ContentsIssue no. 6

December 1999

PolicyMattersNewsletter of the IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy (CEESP)

CEESPCommission on Environmental,

Economic and Social Policy

Globalisation and governanceMatthias Finger

A four-day conference organised by CEESP in collaboration with the Social Science Research Council,New York, brought together leading thinkers on the subject of governance in August this year. The objec-

tive of Beyond Governance, which took place in Murree, Pakistan, was to apply an emerging understand-ing of governance to a concrete issue – within a regional context – in this case South Asia. Through aselection of papers and extracts of papers presented in Murree, Policy Matters examines the issue of gov-

ernance from a number of different perspectives, leading with a critical examination of the concept of gov-ernance and its current uses, extracted from a longer paper by Professor Matthias Finger.

The special importance of both the concept and the practice of governance stems from the fact that globalisationhas profoundly altered the premises of and the ground-rules for traditional nation-state politics. As traditional, local,national and international political institutions are no longer adequate to meet the challenges created by the pro-cess of industrial development, ‘governance’ emerges as a new concept, directly related to the process of glob-alisation.

Globalisation is defined here as the latest stage of a process where technological, economic, ecological, cultural,and military trends, traditionally observable on a geographically limited scale and scope, are extended to the entireglobe. First separately, but increasingly in a synergistic manner – and therefore ever accelerating - these trendslead to the emergence of new players with new and different (power) relationships among them. Let me brieflycomment here on each of these five trends separately.

Technological globalisation – which is the result of global scientific development – is certainly most fundamental,as this is the process which underlies and accelerates most if not all other processes, in particular those of eco-nomic and cultural globalisation. Key players are techno-scientific institutions, whose aim is to make scientificprogress useful for commercial and political interests. As almost all of these institutions work with the same sci-entific rationality, the outcomes of technological globalisation are quite homogeneous.

The field of communication perfectly illustrates how technological globalisation influences cultural globalisation .Indeed, whether it is because of the media, communication or tourism, more and more inhabitants of the planetshare the same cultural references and define themselves in respect to the same dreams, mostly American ones.This, of course, leads to a certain uniformity, as well as a loss of cultural diversity (e.g., Ritzer, 1998). However,this process of cultural globalisation is not necessarily synonymous with cultural homogenisation, since this new‘global culture’ is often fragmented and incoherent, victim as it is of rapidly changing fads and fashions. The mainactors here are media and entertainment conglomerates, which are in fewer and fewer hands. One must alsomention that parallel to the standardisation of culture one can observe a localisation and so-called “ethno-isation”as a reaction to it.

It is in the area of economy and business that the phenomenon of globalisation has probably been best studied(e.g., Barnet & Cavanagh, 1994; Dunning, 1993;), and often equated to globalisation per se. However, one mustdistinguish here between the globalisation of the financial networks (which are by now almost totally integrated),the globalisation of production, and the globalisation of the markets, i.e., of consumption. As a consequence, the

Governance issueGovernance and globalisationMatthias Finger 1

Structural adjustment in PakistanShahrukh Rafi Khan 10

Criminal appropriations of powerPaula R. Newberg 14

Paving flagstones to HellDipak Gyawali 17

Research project on ‘comprehensive governance’Matthias Finger 20

Regular features

CEESP contacts 2

Letter from the chair 3

New resources 4

Network news 21

Forthcoming 24

Members:Atiq Rahman (Bangladesh), BCAS, Bangladesh Agricultural University,Mymensingh 2202, Bangladesh; Tel: +88 91 556 95-7 x2147, Fax: +8891 558 10, email: atiq@bdcom.com

Sharukh Rafi Khan (Pakistan), SDPI; email: sharukh@sdpi.org

CEESP Representative in MesoamericaPascal Girot (Costa Rica), email: pgirot@sol.racsa.co.cr

Ring Focal PointsViv Davies/Josh Bishop (UK), IIEDAshok Khosla/George Varughese (India), Development AlternativesSergio Mazzucchelli (Argentina), IIED-ALDavid Okali (Nigeria), NESTBheki Maboyi/Dorothy Manuel (Zimbabwe), ZEROSharukh Rafi Khan (Pakistan), SDPIAtiq Rahman (Bangladesh), BCAS

IUCN Secretariat SupportFrank Vorhies Economics Service Unit, IUCN HQ, Tel: +41 22 9990273, Fax: +41 22 999 0025, email: fwv@hq.iucn.org

Cristina Espinosa Social Policy Unit, IUCN HQ; Tel: +41 22 999 0266,Fax: +41 22 999 0025, email: cme@hq.iucn.org

IUCN HQ, Rue Mauverney 28, CH-1196 Gland, Switzerland

CEESP SecretariatErika Spanger-Siegfried, Stockholm Environment InstituteBoston/Tellus Institute; email: ceesp@tellus.orgCEESP website: http://ws101.cisti.nrc.ca/ceesp/

About IUCNIUCN– The World Conservation Union –was founded in 1948 and has itsheadquarters in Gland, Switzerland. IUCN brings together sovereignstates, governmental agencies and non-governmental organisations in aglobal partnership to influence, encourage and assist societiesthroughout the world to conserve the integrity and diversity of nature andto ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable and ecologicallysustainable.

The Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy(CEESP) is one of six IUCN commissions that draw together a networkof expert individuals. CEESP is an inter-disciplinary commission, whosemission is to act as a source of expertise on economic and social factorsthat affect natural resources and biological diversity; to assist in theformulation of policies for the conservation and sustainable use ofnatural resources and the equitable sharing of the benefits arising fromthis use; to contribute to the IUCN programme and mission; and inperforming this mission, to establish itself as a central source ofguidance, support and expertise on environmental policy.

Policy Matters is published by the Commission on Environmental,Economic and Social Policy of IUCN – the World Conservation Union. Edited by Catherine McCloskey, IIED.Production: Eileen Higgins and Bridget Tisdall, IIED.

Articles published in Policy Matters do not necessarily reflect the viewsand opinions of IUCN or CEESP.

CEESP Steering CommitteeChair : Tariq Banuri Stockholm Environment Institute Boston/Tellus Institute, 11 ArlingtonStreet, Boston, 02116-3411, USA, email: ceesp@tellus.org

Vice ChairsBina Agarwal (India) Institute of Economic Growth, New Delhi, India;Tel: +91 11 725 7570/725 7424, Fax: +91 11 725 7410, email: bina@ieg.ernet.in

Franck Amalric (France), Society for International Development, ViaPanisperna 207, 00184 Rome, Italy; email: francka@sidint.orgCo-chair: Working Group on Ethics

Nazli Choucri (Egypt), Department of Political Science, MassachusettsInstitute of Technology, E53-490, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge,MA 02139, USA, Tel: +1 617 253 6198, email: nchoucri@mit.edu

Matthias Finger (Switzerland), University of Lausanne, Switzerland, Tel: +33 450 95 3627, Fax: +33 450 95 96 98, email: mfinger@isp.frChair: Working Group on Global Governance and Institutions

Augusta Henriques (Guinea-Bissau), Secretaire General, TINIGUENA,Bairo de Belem, BP 667, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, Tel: + 245 211 116,Fax: + 245 201168

Rustem Khairov (Russia), Executive Director, Foundation for theSurvival and Development of Humanity, Denezhny Pereulok, 9/5,Moscow, Russia, Tel: +7095241 8255, Fax: +7095 230 2608, email: GCINFO@SPACE.ru

Christophe Lefebvre (France), Conservatoire du Littoral, “LeRiverside”, Quai Girard 62930 Wimereux, France, Tel: +33 321 32 6900,Fax: +33 321 32 6667, email: eurosite@netinfo.frChair: Working Group on Coastal Conservation

Stephen A Marglin (US), Dept. of Economics, Harvard University; Tel:+1 617 495 3759, Fax: +1 413 259 1729, email: smarglin@harvard.edu Co-chair: Working Group on Ethics

Yves Renard (St Lucia), Executive Director, Caribbean NaturalResources Institute, Clarke Street, Vieux Fort, St Lucia, West Indies, Tel: +758 454 6060, Fax: +758 454 5188, email: renardr@candw.lcChair: Working Group on Collaborative Management

Senior Advisor:Mark Halle (Switzerland), Le Viaduc, Rte. des Marettes, CH-1271Givrins, Switzerland; Tel: +41223693754, Fax: +41223693758, e-mail: mark.halle@iprolink.chWorking Group on Trade and Sustainable Development

CEESP South Asia CommitteeChair :Ashok Khosla (India), Development Alternatives, B-32 Tara Crescent,Qutab Institutional Area, New Delhi - 110 016, India; Tel: +91 11 6851158; Fax: +91 11 686 6031; email: tara@sdalt.ernet.in

Secretary :Shaheen Rafi Khan (Pakistan), SDPI, 3 UN Boulevard G-5, Islamabad,Pakistan; Tel: +92 81 21 8134, Fax: +92 81 21 8135, email: shaheen@sdpi.org

CEESP CONTACTS

Letter from the Chair

I wish to start by welcoming Nigel Cross as the newExecutive Director of IIED. Nigel brings extensive experienceworking on the ground – particularly in the Sahel – and is askilful manager and communicator. I am sure that, under hisleadership, IIED faces a very successful future.

Catherine McCloskey will shortly be departing on maternityleave. Her absence will be felt throughout. Catherine has runthe Secretariat so well, kept the newsletter going and madecontinuous improvements in its quality, and acted as theintermediary between the outside world (including CEESPmembers) and the CEESP Steering Committee. She will besorely missed by all of us.

During Catherine’s absence, Erika Spanger-Siegfried of theStockholm Environment Institute’s Boston Center will be fill -ing in; for the time being, you can refer Secretariat andnewsletter questions to her.

In the months leading up to her leave, Catherine has takenpart in the re-invigoration of the Collaborative ManagementWorking Group, set up in 1996 to assist the IUCN Secretariatin an ambitious programme of work. Sadly, with the suddendeparture in 1998 of Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend, former headof the IUCN Social Policy Group, the CMWG ran intoresource difficulties – both human and financial, as theProgramme’s priorities shifted away from collaborative man-agement. Over the past few months, a number of key mem-bers of the CMWG with the support of IIED, have taken stepsto revitalise the group, starting with the preparation of a thirdissue of CM News, enclosed here. It reports on a number ofexciting projects currently being undertaken around the worldand is testament to the ongoing enthusiasm of CM members.It is hoped that resources will be found to build on this work,to establish a clear mandate for the Group, to continue sup-porting IIED in preparing a regular newsletter – and estab-lishing a CMWG website.

In a related development, CEESP is finalising arrangementswith IUCN’s World Commission on Protected Areas to launcha joint Task Force on Collaborative Management and Pro-tected Areas. The discussions began in 1998, with the activeinvolvement of CM Forum members, and have led to a con-sensus on the terms and objectives of the proposed TaskForce. These include promotion of greater understandingand wider application of co-management initiatives related to

the management of protected areas, as well ascataloguing and classifying the co-managementapproaches currently in use. These efforts willlead to a workshop at the fifth World ParksCongress, in 2002. Yves Renard, CMWG Chair,and Adrian Phillips, WCPA Chair, have request-ed Ashish Khotari to lead the group. Our thanksto Ashish for taking on this role.

In August, Adil Najam represented CEESP atthe Regional Scoping Meeting on ClimateChange, organised by ROSA in Johannesburg,South Africa. The participants recommendedthat IUCN’s Climate Initiative should focus onthe interface between climate change and sus-tainable development, as this was most mean-ingful from a developing country (and especiallySouthern African) perspective. Subsequently, Iaddressed the Ottawa Ministerial Forum, and apolicy workshop organised in Bangkok by theAsian Development Bank for Asian policy mak-ers. In general, there is a much greater aware-ness of the concern for linking climate changemitigation and sustainable development in orderto get Southern countries on board. This is alsoconsistent with the direction of the discussion inthe IPCC. A number of CEESP and Ring mem-bers are involved in international climate changediscussions as part of IPCC writing teams. I amthinking of ways in which their counsel could beused more effectively by IUCN as it tries toestablish its niche in this area.

The focus of this issue of the newsletter is ongovernance. This was the subject of a recentconference organised by CEESP jointly with thePakistan Environment Program, and the SocialScience Research Council. The conferencewas held in Murree, Pakistan, August 25-28th.The sustainable development community hasbeen tackling the issue of governance for morethan ten years. Recently, a number of peoplehad begun to identify what they perceived as asignificant gap between the way in which theissue of governance is constructed in the aca-demic and policy literature, and the way it is

experienced in the field. The formerput forth an idealistic aspect – that theproblems of governance were solvablethrough simple (and often simplistic)policy intervention. But from the fieldthe problem seemed quite different,since many good reform efforts in thepast had been hijacked by a smallgroup of elites. In other words, it madesense to think of solutions to the prob-lem of governance, not as the reformof a slightly deformed system, but asthe obstruction of a set of criminalactivities that have succeeded inhijacking reform efforts and institutionsin the past.

To pursue this line of thinking, weasked a group of academic scholars ofhistory, anthropology, economics, polit-ical science and literary criticism tointeract with South Asian practitioners,representing mainly IUCN membersand Secretariat staff. It was a highlyfruitful exchange, and will lead to manylessons of interest for the IUCN com-munity. Papers will be compiled in a volume to be jointly edited by myself and David Ludden, Professor of History at the University ofPennsylvania.

We also took advantage of the meetingto allow Matthias Finger, Chair of theGovernance Working Group, to meetseparately with key IUCN staff mem-bers to discuss a position paper he ispreparing for IUCN, on global gover-nance. The background document isavailable here p.20) and on the CEESPwebsite at http://ws101.cisti.nrc.ca/ceesp/. We encourage you to sendcomments to Matthias Finger.

While you are visiting the site, youmight also want to see the background

Dear Colleagues,

paper on ethics, and send comments to Franck Amalric,Chair of the Ethics Working Group.

Most recently, we held a three-day workshop on operational-ising sustainable livelihoods (7-9 November) in Boston. Thegoal of this scoping meeting was to identify ways in whichsustainable livelihoods can be operationalised, and to formu-late clearly the idea of a formal, international network ofgroups active in the area of sustainable livelihoods. Such anetwork would draw together the knowledge, energy andpractical experience of sustainable livelihood concept cham-pions, advocates, researchers, and practitioners.

The analogy proposed to this work is that of the ConsultativeGroup for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). It wasrecalled that, in response to food crises, a network of institu-tions focused on agricultural research functioned as a clear-ing house of ideas and experience, as well as champions ofa concept around the world. The work of this network helpedto translate a universal theory into practical, local applica-tions. In continuing the analogy, the meeting has adopted theacronym, CGSL (Consultative Group for SustainableLivelihoods).

This analogy, however useful it is, need not be taken too lit-erally. CGIAR has come under criticism as being overlybureaucratised and wedded to an approach that has histori-cally excluded key emerging concerns – especially those per-taining to the environment and social development.

Taking cues from, but without being confined to thisapproach, the CGSL workshop aims to explore how existinginstitutions and networks can be energised to operationalisethe idea of sustainable livelihoods. I look forward to reportingthe outcome.

Tariq Banuri

Who benefits?Nick Robins, SarahRoberts & Jo Abbot,IIED ISSN 1562-3319

Experts from developing countriesare increasingly affected by envi-ronmental factors. For some, thisopens up new trade opportunities;for others it presents additionalbarriers and constraints. But whathas rarely been asked is whetherthis environmentally-driven tradecontributes to poverty eliminationand broader-based development:in sum, who benefits?

To shed light on this question, the who benefits? study reviews trends in environmen-tally-driven trade, drawing on the experience of organic coffee exporters fromVenezuela and the South African citrus sector. It also examines the fair trade move-ment’s approach to generating and assessing benefits and the trends towards convergence between environmentally and socially focused trade initiatives. Thereport concludes by recommending action for increasing the social benefits of environmentally-driven trade.

Who benefits? is part of IIED’s Stimulating Sustainable Trade series, which examinesthe impacts of social and environmental requirements on trade between the North andSouth and looks at how to encourage trade in more sustainable goods and services.It is available from the IIED bookshop, bookshop@iied.org.

For more information about IIED’s work on sustainable trade, see the SustainableConsumption and Trade initiative website, www.iied.org/scati, or contact Nick Robinsor Sarah Roberts at IIED, nick.robins@iied.org; sarah.roberts@iied.org.

ally served industrial development andits promoters, has been made obsoleteby the very process it has actively pro-moted. And in some cases, if one readsneo-liberal literature, the nation-state isnow the key obstacle to further growthand economic expansion. If the win-ners of globalisation want to do awaywith the nation-state, the losers,instead, seem to put all their hopes init. Indeed, many peoples, especially inthe developing countries, seem to thinkthat the same nation-state, which atleast in part has caused their hard-ships, will now protect them from thenegative effects of globalisation.

It is probably premature to say exactlywhere the nation-state is heading as aresult of the numerous attempts toadapt to and cope with globalisation.However, it is possible to identify fourtypes of pressure imposed on thenation-state by globalisation. As profitsincreasingly globalise and social andenvironmental costs increasinglylocalise, the nation-state runs into astructural financial problem, where itinevitably has do more with less.Secondly, there is a growing crisis oflegitimacy as global actors increasinglydictate what nation-states should do(either by bypassing or by instrumen-talising them), and society increasinglyhas reactive, defensive, and thereforetemporary demands. Along with thestructural financial problems, thestate’s declining credibility in turn leadsto a loss of political coherence and col-lective problem-solving capacity.

Over the past ten years or so manynew collective problem-solving mecha-nisms, along with corresponding insti-tutions, have emerged – a phe-nomenon described by the concept of‘governance’.

At the level of society, there are also many vic-tims of the same process, in particular thosewho are least mobile socially, geographicallyand professionally. At an ecological level, thefirst victims of globalisation are the species andpeople who depend directly on naturalresources for survival. On a cultural level we arearguably all victims of globalisation, since formost of us, our identity remains linked to a geo-graphical location with a given culture and lan-guage. Globalisation, on the other hand, hasbecome synonymous with a loss of roots, lossof meaning and identity.

In short, while globalisation builds on historicaltrends of rationalisation, institutionalisation,expansion and further socio-cultural and eco-logical degradation and exploitation, it nowseems to have reached a new stage in the formof new and institutionalised global organisations(TNCs, NGOs, multilateral organisations). Thisnew global institutional reality is, however, par-alleled by a corresponding process of localisa-tion, characterised mainly by its defensivenessand reactiveness.

What future for “old politics”?The question now is what role do traditionalpolitical players – national and local govern-ments, international institutions, public adminis-trations, public enterprises, political parties, andmany others more – play in the new framework.

For the nation-state, the historical unit withinwhich collective problems have traditionallybeen addressed, this is a particularly paradoxi-cal situation. The nation-state was, and to a cer-tain extent still is, a significant player in all fiveprocesses of globalisation: cultural homogeni-sation, ecological destruction, techno-scientificadvancements (often tied to the military), mili-tary conquest, and of economic growth andindustrial development more generally. Today, itseems, the same nation-state, after having loy-

least mobile lose out, i.e., natural resources lose out againstworkers, and workers lose out against capital. Consumption,of course, also goes global, as culture becomes more uni-form, and as production spreads world-wide. Consequently,companies which produce these new global goods and ser-vices increasingly merge, and turn the planet into one bigsupermarket. Such concentration can now be found in allsectors, some of which are already highly cartelised as aresult of economic globalisation.

Ecology has also become globalised. Since the beginning ofthe 1980s, favoured by a new scientific approach called‘Global Change’ (Malone & Roederer, 1985) the planet hasincreasingly been seen as a single global system (Sachs,1993). As a consequence, many ecological issues and prob-lems are seen as a threat to the entire Biosphere. This is nowthe case with nuclear pollution, climate change, ozone deple-tion, biodiversity destruction, and many other resource- orpollution-related issues. The actors of this new global eco-logical awareness can be found in the scientific community,among international environmental NGOs, and indigenouspeoples’ organisations (Tamiotti & Finger, forthcoming).

Even the military, traditionally very much tied to the nation-state, has become globalised, parallel to planetary securityconcerns, some of which are now of a non-military nature.

In each of these five dimensions of globalisation there arenew actors emerging for whom the playing field is now theentire globe. Until recently, transnational corporations (TNCs)were considered to be the most typical such new globalactors (e.g., Barnet & Cavanagh, 1994; Korten, 1995). Someof them – with their strategic vision, their mobility, and theireconomic and sometimes even political power – havealready become more powerful than many governments.However, this same phenomenon of globalisation alsoextends to civil society (Princen & Finger, 1994) in the formof ‘multinational’ non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Inaddition, new global agencies have emerged which are nolonger controlled directly by governments as in the case ofmost UN agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions, such asthe GATT and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF), or the World Bank(Chossoudovsky, 1994; Danaher, 1994). These players notonly have a global strategic vision, but are among the mostactive promoters of globalisation, profiting from the continua-tion of the process.

GOVERNANCE

Governance and globalisation(continued from page 1)

work, most often an international con-vention.

A number of scholars have focusedtheir studies on the effectiveness ofinternational regimes, where effective-ness can be defined as the degree towhich international environmentalaccords and organisations lead tochanges in behaviour that help solvecollective problems. However, theassessment of the effectiveness of aninternational accord or regime is gener-ally rather difficult to establish, in thesame way as is the effectiveness andcorresponding evaluation of public poli-cies at the national level. The natureand extent of international environmen-tal commitments have been trans-formed in recent years as states havetaken on more responsibilities undertreaties and agreements which areincreasingly stringent and with whichthey must comply.

Common propertyresourcesmanagement theoryCommon property resources can bebroadly defined as those in which agroup of people have co-equal rights,specifically rights which exclude theuse of these resources by other people(World Bank, 1992). Common PropertyResources Management Theory(CPRMT) looks at the ways in whichindividuals and groups organise them-selves to govern and manage commonproperty resources. Furthermore, itseeks to contribute to the elaboration ofa theory of self-organisation and self-governance in a specific area, general-ly related to specific resources (e.g.,forests, water, fisheries, etc.) (Ostrom,1990: 27).

becomes a model able to provide non-demo-cratic or stateless countries with appropriatedemocratic institutions. But it does not addressthe interdependency and complexity of gover-nance situations

Regime theoryBecause of an increase in the number of inter-national institutions, the growing interdependen-cy and complexity of local and global issues,and the emergence of new players on the inter-national scene, it became necessary during the1990s to redefine international public action. It isin this context that the concept of governancehas been re-introduced mainly to describe inter-dependencies and complexities involved in theoperation of a given community or institution,generally limited to a geographical area andeven to a specific issue (such as, for example,polar bears) or resources (e.g., water). The ideais not to focus on the operation of structures, butrather to understand the forces and powersinvolved in the overall process governing theissue in question. In the context of internationalrelations theory, the concept of area-specificgovernance has been used at two levels,regime theory above state level and CommonProperty Resources Management Theory belowthe state level.

Regime thinking has initiated a new trend inconsideration of international institutions. Theclassic definition of an international regime is aset of “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expec-tations converge in a given issue area”.Consequently, regimes are centred on nation-states, even though they can and often doinvolve other players when it comes to their for-mulation, implementation, and evaluation. Inother words, Regime Theory pertains to a spe-cific issue generally located at the supra-nation-al level, often involving the solution of a specificcollective problem by means of the co-operationof nation states and other players. Such aregime is generally grounded in a legal frame-

In the literature of political science, the idea of governanceinvolves a broad range of concepts. Nevertheless, four dif-ferent schools of thought can be identified, namely structuralor good governance, regime theory, common propertyresources management theory, and the idea of so-called‘global governance’.

Structural or ‘goodgovernance’Structural governance is a tendency that involves mainly thedemocratic structures of a state at a national level only. Inthis context, the term of governance has been mainly usedby the World Bank since the early 1990s. World Bank work-ing papers usually refer to the more eloquent concept of‘good governance’, introduced to address politically sensitivequestions regarding state reform in developing countries,which were promoted in the main by international financialinstitutions. While the statutes of organisations, such as theWorld Bank and the IMF, expressly forbid them to take uppolitical issues, the use of the concept of governance hasallowed these institutions to interfere in political and socialissues without directly confronting the governments con-cerned. The World Bank has used the concept of good gov-ernance in a didactic manner, mainly in Africa to determinethe institutions and political practices that would be neces-sary for the (industrial) development of a given country(Senarclens, 1998 : 92), in other words in order to obtainstructural adjustment loans.

The concept of good governance has also been used in thesame way within the UNCED process with the aim of creat-ing a political climate suitable for so-called sustainabledevelopment. In this context, governance came to bedefined as three things: the participation of states in interna-tional law-making; the evolution of the decision-makingmechanisms of international institutions; and the participa-tion of non-governmental entities in national and internation-al decision-making and implementation processes. In boththe World Bank and the UNCED context the notion of (good)governance appears to be very close to that of government,albeit with additional participation by selected non-govern-mental organisations (both business and not-for-profit).Moreover, it refers to broadly accepted structures of govern-ment, whose aim it is to define a certain way of operatingstate institutions, usually modelled after Western democra-cies, or more precisely that of the United States. It then

GOVERNANCE

CPRMT takes a stakeholder approach, where each stake-holder is directly affected by what the others do. It also makesvery specific assumptions about the nature of the stakes.While theoretically and conceptually very solid, it is difficult toextrapolate CPRMT beyond the local level, beyond the areaof natural resources, and beyond some basic assumptionsabout stakeholder interests.

Global governanceGlobal governance is certainly the most prominent, but alsothe vaguest use of the term governance. It is rooted in theidea that economic and financial globalisation have pro-foundly redistributed economic and political power, thus chal-lenging State authority. Since the 90s, the development ofhumanitarian interventions has altered the previous basis ofinter-state order, allowing for supra-state players to increas-ingly interfere in national and local matters. These and otherchanges have been conceptualised, albeit not systematically,by the Commission on Global Governance, meeting on a reg-ular basis in Geneva since 1992. In a report entitled OurGlobal Neighbourhood, the Commission defined the conceptof governance as follows:

“Governance is the sum of the many ways individualsand institutions, public and private, manage their com-mon affairs. It is a continuing process through which con-flicting or diverse interests may be accommodated andco-operative action may be taken. It includes formal insti -tutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance,as well as informal arrangements that people and institu-tions either have agreed to or perceive to be in theirinterest” (Commission on Global Governance, 1995).

Such a definition encapsulates almost everything, from thenotion of individuals working together to that of co-operationamong nation-states. Typical of UN – and particularlyUNCED – jargon, this conceptualisation does not take intoaccount the power differentials between individuals and insti -tutions, or their strategic interests. By enlarging the conceptof global governance to include grassroots players and localpeoples, a number of authors have elevated civil societyplayers to global players, thus not only confusing levels, butmoreover ignoring the status and role of institutions. This,however, is not to say that local levels and actions are not rel-evant when it comes to dealing with concrete issues and day-to-day concerns. Indeed, many international institutions and

GOVERNANCE

organisations now increasingly transfer theircapacity to implement to local players (Tamiotti& Finger, forthcoming). This may have less to dowith an emerging global civil society than withyet another instrumentalisation of the local bythe global, furthermore bypassing nation-statesin the process. In no way can such civil societyactivities be conceptualised as an organisedcounter-force to newly emerging global players.

The four conceptualisations of governance men-tioned here all have their shortcomings, GoodGovernance Theory being particularly non-origi-nal, as it confuses governance with (Americanstyle) government. Global Governance Theoryis closer to wishful thinking than to actual reality:civil society and corresponding civil societyNGOs cannot be seen as being on an equalfooting with other newly emerging global actors,such as TNCs and multilaterals. Moreover glob-al governance is particularly a-political, and inthis respect a typical outcome of the UNCEDpublic relations exercise (Chatterjee & Finger,1994). Common Property ResourcesManagement Theory is conceptually verysound, but deals mainly with natural resourcesmanagement at a sub-national level. As such, itdoes not really address the issue of institutionsand organised players and their interests.Regime Theory is, in my view, the most interest-ing and promising approach to governance, as itidentifies the supra-national level and explicitlyaddresses the issue of organisations and insti-tutions. However, Regime Theory refers to sec-toral issues, and does not really constitute acomprehensive approach. Furthermore, itremains very state-centric. Finally, all four gov-ernance theories focus on one policy level with-out relating it to all other levels.

Global governance:money and powerThe main players involved in collective problem-solving at the global level are governments,international and multilateral institutions, TNCs,and some NGOs. They deal with such issues as

development, trade (liberalisation andre-regulation), and security.

The past fifty years have been charac-terised by the expansion of internation-al institutions and public players, carry-ing out international policies, some ofwhich are self-attributed. They includethe United Nations system with its var-ious agencies, the Bretton Woods insti-tutions, i.e., the World Bank and theInternational Monetary Fund, and theGeneral Agreement on Trade andTariffs, leading in 1995 to the creationof the World Trade Organisation(WTO). All three types of institutionsdeveloped in parallel over the past 50years, sometimes with overlappingmissions and activities. While theUnited Nations, with its multiple agen-cies, has become more and more frag-mented and thinly spread (whichbecame particularly problematic whenfunds got scarce), the Bretton Woodsinstitutions, especially the World Bank,have invaded UN development territoryby subsuming social development andsustainability into their economic devel-opment agenda. The GATT, on theother hand, developed a powerfuldynamic of trade liberalisation, and bydoing so, somewhat undermined theagendas of both the UN and theBretton Woods institutions.

Today, in the era of economic, ecologi-cal, cultural, and technological globali-sation, with their emerging problems,paralleled by the growing importance ofTNCs and NGOs, these internationalpublic players have largely redefinedthemselves and regrouped aroundthree key issues: security, sustainabledevelopment and trade regulation.

The UN, under heavy financial pres-sure, is currently refocusing on issues

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of security, the safeguard of international boundaries, humanrights protection, and humanitarian intervention. In doing so,the UN is abandoning one of its core mandates, development– this is being taken over by the Bretton Woods institutions,especially, the World Bank, which is in a more favourablefinancial position and is sensitive to public opinion. Indeed,the World Bank, UNDP (the UN Development Programme),and UNEP (the UN Environment Programme), already linkedthrough the GEF (Global Environmental Facility), seem to beregrouping around the issue of sustainable development, andthis might well lead up to a new ‘Earth Bank’. Finally, there isthe issue of trade and trade regulation. Having actively pro-moted trade liberalisation, the GATT and the WTO nowincreasingly come under pressure from public opinion, devel-oping countries, and TNCs, asking for the reintroduction ofsome sort of trade regulation. In order to do this, however, theWTO will have to regroup with organisations such as ISO (theInternational Standardisation Organisation), and other privateplayers. This illustrates that, at the global level, the definitionof future governance mechanisms is driven by financial andeconomic interests as well as corresponding power, mainly ofTNCs. As a result, privately defined standards are likely tobecome perfectly acceptable tools for global trade regulation.

The environment, as a cross-cutting issue, relates to all threedimensions – security, sustainable development and traderegulation. Indeed, environmental degradation has becomean issue of security. Examples are found in the potential con-flicts arising from scarcity of natural resources (such aswater), or from transnational environmental damage (such asnuclear disasters). Secondly, since UNCED, environmentalprotection has been reframed in terms of ‘sustainable devel-opment’, and UN bodies, such as the UNDP and the WorldBank, have been keen to promote corresponding (sustain-able) development projects. The environment also pertains totrade: while environmental protection was and still is consid-ered to be an impediment to trade, it is also becoming anargument, or perhaps an excuse, for re-regulating trade.

National governance:managing networksIt is of course at the national level where governments stillhave the strongest hold on public affairs. Nevertheless, eventhere one can observe the erosion of traditional politics, bothin terms of the policy process (policy-formulation, policy

implementation, and compliance) and in termsof public management where more and morestakeholders are involved. In parallel, one canobserve how new types of policies – i.e., facili -tating, enabling, incentive-based, etc. – aremade necessary since traditional ‘commandand control’ policies are no longer effective. Asa result, various stakeholders – e.g. business-es and NGOs – are being included both in thedefinition of the (environmental) policies andtheir implementation.

This is not (yet) comparable to the situation atthe global level, where governments are clearlyonly one among many players involved in man-aging public affairs. In this respect, the termgovernance at the national level is not entirelyappropriate. Governments retain their ultimatepower, i.e., sovereignty over their territory, aswell as control over legislation. Nevertheless,the capacity to get things done is increasinglydependent upon a government’s ability tomobilise the various players involved.

None of the above governance theoriesaddresses this issue at the national level. Onehas to look at theories of public management tofind a conceptualisation of this development. Ifthe public service in question can be deliveredfor the most part by the market, there is a cleartrend from public service provision to regulation.Where this is not the case, i.e., when public ser-vice is mainly the result of public provision, onecan identify new theoretical conceptualisationssuch as “network management”. Here the role ofgovernment is to mobilise and facilitate a com-plex network of public, private, and not-for-profitplayers. Unfortunately, such conceptualisationsare never fed into the larger framework of gov-ernance, nor related to developments occurringabove and below the nation-state level.

Local governanceAt the local level, governance is a totally differ-ent matter. In the era of globalisation, the local

becomes synonymous with exploitationand domination, where it is used by theglobal to further the process of globali-sation. The local is where problemsfirst become visible – even if they areonly symptoms of global problems –and where they need to be solved asthey arise, but it is also where theresources and means to address suchproblems are scarcest. If these prob-lems become too overwhelming,national and global players intervene.

In non-crisis situations, national politicsgenerally defines the local as the levelat which all global, regional and nation-al policies will ultimately (have to) beimplemented. It is also the level whichgives legitimacy to the entire public pol-icy chain. Many collective issues maybe handled more efficiently at the locallevel as populations often have inti-mate knowledge and experience oflocal ecosystems, as well as a sense ofcontinuity with a given place.

This level of governance has only beenrecognised in the context of largerglobal problems, in particular after thepublication of the Brundtand Report in1987. The need for and the role of localactions has been enhanced by Agenda21, agreed to at UNCED, and which ledto a spate of local initiatives throughoutthe world. Such local initiatives, howev-er, are rarely self-contained local gov-ernance mechanisms, as they are partof a larger concept of implementing a‘global public policy’.

True local governance is somethingelse, namely community-based localproblem-solving within the largerframework of globalisation and locali-sation as outlined above, and of ‘learn-ing our way out’ of the dead end of

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industrial civilisation (e.g., Finger & Asún, forthcoming). Suchcollective problem-solving efforts will become increasinglynecessary parallel to the process of globalisation and thedestructive effects it has on local communities and theirlivelihoods. They are also quite different from the efforts con-ceptualised by Common Property Resources ManagementTheory. Indeed, the weakness of that theory lies in the factthat it does not contextualise common property resourcesmanagement, particularly within the larger framework of glob-alisation, although this is where the most innovative gover-nance efforts take place.

Governance efforts as I have defined them above, can beseen as attempts to solve (public) problems collectively byidentifying the relevant stakeholders – and can be identifiedat global, national, and local levels. Even though the stakes,and often the players involved are different at each of thethree levels of governance, the levels are not independentfrom another, but nor are they at all co-ordinated.

This is particularly problematic in the case of the four theoriesdiscussed above, which all focus on their specific levels.Global Governance Theory maintains the illusion that gover-nance can be an encompassing concept linking the local, thenational, and the global into one coherent governance frame-work. As such, Global Governance Theory – along withCommon Property Resources Management Theory – leadsone to believe that all the players involved in a given gover-nance mechanism are equal partners, deciding about theircommon fate and/or the use of their resources. In thisrespect, all four governance theories are particularly perni-cious: they hide power relationships and the players’ strate-gic interests. This is particularly problematic at the globallevel.

Global players now have a significant advantage over localand even national players, as they are more mobile and oftenricher. As a result, they exploit the local, particularly the localresources and manpower, by playing them against eachother. Increasingly, the global players, mainly the TNCs, alsoexploit nation-states, or nation-states are simply instrumen-talised in order to better exploit the local. If the national can-not be instrumentalised by the global players – say for exam-ple by the multilateral institutions – it is simply bypassed, asin the case of the World Bank which works directly with north-ern and southern NGOs when it comes to implementingsome of its objectives.

A comprehensiveapproach to governanceIt is doubtful whether any of these three levels isthe appropriate one when it comes to dealingwith globalisation and its negative conse-quences: indeed the global level is too interest-ed and involved in pursuing the process for it tobe an appropriate level to address it. Thenation-state, in turn, is either already too instru-mentalised by the global actors or simply not theappropriate level when it comes to addressingthe main problems caused by globalisation,such as the cultural and the ecological conse-quences of globalisation, in particular, but prob-ably also the economic problems. The locallevel, in turn, even though the most innovativeone, is probably too small and too vulnerable tonational and global forces.

One therefore has to think of other levels of gov-ernance when it comes to addressing the nega-tive consequences of the globalisation process.Key requirements for such levels to be relevantpertain, in my view, to some sort of ecologicalintegrity or coherence (e.g., bio-regionalism,eco-regions, watersheds, etc.), but also to somesort of cultural dimension. The main stake in theage of globalisation, pertains to ecological andcultural survival. Despite the wealth of literatureon eco-regions, the cultural aspect still has to beclarified. Nevertheless, both the ecological andthe cultural dimensions point to a regionalapproach to governance, which, depending onthe country and the region, can either be ofsupra- or of sub-national nature. There is yetanother advantage to defining governance atsuch a regional level, as most of the gover-nance mechanisms can still be designed, asopposed to having to be reclaimed. The originalstrategy of the ‘new politics’ thus would precise-ly be in the design of such new regional gover-nance mechanisms.

In the design of such regional governancemechanisms, one could certainly be inspired byRegime Theory, as well as by Common

this conceptualisation would have tooccur within the larger context of theglobalisation-localisation dynamics,taking into account the respective pow-ers and strategic interests of the vari-ous global and national playerrs.Finally, such a conceptualisation wouldhave to locate itself within the overallframework of collective problem-solv-ing or ‘learning our way out’ (Finger &Asún, forthcoming), the main issuebeing the level at which such collectiveproblem-solving makes most senseand has most autonomy.

BibliographyBarnet, R. & J. Cavanagh (1994). GlobalDreams. Imperial corporations and the new worldorder. New York: Simon and Schuster.Chatterjee, P. & M. Finger (1994). The EarthBrokers. Power, politics and world development .London: Routledge.Chossoudovsky, M. (1997). The globalisation ofpoverty. Impacts of IMF and World Bank reforms.London: Zed Books.Commission on Global Governance (1995) OurGlobal Neighbourhood. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPressDanaher, K. (1996). Corporations are gonna getyour mama. Globalization and the downsizing ofthe American Dream . Monroe ME: CommonCourage Press.Dunning, J.H. (1993). The globalization of busi -ness. London: Routledge.Korten, D. (1995). When corporations rule theworld. West Hartford CT: Kumarian Press.Malone, T.F. & J.G. Roederer (eds.) (1985).Global Change. Cambridge University Press.Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons. TheEvolution of Institutions for Collective Action .Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Princen, T. & M. Finger (eds.) (1994).Environmental NGOs in World Politics.: Linkingthe Local to the Global. London: Routledge.Ritzer, G. (1998). The McDonaldization Thesis.London: Sage.Sachs, W. (ed.) (1993). Global ecology: a newarena of political conflict. London: Zed Books.Senarclens, P. (1998). “Governance and the crisisin the international mechanisms of regulation”.International Social Science Journal 155.World Bank (1992) Governance and develop-ment . Washington D.C.: World Bank

Matthias Finger is Professor at the Institutefor Advanced Studies in PublicAdministration, Lausanne, Switzerland, andthe Institute for Social Ecology, Plainfield,Vermont, USA; email: mfinger@isp.fr

In a much-cited article, Huntington (1993, p. 39) stated,“through the IMF and other international economic insti-tutions, the West promotes its economic interests and

imposes on other nations, the economic policies itthinks appropriate.” Such statements are enough to makeeven the most level-headed of Third World thinkers paranoid.Why would industrialised countries want to enforce structuraladjustment (SA) policies on poor countries? The worst possi-ble motive is that for various economic reasons they want tosee poor countries shaped in their own image. The bestmotive is that they are persuaded that SA is in the interest ofthe economies they lend to. We do not assume an a prioriposition on this issue for Pakistan and rely instead on the evi-dence.

However, looking at the evidence is not as straightforward asit sounds since there can be different perspectives fromwhich it is viewed. As prudent bankers, the IMF and theWorld Bank worry about repayments, and so they naturallyadopt a lender’s perspective. Nevertheless, lenders and bor-rowers may have conflicting interests and so it is important toassess SA from a national perspective too. Furthermore,since SA policies vary in their impact on different socialgroups, it is important to delve deeper and identify who gainsand who loses, and in what way, from such policies. We referto the latter as a political economic perspective.

Much of the evidence cited in the context of SA has been ofa cross-country nature. Country case studies, however, havenow become more readily available. To date, the evidencehas not conclusively demonstrated that countries that havetried to reform their economies according to IMF/World Bank-prompted SA prescriptions (in exchange for loans) have suc-ceeded in the judgement of either the donors or the borrow-ers. There are some success stories and many failures.

Establishing success empirically is difficult, since control dataare often needed but not available, i.e. what would have beenthe condition of the country without SA? Even when enoughtime has passed to assess reforms, it is difficult to isolate theimpact of structural reforms from everything else going on inthe economy. Failures sometimes stare one in the face in theform of riots that have often followed SA programmes in theThird World.

Even so, SA and the neo-liberal paradigm that underlies itare now the dominant economics paradigms practised by

Structural adjustment in Pakistan: evidence and new developmentsShahrukh Rafi Khan

developing countries and have been so sincethe early 1980s. The reasons for this probablyinclude the endorsement of such economicreforms by the G-7 governments and hence itspropagation by the IMF, the World Bank, as wellas many western bilateral aid agencies such asthe USAID. There is also predominant supportfor such a reform programme in academia aswell as in prominent advisory or consulting bod-ies.

In this essay, we first review the evidence forPakistan. Following this, we identify some newdevelopments in the application of SA inPakistan that suggest that SA policies are likelyto have a much more far-reaching impact ondeveloping countries than in the past. We con-clude with some advocacy positions.

Evidence from Pakistan1

On most critical economic issues, SA-initiatedreforms embody an internally consistent set ofhypotheses. We began by reporting on evi-dence generated by testing various neo-liberalhypotheses on various critical economic issuessuch as devaluation, financial sector reform, pri-vatisation, trade policy and industrialisation.Following that, we reported on evidence basedon the overall impact of SA on labour and thepoor as well as the impact of gender, health,environment and food security. While we adopt-ed a national and a political economic perspec-tive when assessing SA reforms, we were com-pletely open to accepting whatever resultsemerged. We summarise now the major find-ings reported in detail in Khan (1999).

Testing hypothesesWe began our research by examining the termson which Pakistan receives aid and the impactof aid and debt on economic growth. There is lit-tle that is encouraging to be said about how theterms on which Pakistan receives aid havechanged over time. Concessional aid as a per-centage of the total has declined, the averageinterest rate has increased, the maturity period

has decreased and the grant elementhas decreased. Thus Pakistan’s debt inabsolute real terms, the debt/GDP ratioand the debt/export ratio hasincreased, particularly since 1988,when the more intensive phase of theSA period started. Given the changingterms under which Pakistan is receiv-ing aid, there is every likelihood that thedebt/GDP ratio will continue to rise.This is particularly the case since ourresearch shows that aid has a negativecausal impact on GDP (Granger) andthat aid has a negative and significantimpact on economic growth. The latterfinding holds up when subjected to atest for robustness after controlling forsupply side shocks. There are variousreasons likely to explain the negativeaid-growth association. Among them,the most prominent are likely to be thatit provides a soft budget constraint asexplained by Kornoi (1986) in the con-text of the Soviet Bloc, and that itenables rent-seeking and inefficientgovernment to survive, as explained inthe public choice literature.

The impact of devaluation was investi-gated. This is frequently recommendedas part of SA programmes, on the bal-ance of trade. Estimating export andimport demand functions is the conven-tional method of evaluating the likelyeffect of devaluation on the externalbalance. Using quarterly data, weshowed little or no positive effect on theexternal balance resulting from a cur-rency devaluation.

We explored the neo-liberal case forfinancial liberalisation. This is premisedon a positive association of real andfinancial saving, productivity andgrowth with the real term deposit rate.Some researchers in Pakistan, whichembarked on a series of financial sec-

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tor reforms including interest rate liberalisation, have pre-sented such evidence. On the one hand, using appropriatetime series analysis, we re-examined the evidence, andfound mild support at best for the neo-liberal hypotheses. Onthe other hand, we made a case on political economicgrounds for avoiding or postponing interest rate liberalisation.In brief, the rich are the real beneficiaries of higher interestrates. The poor lose from the inflation resulting from the high-er deficit financing that is resulting from the huge debtinduced by the interest rate liberalisation. Since the richrefuse to pay their share in taxes, keeping the interest ratelow is a sensible implicit tax on them.

We found support for privatisation of commercial banks,based on efficiency gains post privatisation and also basedon the better performance of privatised banks compared tothe nationalised banks. We also compared the pre- and post-privatisation experience of five firms in three industries inwhich employee buy-outs and conventional privatisationoccurred. We did not find evidence to support the hypothesisthat labour productivity is higher in employee-owned firms.We found that private sector firms were more successful thanemployee buy-outs in raising profit rates. In general, privateownership seems to lead to less labour retrenchment,although in one case the complete replacement of the labourforce lends credence to employee concerns about privatisa-tion.

We explored whether trade liberalisation has ushered in thelarge-scale de-industrialisation that is feared by some to fol -low in its wake, and whether it has been successful inenhancing export promotion. We relied on several differentmethods and found that the evidence, with regards to indus-trial and export growth in the SA period, is mixed. The per-formance of the consumer goods sector in promoting exportsand displacing imports has been robust. Other evidence alsopoints to an improvement in export performance, althoughPakistan is still not meeting its export potential or matchingthe mean performance of even low-income countries.However, there is evidence of imports displacing domesticproduction in the intermediate goods sector, average annualgrowth in industry declining, and industry growth falling fur-ther behind potential in the period of economic liberalisationcompared to the earlier periods. We were not able to estab-lish, possibly because of the paucity of time-series observa-tions, that either industry or exports generated positive exter-

nalities for, or used resources more productive-ly than, the rest of the economy.

Assessing impacts

We reviewed evidence regarding the likelyimpact of IMF/World Bank policies on labourand the poor in Pakistan. Our findings show thatsince the 1988 bout of SA, public sectoremployment has decreased while wages havebeen frozen. Also, overall unemployment inoccupations with a high incidence of the poorhas dramatically increased and real wages ofskilled and unskilled labour sharply declined. Inaddition, subsidies that were critical to the con-sumption pattern of the poor have been cut,while the burden of indirect taxes on the poorestincome group has increased. Not surprisingly,there has been an increase in poverty andinequality, particularly in the rural areas.

We reviewed the change in the socio-economiccondition of women during the intensive periodof SA in their role as producers, as home man-agers and as mothers. In their role as produc-ers, overall participation of female labourincreased such that their share in the labourforce virtually tripled. However, over this period,there was a dramatic decline in female self-employment and a more dramatic rise in thefemale unemployment. In their role as homemanagers, women confronted a more than dou-bling of the sensitive price index and a cut ofabout two-thirds in consumption subsidies, as apercent of the budget. The price of wheat, fromwhich the poor derive about 55 percent of theircalorific intake and about 70 percent of theirprotein intake, also more than doubled. Thenumbers show that compared to 1987-88, edu-cation expenditure as a percent of GNP hasbeen constant, while that of health has actuallydeclined. This could have had an adverseimpact on women in their role as mothers.

While government health expenditures as a per-centage of GNP have declined in Pakistan, inabsolute real terms it has increased. Progressover this period is evident on a number of health

indicators such as the infant, child andmaternal mortality rates as well as lifeexpectancy. However, Pakistan stilllags far behind the means of low-income countries and South Asiancountries in all child survival statistics.In view of this, and since the evidenceshows a significant and sizeable asso-ciation of public sector health expendi-tures and the decline in infant mortalityrates, there seems little justification incutting public sector health expendi-tures.

We surveyed issues on trade and theenvironment from a southern perspec-tive and with a focus on the availableevidence. There is reason to believe,and a little evidence confirming, thatmanufacturing export promotion wouldresult in the use of cleaner technolo-gies than producing for a protecteddomestic market. Evidence suggeststhat primary export promotion may beenvironmentally detrimental. Much lesshas been written about the environ-mental impact of import liberalisationthat is required to accompany exportpromotion. There is a danger thatunregulated import liberalisation mayresult in the dumping of dirty, second-hand, northern machinery and haz-ardous agricultural inputs. We focusedon the agriculture sector and showedthat Pakistan is pursuing a very openregime with regards to the import ofpesticides and fertilisers. We conduct-ed a suggestive cost-benefit exerciseto highlight potential environmentalcosts and the relevant policy issues.

We explored issues of food security,entitlement and resulting capabilitieson an aggregate level. The positivefinding is that even though the areabeing devoted to cash crops is risingmuch more rapidly than the area devot-

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ed to food crops, the increase in food production is keepingpace with the increase in cash crop production. This appearsto have translated into a steady increase in per capita avail-ability in the important food crops and also in an averageincrease in calorific and protein intake for all income groups.However, we find that capabilities of the poor have beeneroded over the SA period with real wages falling sharply,inflation in food prices exceeding non-food prices, unemploy-ment rising, and average household income falling. We alsoexplain how privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation inthe agricultural sector may make coping more difficult for thesmall farmer.

New trends in structuraladjustment policies Several new trends in SA policies seem evident from observ-ing the recent engagements of the Government of Pakistanwith the Bretton Woods institutions.

Pre-conditionalities

The Government is being required to show good perfor-mance before the next tranche is released. Thus instead ofconditionalities to be satisfied once the loan is released,Pakistan is being required to satisfy pre-conditionalities inorder to get the loan.

Overt politicisationPolitical criteria might always have determined whether or notSA loans would be granted to governments. Thus while acharade of meeting performance criteria was maintained, theG-7 had other criteria in mind when calling the shots.However, of late, it seems that the charade has been aban-doned. Pakistan had a good dose of reality when it toyed withan independent military posture in Kashmir. In fact, not onlydid the Pakistani Prime Minister make a hasty trip toWashington, D. C. to reassure the US President, but historicrealities were abandoned and the disputed territory ofKashmir was referred to as Indian territory. A high price, inthe form of Kashmiri aspirations for self-determination, waspaid for the restoration of the SA facility and the green light toforeign investment and other bilateral and multi-lateral aid.

Overt support for international capitalOnce again, a radical view holds that SAmarket-friendly policies are designed to facilitate the opera-

tions of multinational corporations. Recentexperience in Pakistan shows that if ever therewere a pretence that this was not the case, ithas been abandoned. The World Bank facilitat-ed the deal between multi-national power pro-ducers, referred to as independent power pro-ducers or IPPs, and the Government ofPakistan. It also provided guarantees anddirectly extended a loan facility for it.2 The dealswent sour when a new government came topower and alleged that kickbacks were respon-sible for the old government agreeing to non-viable, high tariffs and guarantees of govern-ment purchase. The Bretton Woods institutionshave now made it clear to the government thatthe next tranche of the current SA loan willdepend on the resolution of the IPP issue.3

While the Government has gained politicalmileage from the issue by maligning the out-going government, there is a genuine concernthat buying power at the contracted tariff willbankrupt the country’s main power utility.

The stakes for the Government are now veryhigh. Its official reserves stand at only about$1,474 billion. However, the bottom line may notbe the IPP issue, but whether or not Pakistanwill agree to sign the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty (CTBT) as the G-7 would like. Whilethere are many good reasons to sign the CTBT,or to have avoided the nuclear option, it isshameful to be susceptible to such pressure.

IMF/ World Bank as whipping boys

A recent advertisement placed by the IMF for apublic relations officer suggests that the Fund isconcerned about its image. However, theimpression created by observing the political-economic scene in Pakistan appears to be thatthe Bretton Woods institutions are quite contentto take the fall. Thus the Government routinelypasses the buck for harsh decisions such as theimposition of a regressive generalised sales taxor increases in utility prices on to theFund/Bank. Not only that, this drama alsoallows the Government to keep postponing diffi-cult decisions, engaging in real structural reform

such as land reform, imposing an agri-cultural income tax and other directtaxes, and dealing with weak tax andfinancial administration. Instead it con-tinues to engage in large schemeswhich have no social cost-benefit orenvironmental impact assessmentsand much kick-back potential, such asthe yellow-taxi scheme, the motor-wayconstruction scheme and the ‘my-house’ construction scheme.

ConclusionThe truth is that the Bretton Woodsinstitutions often get it wrong. Despitean economic slow-down, Pakistan isbeing asked to meet a deficit target of3.3 percent of GNP. The insistence oninterest rate liberalisation has resultedin a huge domestic debt due to thehigher costs of government borrowing.Ironically the interest payments on thisdebt are an important cause of thedeficit in the first place. Similarly, theirinsistence on premature trade liberali-sation has shrunk the tax revenue(again leading to a deficit) and generat-ed de-industrialisation (again causingthe tax base to shrink). The insistenceon exchange rate liberalisation had vir-tually no impact on the trade deficit, butincreased the foreign debt in local cur-rency terms to the extent that prices didnot adjust or adjusted slowly. Whenprices do adjust, the poor once againsuffer from the erosion of their standardof living.

The incompatibility of inflation withexchange rate liberalisation, of tradedeficit with trade liberalisation, and ofdeficits with interest rate liberalisation,and so on, are also examples of theBretton Woods institutions getting itwrong. Thus, many of the problemssuch as inflation, large deficits and

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unemployment that SA is supposed to deal with have oftenresulted from these policies. The doctor creates an unendingdemand for his services!

In all fairness, the World Bank genuinely seems as though itwishes to learn from its mistakes. Its current approach tolarge dams, and its support for clean fuels, the environmentand gender sensitivity suggests hope. Yet, even its ownreports show that its large projects, such as the EnvironmentProtection and Resource Conservation Project often performpoorly. The staff and consultants who fly in for short visitshave a limited understanding of the institutional culture andwhat is possible. Also, for the most part it seems that thesame core market ideology drives the Bank prescriptions asin the case of the Fund.4

What are the solutions to this problem of SA that is present-ed to poor countries as a solution? First, if aid must be taken,then, as the State Government in Calcutta recently stated,the lenders need concern themselves only with repaymentand, if there are doubts about that, the loan need not begiven.

Second, given the evidence pointing to a negative associa-tion between aid and economic growth, there is a case topress governments to stop taking destructive aid as suggest-ed by the ‘50 years is enough’ campaign. Malaysia hasdemonstrated that its approach to dealing with the recentAsian crisis of imposing capital controls and avoiding defla-tion resulted in a much lower human cost than that inThailand and Indonesia, and it also avoided indebting futuregenerations by refusing to go to the IMF.

Thirdly, the ‘50 year is enough’ campaign now needs to becarried further. The real problem is that poor countries haveno redress for the expensive mistakes made by the BrettonWoods Institutions. It is now time for scholars to gather evi -dence systematically. Countries, organisations or individualsshould take the Bretton Woods institutions to court for dam-ages to current and future generations. Perhaps the threat ofsuch liability will encourage responsible behaviour. While it istrue that the “piper calls the tune,” and that the governmentsof poor countries need not take the loans, the reality is thatrapacious elites solicit the loans for their own benefit. Thusthe poor in southern countries need protection. An alliance ofenlightened liberals in the South and the North for legalaction may help.

ReferencesHuntington, S. P. (1993). ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ ForeignAffairs Vol. 72, No. 3, July-Aug.Kornai, J. (1986). ‘The Soft Budget Constraint’ Kyklos, Vol.39, pp. 3 - 30. Khan, S. R. (1999). Do World Bank and IMF Policies Work?London: Macmillans.

Footnotes1 This evidence has been drawn from Khan (1999).2 “Hectic government efforts to deal with HUBCO crisis,” TheNews International (Islamabad), September 25, 1999, p. 1.3 The World Bank President, James Wolfensohn, is claimedto have said that Pakistan needed to resolve the remainingissues with the IPPs to win more money from the IMF and theWorld Bank. Similarly, the Managing Director of the IMF,Michael Camdessus, is said to have mentioned that the delayin the $280 million tranche has to do with difficulties in meet-ing conditions starting with the IPP issue. “IMF says tranchedelayed to Pakistan,” The News International (Islamabad),September 25, 1999, p. 1.4 For now it seems that the top leadership in the Bank has dif-ferences with the unthinking application of these prescriptionsas indicated by a surprising essay titled “Sick patients, warringdoctors,” in September 18th-24th, 1999 issue of TheEconomist

Shahrukh Rafi Khan is Director of SDPI,Pakistan, and member of the CEESP SouthAsia Committee.

Hijacking is a metaphor about agency and action, inten-tion and implication. How useful is it as a description andan explanation of political behaviour in South Asia?

Kidnapping and hijackingSocial scientists and policy makers too often equate the sumof institutional behaviour with the operation of the State; theprocess of building states with the creation of specific institu-tions; and stability with maintenance. Conversely, the break-down of institutions is often thought to indicate the necessary,potential or possible implosion of the State itself. Theseequations are incomplete and often misleading. The State’srelationships to political, economic, and civil societies are atleast as important as its technical capacities in several ways.Firstly, the instruments that craft these relationships areembedded in the ideologies that create and maintain theState. Secondly, state implosion can most often be located inthe breaches between state and society. Thirdly, governancebreaks down when the ideology that organises power disal-lows appropriate and adequate relations between citizen andstate – when those who govern pursue politics that not onlydiminish the reach of state institutions, but also its nature –by removing the expression of demands from the ways thatneeds are addressed.

Kidnapping is a simple version of this breach. When one partof the State overtakes another, bargains are generally struckamong various interest groups and affected parties to returnthe institution to its portfolio. This is a form of ransom, paid byaffected parties to those who have transgressed norms.Ransom changes relationships, and in the end, the questionof propriety – should it have been paid, was the cost correct?– is left for future judgement.

Kidnapping embodies several intra-mural activities: when thepower balance within the State is destroyed by some, othersextend the rules of politics and in so doing, appear to actrationally. The result is almost inevitably an incremental dis-tortion of the system that gradually changes the system itself,and can reinforce characteristics that lead to breakdown.Recent decades in South Asia offer many examples of thisproblem: the misuse of elections by parliamentary minoritiesand majorities alike, the use of force to reduce the power ofjudicial institutions, and the coup d’état are all versions of thisphenomenon.

Hijacking is more complex. Customary lan-guage suggests that someone or somethingoutside the system overtakes the entire system.But who hijacks whom, and how?

Under circumstances of invasion, for example,actors who do not normally work within theState take over that State, although state actorsmay be complicit in hijacking. The result may bea new version of the old State, or a new Stateentirely.

Two extreme versions of hijacking seem todescribe the State kidnapping itself: revolutionfrom within, and in a very different way, statefailure. Both involve domestic actors who takeon roles outside the basic structure of the State– that is, acting on terms different from those onwhich the State is constituted, and in ways thatremove the State from those who had com-prised it. This sense of hijacking is intrinsicallyrevolutionary in spirit – the content of ideologynotwithstanding – although its immediateresults may seem more like workaday reform.Hijacking cannot be judged solely on the basisof perceived changes in policy; rather, it is iden-tified by the way in which changes in basicstructure are effected.

Agency is therefore joined with the intention tosubvert. When institutional behaviour simplydescribes the erosion of institutional mandatesor revisions in the terms of authority – oftenundertaken precisely to maintain the status quo– this is not hijacking. Instead, hijackingdescribes actions that are meant to invokechange in the nature of the State by subversion.

When subversion occurs, how do state actorsrespond? Under normal circumstances, institu-tional actors choose among a range of alterna-tive behaviours: they might resist the impositionof change, or succumb to pressures to legitimatechanges in basic structure. More often, they val-idate changes incrementally, under conditions ofuncertainty – hence the jurisprudence of revolu-tionary legality in Pakistan, or recasting military

ordinances into constitutional amend-ments in a variety of martial law states.

The slippery slope from validation tolegitimisation reflects a dangerous ana-lytical problem as well as a practicalpolitical one. Can institutions legitimisethe change that hijacking implies? Ifelected government alters the constitu-tional structure of the State, and thusthe terms within which authority is con-stituted, is this hijacking? If so, is itbecause of specific changes, or theways in which they are made? Who (orwhat) is required to legitimise hijack-ing?

Each of these questions raises thespectre of state failure: the most impor-tant element of the concept is its totali-ty. When revolution occurs, the Stateas an entity may not appear to be indanger, but the particular State as apolitical concept is jeopardised.Similarly, invasion may threaten thephysical integrity of the State and thesafety of its people, but more profoundare the different political meanings thatthe State takes on for its citizens andoutside interlocutors alike. In bothcases, hijacking is essentially a politicalconcept, the nature of which is definedsimultaneously from within and without.By their very natures, the concepts ofhijacking and state failure are commen-taries on the changing nature of statesovereignty.

Two examples exhibit the complexitythat hijacking raises.

• Hijacking a failed state.

Afghanistan is a state whose territo-rial sovereignty has been jeopar-dised by armed conflict, and whichhas no functioning institutions.Under these conditions, if the

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Criminal appropriations of powerNotes on kidnapping, hijacking and state failures in south Asia

Paula R. Newberg

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Taliban movement were to appropriate state institutionsfully, its efforts would be labelled kidnapping, and possiblyhijacking. Without active domestic contest, the role of for-eign interlocutors is critical in relation to fighting factions.Here hijacking is a transnational activity made possible bystate failure. Because no-one in Afghanistan is yet capa-ble of withstanding the ideological pressures imposed byfighting, the State is, in effect, twice hijacked.

• Not quite hijacking a failing state. Prior to the October1999 coup d’état , Pakistan’s institutions functioned, butonly through the constant onslaught of political pressuresthat increasingly come from outside formal politics. Themajor responsibilities of the State were rarely undertakenby state institutions. Power-holders deliberately cededresponsibilities to new political organisations whose self-defined dual roles were to take over institutions and rejecttheir ideological underpinnings: private armies threatenedthe State’s monopoly of force, judiciaries were silenced bypolitical appropriation, and parliaments were forced not tofunction. The weight of evidence suggests that the Statewas undergoing significant revision – and the coup d’étatwas a predictable outcome of the strife that such contestcaused. Under such circumstances, neither state institu-tions nor constitutional instruments seem relevant. Dosuch changes in the terms of political sovereignty consti -tute hijacking? Does hijacking precede state failure, or arethey concurrent?

In each instance, the writ of the State is redefined and thenature of risk – for the State and its future – is redefined aswell. The totality of the hijacking phenomenon underscoresthe close identity of institutions with one another, and theways that authority – regardless of the constitutional mandateof institutions – is often indivisible. Moreover, if hijacking is aprocess, and not a discrete event, saving the State is anequally – if not more – complicated process. Here metaphorelides into literalism: how is the ship of state to be recovered?

Conceptual queries• When is the hijacking of institutions equivalent to state fail -

ure; when does it precede state failure; and when is it aphenomenon separate from state failure?

• Is hijacking a discrete event, the accumulation of events,an autonomous or semi-autonomous process, or simply

tion or result, means or ends? (Is Pakistanfailing because it has been, in effect,hijacked?)

• If state behaviour does not change, when canwe say that it has been hijacked? (Has theTaliban hijacked Afghanistan; did that happenbefore it arrived; or is this an event — or pro-cess — waiting to happen?)

• Is institutional hijacking always synonymouswith ideological hijacking?

• If hijacking and state failure are not synony-mous, which institutions and/or instrumentscan prevent hijacking from becoming statefailure, and how? What are the necessaryconditions for establishing and/or retainingthe resilience of institutions? (Is the militarymore important in the calculus than, for exam-ple, courts?)

• Has a state failed when state institutions donot work appropriately, but non-state institu-tions continue to function? To what degree isthe vitality of the non-state sector an indicatorof state resilience? (How do we compare ele-ments of the non-state sector – non-govern-mental organisations, private armies, andmosques and temples, for example?)

• When does active resistance to the State sig-nify the breakdown of institutions, when doesit suggest that the basic structure of the Stateis compromised, and when does it signify thecontinuing resilience of the State? Is theabsence of resistance an important reflectionof hijacking or kidnapping?

• How can a hijacked state be retrieved? Howimportant are external players in this calcu-lus? What, if any, instruments of the State areneeded to engage in the process of retrieval?

Instrumental queriesSeveral examples in the recent history of SouthAsia extend the boundaries of our thinking about

Institutional incompatibility and

conflicting political agendasDuring Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’ssecond term, the Supreme Court ChiefJustice came into conflict with Govern-ment in ways that risked the integrity ofthe court, constitutional limits on parlia-mentary rule and prospects for demo-cratic governance. A stand-off aboutissues of judicial administrationrequired the arbitration of the ArmyChief, and ended in the resignation ofthe Chief Justice. During judicial chal-lenges to the parliamentary writ, mem-bers of the Cabinet stormed the Court.Despite evidence to the contrary, alater Supreme Court decision ruled thatthe storming had not taken place.Declining civil liberties protections, theabuse of rights for ethnic minorities,sectarian assassinations, and majorchasms between elected and appoint-ed bodies challenged the constitutionalfoundation of the State to the point thatits ideological and institutional fabricrisked implosion.

In these instances, the basis for politi-cal legitimacy is contested, not throughinstitutions, but via attacks on institu-tions. At what point is the State nolonger what it once was? How can weparse the notion of political agency tounderstand whether the State hasbeen hijacked by those who purport torepresent it? Is the coup d’état a modeof retrieval, or simply a symptom ofhijacking?

Constitutional abeyance/forcing

ideological changeThe classic case of hijacking is thecancellation of constitutional rule. Eachof Pakistan’s coups d’état was followedby the imposition of a provisional con-stitutional order that placed the consti-tution out of the reach of institutions

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ciary to comply with constitutional cancellation through intim-idation, or the promise of restoration. Restoration, in turn(although time will tell with the 1999 coup), became part of theredesign of the ideological wrapping of the State which, inturn, altered the balance among institutions in ways thatmade real democracy difficult to attain. After the 1977 coupand the 1985 partial restoration, the structure of institutions –from the rule of law to the previously respected delineationbetween foreign and domestic politics – was jeopardised tothe point that the State risked failure from the forces set inmotion by the military government.

A slightly different version of this intention was played out inboth Pakistan and Bangladesh through their respective 8thconstitutional amendments, written by military governmentsas a lure to parliaments interested in reviving constitutionalrule. Both attempted a dual goal: to revise state ideology andto redraw judicial responsibilities to support the new ideology.Both were really military ordinances disguised as parliamen-tary prerogatives.

In both instances, institutions were kidnapped by those inpower: the masquerade of disjointed incrementalism ledpoliticians and courts alike to act as if they were not fettered.This was not really true: neither state, however, is what it oncewas. The jurisprudence used to justify these manoeuvres,and the parliamentary acquiescence they demanded, haveplagued the principles and practice of politics in both coun-tries. Does revoking constitutionalism count as hijacking?

Jurisprudential failures leading to new state formations

Political parties in east Pakistan tried to use state institutionsto further the project of democratic majoritarianism. Highcourts falteringly attempted to reconcile centralisation anddevolution, and democratic rhetoric with military rule. Judicialfailure (in a directed state) led to war and secession. One oranother of Pakistan’s wings was hijacked through the failedsymbols of sovereignty.

Does forced secession constitute hijacking? (Does it matterwhich wing, and which leaders, undertook hijacking?) Howare means and ends judged?

The problematic of parliamentary crisisDemocratic majoritarianism in Pakistan and Bangladesh hasyet to succeed fully. The formal equation of democracy andelections has been disproved: dissent is not seen as part of

parliamentary democracy, but alternately as theprogenitor or outgrowth of anti-parliamentaryactions – and state institutions suffer as muchas the vaunted concept of democracy. The pro-cesses of democracy are subordinated to endproducts, and the futility of achieving them is co-ordinately viewed as a characteristic of the polit-ical system itself. In terms of representation,legitimacy and policy, the results are predictablypaltry and seemingly intractable. In this sense,all participants in politics are complicit in theimplosion of the State, the failures of parliamen-tary rule, and the kidnapping and/or hijacking ofthe State. The long-term, pervasive quality ofsuch behaviour turns kidnapping into hijacking.

The metaphoric and literal dimensions of thesecases give rise to questions about institutions,political intention and agency. All point to failuresin state structure, and thus, to the potential forkidnapping and, in some cases, hijacking. Anumber of the issues raised – including the orig-inal weaknesses of state institutions, their rela-tionships to one another, and significantly,whether states can adapt to significant change incitizen preferences (regardless of the source ofthese preferences) – also address several ques-tions that these notes do not: the economic andsocial basis for political action, and the ways thatresources are mobilised through policy.

Returning the State to its ownersOnce hijacking occurs, several things happen atonce: governance in its broadest sense ceases,and the residue of state authority becomes eas-ily appropriable for uses that are generally nei-ther equitable nor just. When hijacking is equiv-alent to state failure – or leads to it, or accom-panies it — the first element of the State to dis-appear is justice. To recapture the State there-fore requires establishing a sense of justice asa defining element of the State, and as a pre-requisite for rebuilding institutions. This differsmarkedly from the improvisations that so oftencharacterise transitions. Indeed, improvisationand short-term conciliation rarely offer a vehiclefor recovering the State from its hijackers.

When state institutions fail, or whenthey appear to be failing, citizen despairtakes many forms; after a point, fewfrustrations seem satisfied by ordinaryimpulses to reconstruct institutions.Resurrecting small traditional mecha-nisms may offer limited respite fromindividual woes, but cannot substitutefor the complex institutions that theState is designed to provide. The bestjustification for reviving the State –however fraught with problems italways is – is the project of providingjustice and ensuring rights in the com-plex ways that complex societiesrequire.

In this sense, governance – the envi-ronment for providing justice and theaggregation of state institutions estab-lished for that purpose – is both meansand ends. To the degree that institu-tions themselves are complicit (byimplication, if not intention) in hijacking,delivering or returning them to a rights-based notion of justice would seem tobe a prerequisite for reconstitutingand/or repairing the State. In SouthAsia’s current circumstances, withtransnational markets and politicalforces overtaking many national activi-ties and loyalities, rescuing the Statefrom hijacking may be the first step inrecognising the State’s changing role.

This article is an edited version of apresentation prepared for anSSRC/IUCN conference on gover-nance, held in Pakistan in August1999; and is a short, preparatory ver-sion of a longer article to be publishedby the SSRC.

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Paving flagstones to HellHijacking public resources in the name of development

Extracts from a paper by Dipak Gyawali

It is said that the road to Hell is paved with good inten-

tions. In much of South Asia, wherever one sees pathol-ogy in the practice of irrigation or any other endeavourrelated to water resources, one is often misled in one’s

search for the cause by the purported noble intentions ofbringing ‘development’ to the ignorant masses.

That the State should be the micro-manager of a nation’swater resources is a recent event. In South Asia, aided andabetted either by colonialism or foreign aid, the State hastaken on the divine right to own, manage and modify the nat-ural resources within its area of jurisdiction. For instance,Nepal’s Water Resources Act 1992 has declared for the firsttime that water ‘above the ground, on the ground and belowthe ground’ belongs to the State. This has happened in acountry with one of the longest and best studied traditions of‘farmer-managed irrigation systems’ as opposed to state-managed projects that came into being only towards the endof Rana reign as a response to British India engaging in sim-ilar ventures across the border.

This process of devolving resource management to the Stateand its bureaucracy benefits the social sector responsible forconveying the technology in question. For instance, a civilengineering degree commands a high ‘dowry value’ in thecow belt of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh because it essentiallygives the holder the licence to dispense with state resourcesearmarked for flood protection and embankment construc-tion. An electrical engineering degree assures the certificate-holder a job in a state-owned electricity corporation which iskept afloat through high tariffs and subsidies, a job that hasperks and side earnings that accrue from the rent-seekingopportunities generated by the State monopoly. The networkthat sustains the rent-seeking mechanism often consists ofan iron – politician-contractor-bureaucrat – triangle thatobstructs decision-making (the license raj), public audit andscrutiny. Such state monopolies justify their existencethrough incantations of the welfare motive, but their existenceoften serves to sustain a class that is able to divert resourcesto its advantage.

The pathology of this form of social parasitism can be illus-trated by case studies of water management in South Asia.The case study approach is often criticised for not being com-prehensive or sufficiently representative. The methods oftenused to counter this are statistical surveys that attempt tocapture a representative sample. However, such methods

can be prohibitively expensive and may be usedonly if there is a reasonable chance that theycan be pursued fairly. In most cases of develop-ment pathology, the vested interests are soentrenched that the application of these mea-sures is too risky. How, for instance, can onefind the truth when the State structure itself hasbeen hiding the data, when it has falsified infor-mation or presented a picture of well-being thatis at variance with the true experience of farm-ers? It is not in the interest of the iron triangle toallow such research because it is disturbing tothe status quo. The method chosen in this arti-cle is to look at case studies where an ‘argu-mentative’ civil society has brought forth evi-dence in the face of state opposition, whichhighlight how the welfare objectives that osten-sibly justified projects were subverted to suitnarrow interests.

Sri Lanka1

Southern Sri Lanka is a hydro-ecological regionwhich enjoyed a sustainable system of irrigationfor seven centuries. This began to decline in thetwelfth century with the introduction of the State-centric hydraulic engineering perspective,although this did not become widespread untilthe advent of colonialism. Catering to the short-term goal of hydraulic efficiency, such a systemleads to a rapid extraction of accumulatedresources at the expense of the long-term needto sustain the productive potential of land andwater.

According to the hydraulic engineering perspec-tive, water is seen as inanimate but active, andthe small village ponds of the ancient irrigationsystems primitive and inefficient. These need tobe replaced by larger storage reservoirs whichare ostensibly more beneficial on the principle ofeconomy of scale. Distribution systems aredesigned in well-laid grid blocks to supply waterto individual farmers who are seen as individual-ist entrepreneurs in isolation from both natureand their peers. Downstream, surrounding landis levelled to make it amenable to the construc-

tion of large canals. Forests arecleared to make way for efficient mono-cropping and may be limited to theupper catchment area to reduce siltingin the reservoir.

In contrast, the ecosystems perspec-tive views water as animate and pas-sive due to its role as facilitator innature’s bio-geo-chemical cycles,especially in the root zones of soils that‘live’ because of water. Using this sys-tem, perfected over thousands ofyears, farmers are not just Western-style economic agents of agribusiness,but part of the whole: the outflow fromone farmer’s field is the input to anoth-er farmer’s plot in a web that intercon-nects the whole village. Small pondsare interconnected (as are villages)with larger canals and bund structuresthat adapt to the contours of the landas well as to the nature of the rainfall.Forests are an intrinsic part of this per-spective and they are interspersed withfields in development areas for betterconservation of nutrient flows.

While the hydraulic engineering per-spective is based on the strategy ofdomination over nature, the ecosys-tems perspective is based on strate-gies that adapt to nature either activelyor passively, depending on the strengthand complexity of the social organisa-tion. As a top-down, expertise-basedapproach, modern irrigation engineer-ing has relegated the farmer to a pas-sive role, and failed to see how the vil-lage tank was the centre of village lifeand a major source of security againstthe inevitable drought.

The Lunugamvehera and Udawalaweprojects in the south, or the EppawalaJayaganga in the northern dry zone tellof resource manipulation that fails to

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meet the stated objectives (they often fail to provide the waterpromised), and in the process alienated the farmers from theState itself. The burning down of the engineer’s office of theLunugamvehera project just after it was ceremoniously inau-gurated, was the first indication of the dissatisfaction rife inthe area. This was to express itself in a later avtar as the JVPuprising. The social class responsible for bringing this tech-nology, however, labelled this an anti-social and anti-govern-ment act to be counteracted with violence at the State’sbehest, rather than an honest audit of the project and itsclaims.

Bihar2

In a similar way to the Bangladesh delta further downstream,Bihar is the inland meeting ground of several mightyHimalayan drainage systems such as the Ganga, Gandak,Kosi and smaller but no less destructive rivers such as theMahananda, Kamala and the Bagmati. Bihar, which has halfthe area of Poland and more than twice its population, con-stitutes less than 14% of the overall Ganga basin. The char-acteristics of these rivers of the Himalaya-Ganga are deter-mined by the heavy monsoon precipitation between June andSeptember when the rivers are in a spate. During othermonths, the flow is a function of groundwater inflow withsome snowmelt in the spring, if the rivers have snowlines intheir catchment. Unlike rivers in temperate climes such asEurope or the eastern US, the peak monsoon flows in therivers of the Himalaya-Ganga can be a thousand times high-er than dry season runoff. The implication of this hydro-eco-logical phenomenon is that hydro-technical control technolo-gies, which have to be designed for extreme flood events,need to be many times more expensive here to be effectivethan would be the case in Europe.

Another unusual phenomenon arises from the extremeregimes of the rivers of the Himalaya-Ganga: high sedimentload that erodes one of the youngest mountain chains andbuilds the Indo-Gangatic floodplains as well as the Bengaldelta. It is a geologic process of immense scale that is com-paratively only slightly and locally exacerbated by anthro-pogenic misdeeds. The implication of this hydro-ecologicalphenomenon is that reservoirs in the Himalaya-Ganga havea life expectancy a half to a quarter of that of such reservoirsin temperate climes. Correspondingly, the economic invest-ments made in such technologies become that much costlier.

Furthermore, the technology of embankmentbuilding to contain floodwaters of a river withindemarcated channels also become ineffectiveafter a very short period. The reason for this isthat, instead of spreading out over the floodplains, the sediment is deposited within theembankment and raises the level of theriverbed. This induces more seepage from theriver at its height into the allegedly protectedarea that, compounded with the water alreadycollected from normal rainfall, remains trappedoutside the embankment. It contributes to whatis known as water logging, where land thatwould have been flooded for two to fourteendays a year remains so for as long as ninemonths or more.

It is within the last fifty years of Indian indepen-dence that the marginalised north Indian Stateof Bihar experienced extensive development inthe areas of irrigation and flood control. The ini-tial promise made during the latter days ofBritish rule and repeated since Independence,was of a high dam at Barahakshetra in Nepalwhere the Kosi emerges from the hills into theplains after draining a catchment that rangesfrom Kathmandu in the west to Sikkim in theeast. Funding competition within the IndianUnion and the difficulties of negotiations withNepal placed that option on the back burner.The technology chosen instead was that ofembankment construction with an irrigationcomponent added later to make the schemeeconomically more attractive.

During the British Raj, there were seriousdoubts about the viability of large-scale surfaceirrigation schemes as well as embankments inthe north Ganga plains. After Independence in1947, such projects were needed to give legiti-macy to the new state in the eyes of the newlyliberated masses. This method of flood controland irrigation was selected with missionaryzeal. In examining the history of decision-mak-ing in this period, one is struck by the institu-tional filters at work, which, having selected thetechnology of embankment building for the mis-

sion at hand, chose to disregard all evi-dence pointing to the need for caution.Embankments increased from 154kmin 1954 to 3454 km by 1988. However,the flood-prone areas increased in thisperiod from 2.5 million ha to 6.46 mil-lion ha. The Kosi project, conceived in1953 to irrigate 712,000 ha in the northBihar plains, succeeded in irrigatingonly 213,000 ha (1984 figures). On theother hand, the project has managed towater-log and expose 292,000 ha offertile land to further flooding and trap800,000 people in 338 villages in alimbo of poverty and destitution.

The most striking impact of fifty yearsof embankment building in Bihar is thecorruption in its administration, as thefollowing bears out:

Such is the racket of breaches thatout of the 2.5 to 3 billion rupeesspent annually by the Bihar govern-ment on the construction and repairworks, as much as 60 percent usedto be pocketed by the politician-contactors-engineers nexus... Theactual expenditure never exceeds30 percent of the budgeted costand after doling out the fixed per-centages, the contractors are ableto pocket as much as 25 percent ofthe sanctioned amount. A part ofthis they use to finance the politicalactivities of their pet politicians andget further projects sanctioned.Thus the cycle goes on. 3

The response of the water managers inIndia, whether in Delhi or in Patna, hasbeen to turn a blind eye to this failure.There have been no attempts by theState machinery to review the impact ofirrigation and embankments on the pro-ductivity and human welfare within thearea in question, or to initiate corrective

the State that was the entrepreneur, the auditorand the adjudicator. No other independent soli-darity was allowed, which meant that real busi-ness and real activism were driven under-ground. It was in the interest of this solidarity tomaintain the terrain uncontested. However, theill-effects of runaway technology soon becamemanifest in the social polity, and activismemerged anew.

Had the terrain not been uncontested to startwith, perhaps the voices of cautionary activismand innovative entrepreneurship would haveprovided solutions that may have been lessdamaging to the environment and society. Thecases above do demonstrate that uncontestedterrains are hijacked by one set of interests atthe expense of others. Reform would necessi-tate that space is provided to all interest groups.Perhaps the difficulty lies in seeing ‘governance’as synonymous with ‘management’, becausethe socio-physical complexity of the Himalaya-Ganga cannot be micro-managed. The uncer-tainties are too high, the complexities too intri-cate, and the potential for surprises all too fre-quent for ‘management’ to be the goal of goodgovernance. Such an approach can easily leadto a hubris of monistic control such as hasoccurred with Nehruvian socialism or Stalinisttotalitarianism. A more modest goal would be toreduce the scale and scope of surprises, whichcan be achieved with interventions in nature thatare modest in scale, with decisions regardingthem made as close to the users as possible,and with ample scope for challenge from theinnovators and those raising voices of caution.

References:Bharti, I. 1991: Fighting the Irrigation Mafia inBihar, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXVI,NO. 38, September 21, Bombay.Gyawali, D. 1997: Foreign Aid and the Erosion ofLocal Institutions – An Autopsy of Arun3 fromInception to Abortion, in C. Thomas and P. Wilkin(ed) Globalization and the South, Macmillan,London.Gyawali, D. 1998: Patna, Delhi and EnvironmentalActivism – Institutional Forces Behind WaterConflict in Bihar, Water Nepal vol 6 no 1,Kathmandu.Gyawali, D. and Dixit, A. 1998: Mahakali Impasseand Indo-Nepal Water Conflict, Economic andPolitical Weekly, 27 February, Mumbai.Mendis, D.L.O. 1999: Hydraulic Engineering ver-sus Water and Soil Conservation Ecosystems:Lessons from the History of the Rise and Fall of SriLanka’s Ancient Irrigation Systems, Water Nepalvol 7 no 2, Kathmandu.

Footnotes1 This section is based on Mendis (1999).2 This section is based on Bihari activist literature(mostly in Hindi) summarized in Gyawali (1998),which is forthcoming in GeoJournal’s Octoberissue. 3 Bharti (1991)

Dipak Giyawali is based in Kathmandu,Nepal; email: Ida@wlink.com.np

measures. One possible reason is the entrenched nature ofthe corruption, which has contributed to a burgeoning grass-roots activist counter-reaction. Groups such as the BiharKudal Sena (Bihar Hoe Army), Shaheedi Jatha (MartyrSquad) and Tatbandh Virodhi Sangharsh Samity (Anti-Embankment Agitation Committee) are engaged in protestmovements that range from peaceful gheraos to not-so-peaceful demolition of embankments. Very often, officials andpolice are chased away by the locals when they try to repairthe embankments that have been cut or demolished by thelocals.

As with the Sri Lankan case, the water establishment has nottaken the initiative to re-examine the efficacy of its fifty-yearefforts. If questions are asked, they are often procedural,relating to bureaucratic lapses. Questioning the efficacy ofembankment building would cast doubt on the rationale forthe very existence of the Department of Water Resources. Asa result of this limitation in self-evaluation (which would havebeen the basis for self-legitimisation), activist groups such asthe ones mentioned above as well as the Barh Mukti Abhiyan(Flood Liberation Campaign) have intensified their cam-paigns to stop or demolish embankment building. The Statemachinery, on the other hand, continues to look for a solutionin a high dam in Nepal. The rift in perspectives betweenthese two social solidarities leaves little room for conflict res-olution.

Governing versus ManagingThe cases discussed above highlight how public welfareschemes ended up benefiting a few at the expense of thepublic. In Sri Lanka a hydraulic mindset bent on controllingnature rather than actively adapting to it ended up fosteringschemes that alienated the peasant from the land and ulti -mately the State. In Bihar, a technology was massively imple-mented which was ill-suited to the hydro-ecology of the landand has left in its wake a peasantry impoverished and alien-ated from the State.

The search for an answer in these two cases of resource usehas to begin by looking at the social solidarities that havegained sway over an uncontested terrain. In the Age ofDevelopment following the Second World War, the Stateemerged as the leading carrier of this mission. It developedin its wake a class of rentiers whose social control over cer-tain technologies allowed them tremendous benefits. It was

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Research project on ‘comprehensive governance’ by CEESP’s Working Group on Governance and Institutions

The special importance of governance for IUCN, as well as all otherplayers in international environmental politics, stems from the factthat globalisation has profoundly altered the premises and theground-rules for sustainable development, including the managementof eco-systems. It has also altered the status and the roles statesplay when promoting and regulating development and environmentalprotection. Consequently, the ‘division of labour’ between global,international, national, regional, and local players shifts and the rela-tionships between them change. This is particularly the casebetween governments, business organisations, NGOs, and playersfrom civil society. At a national level, one can observe processes ofdecentralisation and the emergence of regional and local governancemechanisms. At the international level there is an increasing frustra-tion with intergovernmental organisations. New institutionalapproaches are emerging and being tested. One can say that, sincethe 1980s, environmental policy and policy-making in particular hasshifted from a purely governmental and inter-governmental to astakeholder approach. Besides governments and international organ-isations, stakeholders now include non-governmental organisations(NGOs), trans-national corporations (TNCs), as well as newly emerg-ing multilateral institutions such as the World Bank (WB), the GlobalEnvironmental Facility (GEF), and the World Trade Organisation(WTO). Traditional command-and-control policy-making, policy imple-mentation, and enforcement capacities of nation-states have weak-ened accordingly.

If IUCN is to be successful in its mission, it must have a thoroughunderstanding of these shifts in the authority and functions of institu-tions, players and governance mechanisms. It must be able to detectwhere new opportunities are arising as a result of shifts in patterns ofgovernance, and where continued efforts will bring diminishing

returns. In particular, it will have to understand the changes in levelsof governance, as well as their interrelationships. In other words, ithas to understand these new emerging governance mechanisms, inorder to see how and where it can play a significant role, and how itcan influence this process as a whole. CEESP’s Working Group onGovernance and Institutions, particularly by means of this researchproject, seeks to help IUCN think through what ‘nature conservation’means in a globalised world. In making recommendations as to howthe various parts of the World Conservation Union can tackle thisissue, the report will build on the fact that IUCN is probably uniquelypositioned to bring together government, business, and NGOs whenpromoting sustainable development.

The goal of this working group for the period of Summer 1999 toSummer 2000 is to elaborate a report assessing the pertinence andthe usefulness of the concept of “Comprehensive Governance” forIUCN, and to make related recommendations. The report will bebased on a study of existing literature and on analysis of empiricalcases. Water, particularly the management of river basins, is used asan example from which the concept of ‘comprehensive governance’is being developed. Various intermediate versions, as well as thefinal version of the report and the recommendations will be testedwith researchers, IUCN staff, and relevant decision-makers. In paral-lel, the process of writing the report will be used for building a con-stituency of the working group, as well as for proposing a resolutionfor the World Conservation Congress in Amman in October 2000,setting out a mandate for further IUCN work on the topic. The reportwill be available in late August 2000.

Matthias Finger, Professor. mfinger@isp.frLudivine Tamiotti, Research Assistant. lt328@is9.nyu.edu

NETWORK NEWS

IUCN and climatechangeErika Spanger-Siegfried

In early 1999, the IUCN Global Initiative on Climate Change (GICC) wasestablished, with the goal of strengthening the understanding of therelationship between climate change and the directives of IUCN – inparticular, the conservation of ecosystems and species, and thesustainable and equitable use of natural resources.

This development was largely in response to the 1996 WorldConservation Congress, in Montreal, where the Director General wascalled upon “to develop a strategy for IUCN on climate change, and toparticipate in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange and the work of the Framework Convention on Climate Changeas far as there is a direct link with the conservation of biodiversity andnatural resources.” As Union momentum built around the issue,consultations were carried out with IUCN’s technical programmes,Regional and Country Offices (RCOs), and Commissions to exploreways to integrate climate change into their respective programmes ofwork. These initial efforts helped to outline the form and function ofIUCN’s programmatic response, and to provide the basis for theInitiative’s launch.

A two-day scoping meeting, hosted by the newly born GICC, at IUCNHeadquarters in Gland in February 1999, attempted to further exploreand clarify IUCN’s approach. The two sessions, involving roughly 20participants from IUCN’s technical programmes, RCOs, andCommissions, as well as outside experts, concentrated on taking stockof the problem and identifying opportunities for IUCN to respond.

While the discussion reaffirmed the general thrust of the 1996recommendation, it also expanded upon it by clarifying the need for thetechnical programmes, RCOs, and Commissions to become involved inthe development of a co-ordinated approach to climate change. To thisend, the participants established three primary areas of activity whichthe Initiative would address: defining ecosystem and speciesvulnerability and the ecological limits of climate change; identifying waysto improve ecosystem resilience in the face of climate change; andevaluating the role of biodiversity and natural resources in mitigatingclimate change.

Through this process, a set of specific activities for each of the threetypes was identified. Cumulatively, these are intended to provide a co-ordinated approach to the climate change challenge that spans the nextseveral years.

From this basis a number of recent activities have stemmed. Inparticular, the Initiative has worked with the technical programmes andRCOs to follow-up on specific activities. For example, in March theGICC, in co-operation with the Senior Advisor for Social Policy,convened a meeting at the IUCN Washington Office to discuss howimplementation of the climate change agenda could affect communities.From these discussions a collaborative project outline emerged,premised on the notion that those most impoverished and resource-dependent are also likely to be the ones most vulnerable to changesand variations in climate, as evidenced by recent events, such asHurricane Mitch and the floods in Bangladesh. The project objective wasthus defined as development of a fuller understanding of this

vulnerability, with a long-range view toward enhancing the resilience ofat-risk communities. Through a collaborative workplan, including thedevelopment of case studies, regional and global workshops, publicationof findings and proceedings, and participation in relevant internationalfora, the Initiative aims to increase the capacity of IUCN to inform suchclimate change coping and adaptation efforts.

The Initiative co-convened, with the Freshwater Initiative and otherpartners, a workshop on Water Resource Management and GlobalChange as part of the 13th session of the Global Biodiversity Forum,held prior to Ramsar COP7. The workshop participants recommendedthat a Memorandum of Co-operation be developed between the RamsarConvention and the United Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChange – a recommendation which the Parties to the RamsarConvention (Resolution VII.4) adopted. With the support of the Bureauof the Ramsar Convention, the Climate Change Initiative and theFreshwater Initiative are now jointly undertaking a project to facilitateefforts to explore areas of co-operation between the Ramsar Conventionand the UNFCCC.

The Initiative is contributing to follow-up work from the last negotiationsof the Convention on Biological Diversity – CBD (Bratislava, Slovakia,May 1998) on the threat posed by climate change to coral reefs andother coastal and marine ecosystems. The Initiative is planning tocontribute to an upcoming expert workshop, convened by the Secretariatof the CBD, to discuss the causes and effects of the 1997-98 coral-bleaching event. Together with the Marine Initiative, a proposal is beingdeveloped to carry out further work, including case studies/assessmentson ecological and socio-economic impacts, and awareness raising andpolicy development efforts.

As another follow-up to the CBD meeting, the Initiative is attempting tofacilitate understanding of the treatment of forests in the Kyoto Protocol,and the implications for forest biodiversity. IUCN has provided analysison this topic by jointly preparing with the World Resources Institute apublication entitled “Climate, Biodiversity, and Forests.” The Initiative isalso actively contributing to the Global Environment Facility’s efforts todevelop an operational programme on carbon sequestration.

More recently, GICC has focused much of its effort on scoping activitieswithin the RCOs. In July, IUCN ORMA and other IUCN members inMeso-America, joined in an Initiative-led effort to define key climatechange issues and opportunities for the region, and to develop aworkplan.

A similar effort was undertaken by the Southern Africa RCOs – andattended by CEESP – the following month in Johannesburg. Throughthe discussions, according to Initiative co-ordinator, Brett Orlando,participants “recognised that the international climate change agenda isfocused too narrowly on emissions reduction, and that a need exists tobroaden the agenda to include issues such as social vulnerability,ecosystem integrity, sustainable livelihoods, land-use patterns, poverty,food security, and social, economic and ecological resilience”. IUCN, itwas agreed, was well placed to catalyse debate, making the climatechange agenda more relevant to the southern African region.

As an example of the output from the Initiative’s regional workshops, theJohannesburg participants agreed that in the following 18 to 24 monthsthe RCOs, with the support of the Global Climate Change Initiative,would undertake the following activities:

• Co-ordination of a series of national workshops, followed by a singleregional workshop to develop a regional framework for the UNFCCCand COP6 agenda (Autumn 2000/Spring 2001);

NETWORK NEWS• Development of a work-plan for awareness raising, including a publi-

cation outlining the relevance of climate change to the southernAfrican region;

• Design of a research agenda for southern Africa on climate change,water availability, wetlands conservation, and sustainable livelihoods.

The Initiative is attempting to shape a third scoping session for theSouth and South-east Asia region, where similar potential exists foridentification of region-specific issues, and for the development of anaction agenda on climate change. As a contribution to both regionalwork, and that of the Global Initiative, IUCN Pakistan is developing apaper to review key issues, and further sharpen the role of IUCN in theclimate arena.

Discussions have also begun between GICC and the IUCN SouthAmerica Regional Office to explore opportunities to integrate climatechange into the regional programme. In coincidence with this, theInitiative recently contributed a presentation on the linkages between theClimate Change Convention and the Conventions on Biological Diversity,Desertification, and Wetlands to a meeting of the Environment Ministersfrom the Amazon countries, hosted by Ecuador’s Minister ofEnvironment and IUCN president, Yolanda Kakabadse. The meetingresulted in a Ministerial Declaration to pursue further work on climatechange and ecological and social vulnerability in the region.

Looking toward the October 2000 IUCN World Conservation Congress inAmman, Jordan, the Initiative is planning to organise a meeting on theecological and social limits of climate change. It is envisaged that theoutcomes of the meeting will contribute to the development of an IUCNquadrennial programme as well as to the COP6 negotiations of theClimate Change Convention later that year.

For more information, please contact Brett Orlando, Climate ChangeProgramme Officer, IUCN Washington Office, 1630 Connecticut Ave.,NW 3rd Floor, Washington, DC 20009 USA, Tel: ++1 202 387 4826, Fax: ++1 202 387 4823, Email: borlando@iucnus.org.

IUCN prepares for second congressIn less than a year (4-11 October 2000) IUCN’s second WorldConservation Congress will be held in Amman, Jordan. It is expected tobe the biggest environmental gathering ever held in the Middle East.

The theme of the Congress is ‘ecospace’. It will address the problem ofthe current inadequacy in social and spatial organisation forenvironmental management, involving knowledge, empowerment andgovernance at global, national and local levels. It will link ecosystemconservation with the need to stem the global loss of biodiversity, andbuild on IUCN’s traditional strengths in species and protected areas.

CEESP will host a day-long workshop at the Congress to report onprogress made during 1996-2000, build consensus on the role socialsciences should play in IUCN’s work and initiate a strategic planningexercise. Focusing on seeking solutions to environmental problems inpatterns of human behaviour, and building on the insights of socialscientists and philosophers, CEESP will discuss developments withinspecific topics: market based instruments, subsidies, resourcemobilisation, trade, governance, ethics, collaborative management,environmental security, climate change, sustainable livelihoods, genderand technology. In examining these issues, the workshop may focus ona particular natural resource such as water and/or coastal zones.

For further information, contact Erika Spanger-Siegfried at:ceesp@tellus.org.

IUCN in dialogue with the oil industryThe Economics Service Unit and the Social Policy Programme of IUCNmet with representatives from the International Exploration andProduction Association of the oil industry (E&P Forum) in July this year.IUCN has been exploring collaboration with the E&P Forum to developguidelines designed to enhance social impact assessment as part of anenvironmental impact assessment for oil and gas operations. Opendialogue and consultation involving local communities and indigenouspeoples as well as governments are important components of thedevelopment of SIA guidelines.

A workshop convened by the Forum and IUCN is planned as a first stepto develop this process, and this will take place at IUCN HQ in March2000. Its main goal is to provide an opportunity for oil companies,governments and the NGO sector to share case studies of social andenvironmental impact assessment, and to identify elements of good andbad practice. Outputs of the workshop will be used in the preparation ofthe guidelines.

To be co-sponsored by IPIECA, the workshop will take the form of a two-day facilitated dialogue revolving around two key themes: consultation(stakeholders, participation etc); and community rights and benefit andcost sharing.

For further details, contact Cristina Espinosa, Social Policy Group; email:cme@hq.iucn.org; or Frank Vorhies, Economics Service Unit; email:fwv@hq.iucn.org.

IUCN in strategic partnership with World BankIUCN and the World Bank signed a memorandum of understandingcreating a new strategic collaboration in June this year. The twoorganisations will collaborate in providing “balanced environmentalstakeholder consultation forums, and mediation on emergingenvironmental issues” in the field, as well as on a national, regional orglobal basis, the agreement says. There will be a focus on building andstrengthening national environmental institutions, especially in the areasof environmental law and policy, and a staff exchange programme topromote the sharing of knowledge and expertise.

The two organisations decided to enter into a formal partnership afterexploring the possibilities for co-operation during a four-year pilotproject. One of the key elements of the collaboration in the past fouryears has been the establishment of the World Commission on Dams,and mobilising $7.5 million for its work. The Commission will report backto the international community in 2001 with recommendations on when,where, whether and how to build large dams.

Another collaborative effort has been the enlargement of the IUCN asfacilitator of stakeholder consultations for the Bank’s Forest PolicyStrategy development – a multi-year, multi-million dollar programme,designed to review forest sector issues and the Bank’s role in helping toreverse global trends of forest loss and degradation. The Forest PolicyStrategy group is also due to complete its work in mid-2000.

At the global level IUCN and the World Bank are working together onthe role of transboundary parks and protected areas in sustaining andbuilding peace, and planning for the 2002 World Parks Congressorganised by IUCN WCPA in South Africa. The joint publication of afour-volume report on a Global Representative System of MarineProtected Areas has led to the World Bank and IUCN’s setting upmarine protected areas in Samoa and Vietnam, with another underpreparation in Tanzania. These are intended to foster bettermanagement of marine resources and limit the impacts of unsustainable

Meso-American members meet in GuatemalaMeso-American members of IUCN gathered in Guatemala in earlyOctober for the Regional Members’ Forum. Pascal Girot, CEESPrepresentative for the Region, submitted the report on the last RegionalPolicy Network meeting held in San José in July, and on the basis ofthis, three key areas of work were identified:

• The monitoring of international conventions (Biodiversity, ClimateChange, CITES, Ramsar etc);

• Trade and Environment; and• Security and Environment

A further regional steering committee meeting is planned before the endof the year to establish a comprehensive workplan for 2000.

The Regional Policy Network meeting held in July, enabled participantsto take stock of what is being done in the Region in terms of policy. Onenoteworthy initiative is the ARCA, currently led by CEDARENA, anenvironmental law organisation based in Costa Rica. ARCA is analliance comprising fifteen environmental NGOs, mostly associated withthe Pro Natura groups and with close ties with the Nature Conservancy.Most are members of IUCN from Central and South America. The mainobjective of this alliance is to define common policy goals and workthrough different topics relating to national and global policy fora with aparticular interest in practical aspects of collaborative management andprotected areas and forests in the Region. It is hoped that CEESP willbe involved in running a series of workshops and meetings oncollaborative management in the Region in 2000.

‘Mini’ Ring Meeting, Boston, November 1999The Regional and International Networking Group (RING) tookadvantage of another international coming-together at Boston in earlyNovember (the scoping workshop for the proposed Consultative Groupon Sustainable Livelihoods, CGSL) to hold a ‘mini’ Ring planning andstrategy meeting prior to the CGSL. In attendance was Tariq Banuri(CEESP), Ashok Khosla (DevAlt), George Varughese (DevAlt), VivDavies (Ring Coordinator, IIED), Atiq Rahman (BCAS), Saleemul Huq(Ring Research Driver)), Adil Najam (Ring Research Driver), TomMathews (DevAlt) and Youba Sokona (ENDA).

The meeting provided an opportunity for the Ring members to: discussdevelopments and progress since the introduction of the the two newRing research ‘drivers’; finalise plans for the two upcoming Ring regionalresearch meetings, scheduled for early 2000 in W. Africa and India;discuss the strategy and criteria for enlarging the Ring network;formalise plans for the next major phase of Ring activity; and discuss themodalities and agenda for the 4th International Ring Meeting scheduledfor March 2000, in New Delhi.

All in attendance considered the meeting to be highly productive. A fullreport is currently being circulated amongst Ring members, and PolicyMatters hopes to include a more detailed account from the meeting andan outline of future Ring plans in the next issue.

Apologies!Apologies to Chris Morry and Debbie Gray whose role in the Workshopon Freshwater Ecosystem Management and Social Security, reported inthe last issue of Policy Matters, was not acknowledged. Chris’ work inmanaging the vision project, and the contributions of both he and Debbieto the drafting of the final report were greatly appreciated. Sorry not tohave said so before!

NETWORK NEWSCEESP Working Groups

Trade and EnvironmentA Central American conference on trade and environment was held in ElSalvador from 7 to 10 July, sponsored jointly by IUCN (CEESP and theMeso America Regional Office), IISD, and SICA (the Central AmericanIntegration Secretariat). It gathered over 50 participants from throughoutthe sub-region. The programme aimed to identify the Region’senvironmental interests in the trade context, and more particularly toexamine how these interests might be better articulated and defended inthe international trade arena. It built on research on two issues: that ofshaded and organic coffee, and that of environmental services. The firstillustrates the issue of how the trade rules make it difficult for theconsumer to express preference for environmentally-friendly goods. Thesecond illustrates the potential for new markets for environmentalservices - eg. the fixation of atmospheric carbon under the provisions ofthe Kyoto Protocol. The meeting adopted a comprehensive action plan,and established a Trade Working Group under CEESP’s Regional PolicyNetwork for Central America.

Task force on environment and securityIUCN has recently agreed to the constitution of a Task Force onEnvironment and Security. Subject to final confirmation, this Task Forcewill be chaired by Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Representative of theSecretary General of the UN for Africa. It will design and oversee theproduction of eight case studies illustrating the link between naturalresource degradation and conflict. These cases will form the basis for aworkshop to be held during the IUCN World Conservation Congress inAmman, Jordan, in October 2000, and will provide the material for abook, to be published shortly thereafter.

Coastal Zone ConservationA set of policy tools for the long-term protection of the MediterraneanCoastal Zone were agreed at a recent workshop held in Spain. Therecommendations were based on the conclusions of a number ofmeetings held over the past five years, which endorsed the need for landacquisition for conservation.

The resolution calls on States to inter alia facilitate land acquisition andmanagement for conservation to complement other protection tools, andto support the creation of organisations dedicated to this objective.Donors are called upon to incorporate the socio-economic benefits ofcoastal land acquisition and management for conservation in theirsustainable development strategies, and to ensure that funding isstreamlined through simplified procedures in order to promote a rapidresponse essential in the context of the property market; to supportintervention based on an agreed programme of objectives, rather thanon a case-by-case basis; and to provide for the possibility of othercontributions in addition to the targeted funding provided by publicauthorities at State level.

For further information and/or a copy of the policy tools, contactChristophe Lefebvre, Chair Coastal Zone Conservation Working Group;email: eurosite@netinfo.fr

Global development network conference:Bridging knowledge and policyBonn, Germany, 5-8 December 1999

The goal of the Global Development Network is to support andlink research and policy institutes involved in the field ofdevelopment, and whose work is predicated on the notion thatideas matter.

See www.gdnet.org/bonn99/index.htm for details.

IUCN council meetingGland, Switzerland, 7-9 February 2000

Transdisciplinarity: joint problem-solving among science, technology and societyZurich, Switzerland, 27 February – 1 March 2000

An international conference intended to discuss and developtransdisciplinary practice and research. Also aims to createfavourable institutional structures and powerful incentives.

Contact: Transdisciplinarity Conference Secretariat, SwissPriority Programme Environment, Langgasstrasse 23, CH-3012 Berne, Switzerland. Fax: +41 31 3025520; email:transdisciplinarity@snf.ch;www.digitalwork.ch/transdisciplinarity/head.html.

The second global knowledge conference:building knowledge societiesKuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 7-10 March 2000

The conference will focus on the themes of Access,Empowerment and Governance. The Global KnowledgePartnership is an informal partnership including the WorldBank, UNDP and a number of public, private and not-for-profitorganisations.

See www.globalknowledge.org for details

The South and South-East Asia regionalconservation forum 2000Vigyan Bhawan, New Delhi, India, 14-17 March 2000

During the four day meeting country presentations will bemade by IUCN members on progress in conservation,including case studies and lessons learned since the last RCFin Kota Kinabalu. A workshop will be held on day 3 to discussthe Regional Programme Framework and will be followed upby Commission presentations.

Contact: Dr. Zakir Hussain; email: hussain@ait.ac.th

Cultures and biodiversity congressKunming, China, June 2000

The costs of globalisation are very high. Especially alarmingare the limitations external agents place on the problem-solving potential of local knowledge systems, and the resultingconflicts experienced by indigenous peoples who have little orno political space to articulate how they would like life tocontinue in succeeding generations.

This ten-day congress will examine ways in which differentindigenous cultures protect their environments. Aimed atproviding a supportive space for dialogue, the congress willgather members of local communities, natural and socialscientists and environment and development NGOs.

Contact address: Xu Jianchu, Centre for Biodiversity andIndigenous Knowledge, Kunming, Yunnan, China; email:cbik@public.km.yn.cn

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