political economy of federalism in pakistan and movement for self-determination in sindh

7/27/2019 Political Economy of Federalism in Pakistan and Movement for Self-Determination in Sindh

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www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/16810-political-economy-of-federalism-in-pakistan-and-movement-for-self-determination-in-sindh?tmpl=component&print=1

Bashir Qureshi.

Political Economy of Federalism inPakistan and Movement for Self-Determination in SindhFriday, 07 June 2013 00:00By Zulfiqar Shah, Truthout | Op-Ed

Pakistan is at a cro ssroads, its federal structure

severely threatened by provincial independence

mov ements fueled by ethnic tensions, structural

political failures and the allocation of tax rev enues.

Pakistan is on the brink again after 197 1 . Intensive

decade-long secessionist warfare is underway in

Balochistan, and a mass mov ement, accompanied by

low-scale insurgency , has arisen in Sindh, which c ast

the shadow of popular uprising in March 201 2, whenhundreds of thousands took to the streets in the

prov incial capital Karachi, demanding independence

for Sindh.

Immediately after that "freedom march" in Karachi, its organizer, and popular freedom mov ement leader

Bashir Qureshi,died under my sterious circumstances. It is widely be lieved in Sindh that he was poisoned

by the security agencies of Pakistan. This concern of the Sindhi peo ple has been validated by the medic al

investigations report carried out by a medical board formed by the Sindh Health Department and

confirmed by the then-home minister of Sindh, Manzoor Wasan, in an interview by a Sindhi daily , A wami

Awaz, in Karachi.

Qureshi's demise was followed by the murder of another resistance mo vement leader, Muzaffar Bhutto, who

was fo rc edly disappeared in 2011 at the hands of sec urity agencies, ac cording to the various internationaland Pakistani human rights bodies. Another brutal act was previously reported in April 2011 , when three

freedom mov ement leaders were burned aliv e by the security agencies in the Sanghar district of Sindh,

according to a fact-finding report of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.

Several hundred people are still illegally de tained or disappeared acro ss the province.

The popular uprising in Sindh is meaningful bec ause the prov ince c ontributes a large share to Pakistan's

economy and is the second largest province, home to o v er 50 .54 million people. Moreov er, it is the only

state that v oluntarily became part of Pakistan by adopting the Pakistan Resolution in the Sindh Legislative

Assembly in 1 946. M.A. Jinnah, founder of the c ountry , was an ethnic Sindhi and died due to health-care

negligence by the co untry 's seco nd line leadership; three ethnic Sindhi prime ministers of Pakistan were

illegally dismissed from office by the military during their five terms of gov ernment, and two of them were

killed in Punjab province. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was executed under General Zia al Haq's martial law, which is

commo nly termed judicial murder in Pakistan, and his daughter Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in the

backy ard of the military 's General Headquarters in Rawlapindi dur ing General Musharaf's rule in 20 07 . It is

academically well documented by Stephen P. Cohen in his boo k The Pakistan Army that the armed forces in

Pakistan contain an ov erwhelming ethnic Punjabi majority.

Econom ic and Fiscal Exploitation

Sindh has c ontributed a significant 3 2.7 percent historical av erage to Pakistan's GDP; meanwhile, the

prov ince's own GDP per c apita is $1 ,400. Fifteen percent of Sindh's GDP is lost due to environmental

degradation caused mo stly by Punjab's water rights violations as well as by faulty drainage schemes

carry ing industrial and agricultural waste through Sindh from the higher elevation prov ince of Punjab.
http://dawn.com/2011/05/06/hrcp-seeks-judicial-probe-into-sanghar-killings/http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA33/001/2011/enhttp://dawn.com/2011/05/06/hrcp-seeks-judicial-probe-into-sanghar-killings/http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA33/001/2011/enhttp://truth-out.org/http://www.truth-out.org/author/itemlist/user/48512


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According to the Pakistan Energy Book 2007 , an estimated 1 ,000,415 MMc f (millio n cubic feet) of natural

gas is produc ed in Sindh, which acco unts for 7 0.7 7 percent of Pakistan's total gas production; Sindh

produces 1 3.87 million barrels o f oil, which is 56.36 per cent o f Pakistan's total oil production. Oil extracted

from Sindh had an annual value o f $1.7 5 billion, out of which the prov ince's financial receipts were 1 2.5

percent, and the employ ment share was below 1 percent for ethnic Sindhis. In June 201 1, the elec ted

parliament in Pakistan, through the 1 8th constitutional amendment, transferred autho rity o ver the

country 's natural resources to the pro vinces that improved the financial share in their own resources,

howev er the amendment has not yet been implemented, and the authority to nego tiate exploration of coal

reserv oirs in Sindh has been unlawfully handed o ver to the federal government. It is worth mentioning that

unearthed coal reserv es in Sindh total 17 5 billion tons.

Pakistan first explor ed its natural gas reservo irs in Balochistan during the 195 0s, but the pr ov ince could

only utilize those reso urces for its own residents after 1 986, when an armed forces cantonment was

established in Quetta, capital of the prov ince. In the past 65 years, only 7 perce nt of this resourc e has been

utilized by the residents of the Balochistan. Until 200 8, Sindh consumed 45 percent of its gas produc tion,

while Punjab consumed 93 0 percent of its to tal gas pro ductio n. Despite their highest shares o f the natural

resourc es o f Pakistan, Sindh and Balochistan are kept out of the dev elopment mainstream. This is validated

by the Millennium Dev elopment Goals Report o f 2005 issue d by the government o f Pakistan, whic h

mentions that the o il-, gas- and co al-rich districts o f Sindh and Baluchistan had poo r indicators o f human

dev elopment. A n estimated 7 6 percent of Pakistan's known oil reserv es are located in Sindh, but extremely

centralized econo mic and fiscal federalism has given birth to the conflict between the prov ince and the

center.The National Finance Commission (NFC) is the federal fiscal structure, where rev enue c ollected by the

prov inces is pooled and distributed to the federal and provincial gove rnments every five years. Such a

periodic rev enue distribution is called an "NFC Award" in Pakistan and has been practiced since 1 97 1. I n

1991 , provinces receiv ed 20 perc ent and the center 80 perce nt of the country's total tax revenue, a

proportion reformed in 1997 , with 37 percent for the prov inces and 63 percent for the center. In 1997 ,

Sindh contributed 65 percent, Punjab 25 percent, Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa 7 perce nt and Balochistan 3

percent of the country 's tax rev enues; however Sindh rece ived 9 percent of the redistributed rev enues,

Punjab 25 percent, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 6 percent and Balochistan rece ived 2 perce nt , while the rest went

to the central gov ernment. Until 1997 , the resource distribution was made on the basis of population,

whic h gav e an ultimate e dge to the Punjab - whic h ac counts for 6 0 percent of the c ountry 's total

population.

The most recent NFC Award of 201 0 was further reformed promising a 57 .5 perc ent share of rev enues to

the prov inces and a 42.5 perc ent share to the center in 2011 . Other factors of distribution giv en weight

along with population were also included. For example, now population acc ounts for 82 perce nt of the

weight ing; poverty , 1 0.3 perc ent; revenue generation, 5 perc ent; and inv erse population density , 2.7

percent. Sindh is the greatest loser in this reform, as despite being the major rev enue generato r, Sindh

receives 24.5 perc ent; meanwhile Punjab receiv es 51 .7 perce nt as its receipts remain unchallenged

because o f population; Khy ber Pakhtunkhuwa and Balochistan remaine d reaso nable well-taken c are of,

receiving 14.6 perc ent and 9.11 percent, respectively, o ut of the total share of the prov inces.

Punjab has a dual ec onomic and fiscal edge - the 82 perc ent share in the fiscal distribution among the

prov inces and another major share through the federal civil and military departments gained primarily

from the ethnic Punjabi majority . Ac cording to the 2012-13 budget, 1 8.4 percent of Pakistan's budget isallocated for the defense, which is higher than any o f the civilian budget rubrics for the country , espec ially

because, whe n combined with ov erall sec urity ex penditures, including the defense , inter ior and strategic

departments, it willamount to at least an estimated 30 percent o f the country 's total budget. The ethnic

compo sition of the key security organs - including the ministry of defense, ministry of foreign affairs and

interior ministry, along with the armed forces, seco nd-tier armed institutions and law enforcing agencies -

is overwhelmingly Punjabi, which ultimately means that the eco nomic flow derived from federal

gov ernment employ ment opportunities, procurement and other expenditures is also directed toward

Punjab.

Politics of Underdevelopment

According toa poverty assessment in Sindh by Asian Development Bank (A DB) in 20 08, due to a growing


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population and a rise in literacy and migration, nearly 600,000 additional people will be entering the job

market each y ear in Sindh. This is in contrast to the long-term annual job creation rate of 350,000 in the

province.

Agro -based industry could pro vide some r elief, but poo r law-and-o rder conditions and weak infrastructure

have been a barr ier. Industry in Sindh is mainly concentrated in Karachi, ex cept for a handful of units in

Hyderabad, Kotri and Sukkur. Until 2008, about 1 1 ,500 industrial units were loc ated in Karachi, the

capital of Sindh, employ ing 2.5 million people, but the share o f ethnic Sindhi people remained less than 1 0

percent. That co mpares poo rly to the strength of 45 tec hnical institutions of Sindh in 2008, which

registered 18,00 0 students, out of which 40 percent were from outside Karachi.

Though Karachi is the capital, the admission of students from the rest of the prov ince into the public

academic institutions is prohibited due to the legislation passed by the Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)-

led gov ernment in Sindh during the military rule of general Perv ez Musharaf. Constitutionally, the c hief

minister is the prov ince authority ov er the higher education institutions, but in Sindh, the governo r of the

prov ince is the decision maker. A go vernor in Pakistan is a ceremonious repre sentative of the federation in

the prov inces. The current gov ernor, who has held the post the last 11 years, belongs to (MQM), a Karachi-

based ethnic outfit.

Basically, human resource dev elopment initiatives prov iding equal opportunity are required to create a

socio-ec onomic balance between ur ban and rural areas as well as between Sindh and Punjab.

Sindh has beco me a microc osm of the climate change. A n erratic flow of the Indus River, which brings

mega floods once in a while after many y ears of drought, disastrously aggrav ates poverty , unemployment

and job insecurity .

The Indus flood o f 2010 and rain floods of 201 1 have intensified the v ulnerability of a majority in Sindh.

According to the Sindh gov ernment, the flood of 2010 wreaked havoc with Sindh by displacing 7 .254

million people from 1 1,992 v illages, inundating ripened cro ps on 24.821 million acres o f land and

destroy ing 87 6,000 houses. The losses for Sindh amount to $1 .44 billion in agriculture, $0 .12 b illion in

livestoc k, $1 .42 billion in housing, $380 million in road infrastructure, 5 50 million in irrigation

infrastructure, $ 41.5 million in health infrastructure, $ 32.5 million in educational infrastructure, $ 420

million in urban infrastructure and $1 00.6 million in the gov ernment building damages. Meanwhile, during

the rain floods of 201 1, around 8.9 million people were displaced, 1 52 million houses damaged and 6.7 7

million acres crops dev astated. The losses from the 201 1 floods were higher than those from the flood of

2010.

Water Con flic t

The major political struggles in Sindh after 1 988 have focused o n water shortages in Sindh and some mega

irrigation projec ts like the Kalabagh Dam. The river water shortage has left its adverse effects on the

eco logical order of Sindh, agriculture, rural economy and culture.

The Indus Delta faces degradation threats. During the past two decades, the sea intrusion has resulted in

tidal erosion and salt water despoilation of about 2.2 million acres of land in the Badin and Thatta districts

in co astal Sindh, while mangrov e forest cov er has decreased from about 228,812 hectares to 7 3,00 1

hectares. Mangroves provide fuel wood to 1.2 million people, forage to 16,00 0 camels, and other products

to 28,57 0 househo lds and they shelter inland areas from co astal flooding.

Mangrov es act as a shield against active tidal erosion in the area and support thousands o f botanical,

aquatic and wildlife spec ies and prov ide a nursery for most of the 44 co mmercial fish and shrimp species in

the deltaic area. All these benefits are dependent on the surviv al of the mangrov e forest, which in turn

needs freshwater flow in the estuaries. Unfortunately , the activ e delta is now only 10 perc ent of its original

area. Sindh requires a minimum of 35 MAF (million acre feet) of water a year for its ecolo gical sustenance

and agricultural pursuits. The econo mic loss due to the Indus Delta devastation is estimated around $ 120

million annually, which does not include the unquantifiable value o f environmental aspects suc h as

bio div ersity , habitat and c oastal protection.

Demographic Sovereignty

The peopling of Sindh began with the birth of Pakistan in 1947 . It has no w bec ome a multiethnic and


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linguistic prov ince due to migrations from within Pakistan and outside, altering the demographic fabric o f

its urban hubs. The census in Pakistan has not taken place since 1998. Ifdemographic estimates are carried

out today on the basis of 1998 c ensus by including urban-rural and inter-provincial population shifts as

well as e xternal migrat ion patte rns in the context of bro ade r ethno-linguist groups' context, the result

would be: Sindhis 68 percent; Muhajirs (re fugees) 19 perc ent and rest 1 7 perc ent. Muhajirs is abroader

categoryin Sindh that includes Urdu-speaking refugees from India who migrated during the partition o f the

subc ontinent in 1947 and non-Urdu and non-Sindhi Biharis, Gujratis, Rajasthanis, Bengalis and others who

migrated from I ndia, Bangladesh and elsewhere in South Asia after 1947 . Similarly, in Karachi city,

indigenous Sindhi and Sindhi of Balochi, Gujarati and Rajasthani origin comprise around 50 percent of the

population; the Urdu-speaking of Indian origin and ethno-linguist Biharis of Bangladeshi origin are below25 percent and the rest are 25 percent.

The existing political arrangements have threatened the demo graphic security and sovereignty o f Sindhi

people in their historic land due to nonex istence of legal and legislative frameworks. Neither the prov incial

legislature nor the gov ernment in Pakistan has first generation migrants or refugees as parliamentarians

and ministers. It is in Sindh alone where first generation Punjabi and Pashtun migrants and refugees are

bo th part of parliament and o f the c abinet of the prov inc ial go v ernme nt. The mov ement for demographic

security in Sindh is as old as Pakistan itself, but the federation is unwilling to carry such legislation. Besides,

federalism in Pakistan essentially enshrines Punjabi dominance, by which the federal legislative parliament

contains an o verwhelming majority o f ethnic Punjabis, rather than a mix of Sindhis, Baloch and Pashtuns.

Together, the later three do not form the obligatory two-thirds majority to legislate.

What is to be don e?

Pakistan is again at a crossroads, as the reasons that led to the breakup of the co untry in 197 1 exist today

with more intensity for the o ppressed prov inces o f Sindh, Balochistan and Pakhtunkhuwa. Essentially , the

country requires major re forms of federalism that offer demo graphic, ethnic, eco nomic, and fiscal as well

as development security - and the consequent abolition of the ethnic hegemony of Punjab and its allies.

Until federal reforms, combining proportionate representation and the participation of v arious prov inces

is ensured in all forms of statecraft, the freedom mov ement in Sindh will not only be well-justified, but also

the only way out for the poo r and marginalized 50 million people o f this richest prov ince of Pakistan.

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http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/A%20confrontation%20between%20Pakistanu2019s%20powerful%20military%20and%20the%20civilian%20government,%20over%20a%20controversial%20offer%20supposedly%20made%20by%20the%20government%20to%20the%20U.S.%20administration%20to%20rein%20in%20the%20army%20forces%20and%20its%20spy%20agency,%20led%20Tuesday%20to%20the%20resignation%20of%20the%20Islamabadu2019s%20ambassador%20to%20Washington.%20%20The%20departure%20of%20Husain%20Haqqani,%20regarded%20as%20a%20highly%20effective%20operator%20in%20Washington,%20is%20a%20major%20blow%20to%20the%20government%20of%20President%20Asif%20Zardari,%20which%20was%20accused%20of%20treachery%20over%20the%20controversial%20proposal,%20said%20to%20be%20made%20in%20a%20memo%20delivered%20to%20the%20top%20U.S.%20military%20official.%20%20Democracy%20remains%20fragile%20in%20Pakistan,%20which%20has%20been%20ruled%20directly%20by%20the%20military%20for%20half%20its%20existence.%20Pakistan's%20support%20is%20believed%20to%20be%20vital%20to%20stabilizing%20Afghanistan%20but%20political%20turmoil%20in%20Islamabad%20keeps%20the%20government's%20focus%20on%20mere%20survival.%20%20The%20tangled%20saga,%20dubbed%20u201cmemogateu201d,%20will%20also%20further%20damage%20Pakistanu2019s%20relations%20with%20the%20U.S.,%20which%20have%20relied%20on%20the%20civilian%20government%20to%20act%20as%20a%20brake%20on%20a%20military%20that%20Washington%20believes%20supports%20the%20Taliban%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20other%20Islamic%20extremist%20groups.%20Pakistanu2019s%20ties%20with%20the%20U.S.%20are%20already%20in%20crisis.%20%20u201cI%20have%20requested%20PM%20Gilani%20(prime%20minister%20Yousaf%20Raza%20Giliani)%20to%20accept%20my%20resignation%20as%20Pakistan%20Ambassador%20to%20US,u201d%20Haqqani%20announced%20over%20Twitter,%20just%20before%208pm%20local%20time.%20u201cI%20have%20much%20to%20contribute%20to%20building%20a%20new%20Pakistan%20free%20of%20bigotry%20&%20intolerance.%20Will%20focus%20energies%20on%20that.u201d%20%20Haqqani%20had%20always%20denied%20being%20the%20author%20of%20the%20memo,%20which%20was%20delivered%20in%20May,%20in%20the%20days%20after%20Osama%20bin%20Laden%20was%20found%20and%20killed%20in%20northern%20Pakistan%20by%20a%20U.S.%20raiding%20squad.%20%20The%20missive%20was%20sent%20by%20an%20American%20businessman%20of%20Pakistani%20origin,%20Mansoor%20Ijaz,%20to%20Admiral%20Mike%20Mullen,%20then%20the%20chairman%20of%20the%20joint%20chiefs%20of%20staff.%20Ijaz%20later%20said%20that%20Haqqani%20was%20the%20author.%20%20Many%20believe%20that%20Haqqani%20was%20set%20up,%20by%20elements%20associated%20with%20the%20military.%20He%20was%20no%20ordinary%20ambassador,%20but%20a%20close%20adviser%20to%20Zardari%20and%20his%20easy%20access%20to%20the%20top%20U.S.%20military%20and%20civilian%20leadership%20was%20viewed%20with%20deep%20suspicion%20by%20Pakistanu2019s%20military%20establishment.%20Before%20being%20appointed%20as%20the%20U.S.%20envoy%20in%202008,%20with%20the%20restoration%20of%20democracy%20in%20Pakistan,%20he%20wrote%20a%20book%20on%20the%20links%20between%20the%20armed%20forces%20and%20jihadists%20in%20Pakistan.%20He%20had%20previously%20served%20as%20a%20professor%20at%20Boston%20University.%20%20It%20has%20never%20been%20clear%20why%20Haqqani,%20who%20could%20easily%20convey%20the%20message%20himself,%20would%20use%20an%20intermediary%20to%20deliver%20such%20an%20explosive%20message,%20or%20why%20he%20would%20risk%20putting%20it%20down%20on%20paper.%20Furthermore,%20the%20memo%20contains%20a%20mistake%20that%20Haqqani%20would%20be%20unlikely%20to%20make.%20%20In%20the%20memo,%20which%20was%20first%20revealed%20by%20Ijaz%20in%20a%20column%20for%20the%20Financial%20Times%20newspaper%20last%20month,%20an%20offer%20is%20made%20to%20disband%20part%20of%20the%20militaryu2019s%20Inter-Services%20Intelligence%20(ISI)%20spy%20agency,%20the%20wing%20responsible%20for%20dealing%20with%20the%20Taliban,%20in%20return%20for%20the%20U.S.%20pressing%20Pakistanu2019s%20military%20against%20staging%20a%20coup.%20%20A%20spokesman%20for%20Mullen%20had%20initially%20denied%20receiving%20the%20memo%20but%20last%20week%20that%20changed,%20which%20put%20Haqqani%20in%20the%20spotlight,%20but%20the%20spokesman%20emphasised%20that%20Mullen%20had%20not%20regarded%20it%20as%20a%20genuine%20communication%20from%20Zardari%20and%20had%20therefore%20disregarded%20it.%20As%20a%20result%20of%20the%20changing%20statements%20from%20Mullen,%20some%20in%20Pakistan%20see%20a%20conspiracy%20orchestrated%20in%20Washington,%20to%20sow%20more%20chaos%20in%20Pakistan.%20Public%20opinion%20here%20is%20ferociously%20anti-American%20and%20willing%20to%20believe%20wild%20theories%20that%20the%20U.S.%20is%20trying%20to%20destroy%20Pakistan.%20%20Read%20more:%20http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/11/22/131049/pakistan-ambassador-to-washington.html#ixzz1eT5nt9WWhttp://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/5118http://truth-out.org/http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/1659http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=55738http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/1221mailto:[email protected]://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2013/05/01/oped/the-centre-cannot-hold/248248.htmlhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karachi#Ethnographyhttp://www.merinews.com/article/political-and-ethnic-battles-turn-karachi-into-beirut-of-south-asia/15875445.shtmlhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sindh#Demographics_and_society%20


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political economy of federalism in pakistan and movement for self-determination in sindh

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