Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom

or practice to the contrary.When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the

latter shall govern.Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws

or the Constitution. (5a)

______________

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9522

AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

SECTION 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046, entitled “An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines”, as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5446, is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 1. The baselines of the Philippine archipelago are hereby defined and described specifically as follows:

Basepoint

Number

StationName

Location World Geodetic(WGS 84)

Latitude (N)

System of 1984Coordinates

Longitude (E)

Distanceto next

basepoint(M)

1 PAB-01 Amianan Is. 21° 6′ 57.73″ 121° 57′ 27.71″ 70.03

2 PAB-02 Balintang Is. 19° 57′ 38.19″ 122° 9′ 46.32″ 99.17

3 PAB-04 Iligan Pt. 18° 18′ 35.30″ 122° 20′ 19.07″ 71.83

4 PAB-05A Ditolong Pt. 17° 7′ 16.30″ 122° 31′ 28.34″ 1.05

5 PAB-05B Ditolong Pt. 17° 6′ 14.79″ 122° 31′ 43.84″ 0.39

6 PAB-05 Ditolong Pt. 17° 5′ 51.31″ 122° 31′ 42.66″ 3.29

7 PAB-06 Spires Is. 17° 2′ 36.91″ 122° 31′ 3.28″ 9.74

8 PAB-06B Digollorin Pt. 16° 53′ 18.03″ 122° 27′ 56.61″ 3.51

9 PAB-06C Digollorin Rk. 16° 49′ 56.11″ 122° 26′ 50.78″ 2.40

10 PAB-07 Diviuisa Pt. 16° 47′ 38.86″ 122° 26′ 4.40″ 30.94

11 PAB-08 Dijohan Pt. 16° 18′ 44.33″ 122° 14′ 16.69″ 116.26

12 PAB-10A Tinaga Is. 14° 29′ 54.43″ 122° 57′ 51.15″ 80.29

13 PAB-11 Horodaba Rk. 14° 6′ 29.91″ 124° 16′ 59.21″ 0.54

14 PAB-12 Matulin Rk. 14° 6′ 10.40″ 124° 17′ 26.28″ 96.04

15 PAB-13 Atalaya Pt. 12° 41′ 6.37″ 125° 3′ 53.71″ 6.79

16 PAB-13A Bacan Is. 12° 36′ 18.41″ 125° 8′ 50.19″ 5.52

17 PAB-14 Finch Rk. 12° 32′ 33.62″ 125° 12′ 59.70″ 0.80

18 PAB-14A Cube Rk. 12° 31′ 57.45″ 125° 13′ 32.37″ 4.90

19 PAB-14D NW Manjud Pt. 12° 28′ 36.42″ 125° 17′ 12.32″ 1.30

20 PAB-15 SE Manjud Pt. 12° 27′ 37.51″ 125° 18′ 5.23″ 7.69

21 PAB-16A E Sora Cay 12° 21′ 41.64″ 125° 23′ 7.41″ 5.68

22 PAB-16B Panablijon 12° 17′ 27.17″ 125° 27′ 0.12″ 5.21

23 PAB-16C Alugon 12° 13′ 21.95″ 125° 30′ 19.47″ 1.94

24 PAB-16D N Bunga Pt. 12° 11′ 48.16″ 125° 31′ 30.88″ 0.54

25 PAB-17A E Bunga Pt. 12° 11′ 20.67″ 125° 31′ 48.29″ 5.71

26 PAB-18A SE Tubabao Is. 12° 6′ 7.00″ 125° 34′ 11.94″ 83.84

27 PAB-19C Suluan Is. 10° 45′ 16.70″ 125° 58′ 8.78″ 56.28

28 PAB-19D N Tuason Pt. 9° 49′ 59.58″ 126° 10′ 6.39″ 57.44

29 PAB-20A Arangasa Is. 8° 53′ 16.62″ 126° 20′ 48.81″ 40.69

30 PAB-21B Sanco Pt. 8° 13′ 11.53″ 126° 28′ 53.25″ 30.80

31 PAB-22 Bagoso Is. 7° 42″ 45.02″ 126° 34′ 29.03″ 12.95

32 PAB-22C Languyan 7° 29′ 49.47″ 126° 35′ 59.24″ 0.54

33 PAB-23 Languyan 7° 29′ 16.93″ 126° 35′ 59.50″ 0.76

34 PAB-23B Languyan 7° 28′ 30.97″ 126° 35′ 57.30″ 1.02

35 PAB-23C N Baculin Pt. 7° 27′ 29.42″ 126° 35′ 51.71″ 10.12

36 PAB-24 Pusan Pt. 7° 17′ 19.80″ 126° 36′ 18.16″ 1.14

37 PAB-24A S Pusan Pt. 7° 16′ 14.43″ 126° 35′ 57.20″ 63.28

38 PAB-25B Cape San Agustin 6° 17′ 14.73″ 126° 12′ 14.40″ 1.28

39 PAB-25 Cape San Agustin 6° 16′ 8.35″ 126° 11′ 35.06″ 67.65

40 PAB-26 SE Sarangani Is. 5° 23′ 34.20″ 125° 28′ 42.11″ 0.43

41 PAB-27 Panguil Bato Pt. 5° 23′ 21.80 125° 28′ 19.59″ 3.44

42 PAB-28 Tapundo Pt. 5° 21′ 55.66″ 125° 25′ 11.21″ 3.31

43 PAB-29 W Calia Pt. 5° 21′ 58.48″ 125° 21′ 52.03″ 0.87

44 PAB-30 Manamil Is. 5° 22′ 2.91″ 125° 20′ 59.73″ 1.79

45 PAB-31 Marampog Pt. 5° 23′ 20.18″ 125° 19′ 44.29″ 78.42

46 PAB-32 Pola Pt. 6° 9′ 8.44″ 124° 15′ 42.81″ 122.88

47 PAB-33A Kauluan Is. 6° 26′ 47.22″ 122° 13′ 34.50″ 29.44

48 PAB-34A Tongquil Is. 6° 2′ 33.77″ 121° 56′ 36.20″ 2.38

49 PAB-35 Tongquil Is. 6° 1′ 8.15″ 121° 54′ 41.45″ 1.72

50 PAB-35A Tongquil Is. 6° 0′ 17.88″ 121° 53′ 11.17″ 85.94

51 PAB-38A Kinapusan Is. 5° 12′ 8.70″ 120° 41′ 38.14″ 55.24

52 PAB-39 Manuk Manka Is. 4° 47′ 39.24″ 119° 51′ 58.08″ 43.44

53 PAB-40 Frances Reef 4° 24′ 53.84″ 119° 14′ 50.71″ 0.61

54 PAB-40A Frances Reef 4° 25′ 3.83″ 119° 14′ 15.15″ 15.48

55 PAB-41A Bajapa Reef 4° 36′ 9.01″ 119° 3′ 22.75″ 6.88

56 PAB-42A Paguan Is. 4° 42′ 52.07″ 119° 1′ 44.04″ 3.40

57 PAB-43 Alice Reef 4° 45′ 55.25″ 119° 3′ 15.19″ 2.28

58 PAB-44 Alice Reef 4° 47′ 5.36″ 119° 5′ 12.94″ 18.60

59 PAB-45 Omapoy Rk. 4° 55′ 10.45″ 119° 22′ 1.30″ 23.37

60 PAB-46 Bukut Lapis Pt. 5° 2′ 23.73″ 119° 44′ 18.14″ 44.20

61 PAB-47 Pearl Bank 5° 46′ 35.15″ 119° 39′ 51.77″ 75.17

62 PAB-48 Baguan Is. 6° 5′ 58.41″ 118° 26′ 57.30″ 8.54

63 PAB-48A Taganak Is. 6° 4′ 14.08″ 118° 18′ 33.33″ 13.46

64 PAB-49 Great Bakkungaan

Is.

6° 11′ 4.65″ 118° 6′ 54.15″ 3.97

65 PAB-50 Lihiman Is. 6° 13′ 39.90″ 118° 3′ 52.09″ 5.53

66 PAB-51 Sibaung Is. 6° 17′ 43.99″ 118° 0′ 5.44″ 41.60

67 PAB-52 Muligi Is. 6° 52′ 14.53″ 118° 23′ 40.49″ 75.06

68 PAB-53 South Mangsee Is. 7° 30′ 26.05″ 117° 18′ 33.75″ 26.00

69 PAB-54 Balabac Is. 7° 48′ 30.69″ 116° 59′ 39.18″ 6.08

70 PAB-54A Balabac Great Reef 7° 51′ 27.17″ 116° 54′ 17.19″ 1.18

71 PAB-54B Balabac Great Reef 7° 52′ 19.86″ 116° 53′ 28.73″ 2.27

72 PAB-55 Balabac Great Reef 7° 54′ 36.35″ 116° 53′ 16.64″ 7.42

73 PAB-60 Ada Reef 8° 2′ 0.26″ 116° 54′ 10.04″ 10.85

74 PAB-61 Secam Is. 8° 11′ 18.36″ 116° 59′ 51.87″ 30.88

75 PAB-62 Latud Pt. 8° 37′ 56.37″ 117° 15′ 51.23″ 7.91

76 PAB-63 SW Tatub Pt. 8° 44′ 17.40″ 117° 20′ 39.37″ 11.89

77 PAB-63A W Sicud Pt. 8° 53′ 32.20″ 117° 28′ 15.78″ 13.20

78 PAB-64 Tarumpitao Pt. 9° 2′ 57.47″ 117° 37′ 38.88″ 81.12

79 PAB-64B Dry Is. 9° 59′ 22.54″ 118° 36′ 53.61″ 82.76

80 PAB-65C Binangcolan Pt. 11° 13′ 19.82″ 119° 15′ 17.74″ 74.65

81 PAB-67 Pinnacle Rk. 12° 19′ 35.22″ 119° 50′ 56.00″ 93.88

82 PAB-68 Cabra Is. 13° 53′ 21.45″ 120° 1′ 5.86″ 115.69

83 PAB-71 Hermana Mayor Is. 15° 48′ 43.61″ 119° 46′ 56.09″ 9.30

84 PAB-72 Tambobo Pt. 15° 57′ 51.67″ 119° 44′ 55.32″ 12.06

85 PAB-73B Rena Pt. 16° 9′ 57.90″ 119° 45′ 15.76″ 0.25

86 PAB-73 Rena Pt. 16° 10′ 12.42″ 119° 45′ 11.95 6.43

87 PAB-74 Rocky Ledge 16° 16′ 34.46″ 119° 46′ 19.50″ 0.65

88 PAB-74A Piedra Pt. 16° 17′ 12.70″ 119° 46′ 28.52″ 1.30

89 PAB-75 Piedra Pt. 16° 18′ 29.49″ 119° 46′ 44.94″ 1.04

90 PAB-75C Piedra Pt. 16° 19′ 28.20″ 119° 47′ 7.69″ 0.63

91 PAB-75D Piedra Pt. 16° 20′ 4.38″ 119° 47′ 20.48″ 80.60

92 PAB-76 Dile Pt. 17° 34′ 24.94″ 120° 20′ 33.36″ 6.86

93 PAB-77 Pinget Is. 17° 41′ 17.56″ 120° 21′ 2.02″ 14.15

94 PAB-78 Badoc Is. 17° 55′ 4.13″ 120° 24′ 40.56″ 35.40

95 PAB-79 Cape Bojeador 18° 29′ 32.42″ 120° 33′ 42.41″ 1.77

96 PAB-79B Bobon 18° 30′ 52.88″ 120° 34′ 55.35″ 53.23

97 PAB-80 Calagangan Pt. 19° 10′ 14.78″ 121° 12′ 52.64″ 98.07

98 PAB-82 Itbayat Is. 20° 43′ 15.74″ 121° 46′ 57.80″ 25.63

99 PAB-83 Amianan Is. 21° 7′ 17.47″ 121° 56′ 43.85″ 0.08

100 PAB-84 Amianan Is. 21° 7′ 18.41″ 121° 56′ 48.79″ 0.25

101 PAB-85 Amianan Is. 21° 7′ 12.04″ 121° 57′ 3.65″ 0.44″

SECTION 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as “Regime of Islands” under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.

SECTION 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, without limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.

SECTION 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the charts and maps indicating the aforesaid baselines, shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

SECTION 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith produce and publish charts and maps of the appropriate scale clearly representing the delineation of basepoints and baselines as set forth in this Act.

SECTION 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a supplemental budget or included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law.

SECTION 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other portions or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.

SECTION 8. The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, and all other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and issuances inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended or modified accordingly.

SECTION 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: March 10, 2009

Published in the Malaya on March 12, 2009.

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the most comprehensive attempt at creating a unified regime for governance of the rights of nations with respect to the world's oceans. The treaty addresses a number of topics including navigational rights, economic rights, pollution of the seas, conservation of marine life, scientific exploration, piracy, and more. The treaty, one of the longest in history, is comprised of 320 articles and 9 annexes, representing the codification of customary international law and its progressive development.

Historical BackgroundSince humanity first set forth upon the seas, the issue of sovereign control over the oceans has been an ongoing concern. Prior to the 20th century, the oceans had been subject to the freedom of the seas doctrine. This principle, adopted in the 17th century, limited national rights and jurisdiction over a narrow band of water along a nations coast, the rest of the sea being free to all and belonging to none. Nearly a century later, the "cannon-shot" rule became the basis for determining how much of the adjacent oceans were under the jurisdiction of a nation. The cannon-shot rule set forth that a nation controlled a territorial sea as far as a projectile could be fired from a cannon based on shore. In the 18th century this range was approximate three nautical miles. As time progressed, three miles became the widely accepted range for the territorial sea.[1]Due to the slow pace of technological developments prior to the Industrial Revolution, these simple rules provided effective governance of the world's oceans. With the technological developments of the mid-19th and early-20th

centuries, however, not only did ships become more powerful, but technology allowed humanity to exploit ocean resources that had never before been envisioned. Fishermen, once limited to areas near their own coasts, were now equipped with vessels that could allow them to stay at sea for months at a time and capture fish harvests that were far from their native waters. Virtually unrestrained, fleets from around the world traveled to areas rich in fish-stocks. The lack of restraint on the part of these fishermen resulted in fish stocks around the world being depleted without regard to the stability of their numbers.[2]Evolving technology also allowed for the exploitation of previously inaccessible off-shore resources, most notably oil (but also diamonds, gravel, and precious metals). To illustrate the rapidity of these developments, in 1947 off-shore oil production in the Gulf of Mexico was still less than 1 million tons. By 1954, production had grown close to 400 million tons.[3] As a matter of perspective, just in the Gulf of Mexico, the United States alone currently produces 218,192 tons daily, for a total of 79.6 million tons annually, reflecting a steadily decreasing trend that began in the 1970's.[4]

In order to protect local resources, be they biological or mineral, nations began expanding their claims of sovereignty beyond the traditional 3 mile limit. The first nation to challenge the long-standing freedom of the seas doctrine was the United States. On September 28, 1945, President Harry S. Truman signed what has become commonly known as the Truman Proclamation. The proclamation set a claim of sovereignty by the United States to the outer continental shelf (OCS) and the resources therein as well as establishing the right of the U.S. to establish conservations zones "in areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States."[5] While recognizing some limited sovereignty over an expanded region of the sea, the proclamation was careful to stipulate that the new US policy did not affect "the right [of] free and unimpeded navigation."[6]After the United States expanded its claim, it was not long before other nations followed suit. By 1950,Argentina was actively claiming its continental shelf as well as the water column above it, Ecuador, Chile, and Peru were asserting rights over a 200-mile zone in order to protect its biological resources from foreign fleets, and a spate of Arab and Eastern European nations were laying claim to a 12-mile territorial sea. There was a growing understanding, however, that such a fractured regime could not continue.[7]UNCLOS IRecognizing the conflicts that were resulting from the current regime, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1105 (XI), which called for the convening of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in Geneva in 1858. Eighty-six nations participated (now commonly referred to as UNCLOS I). The meeting produced four separate conventions [8]: 1) the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (established sovereignty rights and rights of passage through the territorial sea, established the Contiguous Zone to extend 12 nautical miles from the baselines, but failed to set standards of limits on the territorial sea);[9] 2) the Convention on the High Seas (established access for landlocked nations, expounded on the concept of "flag state," outlawed the transport of slaves, covered piracy, established safety and rescue protocols, established a national duty to prevent pollution, and established rights to laying of undersea cables and pipelines);[10] 3) the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (established the right of coastal nations to protect living ocean resources, required nations whose fleets leave their territorial sea to establish conservation measures, and established measures for dispute resolution);[11] 4) and the Convention on the Continental Shelf (established the regime governing the superjacent waters and airspace, the laying and maintenance of submarine cables or pipelines, the regime governing navigation, fishing, scientific research and the coastal nation's competence in these areas, delimitation, and tunneling).[12] The Convention also produced an Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (provides for the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, or for submission of the dispute to arbitration or conciliation).[13] While UNCLOS I saw a significant development in the international legal regime governing the oceans, there were still many issues left unsettled.UNCLOS IIIn an attempt to deal with the issues that remained unresolved after UNCLOS I, the General Assembly called for a second United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (now commonly referred to as UNCLOS II). The parties met for just over a month in early 1960 with the objective of settling the question on the breadth of the territorial seas and fishery limits. While the conference adopted two resolutions, the parties were unable to come to consensus on the issues at hand.[14]UNCLOS IIIFrustrated by the continuing inconsistency in the ocean governance regime, Malta's ambassador to the United Nations, Arvid Pardo, called upon the General Assembly to take action and called for "an effective international regime over the seabed and the ocean floor," that clearly defined national jurisdiction.[15] One month later, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2467 A (XXIII) and resolution 2750 C (XXV), which created the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction and called for the convening of a third Law of the Sea meeting to be held in 1973.[16]The deliberations lasted for nine years, saw the participation of 160 nations, and concluded in 1982 with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is now commonly referred to as simply "UNCLOS" or the Law of the Sea Treaty.[17] UNCLOS is one of the largest, and likely one of the most important, legal agreements in history. The treaty contains 320 articles and 9 annexes. It synthesizes and builds upon the agreements that were developed at the first conference (see UNCLOS I above). The agreement addresses a myriad of issues including navigational rights of ships and aircraft, limits on the extension of national sovereignty over the oceans, environmental protection of the oceans, conservation of living resources and mining rights.While UNCLOS was first signed in December of 1982, the agreement did not come into force until November of 1994, a period of nearly 12 years.[18] UNCLOS required 60 signatures for ratification and could only enter into force one year after the final nation had ratified or acceded to the treaty.[19] The main reason many nations took

so long to sign the treaty is because of Article 309, which prohibits nations from taking out reservations to any part of a treaty. A reservation is a statement made by a nation when accepting a treaty, whereby it excludes or modifies the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty as those terms apply to the nation accepting the treaty.[20] The inability of a nation to take out reservations to particular terms of the treaty caused many nations to hesitate. UNCLOS represented a significant number of compromises and some of the terms of the agreement did not sit well with various nations. However, in order to establish a unified doctrine of the law of the sea, UNCLOS necessarily had to prevent reservations or risk maintaining a fractured regime.Divisions of Ocean AreasOne of the most powerful features of UNCLOS is that it settled the question of the extent of national sovereignty over the oceans and seabed. Parts II, V, VI, and VII establish the various regions of the oceans, who has sovereignty over each, and to what degree. The following sections explain both how the maritime regions are divided and the sovereign powers that nations may exercise over each region.

Baselines

Diagram of the various regions of the ocean over which a State may exercise sovereignty.The baseline is the boundary from which a nation may begin measurements to determine the portion of the adjacent oceans or continental shelf over which it may exercise sovereignty. Except in some special cases, the baseline is the low-water line along the coast.[21] Detailed explanations of how baselines are determined are provided in Articles 5-7 and 9-14. Special rules have been established for determining the baselines of archipelagic nations (nations that consist of a number of small islands such as the Philippines) and can be found in Article 47.Internal WatersInternal waters are those that are contained on the landward side of the baseline.[22]These waters fall under the exclusive sovereignty of the nation in which they are contained.Territorial SeaArticle 3 of UNCLOS declares that a nation may establish a territorial sea that extends up to 12 nautical miles from the baselines. Within the territorial sea, a nation has exclusive sovereignty over the water, seabed, and airspace.[23] The treaty establishes that all nations have the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of another nation and that, outside certain conditions, the nation laying claim to the territorial sea cannot hamper innocent passage of a foreign vessel.[24] UNCLOS adopted the basic concepts of the territorial sea and the right of innocent passage that had been codified in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, but the new treaty went a step further by establishing the limits of a nation's territorial sea.

By the late 1960's many nations recognized a 12-mile limit to the territorial sea. At the start of the UNCLOS, only twenty-five nations maintained the traditional claim of 3 nautical miles. Sixty-six nations were claiming 12 nautical miles, fifteen nations claimed between 4 and 10 nautical miles, and eight nations were claiming an astounding 200 nautical miles. Smaller nations, including those without large navies or merchant fleets, favored a larger territorial sea in order to protect their coastal waters from infringements by more powerful nations. The world's major naval and maritime powers, however, pressed for the 3-mile rule because the 12-mile rule would have placed over 100 straits used for international navigation under the exclusive sovereignty of other nations. Some of these included the Strait of Gibraltar (the only open access to the Mediterranean), the Strait of Hormuz (the only passage to the oil-producing Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman nations), and the Strait of Malacca (the main route connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans).[25]Remembering that the Cold War was still ongoing during the Convention, smaller nations were particularly concerned about the possibility of threats to their national security posed by warships of foreign nations or even the possibility of becoming embroiled in the conflicts of foreign powers. In an attempted compromise, the small nations offered the larger maritime powers the right of innocent passage, however the maritime powers were not satisfied with this offer. The problem, in the view of the great powers, was that restrictions to innocent passage would prohibit covert movements of vessels (such as submarines) and did not guarantee overflight rights, thereby creating a security risk.[26]In the end, the parties came together to form a compromise known as "transit passage." Applied specifically to straits that would otherwise fall within the territorial sea of a nation, transit passage applies to straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas to another and allows for "navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of [a] strait...."[27] In all other ways aside transit passage, the waters of a strait still remain the territorial sea of the adjacent nation.[28]Contiguous ZoneThe Contiguous Zone is a region of the seas measured from the baseline to a distance of 24 nautical miles. Within this region, a nation may exercise the control necessary to prevent the infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea, and punish infringement of those laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.[29]Exclusive Economic ZoneThe Exclusive Economic Zone or "EEZ" is a region that stretches a distance of no more than 200 nautical miles from a nation's baselines.[30] Generally, the rules regarding the High Seas, set forth in Articles 88 to 115, apply to the EEZ.[31] Within its EEZ, a nation may explore at exploit the natural resources (both living and inanimate) found both in the water and on the seabed, may utilize the natural resources of the area for the production of energy (including wind and wave/current), may establish artificial islands, conduct marine scientific research, pass laws for the preservation and protection of the marine environment, and regulate fishing.[32]One of the primary purposes behind establishing the EEZ was to clarify the rights of individual nations to control the fish harvests off their shores. The 200-mile limit established by UNCLOS is not an arbitrary number. It is derived from the fact that the most lucrative fishing grounds lie within 200 nautical miles from the coast as this is where the richest phytoplankton (the basic food of fish) pastures lie.[33]The creation of the EEZ gave coastal nations jurisdiction of approximately 38 million square nautical miles of ocean space. The world's EEZs are estimated to contain about 87% of all of the known and estimated hydrocarbon reserves as well as almost all offshore mineral resources. In addition, the EEZs contain almost 99% of the world's fisheries, which allows nations to work to conserve the oceans vital and limited living resources.[34]Continental Shelf

Cross sectional map of a continental shelf.Unlike the other boundaries that have been thus far discussed, the continental shelf is a real, naturally-occurring geological formation. It is a gently sloping undersea plain between the above-water portion of a landmass and the deep ocean. The continental shelf extends to what is known as the continental slope, a point at which the land descends further and marks the beginning of the ocean itself. It is host to most of the world's oceanic plant and animal life and plays a vital role in energy production, from offshore oil and gas reserves to renewable energy resources.[35]When UNCLOS refers to the continental shelf, however, it is using "continental shelf" as a legal term.[36]While the EEZ captures a lot of the continental shelf for many countries, it does not capture all of it. As such, UNCLOS includes provisions for nations to lay claim to a continental shelf that exceeds 200 nautical miles from the baseline by establishing the foot of the continental slope as set forth in Article 76, paragraphs 4-7. These provisions allow for an extension of an additional 150 nautical miles from the baseline or 100 miles from the 2,500 meter depth.

[37] Nations exercise over the shelf the sovereign right to explore and exploit the non-living natural resources of the continental shelf as well as the living organisms that live on the seabed itself.[38] The water above the portion of the continental shelf that is not contained within the EEZ remains part of the high seas (as does the airspace above that area).[39] Nations wishing to request an extension of sovereignty over an extended portion of their naturally occurring continental shelf must do so within 10 years of UNCLOS coming into force for that particular nation.[40]The extension of sovereignty to the extended continental shelf comes with a price. A nation that exploits resources on the continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical mile mark is allowed five years in which to develop and exploit the resources of the shelf without charge. Starting on the sixth year, a nation has to pay 1 percent of the value of the resources produced from the site. The rate of payments increase by 1 percent for each year until the twelfth year and is capped at 7 percent thereafter. Developing nations are exempted from this provision.[41] Revenues generated from these operations are deposited with the International Seabed Authority and equally distributed among national parties to UNCLOS.[42]High SeasMap illustrating the high seas. All areas in blue are considered part of the high seas and are not subject to national appropriation.Waters beyond a nation's EEZ are considered to be the high seas.[43] The high seas are still governed the "freedom of the seas" concept, albeit a modified version. Just as with the classical version, no nation my lay claim to any portion of the high seas.[44] Per the terms of the treaty, "[t]he high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked."[45] On the high seas, nations are permitted freedom of navigation and overflight, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, freedom to construct artificial islands, freedom of fishing, and freedom of scientific research.[46] Other provisions regarding the high seas include a prohibition on the transport of slaves, piracy, illegal drug trafficking, and the suppression of unauthorized radio or television broadcasting.[47]The AreaThe "Area" is the seabed and ocean floor that is beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.[48] This is the portion of the seabed that is beyond the EEZ or the recognized continental shelf of a country. It would be inaccurate to say that the Area is the seabed underneath the high seas, since the high seas can overlap portions of continental shelf that are subject to national sovereignty. The Area is particularly unique in that UNCLOS designates it and the resources it contains as "the common heritage of mankind."[49] No nation is allowed to lay claim to any part of the Area or its resources. Regarding the resources, "[a]ll rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole...."[50] As a result, companies that wish to exploit the mineral resources of the Area will have to enter into a profit sharing agreement in which the profits derived from mineral resources captured in the Area will be shared with developing nations.Agencies Created by UNCLOSIn order to administer UNCLOS, the treaty created four bodies to handle specific issues. The following sections discuss the mission of each body and its founding authority.

Commission on the Limits of the Continental ShelfThe Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf was created to implement Article 76 of the treaty, which is the article which allows for a nation to extend sovereignty over a portion of the continental shelf beyond the limits of the EEZ.[51] The Commission is comprised of 21 members who are specialists in the fields of geology, geophysics, or hydrography and are elected by the Nations Parties to the Convention. Members of the Commission are charged with evaluating data submitted by coastal nation requesting an extension of sovereignty over an extended portion of their naturally occurring continental shelf.[52] The Commission was established and derives its authority from Annex II of the Convention.International Seabed AuthorityLogo for the International Seabed Authority, 'the Authority'The International Seabed Authority is the organization that is responsible for the governance of the Area.[53] Article 156 of the Convention mandates the creation of the Seabed Authority, which is commonly referred to as "the Authority" throughout most of the treaty.[54] All nations that have agreed to be bound by UNCLOS are automatically members of the Authority.[55]The Authority is comprised of three bodies: the Assembly, the Council, and the Secretariat.[56]The Assembly

The Assembly acts as a legislative organ in which each member nation has one representative.[57] Of the many powers and responsibilities entrusted to the Assembly, one of the most important is the power to decide how revenues derived from deep seabed mining will be distributed. Other powers include the power to set policy regarding activities in the Area and oversight of its management.[58]The Council

The Council is a body comprised of 36 persons who represent various members of the Authority itself (the nations bound by the treaty). Members of the Council are elected by the Assembly and serve for a term of four years.[59] The Council acts as the executive branch of the Authority and has the power of establishing the specific policies to be pursued by the Authority.[60] Other powers of the Council include establishing subsidiary agencies (as needed) to carry out the functions of the Council, approve or reject work plans related to the Area, oversee the collection of payments made to the Authority, and institute proceedings against a member nation in the Seabed Disputes Chamber (see International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea below).[61]Within the Council there are two Commissions: the Economic Planning Commission and the Legal and Technical Commission. Each Commission is comprised of members elected by the Council from a list of candidates nominated by the nations that are bound by UNCLOS. Members of either Commission serve for a term of five

years and must have no personal financial connections related to exploration or exploitation of resources within the Area.[62]Members of the Economic Planning Commission are required to have qualifications in the areas of mining, management of mineral resources, international trade, or international economics and it is required that at least two members of the Commission are from developing nations whose mineral exports be the same as those being mined from the seabed.[63] The primary function of the Economic Planning Commission is to expound upon the relationship between the minerals being mined, the effect mining has on global prices for the mineral in question, and the effect changes in price may have on developing nations.[64]Members of the Legal and Technical Commission are required to have qualifications in the areas of exploration, exploitation, and processing of mineral resources, oceanology, protection of the marine environment, or either economic or legal matters relating to the ocean mining industry.[65] It is the responsibility of the Commission to review written plans for work activities to be conducted in the Area, prepare assessments of the environmental implications of activities in the Area, make recommendations to the Council regarding environmental protection of the Area, and to calculate the production ceiling and issue production authorization on behalf of the Authority.[66]The Secretariat

The Secretariat of the Authority is comprised of the Secretary-General and his or her staff. The Secretary General is elected for a term of four years. Nominations for Secretary-General are made by the Council and voted on by the Assembly. The Secretary-General serves as the chief administrative officer of the Authority and is required to make an annual report to the Assembly on the work of the Authority.[67 ] The EnterpriseArticle 170 calls for the formation of an agency called "the Enterprise." The purpose of the Enterprise is to coordinate the exploration and exploitation of resources in the area. Annex IV of the treaty details the composition and governance of the Enterprise, however, since deep seabed mining has yet to start, the Enterprise has never been called into action.

International Tribunal for the Law of the SeaAnnex VI of UNCLOS establishes the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The Tribunal is comprised of 21 members, no two of which may be from the same member nation.[68] Members of the Tribunal serve for a period of nine years, after which they are eligible for reelection to the Tribunal.[69]The Tribunal has formed a number of Chambers including the Chamber of Summary Procedure, the Chamber for Fisheries Disputed, the Chamber for Marine Environment Disputes, and the Chamber for Maritime Delimitation Disputes.[70] The Tribunal is also the home of the Seabed Disputes Chamber, which is responsible for adjudicating disputes pursuant to Part XI, Section 5 of UNCLOS, which governs settlements of disputes that arise from deep seabed activities.[71]Environmental ConsiderationsAlthough UNCLOS is not an environmental treaty, it frequently addresses environmental concerns. In addition to having an entire section dedicated to the protection and preservation of the marine environment (Part XII), the treaty also contains numerous references to environmental duties and obligations throughout its many articles. The scattered placement of all of the environmental references makes it difficult at times to put together a comprehensive understanding of the duties of member nations and the powers they are granted to enforce the various provisions.

Section 1 of Part XII of UNCLOS sets the tone for a number of the environmental provisions laid out in the treaty. Part XII opens with Article 192: "States have an obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment." This is immediately followed by Article 193: "States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environmental policies," [emphasis added]. Nations are then subsequently charged with creating national law to address various pollution issues and are supposed to employ "the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities."[72] Article 204 requires states to observe and evaluate the risks posed by pollution to the marine environment. In particular, nations are required to monitor the effects of any activities that they permit or actually engage in.[73]The following sections examine UNCLOS on various topical issues related to the environment in an attempt to create a comprehensive narrative.

Pollution Prevention (Generally)

Article 195 requires nations to "prevent, reduce and control pollution in the marine environment." Article 195 also prohibits nations from transferring pollution to another nation, either directly or indirectly, or from turning one type of pollution into another. The prohibition on changing one pollutant into another may have impacts on future carbon mitigation schemes such as water-column carbon sequestration or sub-seabed sequestration. For more information, see Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (1972) and the 1996 Protocol.

Part XII of UNCLOS also encourages nations to participate in regional agreements related to the environment and establishes duties of nations to their regional counterparts (see Articles 197-201). Some of the duties that nations owe to other regional nations include the duty to notify of imminent danger to the marine environment from pollution or actual damage from pollution.[74] Nations are encouraged to work together to form regional plans for the preservation of the marine environment as well as to develop contingency plans for responding to pollution

incidents and coordinating with one another in data-sharing on regional marine pollution and establishing scientific criteria for the promulgation of regulations regarding marine pollution.[75]Dumping at SeaDumping is defined in Article 1 as "any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea" or the disposal of the vessels, aircraft, platforms, or structure themselves at sea.[76] UNCLOS makes an exemption for the disposal of wastes that are incidental to the normal operations of vessels, aircraft, etc.[77]Article 210 specifically addresses the issue of dumping and requires nations to enact their own legislation on the issue. Paragraph 6 requires that national laws and regulations be at least as effective as global rules and standards. These global rules and standards are articulated in the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter , which was concluded in London in 1972, the year prior to the start of UNCLOS III.[78]Coastal nations are recognized as the only authority that can approve any dumping activities within its territorial sea, its EEZ, or on its continental shelf. Nations are given the exclusive authority to authorize or deny such activities. Nations who authorize dumping activities are required to give consideration as to how other nations may be adversely affected by dumping activities in areas governed the local nation.[79]There are three ways in which anti-dumping measures can be enforced. The first means of enforcement is by a coastal nation, which has the right to enforce anti-dumping measures within its territorial sea, its EEZ, or its continental shelf. The second means of enforcement is enforcement by Flag Nations, which may always enforce their own laws against any violator flying its flag regardless of where the offense occurred. The third and final means of enforcing anti-dumping measures is enforcement by a the third party, which would be a nation in which ships take on wastes within its territory. If multiple nations appear to have jurisdiction over an issue of dumping, only one is required to take on the individual case.[80]Fishing RightsMany of UNCLOS's articles on fishing rights relate to who has the right to control and exploit various fish stocks. While these articles are not primarily environmental in nature, they do contain provisions on regulating overfishing, which is itself an environmental concern. The placement of these articles in Part V (governing the EEZ) and Part VII (governing the high seas) as opposed to Part XII (governing environmental protection) may be read as an indicator of the economic and territorial focus associated with protecting sovereign rights over fish stocks as opposed to an environmentally centered approach.

In the EEZCoastal nations have primary control over the fish stocks in their EEZ. As part of this primary control, the coastal nation is required to maintain the existing stock and protect it from over-exploitation. As a part of that responsibility, coastal nation get to determine the maximum allowable catch for a given species.[81]While coastal nation are required to monitor and maintain fish stocks within their EEZ, they are also required to provide for the maximum exploitation possible that will not threaten the population in question.[82] To that end, coastal nation are required to determine not only how much of a specific species can be caught, but how much the nation itself has the capacity to catch. In instances where the nation cannot catch the full maximum allowable catch, the coastal nation is obliged to give other nations access to the surplus.[83]Fish, however, do not recognize manmade boundaries. In recognition of this fact, UNCLOS provides special rules for species that cross various types of boundaries. In instances where one species of fish migrate within the EEZ's of multiple coastal nation, those nations are obligated to come to agreement on the conservation and development of such stocks.[84] Some species are considered "highly migratory" (see UNCLOS Annex I for a full list of highly migratory species). Nations engaged in fishing for these highly migratory species are required to cooperate with one another to maintain appropriate levels of these stock and to make sure that they are not overfished.[85]Another consideration taken into account by UNCLOS are fish species that migrate between internal waters and marine waters as part of their breeding cycle. Anadromous species, those that spawn in fresh water and later migrate toward marine waters, are primarily the responsibility of the nation in whose rivers the fish originate.[86] The nation of origin is allowed to determine the allowable catch for these species.[87] For catadromous species, those that live in fresh water and migrate to marine waters to spawn, are again primarily the responsibility of the coastal nation.[88] Harvesting of these fish is limited to the EEZ. In cases in which the species travels through the EEZ of multiple countries, those countries must work together to establish rational management of the species.[89]On the High Seas

All nations have the right to fish on the high seas subject to their treaty obligations.[90] Along with this right, nations have a duty to take measures to ensure the conservation of living resources on the high seas.[91] Nations who are fishing for the same species or different species within the same area of the high seas are supposed to work together to conserve and protect the species from over-exploitation.[92] In determining maximum allowable catch, nations are to take measures to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield and they are to take into consideration the effects on species either associated with or dependent on the harvested species.[93]Marine MammalsCoastal nations are allowed to pass laws more stringent than those for fishing regarding the harvesting of marine mammals.[94]BiodiversityArticle 196 requires nations to "take all measures necessary" to prevent the intentional or accidental introduction of non-native species to a new part of the marine environment. Regarding the introduction of alien species the

prohibition is on non-native animals that "may cause significant and harmful changes [to the local environment]."[95] It is hard, however, to know exactly what species will cause either significant or harmful changes to the environment. For more information see Alien Species and Aquatic Invasive Species.Land Based PollutionArticle 207 requires nations to "adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources...."[96] Article 207 specifically calls upon nations to regulate pollution that comes into the ocean from rivers, estuaries, pipelines, and outfall structures, which are the primary sources of land based pollution in the marine environment. Paragraph 3 of Article 207 also encourages nations to harmonize their policies on a regional level. This Article has, however, been criticized as being weak since it lacks and enforcement mechanism and it relies upon local legislatures to set their own priorities for land-based sources of pollution.[97] UNCLOS does address enforcement of land-based pollution measures in Article 213 by saying "States shall enforce their [own] laws and regulations adopted in accordance with Article 207...."[98]Atmospheric Based Pollution

Article 212 requires nations to adopt laws and regulations to prevent atmospheric pollution that will result in pollution to the marine environment. Article 222 compels nations to enforce these measures once passed.

Pollution from Ships

Article 211 requires nations to pass laws and regulations governing pollution from ships flying the nation's flag. Article 211 also allows nations to pass laws and regulations aimed at preventing and controlling pollution from ships that enter both their ports and their territorial seas. In both cases, the nation must notify the international community and the regulations cannot abridge the right of innocent passage.[99]Nations may also pass laws regulating pollution from ships in their EEZ, provided that the regulations conform to international rules and standards.[100] Under certain circumstances nations may be permitted to enact more stringent rules or regulations, provided that they can prove a need or special circumstance exists for which international rules and standards are not sufficient.[101] 

EnforcementEnforcement of the provisions of UNCLOS can be a complicated issue as multiple nations may appear to have jurisdiction over a single issue. What happens, for example, if a vessel flying the flag of one nation is accused of dumping in the territorial sea of another? What if the same ship was caught dumping on the high seas by a ship flying the flag of another nation? The following sections attempt to explain how various portions of the environmental provisions of UNCLOS are enforced and by whom.

Enforcement by the Flag NationNations have vast powers of enforcement over vessels flying their flag. Flag nations are required to keep a register of ships which fly their flag and assume jurisdiction of those ships and crew under international law.[102] Flag nations are responsible for adopting laws and regulations targeted at preventing and controlling pollution from ships which fly their flag and are to provide for the effective enforcement of such laws, regardless of where a violation occurs.[103]Flag nations are required, at the request of another nation, to investigate alleged violations committed by vessels flying their flag. If the nation believes that a violation has occurred, the nation has a duty to promptly institute proceedings in accordance with the its laws.[104] Flag nations are to notify the requesting nation and any relevant international organizations of any actions taken and their eventual outcome.[105]Flag nations also have the ability to halt proceedings against one of its vessels on charges related to the prevention of pollution under Article 228, provided that: 1) the violation did not occur in the territorial sea of the nation instituting proceedings, 2) the flag nation takes over the proceedings within six months of the date the proceedings were begun, 3) the case is not one of major damage to the coastal nation, and 4) the flag nation does not have a history of repeatedly disregarding its obligations to enforce the applicable international rules regarding violations committed by its vessels.[106]Flag nations are also obligated to make sure that ships flying their flag meet the requirements of seaworthiness.[107] In the event a ship enters the port of a foreign nation and it is found to not be in a seaworthy condition, the port nation is obliged to detain the vessel and require it to be repaired prior to its continuing its voyage.[108]Enforcement by Port Nations

Port nations have the authority to enforce their own laws with regards to violations that occur in their territorial sea and EEZ, pursuant to Article 220(1). Customary law has for many years recognized the right of a port nation to exercise jurisdiction over a vessel that docks in its ports. Under customary international law, a nation does not have to grant access to its ports and, as such, when ships enter port they voluntarily submit themselves to the sovereignty of the port nation.[109]Article 218 give port nations new authority with which they may investigate and, when sufficient evidence exists, prosecute violations of UNCLOS's prohibitions against pollution.[110] If the violation occurs on the high seas, the port nation may undertake the investigation and initiate prosecution itself.[111] If the violation occurred in the territorial sea or internal waters of another nation, the port nation may only begin an investigation and/or prosecution at the request of either: 1) the nation in which the violation occurred; 2) the flag nation; or 3) a nation that has itself been damaged or threatened by the discharge violation. In the event that the port nation is one that

has been damaged or threatened by a discharge violation that has occurred outside its own territorial sea, it has the ability to initiate an investigation and prosecution itself.[112]It is important to note that this ability is derived solely on the basis of treaty and not from customary international law.[113] Also, it is important to note that the flag nation may still take the prosecution for itself, per Article 228 as discussed above. In the event that the flag nation does take over the prosecution of such a violation, the port nation is obligated to drop the charges against the foreign vessel upon the conclusion of the proceedings by the flag nation.[114] Port nations that opt to impose penalties on foreign vessels must do so within three years from the date that the violation was committed.[115]Port nations also have the right to stop vessels from proceeding from port if they are found to not meet the international rules and standards for seaworthiness and thereby threaten the marine environment. Nations may only allow the vessel to proceed to the nearest repair yard and, upon completion of all necessary repairs, must allow the ship to continue on its voyage.[116]Enforcement by Coastal Nations (Not Acting as Port Nations)

The powers of a coastal nations to enforce various anti-pollution measures varies depending on the location of both the suspected violation and the location of the ship at the time the coastal nation chooses to act its suspicion. In cases where ships are currently navigating in the territorial sea of a coastal nation and it is suspected that a violation of either international anti-pollution laws or the coastal nation's laws has occurred while the vessel was navigating through the territorial sea, the coastal nation has the authority to undertake a physical inspection of the vessel and may institute proceedings against it. Note that there are a few criteria that must be met. First, the ship must have committed the violation in the territorial sea of the coastal nation and secondly, the ship must still be in the territorial sea of the coastal nation. Only then can agents of the coastal nation undertake an investigation of the ship.[117]For suspected violations that occur in the EEZ of the coastal nation, the power and authority of that nation is not as broad. In cases where a suspected violation has occurred in the EEZ and the vessel is still in either the territorial sea or the EEZ, the coastal nation is permitted to request information regarding the ship (specifically its identity, port of registry, its last and next port of call, and other information the coastal nation deems necessary to establish whether or not a violation has occurred).[118] Should the ship be unwilling to supply that information, or if the information supplied is clearly false, only then can the coastal nation undertake a physical investigation of the vessel.[119] Here the requirements are that the suspected violation occurs in the EEZ, the vessel in question must still be in either the territorial sea or the EEZ, a request must be issues for information, and only after a failure of the ship to comply with the request of the coastal nation may that nation undertake a physical investigation of the ship.The preceding paragraphs only cover suspected violations. If, however, there is "clear objective evidence" that a vessel currently navigating in a costal nation's territorial sea or EEZ has committed a violation in the EEZ "resulting in a discharge causing major damage or [the] threat of major damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal State, ... that State may... institute proceedings, including detention of the vessel."[120] In order for the coastal nation to take such measures, there has to be clear evidence of the violation occurring, the violation must result in major damage to the coastline or the interests and resources of the nation or the threat of major damage, and the vessel must still be within the territorial sea or the EEZ.General Provisions Regarding Enforcement

UNCLOS provides some general requirements regarding nations enforcing their laws or international law against ships from another nation. First, any enforcement measures taken against a foreign vessel can only be conducted by ships that are clearly marked and identifiable as being in the service of the enforcing nation's government.[121] When engaging in enforcement activities, agents of the coastal nation have an obligation to not endanger the safety of navigation of other vessels and also to not bring any detained vessel to an unsafe port.[122] In the event that a nation takes action against a foreign vessel, the nation has a duty to inform the ship's flag nation of what measures were taken.[123] With regard to the prevention of pollution, vessels owned and operated by a foreign nation on governmental non-commercial missions are protected by sovereign immunity, a principle that shields these vessels from liability.[124]On the matter of assessing penalties against a foreign vessel, UNCLOS states that only monetary penalties may be imposed regarding violations committed by vessels outside the territorial sea of the coastal nation. In instances where a violation has occurred within the territorial sea, monetary penalties are the only type of penalties that may be imposed unless the vessel has committed an act of willful and serious pollution.[125] UNCLOS also provides that civil proceedings may be instituted against a vessel of a foreign nation regardless of what criminal proceedings have already taken place or what penalties have been assessed against the vessel.[126]Scientific Explortation

All nations have the right to conduct scientific research in the oceans, provided that the research is 1) conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes; 2) conducted with acceptable scientific methods; 3) does not interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea; and 4) conducted with respect to the other terms of the UNCLOS treaty, including those pertaining to protection and preservation of the marine environment.[127]Coastal nations have the exclusive right to regulate, authorize, and conduct scientific research in their territorial sea, which means that scientific research within the territorial sea can only be conducted with the expressed consent of the nation.[128]Foreign nations that wish to conduct scientific research in the EEZ or on the continental shelf of another nation may do so, but only with the consent of the other nation. Nations may reject a requests by a foreign nation for access to their EEZ or continental shelf if the project: 1) is of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources (living or non-living, unless the research is to be conducted on the continental shelf more than 200 nautical miles from the baselines); 2) involves drilling into the continental shelf, the use of

explosives, or the introduction of harmful substances into the marine environment; 3) involves the construction or use of artificial islands; or 4) if either the proposal provided to the nation regarding the research was inaccurate or if the requesting nation has outstanding obligations to the coastal nation for prior research projects.[129]Foreign nations wishing to conduct scientific research off the coast of another nation must inform the coastal nation of the nature and objectives of the project, the methods to be used, the precise location where the research is to take place, the timeframe for the research, information regarding the organization conducting the actual research, and to what extent the coastal nation may take part in the project.[130] While undertaking scientific research off the coast of a nation, the research team from the visiting nation must guarantee the right of the coastal nation to participate or be represented in the research project without obligation to contribute to the costs of the project. The visiting research team from the foreign nation is also obliged to provide the coastal nation with preliminary and final reports as well as access to all data and samples taken during the course of the project. Visiting research teams from foreign nations must also notify the coastal nation of any changes to the agreed upon plans for conducting the research and must also remove any and all equipment once the experiment is completed (unless another agreement has been made with the coastal nation regarding removal).[131]Present Status and United States Interpretation

Presently there are 160 nations that have ratified UNCLOS. The United States, however, is not one of them. When the treaty was originally concluded in 1982, then President Ronald Reagan chose not to sign the treaty on the grounds that the proposed international seabed regime governing the mining of the seabed would both hamper the development of seabed mineral resources and would be contrary to principles of free enterprise.[132] Even though the President Reagan opted not to sign the treaty, in 1982 he issued an Ocean Policy Statement announcing that the United States both accepted and would act in accordance with the Convention on all issues save those of deep seabed mining.[133] In the same proclamation, President Reagan created the EEZ for the United States.[134] In making that proclamation, the United States acquired the largest EEZ in the world, one that stretched off the United States mainland, Alaska, and Hawaii, as well as island territories in both the Atlantic and Pacific. In 1988, President Reagan acted again to expand the territorial se from 3 nautical miles to 12 nautical miles. The final change in the ocean boundaries of the United States occurred in 1999 when then President William (Bill) Clinton established the contiguous zone.[135]Criticisms

While generally hailed as a monumental achievement in the arena of international law, UNCLOS has also received its fair share of criticism. One of the most often heard criticisms is the treaty's reliance upon national legislation to implement its provisions. The problem becomes one in which the treaty must rely on national legislatures to set, for example, pollution provisions as a priority on the legislative agenda. While the benefit of such a scheme is that it allows the national autonomy, the weakness is that nations may not view such legislation as a priority. National administration of the law has also come under criticism, as some countries have shown a willingness to excuse violations that have happened abroad. One result of such weak national enforcement and regulation is the emergence of "flags of convenience" nations.[136]Another criticism related to UNCLOS relates to the jurisdictional breakdown of sovereignty. The way in which control of ocean resources has been divided does not reflect the natural order of the marine environment. Provisions that govern ensuring that fish stocks are not over-depleted, for example, divide control and conservation measures based on distance from the shores as opposed to the natural order of the ecosystem. These divisions have been accused of hampering cohesive management of resources if favor of respecting national sovereignty.[137]And then there is the criticism that kept the United States from signing UNCLOS, that of the deep seabed mining regime. As was already mentioned, the profit sharing provisions related to deep seabed mining have been hailed by some as being antithetical to principles of free-market capitalism.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1596 June 11, 1978

DECLARING CERTAIN AREA PART OF THE PHILIPPINE TERRITORY AND PROVIDING FOR THEIR GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

WHEREAS, by reason of their proximity the cluster of islands and islets in the South China Sea situated within the following:

KALAYAAN ISLAND GROUP

From a point [on the Philippine Treaty Limits] at latitude 7§40' North and longitude 116§00 East of Greenwich, thence due West along the parallel of 7§40' N to its intersection with the meridian of longitude 112§10' E, thence due north along the meridian of 112§10' E to its

intersection with the parallel of 9§00' N, thence northeastward to the intersection of parallel of 12§00' N with the meridian of longitude 114§30' E, thence, due East along the parallel of 12§00' N to its intersection with the meridian of 118§00' E, thence, due South along the meridian of longitude 118§00' E to its intersection with the parallel of 10§00' N, thence Southwestwards to the point of beginning at 7§40' N, latitude and 116§00' E longitude.

are vital to the security and economic survival of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, much of the above area is part of the continental margin of the Philippine archipelago;

WHEREAS, these areas do not legally belong to any state or nation but, by reason of history, indispensable need, and effective occupation and control established in accordance with the international law, such areas must now deemed to belong and subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, while other states have laid claims to some of these areas, their claims have lapsed by abandonment and can not prevail over that of the Philippines on legal, historical, and equitable grounds.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree as follows:

Sec. 1. The area within the following boundaries:

KALAYAAN ISLAND GROUP

From a point [on the Philippine Treaty Limits] at latitude 7§40' North and longitude 116§00' East of Greenwich, thence due West along the parallel of 7§40' N to its intersection with the meridian of longitude 112§10' E, thence due north along the meridian of 112§10' E to its intersection with the parallel of 9§00' N, thence northeastward to the intersection of parallel of 12§00' N with the meridian of longitude 114§30' E, thence, due East along the parallel of 12§00' N to its intersection with the meridian of 118§00' E, thence, due South along the meridian of longitude 118§00' E to its intersection with the parallel of 10§00' N, thence Southwestwards to the point of beginning at 7§40' N, latitude and 116§00' E longitude;

including the sea-bed, sub-soil, continental margin and air space shall belong and be subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines. Such area is hereby constituted as a distinct and separate municipality of the Province of Palawan and shall be known as "Kalayaan."

Sec. 2. Pending the election of its regular officials and during the period of emergency declared in Proclamation No. 1081, and unless earlier provided by law, the administration and government of the area shall be vested in the Secretary of National Defense or in such officers of the Civil government or the Armed Forces of the Philippines as the President may designate.

Sec. 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 11th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-eight.

Admin code

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Administrative Code of 1987."

Section 2. General Terms Defined. - Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a whole, or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning:

(1) Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.

(2) National Government refers to the entire machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the different forms of local governments.

(3) Local Government refers to the political subdivisions established by or in accordance with the Constitution.

(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

(5) National Agency refers to a unit of the National Government.

(6) Local Agency refers to a local government or a distinct unit therein.

(7) Department refers to an executive department created by law. For purposes of Book IV, this shall include any instrumentality, as herein defined, having or assigned the rank of a department, regardless of its name or designation.

(8) Bureau refers to any principal subdivision or unit of any department. For purposes of Book IV, this shall include any principal subdivision or unit of any instrumentality given or assigned the rank of a bureau, regardless of actual name or designation, as in the case of department-wide regional offices.

(9) Office refers, within the framework of governmental organization, to any major functional unit of a department or bureau including regional offices. It may also refer to any position held or occupied by individual persons, whose functions are defined by law or regulation.

(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework vested within special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.

(11) Regulatory agency refers to any agency expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate, administer or adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and interests of private persons, the principal powers of which are exercised by a collective body, such as a commission, board or council.

(12) Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State.

(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.

(14) "Officer" as distinguished from "clerk" or "employee", refers to a person whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular function in the exercise of governmental power, "officer" includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function.

(15) "Employee", when used with reference to a person in the public service, includes any person in the service of the government or any of its agencies, divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities.

Article 16 sec 3 – state cannot be sued without its consent

March 16, 1923

ACT NO. 3083

 

AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED

 

SECTION 1.            Complaint against Government. — Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the

Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,

expressed or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.

SECTION 2.            A person desiring to avail himself of the privilege herein conferred must show that he has

presented his claim to the Insular Auditor [i]1 and that the latter did not decide the same within two months from the date of its

presentation.

SECTION 3.            Venue. — Original actions brought pursuant to the authority conferred in this Act shall be instituted

in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the province were the claimant resides, at the option of the latter, upon

which court exclusive original jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear and determine such actions. cdpr

SECTION 4.            Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be governed by the same rules of procedure, both original and

appellate, as if the litigants were private parties.

SECTION 5.            When the Government of the Philippine Island is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of

original jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by way of set-off or counterclaim in a similar action

between private parties.

SECTION 6.            Process in actions brought against the Government of the Philippine Islands pursuant to the

authority granted in this Act shall be served upon the Attorney-General[ii]2 whose duty it shall be to appear and make defense,

either himself or through delegates.

SECTION 7.            Execution. — No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any court against the

Government of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of this Act; but a copy thereof duly certified by the clerk of the Court in

which judgment is rendered shall be transmitted by such clerk to the Governor-General, [iii]3 within five days after the same

becomes final.

SECTION 8.            Transmittal of Decision. — The Governor-General, [iv]4 at the commencement of each regular

session of the Legislature, [v]5 shall transmit to that body for appropriate action all decisions so received by him, and if said body

determine that payment should be made, it shall appropriate the sum which the Government has been sentenced to pay,

including the same in the appropriations for the ensuing year.

SECTION 9.            This Act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, March 16, 1923.

 

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also

for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the

minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority

and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their

employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the

scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been

caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176

shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils

and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they

observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)

LGC Section 22. Corporate Powers. -

(a) Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the following powers:

(1) To have continuous succession in its corporate name;

(2) To sue and be sued;

(3) To have and use a corporate seal;

(4) To acquire and convey real or personal property;

(5) To enter into contracts; and

(6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the limitations provided in this Code and other laws.

(b) Local government units may continue using, modify, or change their existing corporate seals: Provided, That newly established local government units or those without corporate seals may create their own corporate seals which shall be registered with the Department of the Interior and Local Government: Provided, further, That any change of corporate seal shall also be registered as provided hereon.

(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall.

(d) Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their proprietary functions and in the limitations provided in this Code and other applicable laws,

1. Angara vs. electoral commission

63 Phil. 139 – Political Law – Judicial Review – Electoral CommissionIn the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the

SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

I.      THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member

of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the

National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been

subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election

protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly.

The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution

providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before

December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner

sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his

motion.

II.    THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking

cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the

previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its

jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the

petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution

of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional

prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua

against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National

Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of

the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the

Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the

election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be

as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express

lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that

power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power

regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should

be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power

necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In

the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in

filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to

promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all

contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National

Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the

Electoral Commission.2. agbayani vs. pnb

227. DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB

effects of constitutionality

**Justice Fernando ponente kaya wordy at magulo**

Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a REM, which was to mature 5 years later.

15 years later, PNB sought to foreclose the REM. Agbayani filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by prescription. She also claims

that she obtained an injunction against the sheriff.

PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the period from the time of issuance of EO32 to the time when RA 342 was issued should be deducted.

o E0 32 was issued in 1945 – providing for debt moratoriumo RA 342 was issued in 1948 - extension of the debt moratorium

The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was likewise nullified.

Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending the payment of debts by war sufferers. However RA 342 could not pass the test of validity. (I think what Justice Fernando was saying is that the law was later declared unconstitutional because it violates the non-impairment of contractual obligations clause in the constitution).

PNB claims that this period should be deducted from the prescriptive period since during this time the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As such, the action has not yet prescribed.

ISSUE: Has the action prescribed?

SC: NO.

The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it suffers from infirmity, cannot be a source of legal rights or duties. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Such legislative act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect the awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether a legislative act is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would e to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration. (OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE). The existence of a statute prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached.

During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not run. Thus, the prescriptive period was tolled in the meantime prior to such adjudication of invalidity.

(read orig)..

Agbayani Facts:Francisca Serrano de Agbayani obtained an agreeable judgement in her suit against Philippine National Bank and the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan from proceeding with an extra-judicial foreclosure sale of land belonging to de Agbayani mortgaged to PNB to secure a loan which was declared no longer enforceable because the prescriptive period was over. There was a failure to sustain the defense raised by PNB that the right to foreclose the mortgage still subsisted if they referred to an Executive Order and an Act that were later found to be unconstitutional. The lower court stated the inflexible view that an unconstitutional act is not a law which, therefore, creates no rights and imposes no duties, and is inoperative. There was no dispute with the facts, making the appeal possess merit because of the failure of the lower court to adhere to the applicable constitutional doctrine as to the effect to be given to a statute subsequently declared invalid.

Issue: Whether or not an unconstitutional act can be the source of any legal rights or duties.

Decision: No. The Court referred to the new Civil Code which states that a law that is inconsistent with the Constitution is void. Therefore, an unconstitutional act cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties.

3. Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, (an international zone [foreign country] in North Africa), on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise, she was married to a Spanish Citizen and a permanent resident of Tangier from 1931 up to her death, on January 2, 1955. She left properties in Tangier as well as in the Philippines. Among the properties in the Philippines are several parcels of land and many shares of stock, accounts receivable and other intangible personal properties. On the real estate the respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of her estate, paid the sum of P111,582.00 as estate tax and the sum of P151,791.48 as inheritance tax, on the transfer of her real properties in the Philippines, but refused to pay the corresponding deficiency estate and inheritance taxes due on the transfer of her intangible personal properties, claiming that the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code and that he could avail of the reciprocal provisions of our Tax Code. The Collector of Internal Revenue in a decision assessed the estate of the deceased, as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, the sum of P161,874.95 including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties of Maria Cerdeira..ISSUE: Whether or not Rueda is rightfully assessed those taxes.HELD: “Foreign Country” used in Sec 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which although not an international person in the sense of international law, DOES NOT impose transfer of death taxes upon intangible personal properties of citizens not residing therein. Or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our government in order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits provided by our Tax Law. But since such law has not been alleged, this case is to remanded to the lower court for further trial.

4. Magallona

55 SCRA 476 – Political Law – National Territory – RA 9522 is ConstitutionalIn March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted – the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties – this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, terms the Philippine waters a “archipelagic” waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a “regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 nautical miles2. But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime are increased to 586,210 nautical miles2.  (See image below for comparison)If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

Anent their particular contentions:a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act  is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our “internal waters”, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent passage.  No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.

NOTES: Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-based rights:a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereigntyb. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforcecustoms, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zoneNote: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.

5. Republic of the Philippines, petitioner-appellee, vs. Pablo Feliciano and Intermediate Appellate Court, respondents-

appellants.

March 12, 1987

Yap, J:

Facts: Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. 

The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the rest of the property reverted to the public domain.

The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for more than 20 years under claim of ownership.

The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not appear at the day of presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.

The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration and then the case was reopened to allow them to present their evidence.

Feliciano filed a petition for certiorari with the Appellate Court but it was denied.

The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.

Issue: Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.

Held: No

Ratio: A suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a showing that the state has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.

The complaint involves land not owned by the state but private land belonging to Feliciano, hence the government is not being divested of any of its properties.

R e p u b l i c v . F e l i c i a n o F A C T S :Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State.On January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the RP,represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4)lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac,Camarines Sur. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola had acquired theproperty by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an

informacion posesoria that upon his purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced variousimprovements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands onOctober 24, 1954.On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes, underthe administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in theMunicipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located withinthe reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of Feliciano and should therefore beexcluded therefrom. Feliciano prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in questionconsisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based oninformacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to thesettlers.ISSUE:WON the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of landR U L I N G :NOR A T I O N A L E : A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State hasconsented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to bemisinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courtssua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed instrictissimi  juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued mustemanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body. Addt’l: Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that theinformacion posesoria registered in theOffice of the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory information; itwas "reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without thesubmission of proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can bevalidly made only in case of loss of the original. These circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validityof the "informacion posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document is thefact that "possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares," whereas the land claimed by respondentFeliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in accepting"possessory information documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged ownership of land

6.tan vs. director of forestry . ID.; ID.; TIMBER LICENSES; NATURE THEREOF; NONIMPAIRMENT CLAUSE MAY NOT BE INVOKED; CASE AT BAR. all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded byexecutive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, (125 SCRA) This Court held: ". . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end thatpublic welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validlywithdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. `A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right,nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation` (). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is itproperty or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576) . . ." We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:(190 SCRA 67) ". . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization anddisposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State toqualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validlyamended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of thedue process of law clause

." Since timber licenses are not contracts, the nonimpairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring thecancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the nonimpairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law hasactually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized

as a violation of the nonimpairment clause. This is because byits very nature and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of thepeople to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., (110 Phil. 198