political reconstruction of bangladesh reflections on building a new state in the seventies

8/3/2019 Political Reconstruction of Bangladesh Reflections on Building a New State in the Seventies

1/5

Political Reconstruction of Bangladesh: Reflections on Building a New State in the SeventiesAuthor(s): Rajni KothariReviewed work(s):Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 7, No. 18 (Apr. 29, 1972), pp. 882-885Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4361306 .

Accessed: 26/11/2011 05:30

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Economic and Political Weekly.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=epwhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4361306?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4361306?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=epw


2/5

SPECIALARTICLES

Polit ical Reconstructionf BangladeshReflections on Building a New State in the Seventies

Rajni KothariThis paper seeks to point out certain generallessons that we have learnt from the last 25 years ofexperience in regard to state and nation buildingin the "ThirdWorld".There is, on the one hand, the modernisationmodel which seeks to underminethe autonomyandpower of the new states. Thereis, on the otherhand, what may be called the state-buildingmodel whichseeks to conceive of the tasks of modernisation, conomic developmentand the rest as part of a generaldrive towardsconsolidatingnationalautonomyandrealisingthe values of democracy, social justice andsecularism.Bangladesh has come to life when the alternative cenarios can be perceived n their fullness,whenthe ground for making critical choices has been cleared of a lot of confusionand misleading cliche, andwhen the real need is for a proper perspective and bold initiatives from the political elite rather thanpassing on the responsibility to foreign trained technocrats.

BEING neither a citizen of Bangladesnnor an "area specialist"on it, I approachthis rather large subject with some tre-pidation and a clear understanding thatthese are the thoughts of an outsider.My only excuse in undertaking thisanalysis is that Bangladesh has cometo life at a time when it can draw froma wide range of experience that hasalready been gathered and when theelements involved in building a viablestate - or in undermining it - areno longer mysterious. The contem-porary history of the growth anddecline of states and nations has ledto a considerable body of insights intothe conditions that make or retard apolity, the problems it must face up toin the course of realising the valuesand goals it cherishes, and the fallaciesand intellectual howlers that it oughtto avoid if it is to survive as a state,become a nation and prosper as asociety. The insights can be usedwith considerable advantage by Bangla-desh, the newest o;f the new states,as it begins to shape its unique destinyduring the seventies and beyond. Amajority of the "new states" came intobeing during the late forties and thefifties, most of them ran into difficul-ties during the sixties, and quite alarge number of them are still in badshape.- Still others which secured theirindependence long back (eg, thecountries in Latin America) or indeednever formally lost their independence(Thailand and Nepal and some coun-tries in the Middle East) continue toface challenges to the integrity of theirpolitical systems, and have not beenable to make life worth living for themajority of their peoples in the face

if serious threats from both within andwithout. Other countries (e g, in East-ern Europe) which do not fit the rubricof "new states" but underwent majortransformations after the War -alsocontinue to face similar problems.Bangladesh has to look critically at thesevarious states, the pitfalls they fell into,and the reasons why so many of themare in such bad shape. It has to learnhow to avoid these very pitfalls andchart a fresh course for itself. Comingto life in 1972 - after twenty-five yearsof twilight existence between formalindependence and a colonial politicalstatus - Bangladesh has a chance todo better than most of these and, inturn, provide some lessons for its olderpredecessors.

The DominantModel ofDevelopmentThe fifties and the sixties when alarge number of these new states wverestruggling to become viable politicalentities were also decades characterisedby a dominant ideology of changewhich set forth a comprehensive designfor development. The intellectualstimulation for such a design camefrom the United States, the hegemoni-cal power of the post-War world, sup-ported by a set of influences fromWestern Europe which had come underthe benevolent influence of the Mar-shall Plan and had lost their capacityto pose meaningful altematives, andendorsed by a differentlyconceptualisedmodel from the Soviet Union but with

almost similar consequences. Theprincipal elements of this design set

before the leaders and intellectuals ofthe "developing nations" were asfollows:(1) New Economism: The new stateswere poor. Therefore the principalproblem facing them was in respect oftheir economic development. It wasnecessary, therefore, that these countriesconcentrated on problems of "internal"development, keeping down mass con-sumption, raising saving and investment

in the "modem sector", pursuing aggre-gate rate of growth without immediateconcern for distributive goals and main-taining 'and enforcingpeace and stabilityfor all this. Thus came about the neweconotnism of the post-War world.(2) Modernisation: The new stateswere "backward", "underdeveloped"and "traditional". In the absence ofrapid "modernisation",economic deve-lopment was not possible. Hence theneed for first undertaking processes ofmodernisation and "social mobilisation"- urbanisation, education, physicalmobility, adoption of modern means ofcommunication zrndmass media, build-ing a "rational" bureaucracy and amodem managerial class, and thusgetting rid of the "shacklesof tradition".In the absence of all this, democraticparticipation would lead to the influxof '5parochial" lites who would under-mine the "universalist"goals of modem-isation.

(3) Integration: The new states weredivided and lacked a common identityas a nation. Ibos and Yorubas, Hindusand Muslims, Chinese and Malays,Tamils and Sinhalese, caste and tribaldivisions, northerners and southerners,

882


3/5

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY April 29, 1972majorities and minorities everywhere -all these had to be "integrated"',aughtto share a common "national identity",and be subjected to a strong "centralauthority" that was able to withstandinternal pressures, contain centrifugaltendencies and legitimise the establish-ed order and its elite. The new stateswere also characterised by internalviolence, prone to give in to chaos, lack-ing in the instruments of public order.It was therefore necessary to establishinternal peace and stability. A strongstate was one that ironed out internaldifferences. The necessity to acquireautonomy and integrity with respect tothe external world was not part of thismodel.

(4) Necessary Sequences and Pre-requisites: Implied in this wholedesign was a notion of stages of deve-lopment, of meeting certain "pre-requisites". The prerequisites wererather neatly conceived: economicdevelopment before political democracy,modemisation of the traditional societybefore extension of rights of participa-tion to the common people, nationalintegration before any exercise of localautonomy and self-govemment andinternal consolidation and stability asa necessary precondition of externalviability.(5) Aid and Alliance: In order to

carry out these various prerequisites -economic development, modernisation,national integration and political stabi-lity - it was necessary to have twothings. One was resources for thesepoor countries if the "gap" betweenthem and the rich countries was to befilled. The other was external peaceand security. It is here that the roleof the developed nations was to befound - provide economic "aid",guarantee peace in the respectiveregions, and protect the new and fragilestates from the viruses of "communistaggrandisement" or "capitalist imperial-ism"'as seen differently by the rivals inthe cold war. All that the new stateshad to do was to accept the terms ofthe Truman doctrine and its laterdevelopments (or their Russian orChinese counterparts)and preferablyjoin one or other of the defensive alli-ances or pacts, or at least adopt a posi-tion of neutrality and equidistancebetween the two blocs. Those whowere aligned had, of course, a beiferchance of external security and propor-tionally greater economic and militaryaid. Thus took place the doctrines offoreign aid, spheres of influence andzones of security - and the feeling

among the new states that they wereindeed getting the best of both worlds(in some cases, e g, in latterday Pak-istan, the best of many worlds).Such a design for developmentacquired considerable vogue throughout

the fifties and the sixties. Thoughlargely Western inspired, it was to aconsiderable extent also endorsed byinfluences emanating from both thesocialist and the non-aligned blocs. Theonly alternative scenario that xvasadvanced was by the votaries of worldrevolution and "liberation struggles" tohasten the cause of the world revolu-tion. Unfortunately, however, the re-volutionaries hitched their wagonis tooclose to the "internationalism"of thevanguard powers which was no lesscorrosive of the autonomy and self-con-fidence of the new states than was the"universalism" of the Western intel-lectuals. WYhat as conmon to bothwvasa frantic developmentalism whichignored political realities of the post-War world and produced elites thatwere more closely aligned to metro-politan centres of the world than withtheir own peoples. They impeded thelogical outcome of national independ-ence movements and the end of theimperial era - namely the creation ofself-reliant and viable states andnations as instruments for the realisationof freedom, democracy and social just-ice, for a vast majority of mankind.

Nehru's sane though hesitant voiceagainst the pernicious political andeconomic doctrines of the cold war eraand his effort to safeguard the auto-nomy of the new states through thedoctrine of non-alignment perhaps savedhis own country from falling prey to thefull consequences of such a model(although even for India the realdeliverance came only after the eventsof 1971) but on the whole the realparameters of state and nation buildingevaded the elites of the large majorityof the new states. Instead, they gottied up in the peculiarly anaemic dis-pensation of the dominant model ofdevelopment: authoritarianismat home,dependence abroad; "economic develop-ment" that produced a parasitic eliteand high peaks of urban prosperitywhich created internal colonies and ex-ternal bondage; doctrine of ,"modem-isation"' which reduced self-respectand condemned the native populationsto a state of misery because they"lacked motivation"; a compulsivepreoccupation with centrifugal tenden-cies at home so that externally thenations of the Third World contin}ued o

be dependent and hence amenable tothe politics of "cold war" and "spheresor influence"; a widespread perceptionof nation-building as essentially an"intemal" task while leaving the "ex-ternal" dimension of nation building tothe superpowers. The political con-sequence of such a model was that theworld got neatly divided between"developed" and "developing" nationswhen the real division was that betweendominant and dependent govermnents- the latter lacking the features ofeither statehood or nationhood. Govern-ment after govermnent was turnedagainst its own people backed by t-hecatchy slogan of "consolidation of cen-tral authority" - central authority be-ing perceived as something to beconsolidated internally rather thanexternally. By the same token, exten-sion of democratic rights was withheldfrom the people lest it may give rise tointernal divisions and breakdown ofcentral authority and its "legitimacy".Somehow, the crucial lessons of history,on the one hand that the best way toensure political integration and legiti-macy was by involving the people atlarge in the operative political struc-ture, and on the other hand that the onlyway of building and consolidating poli-tical authority was through a demon-strated ability to meet external threatsand challenges, were lost on the elitesof the new states, thanks to their cap-tivity by the model outlined above.

As this happened, the Third Worldbecame a breeding ground for the the-orists of "identity crisis" and "revolu-tion of rising expectations" and provid-ed the basis for a growing militarisationof the world, large-scale economic ex-ploitation and widening internal dispa-rities as a price for getting a pat onthe back as "models"of successful eco-nomic development (a la Papanek). Thepolitical concomitant of this was a con-tinuing sport in which coutpsand coun-ter-coups were watched with gusto by"concerned" world powers and worldpress. The anguish and self-denigra-tion of the intellectuals of Latin Ameri-ca, Africa and South-East Asia at thisspectacle followed logically from theirsystematic brainwashing by the domi-nant theory of development and theirfailure to recognise the political com-pulsions of the achievement of state-hood and nationhood. The huge armyof economic developmentalists, techno-crats and international civil servantsand do-gooders ensured that the designfor dominance conceived by the Tru-man doctrine and everything that fol-lowed it remained impregnable.

883


4/5

IIAlternative Scenario

To be sure, there have been impor-tant countervailing factors at work. Forone thing, the new states included largeand potentially powerful countries likeIndia and China which, despite theirearly ambivalence (as in the case ofChina) or mid-course compromises (asin the case of India), were ultimatelybound to value their independence andautonomy in pclitical functioning aboveeverything else. Secondly, as againstthe hordes of politically and intellec-tually servile elites found irl parts ofthe Third World, there have also beensome outstanding men who have valuedtheir own and their nations' self-respect above the immediate considera--tions of aid and trade, and who haveshown a capacity for initiating inide-pendent and politically sensitive poli-cies - Mao, Tito, Nehru, Nasser,Nverere, Ho Chi Minh, Castro, Allende.Thirdly, the political strategies of thenew imperial powers ran into serioustrouble wNhei. hey sought to "over-shoot", ignoring the powerful fo'ces thathad been let loose by the resurgent na-tionalism of the mid-twentieth century.The biggest debacle of all was, ofcourse, the war in Vietnam - the sym-bol of defiance on behalf of strugglinghumanity against the supposedly invin-cible war machine of super powers. Noless important has been the liberationstruggle of Bangladesh and India's rolein it, providing an even more decisivedefeat to the divisive and manipulativedesigns of the strategists of regional ba-lances. Less clear but no less signifi-cant for the emergence of self-reliantnationhood are some developments inthe Middle East, parts of Latin Ameri-ca and the gathering momentum of for-ces in Black Africa.

Finally, there has taken place a con-tinuing shift in the great power ba-lance which has resulted in strength-ening democratic and socialist forces inworld politics. Starting (soon after theSecond War) with a "bi-polar" powerstructure of the world which tilted hea-vily in favour of the military and in-dustrially powerful United States, thedevelopment of the last twenty-fiveyearshave been a progressive swing towards,first, a more real balance betwveenthe WVest nd the East and, still later,a tilting towards the East in which the"North-South" axis played a crucialrole. In this the more flexible policiesof the. Soviet Union which, first underKhrushchev and then under his slicces-sors, understood the political potentialof the poorer countries in the southernhemisphere far better than the headyrulers of the United States, turnedlout to

be a positive factor in the growth of de-mocratic nationalism and the emergenceof centres of independent power -India, North Vietnam, Cuba, Egypt -despite the continued authoritarianismOf the Soviet Union itself at home andwithin the East European region. Buteven in the latter region a number ofindependent centres emerged daring thisperiod which defied the hegemonicalposition of Moscow. The net result hasbeen a world in which independent statebuilding - along different models ofpolitical development - has becomemore and more possible.We have examined the model follow-ed by the elites of dependent countries-essentially a model of economic moder-nisation in the aggregate at the expenseof both the political integrity of thesestates and the general welfare and de-mocratic rights of their peoples. Themodel that has slowly emerged fromthe other end of the spectrum can besummarised as follows:(1) A vigorous policy of national self-sufficiency in respect of basic economicrequirements (even if this meant a re-lativelv lower aggregate rate of growthin the short run). The chief instrumentsof this have been a comprehensivepoli-cy of import substitution and a greaterreliance on trade rather than "aid" andon bilateral economic co-operation wvitha number of countries and institution-alised economic support for specificschemes rather than a generalised aidpackage as administered by the variousAid Clubs.

(2) A similar attempt at self-reilanceiII matters of national defence and se-curity through the development of re-quisite armed forces, the growth of in-digenous armaments production (or, inthe case of small states, a definite allo-cation of foreign exchange for arms pur-chase in the open market) and theavailabilityof local expertise in the fieldsof intelligence and strategic studies.(3) A system of production and dis-tribution of goods which psevents con-centration of wealth and economic ex-ploitation and hence of the growtb ofparasitic elites concentrated in urbanareas. This will entail a number of stepschief among which are (a) land reforms,labour legislation and redistributivetaxation; (b) accent on agriculture andrural and semi-rural employment as ameans of livelihood in the early phaseof economic development and policiesaimed at containing an overgrowtlhofmnetropolitanareas; (c) adoption of anincomAspolicy involving minima as wellas maxima (forgetting about "bridgingthe gap" with rich nations which is anirrelevant chimera); and (d) a design of

infrastructural development which at-te'nds more to minimum conditions of

civilised life for al - clean drinkingwater, a roof for every family, free me-dical facilities, cheap education, etc -rather than concentrating on conspicu-ous superstructures in metropolitanareas. All these steps are with a viewto curb the growth of an elite that isdisoriented from indigenous society andnational purpose.(4) The development of institutions ofa participant democracy - -periodicelections, local self-government, freegrowth of trade unions and peasant andycuth associations and an unfetteredpress - as a necessary basis for politi-cal support and legitimacy, a mechanismfor change of elites and availability ofcounter-elites, and a means for account-ability of the authoritarian componentsof the polity, viz, the army, the bureau-cracy and the ruling party or coalition.(The only altemative, it is now clear,is an authoritarian regime out of touchwith social reality which stays on inpowver through either the backinig of themilitary or external support or both.)

(5) Involvement of the youth of thecountrv in productive processes and de-cision-making structures, absorbing theconstructive aspects and containing thedestructive aspects of the "revolt of theyouth" which is likely to become aworld-w^ide phenomenon in the years tocome.

(6) The need to think of the problemof "ethnic pluralities" and their "inte-gration" as part of the drive of achiev-in(g national autonomy and social trans-formation, and to avoid the pitfall ofbeing overconcerned wvith 'centrifugaltendencies" and the "parochialism" ofthis or that community, the principaltask in the national integration being todisorient local minorities from externalstimuli and to remove the suspicion ofthe majority community about the lackof patriotism of given minority comimu-nitv or communities.

(7) Attention to problems of size, ter-ritorial organisation of the country, lo-cal autonomy and a reconciliation of theeconomies of scale on the one handand the politics of scale on the other-in short, a well thought out policy ofdecentralisation and of regional andlocal participation in national. tasks.

(8) Consideration cf a regional policyexternally (especially necessary forsmall countries) as a complement topolicies of national self-sufficiency ineconomic development and national de-fence, wNith a view to seeking both eco-nomic prosperity and political security,not through a clientistic relationship toan external power but on the' basis ofco-operation among neighbours who canthink of their "interests" in terms ofmutuality 'and common purpose andvalues.

884


5/5

IIIChoice among Alternative Models

What I have tried to do in this paperis to point out certain general lessonsthat we have learnt from the last twen-ty-five years of experience in regard tostate and nation building in the "ThirdWorld". There is, on the one hand,the moder-nisation mnodelwhich seeks toLindermine the autonomy and power ofthe new states. There is, on the otherhand, what may be called the sfate-buiilding model which seeks to conceiveof the tasks of modernisation, economicdevelopment 'and the rest as part of ageneral drive towards consolidating na-tional autonomy and realising the valuesof democracy, social justice and secu-larism. Bangladesh has come to lifewhen the alternative scenarios can beperceived in their fullness, when theground for making critical choices hasl)een cleared of a lot of confusion andmisleading cliche, and when the realneed is for a proper perspective andl)old initiatives from the political eliterather than passing on the responSibili-tv to foreign trained technocrats.

It is not the task of an outsider totell the citizens or policy-makers ofBangladesh what precise choices they

shouldmake;he is not onlylikelyto bemisunderstood ut he is bound to bewrongwhen it comesto the detailsofstatecraft. Bangladeshhas many ad-vantagesover other countries n the"ThirdWorld". It is neithertoo smallnor too large in size, fairlyho!uogeneousin population and a countrywhosevariousgroups have together fought aliberation truggle against one of theworst tyrannies n recent times. It ispredominantlyuraland lacks any great"megalopolis" ith too large a middleclass elite which is committed o im-ported models. It has a large potentialof manpower nd skill, abulndancefhydraulic ower,and a largenumberofsmalltownswhichcanbecome he inervecentresof nationbuilding.It fulfiL thevision of a land of small farmersanddecentrall'sedndustry where greateraccent will be on realising minimnumwelfare for all instead of falling preyto the temptation of becoming a mightyindustrial power and "bridging thegap" with post-industrial societies. Ithas as its neighbour a large friendlycountry which is willing to look uiponit as an equal friend and partner inthe preservation of peace amd securityin the region. It will have a largefund of goodwill all over the world

which, as it comes out of its initial shlockand wonder, is bound to look upon thisnew state with respect. Bangladesh haslearnt its political lessons through bitterstruggle and is bound to place the high-est value on its independence and au-tonomy. Above all, it has a large andurgent agenda of tasks at home and anirnspiring eadership at the helm %Nichcommands nation-wide support. It isfortunate in having such a leadershipwhich has a faith in democracy andpride in belonging to SoniarBangla.If only Bangladesh can avoid thetemptation of other new states in res-pect of its relationship with "greatpowers", at the same time not becomeoversensitive about its relationship withIndia and make the few critical choicesiti respect of domestic political and eco-nomic strategy - especially avoilingthe pitfalls of the prevailing model ofeconomic development - it appearslikely to emerge as not only a viablestate but perhaps also a norrma-setterorothers. The manner in which it hasstarted off - with a ceiling on income,curbs on importsof all goods other thanbare necessities, and adoption of Ben-gali, the language of the people, as thelanguage of administration - providesground for such optimism.

Employment a n d I n c o m e in R u r a l I n d i aPradhan H Prasad

The phenomena of low' utilisation of labour, low earniing, and inadequate consumption of the vastmajority of the people in India have to be analysed in the context of the semi-feudal bondage in whicha vast majority of the rural population live even today. It is the high concentration of land in the handsof a few, the uneconomic holdings of the small farmers, and the high proportion of landless labourers,that explain the low utilisation of land and labour - there being sufficient empirical evidence that largefarmers use land less intensively than do the small farmers.In the circumstances, land reforms - rather th2n the present intensive agricultural developmentprogrammes - are strongly indicated for improving land and labour utilisation in the country and freeingpeople from semi-feudal bondage.Also necessary are widespread sources of supplementary income for the people. Labour-intensivetechniques in non-basic goods production is a viable way of ensuring this.This article argues that the existing manufacturing set-up will not be capable of generating thesupplementary income or of diverting the population from agriculture to industry with a view to reducingsemi-feudal exploitation. The employment base of the presently patterned manufacturing sector is toolow to have any significant impact in the near future.TIHE existing phenomena of low utilisa-tion of labour, low earning, and inade-(uate consum-iption of the vast majorityof the people in India' have beenunderstood mainly in terms of dualism,in that, whe'l the vast majority of self-employecl persons are given an imputeclvalue' in t,rms of the existing wagerate in the economy, it appears that theresources with which they are workingearn a iowxvr (ev.en negative) rate ofprofit compared wvith that prevalent in

the rest of the economy.2 The questionsthat are then asked too often are:Why should such a condition (i e, wheresupply of lahour is greater than thedemand for it at the existing wage rate)contintue to exist in the long run? Whydoes it not bring about increasing stul)stitution of labour in place of land andcapital wherever possible so as to bringabout a higher rate of employment andinvestmenit? The explanations that havebeen advanced have been mainly in

terms of capital shortage and wagecost-efficiency equilibriutn theories.3The implicit assurption has been *thatthe labourers are largely 'free fromsemi-feucdal bondage' that has bee'- thefeature of present-day advanced econo-mies in th.- period following feudalism.I-lowever, i-l a vast sector of ouieconomy, this assuLmption has hardlyany validity.It is well known that the ascendencyof British power in India brought about

885

political reconstruction of bangladesh reflections on building a new state in the seventies

Documents