political exclusion and the lack of democratisation: cross...

Political Exclusion and the Lack ofDemocratisation: Cross-NationalEvaluation of Nepali Institutionsusing a Majoritarian–ConsensusFramework

MAHENDRA LAWOTI

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Western Michigan University, USA;

Associate Fellow, Asia Society, New York, USA; President, Association for Nepal and

Himalayan Studies.

ABSTRACT Going beyond examining single institutions, which is not sufficient toestablish a polity’s effect on exclusion, the article adapts Lijphart’s majoritarian–consensus framework, which analyses ten influential institutions, to evaluate theNepali polity. The cross-national evaluation shows that the Nepali institutions arenot inclusive. As some individual Nepali institutions are exclusionary, combiningindividual and collective analysis establishes the net effect of political institutions asexclusionary. This study demonstrates that collective political institutions in newmulticultural democracies can be evaluated in terms of inclusion/exclusion. Suchevaluations are useful in providing the basis for reforming polities to includeminorities and consolidate and deepen democracy.

KEY WORDS: Political exclusion/inclusion, majoritarian–consensus democracy,political institutions, Nepal, ethnic politics

Commonwealth & Comparative Politics

Vol. 45, No. 1, 57–77, February 2007

Correspondence Address: Mahendra Lawoti, President, Association for Nepal and Himalayan

Studies, 3408 Friedmann Hall, Kalamazoo, MI 49008, USA. Email: [email protected]

1466-2043 Print=1743-9094 Online=07=010057–21 # 2007 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080=14662040601135755

Many of the third wave democracies that have not consolidated are multi-

cultural societies. According to the Freedom House survey ‘a state with a

dominant ethnic group is some three times more likely to be Free than a multi-

ethnic one’ (Karatnycky, 2002: 475). These observations support earlier

studies that had argued the difficulty of consolidating democracies in multicul-

tural societies. Scholars have shown that political exclusion and inequalities

among cultural groups often lead to conflict and erosion of democracies

(Gurr, 1993, 2000; Horowitz, 2000a; Linz & Stepan, 1996). Others have identi-

fied that political institutions facilitate political exclusion (Cohen, 1997;

Lijphart, 1977; Saideman et al., 2002).

The studies on the effect of political institutions on political exclusion have,

however, largely identified a single or a couple of institutions that facilitate

exclusion. This may be useful but is not sufficient to ascertain the net effect

of institutions on exclusion because some institutions operating in a polity

may contribute toward exclusion while others may push toward inclusion,

sometimes even producing a more or less balanced result. Thus to find out

the overall effect of institutions on exclusion/inclusion, one needs to investi-

gate the major institutions of a polity. The interaction of various institutions

and its effect on exclusion/inclusion also make it necessary to evaluate the

institutions collectively. The analysis of collective institutions becomes

especially necessary in new democracies because such polities may adopt

some inclusive institutions but continue with other exclusionary institutions

as well. Further, combining analysis of collective institutions and individual

institutions will provide more information on the effect of institutions on

exclusion, if any.1

In this context, this study aims to evaluate the effect of collective insti-

tutions on political exclusion/inclusion in Nepal using Lijphart’s majoritarian

and consensus framework. The aim is to find out whether institutions can be

collectively evaluated for their role in political exclusion.

Inclusion and Democracy

Democratisation is a continuous process and after procedural aspects like

periodic elections and adult franchise have been achieved in a society, demo-

cratisation requires ‘the authentic political inclusion of different groups and

categories, for which formal political equality can hide continued exclusion

and oppression’ (Dryzek, 1996: 475). Democratisation may remain incom-

plete when sub-groups of people are politically excluded.

Following Young and Dryzek (Young, 2000; Dryzek, 1996), I consider pol-

itical inclusion consisting of (1) effective participation in the decision-making

process and (2) public policies that address the needs and aspirations of differ-

ent groups in polities. Inclusion in the decision-making process is a condition

58 M. Lawoti

but may not be sufficient for inclusive public policies. Inclusive democracy

requires the fulfilment of both conditions.

Democratic theorists argue that for decisions to become binding

to someone, they or their representatives have to be involved in the

decision-making process (Dahl, 1989; Dryzek, 1996; Pateman, 1970;

Young, 2000). Inclusion of various groups, especially in the decision-

making process, is important because non-members, in some specific issues,

may not be able to represent interests and perspectives of groups whose

values, experience and lifestyles are different. To arrive at decisions that are

fair and just, all perspectives should be deliberated and weighed (Kymlicka,

1995; Mahajan, 1998; Parekh, 1994; Young, 1990). When someone is

deprived of an equal voice, the chances are quite high that his or her ‘interests

will not be given the same attention as the interests of those who do have a

voice’ (Dahl, 1989: 76). It may lead to not meeting the needs and aspirations

of the excluded groups and may even result in insensitive and harmful pol-

icies. Thus, democracy may become less meaningful to the excluded

groups. Hence, many democratic theorists consider inclusion a fundamental

aspect of democracy (Dahl, 1989; Lewis, 1965; Phillips, 1996; Young, 2000).

Democratisation, Political Institutions, and Exclusion

In emerging multicultural democracies, consolidation of democracy may

become tricky if the question of the state (appropriate institutions) is not

settled (Linz & Stepan, 1996: chapter 2). Holding periodic elections may

not be sufficient in multicultural societies to consolidate democracies. Accom-

modative political institutions are required to address the cultural cleavages

(Reynolds, 2002). Unfortunately, despite the availability of scholarly knowl-

edge on accommodative institutions, multicultural countries often have

not adopted the appropriate institutions to accommodate different groups

(Horowitz, 2000b).

Majoritarian institutions are a major cause of political exclusion (Gurr,

1993; Horowitz, 1994; Lewis, 1965; UNDP, 2000). Cross-national studies

of a large number of countries have confirmed that countries with a first-

past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system and a unitary state face more violent

conflict than countries that have adopted some form of proportional electoral

system and federalism. The FPTP and unitary structure generally favour larger

groups and marginalise minorities (Cohen, 1997; Saideman et al., 2002).

The role of political institutions in political exclusion can also be verified

indirectly. Scholars have shown that accommodative structures lead to the

inclusion of different groups and management of ethnic conflict. Lijphart

(1977) called polities with accommodative institutions consociational democ-

racies.2 Horowitz and Gurr also, among others, recommend power-sharing

Cross-National Evaluation of Nepali Institutions 59

institutions for protection of minority rights and management of ethnic con-

flict (Gurr, 1993; Horowitz, 2000a). The proportional representation electoral

method, federalism, grand coalitional executives and the constitutional protec-

tion of minority rights are often recommended for the accommodation of

different groups in multicultural societies. Power-sharing institutions have

addressed cultural cleavages in established multicultural democracies

whereas problems of exclusion have occurred in many culturally plural

countries with majoritarian institutions (Cohen, 1997; Harris & Reilly,

1998; Horowitz, 1994; Lewis, 1965; Taylor, 1998).

Majoritarian and Consensus Democratic Forms

Arend Lijphart broadly categorises institutions found in established democra-

cies into consensus and majoritarian forms (Lijphart, 1984; 1999: 225).

Lijphart’s classification is based on the study of 10 major institutions in 36

western and non-western and developed as well as developing democracies.

The majoritarian and consensus institution contrast are presented in Table 1.

A major difference between the two forms is that the majoritarian insti-

tutions concentrate whereas the consensus institutions diffuse power. Majori-

tarian institutions allow a bare majority to control governance structures

whereas the consensus institutions seek to maximise the size of the majorities.

By broadening the majority requirement, consensus institutions facilitate

the participation of more people in governance. They divide and share

power among different levels of government, political institutions and

Table 1. Majoritarian and consensus institutions

Institutions Majoritarian Consensus

Party system Two-party systems Multiparty systemsCabinet Concentration of

executive powerSharing of executivepower

Executive–legislativerelation

Dominance of executive Balance of power betweenexecutives and legislature

Electoral system Majority and pluralitymethods

Proportionalrepresentation

Interest group Pluralism CorporatismDivision of power Unitary and centralised Federal and decentralisedParliament Concentration of

legislative powerDivision of legislativepower

Constitution Amendment flexibility Amendment rigidityJudicial review Absence of judicial review High judicial reviewCentral bank Dependent Independent

Source: Lijphart, 1999.

60 M. Lawoti

actors, and socio-cultural groups. Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands,

Papua New Guinea, India, Germany, and Austria are consensus polities.

The UK, New Zealand (before 1996), and Botswana are, on the other hand,

prototypes of the majoritarian model. The majoritarian institutions concentrate

power by making the executive strong and facilitating single party control. In

the real world, however, there are many established democracies with mixed

institutions. Sweden and the US are examples of countries with mixed

institutions.

The winner-take-all majoritarian political institutions facilitate exclusion of

the losers. In such polities, it is likely that the majority may formulate policies

based on their values and priorities. Some of the policies may become harmful

to the minorities. The harm may not be long term if the majority changes, as in

political–economic issues in non-plural societies. However, if the majority–

minority distinction is based on perennial cultural factors, the harm may be

long term. Thus the minorities may become permanent losers in culturally

plural societies with majoritarian institutions.

Majoritarian institutions have addressed class cleavages and consolidated

democracies in non-plural societies where cultural cleavages are not salient

but have failed to do so in multicultural polities because they cannot

address cultural cleavages (Lewis, 1965; Lijphart, 1977; 1984). Consensus

institutions, on the other hand, can address both class and cultural cleavages.

Scholars have called the consensus–majoritarian framework a path-

breaking concept (Norris, 2002). Lane and Ersson (2000: 207) go further and

say that it is ‘perhaps the most influential institutional text in political science

during the post-war period’. Lijphart’s framework has a number of advantages

over other institutional choice models for analysing political systems. First, this

framework does not limit itself to a few institutions such as presidentialism–

parliamentarism or proportional–plurality electoral systems for explaining

the political phenomena. It analyses ten influential institutions. Complex

phenomena like political systems can be better explained by models that

incorporate more variables that influence it.

Second, this approach also does not deal with only one type of democracy,

as federalism and consociationalism do, but analyses the power distribution by

contrasting two principally opposite democratic institutions. It allows, as in

the current study, to see where a particular polity may belong in the majoritar-

ian–consensus continuum.

Third, and more important for us, the underlying basis of the consensus model,

as will be discussed in the next section, is the accommodation of different groups

in the polity. The consensus model incorporates institutions such as federalism

and proportional electoral systems that have been established as inclusive

(Cohen, 1997; Schmidt, 2002). Hence the majoritarian–consensus framework

can be adapted to assess inclusive/exclusionary characteristics of polities.


Fourth, the consensus model overcomes the shortcomings of the consocia-

tional model, its precursor. The consensus model does not rely heavily on elite

accommodation nor does it freeze/reify minority identities. It is based on

mass electoral competition, within certain inclusive institutional parameters

that maximise majorities, to distribute power. Thus, this framework is better

in taking account of the dynamics of identity changes, patterns of mass mobil-

isation and people’s preferences.

Consensus Democracy and Inclusion

Lijphart reduces the ten institutions to two dimensions using factor analysis.

The two dimensions (executive–parties and federal–unitary) of democracy

provide us with four clusters: consensus and majoritarian as two opposite

clusters and unitary–consensus and federal–majoritarian as mixed ones.

Lijphart found that the majoritarian cluster mostly had non-plural democracies

(nine non-plural and three plural) and the consensus cluster mostly plural

democracies (six plural and one non-plural).3 The consensus–unitary (six

plural and six non-plural) and federal–majoritarian (three plural and two

non-plural) clusters have a more or less equal number of plural and non-

plural democracies.

Of the 18 established plural democracies in Lijphart’s study, six are in the

consensus cluster (Switzerland, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, India, and

Papua New Guinea), three in federal–majoritarian (the US, Canada, and

Spain), six in consensus–unitary (Finland, Belgium, Italy, Mauritius, Israel,

and Luxembourg), and three in the majoritarian cluster (France, Colombia,

and Trinidad and Tobago). Of the plural democracies 83.33 per cent have

some consensus institutions, either in the executives–parties, federal–

unitary dimensions, or both.4

Even the three plural democracies that are in the majoritarian cluster do not

exhibit strong majoritarian positions on Figure 1. Colombia has shifted in the

consensus direction on both dimensions (comparison between pre- and post-

1971 years). France has also become less majoritarian with greater decentrali-

sation in 1981 and active judicial review since 1974 (Lijphart, 1999: 255).

Thus a trend towards becoming less majoritarian (except for Trinidad and

Tobago in the executives–parties dimension) can be observed in the plural

democracies found in the majoritarian cluster. With a population of

1,287,000 (1995 count), Trinidad and Tobago’s institutions are susceptible

to the influence of its small size. It has less necessity for decentralisation–

federalism, a major consensus element.

Lijphart found the degree of cultural pluralism explained the clustering

of the institutions more. In both the dimensions, plurality was the weaker

explanatory variable but since the stronger variables, British political heritage

62 M. Lawoti

and population size of countries, are significant predictors only on one

dimension (executives–parties and federal–unitary, respectively), plurality

becomes a stronger predictor when both dimensions are considered (Lijphart,

1999: 250–253).

The evolution of different type of institutions in the established plural (con-

sensus) and non-plural (majoritarian) democracies means that the institutions

found in culturally plural democracies have emerged to address the cultural

cleavages in such societies. Representation of women is higher and public pol-

icies are more inclusive in polities with consensus institutions (Lijphart, 1999:

chapter 16). Lijphart also demonstrates that consensus polities are gentler and

kinder and they formulate policies that are more favourable to disadvantaged

groups and minorities. Without including different groups, democracies would

not have become established in multicultural societies. Thus, it can be safely

assumed that the consensus institutions are inclusive. Extending the logic, we

can say that if new democracies adopt consensus institutions they may have

better chances of including different groups and subsequently consolidating

democracy.

The Collective Effect of Nepali Institutions on Exclusion

Are the Nepali institutions inclusive or not? This study conducts a cross-

national evaluation of ten influential political institutions collectively as

well as individually to seek an answer. Before that, however, it is essential

to describe the Nepali context.

Brief Political History of Nepal

The House of Gorkha conquered different kingdoms, principalities, and

indigenous peoples from 1769 to form what later on became the kingdom of

Nepal. The monarchy weakened after 1846 for a century when the Rana

family effectively assumed autocratic control of the governance of the

country. The Ranas introduced a Civil Code in 1854 that imposed the Hindu

caste hierarchy on non-Hindus. The Ranas were thrown out in 1951, after

which the polity remained open for a decade. The first parliamentary election

was held in 1959 but after 18 months King Mahendra deposed the democratic

government and introduced the Panchayat system, a guided democracy that

lasted for 30 years. During these periods, the dominant ethnic/caste group

consolidated its position in the polity and society at the cost of other groups.

The restoration of democracy in 1990 opened up the polity again. Three

general and two local elections were held up to 1999, after which successive

governments were unable to conduct elections across the country due to the

ongoing Maoist insurgency. The post-1990 democratic epoch witnessed


widespread corruption, the politicisation of administration, and the continued

exclusion of minorities from the governance of the polity. The Maoist

insurgency, launched in February 1996, grew rapidly with the support and

participation of a large section of the alienated population, including the

excluded ethnic/caste groups (Lawoti, 2003). The King dismissed the

elected government in 2002 and began ruling directly from February 2005

until popular mobilisation forced him to return power in April 2006.

Political Exclusion in Nepal

I consider the indigenous nationalities (adibasi-janajati), madhesi (people of

the Terai plains), dalit (traditionally considered ‘untouchable’ Hindus), and

women as the excluded groups.5 Broadly, these groups face domination in cul-

tural spheres and in accessing resources (material well-being, political access

and positions, and influence). This is despite the indigenous nationalities, dalit

and madhesi collectively constituting more than two-thirds of the population.

The cultural and resource-wise dominant group, the Caste Hill Hindu Elite

Males (CHHEM) consisting of Bahun, Chhetri,6 Thakuri and Sanyasi, is not

a numerical majority.7 The Newar, an indigenous group from the capital, is

also better off economically and politically but faces cultural discrimination.

The restoration of democracy in 1990 that lifted the ban on political parties

and introduced considerable political rights and civil liberties did not signifi-

cantly improve the position of these groups in the governance of the country.

This was despite the explosion of identity movements (Gellner, 1997; Hangen,

2000; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1999). In fact, the political exclusion of some of the

groups in the Parliament and administration increased after 1990 compared

to the 1959–1960 democratic period and the undemocratic Panchayat epoch

(Lawoti, 2005; Neupane, 2000).

The marginalised position of various socio-cultural groups becomes evident

if we examine their representation in influential government and societal pos-

itions. Neupane found that the CHHE8 dominated politics, executive, judi-

ciary, Parliament, civil administration, academia, industry and commerce,

civil society, local government, and educational and cultural leadership

(Neupane, 2000). Jointly the CHHE (30.89 per cent) and Newar (5.48 per

cent) are 36.37 per cent of the population, but in 1999 they were holding

more than 80 per cent of the leadership positions in the important arenas of

governance. Even the relatively more open realms such as the media, civil

society, and politics demonstrate the high exclusion of traditionally margina-

lised groups. Women’s presence in public positions, including that of CHHE

women, has been insignificant as well. Women’s representation never passed

six per cent in the House of Representatives (HOR) formed in 1991, 1994, and

1999. Some of the cabinets had no women at all. In 1997 women accounted for

64 M. Lawoti

five and four per cent respectively in the gazetted civil service and judiciary

respectively (Acharya, 2003; FWLD, 2000).9

The extreme level of exclusion prevalent in Nepal can be better understood

with the case of the dalit. Only one dalit got elected to the HOR and not a

single dalit was made a cabinet member during the democratic epoch from

1990 to 2002.

Methodology and Data

I adapt Lijphart’s majoritarian–consensus framework to find out whether the

overall Nepali institutions are inclusive or exclusionary, measure Nepali insti-

tutions following Lijphart’s method and compare them with his 36 established

democracies. As discussed earlier, different types of political institutions have

facilitated consolidation of democracies in culturally plural and non-plural

societies. Since political institutions in the established plural democracies con-

tributed to the consolidation of those democracies, among other ways, by

including different groups in governance, those institutions can be considered

inclusive. Thus, if the institutions in new democracies are similar to the

institutions found in established plural democracies, they will be deemed

inclusive.

Here my claim is not that political institutions alone determine political

exclusion or inclusion. Rather, the article accepts that the interactions of

formal with informal institutions, of rules with norms, practices and conven-

tions, and of actors’ strategies with both formal and informal institutions

provide a better and more complete explanation of the exclusions or inclusions

that are observed. The aim of this article, however, is to determine the role of

the institutions in inclusion or exclusion, and that can be achieved by compar-

ing the Nepali institutions with Lijphart’s institutions. The strategies of the

actors and informal institutions had also interacted and affected the institutions

in Lijphart’s study. Despite those interactions and impacts, there was a clear

clustering of culturally plural and non-plural democracies based on insti-

tutional forms. When we measure the Nepali institutions and compare them

to institutions from 36 democracies, the effect of informal institutions and

actors’ strategies remain constant.

We have to keep in mind, however, that Nepal is not an established democ-

racy. The effect of the Nepali institutions may not be similar to that in estab-

lished democracies. After all, the established democracies consolidated

because they had certain characteristics and institutions that were different

from those of non-established democracies. Hence, when the varying

degrees of democracies produce differential effects, they will be pointed out.

Evaluating new democracies using Lijphart’s framework is not problematic

either. We are not aiming to contest or revise Lijphart’s model or develop an


alternative empirical theory on democratic forms. Evaluations are often con-

ducted by comparing the object with ideal or established standards.

Additionally, we should be aware that Lijphart’s framework includes some

institutions like the central bank and interest groups that do not directly

capture inclusion or exclusion of cultural groups. They capture power

sharing or concentration but power sharing may not always lead to inclusion.

Power can be shared by members of the dominant group belonging to different

ideological factions while excluding members of other groups.

Lijphart’s definition and selection of democracies allows us to test the

inclusive or exclusionary characteristics of institutions. First, Lijphart ana-

lysed only those countries that were fully ‘Free’ in the Freedom House

ratings. The ‘Partly Free’ countries like Nepal were not included in the analy-

sis. Second, all his democracies have lasted for at least 19 years without inter-

ruption. The long range allows analysis of the effects of institutions on the

polity. Institutional effects take time to manifest. Evaluation of the polities

for long periods ensures that the measurement really reflects democracy and

not a fluke behaviour in a particular period. The two criteria ensure that the

countries are established democracies. The advanced democracy ‘yields a

set of clear and unquestionable cases of democracy on which we can base

our comparative analysis’ (Lijphart, 1984: 38).

Specifically, we will see in which quadrant of the majoritarian–consensus

distribution the Nepali institutions fall, or in other words are the Nepali insti-

tutions similar to majoritarian, consensus, or mixed institutions. If the Nepali

institutions fall in the consensus quadrant, they can be deemed inclusive. They

will be considered non-inclusive if they fall in the majoritarian quadrant. If

they fall in the consensus–unitary or federal–majoritarian quadrants, they

will be deemed inclusive in one dimension of democracy while non-inclusive

in the other. The logic for the comparison is summarised below:

. Institutions contribute toward consolidation of democracies because

without appropriate institutions, democracies would not have consolidated.

. Democratic institutions found in established plural democracies are differ-

ent from those found in non-plural ones. Established plural democracies can

be deemed inclusive because if they had not included different groups, they

would not have consolidated.

. If the Nepali institutions are similar to those found in established plural

democracies, they can be deemed inclusive.

Measuring Nepali Political Institutions

The indices for Nepali institutions, the highest majoritarian and consensus

values, and the mean values of institutions for plural, non-plural, and 36

66 M. Lawoti

democracies are given in Table 2 (the detailed calculations of the indices can

be provided upon request). The values help us to see where a particular Nepali

institution lies. If the values are higher or lower than the mean plural or non-

plural democracies, I consider the value to be highly majoritarian or consen-

sus. On the other hand, if the Nepali institution’s value is in between the mean

values of consensus and majoritarian countries, then I consider it as a moder-

ate value. I term it either majoritarian or consensus depending on which mean

values it is closer to.

Division of power measures the centralisation and decentralisation.10 The

most decentralised states are federal decentralised polities whereas the most

centralised states are centralised unitary states. This can measure exclusion/inclusion because if a state is a federal system, different ethnic groups may

enjoy autonomy. Nepal got the highest index of centralisation (1 out of 5)

reflecting its non-inclusive characteristic in this respect.

Electoral system’s degree of disproportionality measures the difference

between a party’s vote share and seat share in elections. If the degree of

Table 2. Indices of Nepali institutions in comparative perspective

Institution

Max.maj.

Index

Max.cons.Index

Mean of36

Mean non-plural

Meanplural

Nepaliindex

Party system: effectivenumber of parties

1.35 5.98 3.17 2.65 3.69 3.14

Cabinets: minimalwinning %

100 4.1 69.99 76.19 43.06 54.99

Executive–legislativerelation: dominationor balance

5.52 1 3.32 3.74 2.9 -

Electoral system:disproportionality %

21.08 1.3 8.26 8.64 7.88 10.47

Interest group:pluralism orcorporatism

3.56 0.44 2.24 2.42 2.06 3

Division of power 1 5 2.27 1.61 2.93 1Parliament 1 4 2.21 1.91 2.51 2.13Constitution: rigidity

in amendment1 4 2.6 2.35 2.84 1�

Judicial review 1 4 2.17 1.94 2.4 1�

Central bank:independent ordependent

0.17 0.69 0.38 0.33 0.41 0.36

� revised index.

Sources: Lijphart (1999) and fieldwork in Nepal, 2000–2001.


disproportionality is low, then the political parties get seats closely proportion-

ate to their vote share. If the disadvantaged groups are mobilised and ethnic

political parties exist, the degree of disproportionality can help to gauge

inclusion/exclusion. If the disadvantaged groups have smaller parties and

the electoral system favours larger parties, a high disproportionality would

indicate that disadvantaged groups are probably excluded. If the dispropor-

tionality is low, it may suggest that the smaller disadvantaged group parties

would get seats proportionate to their vote share. The disproportionality

index for Nepal is 10.47. It is higher than the average for non-plural democ-

racies, indicating a highly majoritarian value.

Party system is measured by the effective number of political parties in a

polity, based on the proportion of seats of the political parties in the legisla-

ture. If the effective number of parties is more than two, then the party

system consists of more than two influential political parties. A multiparty

system has higher chances of having political parties representing the interests

of disadvantaged groups than a two-party system. Thus, a multiparty system

may promote inclusion whereas a two-party system may not. In Nepal, the

effective number of parties is 3.14. It is a multiparty system.11

Cameral structure measures whether a country has a unicameral or

bicameral system that is balanced (more or less equal power and legitimacy

between two chambers representing different constituencies). Balanced

bicameral system can represent the interests of disadvantaged groups,

especially if one of the chambers represents different ethnic groups or

regions. Nepal has an index of 2.13 in a range of 1 to 4, where 1 represents

a unicameral legislature and 4 a balanced and incongruent Parliament.

Nepal has weak bicameralism.

Cabinets can be consensus or majoritarian in terms of their formation.

A coalition cabinet would facilitate power sharing among a number of con-

stituent parties whereas if a majority party forms a cabinet, power would be

concentrated. If effective ethnic parties or parties with strong linkages with

social groups exist and if coalition cabinets involving those parties are

formed, then inclusion would be facilitated. Lijphart measured power concen-

tration/sharing in a cabinet by the proportion of time one-party cabinets were

formed. The institution would be the most majoritarian if a country formed

one-party cabinets all the time (100 per cent), whereas it would be consensus

if it were less so. The Nepali index of 54.99 per cent shows that Nepali cabi-

nets have moderate power-sharing attributes. It is closer to the mean of plural

than non-plural democracies.12

Central bank independence means less power to the executive. It is ‘yet

another way of dividing power’ (Lijphart, 1999: 233). This institution, like

the interest group pluralism discussed below, does not have direct conse-

quences for inclusion/exclusion. However, it has indirect influences. If the

68 M. Lawoti

central bank is not under the rule of the cabinet that is controlled by the

dominant group, the dominant group will face more difficulty in exploiting

it for its group interests or filling the bank with dominant group members.

Further, it can indirectly facilitate inclusion by diffusing power. The

index for central bank independence for Nepal is 0.36. It is higher than but

close to the average of the non-plural countries. It shows moderate majoritar-

ian characteristics, reflecting the dependence of the central bank on the

executive.

Interest group system measures power sharing or concentration among

interest groups. Interest group pluralism is majoritarian because a resourceful

group can influence a decision all the way. On the other hand, interest group

corporatism facilitates power sharing by requiring coordination of several

groups’ interests in major policy realms. For instance, in corporate democra-

cies labour, business, and government representatives regularly consult to

arrive at binding comprehensive agreements. The index for interest group

pluralism for Nepal is 3 in a range of 0 to 4. It is highly majoritarian.

Despite the lack of direct relevance of central bank independence and inter-

est group system, I have included these two institutions in the cross-national

evaluation because the use of as many institutions/variables as the original

framework would make the analysis more robust.

Adapting the Measurements to the Nepali Context

Some problems surfaced in measuring some of the institutions. The first

problem is that some institutions’ indices misrepresent their actual effect on

the disadvantaged groups. Judicial review and rigidity in the constitutional

amendment process are cases in point. In established democracies, judicial

reviews protect minority rights by restraining the majoritarian impulses of

the polity. Often judicial reviews safeguard the minority rights that are pro-

tected in the Constitution. The high judicial review in Nepal, on the other

hand, instead of protecting minority rights, has often facilitated domination

by minorities. This is primarily because the Constitution contains articles

that discriminate against the disadvantaged groups. For instance, the Consti-

tution declares the Kingdom a Hindu State, bans ethnic political parties,

limits education in non-Nepali native languages to primary level only and

permits citizenship only through male descent (Lawoti, 2005; Subba et al.,

2000). Additionally, the CHHEM justices, who overwhelmingly dominate

the Supreme Court, are unable to look beyond their caste/gender values and

interests while interpreting the articles of the Constitution (Pro-Public,

2000).13

Likewise, rigidity in constitutional amendment process generally protects

the rights of minorities in established democracies by making it difficult to


amend constitutional articles that protect minority rights. However, since the

articles of the Constitution discriminate against minorities in Nepal, the rigid-

ity in the amendment process facilitates the domination of CHHEM. It creates

difficulties in amending the constitutional discrimination toward the indigen-

ous nationalities, madhesi, and women.

These two institutions have facilitated the continued domination of the

disadvantaged groups. The straightforward measurement and interpretation

of these institutions would misrepresent Lijphart’s conceptualisation and

formulation. This problem can be resolved by awarding the two Nepali

institutions majoritarian values. Then the indices would reflect their effect

in the polity: concentration of power and facilitation of the exclusion.

Hence, I have given both judicial review and constitutional rigidity the

majoritarian score of 1.

The second problem is the inability of the methodology to capture the

inclusion/exclusion of minorities even when the institutions share power.14

The measure of executive–legislative relations shows a high consensus

index but is, however, unable to reflect inclusion/exclusion in Nepal. Execu-

tive–legislative relations would be consensual if the cabinet and the legisla-

ture balanced power, and majoritarian if the cabinet dominated. Lijphart

uses the length of the cabinets as the indicator of the relative power of

the executive. The logic is that ‘A cabinet that stays in power for a long

time is likely to be dominant vis-a-vis the legislature, and a short lived

cabinet is likely to be relatively weak’ (Lijphart, 1999: 129). Due to frequent

government changes (11 governments from 1991 to 2001), Nepal shows

non-dominance of the cabinet. However, the weak representation of disad-

vantaged groups in the Parliament and the cabinet means that even when

power is shared between legislature and the executive, disadvantaged

groups do not access it. The dominant group members, who control the

major political parties, shared power among themselves. This demonstrates

that power sharing may not necessarily lead to inclusion.

Secondly, the frequent government change in Nepal is largely due to

politicians’ hunger for power. It is not due to formal institutional mechanisms.

Despite the misrepresentation, it is not easy to revise the index as we do

not know how much this contributed to the exclusion, unlike in the case

of rigidity of amendment and judicial review, where their role in exclusion

was obvious and significant. Thus, I have dropped this variable from the

comparison.

Cross-national Evaluation: Exclusionary Nepali Polity

Factor analysis calculated the value of the executive–parties and federal

unitary dimensions for Nepal as 0.20 and 1.03 respectively. The values

70 M. Lawoti

of the two dimensions for the 36 established democracies are found in

Appendix A in Lijphart (Lijphart, 1999: 312). The position of Nepal in the

two-dimensional map of democracy is shown in Figure 1. The addition of

Nepal to Lijphart’s 36 established democracies did not make any significant

difference to the factor loadings. Dropping the executive–legislative relations

variable also did not affect the factor loading significantly: there are only

slight changes in the executives–parties dimensions.15

Nepali political institutions lie fully on the majoritarian cluster in the

two-dimensional map: it is majoritarian in both the federal–unitary and

executives–parties dimensions.16 The institutions are not similar to those

found in established plural democracies. Thus the Nepali institutions can be

deemed not inclusive.

The extent of exclusion in Nepal is higher than suggested by its position

on the two-dimensional map. Some of the institutions showed consensus

attributes, despite not including the marginalised groups. In other words,

the position of Nepal in the two-dimensional map of democracy is conserva-

tive in terms of majoritarianism. In addition, analyses of individual

institutions show that not a single institution included marginalised groups,

despite some showing power-sharing attributes. If there had been some

inclusive institutions, they might have negated some of the exclusionary

effect.

More important, as discussed earlier, studies have shown the constitutional

articles, the unitary structure, and the electoral system in Nepal to be

Figure 1. Nepal’s position in two-dimensional conceptual map of democracy


exclusionary (Bhattachan, 2000; Gurung et al., 2000; Lawoti, 2005). For

instance, the unitary state has meant the absence of autonomy for ethnic

groups. Likewise, compared to the proportional representation system, the

FPTP electoral system has favoured the large political parties controlled by

the dominant group denying proportionate representation to small ethnic-

oriented parties. Similarly, as discussed earlier, constitutional articles dis-

criminate against the disadvantaged groups.

The combination of individual and collective analysis of institutions

permits us to say that the overall effect of the institutions is exclusionary.

Some single institutions have been shown to be exclusionary whereas the col-

lective effect of the institutions are non-inclusive. The net effect is

exclusionary.

The exclusionary institutions further reinforce the exclusionary effect

of the socio-historical factors. The exclusionary institutions also obstruct

efforts the disadvantaged groups make towards inclusion. Thus, even the

‘explosion’ of identity movements after 1990 did not increase the presence

of disadvantaged groups in influential governance positions.

Conclusion

This study has provided several academic and policy-relevant insights into

the effects of political institutions on democratisation. First, it shows that

the political institutions in Nepal are exclusionary. Despite being culturally

diverse, Nepal adopted majoritarian institutions in 1990. That is a major

underlying cause of the exclusion of numerous socio-cultural groups during

the democratic epoch.

The exclusion of a substantial population from the polity is not a good

sign for a new democracy. The excluded groups may become alienated

and the ‘democratic’ polity may no longer remain legitimate to them. They

may support anti-democratic forces, as has become clear in Nepal. The sub-

stantial support of the disadvantaged groups for the Maoist insurgency is a

clear sign of this. Likewise, some leaders of ethnic parties joined the

various royal governments formed after the dismissal of the elected govern-

ment in October 2002. Further, like the rest of the common people, the disad-

vantaged groups’ organisations did not formally support the anti-regression

movement launched by the major political parties against the King’s

interventions.17

Second, the analysis of individual institutions provides interesting insights

that can have academic and policy relevance beyond Nepal. Some of the

institutions did not include different groups despite showing power-sharing

attributes. It indicates that while proposing inclusive institutions, in some

72 M. Lawoti

cases we may have to go beyond consensus institutions and specifically

propose institutions that clearly accommodate different groups.

The study also shows that to evaluate the role of institutions in exclusion/inclusion, ideally only the institutions that directly include or exclude should

be considered. Lijphart’s framework can be adapted for such a purpose by

dropping less relevant variables. Developing an entirely a new framework

for evaluation may not be possible in a short time, especially because com-

parable data is needed. Lijphart’s method, despite a certain lack of fit, is not

a significant problem because in any quantitative study, the methodology

and its operation may not be able to capture the specificities of particular

countries.

Third, and more important, this study demonstrates that the inclusive/exclusionary attributes of major institutions can be collectively assessed.

The evaluation of Nepali institutions demonstrates that the consensus–

majoritarian framework is useful for evaluating institutions’ role on

exclusion/inclusion. In that sense it demonstrates the further usefulness of

the consensus–majoritarian model. However, the measurement of some

institutions may have to be revised to take into consideration each country’s

institutional idiosyncrasies. Combined with attention to a country’s individual

institutions’ effects, a cross-national evaluation can provide a more compre-

hensive picture.

Finally, this study has significant policy relevance in today’s world

where many emerging multicultural democracies are facing problems in

consolidating their democracies due to inappropriate political institutions.

Adopting political institutions that merely guarantee political rights and

periodic elections may not be sufficient to consolidate democracies in multi-

cultural societies. The inclusion of different social cultural groups in the gov-

ernance of polity is essential to prevent violent conflict and to consolidate

democracy. Evaluating political institutions in multicultural democracies

that are floundering may allow us to determine whether the political

institutions are a cause of the problem or not. Thus, the evaluation model

developed here can have wide policy implications.

Even older democracies can benefit from institutional evaluations. They

can deepen their democracies if the evaluation finds that they do not have

appropriate institutions. Gurr (2000) found that established democracies

had higher economic inequality among ethnic groups compared to new and

transitional democracies. Political reforms could address the inequalities by

ensuring the inclusion of minorities in policy-making positions.

Political structures, especially those analysed here, are basic institutions

that lay down norms and rules for the operation of the polity. When

such fundamental institutions are exclusionary in nature, exclusion will

continue and the excluded groups may become alienated, leading to greater


support for antidemocratic elements. In such situations, democracy is put at

risk.

Notes

1. The focus of this article is on exclusion at the governance level and not on exclusion in

relation to citizenship or adult franchise.

2. Consociational democracy explains power sharing, autonomy, and accommodation in

culturally diverse societies in terms of federalism, mutual veto, proportional electoral

system, grand coalition, and rigidity in constitutional amendment to safeguard minority

rights.

3. Lijphart’s plural and semi-plural democracies have been lumped together as plural here.

4. Even the remaining 16.67 per cent of the plural democracies with majoritarian features

have some inclusive institutions. For instance, France and Colombia have a high judicial

review (3 out of 4) and balanced bicameralism (3 and 3.1 respectively out of 4) and

Trinidad and Tobago has high constitutional amendment rigidity (3 out of 4).

5. According to the 2001 census, indigenous nationalities made up 36.31 per cent

(mountain ¼ 0.82%, hill ¼ 26.51%, Inner Tarai ¼ 1.11%, and Tarai ¼ 7.85%),

madhesi (Tarai indigenous nationalities, dalit, and Muslim ¼ 4.29) 32.29 per cent;

and the dalit (hill ¼ 7.09, Tarai ¼ 6.74) 14.99 per cent of the population (Bhattachan,

2003).

6. Economic indicators show that Chhetris do not fare well. This is largely because Khasa of

the west, who are extremely poor, are included in the Chhetri category. A prominent

anthropologist like Bista has argued that the Khasa are a different people (Bista,

1996). Even if the Khasa are not categorised separately, it should be acknowledged

that the Khasa’s performance is much worse than Chhetris of other areas. Conservative

estimates say Khasa are at least 4 per cent of the population.

7. Thakuri (1.47%), Sanyansi (0.88%), Bahun (12.74%), and Chhetri (15.8%) form the

dominant group. The latter two are the largest ethnic/caste groups, and are the hill

Brahmin and Kshatriya respectively.

8. CHHE denotes the dominant group, including women.

9. The position of women in public administration has steadily increased since 1971. It was

4.2 per cent in 1971, 6.6 per cent in 1981, and 9.3 per cent in 1991 (Acharya, 1994).

10. See Lijphart (1999) for theoretical discussion and detailed operation of the ten

institutions.

11. The multiparty system in Nepal is largely the reflection of ideological diversity

rather than cultural diversity. In 1999, the CHHE dominated the three largest

political parties with 67.5 per cent. The three parties won 94 per cent of the seats in

the Parliament in the 1999 election, thus influencing the effective number of parties

(Neupane, 2000: 71).

12. However, despite capturing power sharing among different political actors, the method

was unable to measure inclusion/exclusion in Nepal. In 1999, 62 per cent of the

cabinet members belonged to the CHHE. This was largely due to the negligible presence

of marginalised groups in the major political parties.

13. Eighteen of the 20 Supreme Court justices in 1999 belonged to the dominant group

(Neupane, 2000).

14. The discussion of the lack of fit between Lijphart’s method and Nepali institutions is not

an attempt to argue against the Lijphartian framework. Since Nepali democracy is ‘Partly

Free’, as designated by Freedom House, whereas Lijphart’s generalisations are based on

74 M. Lawoti

an analysis of ‘Free’ countries with uninterrupted democratic practices for at least two

decades, the Nepali data cannot be used to question the concept.

15. The factor loading of effective number of parties and cabinets (0.04 and 0.03 respect-

ively) increased slightly and that of the electoral system and interest group pluralism

(0.05 in each variable) increased slightly.

16. Ireland moved to the majoritarian cluster from the unitary–consensus cluster with the

addition of Nepal in the analysis. All other countries remained in the same clusters as

in the analysis of 36 democracies even though their positions slightly changed. For

example, Austria and India are further apart. For the more precise positions of the democ-

racies, Lijphart (1999: 248) should be consulted.

17. Some professional and disadvantaged groups’ organisations supported the movement

after April 2004 after the political leaders apologised for the mistakes they had made

since 1990 and the King’s commitment toward democracy began to be suspect when

he showed an inclination to be involved in governance.

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