ZOiS REPORT No. 5 / 2019 · October 2019

YOUTH IN BELARUS: OUTLOOK ON LIFE AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Félix Krawatzek

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

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Content

02 ___ Executive summary

04 ___ Introduction06 ___ Living conditions, education, and income08 ___ Religion and language10 ___ Learning about politics and the world12 ___ Political interest and engagement12 ______ Interest in and knowledge of politics14 ______ Formal politics: voting behaviour16 ______ Informal politics: knowledge of and participation in protests17 ______ Political youth organisations: not convinced17 ___ Assessing developments in Belarus17 ______ A negative view on their country’s path19 ______ Economic and political concerns20 ______ Trust in people and institutions22 ___ Belarus and the world22 ______ Foreign policy orientation23 ______ Travel experience24 ______ Migration intentions25 ___ Values and ideas of community27 ___ Conclusion

27 ___ Imprint

Executive summary

Belarus is approaching a cycle of elections that promise to be more relevant in the long term than the predictable votes of the past. There is potential for significant shifts in the country because the Belarusian leadership disagrees over further integration with Moscow, and after twenty-five years of rule by president Alexander Lukashenko, there is speculation about an impending change of power.

In February 2019, ZOiS conducted a survey that provides rare insights into the political attitudes of Belarusians aged between 16 and 34, their political engagement, and their views on and experiences with other countries in the run-up to the parliamentary vote on 17 November 2019 and the presidential election due by August 2020 at the latest.

The main findings are as follows:– Nearly 40 per cent of young Belarusians are interested in politics; 50 per

cent want to participate in the parliamentary election this autumn, and 70 per cent want to take part in the presidential election next year.

– Half of young people in Belarus know about protests in their country, and of those, 3 per cent participated in a protest in the last twelve months.

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– Trust in political and public institutions varies considerably: among the younger generation, trust in the media and the parliament is particularly low; the president and the church receive mixed scores; and nongovern-mental organisations (NGOs), the army, and the police are the most trusted institutions.

– Two-thirds of young Belarusians self-identify as Russian Orthodox, but more than 80 per cent attend church only on important religious holidays, if at all.

– One-third of young people in Belarus would like to speak more Belarusian in public; 40 per cent would not, and another 25 per cent do not care either way. For most young Belarusians, the issue of language is not salient for their country’s further development. Russian remains by far the common-est spontaneously spoken language.

– Online sources are the main tool for young people to obtain political in-formation, with VKontakte (VK.com) being the most prominent outlet. You-Tube is also frequently consulted, as is the independent news portal TUT.BY. Alongside these outlets, young Belarusians continue to consult state-con-trolled conventional media, often as a second source of information.

– More than 50 per cent of young Belarusians think that things have deterio-rated over the last decade. Less than 20 per cent believe that the situation has improved.

– Expectations of the government centre on economic issues. Only around 10 per cent of people mention political priorities such as ensuring equal op-portunities.

– With regard to the country’s foreign policy, more than one-third of young people prioritise a closer relationship with Russia. Slightly less than one-third say Belarus should have closer relations with other European coun-tries, most prominently Poland and Germany.

– Forty per cent of young Belarusians see closer relations with the European Union (EU) even at the expense of harming relations with Russia as desir-able. Less than 25 per cent wish for a union with Russia.

– Belarusians have extensive travel and work experiences in other regions of Belarus; but international mobility remains limited to half of young people. International mobility, including for work and travel, centres on EU coun-tries, Russia, and Ukraine.

– A clear majority of young Belarusians are contemplating migration: two-thirds would like to leave their place of residence. EU countries are the most desired destinations, favoured by 38 per cent, while Russia and the United States (US) are preferred by slightly more than 10 per cent each.

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Introduction

It is notoriously difficult to gain reliable information about Belarusian soci-ety and politics. The political and academic debate therefore confronts fun-damental problems when attempts are made to analyse the country’s political and social tendencies. The ZOiS survey conducted in February 2019 provides novel insights into the political attitudes of young Belarusians, their political engagement, and their views on and experiences with other countries.

The survey comes at a potentially critical moment in the country’s develop-ment. Belarus is approaching a cycle of elections, with a parliamentary vote on 17 November 2019 and the next presidential election due by August 2020 at the latest. These upcoming elections should send important signals about the country’s future. This is particularly so because the Belarusian leader-ship disagrees over further integration with Moscow, and after twenty-five years of Lukashenko’s rule, there is speculation about a change of power. Such a profound change will happen neither in the very near future nor as a direct response to the elections, but the political system and society are evolving, and it is in this context that the elections matter, as do the views of young people.

As far as relations with Moscow are concerned, the implications of the 1999 Treaty on the Creation of a Union State of Russia and Belarus have become unclear. The treaty foresaw deep integration between the two countries, but currently there is primarily an immigration and customs union, with

FIGURE 1Cities included in the survey

Source: ZOiS

Population of between 300,000 and 500,000

Population of nearly 2 million

Brest

MinskGrodno

Mogilev

Gomel

Vitebsk

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discussions limited to potential harmonisation of markets and laws. The Russian side seems ready to move on, whereas Lukashenko has repeatedly resisted attempts at further integration. This distance comes despite mount-ing economic pressure from increased oil prices and restrictions on Belaru-sian agricultural exports.

What do young Belarusians think politically, and what do they make of their country’s political situation? This survey was carried out in cooperation with R-Research between 15 and 27 February 2019 among 2,000 respond-ents across Belarus.1 We surveyed people aged 16 – 34 living in the country’s major urban areas. Respondents came from Minsk, with a population of nearly 2 million, as well as the regional hubs of Brest, Gomel, Grodno, Mogi-lev, and Vitebsk, each with a population of between 300,000 and 500,000.2

FIGURE 1 In addition to quotas for place of residence, we fixed quotas for gender and age, to mirror Belarus’s official demographic structure. Overall, Belarusians in the age cohort surveyed here represent a little more than 2.3 million people, out of a total population of 9.5 million. FIGURE 2

The survey was conducted online, a format that was chosen as it fits the com-munication practices of the younger generation, gives respondents control

1 The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance provided by Ana Karalashvili.2 For the purpose of readability, and following general academic practice, this report uses

the transliteration from the Russian spellings of Belarusian names.

FIGURE 2Population by sex and age in 2018

Source: belstat.gov.by

Female

Male

Age Males Females Females0 50,658 48,024 -48,0241 57,251 54,042 -54,0422 61,611 57,941 -57,9413 61,892 58,022 -58,0224 61,568 57,841 -57,8415 60,898 57,398 -57,3986 58,638 55,391 -55,3917 56,378 53,229 -53,2298 56,165 52,832 -52,8329 55,712 52,420 -52,42010 53,855 50,776 -50,77611 50,525 47,775 -47,77512 47,250 45,018 -45,01813 45,477 43,345 -43,34514 44,818 42,462 -42,46215 45,016 42,644 -42,64416 45,650 43,175 -43,17517 46,537 44,192 -44,19218 47,248 44,900 -44,90019 47,630 44,734 -44,73420 46,947 44,166 -44,16621 47,416 44,950 -44,95022 50,669 47,674 -47,67423 54,699 51,326 -51,32624 58,160 55,270 -55,27025 62,916 60,829 -60,82926 67,685 65,353 -65,35327 71,065 67,444 -67,44428 74,777 71,022 -71,02229 78,489 74,667 -74,66730 79,532 75,706 -75,70631 80,132 76,564 -76,56432 79,924 76,851 -76,85133 78,669 76,401 -76,40134 79,282 77,470 -77,47035 76,264 75,142 -75,14236 71,988 71,412 -71,41237 70,600 70,366 -70,36638 69,434 69,487 -69,48739 67,627 68,651 -68,65140 65,836 67,910 -67,91041 64,840 67,158 -67,15842 64,309 67,212 -67,21243 63,367 67,176 -67,17644 62,137 66,566 -66,56645 61,919 67,003 -67,00346 61,938 67,815 -67,81547 61,047 67,525 -67,52548 59,663 66,025 -66,02549 58,811 65,476 -65,476

100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000

Popula8onbysexandagein2018

Females MalesSource: National statistical committee of The Republic of Belarus

60

70

30

40

10

0

50

20

Age Males Females Females0 50,658 48,024 -48,0241 57,251 54,042 -54,0422 61,611 57,941 -57,9413 61,892 58,022 -58,0224 61,568 57,841 -57,8415 60,898 57,398 -57,3986 58,638 55,391 -55,3917 56,378 53,229 -53,2298 56,165 52,832 -52,8329 55,712 52,420 -52,42010 53,855 50,776 -50,77611 50,525 47,775 -47,77512 47,250 45,018 -45,01813 45,477 43,345 -43,34514 44,818 42,462 -42,46215 45,016 42,644 -42,64416 45,650 43,175 -43,17517 46,537 44,192 -44,19218 47,248 44,900 -44,90019 47,630 44,734 -44,73420 46,947 44,166 -44,16621 47,416 44,950 -44,95022 50,669 47,674 -47,67423 54,699 51,326 -51,32624 58,160 55,270 -55,27025 62,916 60,829 -60,82926 67,685 65,353 -65,35327 71,065 67,444 -67,44428 74,777 71,022 -71,02229 78,489 74,667 -74,66730 79,532 75,706 -75,70631 80,132 76,564 -76,56432 79,924 76,851 -76,85133 78,669 76,401 -76,40134 79,282 77,470 -77,47035 76,264 75,142 -75,14236 71,988 71,412 -71,41237 70,600 70,366 -70,36638 69,434 69,487 -69,48739 67,627 68,651 -68,65140 65,836 67,910 -67,91041 64,840 67,158 -67,15842 64,309 67,212 -67,21243 63,367 67,176 -67,17644 62,137 66,566 -66,56645 61,919 67,003 -67,00346 61,938 67,815 -67,81547 61,047 67,525 -67,52548 59,663 66,025 -66,02549 58,811 65,476 -65,476

100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000

Popula8onbysexandagein2018

Females MalesSource: National statistical committee of The Republic of Belarus

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

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over the process, conveys greater anonymity than face-to-face interviews, and thereby limits social desirability bias — the psychological tendency of interviewees to adjust to the interviewers’ real or perceived expectations.

Living conditions, education, and income

Asked about their professional activities in the week before the survey, 56 per cent of respondents indicated that they were working full time. Eight-een per cent of those questioned were studying and 14 per cent said they looked after their family. FIGURE 3 Three per cent stated that they were un-employed. The official unemployment rate of Belarus is 0.3 per cent,3 a num-ber that includes only those who have decided to register as unemployed in a context of low unemployment benefits. Data from the World Bank, by contrast, indicate that youth unemployment (among those aged 15 – 24) is nearing 10 per cent4 and overall unemployment is slightly below 6 per cent.5 Unemployment was higher among female respondents and those with chil-dren.

The young people surveyed were predominantly married or single, and only around 10 per cent were cohabiting, reflecting the country’s tradition-al household structure. Older respondents, those with children, and women were more likely to live with a partner. Around 40 per cent of the sample had children, primarily people older than 25 and those who self-identified as religious. Respondents with children also tended to have a lower level of education.

Forty-four per cent of the sample had completed university education, and around 40 per cent had finished secondary education. The better educated were more likely to live in Minsk, more likely to be female, and less likely to have children.

Twenty-eight per cent of the young people described the material position of their household as one in which they could afford household appliances but not, for instance, a car. A little more than 40 per cent stated they had enough money for clothing and shoes but not enough to buy a large household appli-ance. On a seven-point scale of economic self-perception, with one being the lowest value, the average was 3.91. FIGURE 4 Perceptions of household in-come are primarily linked to place of residence: respondents living in Minsk were significantly more likely to report higher income levels.

For context, Belarus experienced a period of economic growth after the late 1990s, accompanied however by huge rates of inflation; the country then entered a period of recession in 2015 – 16. After 2017, the situation stabilised

3 ‘Uroven’ofitsial’nozaregistrirovannoibezrabotitsynakonetsperioda’,Natsional’nyistatis-ticheskii komitet Respubliki Belarus’, accessed 8 October 2019, http://dataportal.belstat.gov.by/Indicators/Preview?key=153139.

4 ‘Youth Unemployment Rate for Belarus’, Economic Research, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 3 May 2019, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLUEM1524ZSBLR.

5 ‘Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate)’, World Bank, April 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=BY.

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FIGURE 3Employment status (as of last week)

FIGURE 4Self-reported household wealth

Source: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS

n = 1,912

n = 1,960

again and gross domestic product (GDP) grew at 2.5 per cent,6 leading to increased household consumption and a rise in real wages.7 Growth in the past has enabled a decline in the number of households below the poverty line, but inflation remains high, nearing 5 per cent in 2018.8

6 ‘GDP growth (annual %)’, World Bank, accessed 12 September 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=BY.

7 ‘Belarus Economic Update — Fall 2018’, World Bank, 6 November 2018, https://www.world-bank.org/en/country/belarus/publication/economic-update-fall-2018.

8 ‘DevelopmentofinflationratesinBelarus’,WorldData,accessed12September2019,https://www.worlddata.info/europe/belarus/inflation-rates.php.

Var1 Freq1 Workingfulltime 1066 55.8%2 Workingparttime 125 6.5%3 Unemployedandlookingforwork 62 3.2%4 Fulltimestudent 354 18.5%5 Long-termsickordisabled 7 0.4%6 Lookingafterthehomeorfamily 275 14.4%7 Notinpaidworkforanotherreason 23 1.2%

1912

55.8%

6.5%

3.2%

18.5%

0.4%

14.4%

1.2%

Working full time

Working part time

Unemployed and looking for work

Full time student

Long-term sick or disabled

Looking after the home or family

Not in paid work for another reason

Employment Status

Datenreihe1 Source: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle:

Quelle: ZOiS

Var1 Freq

1Thereisnotenoughmoneyevenforfood 43 2.2%

2 Wehaveenoughmoneyonlyforthemostnecessarythings 213 10.9%3 Thereisenoughmoneyforfood,butnotenoughtobuyclothingandshoes 318 16.2%4 Thereisenoughmoneyforclothingandshoes,butnotenoughtobuyalargehouseholdappliance 839 42.8%5 Thereisenoughmoneyforhouseholdappliances,butwecannotbuyanewcar 424 21.6%6 Thereisenoughmoneyforanewcar,butwecannotpermitourselvestobuyanapartmentorhouse 104 5.3%7 Weexperiencenomaterialdifficulties,ifneededwecouldacquireanapartmentorhouse 19 1.0%8 98 09 99 0

1960

2.2%

10.9%

16.2%

42.8%

21.6%

5.3%

1.0%

There is not enough money even for food

We have enough money only for the most necessary things

There is enough money for food, but not enough to buy clothing and shoes

There is enough money for clothing and shoes, but not enough to buy a large household

appliance

There is enough money for household appliances, but we cannot buy a new car

There is enough money for a new car, but we cannot permit ourselves to buy an apartment or

house

We experience no material difficulties, if needed we could acquire an apartment or house

Self-reported household wealth

Source: ZOiS Quelle: ZOiS

55.8%

6.5%

3.2%

18.5%

0.4%

14.4%

1.2%

Working full time

Working part time

Unemployed and looking for work

Full time student

Long-term sick or disabled

Looking after the home or family

Not in paid work for another reason

Employment Status

Datenreihe1 Source: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle:

Quelle: ZOiS

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

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Religion and language

After the significant destruction of church life during the Soviet period, Belarusians experienced religious liberalisation after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Traditionally, the territory of what is today Belarus has held an important bridging function between the Orthodox and the Catholic or Protestant regions of Europe. In the 1990s, smaller denominations, includ-ing evangelical groups, also regained visibility and began to cooperate on certain issues with the Orthodox and Catholic communities.

Two-thirds of the survey respondents indicated that they were Orthodox, 6 per cent said that they were Catholic, and 21 per cent said they followed no religion. FIGURE 5 An important question is what the practical implications of that religious identity are. We therefore asked those respondents who declared a religious affiliation how frequently they visited their respective places of worship. The data show a clear tendency for young Belarusians to attend church only on the most important religious holidays (53 per cent) or almost never (32 per cent). Largely self-identifying as Orthodox, young people do not tend to follow religious practices on a regular basis.

For comparison, in a survey conducted in October 2018 by the Pew Research Center, 20 per cent of Belarusians overall indicated that religion was very important in their lives, a similar value to those recorded in Ukraine or Bul-garia. That survey also found that around one-third of Belarusians attend religious services at least monthly.9 In this regard, young people in Belarus are significantly less religious than the general population.

9 ‘How religious is your country?’, Pew Research Center, 5 December 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/interactives/how-religious-is-your-country/.

FIGURE 5Religious affiliation

Source: ZOiSn = 1,955

Var1 Freq1 Orthodox 1337 68.4%2 RomanCatholic 122 6.2%3 Protestant 24 1.2%4 Muslim 11 0.6%5 Jewish 4 0.2%6 Other 37 1.9%7 Noreligion 420 21.5%

1955 100.0%

68.4%

6.2%

1.2%

0.6%

0.2%

1.9%

21.5%

Orthodox

Roman Catholic

Protestant

Muslim

Jewish

Other

No religion

Religious Affiliation

Datenreihe1 Source: ZOiS

n=1,955

Source: ZOiS Quelle:

Quelle: ZOiS

55.8%

6.5%

3.2%

18.5%

0.4%

14.4%

Working full time

Working part time

Unemployed and looking for work

Full time student

Long-term sick or disabled

Looking after the home or family

Employment Status

Young people in Belarus self-identify as Russian Orthodox but rarely attend a place of worship.

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Our data showed no difference in religiosity by age or gender. However, those who worshipped more frequently were statistically more likely to have voted for Lukashenko in the 2015 presidential election.

One noteworthy aspect of recent changes in the relations between Belarus and Russia is the evolving role of the Belarusian language. In 2014, the Belarusian Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) argued that Belarusian had lost its importance as a sign of national identity and its use had been in steady decline throughout the post-Soviet period.10 However, Lukashenko now encourages intellectuals and writers to promote national culture and Belarusian historical values. Legally, both languages have equal status, although Belarusian has long been stigmatised — Lukashenko, for in-stance, first spoke Belarusian in public only in 2014.

This shift in cultural policy accelerated after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Since then, state officials have started to place an emphasis on medieval Belarusian history, which now figures prominently in political discourse. This emphasis seems to be gradually reflected in young people’s perceptions of history. The state-controlled Institute of Sociology identified the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which existed from the thirteenth century to 1795, as the most interesting period of Belarusian history for young peo-ple.11

Nevertheless, the use of the Belarusian language has declined signifi-cantly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In our survey, we asked what language(s) respondents considered to be their native language. Russian was the most frequent response, mentioned by 44 per cent of young Belaru-sians. Another 37 per cent stated that they considered both Belarusian and Russian to be their mother tongues, which is the country’s official language policy. FIGURE 6

We also enquired whether young people would like to speak more Belaru-sian. Although around one-third expressed such a desire, 40 per cent did not and another 25 per cent did not care either way. For most young Belaru-sians, language is therefore not an overly politicised issue that they see as a crucial component of their country’s further development. This seems to confirm the attitude of society more broadly. When IISEPS asked the general population in 2015 which language(s) they would vote for as the country’s official ones, 48 per cent responded with Russian and Belarusian, 21 per cent did not care, and only 14 per cent mentioned Belarusian alone.12

A further important dimension to language is to understand when people are most likely to speak what language. There might be important differ-ences between the symbolic category of mother tongue and the language actually spoken.

10 ‘Language and national identity’, Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies, accessed 12 September 2019, http://www.iiseps.org/?p=869.

11 ‘SamoiinteresnoiepokhoivistoriiBelarusimolodezh‘nazyvaetperiodVKL’,InstitutSotsiologii, 11 October 2018, https://socio.bas-net.by/samoj-interesnoj-epohoj-v-istorii-belarusimolodezh-nazyvaet-period-vkl/.

12 ‘Language and national identity’, Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies, accessed 12 September 2019, http://www.iiseps.org/?p=869.

FIGURE 6What language do you consider your native language?

Source: ZOiS

Var1 Freq1 Belarusian 373 18.65%2 Russian 872 43.60%

3Belarusian&Russian 746 37.30%

4 Other 9 0.45%

2000 100.0%

18.7%

43.6%

37.3%

0.5%

Belarusian

Russian

Belarusian & Russian

Other

What language do you consider your native language?

Datenreihe1 Source: ZOiS

n=2,000

Source:

n=1,912 Qu

Quelle: ZOiS

6.2%

1.2%

0.6%

0.2%

1.9%

21.5%

Orthodox

Roman Catholic

Protestant

Muslim

Jewish

Other

No religion

Religious Affiliation

Datenreihe1 n=1,955

Quelle: ZOiS

n = 2,000

For most young Belarusians, language is not an overly politicised issue.

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

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We therefore asked what language young people would spontaneously speak in a number of different situations. FIGURE 7 By far, Russian remains the prevailing language in private and public interactions, used spontane-ously by around 90 per cent of young people in public situations. Belarusian is slightly more frequently used in private interactions, such as family din-ners or meetings with friends.

Learning about politics and the world

Belarusians confront considerable obstacles in accessing information about their country or international affairs. Over the last two years, au-thorities have begun to exercise firmer control over online media, com-plementing the restrictive environment and administrative burdens that limit conventional media outlets.13 The government continues to block op-position web pages and regularly fines journalists and bloggers who breach

13 ‘Belarus: Media Under Attack as European Games Loom’, Human Rights Watch, 17 May 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/17/belarus-media-under-attack-european-games-loom.

Var1 ...whenbuyingproducts...duringdinnerwithfamily...duringthebreakatschool/university/work...whilemeetingfriends...whencontanctingthelocaladministration...whenbuyingproducts?1 Belarusian 92 158 110 140 109 4.6%2 Russian 1816 1723 1766 1718 1787 91.3%3 Other 42 49 54 65 48 2.1%4 Difficulttoanswer 39 59 56 69 48 2.0%5 99 0 0 0 0 0

1989 1989

4.6%

7.9%

5.5%

7.0%

5.5%

91.3%

86.6%

88.8%

86.4%

89.8%

2.1%

2.5%

2.7%

3.3%

2.4%

2.0%

3.0%

2.8%

3.5%

2.4%

... when buying products?

... during dinner with family?

… during the break at school/university/work?

... while meeting friends?

... when contacting the local administration?

What language would you spontaneously speak in different situations?

Belarusian Russian

Other Difficult to answer Source: ZOiS

n= 1,989 Quelle: ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

FIGURE 7What language would you spontaneously speak …

Source: ZOiSn = 1,989

Belarusian

Other

Russian

Difficulttoanswer

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

11

administrative rules. Conventional media are largely state controlled, with all TV stations in the hands of the government.

Like in other European countries, the resource young people use first and foremost to learn about political events is online media. The most frequent-ly used platform is VKontakte (VK.com), the Russian-language equivalent to Facebook, which 23 per cent of young people use as their first source of in-formation. FIGURE 8 In our sample, VKontakte users tended to be younger, have a lower household income, and be less religious. YouTube is used the second most often, by 12 per cent of young Belarusians as the first source of information.

Firstchoice(n = 1,928)

Secondchoice(n = 1,841)

Var1 FirstChoice SecondChoice1 BelarusianTV 274 3472 VKontakte 444 3203 YouTube 230 2264 Regional/localtelevisionandradio 80 1255 TUT.BY 251 1206 Belarusiannewspapersandmagazines 74 1127 Belarusianradio 53 1038 Russiantelevision 70 929 Variouswebportals 98 7110 onliner.by 63 6311 Facebook 34 4212 Instagram 79 4213 Odnoklassniki.ru 18 4214 BBC 19 2515 Twitter 32 2116 Yandex 34 2117 Russianradio 4 1318 OtherPeople 10 1119 Russiannewspapersandmagazines 5 1120 s13 13 1021 CNN 9 922 Telegram 18 723 Euronews 7 624 Viber 1 2

1920 1841

14.2%

4.1%

3.8%

2.7%

13.0%

3.3%

0.7%

5.1%

23.0%

11.9%

4.1%

7.1%

4.1%

1.0%

0.4%

0.5%

18.8%

6.8%

6.1%

5.6%

6.5%

3.4%

0.5%

3.9%

17.4%

12.3%

2.3%

7.3%

6.3%

1.4%

0.3%

0.6%

Belarusian TV

Regional / local TV and radio

Belarusian newspapers and magazines

Belarusian radio

TUT.BY

onliner.by

s13

Various web portals

VKontakte

YouTube

Instagram

Other social networks

Russian TV, newspaper and radio

BBC

Other foreign news services

Other people

Main source of information

First Choice Second Choice

Source: ZOiS

fist choice, n=1,928

second choice, n=1,841

Quelle: ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

FIGURE 8Main source of information

Source: ZOiS

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Other Internet sources such as the independent web portal TUT.BY are important. However, Belarusian TV was frequently consulted as the first source of information by nearly 14 per cent of respondents, whereas Rus-sian TV was used by less than 4 per cent. Belarusian TV, newspapers, and radio were more often accessed by people with higher trust in the president, young people with children, and women. Of little importance were foreign broadcasting services.

In some authoritarian contexts, social media emerge as an important alter-native source of information and communication for young people. Young Belarusians tend to use numerous social media platforms, and only very few respondents said they used none at all. FIGURE 9

Political interest and engagement

Interest in and knowledge of politics

Asked whether they were interested in politics, 39 per cent of respondents stated that they were.14 FIGURE 10 Of those interested in politics or unde-cided, a majority (65 per cent) expressed an interest in both international and domestic politics. Young people tend to discuss politics more often with

14 This value is below the 45 per cent of the general population who stated they were at least somewhat interested, according to the 2017 European Values Study. https://europeanval-uesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/

Var1 variable value2 Odnoklassniki Odnoklassniki 6194 VKontakte VKontakte 1,8006 Facebook Facebook 6408 LiveJournal LiveJournal 2510 Twitter Twitter 22712 Instagram Instagram 1,40014 Noneoftheabove Noneoftheabove 23

619

1,800

640

25

227

1,400

23

Odnoklassniki

VKontakte

Facebook

LiveJournal

Twitter

Instagram

None of the above

Social media use

Datenreihe1 Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS Quelle:

Quelle: ZOiS

FIGURE 9Social media use

Source: ZOiS

Var1 Freq1 No 877 44.34%2 Yes 770 38.93%3 Undecided 331 16.73%

1978 100.00%

44.3%

38.9%

16.7%

No

Yes

Undecided

Are you interested in politics?

Datenreihe1 Sou

rce: n=1,97

Source:

n=2,00 Sou

rce: n=1,91 Qu

Quelle: ZOiS

FIGURE 10Are you interested in politics?

Source: ZOiSn = 1,978

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

13

friends or colleagues than with family members: 16 per cent said they did so often with friends and colleagues, whereas 12 per cent said the same for family members. Another 15 per cent underlined that they (almost) never discussed politics with their family. FIGURE 11 There is also significantly more disagreement between friends with 67 per cent mentioning that they often or sometimes disagree with them, whereas only 55 per cent mentioned political disagreement with family members. FIGURE 12

This practice of discussion suggests there is room for political disagreement primarily with friends and colleagues but less in the narrower family realm. Older Belarusians in our survey and those with higher household incomes were more involved in political discussions with friends and family alike. A high frequency of political discussions correlates with a significantly higher knowledge of protests and a higher self-assessment of knowledge about the country’s history. The latter two factors also relate to more political disa-greement. However, socio-economic factors — age, income, education — do not relate to the frequency of political disagreement overall.

Our survey included a set of picture quizzes and factual questions aimed at understanding young Belarusians’ political and historical knowledge. Respondents could acquire a total of ten points, which less than 1 per cent of them managed to do. Nearly half of the respondents scored four or five points. Almost all correctly identified US president Donald Trump, most of them German chancellor Angela Merkel, and half of them Belarusian prime minister Sergey Rumas; around one-quarter could identify Ukraine’s then president Petro Poroshenko. Men’s quiz scores were significantly higher than those of women; education and household income also positively cor-related with political and historical knowledge. Respondents with children tended to have lower quiz scores.

Var variable value ratio1 Often Friends 153 15.20% nFriends 10072 Sometimes Friends 522 51.80%3 Rarely Friends 247 24.50%4 (Almost)NeverFriends 85 8.40%5 Often Family 128 13.70% 9356 Sometimes Family 391 41.80%7 Rarely Family 294 31.40%8 (Almost)NeverFamily 122 13.00%

1942

13.7%

41.8%

31.4%

13.0%

15.2%

51.8%

24.5%

8.4%

Often

Sometimes

Rarely

(Almost) Never

When you discuss politics, how often do you disagree?

Family Friends Source: ZOiS

Family, n= 935

Friends, n= 1,007

Source: ZOiS

Friends, n=1,117

Family, n= 1,111 Quelle:

Quelle: ZOiS Quelle: ZOiS

FIGURE 11Frequency of political discussions

FIGURE 12When you discuss politics, how often do you disagree?

Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS

Var variable value ratio1 Often Friends 175 15.67%2 Sometimes Friends 519 46.46%3 Rarely Friends 340 30.44%4 (Almost)NeverFriends 83 7.43%5 Often Family 131 11.79%6 Sometimes Family 424 38.16%7 Rarely Family 389 35.01%8 (Almost)NeverFamily 167 15.03%

NFriends 1117 100.00%NFamily 1111 100.00%

11.8%

38.2%

35.0%

15.0%

15.7%

46.5%

30.4%

7.4%

Often

Sometimes

Rarely

(Almost) Never

Frequency of political discussions

Family Friends Source: ZOiS

Friends, n=1,117

Family, n= 1,111 Quelle: Quelle:

ZOiS Quelle: ZOiS

Withparentsandfamily(n = 1,111)

Withfriendsandcolleagues(n = 1,117)

Withparentsandfamily(n = 935)

Withfriendsandcolleagues(n = 1,007)

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

14

Formal politics: voting behaviour

The outcomes of elections in Belarus have long been predictable, and the Of-fice for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for Se-curity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) regularly criticises elections in the country. The OSCE election observation mission for the 2016 parliamentary election concluded that the vote proceeded in an orderly manner, but ‘serious procedural deficiencies, inconsistencies and irregularities were observed’.15 The 2015 presidential election also failed to meet international standards and met harsh criticism; the OSCE underlined that ‘the counting of votes and tabu-lation of election results undermined the integrity of the election’.16

The upcoming parliamentary election on 17 November 2019 and the presi-dential election to be held by August 2020 are likely to suffer from similar shortcomings. Although some opposition candidates might end up in the par-liament to appease the West, the elections themselves do not promise to bring about significant change. So what do young citizens make of being able to vote when they lack a real choice? Asked whether they had participated in the 2015 presidential election, about 51 per cent of those over 18 said they had. The turnout, according to the Central Electoral Commission, stood at 87 per cent for the general population. A total of five candidates were allowed to run and Lukashenko won with a total of 84 per cent of the vote.

We also asked respondents whom they had voted for in 2015. This question was less geared towards assessing the actual vote four years ago and more towards providing information about current preferences. In our sample,

15 ‘Republic of Belarus, Parliamentary Elections 11 September 2016, OSCE/ODIHR Election ObservationMissionFinalReport’,OSCEOfficeforDemocraticInstitutionsandHumanRights, 8 December 2016, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/287486?download=true.

16 ‘Republic of Belarus, Presidential Election 11 October 2015, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observa-tionMissionFinalReport’,OSCEOfficeforDemocraticInstitutionsandHumanRights,28January 2016, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/belarus/218981?download=true.

Var1 Freq1 AlexanderLukashenko 410 39.92%2 TatyanaKorotkevich 138 13.44%3 SergeyGaidukevich 12 1.17%4 NikolayUlakhovich 5 0.49%5 Idonotremember 222 21.62%6 Refused 240 23.37%7 #NV 0

1027

39.9%

13.4%

1.2%

0.5%

21.6%

23.4%

Alexander Lukashenko

Tatyana Korotkevich

Sergey Gaidukevich

Nikolay Ulakhovich

I do not remember

Refused

Vote choice in presidential elections 2015

Datenreihe1 Source: ZOiS

n=1,027

Source: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle:

Quelle: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle:

Quelle: ZOiS

FIGURE 13Vote choice in presidential elections 2015

Source: ZOiSn = 1,027

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

15

40 per cent of those who had participated in the election said they gave their vote to Lukashenko, and 13 per cent to opposition candidate Tatyana Ko-rotkevich; more than 20 per cent could not remember, and an even higher share refused to answer ( FIGURE 13), indicating the sensitive nature of such a question. Support for Lukashenko was particularly high among those who self-identified as religious. The vote in 2015 for Lukashenko also correlates strongly with not knowing about recent protests in the country and the use of conventional media.

To further understand the atmosphere around the last presidential election, we asked how many of the respondents’ five closest friends had voted. This value primarily indicates the extent to which the election was remembered as having been politicised and discussed in social networks. Including only the valid answers, the hypothetical turnout would have been about 60 per cent among young people, although more than 40 per cent did not answer the question or said they did not know whether their friends had voted.

These results indicate the low extent to which elections leave a salient trace in the memories of respondents. This characterisation was further explored with a survey question about the reason for not voting. The most frequent response was that voting would not make a difference (39 per cent) or that the respondents did not care (20 per cent). Other reasons, given by around 10 per cent of respondents each, were registration issues, a view that ab-stention was a way of showing disapproval of the system, or a feeling that nobody represented one’s political beliefs.

Looking at the upcoming elections, around half of those young people who were of voting age in February 2019 said they were going to vote in the 2019 parliamentary election. Around one-quarter remained undecided. Turnout for presidential elections in Belarus is generally higher, and in our sample 71 per cent of those of voting age stated that they intended to participate in the 2020 election. FIGURE 14 Women and people who self-identified as religious were more likely to want to participate in the upcoming elections.

Source: ZOiS

Var variable value ratio2 Yes Parliamentary2019 960 51.10%1 No Parliamentary2019 452 24.10%3 Undecided Parliamentary2019 467 24.90%5 Yes Presidential2020 1328 70.70%4 No Presidential2020 291 15.50%6 Undecided Presidential2020 260 13.80%

1879

51.1%

24.1%

24.9%

70.7%

15.5%

13.8%

Yes

No

Undecided

Intentions to vote in parliamentary and presidental elections

Parliamentary 2019 Presidential 2020

Source: ZOiS

n=1,879 Quelle: ZOiS Quelle: ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

FIGURE 14Intentions to vote in parliamentary and presidental elections

n = 1,879

Parliamentary

Presidential

Elections have hardly left a salient trace in the memories of respondents.

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

16

Informal politics: knowledge of and participation in protests

The police crackdown on political and social protests in Belarus has typi-cally been forceful and has complemented general restrictions on civil so-ciety. Over recent years, 25 March, celebrated by the opposition as Freedom Day, has been a day for attempts to rally in Minsk and beyond. Each March, the opposition tries to mark the short-lived Belarusian People’s Republic (1918 – 19), which Lukashenko dismissed in 2018 as a ‘dismal page of our his-tory’. In 2018, marking the 100th anniversary of the republic, an opposition march was forbidden and instead an official concert celebration in the city centre was organised. This year, authorities did not approve any mobilisa-tion and police detained several opposition activists before 25 March. In the city of Grodno, however, several thousand people were able to gather without any arrests.17

At the same time, it is very difficult for protest movements to gain attention in the state-controlled media, and pre-emptive arrests remain common. Protests require permissions that are frequently denied by local authori-ties, and organisers need to pay for security during the event, adding a fi-nancial hurdle. Increasingly, authorities fine protesters, although arrests still occur as well. Freedom of association is severely restricted.18

Our survey asked whether young people knew about social and political protests. FIGURE 15 Given the considerable barriers that exist for access-ing such information, the fact that 47 per cent knew about protests at all is remarkable. Knowledge was higher among male respondents and those with higher household incomes. Participation, however, is very low, as one

17 Alesia Rudnik, ‘Belarusian Freedom Day 2019: are the authorities warming to the idea?’, BelarusDigest, 25 March 2019, https://belarusdigest.com/story/belarusian-freedom-day-2019-are-the-authorities-warming-to-the-idea/.

18 ‘Belarus’ in ‘Freedom in the World 2019’, Freedom House, accessed 12 September 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/belarus.

FIGURE 15Knowledge about protest over the last 12 months

FIGURE 16Participation in political and environmental protest

Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS

Var1 Freq1 Yes 914 47.38%2 No 1015 52.62%

1929

47.4%

52.6%

Yes

No

Knownledge about protest over the last 12 months

Datenreihe1 Source: ZOiS

n=1,929

Source: ZOiS

n=1,929

Quelle: ZOiS

n=1,999 Quelle: Quelle:

ZOiS Quelle: ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

n=1,999 Quelle: Quelle:

ZOiS Quelle: ZOiS

47.4%

52.6%

Yes

No

Knownledge about protest over the last 12 months

Datenreihe1

Source:

n=1,929

Quelle:

n=1,999 QuQuell

e: Quelle: ZOiS

Quelle:

n=1,999 QuQuell

e: Quelle: ZOiS

Var variable value ratio2 Yes PoliticalProtest(n=885) 23 2.60%1 No PoliticalProtest 862 97.40%4 Yes EnvironmentalProtest(n=895) 26 2.90%3 No EnvironmentalProtest 869 97.10%

2.6%

97.4%

2.9%

97.1%

Yes

No

Participation in political and environmental protest

Political Protest (n=885)

Environmental Protest (n=895)

Source: ZOiS Quelle: ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

14.7%

2.5%

5.9%

2.7%

24.3%

4.8%

7.2%

13.6%

3.8%

10.9%

3.7%

16.6%

3.0%

8.4%

Polish TV

Polish Radio

Regional/local TV and radio

Newspapers and magazines

Facebook

Twitter

YouTube

Main source of information

Political & social (n=885)

Environmental (n=895)n = 1,929

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

17

might expect. From those who knew about protests, a mere 3 per cent said that they had been involved. FIGURE 16 The survey data also indicated that 23 per cent considered protest a useful form of political engagement.

Political youth organisations: not convinced

Official youth organisations have been a critical component of youth poli-tics in Belarus. The official Belarusian Republican Youth Union (BRSM), the state-funded successor of the Soviet-era Komsomol of Belarus, enjoys a quasi-monopoly. Officially, some 480,000 people aged between 14 and 31 were members in 2014. Some other small youth organisations also exist, such as the youth wing of the Belarusian National Front, the Belarusian Na-tional Youth Council, and the Young Christian Democrats.

Asked whether they thought that young people should get organised in spe-cific political youth organisations to make their voices heard, 45 per cent of respondents said that they should, whereas most were unsure or against the idea.Asked, however, whether they thought that the government should get young people involved in youth organisations, a little less than one-third of respondents thought that it should, while 41 per cent said it should not.

FIGURE 17

In addition to these assessments, we enquired whether respondents were themselves members of a youth organisation. Seventy-two per cent stated that they were not, and others who were members underlined that they were so on a compulsory basis. Clearly the data speak to the disillusion young people have experienced with state-orchestrated involvement. Al-though young people still become members of the BRSM, many do so in a manner that expresses no support for the regime. Instead, involvement in youth organisations has become part of a ritualised act that people tend to pursue jointly with friends.

Ninety-two per cent of those who reported that they were members of youth organisations mentioned the BRSM. The remaining bodies formed a diverse list of smaller associations and clubs. Asked whether there was a youth organisation in Belarus they would consider joining, 5.5 per cent said yes, with the Belarusian Association of the United Nations Educational, Scientif-ic, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Clubs being most frequently cited, as well as other movements involved in social activities.

Assessing developments in Belarus

A negative view on their country’s path

Asked whether they thought that over the last decade the situation for ordinary people in their country had improved, 16 per cent of the young Belarusians surveyed thought this was the case, and the same share was undecided. More than 57 per cent did not believe that Belarus’s develop-ment was going in the right direction. Pursuing this question further, we asked about people’s assessments of the last decade specifically for young

Var1 Freq1 Yes 906 45.2% 31.8%2 No 476 23.7% 40.7%3 Undecided 624 31.1% 27.6%

2006

31.8%

40.7%

27.6%

Young people should get organised in political youth organisations

Yes No Undecided

Source: ZOiS

n=2,006 Quelle: ZOiS

n=1,977

FIGURE 17Should the government get young people into official youth organisa-tions?

Source: ZOiS

Yes

No

Undecided

n = 1,948

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

18

n Var1 Freqfirstchoice1 StrongleadershipinsideBelarus 302 Strongleadershipvis-а-visothercountries 313 Protectingmybasicsecurity 1424 Guaranteeingequalityofchancesforeveryoneinthecountry 2015 Improvementofmylivingstandards 8086 Anti-corruptionreforms 1137 Structuraleconomicreforms 2908 Tomaintainthestatusquo 109 GivingBelarusiancitizenstherighttovoteinthepoliticalprocess 84

10 Nothinginparticular 297

2006

1.5%

1.5%

7.1%

10.0%

40.3%

5.6%

14.5%

0.5%

4.2%

14.8%

2.3%

3.6%

18.2%

15.3%

19.1%

13.2%

14.4%

1.2%

7.3%

5.4%

Strong leadership inside Belarus

Strong leadership vis-а-vis other countries

Protecting my basic security

Guaranteeing equality of chances for everyone in the

country

Improvement of my living standards

Anti-corruption reforms

Structural economic reforms

To maintain the status quo

Giving Belarusian citizens the right to vote in the political

process

Nothing in particular

What do you expect from those in government?

First Choice (n=2,006)

Second Choice (n=1,790) Source:

ZOiS Quelle: ZOiS

FIGURE 18In your opinion, have things generally got better or worse over the last decade?

FIGURE 19Specific ways in which things got worse

FIGURE 20Best era to be a young person

FIGURE 21What do you expect from those in government?

Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS

Var variable value ratio1 Better FortheaveragePerson 325 16.20%2 Worse AveragePerson 1149 57.30%3 Stayedthesame AveragePerson 336 16.70%4 Donotknow AveragePerson 196 9.80%5 Better ForyoungPeople 386 19.20%6 Worse YoungPeople 1044 52%7 Stayedthesame YoungPeople 385 19.20%8 Donotknow YoungPeople 191 9.50%

16.2%

57.3%

16.7%

9.8%

19.2%

52.0%

19.2%

9.5%

Better

Worse

Stayed the same

Do not know

Have things generally gotten better or worse over the last decade?

For the average Person

For young People Source: ZOiS

Average Person, n=2,006

Young People, n=2,006

Source: ZOiS Quelle:

ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

Financial Situation

Life chances

Personally respected in society

Personally respected by

Quality of life

Specific ways in which things got worse

n=2,006

Quelle: ZOiS

SpecificwaysinwhichthingsgotworseResponse Qualityoflife PersonallyrespectedinsocietyPersonallyrespectedbypoliticians2 1 713 105 223

1044

HierwarichmirnichtsicherwieichdasgraphischdarstellensollinProzentangaben.

713

105

223

655

775

Quality of life

Personally respected in society

Personally respected by politicians

Life chances

Financial situation

Specific ways in which things got worse

2 1 Source: ZOiS

n=2,006 Source:

ZOiS Quelle:

Quelle: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS

n=2,006 Source:

ZOiS Quelle:

Quelle: ZOiS

Var11 Now,inthe2000s2 Afterthefallofsocialismandduringthe1990s3 Duringperestroika/Gorbachev4 DuringtheUSSRaftertheGreatPatrioticWar5 Afterthe1917revolutionbutbeforetheGreatPatrioticWar6 Undecided

59.5%

7.9%

4.4%

5.3%

0.8%

22.1%

Now, in the 2000s

After the fall of socialism and during the 1990s

During perestroika / Gorbachev

During the USSR after the Great Patriotic War

After the 1917 revolution but before the Great Patriotic War

Undecided

Best Era to be a young person in Belarus

Datenreihe1 Source: ZOiS

n=1,975

Source: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS Quelle:

Quelle: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS Quelle:

Quelle: ZOiS

For the average person

For young people

Firstchoice(n = 2,006)

Secondchoice(n = 1,790)

n = 2,006

n = 1,975

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

19

people. Here the picture that emerges is slightly less negative, with 19 per cent stating that things had got better and 52 per cent that they had got worse. FIGURE 18

We asked those who gave a pessimistic view to spell out their assessments in more detail. Presented with five options, respondents said that their finan-cial situation, life chances, and quality of life had deteriorated. Being less respected in society, specifically by politicians, was cited less often. How-ever, less respect from politicians was still mentioned by more than 20 per cent of those who said that things had worsened. FIGURE 19 Women, people with a lower household income, and those living outside Minsk were more likely to hold negative views on the last decade. Trust in the president lay behind positive assessments of developments over the last ten years.

A further perspective on how young people assess their lives was obtained by enquiring how they benchmarked the present against other periods. We asked the following question: ‘Some adults and older people think that life was better in the past. In your opinion, in which era was it best to be a young person like you in Belarus?’. FIGURE 20

Although nearly 60 per cent said the best period was the current one, re-ferring to the time since the 2000s, 8 per cent opted for the 1990s, despite the economic instability and hyperinflation of that decade. Ten per cent fa-voured the communist era. Important to note is that more than 20 per cent of young people selected no response. So while it is not the case that the young have a nostalgic longing for the period of their parents, they are also not clearly convinced that the present era is the most desirable one.

Economic and political concerns

Belarusian youth overwhelmingly (40 per cent) ranked the improvement of living standards as the top priority of the government. FIGURE 21 Related to this concern, 14 per cent of young people mentioned structural economic reforms as their first expectation. After the most recent economic shock of 2015 – 16, the economy has been growing for the last three years and private consumption rose considerably throughout 2018.

However, the economic recovery is predicted to slow.19 Despite the upturn in domestic demand and exports, productivity growth remains low along-side an unfavourable regional economic climate. Meanwhile, the private sector is small, hindered by far-reaching state involvement in the economy; the structural weakness of state-owned enterprises persists. The responses given by young people reflect that the country’s gradual economic improve-ment over recent years has not benefited the broader population.

19 ‘Belarus Needs to Strengthen Competitiveness for Economic Resilience and Robust Growth, Says Report’, World Bank Press Release, 5 June 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/06/05/belarus-economic-update-spring-2019.

The improvement of living standards was ranked as the top priority.

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

20

Trust in people and institutions

The question of trust in public institutions is a particularly salient indicator of how citizens relate to their political and social environment in an authori-tarian system. In a context where the vote helps little to gain information about preferences, trust values make for an important insight into society. In previous surveys among the general population, the Orthodox Church has usually come out as the most trusted institution.20 Previous surveys have also shown that the proportion of those who do not trust major state institutions outweighs those who do.

Turning to young people, their trust values suggest a split between three groups of institutions. FIGURE 22 First, the highest trust levels were achieved on the one hand by volunteer organisations and NGOs, and on the other hand by the army and the security forces. This is similar to the situation in other Central and East European countries where the security apparatus continues to maintain a high prestige. In Belarus, the army is seen as protecting the country externally and is somewhat removed from daily politics. The high trust in the army expressed by young Belarusians is comparable with the positive views on the military that prevail across the

20 ‘Belarus Country Report’, BTI 2018, Bertelsmann Stiftung, accessed 12 September 2019, https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/BLR/.

NGOs(n=1,836)Army(n=1,809)Securityforces(n=1,816)President(n=1,674)Church(n=1,749) Army(n=1,809)Donottrustatall 4.6% 14.5% 15.4% 21.9% 25.0% 14.5%Ratherdonottrust 17.5% 27.9% 27.4% 25.9% 28.1% 27.9%Rathertrust 61.4% 43.7% 45.2% 37.2% 35.2% 43.7%Fullytrust 16.6% 13.9% 12.0% 15.1% 11.8% 13.9%

16.6% 13.9% 12.0%

15.1% 11.8%

61.4%

43.7% 45.2%

37.2% 35.2%

17.5%

27.9% 27.4% 25.9%

28.1%

4.6%

14.5% 15.4%

21.9% 25.0%

NGOs (n=1,836) Army (n=1,809) Security forces (n=1,816) President (n=1,674) Church (n=1,749)

To what extent do you trust...

Fully trust Rather trust Rather do not trust Do not trust at all Source: ZOiS

FIGURE 22To what extent do you trust…

Fully trust

Rather trust

Rather do not trust

Do not trust at all

Source: ZOiS

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

21

broader population.21 Trust in the security apparatus was particularly high among younger and female respondents and those outside the capital. Con-sumption of state-controlled media correlated positively with trust in the security services. Views on NGOs were rather consistent among respond-ents.

Second, scores for the president and the Orthodox Church were mixed, re-vealing the most divided views. The president received on average slightly more positive trust values, although this was a particularly sensitive ques-tion and respondents might have self-censored their views. Higher trust in the president was expressed by young respondents, women, those with chil-dren, and people who lived outside Minsk. Meanwhile, young people saw the Orthodox Church rather negatively.

Finally, there was a set of institutions with overwhelmingly negative trust values. FIGURE 23 These were the Belarusian mass media, local politicians, and the parliament. The negative trust scores for the media reflected the lack of trustworthy independent media in the country. The views of young people correspond to the negative opinions that prevail across the popula-tion.22

21 ‘Negative dynamics of trust to institutes’, Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies, accessed 12 September 2019, http://www.iiseps.org/?p=1489.

22 ‘Dar’yaUrban:TsennostinaseleniyaBelarusi–Rezul’tatynatsional’nogooprosanasele-niya’, Issledovatel’skii tsentr IPM, May 2019, http://kef.by/upload/iblock/5fd/SR_19_01.pdf.

Fully trust

Rather trust

Rather do not trust

Do not trust at all

FIGURE 23To what extent do you trust…

Media(n=1,813)Localgovernment(n=1,692)Parliament(n=1,693)Donottrustatall 19.4% 19.8% 21.6%Ratherdonottrust 40.1% 45.7% 41.5%Rathertrust 36.5% 30.2% 31.4%Fullytrust 4.0% 4.3% 5.5%

4.0% 4.3% 5.5%

36.5%

30.2% 31.4%

40.1%

45.7%

41.5%

19.4% 19.8% 21.6%

Media (n=1,813) Local government (n=1,692) Parliament (n=1,693)

To what extent do you trust...

Fully trust Rather trust Rather do not trust Do not trust at all Source: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

22

Var1 Freq1 Yes 840 43.8%2 No 505 26.3%3 Undecided 575 29.9%

1920

43.8%

26.3%

29.9%

Should Lukashenko seek closer cooperation with EU countries, even if it means estrangement from Russia?

Yes No Undecided

Source: ZOiS

n=1,920

Source: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle:

ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS

n=2,006 Quelle: ZOiS

n=1,977

Yes

No

Undecided

Should Lukashenko seek closer cooperation with EU countries, even if it means estrangement from Russia?

n=1,920

n=1,912

Quelle: ZOiS

Belarus and the world

Foreign policy orientation

To understand respondents’ foreign policy outlook, the survey asked them which one country Belarus should have closer relations with in the future. By far the most frequently mentioned country was the Russian Federation, suggested by more than 36 per cent of respondents. FIGURE 24 Russia was followed by the US, Poland, and Germany, all three of which received around 10 per cent. Taken together, current EU countries accounted for 31 per cent of the responses.

Despite recent complications, Russia remains the closest partner for Belarus and there are deep economic, political, and cultural ties. Unlike a previous study by the Institute of Sociology, our survey does not suggest that young people seek closer cooperation with China, which only 3.6 per cent of our sample men-tioned, despite the widely covered Belt and Road Initiative affecting Belarus.23

With nearly one-third of respondents mentioning EU countries, it is clear that Russia and the EU seem similarly attractive to young Belarusians. Asked whether Lukashenko should seek closer cooperation with EU countries even at the risk of unsettling relations with Russia, however, respondents gave

23 ‘PavelVorob’ev:Vospriyatiebelorusskoimolodezh’yusoyuzasRossieimenyaetsya’,InstitutSotsiologii, 27 November 2018, https://socio.bas-net.by/vospriyatie-belorusskojmolo-dezhyu-soyuza-s-rossiej-menyaetsya/.

FIGURE 24Belarus should develop closer rela-tions with...

FIGURE 25Should Lukashenko seek closer co-operation with EU countries, even if it means estrangement from Russia?

FIGURE 26Should Belarus and Russia unite in one state?

tmp Freq1 none 602 48.2%2 Russia 516 36.8%3 USA 154 11.0%4 Poland 129 9.2%5 Germany 128 9.1%6 Switzerland 54 3.8%7 China 51 3.6%8 GreatBritain 39 2.8%9 Canada 28 2.0%10 Ukraine 27 1.9%11 Sweden 24 1.7%12 Norway 21 1.5%13 UnitedArabEmirates 21 1.5%14 Italy 20 1.4%15 Spain 20 1.4%17 EU 17 1.2%

14041851

n=1,404!!!

36.8%

11.0%

9.2%

9.1%

3.8%

3.6%

2.8%

2.0%

1.9%

1.7%

1.5%

1.5%

1.4%

1.4%

Russia

USA

Poland

Germany

Switzerland

China

Great Britain

Canada

Ukraine

Sweden

Norway

United Arab Emirates

Italy

Spain

Belarus should develope closer relations with...

SouSou

Var1 Freq1 Yes 465 23.7%2 No 1201 61.1%3 Undecided 299 15.2%

1965

23.7%

61.1%

15.2%

Should Belarus and Russia unite in one state?

Yes No Undecided n=1,965

Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS

n=1,920

Source: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle: Source:

ZOiS n=1,920

Source: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle:

Source: ZOiS

n=2,006 Quelle: ZOiS

n=1,977

Source: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiSn = 1,920 n = 1,965

n = 1,404

Yes

No

Undecided

Yes

No

Undecided

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

23

mixed answers. A little more than 40 per cent wished for closer cooperation, whereas one-quarter did not. FIGURE 25 On relations with Russia, we asked whether respondents thought the two countries should unite as one state, effectively realising the aim of the 1999 Union State treaty. Less than one-quarter of respondents favoured this scenario, and more than 60 per cent opposed it. FIGURE 26 In this regard, the current caution and distance that the Belarusian political leadership takes in its policy towards Russia is in accordance with the mood of younger citizens.

Travel experience

Mobility within Belarus is high, and nearly 80 per cent of respondents had travelled beyond their place of residence over the last twelve months. When it comes to international mobility, the picture looks very different. Less than half of respondents had travelled abroad over the past year. Those who travelled had been to EU countries or Russia (more than 20 per cent each), and around 18 per cent had visited Ukraine. FIGURE 27

By far the most frequent reason for travelling abroad was tourism (64 per cent). The second most common reason were visits to family members and friends, both together adding up to 15 per cent. Nearly 11 per cent men-tioned work and almost 2 per cent studying.

Among those who had travelled within or beyond Belarus for work or had lived abroad, the largest number of respondents (16 per cent) had gone to Russia. A little more than 12 per cent of those who had lived or worked abroad had been to EU countries. FIGURE 28

FIGURE 27Over the last year, have you travelled to...

FIGURE 28Have you lived or worked in...

Var1 Russia Ukraine OtherFSU EuropeanUnionUSAorCanada1 429 350 81 443 14

2 429

WiesolldasineinenGraphenübersetztwerden?

429

350

81

443

14

51

84

7

Russia

Ukraine

Other FSU

European Union

USA or Canada

Asia beyond FSU

Middle East / North Africa

Other

Over the last year, have you travelled to...

Datenreihe1 Source: ZOiS

n=2,006 Source: ZOiS

n=1,027

Source: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle:

ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle:

ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

Var1 Russia Ukraine OtherFSU EuropeanUnionUSAorCanada2 1 153 69 26 114 19

153 69 26 114 19

153

69

26

114

19

23

1

Russia

Ukraine

Other FSU

European Union

USA or Canada

Asia beyond FSU

Other

Have you lived or worked in...

2 n=2,006

Source: ZOiS Source:

ZOiS n=2,006 Source

: ZOiS

n=1,027

Source: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle:

ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle:

ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

24

Nearly half of the respondents indicated that they had relatives or friends in EU countries, while nearly 70 per cent had personal links to Russia. Per-sonal ties to Ukraine were also relatively high, with one-third of respond-ents reporting family or friends there. Twenty-nine per cent of respondents mentioned personal links to the US and/or Canada. FIGURE 29 These num-bers underline the extent to which young Belarusians are connected inter-nationally, a potentially important characteristic given the economic and political implications of such transnational links. Two-thirds of respond-ents with transnational connections said that the links related to people who had left since 2000, highlighting a relatively recent emigration rather than older historical connections.

An important component of personal links beyond one’s place of residence is the flow of money from different parts of the country or from abroad.

FIGURE 30 Among the survey respondents, around one-fifth said that they received money from abroad. For context, the overall flow of remittances that can be officially registered is somewhat negligible for Belarus. The most recent data from the World Bank put remittances at 2 per cent of total GDP for 2018.24

Migration intentions

Intentions to migrate are an important indicator of how well a population thinks its country is doing relative to other places and how it will perform in the future. Additionally, young people have a higher propensity to leave their place of residence. In Belarus, our survey shows that two-thirds would like to leave where they live, either to emigrate or to migrate within the

24 ‘Personal remittances, received (% of GDP)’, World Bank, accessed 12 September 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=BY&most_recent_value_desc=true.

FIGURE 29Residence of relatives abroad

FIGURE 30Received money from relatives or friends who live…

Var1 Russia Ukraine OtherFSU EuropeanUnionUSAorCanada1 0 610 1340 1607 1071 14332 1 1396 666 399 935 5733 0 1607 1071 1433 935 6104 1 399 935 573 204 13965 0 1607 1071 1433 1802 6106 1 399 935 573 204 13967 0 1607 1071 1433 1802 6108 1 399 935 573 204 13969 0 1607 1071 1433 1802 61010 1 399 935 573 204 139611 0 1607 1071 1433 1802 61012 1 399 935 573 204 139613 0 1607 1071 1433 1802 61014 1 399 935 573 204 139615 0 1607 1071 1433 1802 61016 1 399 935 573 204 139617 0 1607 1071 1433 1802 61018 1 399 935 573 204 139619 0 1607 1071 1433 1802 61020 1 399 935 573 204 1396

OtherFSU1607

1396

666

399

935

573

204

93

59

Russia

Ukraine

Other FSU

European Union

USA or Canada

Asia beyond FSU

Middle East / North Africa

Other

Residence of relatives abroad

Datenreihe1 Source: ZOiS

n=2,006

n=2,006 Source: ZOiS

n=1,027

n=1,912 Quelle:

ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle:

ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

Answer variable value1 Russia Russia 204 600.0%2 Ukraine Ukraine 41 120.6%3 OtherFSU OtherFSU 22 #DIV/0!4 EuropeanUnionEuropeanUnion 84 #DIV/0!5 USAorCanadaUSAorCanada 34 #DIV/0!6 AsiabeyondFSUAsiabeyondFSU 16 #DIV/0!7 Other Other 2 0.5%

403

204

41

22

84

34

16

2

Russia

Ukraine

Other FSU

European Union

USA or Canada

Asia beyond FSU

Other

Money received from abroad

Datenreihe1 Source: ZOiS

n=403n=2,006 Source

: ZOiS

n=1,027

n=1,912 Quelle:

ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle:

ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS

Young Belarusians are connected internationally and around one-fifth received money from abroad.

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

25

country.25 Only 28 per cent wanted to remain where they were. The driving factor for understanding who wants to leave is income. Higher household wealth predicts aspirations of mobility.

Asked where they would like to go, most respondents were attracted to EU countries in general (38 per cent) as well as to the US and Canada (12 per cent). A sizable share of those respondents who wanted to leave their place of residence wished to move within Belarus, either to Minsk or somewhere else (18 per cent). Russia was mentioned by only 11 per cent. FIGURE 31

As triggers for their possible departure, 47 per cent of young Belarusians mentioned the combined worsening of the country’s political and economic situation. A worsening economy alone was cited by 32 per cent and a dete-riorating political situation by only 1.6 per cent. Knowing others who had already left, which might make emigration easier, was given by 7 per cent of respondents as a motivation to leave.

Values and ideas of community

Young Belarusians overall think that others living in Belarus share their values. Nearly 70 per cent affirmed that values were shared to a high or some degree. FIGURE 32 Pursuing this question further, we asked how

25 This is above the already high value for Russia, where 54 per cent wanted to leave; see Félix KrawatzekandGwendolynSasse,‘YouthinRussia:OutlookonLifeandPoliticalAttitudes’,CentreforEastEuropeanandInternationalStudies(ZOiS),Report1 / 2018,June2018,https://www.zois-berlin.de/publikationen/zois-report/zois-report-12018/. For comparison, inPolandone-thirdwantedtoleavetheirplaceofresidence,FélixKrawatzek,‘YouthinPoland: Outlook on Life and Political Attitudes’, Centre for East European and International Studies(ZOiS),Report4 / 2019,September2019,https://www.zois-berlin.de/fileadmin/me-dia/Dateien/ZOiS_Reports/ZOiS_Report_4_2019.pdf.

FIGURE 31Where would you like to go?

FIGURE 32Are your values shared by other people in Belarus?

Var1 Freq1 SomewhereelseinBelarus 207 18.48% 62 Russia 126 11.25% 43 OtherFSU 24 2.14% 74 EuropeanUnion 423 37.77% 35 USAorCanada 244 21.79% 26 AsiabeyondFSU 11 0.98% 17 Other 85 7.59% 5

1120

18.5%

11.3%

2.1%

37.8%

21.8%

1.0%

7.6%

Somewhere else in Belarus

Russia

Other FSU

European Union

USA or Canada

Asia beyond FSU

Other

Where would you like to go?

Datenreihe1 Source: ZOiS

n=1,120

Source: ZOiS

n=403n=2,006 Source

: ZOiS

n=1,027

n=1,912 Quelle:

ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle:

ZOiS

Quelle: ZOiS

204

41

22

84

34

16

2

Russia

Ukraine

Other FSU

European Union

USA or Canada

Asia beyond FSU

Other

Money received from abroad

Var1 Freq1 Notatall 56 2.8%2 Onlytoalesserdegree 298 15.0%3 Tosomedegree 1084 54.5%4 Toahighdegree 293 14.7%5 Difficulttoanswer 259 13.0%

1990

2.8%

15.0%

54.5%

14.7%

13.0%

Not at all

Only to a lesser degree

To some degree

To a high degree

Difficult to answer

Are your values shared by other people Belarus?

Datenreihe1 Source: ZOiS

n=1,990

Source: ZOiS

n=1,120

Source: ZOiS

n=403n=2,006 Source

: ZOiS

n=1,027

n=1,912 Quelle:

Quelle: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle:

Quelle: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS

n = 1,120 n = 1,990

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

26

much young people tended to trust others they meet for the first time. Fifty-five per cent of respondents indicated that they mostly did not trust oth-ers. The remaining respondents were split between those who did not trust strangers at all and those who mostly trusted them. A negligible fraction of respondents said they fully trusted others.

We also used a range of questions to enquire into the broader community values held by respondents. Here we included a set of questions relating to how respondents envisaged the Belarusian social and political community they would like to live in. The answers to eight questions were aggregated into four separate indices on views on community: conservative-national, liberal-national, liberal citizenship, and multicultural.

The conservative-national index included statements that affirm the im-portance of following the same customs and traditions in a country and the centrality of national culture and history to the school curriculum. The liberal-national index emphasised gaining access to the citizenship of the country while stressing the need for immigrants to identify with their national culture. The liberal citizenship index indicated that all citizens should have the same opportunities in life and stressed the importance of free speech, including the right to criticise religion. The multicultural in-dex emphasised that it is best if a country is diverse and suggested that the state should make additional efforts to cultivate that diversity.

Belarusian youth expressed the highest commitment to a liberal under-standing of identity centred on citizenship and the exercise of citizen-ship duties. This was by far the highest-scoring category. This value was followed by the liberal and conservative understandings of nationalism. In other words, Belarusian youth expressed support for ideas that empha-sise the importance of preserving national culture and passing on national history. The multicultural interpretation of identity received a low score among respondents. FIGURE 33

FIGURE 33Comunity valuesAverage support on a scale from 1 to 100*

Index Value1 ConservativeNationalism 60.312 LiberalNationalism 61.093 LiberalCitizenship 75.474 Multiculturalism 55.18

*Respondentswereaskedtoagree/disagree(onascale)witheachofthestatementsunderlyingthesecategories.

60.3

61.1

75.5

55.2

Conservative Nationalism

Liberal Nationalism

Liberal Citizenship

Multiculturalism

Comunity values Average support on a scale from 1 to 100*

Datenreihe1 Source: ZOiS

Source: ZOiS

n=1,120

Source: ZOiS

n=403n=2,006 Source:

ZOiS

n=1,027 n=1,912 Quelle:

Quelle: ZOiS

n=1,912 Quelle:

Quelle: ZOiS

1.0%

37.8%

Asia beyond FSU

European Union

Where would you like to go?

Source: ZOiS

*Respondentswereaskedtoagree / disagree(onascale)witheachof the statements underlying these categories.

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

27

Conclusion

Belarus is heading towards a time of profound change. The country is in-creasingly participating in Western dialogue, including discussions about possible visa liberalisation, and engaging civil society in dialogue. Some US financial sanctions and EU restrictive measures have been suspended. Eu-ropean banks continue to augment their investment portfolios in Belarus.

At the same time, links with Russia remain of utmost importance — politi-cally, economically, and on the level of society. In addition, the liberalisa-tion Belarus started in 2015 has not been pursued, as press freedom and freedom of assembly are still severely restricted. In this international cli-mate, where the EU as well as Russia have to manage their domestic prob-lems and a shifting international scene, Belarus is bound to position itself in a new way.

Young people’s views about this reorientation matter to understand not what will happen next but what preferences and perceptions the years of Lukashenko’s rule have created. Clearly, young people value a European outlook as well as connections with Russia. The societal values of young Be-larusians mirror norms that can be found in other East and Central Europe-an countries, but mobility and personal links remain higher with countries of the former Soviet Union. The picture that emerges of Belarusian youth is therefore a fractured one, which is also conveyed in the trust young people express in political institutions, their expectations of the government, and their political interests. Tellingly, trust is high for NGOs and the military, mixed for the president, and low for the media.

The upcoming election cycle will not bring about fundamental political changes. But the parliamentary election this autumn and the presidential vote next year matter for what happens thereafter. Lukashenko has indi-cated potential changes to the constitution, electoral reform from a ma-joritarian to a mixed or proportional system to create a meaningful choice of parties, and the possibility to shift some presidential functions to other institutions. These changes will not come quickly, but they take place in a situation where important leadership transitions are happening across the post-Soviet space. In this context, the expectations and worldviews of young people will have to be taken into consideration amid profound changes across society.

Imprint

AuthorDr. Félix Krawatzek

Published by© Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH

AddressCentre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraße 6010117 Berlininfo@zois-berlin.dewww.zois-berlin.de

CitationFélix Krawatzek: “Youth in Bela-rus: Outlook on life and political attitudes”, ZOiS Report 5 / 2019, (https://www.zois-berlin.de/file-admin/media/Dateien/ZOiS_Re-ports/ZOiS_Report_5_2019.pdf)

ISSN 2627-7233

LayoutYuko Stier

Cover imageDenis Karpenkov / Alamy Stock Foto

ZOiS Report 5 /  2019 Youth in Belarus

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