political legitimacy in singapore

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Political Legitimacy in Singapore

BENJAMIN WONGNanyang Technological University

XUNMING HUANGUniversity of Toronto

The long and successful marriage between high capitalism and modernauthoritarianism in the case of Singapore poses a legitimacy puzzle.While the authoritarian regime has enjoyed and continues to enjoybroad-based support, the depth of its legitimacy appears to be shallow.This puzzle is generally explained by the primacy of an exchangerelation between the regime and the people where the regime providessecurity and prosperity in return for legitimacy. Although the regimeand the people are bound by mutual interests, they do not share acommon good. This article argues that institutionalization of market-based compensation for ministers and top civil servants in the case ofSingapore entrenches instrumental rationality and elitism, whichreinforces the exchange relation between the regime and the people.While the relationship is stable, it requires constant attention by theregime to the people’s perceptions of being disadvantaged, which if leftunaddressed could weaken the legitimacy of the regime.

Keywords: Singapore, People’s Action Party (PAP), Legitimacy,Economic Performance, Elites, Ministerial Salaries.

El largo y exitoso matrimonio entre el capitalismo avanzado y elautoritarismo moderno en Singapur plantea un rompecabezas delegitimidad. Mientras el régimen autoritario ha disfrutado y continúadisfrutando de amplio apoyo, la profundidad de su legitimidad parecesuperficial. Este rompecabezas es generalmente aclarado por laprevalencia de una relación de mutuo apoyo entre el régimen y laciudadanía donde el primero provee seguridad y prosperidad a cambiode apoyo. No obstante, aunque el régimen y la ciudadanía están unidospor intereses mutuos, no comparten un bien común. Lainstitucionalización de las compensaciones para ministros yfuncionarios de alto nivel, semejante a los incentivos que tienen losagentes económicos en el mercado, afianzan la racionalidadinstrumental y el elitismo, lo que a su vez refuerza la relación dereciprocidad entre el régimen y las personas. Aunque la relación esestable, requiere que el régimen esté atento a las percepciones de los

Politics & Policy, Volume 38, No. 3 (2010): 523-543. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.© The Policy Studies Organization. All rights reserved.

ciudadanos en caso de que lleguen a sentir que el intercambio esdesventajoso para ellos. Por otro lado, la indiferencia a talespercepciones podría debilitar la legitimidad del régimen.

The inclusion of Singapore in the comparative study of legitimacyinvariably provokes “a range of powerful yet contradictory responses” amongscholars and critics (Khong 1995, 108). A major reason for this reaction is thatSingapore has been “one of the most outstandingly stubborn cases ofauthoritarianism” (Sim 2006, 143).1 Singapore seems to contradict the widelyshared view in the West that the best form of government is a liberal democracy.Moreover, the Singaporean model of government appears to be of interest toRussia and China. According to one scholar:

Beijing is obsessed with watching, analyzing and replicating the success ofSingapore. After all, despite a mediocre global ranking for politicalfreedom, Singapore is confident, prosperous and orderly. Meritocracy ishighly valued, its people generally contented and society vibrant. Mostappealing of all, as far as Beijing is concerned, are the approval ratings forSingaporean leaders, which would make many democratic leaders envious.If there is an ‘Asian way’ of enlightened authoritarian leadership, thenSingapore is by far its best example. (Lee 2009b, A15)

Indeed, the Singapore model has been so successful that it has prompted aconcerned English journalist writing to a predominantly Western audience toask, “why is it that a growing number of highly educated and well-travelledpeople are willing to hand over several of their freedoms in return for prosperityor security?” (Kampfner 2008).

The government of Singapore has enjoyed and continues to enjoy broad-based support. But as several scholars have remarked the level of its legitimacyappears to be rather shallow (Barr and Skrbiš 2008; Khong 1995). Barr andSkrbiš (2008, 158) interviewed several grassroots leaders from 2003 to 2004, andobserved that they displayed “a surprising lack of enthusiasm for the regime anda consistent sense of remoteness and disappointment about aspects of theSingapore system.” Throughout the course of its rule the government has had toengage in “artful manipulations of institutions and procedures” to influencepublic opinion, discourage opposition, and neutralize critics (Case 2005, 227-8).It behaves at times as if it were “still unsure of its own internal legitimacy”(Narine 2004, 434). And while the government claims to have acquired a strongmandate to rule through regular democratic elections, scholars have frequentlynoted that the relation between the government and people is based on forms of

1 Thompson (2004, 1080) says that Singapore is “still the richest non-oil producing country in theworld that is not a democracy.” For a “communitarian” critique of Singapore’s brand ofauthoritarianism, see Bell (2000, 233-76).

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“pragmatic” or “instrumental acquiescence” (George 2007, 129, 133). That thepeople may not fully appreciate what the government has done to develop thecountry is reflected in the occasional complaints of Members of Parliamentthat Singaporeans appear to be “a nation of complainers” (Lim 2006). For agovernment that believes that it enjoys the trust of the people and that it governsin their interest, this view of the relation between the people and its governmentappears to be somewhat puzzling.

It is generally recognized that the legitimacy of the People’s Action Party(PAP) government is largely based on its ability to provide for the security andprosperity of its citizens. One would expect the people to be deeply grateful forthe security, wealth, and power that the country has acquired, yet this does notseem to be the case. This article argues that the institutionalization of market-based compensation for ministers and top civil servants entrenches instrumentalrationality and elitism that shape not only government policy but also thenature of the relation between government and the people. Government andpeople are bound together in a relationship based on mutual interests ratherthan lofty notions of the common good. The relationship is stable but requiresconstant attention to social issues and problems that if left unaddressed couldweaken the legitimacy of the regime.

The PAP Government and the Evolution of Its Political Legitimacy

Singapore was directly controlled by the British colonial government as acrown colony until 1959, when it was granted limited self-government. Itsubsequently merged with Malaysia in 1963 but was expelled from thefederation in 1965, at which point it became an independent state.

Singapore is a multiracial society with the Chinese constituting the largestethnic group. From colonial times, the Chinese were divided into two groups:English-speaking and Chinese-speaking. Most of the Chinese-speakingbelonged to the working class and were educated in the Chinese vernacular. Asthey maintained strong ties with China, they were influenced by the struggle ofnationalists and communists against the imperialist powers. Inspired bysentiments of nationalism and anticolonialism, many students and workers werealso drawn to the idealism of the communist movement.2 Apart from them therewas a small but influential minority of Western-educated Chinese whose facilitywith the English language enabled them to benefit from the patronage of theBritish colonial authorities (Trocki 2006).3 The leadership of the PAP wasdrawn primarily from the English-speaking class.

2 For an account of the complexities of the political struggles of the Chinese in Singapore duringthe colonial period, see Hong and Huang (2008).3 The division between the two groups of Chinese, according to Trocki (2006, 109), “lies at theheart of Singapore’s social fabric and has been one of the dynamic themes that bind thenineteenth-century history of the place to the twentieth.”

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A combination of luck and political acumen helped the PAP under LeeKuan Yew to come into power in 1959 and to remain in power ever since.4 Theparty initially gained legitimacy by aligning itself with left-wing groups thatenjoyed broad popular support among the majority Chinese-speakingpopulation (Sim 2006).5 This alliance enabled the PAP to win a landslide victoryin the 1959 elections.6 But while the PAP shared in the anticolonial sentimentsof the Chinese-speaking majority, it was wary of the influence of communistidealism and Chinese nationalism.

The merger with Malaysia in 1963 provided the occasion for the PAPgovernment to change the basis of its relationship with the Chinese-speakingmajority in Singapore. Concerns about communism and communalism fromboth the British authorities and the Malaysian government helped the PAPgovernment justify its break with the more radical left-wing elements of thealliance. Merger also presented the party with the opportunity to promote amultiracial national ideology. The notion of a “Malaysian Malaysia” implicitlyopposed the special position of the Malays and appealed to the Chinesemajority seeking equal status in the federation. However, the challenge toMalay rights and Malay dominance eventually led to Singapore’s expulsionfrom Malaysia in 1965.

Expulsion took place amidst growing unemployment, communal tensions,and social unrest. The precarious situation of the new state, combined withstrategic mistakes by the opposition, enabled the government under Lee KuanYew to engage in a series of tough actions that put an end to effective oppositionpolitics and to overcome powerful trade and student unions in the name ofpolitical and economic survival. In effect, the apparently dire circumstancessurrounding the founding of the state allowed the PAP leadership “to create, asif on a tabula rasa, a political regime in its own desired image, untroubled by anyeffective challenge” (Khong 1995, 115).

As a young nation-state with sizeable minorities the PAP government couldappeal to neither race, religion, nationalism, nor a common identity to forge aunifying consensus. Given the circumstances of the time, however, it couldappeal to broad concerns and fears about social and political instability as wellas economic deprivation. In addition, because of its experience with communalconflict, the government has always been mindful of the potential problems

4 Contingent factors that helped the regime survive as well as to thrive include the strategiclocation of the island for trade, the role of America during the Cold War especially its involvementin Vietnam, and more recently the war on terror. The latter two helped to align U.S. interests withthose of Singapore, thus affording it not only protection but also economic benefits.5 It is instructive that in the 1950s and 1960s Singapore had an active and politicized civil society.On the significance of alternative political voices, see also Verweij and Pelizzo (2009, 29-30). Butwhether these contending groups are characteristic of a “civil society” is an open questionaccording to Khong (1995, 111) as “the different groups contending with each other did not seethemselves as acting within a commonly accepted democratic framework.”6 The PAP won 43 out of 51 seats contested.


posed by appeals to race and religion. Acknowledging the status of the majorracial groups, the country has four official languages: English, Mandarin,Malay, and Tamil. Malay is the national language, and English the lingua francaas well as the language of administration.

Since independence, the government has replaced vernacular schools withintegrated schools offering opportunities for students from different races tostudy and play together. At the same time a policy of bilingualism ensures thatstudents retain their cultural traditions through the study of their mothertongues. The government has also sponsored ethnic-based self-helporganizations to attend to the educational and social needs of low-incomefamilies. Group Representation Constituencies (GRC) were further introducedin 1988 on the understanding that since one of the candidates running forelections in a GRC must be from a minority race, the multiracial compositionof Parliament is preserved. About 85 percent of Singaporeans live inpublic housing, which is carefully managed to encourage social integration andto prevent the formation of racial or socioeconomic enclaves. By thusaccommodating racial and cultural differences, the principle of multiracialismhas enabled the various races to coexist peacefully.

Over the years the government has experimented with a variety of nation-building projects to foster the development of a national identity and toreinforce its political legitimacy. While these initiatives have been partiallysuccessful their development has been complicated, if not impeded, by theprinciple of multiracialism. To be sure, a majority of Singaporeans haveregularly expressed their satisfaction with the way the government has managedethnic relations. Up to 93 percent of the people in a recent survey expressedsatisfaction with the way Singapore has been governed (Chia and Haoxiang2009). Another survey of youths showed that 50 percent considered themselvesto be “patriotic” (“We love Singapore” 2009). But it is telling that when askedwhat they loved about Singapore, 52 percent said it was because it was “safe andsecure” but only 5 percent said it was “the people.”

A survey conducted two years earlier by the Singapore Polytechnic showedthat 37 percent of young people did not feel patriotic and that if given the chance52 percent of them would migrate overseas.7 This survey was recently cited by anew Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) as one of the reasons whyParliament should reaffirm its commitment to the national pledge. The pledge,which is recited daily by all school children, is aimed at forging national identityand commitment to the country. The pledge, in particular, emphasizes theprinciple of equality, and goes in part like this: “We, the citizens of Singapore,pledge ourselves as one united people, regardless of race, language or religion, tobuild a democratic society, based on justice and equality” (Singapore National

7 See Wassup with YOUth: A survey of Singapore youth’s attitudes, values, media usage, andonline communication. The survey was carried out by second-year Media and Communicationsstudents of the School of Business, Singapore Polytechnic (Singapore Polytechnic Website 2009).


Pledge 2009). In his speech, the NMP urged the government to reconsider thecategorization of the races and to address apparent “contradictions and mixedsignals” embedded in policies like the promotion of ethnic-based self-helpgroups (Oon 2009, B8).

In a rare intervention in Parliament, Minister Mentor (MM) Lee Kuan Yewrose to rebut the speech made by the NMP. It was dangerous, according toMM Lee, “to allow such highfalutin ideas to go undemolished” (Lee 2009c, B6).In particular, the argument for the equal treatment of the races was “falseand flawed.” MM Lee (2009c, B6) was obliged to remind the House that “ourConstitution states expressly that that is a duty of the Government not to treateverybody as equal. It’s not reality, it’s not practical. It will lead to grave andirreparable damage if we work on that principle [of equality].”8 The Pledge wasat most “an aspiration,” the realization of which might take decades if not“centuries” (Lee 2009c). The rebuttal thus reflects the “contradictions andmixed signals” that complicates the task of nation building and the constructionof a national identity.

As other scholars have noted, the principle of multiracialism has createdparadoxical effects. One such effect is that it encourages people to identify moreclosely with their ethnic group and culture (Hill and Lian 1995). In practice,however, multiracialism is managed in such a way as to allow the governmentto assume a neutral position that insulates it “from claims of entitlement ofthe people as both racialized collectives and individual citizens” (Chua 1998,193). In keeping with its vaunted pragmatism and realism, the principle ofmultiracialism has been deployed as policy to manage ethnic relations in a waythat would facilitate economic development.

Since independence the PAP government has determined that rapideconomic growth tied to alliances with foreign capital and MNCs would be thebest way to assure its political survival. This is how economic performancebecame the chief criterion of political legitimacy. The population recognizes thePAP’s right to govern on its ability to deliver material benefits. Singapore’seconomic transformation took place against the background of the Cold War.The country benefited from cooperation with the United States, which toleratedauthoritarian regimes that were anticommunist,9 and in Singapore’s case it alsoprovided protection and privileged access to the U.S. market. This helped tospur economic growth, which in turn strengthened political support at home.

8 Article 152 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2009) states: “(1) It shall be theresponsibility of the Government constantly to care for the interests of the racial and religiousminorities in Singapore. (2) The Government shall exercise its functions in such manner as torecognise the special position of the Malays, who are the indigenous people of Singapore, andaccordingly it shall be the responsibility of the Government to protect, safeguard, support, fosterand promote their political, educational, religious, economic, social and cultural interests and theMalay language” (emphasis added).9 A “Marxist Conspiracy” was detected in 1987, which led to the arrest and detention of severalsocial activists and professionals, most of whom were Catholics.


With the end of the Cold War, Singapore faced a need to adjust itsdiplomatic strategies so as to deal with the triumph of liberal democracy. Asearly as the 1970s, there was already a growing fear that while commercialrelations with the West brought about economic growth, it also introducescontamination by the unhealthy and undesirable social and political values ofthe liberal West. The government responded by promoting traditional Asianvalues, such as Confucianism, both to counter cultural influence from the Westand as an ideology to support the authoritarian character of the PAPgovernment. The end of the Cold War led to the reinvigoration of the so-calledAsian Values debate to mount an ideological alternative to liberal democracywithout compromising or undermining commercial relations with the West.This was an artful attempt to transform political differences into cultural ones.The emergence of the academic discourse of multiculturalism also helped tomoderate criticisms of political practices deemed to be illiberal from Westernperspectives.

But cultural values too must ultimately be subordinated to economicgrowth. In 2004, then Senior Minister (SM) Lee Kuan Yew was invited toBeijing to address the China Scientists Forum on Humanities. In his speech tothe gathering of scientists, SM Lee acknowledged the need to retain certainfundamental features of Confucianism, such as the “Five Relationships,” so asto sustain order and good government. But then he went on to say that “whilethe scholar is still the greatest factor in economic progress, he will be so only ifhe uses his brains not in studying the great books, classical texts and poetry, butin capturing and discovering new knowledge, apply himself to R&D,management and marketing, banking and finance and the myriad of newsubjects that needs to be mastered” (Lee 2004, 2). According to Kluver andWeber (2003, 378), Singapore’s national myth is its “rapid economicdevelopment, rather than a religious-mythical narrative that undergirds theunity and political cohesion of its Asian neighbours . . . the national myth ofSingapore is the story of struggle against economic and political odds to achievea first world standard of living.”10

In any case, the attempt to use Asian values as a cultural complement to theeconomic basis of political legitimacy collapsed with the Asian financial crisisin 1997. Although Singapore was one of the least affected countries, the crisispushed the government toward a policy of external economic expansion. Itexpanded regionally to access cheap labor and internationally to accesstechnology and talent to help increase its competitiveness (Goldstein andPananond 2008).11 Under the changed conditions of the global economy,

10 Kluver and Weber (2003, 378) go on to argue that it would not be surprising that “a nationalidentity, forged on economic progress, would have little emotional or motivational hold on thepopulace.”11 Singapore’s external economy could go up as high as five times its domestic product by 2020(Rodan 2004).


Singapore began transforming itself into a global city to attract foreign talent.And for Singapore to become a desirable place for the talented to work andplay, the country had to liberalize socially. But the government has also learnedfrom experience that many creative and commercial talents are not so concernedwith political freedoms or with local politics. Top-notch scientists from theWest, for example, are attracted to Singapore for the funding and the freedomto pursue their research. So even though the government has had to liberalizeboth economically and socially, these measures do not compromise its politicaldominance. If anything, these liberalization measures have further softened theauthoritarian image of the government, thus enhancing both its domestic as wellas international legitimacy.

The success of the government in adapting to changing geopolitical andeconomic conditions to sustain growth and to moderate criticisms of itsauthoritarianism has been attributed to the intellectual ability and integrity ofthe political and administrative leadership. With regards to domestic politics,the system of elite governance was not designed to be total or absolute but toenable the government to have comprehensive control of the major avenues ofinformation, wealth, and power in both state and society. This strategy allowsfor and even encourages constructive criticism that would lead to improvementsand refinements in the system of governance (Hamilton-Hart 2000). Yet thereis a high price to pay for those who question the fundamental integrity of thesystem. Singaporeans are fully aware of the great personal and material costsexacted on opposition figures, such as J. B. Jeyaretnam and Chee Soon Juan, fortheir temerity in standing up to the government and questioning its authorityand integrity.

The extensive involvement of the government in the economic life of the statemeans that government plays a large role either directly or indirectly in theemployment of the vast majority of its citizens. The disciplinary practices ofthe regime have succeeded in focusing the minds of its citizens on the materialconditions of life and on the economic well-being of the country. Along with itsextensive provision of basic goods, such as housing, health care, and education,the overall effect of this system of governance is to depoliticize the citizenry in acomprehensive manner. As a consequence Singaporeans are by and large morematerialistic and less concerned with politics. Thus, the Singapore government isable to thrive even during an economic crisis (Sim 2006). As noted by Mauzy andMilne (2002), the Singapore government’s electoral victory in 1980 added a newdimension to the definition of performance legitimacy principally because it wona landslide in the midst of its worst economic crisis. And during the course of theAsian financial crisis in 1997 many Singaporeans felt lucky to have “the bestgovernment in the world,” one that is “honest” and “noncorrupt” (Sim 2006,153). As regards the ongoing global economic slowdown the government hasintroduced a slew of programs to help companies and workers to save jobs. Morerecently Prime Minister (PM) Lee Hsien Loong has laid out a new set of politicalinitiatives that when implemented would add more non-PAP members to the


Singapore Parliament (Lee 2009a). There would be at least 18 non-PAP membersof parliament, of which nine would be from the opposition. These initiatives aresupposed to satisfy the people’s desire for greater participation in government,but the PM has indicated that they are meant to stimulate “creative ideas forsocial and economic development” (Lee 2009a, A14). Thus, the governmentcontinues to rely on economic growth to justify and sustain its legitimacy.

The Political Leadership: Meritocracy, High Pay,and a Bit of Financial Sacrifice

The political attitude of the PAP government has been from the very outsetrealistic, pragmatic, and above all, elitist (Barr and Skrbiš 2008; Leifer 2000;Mauzy and Milne 2002). Early in his political career Lee Kuan Yew had alreadyexpressed his doubts about democracy. In an address to the Royal Society ofInternational Affairs in 1962, he said:

[i]f I were in Singapore indefinitely, without having to ask those who aregoverned whether they like what is being done, then I have not the slightestdoubt that I could govern more effectively in their own interests. This is afact which the educated understand, but we are all caught up in this systemwhich the British . . . export all over the place hoping that somewhere itwill take root. (Han, Fernandez, and Tan 1998, 131)

As leader of the country, Lee Kuan Yew would set the precedent ofcultivating elites and empowering them to effect “fundamental social andcultural changes” to transform the country into an economic powerhouse. Thisattitude with slight modification has persisted throughout the course of PAPrule and may even have intensified in its later phases. It is at the root of theunique formation of the ruling class in Singapore.

For Lee Kuan Yew the future of Singapore depended on the rare talents ofa few good men: “I am sorry if I am constantly preoccupied with what thenear-geniuses and the above average are going to do. But I am convinced thatit is they who ultimately decide the shape of things to come” (Barr 2000, 97). Atfirst the political leadership focused on cultivating the administrative andmilitary elites, but over time the class would expand to include the business andfinancial elites. The rule of the talented in Singapore has evolved to the pointthat “it is often hard to say whether a particular member of Singapore’sgoverning elite is a private or public actor” (Hamilton-Hart 2000, 197).Although this system of governance by elites is not problem-free, it is generallyregarded as clean, efficient, and effective. Actors in the system subscribe tonorms and principles including “the commitment to meritocracy, flexibility,performance-based indicators of achievement and an entrenched acceptance ofthe government’s right to rule” (206).

Regarded as a crucial pillar in the PAP’s mode of governance, the principleof meritocracy ensures that individuals are rewarded on the basis of ability and


effort and not on the basis of race, class, or other ascriptive factors.Accordingly, it serves to justify and legitimize social and economic inequalities.The principle is applied in education to identify, cultivate, and reward thetalented. Competition for scholarships among talented students has been saidto contribute to attitudes of elitism, materialism, and individualism.12

Considerable resources in education are dedicated to the selection and trainingof talented students, many of whom are offered prestigious governmentscholarships to study at top universities in the West. The most promising ofthese scholars are later groomed to become top officials and even ministers. In1989, then PM Goh Chok Tong boasted that nearly every minister in his cabinet“was among the top students of their year” (Quah 2003, 151). In 1994, eight outof 14 cabinet ministers were ex-scholars, including the then PM Goh; and in2005 there were twelve ex-scholars in a Cabinet of 19 (Barr 2006).

Since 1994, the principle of meritocracy has ensured that top governmentofficials and ministers in Singapore are the highest-paid public servants in theworld. In 2007, the government revised the salaries of ministers and civilservants, with ministers at the starting grade getting a hefty pay rise of 33percent. The pay of these ministers went up from S$1.2 million to S$1.6 million.The PM’s salary was increased by 25 percent from S$2.5 million to S$3.1 million(Lim 2007). A top-performing Administrative Service officer at the age of 32would receive a pay packet of up to S$361,000 a year.

Government salaries have been steadily increasing since 1972 as theeconomy improved. But as the economy continued to improve it became moredifficult for the government to recruit and to retain its ministers and topofficials. Various strategies were considered and implemented over the years tobridge the gap in salaries between the private and the public sectors. In 1994,the government decided to benchmark the salaries of ministers and civil servantsto the average salaries of top earners in the private sector. This decisioninstitutionalized the practice of “matching public pay to the private sector,dollar for dollar” (Quah 2003, 154). The main reasons given for this policy havebeen competition with the private sector, the need to minimize corruption, andto attract “the best and the brightest” to join the government. As for the highsalaries of ministers, the government takes the view that it must “ensure thatafter having sacrificed their privacy, leisure and family time, such people do notalso have to make too large a financial sacrifice” (153).13 This reasoning reflectsthe practice of the government to invite qualified private sector professionalsto assume ministerial office. To attract these professionals from the private

12 See, for example, Chua Mui Hoong, “How Meritocracy Can Breed Intellectual Elitism” (2006),and Zakir Hussain, “Meritocracy’s Hidden Danger” (2008). An implication of the principle ofmeritocracy is that those who are not successful are deemed to be either not smart enough or nothardworking enough or both, see Ralf Dahrendorf, “When Meritocracy Fails to Past Muster”(2005).13 It would seem that top executives in the private sector are also expected to sacrifice “privacy,leisure, and family time:” hence the concern with work–life balance in the business world.


sector the government considered it “necessary to minimize the sacrifice aperson is asked to make, and minimizing the financial sacrifice is the least [thegovernment] should do” (152).

Salaries of ministers and permanent secretaries are based on a formula thatpegs them at two-thirds the median income of the top eight earners in sixprofessions. The six professions are bankers, lawyers, accountants, engineers,top employees of multinational corporations, and local manufacturers(“Ministerial Salaries Well below Benchmark” 2007). While the formula isintended to remove the need to justify future pay increases, the government isinvariably obliged to defend the policy each time salaries for its ministers andtop officials are increased. Regarding the most recent revision of salaries in2007, K. Shanmugam (2007, H5), currently the Minister for Law and SecondMinister for Home Affairs, said: “I cannot think of another issue where there issuch a disconnect between what is clearly the right policy, and how the publicreact to that policy.” Shanmugam may be right in indicating that the issue ofministerial pay is a fundamental one that shapes the nature of the relationshipbetween the people and government.

The government is clearly aware that the policy is not a popular one, but asusual it has been able to marshal an impressive array of arguments to overcomeresistance to it. This does not mean that all its arguments are good or that thepeople are entirely convinced by them. It is not unreasonable to assume thatmany Singaporeans believe that the official arguments are not sufficient tojustify the policy; and even if they were perceived to be sufficient, Singaporeansmay not be prepared to accept the kind of politics entailed by the policy. ChuaBeng Huat (2008, 56) has observed “that the logic of government is the logic ofbig business is an unavoidable consequence of the salary system: this mode ofreasoning has become an integral part of PAP’s economy-driven political andadministrative pragmatism.”

Problems implicit in the policy may be gleaned from aspects of thegovernment’s defense of it. For example, Shanmugam (2007, H5) offers thefollowing argument.

Why should we demand financial sacrifice from those going into publicservice? Is that the most sensible way of showing one’s commitment to thecountry? It is surely more logical to make sure money is a neutral factor, itshould be neither an attraction nor a disincentive. Quality people should beable to make the choice of public service solely on ability, character, andcommitment to make a difference to society—and not whether they have tomake a financial sacrifice.

The problem with this argument is that money is not and has never beenconsidered a neutral factor in the formulation of the policy. After all, the policyhas been used as a justification to minimize corruption; it is “one of the basicrequirements to protect the integrity of our institutions” (Lee 2007). And it is


not clear why financial sacrifice should not be one of the sacrifices that people ofquality committed to make a difference to society should be prepared to make.

In his response to this debate, PM Lee Hsien Loong (2007) has indicated thathe and the government in fact value people “to whom an income is irrelevant andwho will do what they feel they want to do regardless of pay. When we find them,we will field them if they are suitable. But I cannot design the system on theassumption that everyone is like that because not everyone is like that.”14 The PMalso appears to agree with the critics regarding the necessity of sacrifice.

Many MPs have raised . . . the question of moral authority. They havemade the argument that public office requires selflessness and sacrifice, thatMinisters especially must have moral authority to lead, not just manage.Therefore, you cannot expect wages comparable to the private sector . . . Iagree with these propositions in principle. You must be selfless, you musthave some sacrifice, you must have the moral authority to lead, to getpeople to follow you and therefore it cannot be exactly the same as theprivate sector. So I will differ slightly from Shanmugam. Shanmugam says,‘Why should there be sacrifice?’ I say, ‘Let there be sacrifice so there is nodoubt that the person in this is not making money and not in this to makemoney.’ (Lee 2007)

Having conceded that sacrifice is necessary the PM then went on to argue:“[b]ut let us ask: where does moral authority come from? I think it comes fromleaders who care for the people, who improve the lives of people, who aremotivated to serve others and not enrich themselves, and from leadersdemonstrating that they are more often right than wrong. You need a bit offinancial sacrifice. Some, but this is not an auction” (Lee 2007). For his part thePM has decided to hold his salary at the present level for five years, with theincrement going to charity. This apparently constitutes his “bit of financialsacrifice” so that it would give him the “moral standing to defend the policy withSingaporeans” (Lee 2007). The speech is a little confusing because it fails toclarify the nature and place of “selflessness and sacrifice” in the system ofgovernance in Singapore. It also fails to answer the question why ministersshould sacrifice their pay or why sacrifice should serve as the basis of moralauthority. In this connection, it is worth noting that the sacrifice of the PM issomewhat paradoxical: he sacrifices his pay in order to justify a policy that sayssuch sacrifices are ultimately unnecessary. The speech thus leaves ambiguous theideas of duty and sacrifice in the political life of Singaporean ministers. It is thisambiguity about the place of duty and sacrifice in the political culture ofSingapore that may help to explain the apparent “disconnect” between thepeople and the government. And this in turn seems to limit the moral characterof the political legitimacy enjoyed by the government.

14 The speech does not give any examples of people in this category.


Murmurings in the Land of the Merlion15

The incidents recounted below serve to indicate why the degree of legitimacymay not be very deep. They point to underlying resentment against the rich andtalented and indicate latent hostility toward the ruling elite. That thegovernment is aware of this latent hostility is reflected in its various attempts toplacate the public in relation to these incidents.

On November 20, 2005 the Straits Times carried an article about pianistMelvyn Tan’s visit to Singapore (Tom 2005). As his aging parents were tooold to visit him in London, he was obliged to return to Singapore. ForMelvyn, coming back to Singapore was something of a risk. Although he leftSingapore when he was twelve and became a British citizen in 1978, he wasstill a Singaporean when he was called up for National Service (NS), which hefailed to fulfill. Under the Enlistment Act, defaulters could be fined up to$5,000, sent to jail for up to three years, or both. He was relieved uponturning himself in, that he was only given a fine. The article was written tocelebrate Melvyn’s return from exile, so to speak. In the time that he had beenaway, he had made his mark in the classical world with some 30 recordings tohis name, and since his return he had been invited to be on the jury of anational music competition.

But instead of a celebratory reception, Melvyn’s return and the story of hisevasion of NS stirred up a storm of angry protests. The headline for one ofseveral angry letters to the press ran: “Are NS men’s sweat and tears worth only$5,000?” (Melvyn was actually fined $3,000) (Liew 2005, H10). The controversyreached a point where it had to be addressed in Parliament, whose memberswere divided, with some demanding tougher penalties and others pleading forclemency. Then minister of defense Teo Chee Hean pressed for and obtainedstiffer fines and jail sentences for draft dodgers (Koh 2006). The tougherpenalties he said would “send a strong signal that NS is critical to the country’ssurvival” (Koh 2006, 1).

A perceptive reporter felt that the animosity toward the hapless pianistreflected a “worrying divide—one that stems from a combination of class- andtalent-envy” (Lim 2005). A year later the same reporter would respond toanother similar controversy that would grip the nation. The report carries theheadline “Why the Elite Envy?” and it opens with the observation that “everyfew months or so, simmering unhappiness over the attitudes and privileges ofindividuals seen to belong to the elite boils over” (Lim and Kwek 2006, S11).The episode that inspired her article this time was a blog entry written by astudent from the Raffles Junior College, the top high school in Singapore. The

15 The Merlion, a symbol with the head of a lion and the body of a fish, was designed for theSingapore Tourism Board and is promoted as an official souvenir and even a national icon ofSingapore.


student was responding to a post from a young executive expressing hisconcerns about job security and age discrimination in Singapore. The studentlambasted the executive, calling him a “bleeding stupid 40-year oldSingaporean . . . whining about how Singapore is such an insecure place.”16 Shethen went on to say “if you’re not good enough, life will kick you in the balls,that’s just how things go” and concluded her post with a scathing remark:“please, get out of my elite uncaring face.”

The student also happened to be the daughter of a prominent member ofParliament who defended her remarks. When asked for a response, the fathersaid:

[w]hat she said did come across as insensitive. The language was strongerthan what most people could take . . . I think if you cut through theinsensitivity of the language, her basic point is reasonable, that is, that awell-educated university graduate who works for a multinational companyshould not be bemoaning about the Government and get on with thechallenges in life. . . . Nonetheless, I have counselled her to learn from it.Some people cannot take the brutal truth and that sort of language, so sheought to learn from it. (Wikipedia 2009)

This response created such a furor that the father was compelled to make apublic apology, in particular with reference to what he said “about people’sinability to take the brutal truth and strong language” (Kwek 2006, H4).

The most recent case involved a top civil servant who was publiclyreprimanded by a minister. In the lifestyle and entertainment section of theSunday Times, Mr. Tan Yong Soon, permanent secretary in the Ministry ofEnvironment and Water Resources, contributed an article about his family’sholiday to France to learn a basic cuisine course from the prestigious cookeryschool Le Cordon Bleu. The article shared his amusing experiences at thecooking school, but it evidently failed to amuse some readers. As it turned outthe cost of attending the exclusive cooking school was S$15,270 per head, andalong with his wife and son the trip would have cost over S$45,000. Thenegative public reaction to this extravagance was picked up by Reuters, whichdrew attention to a personal remark the official made about the extendedholiday he had: “Taking five weeks leave from work is not as difficult as onethinks. Most times when you are at the top, you think you are indispensable.But if you are a good leader who has built up a good team, it is possible” (Lee2009d). The public outcry eventually prompted the minister of defense, Mr.Teo Chee Hean, to rebuke the permanent secretary for writing an articlethat was “ill-judged” and which showed a “lack of sensitivity.” The head

16 The postings by the executive and the student are available from Wikipedia, “Wee Shu MinElitism Scandal” (2009).


of the civil service was obliged to convey his apologies to the public and toissue a reminder to civil servants to conduct themselves “with decorum andhumility” (“Perm Sec’s Article Showed Lack of Sensitivity, Says Teo”2009).

What is striking about these incidents is that they are evidently not aboutgrave matters of state. One or two of them could be characterized as somewhattrivial or frivolous. Yet the public reaction and the government’s response werequite dramatic. These episodes seem to reflect the unhappiness felt by the publictoward the wealth and privileges enjoyed by the ruling elite. According tosociologist Alexius Pereira, most Singaporeans accept that “we need thesetechnocrats and highfliers to make decisions because our nation being what it is,small and vulnerable, one wrong step and we’re finished. But they also hate thatthis group enjoy privileges and are always telling us what to do” (Lim and Kwek2006, S11).

The public expression of moral outrage in these cases indicates that thepublic does not appear to believe privileges enjoyed by the ruling elites are fullydeserved. Because the relation between the government and the people isfundamentally one of exchange, both parties are particularly sensitive to anyperceived tilt in the established balance of fair exchange. The politicalleadership’s faith in meritocracy, which justifies the policy of amply rewardingthe talented, commits it to the view that those who succeed in enriching others,as measured by economic growth, should not be poorer for it. The belief inmeritocracy leads the ruling elites to dismiss cases of public moral resentmentagainst the ruling elites as manifestations of an underlying public envy, whichseems to be aimed at depriving them of their fair share, since the public is widelyregarded as incapable of producing good policies, especially those promotingeconomic growth. The historical experience of an egalitarian incomedistribution in the early decades of an independent Singapore and thesubsequent growing income gap seem to have made the public deeply suspiciousof the ruling elite’s claim to fulfill their end of the bargain: the provision ofsecurity and prosperity. That the examined cases seemingly confirm publicsuspicion of unjustified elite privileges explains the spontaneity and depth ofpublic moral indignation.

When it comes to the question of desert the elites may believe that theyhave earned their privileges by virtue of their abilities and effort; that is, onthe principle of meritocracy. They have not cheated anyone, so why shouldthey be ashamed of the wealth and privileges they have earned? But theproblem is that the principle of meritocracy can not be perfectly applied in animperfect world. Faced with the public perception of the problem of elitism,Lee Hsien Loong (2006, 23) has been obliged to say to those who have beensuccessful on the basis of Singapore’s meritocracy that “[i]f you are successful,don’t say it’s just because of yourself. It’s because of the system, it’s becausemany people have helped you succeed. So you owe them something, you owethe system something, you owe Singapore something.” This statement


captures more accurately the policy of cultivating elites. But if this is so itgreatly qualifies the individual characteristics that ground the principle ofmeritocracy. The perception that the elites have benefited disproportionatelyfrom the system or that not all their privileges are justified is therefore notwithout merit.

Conclusion

In his defense of the salary increase of ministers, PM Lee Hsien Loongcompared the median income of ministers ($2.2 million) with the median incomeof the top 55 earners of companies ($1.75 million) listed on the Singapore stockexchange. The salary of $1.75 million coincides with companies with marketcapitalization of between $4 and $5 billion dollars. The PM made thecomparison in order to imagine what Singapore would be like if it were turnedinto a corporation. “If Singapore Inc were a listed company, what would itsmarket capitalization be. . . . My GDP, which is the profit earned by SingaporeInc is $210 billion. The average price earnings ratio on the Singapore exchangeis now 20. So if I calculated a market capitalization—if Singapore Inc went foran IPO [Initial Public Offering]—this is a $4 trillion dollar company” (Lee2007). On the basis of this calculation the pay of the minister should be about athousand times the median income of the top 55 private sector earners. Thepurpose of the comparison may have been to show that the cost of governmentto Singaporeans is still relatively “cheap” (Chua 2007), but on the other hand,it also reveals the immense gulf separating ministers from most Singaporeans,both rich and poor alike.17

On the basis of its success in developing the country and improving thelives of citizens, the political leadership expects a deep commitment andperhaps even unquestioning loyalty from the people. But in blurring the linebetween the private and public sector, the market-based compensation ofministers and top officials leaves unclear what it is that motivates the politicalleadership. Members of the ruling elite can not say that they are notmotivated by the desire for wealth and prestige. They can not be characterizedas individuals who are selfless in their devotion and dedication to the country.Accordingly they can not command the deep respect and honor they believethey deserve from the people. As PM Lee Hsien Loong has said the

17 The comparison, however, reveals how close the imagined compensation of Singaporeanministers is to CEOs of top corporations in the world. The highest paid CEO in the UnitedStates in 2008 was Steven Schwarzman of the Blackstone Group. He received US$702.4 milliondollars (S$1 billion) just as the global recession deepened. But the logic of the PM’s argumentwould suggest that Mr. Schwarzman was overcompensated (“US Highest-paid CEO Earns $1b”2009).


government apparently values people “to whom an income is irrelevant,” butit is hard to sustain the belief that the current corps of leaders are such peoplewhen they award themselves a hefty salary increase in the name of fairness.And he also agrees that sacrifice is somehow necessary in politics to attainmoral standing. As the chief representative of the regime he has only gone asfar as to make “a bit of financial sacrifice.” Such a sacrifice would nottherefore command great moral authority.

We have dwelt at some length on this issue because we believe it goes to theheart of the legitimacy issue in Singapore. The Singaporean bargain hasinvolved the political acquiescence of the people in exchange for security anddevelopment produced by a meritocratic elite dedicated to serving the bestinterests of all citizens. The justice of this bargain can be compromised if theelite fails to deliver on its promises or if it seems to be serving its own interestsat the expense of the people. As long as the compensation issue remainsunresolved, the fundamental relationship established between the people andthe government will be jeopardized, and doubts about governmental legitimacywill grow.

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