SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF MSC POLITICS AND COMMUNICATIONAT THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCEJANUARY 21, 2013

BY: FELICITY TANm.f.tan@lse.ac.uk

The emergence of political branding is good for democracy.

Branding, the “hallmark” of modern political communications, is viewed as ersatz ideology

especially in electoral contexts: a sales pitch during the political point of sale where voters are

consumers and candidates are products (Mitsikopoulou, 2008; Scammell, 2007, p. 176). It

reduces political information to symbols and images constructed on the basis strategic

marketing research, and so enables the shifting of shallow ideological roots for electoral gain

(Dean & Croft, 2009; Scammell). Political branding is thus often derided as a means to an end,

and is seen to narrow the political agenda to the detriment of democratic processes (Marsh &

Fawcett, 2011). Such arguments against political branding, however, do not appear to fully apply

to a “dysfunctional democracy” like the Philippines (Dressel, 2011, p. 53), as recent trends in

elections there suggest. In the Philippines, often characterized as a “cacique democracy”

(Anderson, 1988), the rise of modern political branding represents a decisive shift in voter

mobilization and government responsiveness that has the potential to shrink the country’s

democratic deficits (Hedman, 2010a).

The increasing robustness of market-driven branding in Philippine elections indicates the

weakening ability of political machines to ‘deliver’ votes based on kinship networks, non-

ideological alliances and coercion. Fueled by the rise of mass media, modern political branding

challenges the primacy of clientelist “command votes” by activating “market votes” that are

more responsive to the electorate (Teehankee, 2006). Its practice also indicates decreasing

barriers to entry in the political arena, opening doors for political outsiders to construct counter-

narratives to politics as usual (Bionat, 1998). An examination of recent presidential elections

shows the dependence of weak political brands on patronage and bossism, which is at the core

of the “crisis” of Philippine democracy (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003, p. 281). And as evident in

the 2010 race, the injection of political branding as “something new” in Philippine politics

necessitates some form of responsive ideology that can foster reflexive governance (Hedman,

2010a). Because political machines continue to dominate local elections due to higher

incidences of poverty and less access to media in remote regions (Bionat), the analysis here will

be limited to presidential races in the post-dictatorship era. Even so, the emergence of modern

political branding in the Philippines, while not without the risks posited in mature democracies,

represents shifts in voter mobilization that feed from and into increasing public demand for

platforms and serious debate, challenging the old order of cacique politics, and signaling a

departure from what has thus far been an unrepresentative democracy.

From Feudal to Mass Politics: Political Branding and the rise of the Market Vote

Political brands are unique, identifiable symbols and associations embodied in names or

trademarks that serve to differentiate between political actors, notably as candidates during

elections (Mitsikopoulou, 2008). Brands are a “form of condensed meaning” (O'Shaughnessy,

2002 cited in Mitsikopoulou) summarizing ideas and attributes packaged in a single product: the

candidate. A political brand is thus the “psychological representation” of the candidate from the

point of view of the voter, an affinity known as brand equity (Scammell, 2007, p. 177). In the

Philippines, brand equity may be outcomes of patron-client relationships, inherited from non-

political contexts or, most recently, manufactured from readings of the public mood. As such, a

modern political brand is not just an identifier but an identity that needs to be “designed,

positioned and driven to grow” through the segmentation and targeting of the electoral market

(McDivitt, 2003 cited in Marsh & Fawcett, 2011). Political branding in the modern sense is thus

the strategic construction of an emotional connection representing the electorate’s rational and

irrational preferences in candidate selection (Scammell) and can be viewed as a new form of

voter mobilization, usually in the absence of distinct political ideologies.

Voter mobilization in the Philippines has historically been dominated by the dynamics of “feudal

politics” from which “command votes” are drawn (Teehankee, 2010, p. 118):

Bloc votes…are gathered and delivered through [a network of] political machines and bailiwicks, usually negotiated through leaders and gatekeepers.

Command votes are a result of – and often used to justify – electoral manipulation that cascade

from and into a political system variously referred to as caciquism, bossism and clientelism, or

more descriptively, “guns, goons and gold” (Quimpo, 2010, p. 51; Thompson, 2010a). Because

name recognition has long been among the most crucial metrics for candidate selection,

coupled with the “winnability factor” of bailiwick networks, Philippine brand politics in the

traditional sense can be associated with political dynasties: some 160 families to which nearly 20

percent of all Philippine legislators since 1907 belong (Institute of Philippine Culture, 2005, p.

134; Perron, 2009; Teehankee, 2007). An “enduring feature of Philippine politics,” these clans

utilize the mileage of their family name, bolstered by their alliances, socio-economic stature and

access to state resources, to actively pursue elected office (Teehankee, 2007). Their

consolidated power form political machines expressly built to mobilize and influence electoral

outcomes for the protection of economic and personal interests (Teehankee). Political scions

dispense patronage in exchange for votes, and when their economic bases are weak or

threatened, their machines enable fraudulent and coercive tactics to secure their election

(Perron, 2009; Teehankee).

The ascendancy of mass media and increasing urbanization after Martial Law have been linked

to the declining influence of traditional brands as such on the electorate (Hedman, 2010a;

Teehankee, 2010), but have not been sufficient to supplant the primacy of command voting.

Instead, it appears it is the emergence of a new kind of political brand coinciding with the rising

influence of mass media that began to change the political game in the post-dictatorship era.

The victory of political newcomer Fidel Ramos over traditional powerhouses in the 1992

presidential race is credited to a well-oiled political machine that backed him, bestowed via the

incumbent’s endorsement (Teehankee, 2006). In the following elections, however, movie icon

Joseph Estrada captured the presidency with double the votes of his closest rival, a “classic

clientelist, command-vote politician” with a nationally recognizable family name (Thompson,

2010b, p. 9; Table 1). Estrada targeted his campaign to the largest segment of the emergent

vote market: classes D and E or the masa, representing 90 percent of the population (Social

Weather Stations, 2011; Teehankee, 2010). Despite being a political veteran with his own

machinery, Estrada is typically considered a political outsider (Dressel, 2011). It was his strong

brand equity – an extreme popularity among the lower classes sourced from his proletariat

movie persona – that attracted political networks into his fold (Hedman, 2001; Teehankee,

2006; Thompson, 2010b). Popularly known as Erap, an anagram of the Tagalog word for buddy,

Estrada sealed his affinity with the poor with the slogan Erap para sa mahirap (tr. ‘Erap is for the

poor’) (Hedman, 2010b). He actively circumvented traditional clientelist networks, preferring

media to machinery as his primary campaign strategy (Thompson, 2010a; 2010b). Splitting

bailiwicks across the archipelago, the Erap brand soundly crushed command-vote dominance

with market votes, signaling the emergence of the modern political brand as a force to contend

with.

Powerful brands, political legitimacy and the democratic deficit

The democratic deficit in the Philippines boils down to the government’s failure to respond to

“pent-up demands and pressures from below,” fueled and exacerbated by patronage politics

(Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003, p. 259) that the implications of political branding appear to

address, even if limitedly. Political branding does not necessarily promise an end to elite

democracy; Estrada’s pro-poor brand was after all a pseudo-populist appeal, where ‘populism’ is

an alternative form of pro-capitalist governance featuring cronyism and “perfunctory alliances

with leading leftists” (Thompson, 2010a, p. 25). Modern brands do however offer political

legitimacy in terms of voter mandate, especially among the masa. Political legitimacy is

understood by the lower classes as bestowed by the people through elections, itself seen as the

“legitimate democratic process” of representation and, more crucially, as a mechanism of

expressing their power (Institute of Philippine Culture, 2005, p. 101). A legitimate electoral

victory, which recent election trends suggest is achieved through strong, insurmountable

brands, is thus a pre-requisite in bridging the democratic deficit.

The crippling effects of command voting on political legitimacy and, ultimately, democracy, is

perhaps most evident in the “stolen election” of 2004 (Teehankee, 2010, p. 115), which likewise

highlights how voter mobilization strategy depends largely on a candidate’s brand or lack

thereof. If political branding is understood as image and personality politics (Mitsikopoulou,

2008), then 2004 victor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s brand was “at sea,” despite various

makeover attempts (Teehankee; Thompson, 2010b, p. 10). In the absence of a political brand

that would attract market votes, Arroyo – a political veteran, daughter of a former president and

member of the landed elite – actuated clientelism to win enough command votes to crush the

market votes of her populist challenger, another cinema idol who sought to replicate the

“Estrada juggernaut" (Thompson, pp. 9-11). Through years of dispensing political patronage,

including with state funds and to powerful warlords and politicos, Arroyo machinated large-

scale fraud that involved bribing election officials, extensive voter disenfranchisement and

hundreds of extrajudicial killings, to pad a lead of just over one million votes in the official tally

(Desuasido, 2006; Table 1).

Both the Estrada and Arroyo governments have been classified as predatory (Quimpo, 2010),

but Estrada had what Arroyo lacked: support from the heretofore-underrepresented masses.

Estrada had secured nearly 40 percent of the vote in 1998 thanks to the numerical strength of

the poor, garnering more votes than his next two challengers combined, and twice the votes

Ramos won in 1992 (Table 1). In contrast, Arroyo’s controversial victory rendered her so

“distrusted and despised” that “many Filipinos say…in public that they do not recognize her as

president” (Desuasido, 2006, p. 53). Thus, while Estrada’s plunderous presidency was

infamously short-lived, the masa considered him their legitimate leader, with many thousands

of them counter-protesting the middle class-led Edsa Dos demonstrations that ultimately

unseated the popular president in 2001 (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003; Institute of Philippine

Culture, 2005). Edsa Dos was hailed as a triumph in demanding government accountability, but

it also exposed the gap between political forces and the will of the poor and marginalized

(Hutchcroft & Rocamora). Manifesting in 1998 and again in 2001, the connection the Erap brand

established with the masses unleashed the “voice of the electorate” (Scammell, 2007, p. 190). If

voters’ willingness to assert their choice – whether by ballot or street – is an expression of

democracy (Mangahas, personal communication, 2012), then despite the glaring deficiencies of

Estrada’s presidency, the “pull factor” of his brand (Teehankee, 2010, p. 117) had at the very

least loosened the constraints to democratic participation.

Narratives, ‘Megacepts’ and Public Opinion: Branding in the 2010 Elections

The 2010 presidential contest presented an opportunity to address layers of democratic and

legitimation crises by providing an “institutional mechanism” of replacing Arroyo (Teehankee,

2010, p. 115) and by correcting the flaws of Estrada’s branding strategy. By the 2010 election

cycle, public opinion polling had become a social fact in Philippine electoral politics, acting as

“fever chart[s] to guide and shape campaign strategies” (Bionat, 1998, p. 145; Hedman, 2010b).

Media influence, judging by record advertising expenditures, also reached a fever pitch (De Los

Reyes, 2010). Through the “politics of public opinion,” Noynoy Aquino cultivated his winning

brand not only on the basis of demographics but the issues circulating in the public sphere

(Hedman, 2010b). His reflexive brand strategy played a decisive role in producing a national

leader elected by the largest plurality since 1986, with a wide margin and, crucially, dominating

across all regions and social classes (Hutchcroft, 2010; Figures 1.1-2). The “hopes embodied in

the new Aquino presidency” have rendered the 2010 elections a watershed for Philippine

democracy and potentially its future (Dressel, 2011, p. 530).

One explanation for Aquino’s landslide victory in 2010 is the cycle of “clientelism, populism and

reformism” in Philippine politics (Thompson, 2010a, p. 25), but closer examination suggests that

brand politics was a key factor in determining the next phase of the cycle, as in 1998 and 2004.

Indeed, reformist Aquino and fellow contender, populist senator Manuel Villar, ranked among

the top brands of 2010 alongside consumer goods (Mangahas, 2010). Villar outspent and ‘out-

jingled’ Aquino ten-to-one, even amassing the “country’s largest political machine” to

complement his market-vote appeal (De Los Reyes, 2010; Thompson, 2010b, pp. 16-17). On the

other hand, Aquino, the son of democracy heroes, had the built-in advantage of a “meta-

narrative of family and nation, the Aquinos and the Philippines” (Hedman, 2010b, p. 111). Four

months before the election, Aquino and Villar were statistically tied in the opinion polls (Figure

2). While both candidates employed degrees of hybridization in voter mobilization, ultimately,

“how people feel about the candidates” would decide the election (Rocamora, 2010, p. 88;

Thompson, 2010b).

Establishing emotional connections is a hallmark of political branding, and one way brands build

such relationships is by creating a set of promises and expectations catering to voters’ needs

and wants, thereby encouraging participation (Mitsikopoulou, 2008; Dean & Croft, 2009).

Among masa voters in the Philippines, expectations of “dedication to the service of the people”

is the primary notion of leadership; hence, because they evoke assurances of strong will and

guidance in public service, image and personality rank as the top criterion for candidate

selection (Institute of Philippine Culture, 2005, pp. 19-21). Consequently, Aquino’s and Villar’s

brands took the form of megacepts – “easily appreciable core issue[s]” that engage the

electorate (Bionat, 1998, p. 85). These megacepts and the promises they imply are projected via

narratives and images, which voters then use to gauge character traits that signal these

leadership values (Institute of Philippine Culture; Mitsikopoulou, 2008). They were also

projected in colors: orange and yellow to represent Villar and Aquino, respectively, and the

ideals they embodied (Bayos, 2010). Aquino’s brand was predicated on his parents’ political

legacy, a heritage that bestowed on him a clean and honest pro-democracy image (Thompson,

2010b, p. 15). Public grief over his mother’s death furthermore “transformed into political

capital” for the relatively obscure senator, who declared his candidacy amidst the unraveling of

the Arroyo regime’s irregularities (Abinales, 2011; Thompson, p. 14). With a family name* that

“evoke[d] magic” (Magno, 2009), an untainted image and political events in his favor, the

Aquino brand had the makings of a credible reformist narrative backed by a strong, anti-

corruption megacept. In contrast, self-made billionaire Villar, a shrimp vendor’s son, constructed

a “rags-to-riches” narrative intended as an aspirational, relatable, pro-poor megacept directly

targeting the masa as well as Aquino’s lofty heritage (Rocamora, 2010, p. 87; Thompson, 2010b).

He effectively communicated that he identified with the plight of the poor (Ilagan, 2010).

Building on Estrada’s populist success, Villar developed an “applied populism” involving

sponsoring game-show segments that televised his generosity, offering a “foretaste of his

promised benevolence as...president” (Thompson, p. 17). Their brands appealed to the

competing strains of populism and reformism that “run deep in the veins of public opinion”

(Thompson, p. 18).

From a branding perspective, Aquino’s ability to respond to the popular pulse tipped the

election in his favor. Over the campaign period, opinion polls revealed competing clamors for

pro-poor representation and incorrupt leadership, and to a lesser degree, competency (Table 2).

Villar drummed up a pro-poor message and capitalized on his generally acknowledged

competency (Rocamora, 2010). In contrast, Aquino’s slogan Kung walang corrupt walang

mahirap (tr. ‘if there is no corruption, there is no poverty’) linked the dominant voter concerns

of corruption and poverty, reflected his incorrupt image, and was flanked by a solid reformist

* Referencing the Aquino franchise, Thompson notes: “Filipinos also appear to believe that there are such things as ‘good’ dynasties” (2010b, p.15).

narrative. Brand narratives are deliberately left unfinished for voters to adopt as their own

(Mitsikopoulou, 2008). Aquino’s compelled voters to help him combat corruption through the

promise of participatory governance enshrined in his platform, A Social Contract with the Filipino

People, ironed out by a policy unit representing a spectrum of civil society actors (Rocamora,

2010). Finally, exploiting Villar’s refusal to seriously engage with the booming anti-corruption

discourse, the Aquino campaign branded the billionaire Villarroyo – “Arroyo’s real candidate”

(Abinales, 2011; Cabreza, 2010). On May 10, 2010, Villar captured only 16 percent of the vote

and promptly conceded (Abinales).

Political events may have set the stage for his victory, but the uphill battle against the populist

narrative strongly suggests Aquino needed to translate political capital into votes, by

communicating to voters the authenticity of his core values and the associated promises: the

“Noynoy [Aquino] phenomenon” (De Quiros, 2009) was successful political branding in action.

Viewed in terms of brand strategy (Marsh & Fawcett, 2011), the Aquino brand was defined

based on democratic ideals and the public zeitgeist, communicated through a credible image

and narrative, and managed such that his campaign megacept is sustained in governance. The

final aspect is paramount to the potential of political branding in fostering democracy. Where

Estrada’s brand was “window dressing,” Aquino’s has for the most part proven authentic

(Thompson, 2010b, p. 19), and authenticity is necessary if branding is to improve democracy

(Marsh & Fawcett). While democracy is in general difficult to measure, Aquino’s recent 78

percent approval rating across all sectors of society seems to indicate he is on the right path: the

Daang Matuwid (tr. ‘the un-crooked path’), it seems, of his current governance campaign (Pulse

Asia, 2012; Ubac, 2013). While this is a positive illustration of how political branding constitutes

the new permanent campaign (Scammell, 2007), it should be noted that Aquino is

constitutionally barred from seeking re-election.

Conclusions

This paper aimed to (1) establish the pull factor of political branding on the electorate as the

preferable means of voter mobilization against a backdrop of caciquism; and (2) demonstrate

that when reflexive and authentic, political branding can make inroads in consolidating

democracy. Clientelism diminishes government representation and responsiveness, feeding a

“crisis of legitimacy” in the national leadership and for democracy as a whole (Dressel, 2011, p.

539), as seen in Arroyo’s case. By rallying market votes, political branding presents an

opportunity to narrow the democratic deficit. It fuels a positive shift in the expression of

“consumer power” (Scammell, 2007, p. 177) as opposed to that of political machines, evident in

Estrada’s popular election and the mass demonstrations against his ouster. Indeed, the

emotional appeals that define political branding, widely discounted as “cognitive shortcuts” for

making “uninvolved decisions” (Dean & Croft, 2009, pp. 134-135), seem to instead invigorate

the Philippine electorate. And while it can be argued that the preponderance of brand

messaging may affect voter preferences, it could equally be argued that, contrary to claims that

branding erodes political discourse (Dean & Croft), megacepts pull specific issues to the surface,

encouraging public debate of the political agenda. It appears, for instance, that the ‘brand wars’

in 2010 allowed voters to seriously deliberate the narrative that would determine the next six

years. Furthermore, by engaging with public opinion, Aquino was able to craft a brand that

responded not only to the size but the needs of the electorate, creating a “summary of

expectations” (Mitsikopoulou, 2008, p. 354) that his runaway plurality mandates him to deliver.

Authenticity is key if political branding hopes to engender democratic renewal.

Political branding, however, is no magic bullet. Politics continues to be deeply local for market

votes to supplant command votes altogether. Hybridization still exists in national campaigns,

including Aquino’s. Aquino is further accused of engaging in cronyism, and faces criticism for his

failure to address parts of the democratic agenda, including income inequality and gaps in the

freedom of information (Abinales, 2011). It will take the reconfiguration of the country’s political

structures and a realignment of mindsets to eliminate the factors underlying the democratic

crisis (Dressel, 2011). Nevertheless, political branding seems to foster citizen participation,

national debate and government reflexivity that in the Philippines are necessary, albeit not

sufficient, conditions for democratic consolidation. The elections in May 2013 may reveal

whether its transformative potential can be sustained.

APPENDIX: Tables and Figures

Table 1

Presidential Election Results 1992-2010

1992Ramos5,342,521 (23.6%)

Santiago4,468,173 (19.7%)

Other Candidates

1998Estrada10,722,295 (39.9%)

DeVenecia4,268,483 (15.9%)

Roco3,720,212 (13.8%)

2004Arroyo12,905,808 (39.9%)

Poe11,782,232 (36.5%)

Other Candidates

2010*Aquino15,208,678 (42.08%)

Estrada9,487,837 (26.25%)

Villar5,573,835 (15.42%)

Source: Teehankee (2010) and *Fernandez (2010)

Table 2

Pre-Election Survey: Voter Preferences for National PositionsMay 10, 2010 Elections

(Reason for Choosing Presidential Preference)

October 22-30, 2009 December 8-10, 2009 February 21-25, 2010

Not corrupt / clean record 21%Can do something 14%Cares for the poor 12%

Cares for the poor 27%Not corrupt / clean record 21%Good person 12%

Not corrupt / clean record 26%Cares for the poor 22%Can do something 14%

Source: Pulse Asia (2009a, 2009b, 2010)

Figure 1.1

Class ABC Class D Class E Actual Total Vote on May 10*

05

101520253035404550

44 44

35

42.08

1419

2326.25

1318

2115.42

23

13 15

6 6 6

May 2-3 National Survey: Voting Preferences for PresidentMay 10, 2010 Elections

(By Socio-Economic Class, in %)

AquinoEstradaVillarOther CandidatesUndecided

Source: Social Weather Stations (2010) and *Fernandez (2010)

Figure 1.2

National Cap-ital Region

Balance Luzon

Visayas Mindanao Actual total vote on May

10*

0

10

20

30

40

50

43 4147

3942.08

26

18

7

3026.25

10

2025

15 15.4212

1512 13

96 8

3

May 2-3 National Survey: Voting Preferences for PresidentMay 10, 2010 Elections

(By Region, in %)

AquinoEstradaVillarOther CandidatesUndecided

Source: Social Weather Stations (2010) and *Fernandez (2010)

Figure 2

Dec 5-10,

2009

Dec 27-28,

2009

Jan 21-24,

2010

Feb 24-28,

2010

Mar 19-22,

2010

Mar 28-30,

2010

Apr 16-19,

2010

May 2-3, 2010

Actual vote on

May 10*

0

10

20

30

40

5046 44 42

36 37 37 3842 42.08

2733 35 34

28 29 2619 15.42

National Surveys: Voting Preferences for PresidentMay 10, 2010 Elections

Philippines, December 2009 to May 2010(Aquino and Villar, in %)

AquinoVillar

Source: Social Weather Stations (2010) and *Fernandez (2010)

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