realisation by all these formations that the fight against imperialism and the struggle for complete freedom requires a united national front with an international expression. It is in this context that the reconfiguration of the alliance needs to be understood as a process that must organically arise out of the material conditions and not simply based on our subjective wishes. Of course some tactical consideration must be made which on amongst others must be based on the extent of proximity between these newly formed organisations and the capitalists, imperialists and the right wing agenda. Or put differently the tactical consideration must consider the extent to which they are willing to pursue the NDR to its logical conclusion.

5.4. Is it for the first time that the Alliance will be reconfigured?

There remains a problem of divergent conceptualisations of the Alliance, which the Ekurhuleni Summit did not resolve. It seems that two schools of thought exist on this subject in the ANC. Some argue that the ANC must be the political centre, although they also call for a stronger Alliance. In this case, however, there does not seem much purpose to the Alliance outside the elections.

A second school of thought believes that the Alliance as a whole should drive transformation, with tighter coordination of Alliance programmes. While this grouping may also not be comfortable with the use of the term “political centre,” its approach largely resembles the COSATU position. We must avoid polemics that would not help conclude this discussion.

When going through the history of the liberation movement and the alliance in particular it is clear that the reconfiguration of the Alliance would not be for the first time in the history of the movement and our struggle. The Alliance was formed in the heavy furnace of struggle and continued to be reconfigured to suit various conditions and objectives to be pursued at various stages of the struggle. This is captured in the following historical phases:

1920’s : Following the resolutions of the 1920 second congress of the Communist international on the National and Colonial question and later 1928 Comintern on the SACP intensified its work with and within the ANC. This resolution also included trade union work which was also to be undertaken by the party. This work later developed into an alliance mainly between the ANC and the SACP.

1940’s: In 1943 the ANC adopted the African Claims ( a precursor to the Freedom Charter ) in which the trade union movement represented by comrade G. Makabeni from the Council of Non -European Trade Unions CNETU and comrade Moses Kotane from the SACP including representatives from trade unions participated. This representativity was reflective of the genesis of alliance work which clearly included the

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trade union movement in the development of strategic policies but it was not a mass based and mass driven activity like the development of a Freedom Charter later in 1955

In 1947 the Three Doctors Pact (Dr. A. B. Xuma who was the president of the ANC; Dr. G. M. Naicker who was the President of the Natal Indian Congress and Dr. Y. M. Dadoo who was the president of the Transvaal Indian Congress) was signed expressing cooperation between the Non-European peoples and other democratic forces for the attainment of basic human rights and full citizenship for all sections of the South African people.

1950’s : Following the successful campaign dating back from the 1949 programme of action leading to the 1952 launch of the defiance campaign , a nation-wide movement was launched to convene a 'Congress of the People' bringing together South Africans of all races to put forward their demands for a free South Africa. At its Inaugural Conference SACTU had welcomed the COP and endorsed the submission of workers' demands for inclusion in the Freedom Charter.

The ANC formed an alliance with the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), SACPO, SACOD and SACTU to prepare for the most representative assembly which was to be held in 1955. This was the period of the Congress Alliance and this is the alliance which brought about the Freedom Charter.

1960’s: In 1961 when the Congress Movement called a strike against government which had proclaimed a republic, the success of that strike was reliant on SACTU mobilizing its members for a stay away. As Bunting noted later "wherever workers were organised into trade unions there was a favourable response to the strike call."

This period included the Launching of MK in which many trade unionists such as Vuyisile Mini participated in MK and many of them were part of the Treason trail. These included Lawrence Nkosi, Billy Nair, Lesley Masina, Harry Gwala, Curnick Ndlovu and many others.

In the Rivonia Treason Trial again most of those arrested as part of the MK high command were trade unionists. These included comrade Raymond Mhlaba, Elias Motsoaledi and many others.

In 1961 when the Congress Movement called a strike against government which had proclaimed a republic, the success of that strike was reliant on SACTU mobilizing its members for a stay away. As Bunting noted later "wherever workers were organised into trade unions there was a favourable response to the strike call."

The exile years: After the banning of the ANC many of its leaders including the leadership of the trade union movement were jailed or went underground and or to exile . During this period the SAIC and the CPC virtually disappeared and under these conditions, the Congress alliance was mainly constituted by the ANC, SACTU and the SACP.

A Revolutionary Council, with representatives from other Congress alliance partners - including Dadoo (as the vice-chair) and Slovo - was established for the co-ordination of the struggle inside the country. This was a period in which the alliance led the struggle based on the four pillars which included international isolation of the enemy; underground work; armed struggle and mass mobilisation. In each of these pillars the trade union movement, particularly SACTU leaders, COSATU’s predecessor played a critical working with both the ANC and the SACP. For an example amongst the members of the Luthuli Detachment some of whom participated in the Wankie Spolilo operation

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which was the first MK group to have physical combat with the enemy were trade unionist such as comrade Eric Mtshali, Justice "Gizenga" Mpanza, Archie Sibeko, Mark Shope etc. and they were amongst the first to receive military training in the Soviet Union.

It is during this period that one of the historic documents “strategy and Tactics” document was adopted in the historic Morogoro Conference.

1980’s: This was a period which saw the revival of ANC coordinated mass work which saw heightened students, community and worker struggles inside the country which were coordinated by a close working relationship between the United Democratic Front and COSATU which carried the flags of both the banned ANC and the SACP. It is during this period in which the people’s war against apartheid was heightened. The Alliance of the UDF and COSATU became a bulwark for mass mobilisation which saw COSATU and UDF leading one of the biggest strikes in 1986/6 which added the final nail in the coffin of Apartheid regime.

The Post 1994 period: Even in this period, the alliance was reconfigured following the decision to dissolve SACTU and UDF structures, the Alliance was mainly constituted by the ANC, SACP and COSATU and later the civic movement under the auspices of SANCO was brought into the fold. During this period the alliance led many struggles which included the introduction of a new Labour Relations Act, The Reconstruction and Development Programme, New Constitution etc.

The period post the RDP and adoption of the RDP has been characterised by a reality of a movement in political office but in charge of government without that in any way altering the fact that political power remains in the hands of the capitalist class. The movement has remained in charge of r the capitalist state and have introduced ameliorative reforms including imposing certain controls on the activities of the capitalists but that has not tampered with the central sphere of capitalist political power. This has remained the central area of difference in the alliance. As this document is being prepared the movement as a whole has taken a decision to advance a second more a more radical phase of our transition characterised by radical socio economic transformation. It is still to be seen in practice whether the alliance will be central in driving this programme.

All this shows that the alliance has always evolved informed by the material conditions within which the struggle had to be waged. It is therefore important to consider the fact that the Alliance can no longer continue to function as if it was pre 1994 and not consider the fact that the struggle is today proceeding under the terrain of electoral politics in which the ANC is in charge of state power.

The existence of the alliance is determined by the material conditions of struggle rather than the rapport between leaders. The current material reality within which the NDR is being pursued dictates that the Alliance should be where the motive forces are, leading from the front. Its role needs to be clearly articulated with regard to the relationship between state power and mass power. In our view, the Alliance represents the most concentrated expression of the unity of the motive forces of our revolution.

COSATU’s firm view is that the Alliance should be positioned as a strategic centre of power and the ANC should remain the leader of that strategic centre. Any other formulation is bound to present the Alliance as part of an “entourage” that simply

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accompanies the ANC in the struggle. The Alliance is bound to be presented as “peripheral”, while the ANC takes the centre-stage in every aspect. We therefore propose that the Alliance be positioned as a strategic centre of all aspects of the struggle and that the ANC must exercise leadership in that context.

5.5. Rebuilding a Popular movement for Transformation as part of the process toward the reconfiguration of the Alliance

Given the reconfiguration which has taken place in the liberation movement there is a need to ensure that the Alliance is reconfigured through Building a Popular movement from the ground.

Building a popular movement for transformation (PMT) is a critical component of a coherent alliance. Such a movement must be built around issues to win social support for the perspectives and struggles of working people and the poor. New forms of organising will have to be found, to address the changing conditions. These should be built around two central themes:

overcoming poverty and inequality; and

Strengthening democracy.

A campaign against poverty and inequality could be organised by five key sectors of civil society: the trade union movement, the NGO movement, the community constituency at NEDLAC, the churches and religious organisations and progressive intellectuals. Each of these sectors has strengths and weaknesses but such a campaign could be an important catalyst for transformation. This would not be a campaign against government, but against the ravages of apartheid and minority privilege, and for a transformation programme to redress these imbalances. Government would be supported where it is working to deal with poverty and inequality and pressurised to do so where it is failing.

A campaign to strengthen democracy would involve struggling to strengthen existing democratic institutions, to access information and resources for organisations, networking amongst interest groups and, where necessary, utilising avenues opened up by the constitution to challenge those in power to extend basic democratic and socio-economic rights.

Building such a movement must be anchored on what the COSATU 9th Congress conceptualised as a United Front for Jobs and Poverty Campaign Forum, consisting of COSATU, affiliates and our allies and supporters of the campaign, community organisations, NGOs, SACP etc. that will meet regularly and co-ordinate the campaign. These must also be guided by the COSATU’s Eighth National Congress Resolution on work with social movements. The criteria should include the following amongst others:

a) Whether the issue being taken up is genuine and affecting the working class and the poor.

b) Whether the campaign and working together strengthens the working class, the labour movement and the broad democratic movement.

c) Whether the organisations that the Federation wants to work with are mass-based or have an orientation to the masses.

d) The organisations adhere to the principles of internal democracy and working class leadership.

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e) Whether the agenda of these organisations does not aim to liquidate or undermine the Alliance partners.

f) Whether the organisation has a track record of disciplined organisational practice, and does not foster divisions within COSATU affiliates.

They must remain tactical in nature and must not seek to replace the strategic alliance with the ANC and the SACP or seek to create an anti-ANC block instead must seek to consolidate the Alliance and the ANC.

The campaign should be built from the bottom-up and not driven only as a high-profile media campaign by a few leaders. To this extent industrial and community locals have to be resuscitated and resourced. Attention should be focussed on weaker affiliates to ensure strengthening of COSATU in the provinces and meaningful participation of all workers in the campaign. A concerted attempt within affiliates and by the Federation should be made to organise the unemployed, informal and casual workers. This should be co-ordinated by the Alliance Political Council.

5.6. Strategic Elements of a reconfigured Alliance

A reconfigured alliance must include the following elements:

a) Measures to ensure representivity and integrity of the new leadership collective, at national provincial and local levels, and to combat social distance.

b) Legislation to govern conflicts of interest in the state and the movement; policy to prevent those convicted of certain types of offenses from holding certain leadership positions; as well as a package of interventions to combat corruption.

c) Interventions to advance a radical economic shift, including specific commitments to align macro-economic policies, an all institutions of state, to the agenda of promoting decent work, and interventions to dramatically scale up the state`s role in strategic sectors of the economy.

d) A commitment that appointments to strategic positions will be reviewed to effect these changes in strategic Ministries, including Treasury, the SA Reserve Bank, and key SOEs and DFI`s, and that their mandates be changed accordingly. A more focused mandate should also be given to the National Planning Commission to realign the planning process to reflect this radical shift.

e) Implementing proposals to promote a more effective, coordinated developmental state, including the Alliance agreed proposal to implement a Council of State.

f) A coherent labour market, wages and incomes policy, including a legislated national minimum wage, linked to a minimum living level, and comprehensive collective bargaining; and social protection measures.

g) Special intervention programmes to address crisis situations, in public health and education, and other identified areas of service delivery.

h) Agreement on a protocol on the Alliance and Governance to ensure effective implementation of ANC and Alliance policies, and co-ordination with the work of government.

i) Related to the above, an Alliance mechanism to receive reports, monitor and ensure implementation of identified strategic or priority Alliance decisions which seek to contribute to this radical shift. E.g. Resolutions on state ownership in key sectors of economy, and transformation of the mining sector, and, various

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Polokwane and Manifesto undertakings on the economy, corruption and state transformation etc.

There is an urgency of building capacity to implement policy directives. Alliance Summits, Polokwane, the Manifestos, State of the Nation Addresses, ANC Conferences (including the NGC and recent Policy Conference and the 54th National Conference) contain many positive and progressive announcements on what will be done, yet the sorry track record of non-implementation, has led to the disillusionment referred to in this report.

One of the main reasons for this state of affairs is the organisational weakness we have referred to, as well as mediocrity, which is a by-product of slate politics and divisions. We need to take responsibility for our failure to implement, and take corrective measures.

This will require mobilisation of the working class, and broader society, around the urgency for such a comprehensive set of interventions.

5.7. How should a Reconfigured Alliance be structured?

The Alliance should be reconfigured to reflect the following:

a) It must assert itself as a leader and a source of solutions to the challenges facing society

b) To have its structures functioning coherently at all levels and to interface with each Alliance partner.

c) To have the Alliance bestowed with the authority of being the Political Centre, which can decide on matters of deployment, recall and the overall strategic direction of the NDR.

d) To have an annual Alliance Summit used as a mechanism for progress assessment and evaluation, accountability and to identify areas requiring support and intervention.

e) The Alliance Political Council will be responsible for monitoring implementation of the Alliance Programme of Mass Mobilisation. This will call for consistency in attending meetings by all leaders without exception and to implement all decisions with equal commitment.

f) The Alliance Secretariat shall be given the resources and authority to manage the operational processes of implementing the Alliance programme

g) To have the masses remaining a central feature that drives and informs its programmes. This will include a consistent programme to mobilise society behind its programme.

h) The alliances organisational development must keep pace with the developments of the 21st century, including being equal to the task of confronting the continuous devastating changing form of capitalism and imperialism.

i) The alliance must consciously develop its leaders and cadres to possess the required revolutionary skills to tackle the challenges imposed by the 4 th industrial revolution and imperialism.

j) The reconfiguration of the alliance must concurrently happen with the renewal process of each alliance partner, including the renewal of the youth, student and the women’s sections of the liberation movement.

In its operations the Alliance the Alliance must reflect the following

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a) The alliance political council should meet regularly and at the centre of its work should be to drive the National Democratic Revolution

b) The Alliance must find practical and visible organisational presence at the sub- national levels.

c) The Alliance Political Council should be part of deployment , accountability and recall of cadres in and from the state

d) The Alliance should be part of strategic policy formulation such as economic policy and it should be part of monitoring and evaluation of such policies and implementation. In this context we call for the establishment of the Alliance led policy Unit and the Alliance driven monitoring and evaluation which will reside in the ANC’s SGO

e) The alliance political council should regularly meet with strategic parliamentary structures such as parliamentary caucuses to give mandates and a line of march.

f) The constitutional powers of the president prerogatives must be understood beyond the narrow constitutional interpretation but to mean that such powers must be exercised through consultation with the Alliance Political Council .The results of those consultations must be based on consensus.

g) The Alliance should develop a policy development institute, which will play a central role to inform policy development in government. This would draw and tap from each partners already existing resources.

6. Preliminary Assessment of the ANC 2014 Manifesto

Assessment of the ANC 2014 Manifesto

6.1. Introduction

The ANC manifesto for the 2014 General Elections committed to five priorities which included (a) creation of more jobs, (b) decent work and sustainable livelihoods for inclusive growth, (c) Rural development, land reform and food security, (d) Education, (e) Health and Fighting crime and corruption.

There are mixed results on how and the extent to which the priorities have been implemented. Our observation is that the working class resolutions always get postponed because of the so called economic growth problem. The 2007 radical Polokwane policies had to be postponed because of the western capitalist crisis which had negatively affected the South African workers in 2008 and 2009. The general argument has been that we need to ensure growth before development whilst on the other side we argued for growth with development.

An attempt has been made to maintain objectivity which is not class neutral but which is based on data from various institutions and sources. This data confirm that whilst the ANC has adopted policies that favour the working class these policies have not been implemented or where they are implemented their implementation is frustrated by

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political and business interests among key leaders of the ANC across all three spheres of government.

It remains clear that at the heart of the weaknesses in the implementation of progressive policies by the movement is the demobilisation of the motive forces or the deflection of energy of the motive forces to palace politics rather that core issues of the revolution , the subsuming of the ANC under the dictates of the state bureaucracy, the undermining of the autonomy of the ANC as a ruling party to formulate state policy and monitor its implementation, and the tendency to elevate (untransformed) state power over mass power. The central feature of the elevation of the state over the movement has been to see mass-based activism against the deficiencies of the state as being counter-revolutionary, oppositional and thereby a) distancing the ANC from such activities, leading to a situation where a gap between the masses and the ANC develops and b) uncritical defence of the inherent horrible deficiencies of the inherited colonial and capitalist state, leading the masses to gradually lose confidence in the capacity of the ANC to drive transformation.

Where necessary we have provided our political interpretation based on the ANC 54 th

National Conference resolve to advance radical socio economic transformation and these are linked to recommendations which in our view must constitute the core of the 2019 manifesto. The structure is as follows: summary of the commitment as provided in the manifesto, observations and recommendation based on the observations.

6.2. Assessment of the 2014 and 2016 ANC Manifestos

6.2.1. Commitment – Building a Developmental State

Construction of a development state through building internal planning and coordination across the state for industrialisation and creation of decent jobs.

Observation

Policies and laws have been put in place but there is no political will. It appears that there is preference for fragmentation than central planning. This has distorted planning, co-ordination and enforcement of policies and laws in government. The Harvard group, the recently announced investment committee and many advisory committees have compromised policy coherence across government departments. Whilst it is the prerogative of the President of the country to source expertise from outside the movement a proliferation of advisory committees may end up usurping executive policy and has the potential to frustrate the mandate of the 54 th congress. For instance it is not clear how the economic cluster will relate to the investment committee and who is going to take responsibility when there is lack of implementation of the mandate to radically transform SA economic ownership and patterns.

The National Planning Commission was established to address among others lack of coordination in the planning and coordination of government policies. However, the NPC lacks a central planning mechanism and therefore, even if we were to assemble the most experienced government officials they would fails because they do not have a helicopter view of what is happening in the economy. Central planning must address among others who is producing what, where and whether the needs of the poor and the working class are being addressed. Unfortunately the NPC has not attempted to address

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this question. This is very important question as 70% of the economy is owned and controlled by the private sector.

The National Planning Commission has been turned into a research institute with experts and research papers outside the state.

The national development plan (NDP) is a neo liberal document which will not be able to pursue a developmental state mandate and deliver the majority from poverty and unemployment and wealth and income inequalities.

Recommendations:

a) Review the NDP and surgically remove its neo liberal basis root, stem and branch

The planning commission has outlived its purpose , the process must now commence to utilise the Department of planning , monitoring and evaluation in coordinating the process of building internal state planning capacity . In line with the literature on the developmental state, we propose that the state builds the following 4 key capacities :

a) Extractive Capacity:  The state must have capacity to extract social surplus, mobilize national resources, in order to fund social and economic development.  Extractive capacity includes, but is not limited to:

The mobilization of national saving for development

Quantitative regulation of credit allocation by the financial sector

A progressive tax and levy system

b) Redistributive Capacity:  In the extraction and use of national resources, the state must be redistributive, to deal systematically with the history of dispossession and the failures of neo-liberalism.  This can be achieved through:

Improved and expanded provision and access to basic goods and services to the working class and poor communities

Expanded and comprehensive social security Employment guarantee for all willing and able to work at a

statutory minimum wage, to expand public sector roll-out and maintenance of basic goods and services

Low interest rate policy that redistributes social surplus from financial rentiers and speculators, to industrialists in targeted sectors through Development Finance Institutions and the State Bank

Promote collective forms of ownership, small and medium enterprises through credit access, access to capital equipment and technology, markets and skills

Tax on financial transactions, to re-orient investment towards the productive sector.

c) Transformative Capacity:  Transformative capacity relates to the

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capacity of the state to change the industrial structure and lead the process of social transformation.  This includes:

Production and allocation of strategic inputs to targeted sectors at affordable prices, e.g. water, energy, steel, chemicals, fertilizers, capital equipment, etc.

Maximize direct and indirect labour-intensity and localization of public expenditure through setting clear targets for all state sector entities (SOE’s, Agencies and Departments)

Lead and support research and development of new technologies and products in order to meet basic needs and to improve the global competitiveness of the South African and the regional economy

Develop a clear national innovation system—linking state entities, education and training institutions, research institutions, civil society and the private sector.

Set up aggressive targets and punitive measures to promote social transformation—dealing with divisions and unequal access to resources and power as a result of continued apartheid networks in the economy and society

Remove the profit motive from the provision of basic goods and services, increase labour-intensity of state expenditure and support BEE in the productive private sector

d) Administrative Capacity:  The state must have a highly skilled technical cadre to drive the state apparatus and the economy as a whole. This will improve the efficiency, quality and pace of delivery of basic goods and services such as infrastructure, administration of justice, provision of social security, social amenities, etc.  Administrative capacity can be improved by :

Clear career-pathing in the state apparatus Aggressive human resource development of public servants across

all spheres of government, SOE’s and Agencies Closing the pay-gap between the private and public sectors through,

among others, the tax system and putting controls on private sector pay

Improving the education and training system, setting clear targets and punitive measures to higher education and other post-secondary education institutions

Increasing the role of strategic state institutions, especially SOE’s and Agencies, in improving access and shaping the content of education and training

Filling and creating new strategic posts in the state apparatus, informed by the new role of the state

Efficient and effective utilization of existing capacities, by constantly assessing areas of under-allocation and over-allocation of public resources, in line with changes in areas of emphasis in the state developmental programme

Set up punitive measures against corruption in both private and public sectors

The key levers of the developmental state will be the departments,

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state-owned enterprises, agencies and financial institutions.

Departments must:

a) Provide political oversight over agencies and entities under themb) Submit reports, detailing their performance in line with developmental

targetsc) Use budgets to support targeted sectors as identified in the Industrial

Policy Action Plan 2d) Co-ordinate activities of State-Owned Enterprises and Agencies and

direct them towards employment creation, delivery of basic goods and services, in line with their developmental mandates and targets.

e) Privatisation of the state through corporatisation, agencification and independent boards must be reviewed and reversed.

6.2.2. Commitments: Growing the Economy CONOMY and creating quality Jobs OBS

a) Promote local procurement in order to increase local production and jobs and buy local campaign.

b) State will progressively implement the target of buying at least 75% of its goods and services from SA and large state entities will be encouraged to source their infrastructure needs locally.

Observations

a) The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA) was enacted in 2000, and its Regulations promulgated in 2001. The Regulations were amended in 2011 and new regulations came into effect on 7 December 2011. Section 9: Local Production and Content. In terms of paragraph 9 (1) of the Regulations the dti is empowered to designate specific industries where tenders should prescribe that only locally manufactured products with a prescribed minimum threshold for local production and content will be considered. To give effect to government decisions on public procurement; sectors/products were and are being designated for local production and these include the following; Rail Rolling Stock 65%, Building & Construction Materials 14/15 Q1 2. Bus Bodies 80%, Canned/Processed Vegetables 80%, Textile, Clothing, Leather  Solar PV Components  Footwear Sector, Rail Signalling System, Solar Water Heaters (collectors and storage tanks/geysers) Set-top Boxes 30%, Certain Pharmaceutical Products, Furniture Products 85% Electrical and Telecom Cables 90%, Valves Products and Actuators 70%, Working Vessels , 0-100%, Residential Electricity Meters 50-70%, Steel Conveyance Pipes 80-100%, Powerline Hardware and Structures 100%.

b) According to the DTI the local content regulations Bids for all designated sectors/products must contain a specific bidding condition that only locally produced or locally manufactured goods, works and services with a stipulated minimum threshold for local production and content will be considered.

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c) According to the DTI[1] there has been local procurement in areas including passenger trains PRASA and Gibela Rail Transportation announced that the entities had achieved commercial close on the contract to supply the state agency with 7,224 new coaches at a projected cost of R123 billion over 20 years. o The tender is is estimated to create over 8000 direct jobs. o Transnet has awarded a total of R50bn in contracts to CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive, CNR Rolling Stock SA, Bombardier Transportation SA and General Electric SA for the building of 1,064 electric and diesel locomotives to be built in SA.  All the locomotives, except for the first 70, will be built in Transnet Engineering’s plants in Pretoria & Durban.

d) The problem is that most of these amount to assembling and not manufacturinge) Local companies are excluded by tender specification that favour foreign

companiesf) Where there is local procurement it is not accompanied by an increase in decent

jobs.g) The DTI does not have monitoring and enforcement capacity to check whether

all tenders comply with local content regulations.  h) The procurement rules apply to government yet 70% of the economy is

controlled and owned by the private sector. As a result private sector procurement is very minimal and sectors including mining sector have continued to buy goods and services from overseas supplies and have robbed SA of jobs and local production. The financial sector is buying its IT services from foreign overseas monopolies which will make it difficult for SA to train and capacitate its local IT industry, to create skills in this sector and to participate in the fourth industrial revolution.

i) It is not possible to create jobs and industrialize when government and private sector are continuing to buy their goods and services from outside SA.

Recommendations

a) The presidency ( DPME) should be tasked with coordination and implementation of industrial policy across all government spheres in order to ensure that no goods and services can be bought outside SA.

b) The WTO prohibits the differentiation between local and foreign goods. SA should campaign for the review of these rules.

c) Businesses should be required to buy local goods and services as a condition for licensing.

d) The state should directly participate in the production of goods and services in order to create jobs at a higher rate.

e) The 75% local procurement must be calculated based on volumes and value and must be a performance requirements for all managers in the public and private sectors.

f) However, for the state it must be 100% unless there is proof that local procurement is not possible and this proof must be provided under oath to the president of the country.

g) ICASA rules should be amended to provide for legal enforcement of the 90% local music on SA TV and Radio’s.

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6.2.3. Commitment on Securing industrial financing for productive sectors at low rates

Observation

a) The development finance institutions operate on the same basis as private banks. b) We do not have evidence that these institutions are using their financial capacity to

create new firms and jobs.

Recommendations

All development finance institutions should be merged in order to compete with private sector banks and must be required to use easier lending requirements especially for small and black companies.

Commitments: Strategic minerals to ensure security of supply to achieve industrialisation and local beneficiation and enhancing market share of the state owned mining company.

Observations

MPRDA has been amended to provide for this but there has no move to implement this law. The state mining company has remained on the margins of the mining sector both in terms of market share and number of jobs that it has created.

Recommendations

Among others Coal must be declared a strategic mineral which must be made available at cost to Eskom. The lack of regulation of coal prices has resulted in high coal expenses for Eskom, high interest on loans and high electricity prices for the poor and the working class.

6.2.4. Commitments: Increasing exports of manufactured and value added products.

Observations

a) Our exports are still dominated by raw and semi processed minerals and metals with exception major exports items in the automotive and catalytic converters.

b) Asian countries developed their industries by exporting labour intensive manufactured goods through import substitution industrialisation policies.

c) Our export oriented policies have failed and the recent imposition of tariffs by the US on steel and aluminium shows the limitation of our trade policies.

d) As a result our economy has remained a raw mineral based economy with a large proportion of economic players focusing on services such as food,

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accommodation, distribution, retail and finance and consultancies. Whilst these sectors have created jobs the quality of job is very bad because most jobs are characterised by short duration, low pay and little unionisation levels. Our macro and microeconomic policies have failed to promote the manufacturing sector.

Recommendations

a) SA must adopt tariff and other barriers to stop imports of food e.g chickens and other labour intensive products and must not sign further tariff reducing trade agreements that have the objective of increasing market share of imports and destroying local firms and jobs.

b) SA must impose high taxes on exports of mineral products in order to encourage local beneficiation and creation of jobs.

c) A commission of inquiry is urgently needed to determine the current protection that is available to local industries and to recommend new way to protect and rectify SA devastating WTO commitments to allow imports and neglect its industries and workers.

6.2.3. Commitments: Turn Africa into an industrialisation power and create large regional markets, address infrastructural needs of the continent.

Observations

a) According to the DTI In 2010, Africa was the fourth largest export destination for South African products. However, in 2016, Africa became the second largest destination for South African products. Cumulatively, in the past ten years, South Africa’s exports to Africa were mainly from the Manufacturing sector (88 %), followed by Mining (5 %) and the remaining 7% were from the Agriculture, forestry and fisheries sector.

b) Africa is dominated by foreign monopoly capital and there is little industrial capacity on the continent. Attempts to promote industrialisation by countries such as Rwanda must be commended. Trade borders on the Africa continent are poorly managed. There is a high level of import fraud, and illegal imports from food machinery to clothing.

Recommendations

a) The failure of regional economies to diversify production and to develop labour-intensive industries generates high unemployment, which is a major driver of “forced migration”.  An overwhelming majority of non-South African nationals are pushed from their countries because of lack of opportunities, infrastructure, unemployment and poverty.  Therefore, in order to deal with this “forced migration” it is important to promote a broad-based industrial strategy that creates linkages among regional economies, and allows for the development of downstream industries in each of the regional economies.  But this too depends on the policy choices each country makes, especially as they relate to trade and industrial policy.

b) Breaking up private monopoly domination of strategic sectors in the region, promoting downstream labour-intensive industries and building linkages within and between

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regional economies in a manner that promotes decent work, people-empowerment and national sovereignty requires a high degree of political commitment, which can be brought about by a re-alignment of class forces.  Such a re-alignment is the only basis for regional states to implement progressive developmental policies.

c) SA must not sign the continental free trade area. We must first address institutional capacity and competition rules to break up existing monopolies in areas such information communication technologies before we can start promote free trade. An industrial plan on the SADC region and continent can only be pursued with a strong political will and cannot rely on foreign companies.

d) SA must have dedicated budget to assist in building political and trade institutions at the SADC region and on the continent.

e) We need common policies on social and labour policies, trade, industrial policy, de-monopolisation policies and revenue collecting institutions such as SARS and fully fledged court that must resolve all disputes on the continent.

f) To achieve this we would need political agreement to have one single foreign policy.g) Regional agreements such as SACU must be reviewed to make them more relevant to

modern demands of labour.h) SADC colonial borders together with VISA requirements must be abolished with

immediate effect without undermining national policies and security issues.

if Africa is serious about a new and just world order in which the “rise of Africa” shall have real meaning, the following are key;

a) Building a mass based organisation which will lead mass uprisings and mobilisation of the people to rise against those who loot or assist the looting of our natural endowment and abundant resources, particularly the corrupt elites who sustain and service these corrupt systems. The people of Burkina Faso, Tunisia and Egypt have made attempts in that direction, but their gains have been eroded by poor leadership, weak organisation and lack of ideological and political grounding in real alternatives to the crisis of the dominant system

b) Popular rejection of imperialism and all forms of neo-colonialism, including their structures that reinforce the notion of neo-liberalism in economic models of development

c) Development of organic and local models of re-organizing society to serve the interests of the people and change the power relations and structures of society, fundamentally

d) Development of a progressive intelligentsia loyally serving the just cause of the people and not embedded in the co-opted structural designs of the existing order and its failures. It must be an intelligentsia that refuses to be used against its own people, whatever the personal and material gains at hand. It must forge common cause and even lead the popular struggles of the people for a new and just society.

The programme which needs to be undertaken may include the following :

a) There should be a campaign for a continental government that will ensure that there is one tax, labour and social security law and one law that will regulate trade in primary agricultural and mining products. This is important in order to limit the free movement of capital on the continent which benefits investors at the expense of the working class. Shoprite in Zambia should pay the same salary that is paid to a South African worker.

b) The current AU REC’s should be merged into one body under the AU. This would ensure that the space is closed for foreign imperialists and agenda 63 -of a untied strong Africa is implemented today.

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c) Trade unions should campaign to encourage the SA government to form a similar body to BRICS on the continent that should strive for common laws and policies as waiting for the 54 members of the AU to agree on a common agenda will give room to imperialists to further delay African power and unity and continue to loot African resources with impunity.

d) African leaders should not be allowed to raise national sovereignty as a defence to run away from compliance with human rights and laws against corruption whilst at the same time they freely allow multinationals to loot Africa’s resources.

6.2.4. Commitments : Prioritise BRICS development bank and infrastructure development

Observations

Whilst BRICS is not an economic block it has a potential to change the political and economic landscape at international level. The World Bank and IMF and other western creditors have used their financial power to entrench colonial and slave conditions on the continent. BRICS is a credible alternative to imperialism which must be supported. It is on the basis of pressure from rating agencies and World Bank that Eskom has been advised to reduce its workforce to 30000 and to give workers a zero percentage offer. BRICS is led by China which has never colonised any country.

Recommendations

South Africa must actively pursue an anti imperialist agenda. In order to give priority to the BRICS institution SA must withdraw its

membership of imperialists’ institutions including the World Bank and the IMF and revive the failed attempt to withdraw from the ICC.

SA must instead use BRICS to call for urgent review of the WTO along the lines of the Doha development round so that developing countries have more policy space to drive their local development agenda without being restrained by imperial WTO agreements that were signed without consultations in 1994.

South Africa state officials that have been appointed to key positions in the imperialist institutions that do not serve interests of workers and the poor must vacate their positions.

SA must be critical and should consider withdrawing from the Commonwealth participation . This is a institution which remains headed by the British Queen . There is no evidence that it ever advanced an anti- imperialist and anti neo colonial project. Instead all the 53 member countries which are essentialy former British colonies like South African remain subjected to the whims of the Queen in the name of commonwealth.

Britain has played a supporting role arming countries to advance imperialist on their behalf such as it happen with the Israel attack against Palestinian people using weapons that were supplied by Britain. The Turkish President Erdogan personally sanctioned a military operation of air raids, bombings, with tanks and troops in Afrin, leaving behind a trail of destruction and thousands of innocent casualties, men, women and children.  In this operation Turkey employs high-tech weapons from Britain.

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6.2.5. Commitments on Energy :Solar and wind power will feed into the electricity grid to increase our generation capacity.1.3 million Houses will be installed with solar water heaters brining the total to 1.75 million houses covering more than 7.5 million South Africans.

Observations

It is not clear whether the renewable energy products have been manufactuered locally. Renewable energy IPP contracts that have been signed by the Department of energy must be reversed. Eskom should be the only entity driving renewable energy production because energy is sensitive security matter. These contracts were signed in secrecy and without consultation and the benefits and costs have not been disclosed. The introduction of renewable energy IPP’s poses a threat to jobs and sustainability of Eskom and it amounts to privatisation and privatisation means the death of trade unions in the form of short time, retrenchments, low wages, little or absence collective bargaining, corruption, state capture and enrichment of an elite in the governing party and in the business sector. ANC does not have a resolution to privatise Eskom or any other state company. Countries such as Norway have invested in renewable energy but this has not stopped them from using fossil fuels/crude oil and gas to create high standards of living and one of the largest sovereign wealth funds in

Recommendations

Eskom’s natural monopoly status must be protected. Energy generation, transmission and distribution of energy must remain state

owned and controlled. Renewable energy IPP contracts must be scrapped with immediate effect. Eskom must participate directly in the renewable energy independent power

producer programme and must expand its investment in renewable energy e.g Sere wind farm.

SA must review its environmental obligations to ensure that it is not prevented from using natural resources such as coal to change lives of the poor and the working class.

All household and industrial solar equipments including all components must be manufactured in South Africa.

6.2.6. Commitment on Passenger transport

We will work towards new passenger railway lines to connect our people in township and rural areas. Improvement in public transport will create many job opportunities and contribute to skills development as buses, taxis and locomotives will be manufactuered and assembled in South Africa.

Observations

a) The transport networks are poor and the government has neglected public transport system and has only prioritised transport for the elite.

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b) Working conditions of workers in the sector is very poor. Trains, taxi and bus networks are in poor conditions.

c) However, road transport fracture has improved. d) E-tolls have not been scrapped and privatisation of road infrastructure has

continued. e) Air passenger transport has remained inaccessible to the majority. Rail transport for

commuters is unsafe, unreliable and unaffordable such in the case of Gautrain. f) Whilst Gautrain benefits a few yet it is funded by taxpayers yet it excluded the

majority of the working class. g) Rail transport for goods is also inadequate. In light of the above a reliable integrated

transport system not been achieved. Gautrain system integrates buses but not taxis which are owned by black people. We need a new law that must prioritise integration of transport system.

Recommendations

a) Integrated transport system.b) Gautrain must be made affordable for the working class.c) The taxi industry must be subsidised.d) The GAUTRAIN model where private sector shareholders are the main beneficiary

must never be allowed to be extended to other areas as it expensive and unaffordable for the majority.

e) Passenger trains must be extended to areas outside main cities and countries neighbouring SA.

6.2.7. Commitments : Government will develop free wifi in areas in cities and rural areas.

Free wi-fi has been implemented in certain areas in main metros’’. However this has not been extended to rural areas.

Recommendation

Free wifi must be implemented in urban and rural areas. Computer studies must be taught from R level. However, the computers must be

manufactured locally including software and hardware components. Priority must first be given to rural schools.

6.2.8. Commitments : Addressing Youth Unemployment

a) We will increase workplace training for FET’s including placement in the public sector.

b) FET graduates employment is low compared with university graduates. There are many barriers to FET students to qualify for in-service training and technicians and artisans including requirements to pass maths and

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many years spent on training. The requirement for maths must be relaxed through tailor made maths for artisans depending on the field of study and practical training must be 1 year. We must move away from focusing on short jobs opportunities such as EPWP jobs.

Recommendations :

State institutions including Denel, SAA, Armscor and Transnet must be given resources to accommodate all FTE’s who want to qualify as artisans and technicians.

All FTE’s students must be guaranteed a space for training and full time employment in all state companies.

Increase youth intake in the works programmes. Work with private sector to increase youth employment through wage subsidy without displacing unsubsidised jobs. Public works for employment creation: Massively expand public works to create 6 million work opportunities many of long duration and 80% to be taken by unemployed youth.

Youth unemployment is a problem in South Africa and many Africa countries. Attempts to resolve this problem include the use of active labour market policies such as wage subsidies and public works programme such as EPWP and CWP.

Recommendations

The unintended consequences of the wage subsidy and perpetual internship programmes have been to displace trade unions, reduce union membership and impose low wages on

There must be a review existing tax incentives and subsidies with a view of encouraging employment of young people in full time positions. All companies that are accessing these benefits must make sure that the youth are members of trade unions in their sectors.

EPWP and CWP jobs must be converted into full time positions at municipal level. This would improve service delivery and creation of decent jobs. Workers must be required to join trade unions.

EPWP workers national minimum wage must be increased to R20 within 12 months and no NGO‘s should be used to hire and manage EPWP projects. These workers including community health workers must be treated like workers.

6.2.9. Commitments on Macroeconomic policy

Our macroeconomic policy will back accelerated growth and long-term economic stability. This will create the foundation for faster industrial development and job creation. A competitive exchange rate, stable prices and a well-managed government budget provide the foundation for lasting improvements in the lives of all South Africans, especially workers and the poor.

Observations

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The focus on economic growth as measured by GDP is flawed because it is world bank/IMF requirement, it ignores real development indicators such as the quality of work, health of the population especially children and mothers ability to survive birth difficulties, social security, security from harm and violence and most importantly distribution of wealth and income. Despite government‘s earlier privatisation of state assets the public has increased. In 2013, SA’s public debt set at 44.1 percent of the Gross Domestic Product and now we’re sitting at 53.0 percent. This means that government would not have enough funds to finance industrialisation.

South African monetary policy consists mainly of direct controls, which range from credit ceilings; cash reserve requirement and interest rate controls. The aim of these direct controls is to deal with inflation by curbing the growth of monetary aggregates. There has been a decline in economic growth and standards of living in-terms of GDP per capita. This is consistent with a high inflation rate that has been growing since 2013 till present. High inflation and low real wages continues to weaken household spending and there is a persistence decline in investment. The devaluation of rand whilst it may help exporters it would negatively affect the poor in the short term.

The inability to move poverty, inequality and unemployment, and continued racial and class imbalances in these, is a major feature of South Africa over the past twenty years, and a central focus of debate on macroeconomic challenges facing our economic presently. These imbalances have been at their peak since the 2014 democratic elections. In the 2017/18 financial, SA’s unemployment rate is approximately 27.5 percent relative to 24.7 percent that was recorded for the year 2013/14.

The structural reasons for persistence of income poverty and inequality in South Africa include poor quality of education of the majority, inequalities in the returns to skills, unemployment and low labour income formal and in the self-employed informal sector.

The focus on economic growth is false start and has failed SA since 1996. We have had positive economic growth as measured by GDP since 1994 until 2008. Yet the same growth did not create jobs. Recently the focus has been on satisfying the needs of the credit rating agencies despite SA low public debt levels. The public sector salary bill has been raised as threat to finances and government has imposed austerity measures in the form of natural attrition which is a form of retrenchment, and the government is reportedly considering privatisation in order to address the high debt levels. The reasoning is flawed as no government can exist without debt and no government can be insolvent because of the power to impose taxes.

Recommendation:

a) The government in particular cabinet must stop prioritising the needs of the rating agencies but must prioritise the needs of the poor and the working class.

b) Government must abandon inflation targeting and review the mandate of the reserve bank, and nationalise the bank without compensation.

c) Government must participate directly in the financial sector.d) Government must impose taxes on the rich and big companies and must stop

these companies from investing billions outside SA robbing SA of valuable savings and potential jobs. In this context we need prescribed asset requirements on retirement funds and performance requirements on local and

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foreign investors to prioritise local procurement and decent jobs.e) The major objective of government must be how to distribute income and wealth

including de-monopolising the SA economy and reversing the tenderisation of the state and not only economic growth.

f) The focus should be on mobilising domestic investment and not foreign investors as the latter will ensure the continuation of colonial economic conditions. We are not aware of any country which has been built by foreigners. The presidential investment committee must be disbanded with immediate effect as it might end up creating a parallel executive or cabinet without a mandate from the ANC.

6.2.10. Commitments to make Lending and easier affordable credit in the productive sector in accordance with the Growth and Development Sector of 2003. Mobilise private sector and small business and cooperatives through incubators and enterprises in townships.

Observations

a) Lending has remained high mainly due to the high interest rates charged by the banking sector and insurance has remained unaffordable for the majority.

b) The resolution to ensure investment by retirement funds has not been implemented. Self regulation in the financial sector has failed and funding is more short term and focus on financing speculation e.g. mergers and property sector building of malls than in the creation of factories and new jobs.

c) Garnishee orders that deduce money from salaries of workers will be stopped. d) The reserve bank as the custodian of national payment system has proposed

regulations to combat illegal deductions from workers salaries.

Recommendations:

Prescribed assets requirements must be imposed on the financial sector to investor creation decent jobs within a period of 6 months.

The legal interest rates must be limited to 15% in order to reduce the price of loans.

Insurance premiums must be regulated and a state insurance company must established that will charge low prices and without redlining consumers from black communities.

No person including employers must be able to make deductions from salaries except in the case of maintenance court orders.

Non compliance with financial sector charter codes must result in withdrawal of licenses and a minimum 10% fine on the turnover of the companies in the sector.

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6.2.11. Commitments: We will take measures to deal with profit shifting and transfer pricing. Whilst transfer pricing can be effectively regulated at the international level, there must strong domestic regulations to combat transfer pricing locally.

Observations

Transfer pricing is rife in sectors such as mining and in the financial sector. Money laundering which is another form of illicit finance has increased with reserve bank’s policy to allow the rich to move their assets overseas.

Recommendations

Some mining companies have been pointed out by the UN of being guilty of illegal exports of minerals without paying taxes yet the regulatory bodies including the reserve bank have remained mum.

There is need for capital controls to combat illicit movement of capital. In pursuance of the freedom charter the state must take control of exports and

imports of goods including key minerals in order to ensure that all companies pay their fair share of taxes.

6.2.12. Commitments: Revised broad black economic empowerment will favour decent work employment

Observations

BEE has remained an elite driven project to enrich few politically connected individuals. The tender system has weakened state power and has created a parallel state made up of consultants and this system has supported and entrenched monopoly capital. The tender system must be overhauled as it has entrenched the role of black suppliers as subcontractors. Black people must be given full contracts instead of using their colour to get sub-contracts from monopoly capital.

Recommendations

a) BEE Act and rules must be revised to provide for quotas for black people and to encourage black people to become businesspersons in their own right. These quotas must provide that 50% of contracts in respect of value and volumes must be given to black companies within a period of five years.

b) The tender system must promote job creation projects and decent work though higher BEE points and local procurement.

c) In order to alleviate fronting and to ensure true empowerment the definition of what an empowered company is must be re-defined to ensure that only companies that are actually owned and controlled i.e. more than 50% of voting rights and 50% of dividends must accrue to black people can benefit from BEE points.

6.2.13. Commitments on Decent work

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Introduce a national minimum wage to reduce income inequality, ensure that collective bargaining takes place in all sectors of the economy. Councils must be linked to state incentives procurement into living standards and wage equity and Greater protection for informal sector workers and employers. Enforce measures to eliminate abusive practices in atypical work and labour brokers and expand capacity of department of labour to enforce labour law.

Observations

The Nedlac R20.00 per hour agreement is radical move to address colonial wage structure where black workers were restricted to unskilled manual low wage positions. However, the law on NMW must ensure that there are enough resources to enforce the law. There has been a lack of political will to implement the rule that after 3 months workers are regarded as being in full time employment.

The CCMA has estimated that about 20% (percent) of arbitration awards are subject to review on average. It has also estimated that only about 20% (percent) of reviews that are instituted are actually processed to the stage of a hearing. This suggests that reviews are used by employers to delay the enforcement of awards (i.e. the payment of awards) to employees. In reality, the review process causes major delays in the dispute resolution process. It is estimated that it takes on average 23 months to conclude a review and that only about a quarter of reviews which proceed to the Labour Court are successful.

Recommendations

The EPWP workers must be entitled to national minimum wage on implementation of the NMW.

Retrenchments must be regulated and only allowed in exceptional cases and the definition of operational requirements under the labour relations act must be narrowed.

Trade union shopstewards must be capacitated and resourced to assist the Department of Labour to enforce labour laws. They must be certified to be co-enforcers.

All state institutions and departments and the private companies doing business with state must be prohibited from using the services of labour brokers and must in source all workers.

A ban on outsourcing and a prohibition on outsourcing under section 197. A contract between the labour brokers and a worker must be reduced to a 0

month. This would provide certainty that the worker is employed by the client of the labour broker and not the labour broker.

The public holidays Act must be amended to provide for non trading holidays. The department of labour must institute legislated central bargaining councils in

sectors where these are absent and on request of either the trade unions or the employer with immediate effect.

Employers must not be allowed to use scab labour as this is a violation of the right to strike.

To change the law to stop employers from frustrating the implementation of awards in favour of workers.

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6.2.14. Commitments : Rural development, land and agrarian reform and food security

The willing buyer willing seller approach to land reform has failed and will be replaced by the principle of just and equitable compensation in line with section 25 of the constitution. We will finalise and implement the agricultural policy action plan, strengthen agricultural college education through skills development funds and encourage biofuels which will create thousands of new jobs in agriculture. We will strengthen cooperatives in the marketing supply of their produce and access to municipal markets and public institutions as primary buyers of agricultural products, accelerate settlement of land submitted before the cut off date of 1998 and reopen the period of lodgement of claims for restitution of land for 5 years commencing in 2014.

Observations

Various policies have been put in place to address the above commitments. However progress has been slow. The 54th congress resolutions to expropriate land without compensation should be supported.

Recommendations

Section 25 must be deleted from the constitution to ensure that compensation is not a requirement for expropriation of any property and not only land.

The department of agriculture must produce a plan to develop biofuel industry in order to create jobs in the industry and to kick-start black and small scale agriculture.

Establish a state owned company that will market and guarantee minimum prices to farmers. This will create jobs in the agricultural sector and will assist in the utilisation of unused state land in rural and tribal areas and land that has been repossessed and given to communities.

6.2.15. Commitments : Human settlements and basic services

Supply of housing in the gap market teachers’ police office workers, nurses, promote mixed income projects, and roll out basic sanitation infrastrucre in rural areas and informal settlements and universal access to running water.

Recommendations

a) State must finance the housing for civil servants.b) Prohibition on the building of gated universities.c) Regulate estate agents and prices of property to ensure that prices are not used

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exclude blacks from white areas.d) Build free housing for the poor in white suburbs.e) All materials used in housing projects funded by the state must be manufactured

in the country.f) A state construction company must be established to drive infrastructural

projects in SA and on the continent.

6.2.16. Commitments : Improving and expanding education and training

Full integration of grade R educators in the post and remuneration structure, Maintain upward trend in mathematics pass rerate, Phased introduction of compulsory African languages in schools, Investigate appropriate working conditions for public servants teachers, Ensure safety of leaner’s in schools generally no safety of public servants and communities in general, Increase internships and placement in the public and private sectors, School and education infrastructure.

Observations

a) The government is accordance with austerity budget they have not provided for training and funding of grade R1 teachers. There is a need for a new training model for new maths teachers and we need to address the pupil teacher ratio in public schools and availability of leaner support material. The weak remuneration packages for teachers have result in number of teachers moving to the private sector.

b) The violence in communities has spread to schools. The safety of the learner and teachers has been endangered. The solution lies in resolving the issue of unemployment and poverty which have resulted in breakdown of families. More security will not solve this problem.

c) FET’s are collapsing and FET students do not get work because the private sector does not support FET’s. As a result there has been an increase in the number of private FET’s.

d) The two new universities must be dedicated towards building health science universities. .

Recommendations

The 54th conference resolution to provide free education to the poor and working class must be supported.

All matters relating to education must be taken to nedlac for discussion and resolution which must include smooth implementation education decolonisation.

We are still producing more white professors compared to South African black indigenous academics. Instead universities are no increasing foreign African academics. As a result, production of knowledge has been based on European values and cultures and not local context and needs.

Former white institutions still have reserves and enjoy high autonomy. The funding formula must be biased towards formerly black institutions and there

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must be sharing of resources by universities. Government must regulate private schools. Medium of instruction including writing of books is indigenous languages must

be prioritised. Promote the use of indigenous languages in courts and by the state across all

three spheres of government. Stop the abuse of internship model as source of training. Interns must be granted

fulltime employment. Use the two new universities to address human resources in the health sector.

6.2.17. Commitments on Health and social security

Establish the national health insurance fund to roll out the NHI and to ensure universal coverage irrespective of one’s socioeconomic status, provide 7 specialists in each district and rural region to enforce adherence to norms and standards, reform private health care to reduce private health costs, provide patients on chronic medication at selected collection points such as community pharmacies, ensure interrupted supply 0of medicines and other goods in hospitals for patient care and hospital CEO’s will order directly from suppliers, Essential support services catering cleaning laundry and security will be in sourced within a period of five years, Under NHI over 870 health facilities will be refurbished 213 new clinics and community health centres and 43 hospitals will be constructed, Increase recruitment of nurses and double the number of doctors on average 2000 a year, number of people on anti retroviral be doubled from 2.4 million to 4.6 million by 2016, Increased screening for TB and treatment for vulnerable groups inmates men, workers and mining communities and implement the AU’s inspired campaign on accelerated reduction of maternal and child mortality in Africa.

Observations

a) The National Health Insurance Fund has been established. However, the problem is that the NHI seeks to establish NHI accredited hospitals and to private healthcare providers as agents and this would result in public sector funds leaving for the private sector. The NHI undermines indigenous medical institutions.

b) One of the achievements is that 4.5 million patients are on ARV treatment. This is one of the few areas where there has been progress.

c) Despite these achievements there are major human resources issues in the sector including lack of specialist in the public sector, lack of medicine, and lack necessary equipments and machinery and maintenance thereof.

d) Whilst we applaud the efforts of the competition commission to address the issues of competition in the private health sector we cannot address the pricing of drugs, state manufacturing pharmaceutical company and universal access to health care through a market inquiry.

e) The usage of private sector agents such as clicks to distribute and deliver drugs to patients and Dischems is a problem and not a solution. This approach amounts

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to outsourcing and enriching monopoly capital in the pharmacy sector. Drugs should rather be distributed through clinics where access is a problem through state mobile clinics, community health workers and health forums. This approach will address corruption in the procurement of drugs and save money for the state.

f) There is no political will to in-source. The intersection between business interests and political interests is one of the primary factors contributing towards non implementation of the resolution to establish a state pharmaceutical company and this has compromised the state’s obligation under the constitution to access to health care.

g) The building and repair of health facilities is very slow and inadequate. The fall of a roof at Charlotte Maxeke is a case in point. Whilst health care facilities need to be improved the most urgent problem is the lack of nurses’ doctors and other health care practitioners. The granting of private hospital licenses violates the objective to build more public health facilities.

h) Whilst the utilisation of implementing agencies by department health of various NGO’s including the Clinton Foundation and the USAID should be welcomed, we should be aware that it is not possible for imperialists’ agencies to act in our internets and there is need to reduce our reliance on these agencies. Certain NGO’s have selfish agenda to use donor funding to enrich themselves and to pursue political agendas. One of the reasons why the health system is collapsing is the insufficiency of funding by government and life Esidemene incident bearers testimony to this reality.

Recommendations

Unfreezing of posts. Health practitioner posts must be funded from the NHI fund. The fund must be used to fund public hospitals and not to private health.

Implement NHI as conceived by the movement. State pharmaceutical companies must be established and state must use its

power to expropriate patents rights as allowed by WTO. Amend patent laws to prohibit registration of new intellectual property rights

applications. This would reduce the costs of prices of essential drugs. Expand Cuban training programme beyond doctors to include other health care

practitioners. Expedite implementation of NHI as 2025 is closer and might not be realised

because of the weak state of the public health care system. An urgent plan is required to address the lack of nurses, doctors and specialist s

in the public sector. Prohibition of issuing of new licenses for private hospitals and clinics. An inquiry is needed on how to implement the NHI is quickest way possible.

6.2.18. Commitments on Comprehensive social security

Increase supply of social workers and community development workers, mandatory cover for retirement disabilities and survivor benefits and finalise

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comprehensive social security to ensure no needy person falls through the social safety net.

Observations

We acknowledge that in 2016 the government released the comprehensive social security and retirement reform document for discussion. However the Nedlac discussions have been slow and as a result there is no white paper yet. However, our people cannot wait any longer for promises. Social security must be extended to all who are in need. In the main the current social security is only targeting the elderly, disabled and children. Adults between the age of 18 and 59 are not covered.

Recommendations

We demand a comprehensive social security and retirement law by 2020 that must ensure that all those who are excluded are included in the social safety net.

Such a law must include the basic income grant that must cover costs of nutritious food and other services such as transport.

6.2.19. Commitments on Fighting crime and corruption

We will work together to reduce high levels crime particular contact crimes such as rape murder and assault.

It is fact that private security is bigger than police force and the public security sector including the defence force is under resourced in many respects.

We have seen an increase in corporate looting and violation of the law which have resulted in losses of workers investments and job losses. These include cases such as Tegeta, Steinhoff and accounting firms such as KPMG. We have also seen a non-consistent application of the law by regulators where measures that were applied by regulators such as the JSE and the Reserve Bank on the GUPTA companies are not applied to other companies guilty of the same transgressions.

Recommendations

The current police force should be doubled within a period of five years. Remuneration package and benefits must be improved to be aligned with risks

faced by police officers. Foreign security companies must not be allowed to provide security services to

the state and in key government institutions. Introduce of a jury system in criminal cases. Increase the regulation of the private sector with harsher criminal and financial.

penalties and including expropriation of private firms without compensation as a remedy for non compliance with laws and policies.

Impose a prohibition on auditors providing non audit services. Let them be limited to auditing one client at a time.

Ownership and control of auditing firms to be 60% owned and controlled by

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South Africa including dividends. Ensure that there is link between home affairs data and criminal justice

fingerprint system.

6.2.20. Commitments on building a better Africa and better world

Help strengthen AU institutions and reform of UN institutions.

Multinationals have become powerful and undermining democracy throughout the world and there is lack of accountability from those who own and control these entities. They do not pay taxes and violate human rights with impunity.

Recommendations

South Africa must lead the campaign to reduce the dependence of African institutions on imperialist forces and former colonisers particularly in respect of technical assistance and funding.

Contribute towards building Africa institutions that have sovereignty over member states in the areas of migration, taxes and foreign policies. There must be one political position of all SADC countries in international forums.

ECOSOC must be used to regulate multinationals and South Africa must campaign for treaty that will regulate multinationals.

Abolish the current borders with starting with SACU and SADC countries within 12 months.

COSATU’s Analysis of the 2016 Local Government Elections

DRAFT COSATU ANALYSIS OF 2016 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS

7.1. Introduction

The intention of this report is to present a factual reflection of how the COSATU election campaign and the overall ANC led election campaign unfolded as experienced by the COSATU team on the ground. Whilst the report will where necessary reflect on the political context and implications but such a task is not the core mandate of this narrative report. That task belongs to the meeting of the joint political and socio-economic commissions.

This report will focus on metros results and a detailed report analysis each municipality results will be prepared for the scheduled CEC in August 2016. This narrative report is however prepared in line with the directives of the CEC which said defend metros but

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also for robust discussions in the joint commission meeting in order to position the federation to have a better understanding on the political meaning of the elections results in the broader context of the National Democratic Revolution located within the working struggles towards Socialism. Eventually, this political analysis should help to the federation to develop a perspective within which it will engage its allies and rank and file for purposes of defending and advancing the revolution.

The report is divided into five parts. The first part of the report reminds comrades about strategic elements of the COSATU election programmes. This included (a) the rise in the confidence of the right wing and the emergence of the EFF and its anti ANC alliance with the DA as seen in parliament recently translated into anti ANC election campaign, (b) the glaring pointers based on the declining voting trends against the ANC over a period of time , (c) Unresolved Internal organizational challenges in the ANC pointed out in the comrade Nkosazana report and the undermining of the Mangaung Conference , the NGC and Alliance Summit resolution to have these prioritized by the movement; (d) Non resolution of grievances raised by our people and by the alliance formations. COSATU’s resolve to mobilize for the victory of the ANC despite the glaring challenges - in defense of the revolution (e) Defending the Metros and consolidating our base as a core strategy of the approach of our campaign (f) Glaring pointers towards the decline were there for all to see based on election trends.

In this context the report travels with the reader to the what was exactly observed by COSATU on what it calls the Early warning negative pointers at the Nelson Mandela Bay and Early warning Pointers and Trends in Gauteng Province which include Johannesburg and Tshwane metros.

The second part of the report looks at how COSATU implemented her integrated election campaign. This includes the three phases of the campaign which include Phase 1: setting up structures; Phase Two: Why Workers Must Vote ANC (Mayihlome) and Phase Three: Deployment (Siyanqoba).

It also deals with the extent of participation and the role of the affiliates in the campaign and how divisions in the movement undermined the campaign on the ground.

The third part of the report looks at the results focusing on ANC performance in Metros and also presents what is assumed to be the key factors which impacted negatively in the ANC election campaign. The fourth part of the report deals with future considerations and the last part deals with practical steps to be undertaken moving forward.

The starting point of this report is based on the fact that the ANC won the 2016 local government elections and as COSATU we express our deepest and humble appreciation to the millions of our people and workers in particular who went out to vote and express their confidence to the continued leadership of the ANC. The people of our country and activists in every jut and corner of South Africa must never allow to be demoralized by the continued attempts by the right wing to hollow out and render the ANC’s victory as meaningless. We all must build from this victory moving forward.

This victory must however never take away the responsibility to conduct an honest assessment where we did not do well, particularly in areas which we have identified as strategic for the advancement of the radical economic transformation. This victory

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must never leave us blind to the reality of our continued declining support caused by our own strategic mistakes as a movement.

7.2. The context

The context within which the federation mobilized South African workers and society for the 2016 local government elections campaign as per the mandate of various national congress including the recent special and ordinary 12th national congresses. The overarching context was derived from COSATU 2015 Plan which reflects a balance sheet based vision of what was achieved, what still needs to be done and setbacks. Based on this vision, the federation adopted the following principles which underpinned its local government elections campaign:

a) Framework capturing its analysis for what should constitute an electoral platform

b) Establishing elections teams for mobilization towards the ANC decisive victory

c) Mobilize financial resources for the implementation of its elections programme

d) Consciously advancing the elections campaign as an integral part of an organizational renewal project

7.3. COSATU Political Analysis Framework

The framework of the federation as an entry point presented an environmental situational analysis (political situation) as a context of the previous local government elections in 2016. The starting point of the federation’s analysis sketched vividly what should be the understanding of the movement as a whole the nature of the challenges that would confront the broader liberation movement in the 2016 local government elections.

7.3.1. The Alliance of the Opposition parties and their relative strength including the emergence of the EFF and its anti ANC alliance with the DA as seen in parliament.

Firstly, it cautioned the movement on the emergence of the EFF which must not be taken for granted given the level of support they enjoyed amongst the working class communities in the last national general elections of 2014. Their aggressive presence in Johannesburg was cited as adding to the worries of the ANC and the growth of confidence from DA. The DA in particular has already made it public that if it does not win the outright majority then it could force a coalition government that exclude the ANC . It further argued and warned that the DA will benefit from a disproportionately higher turn-out among relatively wealthy voters in Johannesburg. Adding to this reality,

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are internal ANC challenges related to dynamics and issues surrounding the President of the ANC who is also a President of the South Africa particularly the views held by the middle-strata country-wide.

We had already pointed out to the ANC that issues regarding the non scrapping of e-tolls , the non banning of labour brokers , refusal to address COSATU and SACP concerns around certain sections of the NDP , the continued scandals associated with the ANC , non implementation of key alliance resolutions were pointers of the continues loss of confidence to the leadership of he ANC in the society as a whole. The credibility of the ANC was being questioned not just by the opposition but also by many inside the ANC ranks and within the movement as a whole.

7.3.2. Unresolved Internal organizational challenges in the ANC pointed out in the Nkosaza report and the undermining of the Mangaung Conference , the NGC and Alliance Summit resolution to have these prioritized by the movement.

Secondly, our analysis argued that the overarching challenge facing the ANC across provinces is the process of selecting suitable candidates for wards and PR including the manner in which candidate lists are concluded in list conferences which were highly characterized by manipulation and rigging of processes to sideline comrades who were selected correctly by branches and communities. It further highlighted the fact that these tendencies have resulted into unnecessary delays and conflicts which eventually led to fights and killings of cadres of the Alliance. The analysis framework made a point that unfortunately, the lack of a committee of the seasoned leaders and veterans of the ANC similar to the one led by Comrade. Nkosazana Zuma in 2011 which was not put in place to test the honesty and bonafides of the leadership of our movement was a blunder. Precisely because that committee was able to investigate instances where guidelines and processes were manipulated and acted upon in order to arrest such tendencies to a great extent that it gave confidence to members of the movement and the electorate as a whole. The lack of such a similar committee has impacted negatively to the process of selecting suitable candidates as most people have no confidence to the current processes across the country.

7.3.3. Non resolution of grievances raised by our people and by the alliance formations.

Thirdly, our analysis also called the Alliance as a whole to worthy note that processes for the 2016 local government elections as faced by serious complaints lodged regarding irregularities in the identification of suitable candidates from the ward up to list conferences as they are not amicably resolution to them before even elections in most provinces if not all, as a result, such resulted to serious tensions amongst comrades and structures of the alliance. Indeed, these tensions threatened the unity of the ANC thus weakened the ability and strength of the Alliance in mobilizing South

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Africans towards the overwhelming victory of the ANC in the local government elections. The framework of the federation further argued that these grievances and complaints if not properly resolved or managed will lead into a situation where comrades decides to contest as individual candidates in most instances against the ANC resulting into another split of ANC votes in a particular ward and possibly end up not voting for the ANC in the proportional representative ballots.

7.3.4. COSATU’s resolve to mobilize for the victory of the ANC despite the glaring challenges - in defense of the revolution

Lastly, the analysis brought to the attention of the ANC and its allies that the mobilization and attendance of the recent events of the Alliance such as the ANC Elections Manifesto Launch held on the 16th April in Port Elizabeth and May Day Celebrations which were not pleasing at all and argued that such must be noted in order to develop a mobilization strategy responsive to these weaknesses. The analysis brought forth the noticeable internal challenges and fightings in the ANC and other external factors which must be regarded as a stumbling block and correctly argued that it becomes clear that the outcomes of this electoral contest to a great extent shall indicate where balance of the relations of social and political forces are at this juncture and what this means for the revolution. Therefore, despite our demoralization and frustrations with what is going on in the ANC and government, as affiliates of COSATU, the analysis called upon all of us more than ever before to defend the ANC and our revolution. The analysis concluded specifically by calling upon the primary motive force of the National Democratic Revolution and the custodian of the Socialist revolution, the working class, through left axis leadership, to be mobilized around its revolutionary theory in order to defend its revolution hence the federation was charged with a task of intensifying its campaign and machinery to massively mobilize workers and communities so as to ensure the overwhelming victory of the ANC in the 2016 local government elections in every corner of this country.

7.3.5. Defending the Metros and consolidating our base as a core strategy of the approach of our campaign

The framework in terms of what should be the strategic focus properly guided the federation under the notion of defend our metropolitans while making advances in other metros. The framework further argued that whilst it is important for the ANC to win elections in all municipalities but concrete material evidence on the ground compelled a need to prioritize strategic metros. In this regard, the analysis defending strategic metros meant Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane and Johannesburg in particular. Through this analysis the CEC’s key task for the 2016 local government elections was to defend ANC power in these metros in particular while on the other hand it consolidate its majority in other metros and municipalities.

7.3.6. Glaring pointers towards the decline were there for all to see based on election trends.

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Nelson Mandela Bay

Our analysis further provided statistics of the 2009 national general elections, where the African National Congress won 227,861 votes (50,14%), COPE 77,363 (17,02%) and the Democratic Alliance 128,042 (28,17%) within the municipality's boundaries. 460,123 out of 566,668 registered voters cast their ballots, a turnout of 81,2%.

In 2011 May 18 local government elections, the African National Congress secured a narrow majority in this metro. Practically, it secured 189,867 PR votes (52.13 %) and 187,271 (51, 69%) ward votes for a total of 377,138 votes (51, 91%). It won 34 out of 60 ward seats and 63 out of 120, in total. This gives the party a majority of three on the council. While the DA won 146,559 PR votes (40, 24%) and 145,012 ward votes (40, 02%). They also secured 26 ward seats (48 in total). COPE however only managed to secure 4, 95% of the vote (35,928 ward + PR votes) and 6 seats.

369,366 of 569,470 of registered voters in the metro cast their votes, a turnout of 64, 65%. Compared to the previous local government elections the ANC won 3,177 more votes in 2011 than they did in 2006. The party's majority was cut from 66, 53% to 51, 91% due to a surge in support for the DA. The DA managed to win 154,472 more votes in 2011 than in 2006 - an increase of 12, 67%. This lifted their share of the vote from 24, 39% to 40, 13%.

The analysis pointed out that things will get worse for the 2016 local government elections as internal battles in the ANC are rife and resulted into serious lack of confidence by the electorate to the ANC, the reluctance of ANC members to vote and the significant decline from the ANC support base as a result of NUMSA decision not to campaign for the ANC rather to contest the local government elections as United Front against the ANC as it is dominant (strong base) in this metro and the emergence of EFF in Motherwell township which is a sizeable area of the metro and in other areas of the metro. Notwithstanding that members of NUMSA and EFF voted for the ANC in 2011 local government elections which is not going to be the case in 2016 local government elections and also the degree of internal battles in the ANC which will significantly negatively affect the support base of the ANC in this metro. The framework argued that two pressing challenges arose from the support base of the ANC which are - firstly, members of these two formations who voted ANC will now act as opposition to the ANC. Secondly, given the degree of public internal fights over leadership and resources, structures of the ANC have been extremely weakened and in some instance they act as an opposition to the same ANC hence less attention or reluctance to even mobilize for activities and campaigns of the ANC. These two factors have weakened the Alliance and all MDM structures in this metro and in the midst of these challenges facing the ANC, the DA has not significantly shifted from its support base in terms of decline or vote split as it is the case for the ANC. This scary picture indicated a serious threat to the ANC as it showed that potentially the ANC might lose this metro if we rely on the leadership of the

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province and region (metro) alone hence the analysis argued that if there is nothing drastically done by the national leadership of the federation and the alliance as a whole, the metro will be gone to the DA.

7.3.7. Early warning Pointers and Trends in Gauteng Province

In Gauteng province the analysis highlighted that the African National Congress won with 53,59% of votes and loss of a quarter of million votes in 2014 compared to 2009 national general elections while DA gained 39 139 more provincial votes in the province than they did in national votes. This meant than the ANC supporters split their votes across two ballot papers and this suggested that the ANC should expect a serious competition in the Johannesburg metro in particular and probably in Tshwane metro in 2016. The ANC won with 52% of the provincial votes in Johannesburg down from 62% in 2009 and this represent an 11, 25% reduction in ANC’s vote in Johannesburg.

However when one controls for the increase in the population of registered voters the ANC loss is stark to 20, 31% down in Johannesburg. Over the same period the DA’s real gain controlling for growth in the population of registered voters was 48 19% in Johannesburg.

The analysis at the end called for a strong intensification of the political consciousness to the leadership and shop stewards and intensive training for our volunteers in order to ensure that we effectively respond to some of the issues raised by our communities through various forms, including protests which in some cases unfortunately becomes violent due to frustrations and in some instances political opportunisms as recently seen in Limpopo.

7.3.8. COSATU LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS PROGRAMME- WHAT HAPPENED?

• The programme of the federation had three phases namely; Phase 1: setting up structures; Phase Two: Why Workers Must Vote ANC (Mayihlome) and Phase Three: Deployment (Siyanqoba). The programme acknowledged that in both phases one and two unfortunately the federation did not fully implement as expected due to number of reasons arising from the weaknesses of the ANC and poor participation of COSATU affiliates to the entire elections campaign. On the bases of these failures the federation was expected to do everything it can to ensure that all outstanding activities relevant from phase one and two are integrated into phase three. In light of these weaknesses the CEC directed the national office bearers to anchor properly and effectively the implementation of

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COSATU elections programme through the establishment of a war room comprised of the machinery of the federation supported by national organizers of affiliates and a committee comprised of deputy general secretaries.

• Indeed, as per the directives of the CEC, the elections programme integrated all campaigns of the federation drawn from the political programme, transforming labour market, transformation in education and the struggle for a radical economic transformation as part of the adopted 12 th National Congress declaration. As a result, phase three of the elections programme of the federation covered revamping elections structures, engaging with Alliance partners and structures of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDN) at all levels, driving the Battle of Ideas project, intensifying class consciousness through political classes and driving awareness campaign on Why Workers Must Vote ANC.

• War Rooms and the role of affiliates and CEC leaders: Through part one of phase three: revamping elections structures the federation convened the reconstituted national war room jointly with the establishment of the national elections team – the committee of the deputy general secretaries on the 26 th May 2016 which was well attended and adopted a programme of action for implementation. From the 27th May 2016, the elections task team went to province by province convening the reconstituted provincial war rooms, aligning provincial elections programme to the national elections programme and clarifying the composition and functioning of the provincial war rooms. It is important to mention though only five deputy general secretaries participated consistently in this process (CWU, POPCRU, SACCAWU, SADTU and NEHAWU). Key and common to all provincial elections programmes was the convening of open town based shop stewards councils which relatively were successful and CEC members were deployed to address.

• How divisions undermined the campaign on the ground : Through part two of phase three: battle of ideas the elections team convened a very successful public debate in Nelson Mandela University attended by the General Secretary of SACP who gave a keynote address and ANC was absent with no reason(s) given with SASCO supporting the project. The second public debate on “people’s education for people’s power which was to take place in Eastern Cape Midlands College in Nelson Mandela Metro was postponed due to the polarized political envorinment. A sizeable and successful town based political class was organized in Queenstown, Eastern Cape on National Democratic Revolution as our revolutionary theory aimed at dealing with the Vavi-Numsa phenomenon as it is dominant in the area. Alfred Nzo town-based political class which was organized was later postponed due to financial constraints and this class was going to deal with NDR as our revolutionary theory aimed at dealing with the SACP-ANC contestations which impacted negatively to the unity of the federation in the region. In this regard, the federation post the elections would have to come back to this area to cement the cohesion and unity of the federation. On memorial lectures, most provinces have done well as they held successful lectures of

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heroes of our struggles and identified speakers’ honourned these lectures which were relatively well attended.

• Physical interaction with the masses : Through part three of phase three: mop up programme the federation conducted door to door to all provinces, blitzing in strategic places such as taxi ranks, etc; motorcades were also organized with few affiliates branded cars, shop stewards councils were convened, members and shop stewards were mobilized to attend Siyanqoba rallies across provinces including the national rally. Community radios and print media were used to communicate the federation’s message on why workers must vote ANC, party agents were organized and deployed in various voting station for voting and counting and resources were made available by the federation and its affiliates though to a limited extent.

7.3.9. ELECTIONS RESULTS

It is important to sketch the overall national picture on the results of the 2016 local government election for a better understanding of the national overview.

National Picture

The ANC leading in 176 and in control of 161 municipalities with 5 159 seats as it received 53.91%

DA leading in 24 and in control of 19 municipalities with 1 777 seats as it received 26.9%

EFF not leading and in control of any municipality with 761 seats as it received 8.19%

IFP leading in 7 and in control of 6 municipalities with 432 seats as it received 4.25%

Independence Civic Organization of South Africa leading in 1 municipality but not in control of any municipality with 11 seats as it received 0.1%

FF Plus not leading and not in control of any municipality with 67 seats as it received 0.77%

UDM not leading and not in control of any municipality with 59 seats as it received 0.56

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AIC not leading and not in control of any municipality with 55 seats as it received 0.78%

COPE not leading and not in control of any municipality with 45 seats as it received 0.44

Forum 4 Service Delivery not leading and not in control of any municipality with 27 seats as it received 0.19%

ACDP not leading and not in control of any municipality with 22 seats as it received 0.42%

Others not leading and not in control of any municipalities with 195 seats as they received 2.23% and independents which are not leading and controlling any municipality with 27 seats as they received 1.14%

7.3.10. Performance in Metros

Indeed, the election results in the economic hub and strategic metros of our country the ANC has lost its 51% majority which leaves open the possibility of the DA going into coalitions with other parties to reach a majority and unseat the ANC. We discuss below in a summarized manner the outcomes of metros as:

Buffalo City: (ANC majority) – we managed to defend our power in this metro with ANC receiving 58.74% which account for 60 seats, DA receiving 23.4% which account for 24 seats, EFF receiving 7.97% which account for 8 seats, AIC receiving 3.42% which account for 4 seats and PAC, UDM, COPE, ACDP receiving less that 1% which account 1 seat for each. Voter turnout was 55.93% which means that out 419, 044 registered voters only 235, 369 voted.

City of Cape Town: (DA majority) – our intention in this metro was to advance towards the ANC decisive victory unfortunately we could not succeed instead the gap was widened by DA compared to previous local government in 2011. DA received 66.61% which account for 154 seats, ANC received 24.36% which account for 57 seats, EFF received 3.17% which account for 7 seats, ACDP received 1.21% which account for 3 seats, Aljama received 0.66% which account for 2 seats and AIC, FF Plus, DI, UDM, CMC, PAC, COPE, PA all received less than 1% which account for 1 seat each. Voter turnout was 64.21% which means that out 1, 977, 690 registered voters only 1, 271, 923 voted.

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City of Johannesburg: (Hung council) – our intention in this city was defend our majority in order to keep in power unfortunately things did not go on our way as ANC received 44.55% which account for 121 seats, DA received 38.37% which account for 104 seats, EFF received 11.09% which account for 30 seats, IFP received 1.72% which account for 5 seats, AIC received 1.5% which account for 4 seats and FF Plus, ACDP, Aljama, UDM, COPE, PA received less than 1% which account for 1 seat each. Voter turnout was 57.32% which means that out 2, 239, 966 registered voters only 1, 287, 755 voted.

City of Tshwane: (Hung council) – again we needed to defend our majority in order to keep of ourselves in power unfortunately we could not achieved that as results shows that the ANC received 41.22% which account for 89 seats, DA received 43.11% which account for 93 seats, EFF received 11.7% which account for 25 seats, FF Plus received 1.99% which account for 4 seats and ACDP, COPE, PAC received less than 1% which account for 1 seat for each. Voter turnout was 59.20% which means that out of 1, 512, 524 registered voters only 896 974 voted.

Ekurhuleni: (Hung council) – our task was to defend our majority strength so as to keep our power unfortunately even here we could not defend our ruling power as ANC received 48.64% which account for 109 seats, DA received 34.15% which account for 77 seats, EFF received 11.23% which account for 25 seats, AIC received 1.64% which account for 4 seats, IFP received 1.02% which account for 2 seats and FF Plus, ACDP, PAC, PA, COPE, Irasa received less than 1% which account for 1 seat each. Voter turnout was 57.95% which means that out 1, 587, 116 registered voters only 921, 547 voted.

eThekwini: (ANC majority) – though the decline of the results compared to previous local government elections of 2011 at least we have defended our majority to keep us in power as the ANC received 56.01% which account for 126 seats, DA 26.92% which account for 61 seats, IFP received 4.2% which account for 10 seats, EFF received 3.44% which account for 8 seats, AIC received 1.37% which account for 3 seats and ACDP, MF, TA, MOSA, APC, Aljama received less than 1% which account for 1 seat each. Voter turnout was 59.67% which means that out 1, 919 724 registered voters only 245, 908 voted.

Manguang: (ANC majority) – we have been able to defend the majority power of the movement in this metro as the ANC received 56.52% which account for 58 seats, DA received 25.96% which account for 27 seats, EFF received 8.66% which account for 9 seats, FF Plus received 1.92% which account for 2 seats, AIC received 1.69% which account for 2 seats and ANA, COPE received less than 1% which account for 1 seat each. Voter turnout was 57.72% which means that out 425 211 registered voters only 1,148, 559 voted.

Nelson Mandela Bay Metro: (Hung council) – from the closest contestation of the

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previous local government elections in 2011 we needed to defend and improve the majority power of the movement but failed to achieve that as the ANC received 40.92% which account for 50 seats, DA received 46.71% which account for 57 seats, EFF received 5.12% which account for 6 seats, UDM received 1.91% which account for 2 seats and AIC, UFEC, COPE, ACDP, PA received less than 1% which account for 1 seat each. Voter turnout was 63.86% which means that out 609 217 registered voters only 390, 323 voted.

7.3.11. KEY FACTORS

The following can arguably be cited as factors which impacted and affected negatively the results against the ANC:

i. Late start of the campaign in some metros and poor coordination of the elections campaign.

ii. Internal factional battles of the ANC which were extended to communities particularly during the process of identifying candidates and campaigning in some instances.

iii. Poor and contradictory role played by most outgoing councilors who were not considered for this round of local government elections – the de-campaigning of the current ward and PR candidates.

iv. Contradictions amongst the alliance partners in the public which largely arose as a result of excluding each other in the process of nominations and lists conferences – new tendency which is reluctance to accommodate each other and impatience of each other.

v. General anger against the leadership of the ANC particular on issues relating to morals of the leadership, corruption and factionalism.

vi. 2017 factional battles find expression in all levels or structures of the ANC characterized by tensions and battles as conferences proceeding to the national conference have started. These tensions are extended also to all Alliance partners as potentially present a danger of dividing the liberation movement as a whole.

vii. The poor handling of the nomination processes and the manner in which we have responded to grievances and complaints of ANC and Alliance structures including communities.

viii. Lack of credible committee presiding over these complaints and grievances similar to the one led by Cde, Nkosazana Zuma in 2011.

ix. Poor service delivery including failures of the outgoing councilors to account to communities. This has generally created anxiety and anger from within the structure of the ANC, amongst Alliance structures and communities at large. t

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As a result of the above, some voters who have been reliable voters of the ANC decided to vote for other parties though others loyal to the ANC decided to abstain and the voter turnout bears testimony to this point. We note the excuse of weather but the truth is the real and loyal members of the ANC would have ignored the weather and go vote ANC if these factors mentioned above were none-existence.

7.3.12. FUTURE CONSIDERATION

Issues to be considered for future as we evaluate the outcomes of the recent local government elections are as follows:

a. Political management of differences in the ANC and imperatives of leadership morality.

b. Better management of the Alliance differences through a respectful functional alliance of the revolution not of convenience.

c. The ANC should review its approach of nominating candidates due to the factor that it allows its structures to perform its constitutional responsibilities while on the other hand opens up contestations by communities who whether happy or not will eventually make choice on the voting day. It is obvious that if the candidate is not enjoying support of the community from the nomination process such will be reflected on the voting day.

d. A committee comprised of credible comrades of the ANC should be established to deal with concerns and complaints raised by whomever on the legitimacy of the proposed candidate and process thereof. This approach seeks to protect the integrity of the ANC and its structures on fairness and transparency of process while it also gives credibility to ANC process.

e. Accountability of councilors need to aggressively attended to by the ANC structures and if needs be structures must act decisively to the councilors who refuses to call community meeting and accounting to communities including dealing robustly and decisively with corruption and those involved in fraudulent activities which compromises the image of the ANC.

f. The ANC as an organization should not leave issues of communities in the hands of government alone it must continue to mobilize communities around issues of importance and service.

7.3.13. Practical activities to be undertaken as part of the way forward.

a) In the absence of the ANC convening an inclusive assessment meeting ,

COSATU must call for an un urgent Alliance Summit and convene an

assessment meeting of the left axis towards the Alliance Summit: Convene

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a bilateral meeting with the SACP to confront issues and build unity amongst the left forces. This must culminate to a common approach towards the Alliance Summit expressed in joint programmes on the ground similar to the programmes undertaken towards the 2005 ANC NGC meetings.

b) On coalition: A message must be communicated to the ANC that our approach

in dealing with coalition must be based on the principles, values and policies of the ANC But more importantly, it must be informed by the fact that the ANC has the capacity to re-bounce from this temporal electoral set back if we collectively confront and correct our mistakes . It cannot be coalitions at all costs. In an event where the ANC was to consider entering into coalitions such an option must be made based on evidence that it will enhance the realization of ANC policies which are dominantly biased towards working class and the poor. In one word the test of any coalition if it comes to that option must be the realization of the freedom charter and the extent to which that coalition can enhance worker rights and an economic policy trajectory which links growth and development and places the working class at the centre.

c)Place clear working class demands to the ANC for implementation: The left forces need to be clear about what they want both at a policy level and at the level of leadership of the NDR. There is already a package of policy demands which falls with the scope of ANC policy around which mobilization can commence and these include on among others implementation of the NHI , implementation of a comprehensive social security , banning labour brokers , scrapping e-tolls , addressing concerns raised by the SACP and COSATU in the economic and labor market chapters of the NDP and many other sections of the NDP including tackling the overall neo-liberal economic policy trajectory of the country.

d) Build our organization on the ground :Build the organization on the ground through visible campaigns which inspire and unite the motive forces around a common programmes which speak directly to their needs

e) Link state power to mass power: Fight to link state power and organizational mass power. Develop creative ways to have mass activity relate to the implementation of a developmental agenda by the state targeting in particular parliamentary activities.

f) Launch a mass education campaign to counter the right wing propaganda.

Despite the mistakes committed by the leadership of the movement, it is clear that the media and various institutions such as research institutions, civil society organizations, universities, schools, the church, various social clubs etc have been used to educate society against the progressive movement leading to the recent results in these local government elections. This will require a

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conscious effort on our part to enter into an aggressive and unapologetic counter offensive in the battle if ideas in society as a whole. This will require cadres with ideological clarity, credibility and seasoned cadres in the art of the spoken and written word to lead from the front.

g) Build the Alliance and assert it as a centre of political power on the

ground: Assert the Alliance as being at the forehead of the NDR through activities aimed at deepening the radical economic transformation. These programmed must seek to impose the alliance as a political centre based on activities on the ground

h) Rebuilding confidence on the ground through undisputed mass power: Listen to the masses acknowledges mistakes and apologize where necessary. This will require a road show similar to victory rallies and door to door and or community meeting meant just to listen to people.

COSATU’s 2015 Plan

Consolidating Working Class Power for Quality Jobs - Towards 2015: Programme Arising from the COSATU 8th National Congress

9 October 2003

8.1. Introduction

COSATU emerges from its 8th National Congress more united and inspired to tackle the many challenges facing the working class and the broader liberation movement. We reaffirm our vision of a transformative union movement, committed to social transformation both at home and internationally.

We have inherited a rich legacy of democratic and militant trade unionism from our predecessors, directly from the 1973 Durban strikes that led to the resurgence of the democratic trade union movement 30 years ago. We owe it to these pioneers to sustain, build and strengthen COSATU. Thus, we pay our tribute to the heroines and heroes of our struggle who have laid the foundation for the establishment of COSATU.

The complex challenges facing the working class demand a longer- term vision to build a strong trade union movement and to assert working class leadership. The march to our longer- term vision demands patience, resilience; bold thinking foresighted and visionary leadership. We need a medium- term plan because it has become clear that only deep- seated transformation of our economy and the state can bring about the aims of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). Without confronting the power of the white capital we are all doomed.

Certainly, it demands unwavering commitment to principle regardless of short- term defeats, retreats and provocations. For that reason, this Congress stands at a threshold and has developed a long- term plan towards our 30th Anniversary in 2015. It comes at

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an important moment in our history - we are celebrating the 30th Anniversary of the 1973 Durban strikes and stand on the verge of the 10 th Anniversary of our freedom.

We here set out the basic framework for our longer term strategy and call upon the CEC to develop further details including benchmarks, timeframes and resources required to realise it.

8.2. Basic Pillars of our Longer Term Plan to 2015

The 2015 Plan defines priorities, benchmarks and core strategies for taking forward the National Democratic Revolution. The two central pillars of our strategy must be building working class power and ensuring quality jobs. These twin thrusts must be linked and reinforce each other. In particular, engagement on policy issues must support organisational development, rather than overshadowing it. Our longer- term approach has defined, above all:

1. Strategies to build the power of the organised working class in South Africa, in our region and continent as well as internationally.

2. Strategies to make our relationship with the Alliance work.

3. The priority areas for intervening on socio economic policy in the short term to stem the job loss bloodbath and fight for quality jobs.

Our vision for 2015 is shaped by the following benchmarks:

1. Systematic and rigorous implementation of an organisation building programme, ensuring the recruitment of over four million members , by the 10th National Congress in 2009, with a united working class and depth of organisation and militancy.

2. Defending our political gains and space. In this regard we need a strong ANC and SACP, rather than weakened Alliance partners.

3. Deepening our work to establish socialist forums as a platform where debates on all major challenges facing the working class take place and at the same time playing a major role in delivering membership education and deepening the political consciousness of the working class on the ground.

4. A large pool of cadres with organisational, political and ideological depth.

5. Working class leadership of the National Democratic Revolution, including in the ANC and key organs of people`s power.

6. Stronger civil society, especially community-based organisations, and stronger involvement of locals in local government and mobilisation.

7. A stronger role for the working class and black women in the public discourse, challenging the hegemony of capital on a larger scale.

8. Ensuring clear measures are in place to reverse rising unemployment, poverty and inequality, ensuring that the share of the working class in national income is on the rise. In this context, increased capacity for affiliates is required to influence sectoral and workplace restructuring policies.

9. In that context, a strong developmental and democratic state is needed to drive a growth and development strategy with a strong redistributive thrust.

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10. Resurgence of the African trade union movement is essential and COSATU must play a central role in developing the perspective of the international trade union movement.

11. A better coordinated international policy is required that contributes in the struggles to build a better world based on equitable redistribution of resources and closing the growing gap between the rich and poor within and between countries. In this regard we must build stronger international trade unions and improve the coordination and unity of social movements as well as improve coordination with progressive political parties and progressive governments. Success on this front requires a stronger role in the ILO as well as transformation of the UN institutions such as the WTO, IMF and World Bank.

While the 2015 Plan set a bold vision for the medium term, there are obvious risks that can derail our plan.

Hence the 2015 Plan has to help us avoid the worst- case scenario. The worst-case scenario is one characterised by, in the main, our failure to systematically implement this Plan. We define the worst-case scenario as entailing among others:

1. A rapid decline in membership to below 1 million by the 30th Anniversary of COSATU in 2015.

2. The persistence of financial challenges, ultimately forcing a cutback in our roles in the range of issues.

3. The coherence and unity of COSATU being undermined leading to splits.

4. The collapse of the Alliance and in that context the ANC and the SACP also facing splits.

5. A full- blown "skorokoro" scenario as painted by the September Commission Report.

8.3. Political Programme

3.1 Introduction

The establishment of democracy brought a huge increase in political power, labour rights and social and economic  opportunities for black people, including workers and women. It fundamentally improved conditions for the majority of our people. For the first time, the majority of our people enjoy the right to vote and the full range of human rights.

The gains were associated with substantial improvement in pay and conditions for lower level African workers, especially in the first few years of democracy. Blacks and women benefited from laws banning discrimination and improving basic conditions of employment. They also gained much greater access to education and skills development. Workers also benefited from the extension of government services in African communities.

The reconfiguration of the international balance of power, at least since the mid- 1980s, which resulted in the end of the cold war, also made it possible to end apartheid. So despite our transition- taking place in a fluid, complex and hostile international situation, the democratic movement had succeeded in building momentum for progressive change both here at home and abroad.

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As such the ANC-led democratic movement used access to political power to begin to unravel the legacy of the past. Still, the state, with the adoption of the GEAR, pursued a contradictory strategy, which on the one hand provided basic services to the people and changed apartheid labour regulation. On the other hand, it relied on a conservative macroeconomic framework.

The gains listed above have been offset by rising unemployment and the resulting fall in incomes for poor households. Slow growth and low investment have been associated with formal job loss and a decline in the quality of work. To the extent the economy has created jobs at all, they have been low- level, insecure and very poorly paid. Thus the average income from work declined sharply between 1995 and 2001.

Essentially, the first decade of freedom has meant the attainment of political power and not total control over the state. While the ANC is the leading party in government, old- style bureaucrats; reactionary consultants; and advisors from the IMF and World Bank have to a certain extent usurped policy formulation in critical areas. On its part, the democratic movement has weakened its capacity to formulate and develop policy while the Alliance is largely marginalised from policymaking.

Fundamentally, economic power remains firmly in the hands of white capital centred in mining and finance capital. Unless the economy is restructured significantly, it would be hard to realise the objectives of the National Democratic Revolution.

We also note the process of class formation now taking place in our society. While the ruling class remains largely white and centred in mining and finance, we have seen the emergence of a small black bourgeoisie. On its part, the working class has also been restructured with the loss of jobs and expansion of the informal economy.

Capital`s drive for short- term profits has resulted in new forms of insecure and poor quality jobs. The process of class formation has serious implications for the NDR and the working class.

The overall thrust of our political strategy is to assert working class hegemony of society to counteract the entrenched power of capital. To that end, we seek to combine state and social power in a way that consistently tilts the balance of power in favour of the working class.Freedom must bring tangible and real benefits to the working class.

8.4. Pillars of our Political Programme

8.4.1. Democratising the state

The state machinery is an important lever for social change hence seizure of state power is a precondition for social revolution. Still, the state machinery has to be transformed if it is to serve the interests of a new ruling bloc. It is to that end that one of the objectives of the NDR, expressed in the Freedom Charter and the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), was the democratisation of the state. In the last nine years we have witnessed a mixed process to transform the state machinery:

1. The constitution entrenches both representative democracy and elements of participatory democracy.Further, the Constitution has a set of provisions to guarantee good, accountable and transparent governance.

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2. South Africa is now a united country governed by single state machinery. This is a remarkable achievement considering the balkanisation of the state under apartheid.

3. The establishment of integrated and non- racial local governments.

4. Government`s attempt to transform the apartheid state in many cases seeks to introduce the private sector in the provision of public services or alternatively to cut back on the number of workers employed by the state.

5. The establishment of structures of social dialogue such as NEDLAC.

The new state machinery opens up spaces to the working class and the democratic movement to steer the direction of social change. Unless however, the Alliance asserts its hegemony over the state and governance based on an agreed programme for change, we are more likely to repeat the experience of the last nine years.

To that end, we require a strong and functioning Alliance and an Alliance programme to implement the RDP in the current period.

To further deepen democracy and ensure good governance our programme will have the following elements:

1. Building a functioning Alliance

2. Calling for a mixed electoral system at national, provincial and local level supported by oversight institutions such as parliament to ensure accountability of public representatives. To that end we propose 65% constituency- based and 35% proportional representation. The Alliance should develop a deployment strategy for all public representatives with the Alliance structures playing a much stronger role in the appointment of Premiers and Mayors.

3. Strengthening social dialogue and in that context empowering NEDLAC.

4. Defending and building the public sector to ensure that the state drives transformation.

5. Developing our capacity to influence policy and legislative processes at national, provincial; local and sectoral levels combined with mechanism to monitor.

To that end, we will monitor government policy and the contributions of individual members of parliament, Cabinet Ministers and other leaders to the needs of the working class, and find ways to communicate this to our members.

The CEC will develop a concrete programme to achieve the above, specifically the last three. We deal with the Alliance below.

8.4.2. Elections

Our general approach to elections entails the following:

4. For each elections we will have a balance sheet based on our vision of what was achieved, what still needs to be done and setbacks. On that basis we will develop a framework for what should constitute an electoral platform. This analysis will be used to contribute towards the development of Election Manifestos.

5. Establishing election teams for mobilisation of voters during the entire election campaign.

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6. Mobilising financial resources to implement our election plan.

For the 2004 General Elections, we shall follow the programme developed by the CEC, namely:

1. Establishing election teams at national, regional and local level.

2. Mobilising workers to register to vote for elections and to vote ANC.

3. Mobilising resources to carry out this work.

The key task facing us in the forthcoming elections is to ensure that the ANC wins the Western Cape and KwaZulu Natal with a clear majority. Further we will work towards ensuring that the ANC consolidates its majority in other provinces.

The CEC will develop a detailed programme for the local government elections in 2005. The 2006 COSATUCongress will adopt a programme and approach to the 2009 General Elections and 2010 Local Government Elections. The 2009 and 2012 Congress will adopt programme for the 2012 General Elections and 2013 LocalGovernment Elections.

8.4.3. Building the Alliance

We need to develop a more constructive and pro- active approach to the Alliance. Our work starts with the belief that the unity of the working class and its allies, expressed politically through the Alliance, is critical to ensuring a more favourable outcome. But we need a more strategic approach, which lets us gradually build the effectiveness of the Alliance while restoring the hegemony of the working class in the democratic movement.

COSATU believes that the Alliance comprises three independent formations under the leadership of the ANC. To that end, we will consistently work towards ensuring that the Alliance becomes the political centre that steers our revolution. By the political centre we mean Alliance processes that:

1. Allow Alliance partners to participate equally and fully on matters of national, provincial and local importance.

2. Serve as a platform to share information and develop common positions on national and international questions.

3. Serve as forum for the Alliance partners to debate and discuss their different positions, e. g. on economic policy, privatisation, etc.

4. Influence events in all parliamentary structures, be it at a national, provincial or local level.

5. Meet regularly at national, provincial and local level.

COSATU will table a detailed proposal on how the Alliance should operate; relate to governance structures and its relationship with the mass democratic movement.

Linked to this COSATU will also re- table its historical proposal for an Alliance programme for transformation.

Further, COSATU will call for a mechanism to manage inter- Alliance debate and differences as per the Ekurhuleni Declaration.

8.4.4. The ANC

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The ANC is our organisation and we are not going to throw in the towel and leave it. Still we recognise that the ANC is undergoing a process of adjusting to being a party in government, while retaining its overall character as a mass liberation movement. Further, the ANC is being intensely lobbied by capital to adopt its positions.

It is in this regard that the working class has to jealously defend the progressive and working class bias of the ANC.

To that end COSATU commits:

1. To swell the ranks of the ANC by calling on its members, shop stewards and leaders to join the ANC en masse .

2. To develop a joint programme with the ANC on campaigns, education, and others matters.

3. To continue building programmatic relations with the leagues of the ANC

8.4.5. The SACP

The SACP is the vanguard of the working class, and we seek to build it into a strong, mass- based organisation that truly can be the bedrock for workers. To remain relevant, the SACP must strengthen its capacity for independent analysis and policy development from a working class perspective. In the medium term:

1. The Socialist Commission should discuss the two medium term strategy documents developed by COSATU and SACP and develop a minimum platform of work. Further the Commission should re-open discussion on a Conference of the Left and agree on a common programme for the Socialist Forums.

2. COSATU will provide financial and material support to the SACP as a concrete contribution toward the Party becoming financially stable and ultimately self-reliant. In that vain, we will encourage our members and leaders to support the debit order campaign and to join the SACP. The Central Executive Committee will determine the actual contribution by affiliates.

3. COSATU will support the Red October and other campaigns run by the SACP.

4. COSATU will ensure that the Chris Hani Institute is up and running in order to deepen political education and a working class perspective on development questions.

5. COSATU will ensure young workers join the Young Communist League.

8.4.6. The Mass Democratic Movement

COSATU and the working class have to broaden the front facing capital. To that end, we will work primarily with traditional mass democratic movement formations.

We recognise the development of new- issue based social movements, some of which are hostile to the Alliance and COSATU. We have a duty to assert working class leadership of these formations and to that end it is imperative that the Alliance develops a common strategy on the social movements.

Our plan of action would comprise two elements. The first is working with the traditional mass democratic movements. To that end, COSATU will continue to support the student movement, COSAS and SASCO and strengthen SANCO so that they develop

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their organisational and political capabilities. We will also continue our relations with the People`s Budget Coalition, the Basic Income Grant Coalition, the TAC, and the traditional allies of the working class.

The second leg of our work with new social movements will be guided by the criteria set out in the previous COSATU Congresses in 1985 and 1987, as well as the following criteria, to determine social movements that we will work with:

1. Whether the issue/ s being taken up is/ are genuine and affecting the working class and the poor.

2. Whether the campaign and working together strengthens the working class, the labour movement and the broad democratic movement.

3. Whether the organisations that the Federation wants to work with are mass based or have an orientation to the masses.

4. Whether the organisations adhere to the principles of internal democracy and working class leadership.

5. Whether the agenda of the organisations does not aim to liquidate or undermine the Alliance partners.

6. Whether the organisation has a track record of disciplined organisational practice, and does not foster divisions within COSATU affiliates.

8.4.7. Ideological Contestation and Political Education

Our society is characterised by intense ideological contestation, which also manifest itself in the democratic movement.

We can only build working class power in a situation where there is a deliberate and sustained cadreship development programme. Such a programme of political education should deepen members` understanding of the current phase of our struggle, the challenges it poses and the most appropriate strategy and tactics.

To take our political work forward:

1. In the medium term, we must build the Chris Hani Institute into a strong engine for ideological grounding and political education as well as the development of alternatives on a range of issues but primarily to ensure that serves as an intellectual asset of the working class.

2. Set aside a portion of our income for the design and delivery of political education programmes across the Federation. To that end prioritise the strengthening of our locals and regions.

3. Invest in developing a pool of political educators,

4. Collaborate with the progressive intelligentsia to contest the intellectual and ideological space in society through public debates, use of media, and influencing centres of knowledge production such as universities, policy institutes, etc. To that end COSATU should be at the centre of shaping on- going development of curriculum that promotes working class and progressive values in the public education system.

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5. Focus on young workers and develop ways to attract them to trade union organisation.

6. Be at the centre of alternative cultural productions that highlight the experience of our people and which instil values based on the objectives of non- racial and working class traditions

8.4.8. Benchmarks for our Political Programme

The following benchmarks for our political programme shall include:

1. Playing a decisive role in the 2004 elections as well as subsequent elections, and shaping the elections platform. On the one hand, we need to maintain the overwhelming predominance of the ANC. On the other, we must reassert COSATU`s importance in the electoral process. At the same time, we recognise that massive unemployment and high service charges will make for a difficult elections campaigns.

2. Making a reality our long- standing resolution to build the ANC and the SACP by developing a concrete programme with measurable targets and monitoring mechanism.

3. Deepening the ideological contestation around the nature of the National Democratic Revolution.

4. Monitoring government policy and contributions of individual members of parliament, Cabinet Ministers and other leaders to the needs of the working class and finding ways to communicate this to membership including through publishing a scorecard in the Shop Steward Magazine.

5. Ensuring that the working class is a factor in the national congress of the ANC and SACP in 2007.Playing a key role in the ANC centenary celebrations and in subsequent congresses of the SACP and the ANC.

Organisational Programme - Building COSATU Engines9.1 Introduction

Any strategy will fail without a strong organisation on the ground. Only a strong and militant organisation can ensure that COSATU and workers as a class are taken as a force to be reckoned with. We can never affect the balance of forces if our organisation is weak.

The working class does not get a leadership role automatically, but must continue to earn it. To that end we must build the capability of our organisation and ensure genuine internal democracy.

9.2. Building COSATU - An Ongoing Programme of Organisational Development

The 8th National Congress has adopted the Report from the Organisational Review Commission, which set out the basic framework for organisational development. As stated in the Report, organisational development is an ongoing process that must be implemented continuously.

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The Organisational Review Programme must achieve two aims: First and foremost, we must build a strong trade union movement that excels on workplace issues and defence of members in the face of attacks by employers. Second, we must continue to engage on priority policy issues, above all to ensure employment creation and strengthen social protection.

The key elements of the Organisational Review Programme adopted by Congress are:

1. A recruitment drive campaign with the aim of increasing our membership by 10% every year, working towards the overall target of 2.6 million by 2006 4 million in 2009.

2. Ensuring greater support for Shop Stewards, both in terms of organisational service and education.

3. Institutionalising capacity building for both effective organisation and ideological cohesion. The core task is to build the education capacity of affiliates and the Federation, as well as other institutions such as DITSELA and the Chris Hani Institute.

4. Ensuring better financial and personnel management in each affiliate.

5. Unifying the three Federations so that by 2009 we realise our vision of one-country-one-Federation, one-industry-one-union.

6. Promoting women leadership, taking up gender struggles much more effectively, and monitoring progress consistently. Congress has adopted the quota for women representation in leadership structures and by 2006 we must see visible improvements in representivity.

7. Ensuring measures to manage the deployment process. In this regard, we should ensure even development amongst leaders and affiliates and further consolidate the depth in our leadership. We need an exit strategy for leadership that retains experience and expertise within the trade union movement.

8. Implementing gains we have achieved at the level of legislative advances into coherent organisational strategies.

9. Providing quality benefits to workers, improving their and their families` lives; and creating the reputation of COSATU as a movement, which really cares for and is home for all workers. This includes looking at best practice across the affiliates and international experience around issues such as bursaries for children of workers, insurance, health and other benefits, workers` holidays, workers saving schemes, etc.

Further, we need to recognise the fact that the composition, socially and economically of the working class is dynamic and shifting. Therefore our organisational strategies need to address these changing realities, and be specifically geared towards meeting the needs and addressing the consciousness of specific layers and strata of workers. Some of the sectors and strata that we need to consciously target with creative organisational approaches include:

1. Youth.

2. Women.

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3. Migrant workers.

4. Casualised and part- time workers.

5. Unorganised sectors of the working class. The obvious sectors in this regard are about 2 million unorganised farm and domestic workers.

Other sectors also need to be identified, including construction.

The CEC must define a detailed plan to implement the organisational renewal resolutions adopted by Congress. This includes defining priorities, setting time frames and benchmarks.

10. Socio- Economic Programme - Defending and Creating Quality Jobs

10.1. Introduction

Ensuring quality jobs requires both stronger efforts to manage workplace and sectoral restructuring, and more targeted policy engagement overall. We cannot afford to let South Africa follow the pattern of National Democratic Revolution in the rest of Africa, where the ruling elite colludes with local and foreign capital to enrich itself at the cost of the country as a whole.

Rather, we must ensure that government acts to restructure the economy fundamentally, which in turn requires that it do more to manage capital. At the same time, we must define an effective strategy to lock capital into a national agenda, through incentives, regulation and discipline, in order to ensure higher investment.

10.2. Elements of our Programme

Our programme has three core elements:

10.2.1. Engagement at sectoral level, especially through sector summit and charter processes. We need to review our programme of building capacity for sectoral engagement and define guidelines and resource needs. Benchmarks include:

a. By 2006, every affiliate should have a clear programme for sectoral engagement, accompanied by broad- based educational programmes. For its part, the centre should have developed guidelines for sectoral outcomes and engagement that ensure effective use of capacity without overburdening the union movement with policy demands.

b. Sector summits should have been held in sectors prioritised by the GDS (metals and engineering, chemicals, construction, ICT, clothing and textile, agriculture and agro- processing, tourism, call centres and back office processing, and cultural industries), plus health, education, electricity and local government.

c. COSATU should have the capacity to monitor sectoral processes and support affiliates where necessary.

10.2.2. Engagement in the workplace backed up by the living wage campaign. This means that COSATU must do more to develop model demands in each area as agreed by CEC in 2002. These demands should be based on mandates from the 8 th Congress, and circulated in time to influence the 2004 negotiation.

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a. Starting in 2004, key demands from the living wage campaign should have a visible influence on negotiations in all sectors.

b. By the 2009 National Congress, the living wage campaign should have led to greater consistency in standards across sectors.

c. COSATU should begin immediately to monitor negotiations to identify new needs and weaknesses.

It should set standards in each area covered by the living wage campaign, and report on its impact to the 9th National Congress in 2006 and subsequent congresses.

3. Continued engagement on national policies through, NEDLAC, at Parliament and in bilaterals, with two core focuses: supporting economic and labour market policies, which promote job creation and retention, and improving social protection. COSATU should report on key identified priorities and critical areas which include:

a. Engagement to counter pressure by capital for excessively restrictive fiscal and monetary policy.

b. Work to restructure the financial and retail sectors.

c. Ensuring trade agreements do not undermine sectoral developments, destroy jobs or undermine the capacity of the state to drive development.

d. Ensuring affordable access to basic services, focusing on education, health, water, electricity and sewage, as well as public transport and housing - and by extension fighting privatisation and commercialisation.

e. Ensuring a comprehensive social security system.

f. Measures to consolidate worker rights, and roll back strategies of capital including on casualisation, contracting out, etc.

g. Measures to ensure that investment are directed into productive activity, by capital in general, retirement funds (including the implementation of the COSATU policy on retirement funds), the public sector as well as strengthening of the social sector.

11. International Programme

11.1. Introduction

Our local struggles are intertwined with international working class struggles - through our local initiatives and victories that we score, we open up a new front in the ongoing struggle against international monopoly capital. The globalisation of capitalism means that no society can survive on its own. Hence we need to appreciate the dynamic linkages between our struggles here at home and on the international front.

11.2. Elements of our International Programme

COSATU`s international programme rests on three pillars:

I. Building an international working class movement.

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II. International Solidarity.

III. Struggle for a Just World Order.

11.2.1. Building the African Trade Union Movement and International Solidarity

COSATU`s main contribution in consolidating working class international power and solidarity is by concrete action to build a vibrant African trade union movement that is linked to the global trade union movement. In that regard, we have to fight against beggar-thy-neighbour development policies and a race to the bottom as a means to attract investment.

Working- class solidarity especially in the region has two main objectives. First, the gains that we make in South Africa can easily be eroded if workers in the region do not enjoy similar rights. Some companies have relocated to Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland to avoid progressive labour laws that protects workers rights in South Africa. It is for this reason, that the SADC Charter of Fundamental Social Rights is a cornerstone of our action for a common basic floor of rights.

Secondly, we need a strong international trade union movement to enforce global labour standards. Further, we need a progressive international trade union movement that engages with the global discourse on people- centred development. COSATU cannot influence this discourse if it is on the fringe of or un- strategic in its participation in the global trade union movement. Our agenda should at its core, seek a better deal for workers in the current world economy.

That means setting a floor of basic rights for workers across the globe. By extension, it is in the interest of workers both at home and internationally to encourage and nurture global workers` solidarity. To that end, COSATU must define:

Concrete actions to build the African trade union movement and what we want out of that movement.

To that end we also need to clarify what resources we are willing to invest to realise this goal. That also means concretely working to eliminate the barriers to workers unity - including the artificial linguistic barrier.

What we want out of the international trade union movement, our role in it and the resources we are willing to commit.

Having said that, in the next three years we will step up our solidarity work with Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU), Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) Cuba`s CTC and others.

11.2.2. Struggle for a Just World Order

The current world order dominated by the United States is largely not favourable to the working class. The Alliance between powerful trans- national corporations, a handful of developed nations and international financial institutions, currently drives the anti-working class agenda. Still, in the recent past, new opportunities have emerged signifying the rising confidence of the working class to take up struggles against unfair trade, U. S aggression, etc. Overall we seek to ensure:

• A just and equitable world order.

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I. A fair trade regime and reject attempts by developed countries to further entrench their dominance and to undermine the sovereignty of developing countries.

II. Transformation of the international institutions such as the World Bank, WTO and IMF.

III. International peace and stability.

IV. A global basic floor of rights for workers and human rights.

The CEC should develop concrete proposals on how we will realise this overall vision and further elaborate on COSATU COSATU`s global transformation agenda on issues such as trade, development; and international financial institutions.

12.Constitutional review committee

12.1. Background

a) In a number of COSATU congresses affiliates have been raising proposals on constitutional amendments. The federation is currently faced with various challenges involving affiliates. Some of these issues include intervention into affiliates and affiliates withholding subscriptions. Some unions were concerned that there was not sufficient time to consider the implications of these amendments. As a result, a CEC constitutional review committee was formed.

b) The 2017 central committee also considered some of the proposed amendments but did not exhaust the discussion on these issues. The central committee has endorsed the work of the committee.

c) The report below was subject of a discussion at the CEC special political commission workshop.

d) The August special CEC should adopt this report for presentation to the 2018 13 th

Congress.

12.2. Reasons for amendments

a) At the time when the COSATU constitution was drafted in 1985 there was harmony and a common understanding of the working class struggle and national struggle as led by the ANC. However, today a COSATU affiliate can take the federation to court such as in the case of NUMSA and others v COSATU.

b) There is a need to ensure alignment on how national office bearers, PEC’s and locals are elected and execute their functions.

c) Over the years there have been some constitutional amendments. However, some of the sections were left unattended and have resulted in ambiguities. For example when the COSATU Executive Committee was removed the alignment with other sections in the constitution was not done. FINCOM used to report EXCO. After EXCO was abolished the FINCOM continued meeting every month.

d) There is need to look closely at the constitution, analyse problematic areas and suggest solutions for presentation to the congress.

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12.3. Proposed amendments

12.3.1. Re-introduction of EXCO

a) The Constitution should provide for the re-introduction of EXCO to assist CEC to carry out its administrative responsibilities including approving reports from Department and provinces and to give direction where necessary, acquire or lease properties, receive invitations. The scrapping of EXCO has weakened the implementation of the COSATU programmes.

b) The commission agreed that there is no need for an EXCO and that we do not need to constitutionalise the secretariat forum. Whilst the reintroduction of EXCO was not accepted it was noted that CEC should be given space to finish its agenda on time and within the standard timeframe of three days.

c) It was further noted that NOB functions and powers need to be clarified and strengthened. The powers of office bearers are mentioned in clauses 9-10.2.

12.3.2. Reducing the number of delegates to provincial congress

a) The current clause 6.2.2.2 states that each affiliate is entitled to one additional representative for every additional 250 members. Clause 6.2.2.2 of the Constitution on the composition of provincial congress should be amended to provide for one additional representative for every additional 500 members. The effect of the clause would be to reduce the number of delegates to congresses. The motivation behind this proposal was that affiliates are different in terms of membership and financial resources and as result, some of the affiliates may find it difficult to send members to Congress due to lack of resources.

b) The commission observed that the status quo should be retained and did not accept this proposal.

12.3.3. Processing of National Congress resolutions

a) It is proposed that the constitution should provide for a time frame within which affiliates should submit resolutions to the general secretary and for circulation of the draft resolutions before the Congress. The current 30 days as set out in clause 3.7.1 should be increased to 60 days before the national congress and for the general secretary to circulate draft resolutions 50 days before the Congress is held. The effect of the proposal will be to ensure that affiliates have adequate time to prepare and discuss the consolidated resolutions before the Congress.

b) The commission agreed with the rationale for this proposal because affiliates need to adequate time to prepare for the National Congress. However, it noted that the implementation of the resolution may require early congress preparation.

c) It was further noted that it was not clear how this was going to affect the notice of convening the congress.

d) The commission agreed that the status quo should remain as set out in clause 3.7.1 and therefore, congress will have to decide on this proposal.

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12.3.4. Nomination for election of office bearers

a) It is proposed that the closing period for nominations of office bearers should be 30 days before the National Congress and the names and positions of the nominees shall be circulated to affiliates in good standing 20 days before the congress. The proposal would have the effect of introducing a new clause 3.5.7. The committee noted that there is a need to ensure an early and orderly nomination process so as to avoid unnecessary divisions among affiliates. The constitution is silent on the nomination process except to state that nominations must be send to an independent body e.g. the IEC.

b) The commission observed that Congress’s power to re-open the nomination process should not be taken away.

c) It was further noted that the election of COSATU leaders is a business of congress, that the IEC report is also about the leaders’’ standing as well and it is congress that accepts or rejects the IEC report and that in this context Congress can reopen nominations.

d) The commission observed that the current practice be kept intact and that there should be no restrictions on the powers of congress to reopen nominations.

e) However, there was a strong view that the fact that the constitution is silent on circulation of nominees for elections is a recipe for chaos which may hamper smooth processes of election of office bearers.

12.3.5. The effect of a transfer of a COSATU elected office bearer from one affiliate to another affiliate

a) It is proposed that when an NOB is “transferred” from one affiliate to another the NOB should maintain his or her position subject to the following requirements; (1) He/she must be elected as a shopsteward of the affiliate to which he or he has been transferred to, (2) In terms of the constitution of that affiliate, and (3) Within a period of two (2) months from the date of the transfer.

b) The proposal would have the effect of introducing a new clause 9.6.3 regarding the transfer of an NOB to another affiliate.

c) The reason for the proposal is to ensure the stability of leadership across all COSATU structures.

d) The commission observed that the constitution is clear on what happen when there is a change in the position of the COSATU leader between election and the end of term of office. Clause 9.6.1 states that an NOB must vacate his or her position in situations mentioned from clauses 9.6.1.1-9.6.1.3. As a result, a transfer from one affiliate to another does not exist. It was noted that this proposal may contradict other clauses in some of the affiliates’ constitutions which state that a person loses shopsteward position when that person loses his or her job.

e) The commission did not accept the proposal because workers must always have control over the election of shopstewards including national officer bearers.

12.3.6. Minimum membership threshold

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a) It is proposed that the constitution should provide for a minimum threshold membership requirement for new and existing affiliates in order to avoid there proliferation of small rival unions, and to ensure that COSATU has strong unions. It is not the intention of the proposal to dis-affiliate existing affiliates and to block new unions from joining COSATU.

b) Currently there is no minimum threshold for registration as a trade union in law and for admission as an affiliate of COSATU.

c) The commission agreed that there was no basis for an amendment of the constitution to introduce a membership requirement. The CEC must decide each application for membership of COSATU on case by case basis as the Federation is not a bargaining council. The commission did not agree with this proposal.

12.3.7. Weighted voting electoral system

a) It is proposed that CEC delegates should vote in accordance with a mandate from their respective unions and the voting in the CEC should be based on the membership of an affiliate at the relevant time and that affiliates should vote as a block rather than as individual delegates from affiliates.

b) The commission noted that when the CEC meets it is a meeting of delegates or participants and not of affiliates. However, a motion must be moved by an affiliate. As a result, individual delegates may end up voting against a mandate from the union.

c) The commission felt that the weighted voting system might discourage lobbying and observed that the each affiliate should influence all CEC decision irrespective of their levels of membership.

d) The commission did not accept this proposal.

12.4. Other constitutional issues raised by the Committee in the context of the above discussion

12.4.1. Filling of vacancies at PEC level

Clause 5.1.7 provides that where there is vacancy at the Federation level the CEC can fill that vacancy. However, the Constitution is silent on the filling of vacancies at the provincial level. The commission agreed that the constitution should be clarified in order to be consistent with clause 5.1.7.

12.4.2. Term of office

a) There is a need to review the term of office of the NOB’s as set out in clause 3.6 to a five year term instead of the current three years. Whilst some were in favour of increasing the term to 4 years some were arguing that it should be increased to 5 and eventually the committee agreed that the terms of office should be increased to 4 years.

b) The commission noted that there are too many national meetings and that we need to realign our congresses; local, provincial and national congress. We must avoid having congresses of cosatu in one year. Provincial congresses should be convened a year before the cosatu national congress.

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c) Provinces congresses must also be for a 4 year period and that Provincial congress must start the year before the national congresses.

d) The commission recommended that the term of office of provincial congresses NOB’s should be for 3 years.

I. This would ensure full and effective implementation of COSATU resolutions and will mitigate the financial implications of convening a National Congress every three years. The commission noted that the decision to have a shorter term of three year term was motivated by the need to ensure worker control. The commission unanimously agreed that there should be an extension of the current 3 year term of office mainly because the Federation’s Congress is expensive especially if it is held in a short space of time.

II. The commission agreed with this proposal.

12.4.3. Decision making in the CEC and PEC’s

a) According to the current practice, a decision is taken if there is a proposed motion and the motion is seconded. However clauses 5.6.1 (on CEC decision making) and 11.4.1-11.4.2 (on standing orders and rules of procedure at federation meetings) provides that a decision is taken if the motion is duly seconded and a simple majority of people in favour of the motion vote in favour thereof unless otherwise provided for in this Constitution. In this context the issue of voting should be revisited especially in the case where one motion is unopposed. There should be an express clause on unanimous consent or consensus if there is no objection.

b) The current clause means that even if there is one motion that motion must be tested by an ordinary majority vote or 50 plus one. If there is a dissenting voice there must be a vote. Whilst motions must be moved by affiliates decisions must be taken by participants or individual delegates because a motion must be supported by a simple majority of the participants.

c) The committee proposed that a decision should be regarded as taken if the motion is unopposed without the need to get majority support or 50 plus one votes. This would ensure that there are less delays in the decision making process.

d) The commission agreed with the proposal with the proviso that this issue is taken for further legal opinion to ensure that there is fairness in decision making without trampling on dissenting voices because the constitution is subject to the constitution of the republic.

12.4.4. Form of voting

Clause 5.6.2 provides that decisions of CEC must be made by show of hand or ballot. Some of the delegates may be scared of voting by hand. The commission noted that there should be a constitutional requirement for a secret ballot in all cases should there be a motion whether or not to vote by hand or in secret.

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12.4.5. Absence of a provincial shopsteward council

There is a need to constitutionalise the Provincial shopsteward council. Currently the constitution only provides for a local shopstewards council in clause 8. Provincial shopsteward councils should be granted more powers. The commission felt that the provincial shopsteward council should remain a campaigning structure and could not find any compelling reasons to constitutionalise it.

12.4.6. COSATU FINCOM

a) In terms of clause 12.6.3 the FINCOM must meet every month. This was a requirement when EXCO was in existence. When EXCO was removed from the Constitution the one month meeting period was not changed. There is lack of compliance with this requirement and this may amount to dereliction of duty.

b) The commission agreed that the FINCOM meetings should be aligned with the period of the CEC or three months as the committee is reporting to the CEC.

12.4.7. Provincial congress

a) The need to have 9 COSATU provincial congresses in the year of the national congress is very expensive and each Congress costs about 2 million rand. There may be a need to have provincial elective congress during the term of office of COSATU NOB’s.

b) As a consequential amendment to the terms of office of the NOB as discussed above provincial congresses should be convened a year before the national congress.

12.4.8. Suspension of an office bearer

Clause 8.6 of Constitution provides for suspension of a local office bearer. However, the constitution is silent on the suspension of a provincial and national office bearer. There is need for harmonisation and consistency.

12.4.9. Gender structure

a) There is a need to promote gender equality in the federation particular in relation to sexual harassment. It is proposed that the Constitution should provide for a gender structure as set out below. This is a resolution of congress which must be implemented immediately. The commission noted that additional work is needed to integrate the gender structure in the constitution without amending the resolution as adopted by the 12th congress.

b) The commission noted that the gender structure must act within the affiliates and shall be a committee of the executive committees of COSATU.

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2ND DRAFT - THE CONSTUTIONALISATION and REPRESENTATION OF COSATU GENDER STRUCTURES

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT THE COSATU 12TH

NATIONAL CONGRESS 23 – 26 NOVEMBER 2015.

GENDER COMMITTEES

1. ESTABLISHMENT OF GENDER STRUCTURES, PURPOSE AND STATUS

1.1. Gender Committees shall be established at all levels of COSATU.

1.2. The Gender Committees shall be sub committees of the respective Executive Committees.

1.3. The CEC is empowered to oversee the establishment and functioning of the gender structures including monitoring the implementation of the Gender policy and empowerment of women.

1.3. Matters relating to the functioning of the structures shall be in accordance with the provisions of the COSATU Constitution and policies.

1.4. Only workers shall be eligible to stand for Office Bearers positions in accordance with the COSATU Constitution clause 3.5.3.

1.5. The Gender structures shall have in their meetings and office bearers structures no more than 1/3 men.

1.6. The Gender Committees shall attend to any matter referred to them by the respective Executive Committees or Congresses whilst retaining powers to address any matter of gender discrimination or of failure of the structure to implement organizational and or gender policies

2. PURPOSE AND FUNCTIONS

2.1. The Gender Structures shall ensure that:

2.1.1. women in their affiliates are empowered and developed to lead their struggle against patriarchy and capitalism;

2.1.2. women occupy leadership positions including traditional male leadership positions;

2.1.3. monitor and report on the measurable targets resolution;

2.1.4. raise gender awareness amongst women and men;

2.1.5. develop strategies on gender and women specific policies, programmes and activities which can be effectively implemented to give effect to the Comprehensive Gender Policy;

2.1.6. gender is mainstreamed in all activities and programmes of COSATU;

2.1.7. COSATU structures and activities are composed of by at least 50% women;

2.1.8. strong and vibrant gender structures are built to strengthen COSATU

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2.1.9. champion the cause of women at the workplace, and in affiliates, the labour movement and society as part of the mandate of the working class struggle for socialism;

2.1.10. Evaluate and develop further strategies at the respective Gender

Conferences;

2.1.11. Account and submit reports to the respective constitutional structure through the Gender Structure delegates.

3. COMPOSITION. MEETINGS AND REPRESENTATION OF GENDER STRUCTURES

3.1. LOCAL GENDER COMMITTEE (LGC)

3.1.1 COMPOSITION

3.1.1.1 The LGC shall comprise of two (2) gender representatives per affiliate, Local Gender Office Bearers and LOB designated to Gender, as elected by the Local Gender Shopstewards Council and endorsed by the Local Gender Executive Committee.

3.1.1.2. The LGC shall elect from amongst themselves a local gender chairperson, deputy chairperson, secretary and deputy secretary, whom shall co-ordinate the day to day activities of the local gender activities;

3.1.1.3. The Local Gender Chairperson and Local Gender Secretary shall attend the Provincial Gender Committee.

3.1.2. REPRESENTATION

3.1.2.1 The Local Gender Chairperson and Local Gender Secretary shall sit on the LEC.

3.1.2.2. The Local Gender Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson shall form part of delegations to Provincial and National Activities and associated organizations where appropriate.

3.1.3. MEETINGS

3.1.3.1 The LGC shall meet once per month.

3.2. PROVINCIAL GENDER COMMITTEES (PGC)

3.2.1. COMPOSITION

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3.2.1.1. The PGC shall comprise of affiliate gender chairperson and gender co-ordinator or duly nominated representative of that affiliate where that affiliate does not have a gender structure;

3.2.1.2. The Provincial Gender Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Secretary and Deputy Secretary, and Provincial Gender Co-ordinator

3.2.1.3. The Provincial Office Bearer designated to Gender.

3.2.1.4. COSATU Provincial Officials.

3.3. REPRESENTATION

3.3.1. The Provincial Gender Chairperson and Provincial Gender Secretary

shall sit on the Provincial Executive Committee.

3.3.2. The Provincial Gender Chairperson and Gender Secretary shall form part of delegations to Provincial and National Activities and associated organizations where appropriate.

3.3.3. MEETINGS

3.3.3.1. The PGC shall meet at least four times per year or as otherwise determined by relevant structures.

3.3.3.2. The PG Office Bearers and Co-ordinator shall co-ordinate the day to day activities of the PGC in between meetings.

3.3.4. PROVINCIAL GENDER CONFERENCE (PGConference)

3.3.4.1. The PGConference shall compose of the Provincial Gender Office Bearers; Provincial Gender Co-ordinator, PG Office Bearer Designate and other Provincial Office Bearers and Provincial officials;

3.3.4.2. Maximum of ten (10) delegates per affiliate or duly nominated representatives of that affiliate where that affiliate does not have a gender structure.

3.3.4.3. The PGConference shall elect the PG Office Bearers.

3.3.4.4. The PGConference shall meet once every three years before the

Provincial Congress.

3.4. NATIONAL GENDER COMMITTEE (NGC)

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3.5.1. COMPOSITION

3.5.1.1. The NGC shall comprise of four affiliate delegates of which shall be the National Gender Chairperson, National Gender Co-ordinator, NOB designated to Gender, Women CEC delegate or a National Gender Structure member; or duly nominated representative of that affiliate where that affiliate does not have a gender structure;

3.5.1.2. The National Gender Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Secretary and Treasurer, and National Gender Co-ordinator;

3.5.1.3. The National Office Bearers designated to Gender;

3.5.1.4. Heads of Departments

3.5.2. REPRESENTATION

3.5.2.1. The National Gender Chairperson and National Gender Co-

ordinator shall sit on the Central Executive Committee and delegates to the Central Committee and National Congress.

3.5.2.2. The National Gender Chairperson and Gender Co-ordinator shall form part of delegations to all other national activities and associated organizations where appropriate.

3.5.2. MEETINGS

3.5.2.1. The NGC shall meet twice per year or as otherwise determined by relevant structures.

3.5.2.2. The NGC Office Bearers and Co-ordinator shall co-ordinate the day to day activities of the NGC in between meetings.

3.5.3. NATIONAL GENDER CONFERENCE (PGConference)

3.5.3.1. The NGConference shall compose of the NGC Office Bearers; National Gender Co-ordinator, NGC Office Bearers Designate and other National Office Bearers and Heads of Departments.

3.5.3.2. ten (10) delegates per affiliate or duly nominated delegates of an affiliate where that affiliate does not have a gender structure;

3.5.3.3. The NGConference shall elect the NG Office Bearers.

3.5.3.4. The NGConference shall convene every three years before the

National Congress.

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Further the COSATU constitutional clauses shall accordingly also be amended as follows to ensure representation of gender structures

NATIONAL CONGRESS

3.3. insert new 3.2.1.8. delegates from the gender structures as contemplated in clause ….(on the gender structures and representation);

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

4.2. insert new 4.2.3. Delegates from the gender structures as contemplated in clause…. (ibid);

CEC

5.2. insert new 5.2.3.3. Delegates from the gender structures as contemplated in clause… (ibid) ;

PROVINCIAL CONGRESS

6.2. insert 6.2.2.3 Delegates from the gender structures as contemplated in clause … (ibid);

PEC

7.2. insert 7.2.2.3 Delegates from the gender structures as contemplated in clause … (ibid)

LEC

8 insert new 8.1.3.2. Delegates from the gender structures as contemplated in clause … (ibid)

13. Autonomy of affiliates

14. Clause 2.3 states that affiliates are autonomous and that they must abide by the policies of the Federation. There is need to clarify this section to ensure that there is clear guideline on when can CEC intervene in the affairs of the affiliate, at whose request and in which matters and the role of NOB’s in this regard. Clause 5.1 on powers of the CEC is silent on the issue of intervening in affiliates affairs.

15. The commission observed that when read broadly as a whole the constitution does provide the CEC with intervening powers. However, it acknowledged that the absence of a direct provision stating that the CEC has powers to intervene may result in different views among affiliates and court challenges.

16. The commission agreed that clause 2.3 of the constitution must not be tempered with. However it agreed that the clause may be strengthened by making it clear that ‘’the federation through the CEC may intervene in affiliates’ affairs in certain circumstances as set out in the policies of the federation and

17. That the 2001 1st Central Committee resolution below will be used to develop these policies without undermining clause 2.3.

Resolutions of the COSATU 1st Central Committee Held on the 19 - 21 November 2001 At Essepark - Kempton Park on cosatu intervention in the affiliates

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Affiliates

Noting:

1. The need for the Federation to intervene in affiliates where deep seated conflict and crises exist.

2. The need for an induction process so that new affiliates learn about Federation principles, policies and practices.

Believing:

1. The Sixth National Congress sufficiently debated the question of Federation intervention.

Resolve:

1. To adopt the proposal in the Organisational Review Report that COSATU be officially mandated to intervene when an affiliate:

a. Experiences a deep political conflict that creates a crisis in the union.

b. Experiences a serious administrative or organisational crisis;

c. Adopts or implements policies that contradicts COSATU positions.

d. Cannot grow or reach large groups of workers in their sector because of a lack of resources or inability to develop or implement appropriate strategies.

e. Does not adhere to demarcation decisions.

2. The nature of the intervention should depend on the crisis.

a. In the case of political conflict or disagreements on policy, COSATU and affiliates NOB must intervene.

b. For internal administrative or organisational problems, a team with appropriate expertise, led by an NOB, should provide support.

c. The organising Committee is responsible for supporting weak affiliates, based on strategies established by the Secretariat.

d. Demarcation disputes should be handled by a demarcation committee established by the CEC, consisting of a COSATU NOB and two affiliate General Secretaries, and reporting to the CEC.

3. COSATU must develop detailed policy guidelines on intervention and submit them to the CEC for finalisation.

4. COSATU’s organising unit must develop an induction programme for new affiliates, with timeframes, that includes:

a. Education for shop stewards and officials as well as leadership on COSATU’s principles, history and major programmes and aims, and

b. Indicates when and how the new affiliates must adhere to COSATU’s constitutional principles.

5. COSATU’s Education Unit will implement the induction programmes.

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