Is there a need for a maxim of politeness?

Jonas Pfister *

Institute of Philosophy, University of Bern, Langgassstrasse 49a, 3000 Bern 9, Switzerland

Received 13 July 2008; received in revised form 7 June 2009; accepted 2 September 2009

Abstract

In this article two arguments are given in support of a maxim of politeness. The first argument is that assuming a maxim is part of

the best explanation of polite behaviour, considering the problems, which Brown and Levinson’s theory and Fraser and Nolen’s

conversational contract theory have, and which a maxim-based theory does not have. The second argument is that the maxim of

politeness is part of rational conversation among potentially aggressive parties. This leads to a new Gricean theory of politeness: the

maxim of politeness is seen as an additional conversational maxim under the Cooperative Principle in rational conversations among

potentially aggressive parties. The content of the maxim is then determined face-theoretically, incorporating some of Brown and

Levinson’s ideas into the Gricean theory.

# 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Grice; Politeness; Impoliteness; Face; Implicature

1. Introduction

Paul Grice has made one of the most important contributions to pragmatics: he introduced the Cooperative

Principle and a number of conversational maxims. These maxims do not include concerns of politeness, but Grice

writes (Grice, 1967:28):

There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as ‘‘Be polite,’’ that

are also normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate nonconventional

implicatures.

Unfortunately, Grice did not pursue this idea, and his theory of conversation exclusively focuses on the

conversational maxims. The following question thus arises: is there a need for a maxim of politeness? Some

researchers, like Lakoff (1973), Leech (1983), Kingwell (1993), Davis (1998), and Kallia (2004, 2007), believe

that a maxim of politeness is needed – although some of them understand the notion quite differently from Grice.

Other researchers, like Brown and Levinson (1987), view politeness rather as a basic motive that explains

apparent deviations from Grice’s conversational maxims. I would like to explore in this article whether politeness

is to be seen merely as a reason for apparent deviation from conversational maxims or whether concerns of

politeness are part of a maxim of politeness. I will argue that a maxim of politeness is in fact needed in an account

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Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1266–1282

* Tel.: +41 31 631 80 55; fax: +41 31 631 37 79.

E-mail address: jonas.pfister@meaning.ch.

0378-2166/$ – see front matter # 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2009.09.001

of rational communication. And I will present a Gricean theory of politeness different from the ones developed so

far.

I proceed as follows. First I present briefly Brown and Levinson’s theory (section 2), and argue that it is not

satisfactory (section 3). I then present Fraser and Nolen’s (1981) conversational contract theory and argue that it

captures what Brown and Levinson’s theory cannot, but nevertheless remains incomplete (section 4). As a viable

alternative I present the Gricean theory, according to which there is a maxim of politeness underlying rational

conversation (section 5). I then address the question what kind of maxim the maxim of politeness is, and argue that it

can be seen as a conversational maxim in rational conversation among potentially aggressive parties (section 6). I

determine the content of the maxim face-theoretically (section 7) and look at the special case of communicated

politeness (section 8). I address the question of applying the maxim and definition of politeness to actual utterances

(section 9) and conclude by summarizing the argument (section 10).

2. Brown and Levinson’s theory

Brown and Levinson describe their goal in the introduction to Politeness. Some universals in language usage as

follows (Brown and Levinson, 1987:55):

The foremost aim is simply to describe and account for what is in the light of current theory a most

remarkable phenomenon. This is the extraordinary parallelism in the linguistic minutiae of the utterances

with which persons choose to express themselves in quite unrelated languages and cultures. The convergence

is remarkable because, on the face of it, the usages are irrational: the convergence is in the particular

divergences from some highly rational maximally efficient mode of communication (as, for example,

outlined by Grice, 1967, 1975 [that is, the William James Lectures entitled ‘‘Logic and Conversation’’ held

in 1967, and a central part of it published under the title ‘‘Logic and Conversation’’ in 1975, reprinted in

revised form in Grice, 1989]). We isolate a motive – politeness, very broadly and specially defined – and then

claim, paradoxically enough, that the only satisfactory explanatory scheme will include a heavy dash of

rationalism.

Brown and Levinson therefore agree with Grice that politeness is part of rational communication. They endorse the

fundamental assumptions of Grice’s theory of conversation that communication involves (1) an intention of a speaker

directed at a hearer and intended to be recognized (Brown and Levinson, 1987:7) and (2) that communication is

governed by a rational Cooperative Principle (CP) and a number of maxims giving rise to conversational implicatures

(1987:3). Grice defines the CP as follows (Grice, 1967:26):

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted

purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

According to Grice (1967:26–27) the conversational maxims to be subsumed under the CP include: Quantity: 1. Make

your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the exchange). 2. Do not make your

contribution more informative than is required. Quality: 1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 2. Do not say that

for which you lack adequate evidence. Relation: Be relevant. Manner: 1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 2. Avoid

ambiguity. 3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 4. Be orderly.1 These maxims are formulated under the

assumption that the common purpose of the talk exchange is ‘‘maximally efficient exchange of information’’ (Grice,

1967:28).

Brown and Levinson do not endorse a specific view concerning the content of the conversational maxims. They

write (1987:4):

the only essential presumption is what is at the heart of Grice’s proposals, namely that there is a

working assumption by conversationalists of the rational and efficient nature of talk. It is against that

assumption that polite ways of talking show up as deviations, requiring rational explanation on the part of

the recipient, who finds in considerations of politeness reasons for the speaker’s apparent irrationality or

inefficiency.

J. Pfister / Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1266–1282 1267

1 The categories are reminiscent of the ones used by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason.

Although they take considerations of politeness to have ‘‘omni-relevance’’ in social interaction, they want to resist the

line of viewing them as conversational maxims.2 They write (1987:5; see also 1987:95):

Politeness principles are, however, just such principled reasons for deviation. Linguistic politeness is therefore

implicated in the classical way, with maximum theoretical parsimony, from the CP.

Politeness is implicated, and it ‘‘has to be communicated’’. Brown and Levinson introduce the notion of face – I will

come back to it –, and they write (1987:5–6):

In our model, then it is the mutual awareness of ‘face’ sensitivity, and the kinds of means-ends reasoning that this

induces, that together with the CP allows the inferences of implicatures of politeness.

Nowhere do Brown and Levinson state what the content of these implicatures of politeness is. This allows for two

different interpretations: the implicature has politeness as its content, or the content can be anything (and politeness is

communicated in a non-Gricean way). It seems plausible to accept the first interpretation, as Fraser does (1990:228;

2005:66). This leads to the following definition of politeness, implicit in Brown and Levinson’s work:

An utterance is polite if and only if

1. there is an implicature, which is generated because of a violation of a conversational maxims because of concerns of

face, and

2. the implicature has the content ‘‘I intend to be polite’’ or ‘‘I’m being polite here because I’m sensitive to your face

needs’’.3

An analogous problem of interpretation arises for impoliteness. Brown and Levinson say only very little about

impolite utterances. They write that ‘‘politeness has to be communicated, and the absence of communicated

politeness, may, ceteris paribus, be taken as absence of the polite attitude’’ (1987:5). Does the absence of the polite

attitude entail the presence of an impolite attitude? It seems charitable to assume that Brown and Levinson would agree

that there is a third attitude which is neither polite nor impolite. More important is the question of communication. The

following tentative hypotheses may be formulated. First, if politeness has to be communicated, so does impoliteness.

Second, if politeness is communicated in a Gricean way, so is impoliteness. These are only tentative hypotheses. The

resulting definition of impoliteness could then be formulated as follows:

An utterance is impolite if and only if there is an implicature of the content ‘‘I intend to be impolite’’ or ‘‘I’m

being impolite here because I’m insensitive to your face needs’’.

In order to understand Brown and Levinson’s explanations of polite and impolite utterances, their notion of face

needs to be further clarified. This notion has its roots in the one developed by Goffman (1967) and in the English

folk term ‘‘face’’ (Brown and Levinson, 1987:61). Although, as they say, it would have been possible for them to

treat the respect for face as norms or values, Brown and Levinson have opted for a different interpretation: they

‘‘treat the aspects of face as basic wants, which every member [of a community] knows every other member

desires, and which in general it is in the interest of every member to partially satisfy’’ (1987:62). Inspired by

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2 Brown and Levinson formulate three arguments against a maxim of politeness, arguing against Leech’s (1983) account in particular (Brown and

Levinson, 1987:4–5). First, they claim that one is not entitled to posit a maxim for every regularity in language use. This is correct, but politeness

seems to be more than just a regularity, since politeness has a normative aspect, in an uncontroversial sense – if one wants to be polite, then one ought

to do this and that – and also in another, more controversial sense – one ought to be polite (because it is rational). Second, Brown and Levinson claim

that it is socially controlled who has to be polite to whom, and that the Gricean maxims obtain generally. It is true that social factors play a central

role in determining what counts in a particular situation as polite. But this does not exclude, but rather makes necessary a more general definition of

politeness. In fact, Brown and Levinson’s definition in terms of face is just such a general definition. Analogously, the Gricean maxims of

conversation are formulated in very general terms (information, truth, relevance, clarity), and what counts as informative, adequate evidence,

relevant and clear is relative to social factors. Third, Brown and Levinson claim that if politeness had ‘‘maxim-like status’’ it would be ‘‘hard to be

impolite’’. Whatever Brown and Levinson mean by ‘‘hard’’ here, if there is a maxim of politeness, being impolite is as hard as asserting something

for which one lacks adequate evidence (a violation of the second maxim of Quality) or using an ambiguous expression (a violation of the second

maxim of Manner); but the question is precisely to know whether there is a maxim of politeness. I will come back to this third argument (in section

6).3 The first formulation of the implicature’s content can be found in Fraser (1990:228), the second in Fraser (2005:66).

Durkheim’s distinction between positive and negative rites they distinguish between positive and negative face as

follows (Brown and Levinson, 1987:62):

negative face: the want of every ‘competent adult member’ that his actions be unimpeded by others

positive face: the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others.

The positive face not only includes the want that the wants be desirable to others, but also that the wants be approved of

by others (1987:58). Roughly, negative politeness is to try to satisfy the negative face, positive politeness is to try to

satisfy the positive face (1987:70).4 Negative politeness is, in general, more polite than positive politeness, and

depending on how strong the risk of face loss of a face-threatening act is estimated, the speaker will choose a different

strategy (1987:59-60). This leads to violation of conversational maxims and to implicatures of politeness.5

Here are three different examples, one for positive politeness, one for negative politeness and one for impoliteness.

Here is the first one (Brown and Levinson, 1987:103):

(1) Goodness, you cut your hair! (. . .) By the way, I came to borrow some flour.

The reasoning of the speaker may be explained as follows: 1. Asking to borrow some flour is a face threat that has a

particular weight. 2. Doing the act with a face threat of this weight needs some but not much redressive action – choose the

strategy of positive politeness. 3. Positive politeness can here be achieved by claiming common ground with the hearer, by

indicating that the speaker and the hearer share certain specific wants; oneway of doing this is to convey that somewant of

the hearer is interesting to the speaker too; this can be done by noticing or attending to anything the hearer would want the

speaker to notice and approve of – choose output strategy 1 of positive politeness: ‘‘Notice, attend to [the hearer] H (his

interests, wants, needs, goods).’’ 4. Saying ‘‘Goodness, you cut your hair!’’ is flouting one of the conversational maxim

and therefore by saying it one is implicating something – say it! Presumably, since it is common knowledge between

speaker and hearer that the hearer knows that she cut her hair, the speaker seems to violate the second maxim of Quantity

or maybe the maxim of Relation by asserting that the hearer has cut her hair and must thereby implicate something like: ‘‘I

see that you have cut your hair and I convey this to you because I want to be polite to you’’.

Here is the next example (Brown and Levinson, 1987:133):

(2) Can you please pass the salt?

The reasoning of the speaker may be explained as follows: Asking someone to pass the salt is a face threat that has a

particular weight. 2. Doing the act with a face threat of this weight needs redressive action – choose the strategy of

negative politeness. 3. Negative politeness can here be achieved by not coercing the hearer; this can be done by giving the

hearer the option not to act; and this can be achieved by being conventionally indirect – choose output strategy 1 of

negative politeness: ‘‘Be conventionally indirect.’’ 4. Saying ‘‘Can you please pass the salt?’’ is flouting one of the

conversational maxims and therefore by saying it one is implicating something – say it! Presumably, (2) is unnecessarily

long and the speaker is therefore violating the third maxim of manner by saying it and must thereby implicate something

like ‘‘I request of you to pass me the salt and I used that formulation because I want to be polite to you’’. However, since (2)

is conventionally used for requests, an explanation in terms of a violation of conversational maxims seems somewhat

strained.6

Here is the third example (Brown and Levinson, 1987:135):

(3) You can pass the salt.

Brown and Levinson do not say anything about how this particular utterance is to be analyzed. If one takes the

definition of impoliteness suggested above, then one could say that this utterance would be impolite because the

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4 More precisely, Brown and Levinson’s theory includes five different strategies related to so called face-threatening acts (FTAs) – doing the FTA

bald on record, doing it with redressive action to the positive face, doing it with redressive action to the negative face, doing it off record, and not

doing the FTA – of which the last three can be taken to satisfy the negative face.5 The theory is more complicated, including a formula to compute the weight of the FTA and a number of the so-called output strategies, see

Brown and Levinson (1987).6 Brown and Levinson discuss ‘‘conventional indirectness’’ at some length (1987:132–144).

speaker would be implicating something like ‘‘I want to be impolite to the hearer’’ or ‘‘I am being impolite here

because I am insensitive to your face needs’’.

3. Why Brown and Levinson’s theory is not satisfactory

One main problem Brown and Levinson’s theory face has to do with the idea that politeness is communicated as an

implicature. Fraser (1990:233) notes that Brown and Levinson’s view that politeness is communicated as an

implicature is counterintuitive since politeness is normally ‘‘anticipated’’; there is a ‘‘norm’’ of polite communication,

and it is the breach of this norm that is signaled (see also, among others, Kasper, 1990; Kingwell, 1993; Jary, 1998;

Fraser, 2001, 2005; Terkourafi, 2003). This is an important point, but easy to misunderstand. It is not the claim that

implicatures cannot be anticipated, nor the claim that there cannot be a norm to use a certain type of utterance with a

conversational implicature in a certain type of utterance situation. The point is rather that we take an utterance to be

polite7 even if an implicature of politeness is absent. What is implicated must be meant by the speaker,8 and an

utterance can be polite even if the speaker does not mean anything polite.

Take example (1) again and imagine that the speaker does not think about attending to any face but simply wishes to

express her surprise. In that case the implicature that one is surprised is not an implicature of politeness because it is

not generated because of concerns of face; nevertheless, the utterance is polite, possibly even more polite than in the

former case. Take example (2) again and imagine that the speaker does not think about attending to any face but simply

wishes to be as brief as possible and therefore uses a conventional type of formulation for a request.9 The possible

implicature that one is being polite – because one is using a conventional type of formulation for a request – is not an

implicature of politeness because it is not generated because of concerns of face; nevertheless, the utterance is polite.

These examples show that an utterance can be polite even in the absence of an implicature of politeness.

Not only can utterances be polite in the absence of implicatures of politeness, but utterances can also be impolite in

the absence of implicatures of impoliteness. Take example (3) again and imagine that the speaker erroneously believes

that (3) is polite. She might think that it is more polite than saying ‘‘Pass the salt!’’ and, wishing to be polite, she might

opt for saying the longer utterance (3), thereby violating the third maxim of manner. In this case the utterance would be

polite according to Brown and Levinson’s account. But the speaker is in error and the utterance is in fact not polite.

This example might be ruled out by claiming that the speaker is not competent because she does not know the relevant

social norms. So consider another example10: Renate and Rita, two women friends, are walking in a park; Renate is

telling Rita how desperate she is at the moment in her relationship with her husband; Rita interrupts Renate and says:

‘‘Look, there’s a squirrel!’’ and Renate replies: ‘‘Look, there’s squirrel. A squirrel! I am speaking in despair about the

problems I have in my relationship and what does my best friend say? Look, there’s a squirrel!’’ Renate is obviously

upset because Rita is not showing interest in what Renate says. Rita is disregarding Renate’s desire to receive attention

and comfort from her friend in this difficult situation. One can therefore say that Rita is being impolite to Renate. Yet

Rita has not meant that she doesn’t want to pay attention to Renate. The example shows that an utterance can be

impolite even in the absence of an impolite implicature.

J. Pfister / Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1266–12821270

7 I mean by ‘‘we’’ competent speakers as well as researchers of politeness. I’m assuming that competent speakers have an intuitive understanding

of the notion of politeness and that part of the task for a theory of politeness is to devise a notion, which on the one hand captures our (reasoned)

intuitions, and which on the other hand is theoretically useful. Brown and Levinson could reply to the objection that they have devised a theoretical

notion, which as such need not capture any of our intuitions. But then one will surely ask: What is it that this notion is supposed to be about? And

why do they call it ‘‘politeness’’?8 According to Grice (1957:219, 1968:122), to mean something by an utterance is to intend to produce some effect in an audience by means of the

recognition of this intention. In the case of linguistic utterances, what the speaker means divides exhaustively into what is said and what is

implicated. What is said is closely related to the conventional meaning of the utterance; and what is said must also be meant by the speaker (Grice,

1969:87). What is implicated may be characterized negatively as that which is meant but not said (Levinson, 1983:103–104; Neale, 1992:528; see

Saul, 2002 for an argument against the received view, and Pfister, 2007:84–90 for discussion). Grice introduces these notions for reasons having to

do with his philosophical project (see Luthi, 2006). He also distinguishes between conventional and non-conventional implicatures, and between

particularized and generalized conversational implicatures. These distinctions are not relevant for my argument and I will simply use the term

‘‘implicatures’’ to speak of conversational implicatures, that is, of implicatures which can be calculated by assuming the CP and the conversational

maxims.9 In this case there would be no violation of a maxim. There can nevertheless be a conversational implicature. But in this case, if there is an

implicature at all, it is rather to be seen as a conventional one (see Grice, 1967:25–26; see Pfister, 2007:26–30 for discussion of the notion of

conventional implicature).10 The example is taken from the German movie ‘‘Pappa ante portas’’ by Loriot.

The fundamental problem that underlies these problematic cases for Brown and Levinson’s account is that what is

meant and therefore what is implicated is in some sense under the authority of the speaker, what is polite is not in the

same sense under the authority of the speaker. In the normal case of conscious awareness and competence of the

language, the speaker knows what she means and can answer the question ‘‘What do you mean by your utterance’’?

When the speaker ‘‘I do not know what I mean by my utterance’’, one could say that the speaker has not meant anything,

for it often takes time to get clear about one’s intentions. Yet in the normal case it is possible that the speaker doesn’t

know whether she is polite and is unable to answer the question ‘‘Is your utterance polite’’? Brown and Levinson’s

theory treating politeness as an implicature, that is as something meant by the speaker, cannot account for this. In some

sense of authority, to intend being polite is under the authority of the speaker, to hear an utterance as being polite is under

the authority of the hearer, but to be polite is under the authority of something speaker and hearer share (Fraser and

Nolen, 1981:96). What speaker and hearer share is part of what has to be answered by a theory of politeness. One

important theory is the conversational contract theory. I will introduce it and show why it is insufficient.

4. Why the conversational contract theory alone is no alternative

The conversational contract theory of politeness of Fraser and Nolen (1981) can account for the fact that an

utterance is polite even in the absence of communicated politeness. Fraser and Nolen describe conversation in terms of

a ‘‘conversational contract’’, which can be seen as a ‘‘set of rights and obligations that will determine [. . .] the limits of

the interaction’’; each party arrives with some initial set, and this set can then be negotiated in the course of the

conversation. There are two types of terms, general terms, which govern all conversations, and specific terms, which

hold because of the particulars of the conversation. General terms are seldom negotiated ‘‘since the success of an

interaction rests upon their fulfillment’’; specific terms vary from contract to contract and are renegotiated. Examples

for general terms are the requirement of the speaker to speak loudly, clearly and seriously. Examples for specific terms

are the permission to use certain kinds of speech acts, for example a child cannot authorize a parent to do something,

and the permission to use utterances with a particular content, for example, a podiatrist cannot ask questions about the

sex life of his patient (Fraser and Nolen, 1981:93–94). Politeness can now be defined in terms of the conversational

contract. Fraser and Nolen write (1981:96):

In general, speakers operate within the terms of the conversational contract and, in doing so, act in a way which

we call polite. To be polite is to abide by the rules of the [conversational] relationship.

The conversational contract theory therefore nicely captures the idea that an utterance is polite even when no

politeness is communicated.

There are, however, at least two related problems with the conversational contract theory. The first concerns the

obligations of the initial set: Where do these obligations come from? What justifies them? What is their content?

Without answers to these questions the theory does not seem well grounded. The second and more important problem

concerns the claim of negotiability. According to Fraser and Nolen, even the rules that govern all conversations are

negotiated, albeit rarely. But if the success of a conversation rests on the fulfillment of these general rules, as Fraser and

Nolen claim, then there is no room left for negotiation. Rules, which are not part of negotiation, are better called

‘‘principles’’ or ‘‘maxims’’.

One might deny that there are any principles or maxims, but at least on this point the advocates of Brown and

Levinson’s theory agree with the proponents of a maxim of politeness: there is something more fundamental than

negotiable rules, which is part of the rational explanation of polite behaviour. This is not to say that the

conversational contract theory is wrong, but rather that it is incomplete. The conversational contract theory could

be combined with Brown and Levinson’s theory or with a Gricean theory. At the fundamental level of explanation

are the non-negotiable basic motives or principles of politeness, at a level above are the more specific and

negotiable rules of politeness. Since I have already argued against Brown and Levinson’s theory, it is time to turn

to the Gricean theory.

5. The Gricean theory

The Gricean theory accepts, following Grice’s idea (see section 1), a maxim of politeness underlying rational

conversation. To be polite is, roughly, to follow the maxim of politeness, to be impolite is to disregard it. Therefore it is

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possible, and in fact often the case, that an utterance is polite even though there is no implicature of politeness.

Arguably, the examples (1)–(3) above are all utterances with no implicatures of politeness and which are nevertheless

either polite or impolite. By uttering (1) or (2), one is following the maxim of politeness and therefore being polite, by

uttering (3) one is disregarding the maxim and therefore being impolite. Since the maxim of politeness is a maxim that

underlies rational conversation, utterances in a rational conversation will in general be polite. Given our experience, this is

a result we should expect. Unlike the maxims of Quality, but like the maxims of Quantity, Relation and Manner, the

maxim of politeness allows for degrees. One can therefore be more or less polite. And again, given our experience, this is a

result we should expect: politeness is a continuum (Fraser and Nolen, 1981:97).

Like Grice’s conversational maxims the maxim of politeness can generate implicatures. Examples for implicatures

generated by the maxim of politeness can be found in Brown and Levinson (1987), for what Brown and Levinson

explain by claiming that a conversational maxim has been violated because of concerns of face can also be explained

by claiming that a conversational maxim has been violated because of a clash with the maxim of politeness. This is not

to say that Brown and Levinson’s explanation is wrong, but only to say that an alternative explanation is possible.

But if there is an explanation in terms of conversational maxims alone, one will surely ask: is the maxim of

politeness needed? One could argue that the maxim of politeness is needed because there are implicatures which

cannot be explained by Grice’s conversational maxims alone. Such an argument has been put forward by Kallia

(2004:165–166). She presents the following short dialogue11:

A: So what do you think of my new haircut?

B: Did you see the Blue Jays game last night?

B is implicating: ‘‘Let’s talk about something else’’, and: ‘‘I don’t want to hurt your feelings’’. According to Kallia,

this second implicature can only be explained by assuming the maxim of politeness. The explanation may be as

follows: B disregards the maxim of politeness at the level of what is said – she does not satisfy A’s desire of getting an

answer to her question –, but follows the maxim at the level of what is implicated. But one could as well give an

explanation in the spirit of Brown and Levinson: the reason for violating the maxim of relation here are concerns of

face, but the reason is not itself a maxim.

Are there implicatures, which can only be explained by assuming the maxim of politeness? The answer to this

question depends on how the content of the conversational maxims is spelled out and on our intuitions as competent

speakers about what politeness is. Imagine a situation in which it is common knowledge between speaker and hearer

that they have to go outside, that the weather is not yet known and that the hearer strongly dislikes going outside when

it is raining. Now the speaker produces the following utterance:

(4) Look, it is sunny!

The speaker thereby might imply:

(4a) You need not take an umbrella with you.

But he might also imply additionally:

(4b) I am sensitive to your desire of not going outside when it is raining.

The utterance is informative, it is true, it is relevant, and it is clear, brief, and orderly. In particular, it is relevant because

speaker and hearer have to go outside, and this is part of the reason why the utterance carries the implicature that the

hearer need not take an umbrella with him. The additional implicature can be explained by claiming that the speaker

wants to be in conformity with the maxim of politeness: the speaker wants to be polite to the hearer, which means in

this situation that he tries to be sensitive to the hearer’s desire not to go out when it is raining; therefore this is what he

implicates. But there might also be another explanation. As it is common knowledge between speaker and hearer that

J. Pfister / Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1266–12821272

11 Kallia takes the example from Kingwell (1993:387). Compare the example in Grice (1967:35): ‘‘At a genteel tea party, A says Mrs. X is an old

bag. There is a moment of appalled silence, and then B says The weather has been quite delightful this summer, hasn’t it?’’

the hearer dislikes going outside when it is raining, an utterance can only be relevant by taking into account this

information. In this case the utterance would only be relevant if it was an attending to the desires of the hearer.

Assuming that the speaker cannot openly attend to the hearer’s desires for not going outside when it is raining

because of face threat – the hearer would then have to accept a compliment (see Brown and Levinson, 1987:68) –,

the speaker must implicate this. According to this explanation, which I take to be in the spirit of Brown and

Levinson’s theory, there is, contrary to initial appearance, a flouting of the maxim of Relation. However, it is not

clear whether it is theoretically fruitful of expanding the notion of relevance so as to include concerns of showing

approval of desires.

Answering the question of whether the maxim of politeness is needed does not require showing the existence

of implicatures which can only be explained by assuming the maxim of politeness. There are independent

arguments that can be given in support for the need for the maxim of politeness. One argument is that assuming

a maxim is part of the best explanation of polite behaviour, considering the problems Brown and Levinson’s

theory and the conversational contract theory have and which the Gricean theory doesn’t have. Another argument

is that the maxim of politeness is part of rational conversation. This argument will need some elaboration

(see section 6).

The Gricean idea of a maxim of politeness has been interpreted and developed differently: Robin Lakoff (1973)

interprets the maxim of politeness as a ‘‘rule of pragmatic competence’’,12 Geoffrey Leech (1983) views it as being in

competition with the CP,13 Wayne Davis (1998), being critical of Grice, accepts the maxim of politeness only as a

normative rule, and Kingwell (1993) and Kallia (2004, 2007) view the maxim of politeness as being under the CP, but

they enlarge the notion of rational communication so as to include the wants not to hurt each others, to strengthen the

ties that bind us together, etc. (Kingwell, 1993:404), or in general the social dimension of rationality (Kallia,

2004:161). There are two immediate troubles with the last proposal: first, it is not clear what notion of rationality,

apparently different from the traditional one, is involved in this characterization of rational communication; second,

the proposal seems to lead to a proliferation of maxims of just about any kind that can be used in communication. I thus

think that Kingwell and Kallia are right in viewing the maxim of politeness as a conversational maxim, but wrong in

expanding the notion of rational communication. I will first clarify the status of the maxim, and then I will determine

the content of the maxim face-theoretically.

6. The status of the maxim

According to the Gricean theory presented here, the maxim of politeness is an additional conversational

maxim under the CP. What does this claim exactly amount to? Or, in other words, what is the status of the

maxim of politeness? In order to answer this question, it is very helpful to have a closer look at Grice’s theory of

conversation.

Grice is interested in the rational aspect of conversation (1967:29; 1987:369). Conversation may have all different

kinds of purposes, but it is only its rationality that is the topic of investigation. This connects Grice’s theory of meaning

with his theory of conversation. To mean something (in Grice’s sense) by an utterance is to intend to produce some

effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention. The recognition of the speaker’s intention is for the

hearer not simply a cause for producing the effect, but a reason. Reasons are governed by rational principles: to believe

or do something for a reason presupposes some very general assumptions. If I intend someone to take something as a

reason I must assume him to be following certain rational principles. Some of these principles seem to pertain

specifically and essentially to rational conversation. Grice claims that the assumption we make in conversation is that

J. Pfister / Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1266–1282 1273

12 Lakoff (1973) is searching for ‘‘some kind pragmatic rules, dictating whether an utterance is pragmatically well-formed or not’’

(1973:296). She introduces two rules of pragmatic competence, 1. Be clear and 2. Be polite, and first she contrasts them. She sees the

first rule as corresponding to Grice’s maxims of conversation, which she then comes to see as a subcase of the second rule, more precisely as a

subcase of the first rule of politeness, ‘‘Don’t impose’’ (1973:303). The conversational maxims are thus interpreted by Lakoff as a kind of rule

of politeness.13 Leech (1983) proposes a Principle of Politeness (PP), which stands in competition with the CP. Since the CP encompasses any common

purpose of a talk exchange, it seems difficult to view the politeness principle operating at the same level. I therefore conclude with Fraser:

there is little argument for a politeness principle at the level of the CP and there is arguably a maxim of politeness under the CP (Fraser, 2001:

1417; 2005: 67; Fraser refers to Atsushi Fukada and to Susan Burt, who have both made this suggestion earlier, in 1998 and 1999

respectively).

speakers are in general, that is, in the absence of reasons to the contrary, following the CP and the conversational

maxims (1967:28). The hearer in general assumes the speaker to be following these principles, and the speaker is

assuming the hearer to make this assumption.14 Grice considers the observance of the principles not only as something

we do, but something which is rational for us to do. He writes (1967:29):

I would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all or

most do in fact follow but as something that it is reasonable for us to follow, that we should not abandon.

This does not mean that it could not be rational not to follow them. The speaker can opt out both from the maxims and

the CP (Grice, 1967:29), and there can be good reasons for doing so and it would therefore not be irrational.15

Grice was at first attracted by a kind of general conversational contract theory, more precisely by the idea of seeing

observance of the CP and the conversational maxims as a ‘‘quasi-contractual matter, with parallels outside the realm of

discourse’’ (1967:29). He mentions the example of someone struggling with a stranded car and expecting to get help

from the person passing by. Once the person starts helping, the expectations become stronger and more specific: the

two people now have a common immediate aim, that of mending the car. Grice then turns away from the quasi-

contractual interpretation. Here is what he writes (Grice, 1967:29–30):

But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this may apply to some cases, there are too many types of

exchange, like quarrelling and letter writing, that it fails to fit comfortably. In any case, one feels that the

talker who is irrelevant or obscure has primarily let down not his audience but himself. So I would like to be

able to show that observance of the Cooperative Principle and maxims is reasonable (rational) along the

following lines: that anyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (such

as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an

interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the

assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the Cooperative Principle and the maxims.

Whether any such conclusion can be reached, I am uncertain; in any case, I am fairly sure that I cannot reach

it until I am a good deal clearer about the nature of relevance and of the circumstances in which it is

required.

To participate in rational conversation is therefore to cooperate in some sense. The type of cooperation required is not

that one is prepared to do anything, but something much weaker. First, from the analysis of meaning it follows that

there is the common purpose of making oneself understood. Second, there must be the common purpose of

contributing to some joint undertaking like having a conversation (Grice, 1967, 1987; Neale, 1992; Levinson,

2006:45).16 Grice writes (1987:369):

we should recognize that within the dimension of voluntary exchanges (which are all that concern us)

collaboration in achieving exchange of information or the institution of decisions may coexist with a high degree

of reserve, hostility, and chicanery and with a high degree of diversity in the motivations underlying quite

meagre common objectives.

According to Grice, the primary common purpose of communication is exchange of information. This is compatible

with the conflicting of ulterior purposes. Even in a quarrel there is the common purpose of exchanging information.

What are conversational maxims? Grice writes (1967:28):

J. Pfister / Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1266–12821274

14 It is the speaker’s assumption which is essential to there being an implicature, not the hearer’s assumption. Wayne Davis has it wrong when he

claims that part of Grice’s definition of conversational implicature is that ‘‘S is presumed to be observing the Cooperative Principle’’ (Davis,

1998:13); for a conversational implicature to be present it is the speaker who must presume the hearer to presume the speaker to follow the CP! (cf.

Davis, 1998:123). Davis has it wrong again when he claims that it is in Grice’s theory ‘‘not clear who it is that is supposed to presume that S is

observing the Cooperative Principle’’ (Davis, 1998:114–115); the speaker presumes the hearer to presume the speaker to follow the CP. Who is the

hearer? It is the audience to which the message is intended by the speaker. This audience can also be a group of individuals whom the speaker does

not know individually, as in the speech of a politician.15 The CP does not entail that a deviation from it leads to an irrational speech act, contrary to what Kingwell (1993:390) claims, but only that such a

speech act would not be part of a rational conversation. The CP can be taken to define what rational conversation is; it may nevertheless be perfectly

rational not to engage in a rational conversation at all.16 This is a matter of debate. For example, Sperber and Wilson (1986:161–162) disagree and claim that communication can take place without any

common purpose ‘‘over and above the aim of achieving successful communication’’.

The conversational maxims, however, and the conversational implicatures connected with them, are specially

connected (I hope) with the particular purposes that talk (and so, talk exchange) is adapted to serve and is

primarily employed to serve. I have stated my maxims as if this purpose were a maximally effective exchange of

information; this specification is, of course, too narrow, and the scheme needs to be generalized to allow for such

general purposes as influencing or directing the actions of others.

Grice thus suggests, first, that the exchange of information is the primary purpose of conversation, and second, that this

characterization of the primary purpose needs to be generalized in order to include the purpose of influencing the actions

of others. He thought here probably of questions, requests, orders and the like because these, unlike assertions, are not true

or false, and therefore the maxims of Quality, 1. Do not say what you believe to be false, 2. Do not say that for which you

lack adequate evidence, would have to be somehow adapted to such type of utterances for which the question of truth and

falsity makes no sense. One way of doing this is to use the notion of sincerity rule developed by Searle (1969). For

example, the sincerity rule for an assertion is that the speaker should believe what she asserted, for a request that the

speaker should want the hearer to do the requested action and for a promise that the speaker should intend to do what

she promised. To be cooperative when doing these acts is to follow the respective sincerity rules, that means, to

have the respective attitudes or to be in the respective states. The maxim of Quality for requests, for example, could

then be formulated as follows: Do not request what you do not want. And for promises: Do not promise what you do not

intend to do.

The different conversational maxims that Grice mentions do not all have the same status. Grice writes (1967:27):

It is obvious that the observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency than is the observance of

others; a man who has expressed himself with undue prolixity would, in general, be open to milder comment

than would a man who has said something he believes to be false. Indeed, it might be felt that the importance of

at least the first maxim of Quality is such that it should not be included in a scheme of the kind I am constructing;

other maxims come into operation only on the assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied.

The first maxim of Quality thus has a special status (Neale, 1992:531). It marks the distinction between what is a

contribution and what is not any contribution at all, for the following reason: ‘‘False information is not an inferior kind

of information; it just is not information’’ (Grice, 1987:371). When one intends to exchange information, one must

believe the information to be true, otherwise one would not believe it to be information at all and therefore could not

intend to exchange it. However, this factive notion of information might not be the one pertinent to communication

because the speaker can intend to lie, that is, to assert something she believes to be false with the intention that the

hearer believe it. But a lie presupposes the maxim of Quality: the speaker intends the hearer to believe what is asserted

on the basis of recognizing this intention; the hearer will only believe what is asserted on the basis of recognizing the

speaker’s intention if she presumes that the speaker is not asserting something false; therefore the speaker can only

form the intention if she assumes the hearer to presume the speaker to follow the first maxim of Quality. The act of

lying can thus be seen as parasitic on the act of asserting: once the presumption has become reasonable, a

Machiavellian exploitation of the system of cooperation becomes possible (Levinson, 2006:54).

What about the other maxims? The speaker can intend to exchange information without assuming that the hearer

assumes the speaker to say only that for which he has adequate evidence and to be adequately informative, relevant and

clear. But the speaker cannot intend to exchange information in a rational conversation in a maximally efficient way

without making these assumptions. That the exchange is maximally efficient is not only the purpose of the speaker, but

must be, according to the CP, the common purpose between speaker and hearer.17

Are there more conversational maxims than the ones suggested by Grice? The claim I wish to defend is that the maxim

of politeness is to be seen as an additional conversational maxim. It is clear that it does not have the same status as the first

maxim of Quality, for the intention to exchange information does not require the assumption of the maxim of politeness. It

is less clear whether it has the same status as the other conversational maxims or not. The maxim of politeness is not about

the content of the utterance, but, like the maxims of Manner, about the way the utterance is made. An utterance may be

formulated in a polite or impolite way. Can the speaker intend to exchange information in a rational conversation in a

maximally efficient way without assuming the hearer to presume the speaker to follow the maxim of politeness? There is

nothing in the notions of maximally efficient exchange of information and of rational conversation which would make

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17 There is the question of what a common purpose is; here I will simply assume that there is a way of spelling this out.

such an assumption necessary. The speaker can intend to exchange information in a maximally efficient way in a rational

conversation without intending to be polite and even by intending to be impolite. This distinguishes the maxim of

politeness from the maxims of Manner: the speaker cannot intend to exchange information in a maximally efficient way

in a rational conversation by intending to be obscure, but he can do so by intending to be impolite. There is thus a

conceptual connection between the conversational maxims and the maximally efficient exchange of information which is

not present between the maxim of politeness and maximally efficient exchange of information.

The lack of this conceptual connection does not exclude the possibility of other conceptual connections. Such a

connection can be found in the function polite behaviour plays in human societies. Esther Goody remarks in the

introduction to the original publication of Brown and Levinson’s work on politeness in 1978 that the polite behaviour,

as analyzed by Brown and Levinson, seems to require a complex kind of reasoning about the desires of others. She

suggests that this kind of reasoning ‘‘may be fundamental in an evolutionary sense to social life and human

intelligence’’ (Goody, 1978:12). She suggests further that the essence of ‘‘joking relations’’ is that they carry the

‘‘presumption of non-threatening intention’’ (1978:15). Brown and Levinson generalize this idea and write that ‘‘the

problem for any social group is to control its internal aggression while retaining the potential for aggression’’, and

further that ‘‘politeness, like formal diplomatic protocol (for which it must surely be the model), presupposes that

potential for aggression as it seeks to disarm it, and makes possible communication between potentially aggressive

parties’’ (Brown and Levinson, 1987:1). It is not impossible that potentially aggressive parties communicate, but for

the speaker to form the intention to exchange information with someone who is a potentially aggressive partner and

who views her as a potentially aggressive partner she must assume the hearer to assume that she is being polite. Otherwise

there is no reason for the hearer to participate in the exchange of information rather than not. This explains why the maxim

of politeness is to be seen as an additional conversational maxim. The maxim of politeness is not conceptually tied to

maximally efficient exchange of information and rational conversation, but it is conceptually tied to rational conversation

among potentially aggressive parties. The maxim of politeness is therefore to be seen as a conversational maxim as

applied to rational conversation among potentially aggressive parties. Since humans are in general potentially aggressive

parties, this is the notion that is needed in a general account of communication among humans.

This also explains why intentional impoliteness is more common than intentional uninformativeness, irrelevance

and confusion, and why it feels less ‘‘hard’’ to violate the maxim of politeness than the maxims of Quantity, Relation,

and Manner18: whereas the latter maxims apply to the maximally efficient exchange of information in rational

conversation, the former applies only to rational conversation among potentially aggressive parties. When the

potential for aggression is low or the distribution of power is such that the speaker is much more powerful than the

hearer, the requirements for what counts as polite are comparatively low, and the situation might even be such that

there is no need for the speaker to assume the hearer to assume her to follow the maxim of politeness, and no need for

the speaker to follow the maxim of politeness herself. The maxim of politeness is therefore relative to the level of

potential aggression and distribution of power and does not apply to all rational conversations among humans.

However, the application is wide enough for the maxim of politeness to be a useful tool of explanation.

One might ask: are there other maxims besides the maxim of politeness to be added to the conversational maxims?

There might be such maxims, but not every possible maxim satisfies the condition of being conceptually connected to

the notion of maximally efficient exchange of information. In particular, the maxims to follow a particular convention

(of linguistic meaning, politeness, morality, custom, or other) are not general enough to be called ‘‘conversational

maxims’’. Conversational maxims apply independently of any conventions or social norms. When Grice mentions

other sorts of maxims such as aesthetic, social and moral maxims, and gives the example of the maxim of politeness

(see section 1), he might have in mind the maxim to follow the conventions of politeness or social norms of politeness.

Social norms are ‘‘more or less explicit rules that prescribe a certain behaviour, a state of affairs, or a way of thinking in

a context’’; some such norms are norms of politeness, and a ‘‘positive evaluation (politeness) arises when an action is

in congruence with a norm, a negative evaluation (impoliteness = rudeness) when action is to the contrary’’ (Fraser,

1990:219). The corresponding behaviour may be said to be conventionally polite. For example, in some cultures it is a

norm of politeness to start a common meal after having wished each other to enjoy the meal, and in other cultures it is a

norm of politeness to give thanks for the last meal one has had with someone when one encounters that person again.

The conventions or social norms of politeness, and correspondingly conventional politeness, are to be distinguished

from the maxim of politeness, and correspondingly politeness. The conversational maxim of politeness is defined at a

J. Pfister / Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1266–12821276

18 See the argument by Brown and Levinson in Fn. 2.

general level, applying to conversation independently of any conventions. This is not to say that a particular behaviour

could be polite outside a social setting, but only that the maxims of politeness are defined independently of conventions

and norms, at a more general level. Neither is this to say that conventions and norms are not important in the study of

politeness; they are very important, but on a different level than the maxims (see section 9).19

There would not be much to gain in studying the maxims of politeness if the only maxim were to follow the

conventions of politeness. But many proponents of the Gricean theory believe that this is not the content of the

maxim, that the content can be determined independently of any conventions. This content is the topic of the next

section.

7. The content of the maxim

There are different ways of determining the content of the maxim of politeness independently of conventions.

Lakoff introduces three rules of politeness: 1. Don’t impose. 2. Give options. 3. Make A feel good – be friendly

(Lakoff, 1973:298). Leech introduces six maxims: tact (minimize cost to the hearer), generosity (minimize benefit to

self), approbation (minimize dispraise of the hearer), modesty (minimize praise of self), agreement (minimize

disagreement between self and hearer) and sympathy (minimize antipathy between self and hearer); for all of these

maxims there is also a corresponding maximizing-formulation, for example for the maxim of tact it is: maximize

benefit to other (Leech, 1983:132). Better, because more economical and more elegant, is to use Brown and Levinson’s

idea of defining politeness in terms of face. I will, however, use only one part of that idea. According to Brown and

Levinson (1987:62), the face wants of both the hearer and of the speaker are to be satisfied. Although this is necessary

in an explanation of why and how particular utterances are produced, it does not seem to be part of politeness since

being polite is not attending to one’s own face, but attending to the hearer’s face. The maxim of politeness can now be

formulated as follows and added to the list of conversational maxims, thereby integrating part of Brown and

Levinson’s face-theoretic definition of politeness in the Gricean theory:

1. Do not impose on the hearer! (Avoid unnecessary imposition!)

2. Show approval of the desires and actions of the hearer!

The notions of ‘‘imposing on someone’’ and of ‘‘showing approval of desires and actions’’ are left undefined. This is

analogous to Grice’s conversational maxims, where the formulation relies on the speaker’s intuitive understanding of

central notions such as being ‘‘informative’’, ‘‘relevant’’, and ‘‘orderly’’. However, it is not my aim here to defend the

general Gricean theory of conversation; I simply assume that it is basically correct.20 Not to impose on the hearer, that

is, to respect the self-determination of the other, as well as to show approval of the other’s desire and actions are part of

our intuitive understanding of being polite to someone.

The maxim of politeness is like the Gricean maxims universal insofar as it applies to any rational conversation (with a

qualification to be introduced in the next section). What counts as following the maxim of politeness (or the Gricean

maxims) is determined by many different contextual factors, in particular social factors. Variation across cultures is

J. Pfister / Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1266–1282 1277

19 The distinction between ‘‘politeness’’ and ‘‘conventional politeness’’ does not correspond to the distinction introduced by Watts et al. (1992:3)

between ‘‘first-order’’ and ‘‘second-order’’ politeness: first-order politeness corresponds to the ‘‘various ways in which polite behaviour is perceived

and talked about by members of socio-cultural groups’’, that is, to ‘‘commonsense notions of politeness’’, and second-order politeness is a

‘‘theoretical construct, a term within a theory of social behaviour and language usage’’; there can be a commonsensical notion of conventional

politeness as well as of politeness. The distinction by Watts, Ide and Ehlich also raises the question in what sense of ‘‘order’’ the one notion is first

and the other second, or, in other words, how the relation between these two notions is to be understood. The ordering between the notions of

politeness and conventional politeness is parallel to the ordering between the notions of meaning and utterance-type meaning in Grice’s theory of

conversation (Grice, 1957, 1968; see Neale, 1992) and as follows: the notion of politeness is defined independently of any conventions; this notion

may then be used to define what a convention or norm of politeness is.20 One worry connected to the central notions left undefined is the objection voiced by Sperber and Wilson (1986:200–201) and others that Grice’s

theory of conversation does not give definite results. This is the so-called problem of ‘‘differentiation’’ (Davis, 1998:33): the rules of inference used

to work out a correct implicature can usually be used to work out a nonexistent implicature. Following Neale (2004:74), I believe that the

differentiation problem does not affect the metaphysical problem of what determines the content of an implicature – it is the speaker’s intention – but

only the epistemological question of how the hearer comes to know what the speaker intends; this problem about the hearer’s understanding might

not be solvable, precisely because the speaker’s intention is not directly accessible to the hearer but only indirectly via context, conventional

meaning and, if Grice is right, principles of rational conversation (Pfister, 2007:101–105).

therefore to be expected. Psychological research provides evidence for the fact that there are two distinct conceptions of

the self, the conception of the self as independent favoured by most Western cultures, and the conception of the self as

interdependent favoured by many non-Western cultures (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). This has consequences for what

counts as an imposition and an approval of the desires and actions of the hearer in these different cultures.

Like the Gricean maxims of Quantity, Relation and Manner, but unlike the first maxim of Quality, the maxim of

politeness can be followed more or less. One can be more or less appropriately informative, relevant, clear, orderly, and

one can be more or less polite. There is also a threshold: an utterance may be inappropriately informative, irrelevant,

unclear, unorderly, and it may also be impolite.

The two maxims of politeness can clash, as many examples make clear. For example, when the speaker wants to

show his affection for the hearer by an utterance he may thereby show approval of the desire of the hearer to be treated

affectionately, yet he may thereby also impose on the hearer because of the hearer’s desire not to be too close

emotionally to the speaker. In some cases the speaker will not be able to satisfy both maxims at the same time; that

means that in these cases the speaker cannot be polite. But these cases might be less common as one might think. For

example, when being asked a question, already giving an answer which satisfies the conversational maxims in general

satisfies the maxim of politeness, for it is a showing of the approval of the desire of the speaker to get an answer to her

question. Furthermore, not all types of impoliteness are open to the same degree of comment. In a case of impoliteness

because of a clash of the two maxims of politeness, people are, I suppose, quite mild in their comment.

The face-theoretic idea can also be used to define what politeness is:

An utterance is polite if and only if

1. the speaker thereby does not impose on the hearer, and

2. the speaker thereby shows approval of the desires and actions of the hearer.

The hearer referred to is the hearer intended by the speaker. This is not necessarily the hearer to whom the speaker is

obviously addressing the word: Speaker A can address the word to B and intend to communicate something to C, who

is listening to the conversation between A and B, if A intends C to recognize the intention. However, the formulation of

the maxims excludes the case of the eavesdropper: If A does not know that C is listening to the conversation, then A

cannot be said to be polite to C, even though A may thereby approve of C’s desires and C may recognize this.

In order to satisfy the maxim, it is not required that it be satisfied at the level of what is said. The maxim may be

apparently disregarded at the level of what is said and followed at the level of what is implicated. What is said is,

according to Grice, closely related to the conventional meaning of the utterance; and what is said must also be meant

by the speaker (Grice, 1969:87).21 An utterance may be polite at the level – not necessarily the content – of what is said

as well as at the level of what is implicated. This means: what may seem to be impolite at a (superficial) level of what is

said, may nevertheless be polite at a (deeper) level of what is implicated. And what may seem polite at the level of what

is said (or what I made as if to say), may be impolite at the level of what is implicated. For example, by uttering, ‘‘You

are a fine friend!’’ (Grice, 1967:34) what I made as if to say seems polite, but what I implicate (by the ironic tone of

voice) might be just the (impolite) opposite.

The speaker may apparently violate a maxim of politeness (because of a clash with another maxim or in order to

exploit it) and thereby implicate something polite (or impolite). But the speaker may also be intentionally impolite. As in

the case of the violation of the other maxims, this may not be irrational; the speaker may have his reasons for being

impolite.

To be polite at the level of what is said, one must follow the maxim of politeness at the level of what is said.

Examples of this form of politeness include examples (1) and (2) as well as the following, meant seriously:

(5) May I help you?

Utterance (5) is polite at the level of what is said because by asking this question the speaker is offering help, and by

offering help one is showing approval of the desire the speaker thinks the hearer has, namely that she needs help, and

one is not imposing on the hearer.

J. Pfister / Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1266–12821278

21 I do not follow here Grice’s technical notion of what is said, which excludes the so-called conventional implicatures (see Pfister, 2007:17–31 for

discussion).

To be polite at the level of what is implicated, one must follow the maxim of politeness at the level of what is

implicated. By uttering (5), the speaker is implicating something like:

(5a) I am prepared and willing to help you.

Since one is thereby showing approval of the speaker’s desire to get help, without imposing on the hearer, the utterance

is also polite at the level of what is implicated.

Impoliteness can be defined as communicative behaviour, which is not polite. This does not exclude the possibility of

behaviour which is neither polite nor impolite, for the definition of politeness and impoliteness apply only to a particular

kind of behaviour, namely to communicative behaviour. Non-communicative behaviour, for example brushing your hair,

is neither polite nor impolite. Communicative behaviour, on the other hand, is either polite or impolite, but there can be

great differences in degree, both in politeness and impoliteness. Since being polite is defined as a conjunction and a

conjunction is false when at least one of the conjuncts is false, impoliteness has to be defined as a disjunction:

An utterance is impolite if and only if

1. the speaker thereby imposes on the hearer, or

2. the speaker thereby does not show approval of the desires and actions of the hearer.

Since an utterance is impolite if one of the conditions is satisfied, it might seem that it is easy to be impolite. But whether it

is easy or not depends on the conditions for what counts as imposing on the hearer and on not showing approval

of the desires and actions of the hearer. When one chooses a conversationally appropriate linguistic form, asking someone

in the street about what time it is may be considered not to be an imposition on the hearer. Giving an answer which satisfies

the conversational maxims in general may be considered to be showing approval of the desires of the hearer.

An utterance may be impolite at the level – not necessarily the content – of what is said as well as at the level of what is

implicated. Examples of impoliteness at the level of what is said include example (3) and the following, meant seriously:

(6) You are an idiot!

Utterance (6) is impolite because by asserting this the speaker is attributing a weakness to the hearer and by doing so

she is showing disapproval of the desire she thinks the hearer has, namely not to be attributed weaknesses. By uttering

(6), the speaker might also implicate something like:

(6a) You should be more careful!

This again is impolite, because the speaker is showing disapproval of the hearer.

The content of a polite (or impolite) implicature need not be that the speaker is being polite, but it may be, that is,

politeness may be communicated. The special case of communicated politeness is the topic of the next section.

8. The communication of politeness

According to Brown and Levinson (1987:5), politeness must be communicated. I have shown that this is not

necessary (see above section 3). It is nevertheless possible and more or less often the case. Analogous to the possibility

of implicatures having the content that one is informative, truthful, relevant and clear, is the possibility of implicatures

having the content that one is polite. There is an interesting phenomenon appearing here: sometimes to implicate that

one is polite (paradoxically) isn’t polite (Kallia, 2004:153). I call this the ‘‘paradox of politeness implicature’’: one can

be impolite by implicating that one is polite. I will explain how this is possible.

Consider first an example of an utterance generating an implicature with the content that the speaker is truthful.

Here is a short dialogue:

A: There is a rat in the kitchen!

B: Is what you have just said true?

A: I have seen it myself.

J. Pfister / Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1266–1282 1279

Since A can be presumed to be following the maxim of relevance, she must be implicating by her last utterance

something like: ‘‘I am telling you the truth’’. Consider now an example of an utterance generating an implicature with

the content that the speaker is being polite. Forced to state an opinion, the speaker might want to use a harmless, so-

called ‘‘white lie’’ rather than damage the hearer’s positive face:

A: Do you like my new hat?

B: Yes I like your new hat.

Both the speaker and the hearer might know that it is not true that B likes the new hat (Brown and Levinson, 1987:116).

In this case the maxim of politeness wins out against the first maxim of Quality.22 What is implicated here is something

like: ‘‘I am being polite because I am sensitive to your face needs.’’ Some people will find this impolite because it

implies that the speaker thinks that the hearer values the maxim of politeness more than the first maxim of Quality, and

the speaker may have no grounds for thinking so and it might even be false. This explains some of the cases of the

paradox of politeness implicature, but not all. Imagine someone uttering the warm greeting23:

(7) Hello my dear friend!

The speaker may thereby implicate: ‘‘I cherish your presence’’, and she might thereby again implicate also:

‘‘I am being polite because I am sensitive to your face needs’’. This last implicature may be perceived as being

impolite not only when the speaker is taken to have an unjustified or false belief about the values of the hearer

concerning the status of the different maxims, but also when the speaker is taken to give only the impression that

she is polite. The speaker only wants the hearer to think that she cares about her, but in fact she does not care about

her at all.24

9. Applying the maxim and definition of politeness

As competent speakers, social beings and members of a particular culture we often know what counts as a polite (or

impolite) particular behaviour, but we do not always know it. When speakers are perceived to be impolite, all kinds of

things may have gone wrong, but what these speakers lack is often either knowledge about what types of actions count

in general as polite in this situation, how these types of actions can be performed (linguistically), what the conventions

or social norms of politeness are, or what desires the particular hearer has. When a speaker intends to be polite, she

must often have knowledge of all these things. An important aim of the applied theory of politeness is to describe the

first three things, but not the fourth, which is, if at all, part of a more general psychological theory.

9.1. Polite (and impolite) types of actions/speech acts

The task for the researcher here is to find out what types of actions or what speech acts count as polite or impolite.

Assuming the definitions presented here, the task is to find out what types of actions or speech acts count as an

imposing on the hearer or as a showing of approval of the desires and actions of the hearer. To give an answer to a

question, to greet someone, to ask someone about how he is doing, are examples of types of actions which count as

showing approval without imposing on the hearer. Brown and Levinson have done a tremendous job by distinguishing

as many as fourteen strategies of positive politeness, ten strategies of negative politeness and fifteen so-called ‘‘off

record’’ strategies.25 However, one must be careful to distinguish between the following cases: (a) the utterance

J. Pfister / Journal of Pragmatics 42 (2010) 1266–12821280

22 Compare Neale (1992:531), where it is claimed that according to Grice the maxim of quality wins out against the maxim of quantity as in the

example, A: Where does C live? B: Somewhere in the South of France (Grice, 1967:32).23 See strategy 15 of positive politeness in Brown and Levinson (1987:129).24 That this is possible can be seen in the following example, in which the speaker is cancelling a possible generalized conversational implicature:

‘‘I really like your hair, I’m not just trying to be polite’’. (I thank an anonymous reviewer for the example.)25 The off record strategy is: Do the face-threatening act off record! The speaker goes off record in doing A if the speaker ‘‘cannot be held to have

committed himself to one particular intent’’ (Brown and Levinson 1987:69). This category does not seem to be well-formed because the

characterization seems to apply to some of the strategies positive and negative strategies to, for example the strategy of being conventionally indirect

(see example 2 above in section 2).

generates an implicature which can be explained independently of face concerns, (b) the utterance generates an

implicature which can be explained with face concerns and which does not have politeness as its content, (c) the

utterance generates an implicature which can be explained with face concerns and which has politeness as its content,

(d) the utterance satisfies the definition presented here. It is only case (c) that counts as polite utterances according to

Brown and Levinson’s definition; and it is case (d), which includes case (c), that counts as a polite utterance according

to the definition presented here. If one accepts the definition presented here, Brown and Levinson’s list of strategies

and examples may have to be categorized differently.

9.2. (Linguistic) forms for performing particular types of polite (and impolite) actions/speech acts

The task for the researcher here is to find out what (linguistic) forms count as performing particular types of polite

and impolite actions. This will include studies both in lexical semantics and pragmatics. Again Brown and Levinson

have done wonderful work by giving a multitude of examples of expressions from various languages satisfying the

different strategies of their theory. Their work has lead to a multitude of studies on how specific speech acts are

realized (for an overview of some examples see Kasper, 1998:680).

9.3. Social norms of politeness (and impoliteness)

The task for the researcher here is to find out what social norms of politeness prevail in a particular society. Such

norms may be relative to kinds of situations, to social groups inside the society, to the relation between speaker and

hearer, and many more. Convention or social norms of politeness are less basic than the maxim of politeness, which

can be and is defined independently of conventions and norms. However, when one applies the maxim and definition of

politeness, one has to take into account the conventions and norms of politeness too; otherwise one might arrive at the

wrong results. For example, unless one knows the existence of the respective norm, one will not understand that it is

impolite in some cultures to start a common meal without having wished each other to enjoy the meal, and that it is

impolite in other cultures not to give thanks for the last meal one has had with someone when one encounters that

person again.

10. Conclusion

I have given two arguments for the need of a maxim of politeness. First, I have argued that by assuming a

maxim of politeness one does not have the problems Brown and Levinson’s theory and Fraser and Nolen’s

conversational contract theory have. Therefore the Gricean theory of politeness is to be seen as superior to these

theories. Second, I have argued that the maxim of politeness is part of rational conversation among potentially

aggressive parties. The speaker cannot form the intention to exchange information with someone who is a potential

aggressive partner and who views her as a potentially aggressive partner without assuming the hearer to assume

that she is being polite. Otherwise there is no reason for the hearer to participate in the exchange of information

rather than not. I hope that these two arguments give new support to the maxim-based theory of politeness. I have

also determined the content of the maxim in terms of face, and I have given a corresponding definition of polite

behaviour. This shows how parts of Brown and Levinson’s idea can be integrated into a maxim-based theory of

politeness. Finally, I have shown how the maxim and definition of politeness can be applied to actual utterances.

One has to take into account what types of actions count in general as polite in this situation, how these types of

actions can be performed (linguistically), and what the conventions of politeness are. I hope to have made some

way towards a unified theory of politeness, incorporating ideas of face, conversational maxim, conversational

contract and social norms.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deep thanks to Verena Thaler for making me think about politeness in the first place and

for continuous discussion, to David Luthi for making me rethink fundamentally my interpretation of Brown and

Levinson’s theory, and to Bruce Fraser for his very helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank an

anonymous reviewer for comments.

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Jonas Pfister is a member of the research group meaning.ch and teaching assistant at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Bern, holding a

Ph.D. from the same university. His areas of specialization are the philosophy of language and action theory. His Ph.D. thesis, published in 2007,

consists in a large part of a reconstruction of Grice’s theory of meaning and conversation.

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