MOLDOVA’S FOREIGN POLICY STATEWATCHInstitute for Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul”

Issue 23, MAY 2011

NEXT TOPIC TO BE COVERED:The stagnation of economic transformation in MoldovaT

wo years ago any political discussion in Mol-dova or between the Moldova’s Western part-ners could be summarized to one question: Moldova quo vadis? Moldova was really at the crossroads. But nowadays it is perceived as the main success story within the Eastern Partnership. Indeed, Moldova has had remar-

kable achievements in the foreign policy since the AIE (Alliance for European Integration) came to power. Ho-wever, Moldova is not yet a success story but has the potential to become one. The greatest challenge facing Chisinau in terms of its leader status within the Eastern Partnership and of the EU trust is to meet the EU ex-pectations by concrete reforms. What the Republic of Moldova has to offer so far look more like beginnings of reforms than durable and consolidated reforms. But when the gap between the foreign policy successes and the modest progresses in the internal changes be-comes too large, Moldova’s image as a success story can burst like a soap bubble. This risk is not inevitable but it still exists. Both Ukraine and Georgia have pas-sed through this experience of bubble bursts.

LEONID LITRA

Moldova’s Foreign Policy Sta-tewatch represents a series of brief analyses, written by local and foreign experts, dedicated to the most topical subjects related to the foreign policy of Moldova, major developments in the Black Sea Region, coope-ration with international orga-nizations and peace building activities in the region. It aims to create a common platform for discussion and to bring to-gether experts, commentators, officials and diplomats who are concerned with the perspecti-ves of European Integration of Moldova. It is also pertaining to offer to Moldova’s diplomats and analysts a valuable tribune for debating the most interes-ting and controversial points of view that could help Moldova to find its path to EU.

HOW TO AVOID THE EU FATIGUE TOWARDS MOLDOVA?1

1 This policy brief is based on an article that was published by Leonid Litra in the Early Warning Report of IDIS Viitorul.

2 Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch

Str. Iacob Hîncu 10/1, Chişinău MD-2005 Republic of Moldova 373 / 22 221844 phone 373 / 22 245714 fax office@viitorul.org www.viitorul.org

Regional contextThe greatest challenge Chisinau1 is facing in terms of its leader status within the Eastern

Partnership and of the EU trust is to meet the EU expectations by concrete reforms and I refer here to the justice reform, law-enforcement bodies and the institutional capacity. The launching of the Eastern Partnership has offered a new dynamic to the region in the EU Eastern neighborhood. In the framework of this regional initiative, the Republic of Moldova has managed to successfully integrate, despite a not very friendly start expressed by the former president V. Voronin who concluded that the Eastern Partnership is the second CIS aiming at encircling Russia. 2 After the AIE came to power, the EU – the Republic of Moldova relationship normalized and exceeded the traditional framework. Moldova, after it had started approaching the EU, began being spoken about in other terms. If before the conferences and research headlines regarding Moldova were “Quo Vadis Moldova?” or “Moldova at the crossroads”, etc, now they have a positive tone and are rendered in a way proving the beginning of a success: “Moldova’s Breakthrough” or “Moldova – major European success in the EP?” 3.

There are other processes taking place in the EU. On the background of an economic and financial crisis, the EU wants fewer commitments to the “third world” countries. At the same time, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements made the EU more cautious and added to the existing problems, in the context of the discrepancy between the “old Europe” and the “new Europe”. All these make Europe slower and more closed and as a proof we can bring the statements of some important European leaders concerning the multiculturalism failure4 but mainly it refers to the migration from the southern neighborhood, however it includes the Eastern part as well. The term “enlargement fatigue” is as old as the EU itself dating at about the 1960’s when France used its veto to block Great Britain’s access to the European Community5. The term was used during history, being massively mentioned after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements6. Recently the same term is adjusted in order to refer to the neighboring countries that are not officially in the process of joining the EU but are in some sectors integrating in the EU.1

2 Voronin: Eastern Partnership is encircling Russia like a ring, 27/02/2009, Moldova.org, http://politicom.moldova.org/news/voronin-eastern-partnership-is-encircling-russia-like-a-ring-186084-eng.html 3 An example may be the study of Parmentier, Florent: Moldova, a Major European success for the Eastern Partnership? European Issue No 186, 22/11/2010, Robert Schumann Foundation, http://www.robert-schuman.eu/doc/questions_europe/qe-186-en.pdf 4 The last half a year, several leaders declared that multiculturalism is a failure because it did not manage to successfully integrate the im-migrants. Among them we can find: Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, David Cameron, John Howard and Hose Maria Aznar. See Nicolas Sarkozy declares multiculturalism had failed, The Telegraph, 11/02/2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8317497/Nicolas-Sarkozy-declares-multiculturalism-had-failed.html 5 Beyond Enlargement Fatigue?, European Stability Initiative Series, http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=74 6 Forgue, David G.; Kehoskie, Nicole Schude: Enlargement Fatigue in the European Union, American Bar Association, http://www.barnesrich-ardson.com/files/tbl_s47Details%5CFileUpload265%5C126%5Cforgue_fatigue.pdf

In this context, the Republic of Moldova has to make considerable ef-forts in order to avoid a possible EU disappointment that could lead to fatigue. Ukraine and Georgia, as a result of revolutions, have passed through this cycle of “success story”, failure and disappointment. What is important for Moldova is to avoid the Ukrainian scenario that could become possible because of two factors: constant political chaos and lack of reforms. If Moldova does not manage to boost and accelerate the reforms process by offering some concrete results there is a sig-nificant likelihood that in 2012 Moldova will encounter the EU fatigue which, in turn, will cause a disinterest and will place Chisinau next to the former success stories: Georgia and Ukraine.

3Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch

Str. Iacob Hîncu 10/1, Chişinău MD-2005 Republic of Moldova 373 / 22 221844 phone 373 / 22 245714 fax office@viitorul.org www.viitorul.org

In the above-mentioned conditions it is hard to impress the EU in order to offer more than it is prescribed in the most optimistic documents regarding the Republic of Moldova as well. Nevertheless, the Republic of Moldova has managed to generate great expectations in the EU and also a leader sentiment among the Eastern Partnership countries. These expectations and successes were created when the Alliance for the European Integration came to power thanks to the change in the situation, especially, in the area of human rights and mass media freedom and also owing to regional dynamic of the EP which proves an obvious worsening of democratic standards.

In the above-described context, the greatest challenge facing Chisinau in terms of its leader status within the Eastern Partnership and of the EU trust is to meet the EU expectations by concrete reforms. What the Republic of Moldova has to offer so far look more like beginnings of reforms than reforms where it might state with certitude that it is in agreement with the EU requirements. In this context, the Republic of Moldova has to make considerable efforts in order to avoid a likely EU disappointment which could lead to fatigue.

Ukraine 2005-2010: from success story to failure

In the case of the Republic of Moldova the most relevant pattern to mold a scenario is certainly Ukraine. In spite of different geographical parameters and a more conspicuous polarization, Ukraine was the indisputable leader of the European Neighborhood Policy after the 2004 Revolution. The political forces that had come to power in Ukraine in 2004 constantly fluctuated politically without being able to offer tangible results except for those related to press freedom and human rights. Those 5 years of democratic governance in Ukraine were 5 years of political struggles of a maximum intensity as well. The content of the political struggle was expressed by a blocked Parliament, relationships between forces within the Alliance where the commitments were not complied with, by a justice reform that was officially supported by the Alliance but was not actually being implemented in practice. Moreover, the conflict became so exacerbated that it embraced the institutions as well – the government bills were not accepted by the Parliament. Finally, the EU – Ukraine relationships spoiled and a fatigue towards Ukraine took shape in the EU and meanwhile, the fatigue towards the EU appeared in Ukraine on the background of a pronounced Euro-skepticism7.

At the base of all problems that emerged in the Ukrainian political life was, first of all, a lack of consensus among the Alliance forces, and also, in a broader meaning, a lack of consensus within society regarding the reforms that had to be carried out, especially those related to the foreign policy. Just like in the case of Moldova, the disagreements focused on the most fundamental issues such as constitutional reform, which implied reducing the presidential powers whose Commission was severely criticized for being biased. At the same time, the struggle between the components of the Alliance that transferred to a struggle between institutions was very obvious. The best example would be the “decrees war” in which the second government of Iulia Timoshenko (2007-2009) received 881 directives, instructions and requirements from the Presidency and its secretariat during the first 100 days in office, while the government of Victor Yanukovych received 231 during the same period8.

Undoubtedly, there was an enormous geopolitical stake, much bigger than that in the Republic of Moldova. The geopolitical stake did not consist only in keeping Ukraine within the Russia’s zone of influence but also in neutralizing the risk of an orange revolution that could have been fomented in Russia following the Ukrainian model. As for the Republic of Moldova, the geopolitical stake is perceived on the background of the fact that Chisinau is at the moment the only beginning of the EU success story in the eastern neighborhood.7 Popescu, Nicu: (2009), “Ukraine fatigue” vs “EU fatigue”, Euobserver Blogs, 3/12/2009, http://blogs.euobserver.com/popescu/2009/12/03/ukraine-fatigue-vs-eu-fatigue/ 8 For a full description of power struggles in Ukraine see Gromadzki, Grzegorz; Movchan, Veronika et al., Beyond Colours: Assests and Li-abilities of “Post-Orange” Ukraine, International Renaissance Foundation, Kyiv 2010, Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw 2010.

4 Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch

Str. Iacob Hîncu 10/1, Chişinău MD-2005 Republic of Moldova 373 / 22 221844 phone 373 / 22 245714 fax office@viitorul.org www.viitorul.org

Moldova’s “Ukrainization” danger and international conjuncture  

In the Republic of Moldova is observed, a smaller size “Ukrainization” of politics. The context in which this term is used derives mainly from the political crisis triggered by the non-election of the head of the state but also from the numerous elections taking place. Since the 5th of April 2009 till present there have been 4 elections and the 5th is going to take place at the beginning of the summer of 2011, thus, during 2 years Moldova had 5 elections and could also have a referendum and anticipated elections. Despite a rather functional government, in the context of electoral campaigns and political struggles, some adopted decisions have a populist character and the ministries officials prefer to be less loyal because of the likelihood of power change, as an example we can bring the resistance in reforming the Ministry of Interior and the judiciary.

Like in the case of Ukraine, the biggest problem in the Republic of Moldova seems to be the lack of a consensus concerning the developing pattern that has to be adopted. In a larger context, there is a struggle between the Alliance and the Communist party, the internal conflict within the Alliance and the society polarization in terms of the geopolitical vector of Moldova, while the biggest risk are the interminable elections and, even if they are considered being democratic, they will not bring palpable changes in real terms for the population. Besides these aspects is observed a struggle between the state institutions as well which sometimes have divided opinions about crucial issues; these aspects being replicated from the party level to the level of the institutions led by the heads of these parties.

At the international level the situation is not better either. The protests wave hitting Egypt, Tunis, Oman, Syria, Jordan, Algeria, Libya, Bahrain, Nepal and Iran shifts the EU attention towards these regions. Moreover, the EU sees in this wave of protests an opportunity to be seized in order to take some action in these countries. The European Parliament already examined the review of the European Neighborhood Policy southern dimension9 and the crucial fact is that some important countries, including France and Spain, are already pleading for reducing the funds granted to the former Soviet countries and their redirection to the countries in the North Africa10. It is worthwhile mentioning that in this letter the Republic of Moldova was explicitly given as an example by stating that in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (2007-2013) Chisinau receives 25 EUR per capita while Egypt 1,8 EUR per capita which represents a disproportionate and asymmetric policy that nowadays is “difficult to justify and sustain.”

PR vs. ResultsThe above-mentioned internal and external nuances create the necessary conditions for a possible

EU fatigue towards the Republic of Moldova that will appear next year if Chisinau will not be able to offer concrete results in order to meet The EU expectations. The EU has very big expectations towards Moldova especially on the background of the democracy decline in other Eastern Partnership countries and of the ascension in the south of the EU and in the Middle East11. The need for a leader state within the Eastern Partnership is not needed only in order to create a competition between the countries in the EU eastern neighborhood but also because of the justification of the European initiatives success in this direction.

The avoidance of the EU fatigue is closely connected to Moldova’s capacity to offer palpable results in the domain of key reforms something more than just assurance that everything is going to be all right. For instance, the Ministry of Interior reform is an issue that not only the EU is tired of but the Moldovan society as well. Although there is an understanding of the fact that carrying out reforms is not that easy and there are variables to be considered, however, states like Georgia, and we do not refer now to the consolidation of authoritarianism, managed to reform the Ministry of Interior in a relatively short time with results appreciated by the EU partners. The same thing refers to

9 European Parliament resolution on the review of the European Neighborhood Policy – Southern Dimension, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afet/re/840/840978/840978en.pdf 10 Rettman, Andrew; France and Spain call to shift EU funds from east to south, 21/02/2011, http://euobserver.com/9/31843 11 Popescu, Nicu (2011): Of Eastern and Southern neighbors, EUobserver, 14/02/2011, http://blogs.euobserver.com/popescu/2011/02/14/on-eastern-southern-neighbours/

5Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch

Str. Iacob Hîncu 10/1, Chişinău MD-2005 Republic of Moldova 373 / 22 221844 phone 373 / 22 245714 fax office@viitorul.org www.viitorul.org

This publication was produced by IDIS “Viitorul” with the financial support of Soros Foundation Moldova and the National Endowment for Democracy. The opinions expressed in this publicati-on ref lect the author’s/authors’ position and don’t necessary represent the views of the donors.

Str. Iacob Hîncu 10/1, Chişinău MD-2005 Republic of Moldova 373 / 22 221844 phone 373 / 22 245714 faxoffice@viitorul.org www.viitorul.org

the antidiscrimination law that strolls through different institutions but is not passed, fearing that this would decrease the popularity of that who would promote it. It is necessary to emphasize that this is one of the conditions for the visa regime liberalization, that is why a consensus among the stakeholders has to be reached.

These aspects refer to the internal capacity of Moldova to successfully manage the process of adjustment to the EU standards. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will no longer be able to “sell” successes if they do not really occur. Moreover, the part related to the foreign affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration has reached, roughly speaking, its maximal working capacity and this has to be appreciated. But as for the European integration part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, it had poorer results. The interaction between these two dimensions is going on in a disproportioned manner, taking into account the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs marketing is a good one and makes the European partners ready to buy Moldova’s “product” but, because of much more poorer results in terms of internal changes, the product that has already been successfully promoted is not ready to be sold. In this context, the initiative of some experts to establish a Minister or an Agency for European Integration might be a good opportunity to arrange the matters the way to have a higher efficiency in coordinating the European Integration process.

Conclusions What we need now are examples of leader institutions that would maintain the EU interest in Moldova alive. There are several institutions that have “started” like the National Center for Protection of Personal Data that could be served to lure the EU. Meanwhile, these institutions are capable of offering only some more months of the EU attention and fascination. Currently, the European route of Moldova has to be strengthened by the revival of some other institutions whose lack was felt during all these years. An example could be the Agency for Competition Protection that might improve the competition climate or the Court of Accounts whose investigations have to be treated much more seriously than till now or the terms for preventive detention. These examples are connected with a very problematic phenomenon for Moldova – corruption and, in a more precise sense, with the visa liberalization process. The intensity of offering new results must comprise periods of 3-4 months which will make the EU “muse” permanently upon reform results coming from Moldova. The greatest EU expectations are related to the justice reform that has not found so far a place in the praises arriving from Brussels. Management of the expectations from EU would be also an important dimension that has to be taken into account. Promising rewards (like visa-free) on behalf on the Moldovan government in a very short-time to the population and not achieving because of failure to deliver reforms might lead to the situation of mutual disappointment. Eventually, if the results are late, the EU fatigue towards Moldova and its disgrace are inevitable. Chisinau has, at present, a chance that it will not have for a long time. And the concrete results cannot be achieved if the political clashes within the Alliance will last because this party rivalry will lead to the Alliance for European Integration collapse and in such a case it does not matter who was right. The successes in terms of pluralism of opinions and democracy in Moldova are aspects that permitted to revive the dialog with the EU but they will not prove enough to maintain Brussels enthusiasm because in the end in order to ensure the freedom of expression all you need is not to impede this right and even if you guarantee the exercising of this right it does not make you a reformer.